THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE

1951

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Dr. Philip E. Mosely, Director, the Russian Institute, Columbia University, was born at Westfield, Massachusetts, on 21 September 1905. He received his Bachelor of Arts degree from Harvard College in 1926 and a Ph.D. degree from Harvard University in 1933. In 1926 to 1928 he studied at Cambridge University in England, and in Paris. In 1930 to 1932 he carried on historical research in Moscow, under a fellowship from Harvard University. In 1935 to 1936 and again in the summer of 1938 he conducted research on peasant life in the Balkan countries, under a fellowship of the Social Science Research Council. He was an instructor in history at Princeton University, 1929 to 1930, and at Union College in 1933 to 1935. Before the war he was assistant, later associate professor of History at Cornell University. During the war he served as chief of the Division of Territorial Studies in the Department of State, was a member of the U. S. Delegation to the Moscow Conference in 1943 and the Potsdam Conference in 1945, served as deputy U. S. Representative on the U. S. Delegation to the European Advisory Commission in London in 1944 to 1945 and was a political adviser on the U. S. Delegation to the Council of Foreign Ministers in 1945 to 1946. Since 1946 Dr. Mosely has been Professor of International Relations at the Russian Institute of Columbia University and is now Director of the Institute.

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DR. REICHLEY: In this particular series on the Soviet Union to date we have learned of the historical origins, the geographical background, and the development of the Soviet economy. To arrive at a fuller understanding of Russia, we have asked our speaker today to discuss the Russian people, their languages, and any pertinent factors tending either to unity or disunity within the nation. From his biography you have learned that he is particularly well-qualified to speak on this subject. Consequently, it will suffice for me to say that it is a pleasure to introduce the Director of the Russian Institute of Columbia University, Dr. Philip E. Mosely. Dr. Mosely.

DR. MOSELY: I thank you, General Holman and Dr. Reichley, for your very fine welcome. Members of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces and guests: I have been given a very big assignment and I am going to be rather dogmatic in order to cover it. I am sure the more dogmatic I am, the better discussion we will have afterwards, so there is some compensation in being dogmatic.

I want to say a few words about the Russian people and some of their characteristics as they have shown them in the past and present and then go on to discuss some of the factors that make for unity of purpose and action between the regime and the people; also some of the factors that make for disunity and which, under certain conditions, may, play an important part in determining the strength of the regime in asserting its will in the world.

One thing we have to remember about the Russian people is that their general outlook on life was formed a long time ago. It was formed at the time when America was just being discovered and settled. Many of the things about Russia which seem to us very strange today have, therefore, been very familiar to Russians in the past.

One further factor I want to mention right away is that the Europeanization of Russia, in the sense of building up a social and cultural background closer to that of the central and western European peoples, began late and was interrupted early and therefore was incomplete. In the nineteenth century, particularly from the time when serfdom was abolished in 1861, Russia began to develop in the direction of a European type of society, began to overcome the caste system by which occupations were determined by birth and to develop a wider range of freedom of movement between different castes, so that peasants could rise more easily into both the business class and the official class.

But this period was interrupted by the Soviet revolution of 1917, and by 1933--I think if we want to choose a year--we can say that a new caste system, contrasting with the freer, western type of society, had again crystallized in Russia. Some of the features of that period of Europeanization (1861-1917) were greater freedom of thought and greater freedom of criticism, an attempt to build a society more like that of western Europe. To a large extent the Soviet revolution discarded the previous Europeanized upper class, which had taken form at the time between Peter the Great and 1917. What was left was a great mass of people who had previously been very little touched by European concepts and who were now given a kind of leadership which increasingly, after the adoption of the First Five-Year Plan and the imposition of collectivization, tried to isolate the people from western influences.

Now what was this old Moscovite attitude which survived among the mass of the people, particularly the peasants, throughout the period of Europeanization of the upper class and which has continued to the present moment as a substratum of the psychological outlook among the mass of the people down to the present time? One factor is the tendency to look at life as a whole, to believe that every aspect of life must be in harmony with a single centralized purpose. In old Moscovy, this central concept was autocracy, the strengthening of the Orthodox Church and of the state, and the two were considered one. A new orthodoxy is insisted upon today by the regime and, while the people may or may not like individual aspects of it, they do not deny the right of the regime to insist on orthodoxy and conformity to it even in matters of great detail.

