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POWER AND POLITICS

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GENERAL HOLMAN: Gentlemen there are few in this audience today who have not known Mr. Hanson W. Baldwin, our guest speaker, for many years, not personally perhaps but through his close contact with the military scene over a long period of time. There are few who have not read such books as the "Price of Power" and the more recent little volume "Power and Politics," who do not feel when they read them a deep sense of gratitude to Mr. Baldwin for his energy and his persistent effort in keeping the problems of national security before the public. It is always a pleasure to meet Mr. Baldwin, whether we meet him in print in the "Sun-Times," or on television, or in person as we have the privilege of doing today. Mr. Baldwin, we feel very honored to have you talk to the two colleges today and it is a pleasure to welcome you to this platform.

MR. BALDWIN: General Holman, General Vanaman, General Bull, and may I say, friends: My subject today "Power and Politics" is obviously of such enormous dimensions that I think in a 40-minute lecture all I can do is be suggestive. I don't think I need to suggest the importance of the interrelationship of power and politics to an audience such as this. The MacArthur hearings themselves provide sufficient evidence of the emphasis which should be placed on it.

The late James V. Forrestal, who was one of the greatest public servants this country ever had, used to say to those who complained at the intrusion of political considerations into military matters: "There is no power without politics and no politics without power."

This, upon reflection, is an obvious statement, yet it is a truism of which we often lose sight. Today more than in any prior era it is essential to understand the relationships between national power and international politics. Power and politics and an understanding of their interrelationship are more important today than ever before in the history of nations. There are five principal reasons for this importance. Collectively they have tended to make wars--the application of national power to international politics in the form of shooting conflict--more terrible and more violent than ever before.

The first cause for this trend toward "totality of force" was the development of the concept of "total war," which dates back to the Napoleonic era, the nation in arms, or mass conscription which was introduced by Napoleon.

The second reason has been, during the last century and a half, the decline of influence of Christianity and of moral restraints, which used to have some restraining effect on the application of force in wartime.

The third reason was the rise of Marxism and Bolshevism accompanied by the growth of Neopaganism. These ideologies--if they can be called that--fostered the pernicious doctrine that is practiced so often in the world today, the doctrine that the end justifies any means.

The fourth reason for the terrible nature of modern war has been the growing centralization of political, economic, and military power in a few nations, the emergence of larger and larger and stronger and stronger units, the rise of the great nation states of today, the conquest of dominating physical power in the modern world by two "superstates"--the United States and Russia.

The fifth and final reason was the industrial and scientific revolution which can be grouped together and termed the "technological revolution."

Modern invention and production have given us the plane, electronics, the atomic bomb, and all the other terrible equipment which tend to produce more and more totality of military power.

These five causes for the terrible totality of modern war are fundamental in understanding why the interrelationship between politics and power are so important to our time.

Before considering the courses our country may follow in the application of power to politics, before considering where we may go tomorrow, let us see where we stand today, in this, the most dangerous period in our history.

On the "home front," the period since World War II has been one of economic development and great prosperity. Without any doubt Americans enjoy the highest standard of living in the world, and we are producing today at the greatest rate in our history. But our economic prosperity is based in part on an artificial stimulus the foreign aid and arms programs. We are moreover, paying the highest taxes in our history; we are experiencing inflation; and we are exhausting much of our basic wealth in the form of raw materials. There has been a definite growth of the insidious philosophy of "work less and make more," the philosophy of soft and easy living.

These economic developments have been accompanied, on the "home front" by a greater centralization of power--political power and economic power--in the Federal Government, a bigger and bigger bureaucracy, the

growth of larger and larger power units within that government and the growth at the same time of the strength and influence of the military in the Government.

The people today are somewhat confused and have lost some faith in their national leadership, and psychologically, we have lost a little of our native self-reliance and tend to depend more and more on government for the solution of problems which the individual citizen should solve. We have also abandoned some of our moral standards which used to be the guiding star of our conduct. The doctrine "It's all right if you can get away with it" has won widespread acceptance. We have strayed far from the Faith of our Fathers.

Yet, despite these criticisms, we still preserve the inherent American optimism and hope in the future.

On the "home front" today we face some 18 months of conflict and confusion prior to the Presidential election next year, and it is clear, as we enter the second half of the twentieth century, that we have by no means solved the political, psychological, and economic problems at home.

Where do we stand in the world? What is our political position in the world as the second part of the twentieth century dawns? We have experienced ever since World War II the ever-increasing strain of a world-wide conflict--using the word "conflict" in its broadest sense--politically, economically, and militarily. We live clearly, not in one world but in two worlds, with the United States and Russia as the great protagonists. There is no end to that conflict in sight as far as we can foresee today.

Where do we stand in this conflict? All the nations of eastern Europe, once independent and sovereign nations, are under the Communist yoke. But eastern European communism has its weaknesses; it is not a solid monolithic structure. I need only mention Titoism which has made a great crack not only in eastern Europe but in the whole world structure of communism. Nevertheless, eastern Europe is Communist and perhaps it will be more so as the older generations die off in the satellite states and a younger generation, trained in nothing but communism, becomes of age.