This takes forms which are sometimes a little ridiculous to us. For example, when Peter the Great wanted to emphasize the reform of Russia or at least its upper class, the class which directly supported the regime and was the instrument of its rule, he himself took a pair of scissors and began cutting off the beards of the old nobles of the Moscovite type. He also cut off the long sleeves of the nobles' gowns in order to make them adopt a western type of dress and the western habit of shaving. That may seem a ridiculous thing, but people in Peter's day were either fanatically in favor of his attitude on beards or they were fanatically opposed to it. Some of them were so opposed to it that they allowed themselves to be sent to prison rather than accept the change. That would seem ridiculous to us because we assume, on the whole, that people conform to customs because they want to and because they feel that it is in harmony with the people around them, rather than accepting the idea that the government should impose a definite standard.

This same type of emphasis upon even external details can be illustrated also in the Soviet period. For example, in the period when the proletarian nature of the regime was emphasized, roughly down to 1935, government officials refrained from shaving for several days at a time or shaved only once a week because it was considered more in harmony with the proletarian regime to come to the office unshaven, and, of course, without a necktie. When I first arrived in Russia in 1930, I found that it was a little inconvenient to wear a felt hat because the felt hat was regarded as a sign of a foreigner. It meant also that I would be followed more easily by the police because of wearing a hat. They also thought you were trying to cultivate "bourgeois" ways by wearing a hat. So after a few weeks I bought myself a Russian cap and only put on my old felt hat again the day I left Russia.

After 1935 this type of external conformity was reversed suddenly. A decree was issued that an official would be punished if he came to the office unshaven. The fact that it is still very difficult to get razorblades in Russia is not taken into account when enforcing that decree. Since then, the necktie--which had been regarded as a sign of "bourgeois" sympathies and hence of potential disaffection from the regime--suddenly was required of all officials. At the present time in Moscow if an official comes from the outlying regions and does not have a necktie--which is still an article of luxury in Russia--the secretary has neckties in the lower drawer of her desk which she lends to visiting officials without neckties so they will be able to go in and have their interviews with the higher officials.

I mention this detail because it is one of the minor external signs of this strong acceptance of, conformity with, attachment to symbols and of the insistence upon all acting together. The people are conditioned by the history of the past to accept the notion that a strong regime has the right and the duty to demand conformity. That does not mean the individual Russians actively approve of each detail. On the contrary, the Russians are the most grumbling people in the world. They have always grumbled a great deal. On the other hand, they have never felt, at least for several centuries, that they could do very much about it, except in the period which prepared the way for the revolutions of 1905 and 1917. So far as grumbling is concerned, the Russians have always had the right to grumble. So the concept of a regime which lays down the only acceptable dogma on linguistics, on the interpretations of each major point of history, which determines what people shall see and read, and, so far as possible, what they shall think, is understandable to Russians, especially since that older, more Europeanized group was largely swept aside or emigrated, and was deprived of its influence within Russia within about 10 or 12 years after the revolution had occurred.

Another factor which has played an important part in the attitude of the Russians is their rather high degree of ignorance of the West. This ignorance was least felt during that "European" period of Russia's history, particularly in the two generations before the revolution in 1917, but it was a factor even then. It leads ultimately or at the same time to an excessively rosy picture of the West or to an excessively black picture of the West. I should say that it seldom hits the mark. Thus Russian escapees or defectors who come across the line today actually assume that in New York there are a few palaces for the very wealthy, that otherwise people are more or less camping out on the bare ground, and that those palaces are the only housing available for the mass of the people. Even in the highest ranks Soviet Russians have great difficulty in understanding the difference between their own system and ours.

The fact that there is no member of the Politburo today who has lived abroad informally and for any length of time and in close communication with a foreign people is a very important factor in the constant misjudgments which they form of the outside world. Their worst misjudgments relate to the psychology of other peoples, and their best judgments probably relate to the actual physical power of other peoples and regimes.

The Soviet leaders regard the actions of people abroad as a whole, just as they try to regard everything they do as deriving from a single plan, a single ultimate center of control and impetus. The idea that a society can be organized like ours, with a very wide range of initiatives, with many forces expressing their views both to the legislature and the executive, and evolving constructive formulations of policy out of a give-and-take of conflicting views and interests, is in comprehensible to them. When an editorial appears in an American paper attacking one of our leaders, the Soviet leaders assume, in my opinion, that this is simply a device, an attempt to pretend that we have freedom of speech, an attempt to prove that there is no single plan, well thought out in advance. The idea that decisions are made from day to day and that we muddle through, with at least as much muddling as our British friends, is simply abhorrent to their way of thinking and to their system, which assumes that no action should be without purpose and without relation to the central purpose, which is to strengthen the regime at home and abroad.

The Soviet leaders believe that there is a Politburo of America. To it they attribute a unity of purpose which, they believe, is concealed by the display apparent divergences, cross-purposes, contradictory actions and hesitations, which we see in the disorderly but effective process of decision-making in a democracy. The Soviet leaders

doubtless say that they are much more honest than we because they admit that they have a Politburo and that it does make all the final decisions, and even many decisions of detail, and that this Politburo is even photographed once in a while--not in its meetings, of course, but on public occasions. Its membership is actually announced from time to time--every once in a while a list of its membership is brought to light. Whereas we are much more subtle, they would say, because our Politburo is operating somewhere where you cannot find it. Its concealment and deception are so complete that you cannot put your finger on it, and that shows we are much cleverer than they.

Another aspect of this ignorance of the West can be illustrated from a little incident which occurred to me when we were negotiating on the treaties of peace with Italy and the satellite countries. Mr. Dunn, now our ambassador to Italy, was our deputy for the treaties and I was his assistant. On one occasion when a rather complicated matter was coming up, Mr. Dunn had a visit from an old friend who stayed until the very time of the meeting. We could not discuss the agenda in the car because it did not have a soundproof window. We came into the meeting; the Soviet draft was put in. On the face of it, it looked pretty good, but there were a few catches in it which would have been rather serious. In his response Mr. Dunn began to accept it, and I felt that it was simply due to the fact that he had not had time to go over it and refresh his memory on it. So I wrote on a little pad, "We can't take this," and put it over in front of him. Without stopping his presentation, he quietly withdrew his acceptance and said that "we would be glad to study this proposal further."

A few minutes later we had intermission for tea. One of the members of the Soviet delegation came along with me, arm in arm, to go to tea. The fact that we could talk Russian freely made them always inclined to seek out informal occasions like that to chat about things. As we went into the next room to get a cup of tea, he said to me, "Now I know who you are. You are the control." In the Soviet delegations, except the very highest ones, there is often a very inconspicuous fellow who sits behind the principal speaker and from time to time passes him slips of paper. He is the "control."

Ignorance about the West sometimes leads to misjudgments as to what propaganda material about the West to show to their own people. For example, about two years ago the Soviet cultural authorities bought a film which had been produced in this country showing bad housing and improved modern housing. Of course, the Russians cut out the second part

of it and used only the first part--the "before" pictures instead of the "after" pictures--in order to show it as "typical" housing instead of presenting it as some of the worst housing that we have in this country. They began to show this film--that is the first part of the film, the "before" section--to their audiences as a short, in order to impress upon them the "oppression" back of this poverty in America. They happened to show pictures of Harlem where, of course, housing is outrageously poor. As they began to display the picture, an audible catching of breaths went through the entire audience. What impressed the audience in Moscow was not the bad housing. They were rather familiar with that kind of housing, which covers almost 90 percent of Moscow. But the thing that impressed them was the clothesline strung across the alleyways with all the clothing hung out. They said, "these must be rich people. Look at all the clothing. Why, they have several shirts!" So the film was not shown elsewhere in the country, according to the report which reached me through an ex-Soviet citizen.

A similar problem arose when Ilya Ehrenburg, a very talented journalist, returned to Russia from a visit to this country in 1947. At a public lecture, to which about 2,000 people turned out, including an American friend of mine, the thing that Ehrenburg wanted to show was how decadent America had become. So he said, "Why they are so decadent and lazy that, even if they want a package of cigarettes, they get in a car to go to the corner to get it. They even go to the movies in a car and sit in a car to watch the movies." The audience listened openmouthed. They had no concrete picture of the number of cars in America at the disposal of the great majority of American families. To say that there are over 30 million cars in a country does not have any direct impact. But when Ehrenburg said that people use their own cars to go to the movies, that was an illustration to the Soviet people of the difference in the standard of living and had a greater effect than Ehrenburg, who had spent the greater part of his adult life in Paris, could foresee.

One of the Russian features which I will mention briefly now is the matter of tolerance and acceptance of hardship. The Russian people have endured very greatly; in every war they have suffered. If it had not been for the great losses of the First World War, the losses of collectivization--which was a kind of civil war conducted by the government against the peasants from 1929 to 1933--and the losses of the Second World War, Russia would presumably have a population of around 275 million people today instead of 200 million, or just over 200 million, which is the best estimate we can make. In other words, the events of the last 40 years have made a difference of 75 million lives, both in births which failed to occur and in actual deaths, and more of those deaths occurred on the civilian front than on the military. The

Russian people have endured that. During the war it is estimated that a million people died of hunger in Leningrad alone and nothing happened. They went through that. At times of crises the Soviet Government has simply said, "There isn't any food for this or that city because it is not an important industrial city; it is only a county seat, an administrative center. Therefore, it will have to make out with what it can find around it. It will not get any food from our central reserves." That has been taken.