In western Europe we can claim some gains in these last few years in this world-wide conflict. The high tide of communism has receded. All these countries, particularly France and Italy, are economically more stable than they were some years ago. Yet they are still battlegrounds. The recent Italian elections have provided proof of this. Those elections resulted in the defeat of Communist municipal administrators in various former Communist strongholds in Italy. Yet the clear

trend in the Italian vote has been a swing-away from center parties to extreme parties of the right or the left and those extremist parties polled larger percentages of the vote than in former elections. You may see the same trend in the French elections.

In the Middle East the entire area is shaky and divided and ripe for trouble. There has been no real gain against communism in that area. Since the Second World War there has been in the Middle East a tremendous growth of nationalism and antiwestern feeling.

But it is when we examine Asia that we should become most despondent. Asia has presented a picture of brutal civil war, strife, and economic distress ever since World War II. When we lost China to communism we lost, not a battle but a campaign. In Korea the cold war has turned into a shooting war. It has been almost a year since that war started. The most propitious time for peace negotiations is this summer, between now and fall, but there certainly are no battlefield signs that the enemy is ready to quit. On the contrary, there are signs that he is still strong and intends to strike us again.

The Chinese still have large reserves and the Peiping government recently has tightened the grip of communism upon China. The anti-Communist guerrilla strength in China, which had increased after the initial entry of the Communists into the Korean War, has declined lately. In Korea the enemy has not committed all its available armor. The "build-up" area across the Yalu is still being strengthened and Russian magnetic mines are still being laid off the Korean coasts. One recent report indicated that small mine layers are being shipped by sections overland to some of these ports there to be assembled and to be used to keep off shore our ships which have been bombarding Wonsan and other northeast ports. Thus the enemy has the capability of continuing war for some time in Korea--an advantageous course of action for Moscow--and there is no clear-cut end in sight. The best we can hope for in Korea is a political compromise, not a military decision.

Thus it is fair to say that in this world conflict communism has made great gains since the war. Our position in western Europe is stronger, but in the Middle East and the western Pacific it is weaker than it was a few years ago. Cold war has become a hot war in Korea and there is no doubt that since the Korean War started, the possibility of World War III has increased considerably.

So much for our political position in this world conflict.

How do we stand vis-a-vis Russia in military strength? What are some of our strengths and weaknesses compared with Russia? We are strong--very strong--in sea power; we need to fear only two elements of Russion naval strength, submarines and sea mining. We have relearned with some surprise

in Korea that Russian sea-mining operations and methods are exceedingly advanced and very skillful. The Russian magnetic mine, laid off Wonsan and other Korean ports is better than any similar mine we possess. It was laid with great skill.

What about air power vis-a-vis Russia? We are engaged today in a race to build up the so-called conventional arms of the West before Russia gets a strategically significant number of A-bombs. As we develop strength, we should be careful not to overestimate our qualitative advantage vis-a-vis Russia nor should we overestimate Russian quantitative strength vis-a-vis us. Service rivalries have influenced the intelligence estimates of the strength of Soviet air power and the strength of Russian submarines, and the strength of the Russian divisions. Too often exaggerated figures are presented to Congress because of the effect such estimates have on budget allocations to our services. This is a dangerous trend. On the other hand we must have considerably more respect for Russian qualitative worth than we have had in the past. Experience in Korea has shown that the Mig 15 has superior performance to our F-86 in both climbing and speed. This is due in large measure to the engine which powers the Mig 15.

In other words we have tended to decry Russian quality, while exaggerating Russian quantity. A case in point is an estimate that the Russians have 12,000 tactical planes available for use against western Europe. It is conceivable the Soviets may have that number of planes but what about gasoline, air fields, and logistic support to operate any such number against the West?

Again, can they produce, are they producing the thousands of new tanks with which they are credited? Such estimates as these can well be questioned yet there is no doubt that Russia can employ the tactics of mass.

In one other element of military strength--atomic energy--the USSR is gaining strength rapidly. It is possible Russia has from 25 to 50 A-bombs today. We once thought the USSR might have 200 A-bombs by 1953 or 1954. This timetable has to be revised. Some people think the Russians will detonate their second A-bomb sometime this summer. We must estimate, for purposes of security, that the USSR will soon have A-bombs of 50-kilo-tons magnitude numbered in three figures. In sum the United States is becoming much stronger in a military sense, but Russia has made great gains in atomic development and in the organization of its satellite forces and a balance of power has not yet been restored to the world.

So much for our present position. What can we do and where can our country go?

One of the courses often suggested--a course once popular with the American people, one which came into the headlines recently when Mr. Hoover and Mr. Taft made certain suggestions for changes in our foreign policy, is isolationism. Yet isolationism as a viable course of politico-military action is impossible today in a world of modern weapons. How can you defend against 3,500-mile-an-hour rockets, ocean girdling planes, or snorkel submarines? These weapons have given us "live frontiers." Our frontiers today are potentially vulnerable to assault.