Another factor which is important, and which is Russian more than Soviet, is the rather striking absence of national hatreds and resentments or dislikes. The Russians have traditionally shown a great capacity to accept other peoples and to live with them. The Soviet philosophy of the nationality problem is based on an underlying sense of tolerance among the ordinary Russians even more than directly upon the philosophy of the Soviet regime, although it derives from both.

This might seem odd when we consider the anti-Semitism that occurred sporadically under the old regime prior to 1917. In that connection it must be pointed out that this was mainly localized in areas which had been part of Poland at an earlier time and was not felt in Great Russia proper. Furthermore, it was not a racial feeling, but more a cultural and economic and social problem, due to the differences of social occupations and social outlooks of the receptive groups, and the fact that they did have different languages and cultures. If a Jew, a Tartar, a Georgian learned Russian and became Orthodox in religion (the Georgians were orthodox but under their own church), he was fully accepted under the imperial regime as a Russian. It was not a racial matter. It was a religious and cultural matter, and Russians, in the sense of being Orthodox and speaking Russian, were given preference and, as we will see in a minute, are given preference today. But that does not mean that they are truly intolerant of differences or hostile on racial grounds to other peoples.

This is an attractive feature. It has made it easier for the Russians to secure control over other peoples and to integrate them into their system. It has been accompanied by a large-scale change-over to Russian culture and language by other peoples. It has certainly been an element of strength, and it is one which is derived from the pre-Soviet Russian character rather than purely from Soviet ideology.

Another factor which we often tend to overlook, but which strengthens Russian leadership over many neighboring peoples, is that Russian culture, especially of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, developed to very high levels. Some of the most important novels, some of the greatest poets, great drama, music, language, great art, all of these were part of the Russian heritage, together with a rather impressive

development of scientific, engineering and other skills. The Russians have shown a great capacity of absorption and invention and this has made Russian culture the most important culture in that part of Europe and in northern Asia. It means for the peoples of Central Asia and the Caucasus that Russia has been the channel through which they communicated with the most important achievements of the modern world. We must not overlook that element of prestige.

Now I want to turn to factors which make for unity among the Russian people. I have already referred to ignorance of the outside world, which is accompanied by a great distrust of its intentions and by a difficulty of estimating accurately its intentions, of determining whether they are hostile or merely indifferent. This facilitates the policy of the regime of playing upon the fears of the people, of recalling the numerous times in the past when Russia has been invaded and of insisting that only the present regime can defend the country. This is certainly a factor in neutralizing many forms of discontent and it is played upon to the utmost by the government which goes to great extremes to keep out accurate knowledge of the outside world, to cut off contacts between foreigners and Soviet citizens, and thus to keep alive this factor of its control.

In opposition to that feeling, and side by side with it, there is an underlying feeling among many Russians, particularly, those discontented with their regime--and there are many reasons for discontent--that the outside world has none of the blemishes of the Soviet regime, that it is somehow perfect. As a result, quite often when Soviet defectors come abroad, they become disillusioned upon finding out that they have to work even harder in America than in Russia; that there is no easy way, no simple way to advancement; that they have to make a lot of decisions for themselves. The worst complaint of that Soviet aviator (Barsov) who went back to Russia was that he did not know what he was supposed to do and that he had to make so many decisions for himself. He had to decide where to live; he was not assigned to a barracks. He had to decide what to buy in the way of clothing, and he had to work very hard. The only job he could find was dishwashing--which is of very low status in the Soviet regime--whereas he had been an aviator, which put him among the Soviet aristocracy. He could not adjust to the idea that it would take him 10 or 12 years to work up to a corresponding position under the American system, if he succeeded at all.

So there is this combined, this double, focus of distrust which is inculcated in every way by the regime, and this underlying idealization of the outside world as being better than Russia. In my travels in Russian villages and small towns, people often spoke to me about that and said, "Foreigners are better," and "People are kinder abroad," and

things like that which are not capable of statistical proof, of course, but it explains their tendency to transfer their daydreaming to the outside world.

Another factor making for unity is the monopoly of access to information, monopoly on the part of the government. Instead of assuming that the people will gradually form their own opinions, the Soviet regime has always undertaken vigorous campaigns to impose on the people in every field, through every channel, its concept of what was necessary. It makes the pretense of asking for support, through elections and mass meetings, in order to get the symbols of popular support. This is carried out in a very intensive manner to make sure that the entire apparatus of propaganda and agitation is mobilized at any given time to support the government's aims and to put over the ideas that it wants to have accepted and acted upon. This is carried down to individual word-of-mouth efforts in a way which is not actually familiar to us today although it was common enough in the frontier days of cracker-barrel discussions. Of course we did it then entirely as a matter of individual viewpoints and discussions, whereas in the Soviet system it is a matter of centralized direction.

The government has several hundred thousand full-time agitators who are supplied weekly with information material and opinions which they must transmit through word-of-mouth agitation. Similarly, every channel is utilized for putting over the government's ideas and trying to drive out any contrary ideas. People are not able to talk together freely. It is dangerous even to discuss critical ideas with one's wife. In one of the trials in 1937, the prosecutor read to one of the defendants a comment derogatory to the regime, which the latter had made. A laugh went through the audience--which was a hand-picked Communist-Party audience--when the defendent said, "Well, that is something which I could only have said to my wife." That was probably the source through which the secret police had acquired that information which was used to convict the defendant and to sentence him to death.

We must not underestimate the degree to which the government is able to implant positive concepts that it wishes to put over, to occupy minds with these, and keep out and neutralize any collective expression of contrary ideas. It would be a mistake to assume that the regime is weak because it resorts to this system.

We must not underestimate the pride in the strength of the country and in the great expansion of its influence and power as a factor of uniting and neutralizing individual and other discontents. A few weeks ago a defector who came across and was being interviewed, when he got into conversation--after all he had taken the step of high treason which would subject his family to exile and hard labor in Siberia and himself

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to immediate execution if found--suddenly said with a great outburst of scorn, "Well, look what we have achieved. We have got control of China. And look at what you have achieved since the war!" So we must not underestimate this factor of pride which compensates for the many defeats and for the dangers that the regime has undergone in the past.

A factor of importance I have already mentioned is the softening of national differences and the underlying, human sort of tolerance on the part of the Russians as individuals in dealing with people of other backgrounds.

A most important factor in securing a firm control is that a much wider range of careers is now open to talent provided ambitious individuals conform to the regime and its ideological demands. This system of advancement is completely controlled by the regime. In other words there is no way in which a person can become a doctor, a scholor, a school teacher, and so on, without conforming to the regime in all outward respects. That often involves a rather sweeping examination of his point of view, family background, and so on. But the range of openings has been greatly enlarged. It was growing rapidly before the First World War and it was growing to resemble the system of the West, where there are different and divergent channels of advancement and where a modern society needs a very large number of educated and trained people in order to operate.

In industrializing the country, in building up a collectivized system of agriculture, in establishing a very powerful police system, and in maintaining very large armed forces, the Soviet regime has opened a much larger number of careers to a much larger number of people, and those people, individually, do feel a certain loyalty to the regime. So-and-so will say, "Well, before the war my father was just a peasant in the village; he never went anywhere; never knew anything about the outside world. Look at me. I am a doctor," or "I am an official," or "I am an officer in the army," and so on. The cumulative effect of that is an important factor, especially since those who rise in this hierarchy must increasingly discipline themselves to reject all notions incompatible with support of the regime and to maintain conformity with its demands at a given time. In other words, the regime has won, I think, a wide degree of loyalty through this broadening of the careers and in general the destruction of hereditary barriers to advancement in life under the new system.

Old Russia, which was maintained in a rigid form until the abolition of serfdom in 1861, was being rapidly broken down between then and 1917, but people in Russia remember the older system. For example, there is the case, quite ordinary and customary, of the professor (Nikitenko) in Moscow University who was one of the censors under Nicholas I, 100 years ago, in charge of supervising what would be allowed to be printed

and what would not. He had been born into a family of serfs and it took nearly 12 years to buy his mother out of serfdom from the landlord (Prince Skeremetiev) who owned her body. So this memory of an older system of oriental restrictions on advancement was strong. People in the Soviet Union do contrast the present broadening of the careers with that older system, and the regime helps them to overlook the fact that those careers were broadening very, very rapidly in the 60 years from the abolition of serfdom to the establishment of the Soviet regime. The Soviet regime gets the benefit of that because it represents a system under which all advancement depends on loyalty to the regime at least as much as it does upon talent, and the loyalty must be more intensively proven as you advance higher.

Now, in general, aside from the disadvantages suffered by minority groups in some states of our own country, careers are not so widely open in Russia today as they are in the United States. For example, a few weeks ago there was an important discussion in Moscow as to what Russia would be like under communism as compared with the present state of "socialism," which they regard as preparatory to advancing to a communist system. We must remember that Russia is governed by the Communist Party but it considers itself in the stage of "socialism," not of communism which they hope to approach within a few years. The difference between that system and communism, the conference held, is that under "communism" education would be free at the high school level and school supplies and textbooks would be furnished free to all students.

Well, of course, the supplying of free textbooks, pencils, and paper to the students in our public schools has been traditional for 100 years here, and in Russia they have not got to that at the present time. The parent has to buy the books, pencils, paper, and so on for the child even in elementary schools, and schooling is free only in elementary schools. Higher than that they have to pay a fee, which is a substantial burden for families of average income and prohibitive for the poor. Ninety percent of the people have no chance to go to high school in Russia. So that the opportunity for education and other opportunities which derive from it are not so wide open there as they are for the great majority in this country. But the Russians do not compare their conditions with ours. They compare them with what they have heard about the past and what the regime tells them about their present advantages compared to past disadvantages.

Now what are the main factors which make for disunity among the Russians? Here I am going to give a quick resume and we can run through these points in discussion. I believe that there is a continuing conflict between the ideas of the peasants as to the kind of life that they would like to have if they were free and what the government

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demands of them through the collective farm system. I believe that this conflict continues steadily. Adjustments are worked out from time to time. At one time the government will let the peasant have a little more leeway to work on his own garden patch and to keep an extra cow or an extra pig for his own direct benefit. At other times, the government tightens up and demands more of the peasant and gives him less personal initiative. There is a little rebalancing there, with the government always having the upper hand by applying different degrees of rigor in its control. The peasant's desire to retain the fruit of his labor and to buy and sell at prices that he regards as fair to him is a continuing factor and I think that the struggle between the collective farm system and what we can call "peasantism" or the peasant way of life is a continuing factor of underlying weakness to the regime.

Another factor is the continued low standard of living. I have the impression that the standard of living for most of the people is below what it was in 1928, before the beginning of the 5-year plans, that it is better now than it was, far better now than it was during the war and immediately after the war, but that the Soviet regime has not delivered to the people the higher standard of living which, they promised at the beginning, would be the result of the great effort which they asked of the people. This affects both the workers and the peasants.

Another factor is the harsh discipline over the workers. The constant evasion by foremen and engineers of some of the rules which require the exaction of severe penalties for being late to work or for staying away without adequate excuse, and so on, shows that adjustments have to be made in order to get the effort out of the workers. This harsh discipline, which was further tightened in 1940 on the eve of the war and has not been relaxed since the war, is certainly a factor of disunity between the regime and its workers.

The system of repression is certainly a factor which leads to fear rather than love of the regime, and among the people who have defected there is a very high incidence of repression in their families--a father or brother who was simply taken away and was never heard of again. The system of repression lacks discrimination. There is no confidence in its justice. There is no attempt to be just. There is widespread belief that when the police system--which operates very large mining, lumbering, and construction industries of its own, being the largest enterprise in the world--needs carpenters, it goes out and arrests carpenters and puts them into forced labor; when it needs engineers, it arrests engineers. That is the way it is believed by the people to operate. There is no sense of individual justice or expectation of justice. The best you can do is to remain inconspicuous. The higher you go, the greater the danger of disgrace. So that sets up a conflict, too, between desire for advancement and fear of responsibilities.

Another factor is a certain underlying indifference to Communist ideology. I believe that, to a large extent, Communist ideology is simply accepted rather than enthusiastically absorbed and supported. In interviews with former members of the Young Communist League you will find them saying, "Yes, in order to graduate you had to read this pamphlet and be able to answer questions on it." "Okay, I agree." The people who have grown up under the regime do not necessarily, support it enthusiastically, although some do. The "activities" who take the lead in transmitting the ideology of the regime to the masses are advanced more rapidly. But among a very large part of the youth there appears to be a large degree of indifference, of outward acceptance which necessity demands. But the repetitive demands of the regime for inner acceptance of its ideology meets with that great human inertia which is a very important factor in history as well as the dynamism which Soviet leaders regard as the essential central factor of their own regime and its progress.

A factor which also plays some part is the conflict, latent or open, between the Soviet regime and some of the subject nationalities. During the war this conflict took an open form and several of the nationalities--the Crimean Tartars, the Volga Germans, the Kalmyks, the Checken-Ingush--were simply "abolished." Three million people were simply destroyed as national groups. They were scattered as individuals to remote parts. They lost all sign of administrative-cultural autonomy. They disappeared from the face of the map and the names of their towns and villages were changed to Russian names. The reason it was done, according to the Soviet Government, was that they "had failed to resist the temptation to collaborate with the German invaders." Well, if entire peoples shifted over to support the invaders, it showed a deep sense of grievance. Just how this affects other nationalities is hard to say, but certainly the Soviet regime in the last few years has laid great stress on the predominant role of the Russian people. In the May 1945 victory celebrations Stalin raised his glass to "the Russian people who have borne the main burden." This is still compatible with the individual tolerance toward people of other nationalities, but it shows a political discrimination against some nationalities and this must be a very bitter factor from the point of view of the non-Russian nationalities.

The isolation from the outside world is not popular, I would say, among many educated Russians. They accept it, again, because the government demands it, but actually there is a curiosity about the outside world which is left unsatisfied and the efforts to prevent any impact of the ideology of the outside world, as distinguished from its technology, is a very rigorous policy today. It has been openly stressed ever since 1947, although actually it began to be imposed again toward the end of the war.

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What prediction could I make, or would I dare make, about the conduct of the Soviet people in case of war? A great deal would depend on the nature of the war. A war followed by extensive Soviet victories and an early end of the conflict would undoubtedly strengthen the regime and feed the sense of ambition and greatness which has grown among the Russian people. In a long war there would be many strains, many sources of discontent, but it could be assumed that in the field, so long as the army was fighting effectively, one would not expect any large-scale disaffections. In the case of large-scale retreats there might be both individual and group attempts to remain behind and cease the struggle. Especially if the prospects of ultimate victory declined, the tendency to get out of the war would be strong.

A factor which is of some importance in my mind is the question of whether such a war would appear as a long war. In case of a long war, a further factor would be whether it would appear to the Russian people as a defensive or an aggressive war. Even in the defensive war of 1941 it is clear that there was large-scale disaffection, an unwillingness to fight or at least to fight under the circumstances, in the beginning. The Germans changed this by their ruthless policy toward the occupied areas. When I was in Russia in 1943 individual Russians constantly brought that topic up. They said, "We thought the Germans were a cultured people, and look what they are doing." Almost everyone in Russia knew what the Nazis were doing in the occupied areas, and they were deeply resentful of it. In 1941, to an American visitor, Stalin said, "During times of great retreats the people won't fight for socialism. Maybe they will fight for Russia." That proved to be his great ace in the hole. Yet, when the war was over, Stalin claimed the people had fought for the regime and for "socialism" and that victory had proved it was the "best regime" in the world, and so forth. But there is a question whether that view is widely held by the mass of the Soviet people.

A war which began with Soviet troops crossing the Elbe River or advancing to the Persian Gulf and then went into a long war with the indefinite postponement of victory would be understood eventually by the Russian people as an aggressive war, and they might become extremely resentful of it. Their attitude would eventually be very different from that which they showed when fighting a war on their own soil.

A factor which is going to be important for a number of years is that a large amount of hostility and disloyalty was sifted out of Soviet Russia by the German occupation. Many hostile people left the country and presumably the prospects of an exact repetition of that kind of indifference, disloyalty, and cooperation with the invader is much smaller today than in 1941.

Can the Soviet regime be broken down from within? Many people will tell you that the Russian people are our allies. "If we approach them in the right way they will overthrow the regime and there will not be any war." These assertions are extremely misleading and dangerous in my opinion. I think that the grumbling, the discontent, the many forms of resentment, are all present there and the Soviet Government knows all, or nearly all, about them. The government has a very detailed sense of the degree of tolerance of hardships and control on the part of the people. It is able to relax the pressure a little bit or to tighten up a little bit. I would say that the Soviet Government has made many mistakes in judging the degree of tolerance of foreign countries and peoples and has made very few, and no fatal, mistakes in judging the degree of endurance of its own people. This does not mean we should regard the Russian people as an enemy. In certain circumstances they could become a very important factor in weakening their own regime. But we must not expect anything dramatic in the way of their weakening or, even less, overthrowing the present regime.

What would a post-Soviet regime be like? I think it would be based on a considerable degree of voluntary cooperation in agriculture through free corporations, and on a very widespread state ownership of all major instruments of production, and a certain amount of individual initiative in smaller forms of production. But there would be only a gradual loosening up of the principle of centralized control and leadership from above. Any post-Soviet regime would begin by being very authoritarian, but might move toward the creation of greater opportunities for direct participation by the people in decisions and toward freer criticism by the press.

But perhaps over several generations the regime may soften up from within? I feel that if war is avoided for, say, 10 years, the change of generation from those who helped to make the revolution--from the men who were formed in the underground revolutionary struggle and who have a sense that they can demand anything of their people because they themselves ran great risks in the political underground of the revolution--to rule by men who have come to power through working in conformity with the established regime, is bound to have some effect on the motivations of the ruling group. This might lead to a tendency to run fewer risks in dealing with the outside world and to concentrate more on making the system run more efficiently by giving a greater return to their own people from its production. That is a possible line of development. I think we should keep that in mind as a possibility, say, 10 years from now, but we cannot build anything on it now. We must not assume either that a regime like the Soviet regime has always been equally irreconcilable to the West and to us as the strongest power of the West, and that it will always remain equally hostile in every respect. That

possibility of a "softening" of the regime remains open and should be something to watch for over a period of time, but it is not anything on which we can build any immediate political or other plans.

The Russian people then are a factor of great strength to the regime because of its ignorance of the outside world, its tolerance of control and hardship, the type of loyalty, either devoted or grumbling, which it gives to the regime. It is also an element of weakness. The fact is that the Russians do try to withhold a certain part of the individual soul from the demands of the regime, if only because the regime often changes those demands and says one thing is right now and something else is right tomorrow. So the people do retain a certain sense of individual judgment within their own souls. There are elements of disunity within the regime as well as other elements on which the government has relied and can continue to rely in maintaining control over the great area that it controls, together with its great resources, to maximize its power, to increase its role throughout the world, and thus to strive for the maximum extension possible, at any given time, of its power in the world.

QUESTION: Dr. Mosely, would you give us an estimate of the importance of the family in the present-day social structure of the Russians?

DR. MOSELY: The Soviet policy toward the family has gone through a 180 degree evolution. In the period right after the revolution some of the leaders felt that the family should disappear and give way to communal upbringing of children, to communal living. They felt that the family was a self-sufficient institution and that it was the center of striving to live for yourself and your family and to get things for yourself rather than to work for this ideal Communist society which they thought was just beyond the next ridge.

At that time there was complete freedom in family matters. There was freedom of divorce. Either party to a marriage could simply go to the registry office and divorce the other without even discussing it with the wife or husband in advance and without informing them that they were about to be divorced. The correspondents' favorite story was that of a husband and wife sitting at home in the evening. The mailman brings the last mail delivery. There is a post card to the wife saying she is divorced! But of course that is an exaggerated case. But the psychology presented was clear.

There was freedom of abortion because it was felt that women, in order to be free to live as they chose and to devote themselves to their work to building this Communist society, must be free to have children

or not to have them, and in the absence of other well-known means of avoiding births, the only way widely known in eastern Europe was abortion. And it was not frowned upon, particularly, because the Russian folk concept was that the child was not really alive until after the sixth month of pregnancy. Until then it was not really considered to be a human being, and therefore, contrary to the views of the church, which regarded the child as alive from the moment of conception, this popular belief justified abortion in the first months.

Now in 1935, there was an about-turn. The government had become alarmed for one thing at the continued waves of children without family, without training, without family discipline. There were hundreds of little brigands roaming around, and believe me, they were a menace.

On one occasion I came to the home of some Russian friends of mine. The wife was trembling and shaking. I said, "What is the matter?" She said, "Just now, as I was coming home from work, one of the homeless waifs came up to me and said, 'Give me money or I will bite you and I have syphilis.'" And so she gave him some money. This kind of thing was a real menace and the number of waifs was constantly augmented by the breaking up of families, sending families to different parts of the Union for forced labor and the children to other parts, so the regime itself was constantly creating this problem over again.

After having devoted 18 years to trying to break down the authority of parents over children, telling the children they should only obey the leaders of the regime or of the Young Communist League, the government turned around and insisted that the parents should be responsible for any misdeeds of the children, so that the parents could be fined or sent to prison for things which a son or daughter did which were destructive or contrary to law.

At the present time there is a system by which each divorce costs more than the preceding one. This is obviously class legislation because the wealthy or better paid elements of society can afford a second and third divorce, whereas the 90 percent of the people cannot. And so a new act was passed after the war which further tended to strengthen the family. This was the adoption of the rule that in the case of an illegitimate birth the mother is not allowed to sue the alleged father for support. This is similar to the old and now discarded Napoleonic code provision which was designed to impose a social handicap on the mother of illegitimate children while not allowing the mother to sue the father who might be already married to another woman and thus disrupt their marriage. At the same time the regime does give some small assistance to the mother of the illegitimate child if her

income from her work is below a certain amount. It is an attempt to strengthen the parents of the legitimate family and to warn women that they carry a special burden if they are so injudicious as to go ahead and have an illegitimate child. Formerly the mother could sue for support, not only the one alleged father, but several, and there were actually cases in the twenties and early thirties when a woman, by alleging she did not know which of three men was the father of her child, collected alimony from each of them.

COLONEL HICKEY: I am very sorry, our time is up, but Dr. Mosely will be with us in the seminar this afternoon to continue this discussion. Dr. Mosely, I thank you very much for a very stimulating lecture.

(16 July 1951--650)S.