We odcupy strategically an insular position today, not a continental position. In this age of foreshortened geography we are now open to assault on our shores. These facts change our whole military outlook and strategic concept. Moreover, we need the uranium of Africa, the oil from the Middle East, and the columbium used in jet planes. We must have bases, friends, and allies overseas for our own interests. If we have bases overseas, the enemy must attack them first. If war comes, they are an outpost line of our own defense. Unless we want to fight war on our doorstep, we must retain positions overseas. We cannot withdraw into our shell and find an imagined security. Isolationism is impossible. We need the world and the world needs us. So we must rule out isolationism as a viable political military course.

What about the other extreme--world government or a world order by international agreement, a course that is very popular among certain groups of our people? Obviously we must work for the millenium, but we should not expect it soon. You can't transfer power automatically from a superior to an inferior entity. As Bernard Brodie and Jacob Viner have expressed it:

> "We live in a world dominated by two giants, each of which is too strong relative to the total power potential of the world to be proper members of a world government.
>
> "In a narrow legal sense, sovereignty can be formally surrendered but actual power is more difficult to surrender and can be effectively surrendered only to an agency still more powerful.
>
> "In the present state of the world, such an agency with superior power, not only does not exist, but cannot be manufactured out of existing ingredients--even if the genuine will to do so existed--unless that will goes to the extent of preparedness on the part of the United States and of Soviet Russia to dismember themselves."
>
> An obvious absurdity.

To put it in simpler terms the idea of one world by agreement is as if parents were to say to a child, "You earn the living; you run the house; you pay the grocer." The child is in no sense prepared for any

such task. Neither is the United Nations in any way equipped for such a one-world role, nor is any organization, the World Federalists or any other group could devise from devout hopes and precise blueprints. The United Nations has accomplished some things, but it cannot be a miracle worker. It is not a blueprint for the perfect state. We can't even get a basic agreement on principles at Lake Success, much less on substance. There is no hope whatsoever for the brotherhood of man overnight.

If we rule out world order by international agreement, what then? What other course remains? What about world order by conquest, a frank imperialism, preventive war? Sock Russia with the A-bomb before it gets a stockpile and attacks us?

This is a dangerously facile and misleading doctrine--one which unfortunately has had too wide an appeal among some of our military men. It is based on three fallacious assumptions: First, the psychological assumption that war is inevitable, that Russia will some day attack us, and that we had better do it first. This is dangerous thinking. If a nation comes to believe that war is inevitable, you automatically close your mind to all other possible methods of action and you make war inevitable. In past periods what might be called the intangibles of history have sometimes intervened between periods of great tension and what seemed to be the certainty of war, and war didn't come. Moreover, the principles of Marxism indicate that Russian communism thinks of war and the use of armed force as a last resort. The softening up processes of subversion, infiltration, unrest and economic disorder and distress are usually used before war is resorted to, and unless these processes are successful, war usually does not come. Therefore, it is completely fallacious to think of war as inevitable. To think of it as probable and to prepare for it is a far cry from the statement that it is inevitable.

The second fallacious assumption, which is a military assumption, is that of an easy victory; we will just fly over Russia with a few A-bombs, bomb some of the major Russian cities and that would be all there was to it. This is an intriguing picture but war between great powers is never easy and war with Russia today or tomorrow would not result in an easy victory. We have a limited number of A-bombs; we have no really good maps of Russia east of the Urals; we would have some difficulty in penetrating deep into the "heartland"; and, above all, Russia now has the A-bomb. What happens to us if we hit her with it? The bomb won't stop the Red Army, and the best counter to our use of the A-bomb against the USSR would be the use of the Red Army against western Europe.

Would the tactical A-bomb halt this Army? Some scientists believe that if a tactical A-bomb were dropped, over the center of a 15,000-man division well dispersed and dug in, as it would be in the field, there might be something like 400 casualties. A little dirt offers good protection for the division in the field against tactical atomic bombing,

and though the tactical A-bomb is still in the process of development and has not yet been developed to its most effective optimum let us not count on it as the answer to our prayers; it is not a Maginot Line.

The best Russian countermove to our atomic bombing of its cities would be to push into western Europe. Then what happens? Would we bomb Paris? What would we do? I think the answer is obvious. The war would be a long and costly one. Perhaps another invasion such as that of Normandy would be necessary to liberate the West. It would not be a quick, easy war, but a long, slow, and costly one. I think the military assumption of a quick and easy victory is fallacious. The preventive-war theory is also based upon a fallacious political assumption, the assumption that war would solve all things. If we would only get rid of Soviet Russia, all would be sweetness and light in the best of all possible worlds. But this is nonsense. We entertained similar thoughts before the last World War, and here we are five years after World War II planning World War III. War never solves all things; it merely substitutes one set of problems for another. Europe and Asia are patients convalescing with difficulty from a long illness. You don't give such a patient virus pneumonia to bring about recovery. A major war in Europe in the near future would mean the loss of the things we were trying to defend and eventually a triumph of extremism of either the right or the left. The strain of another major war now, with its economic and political stress, would also be a threat to our way of life in the United States. In other words, the doctrine of a preventive war has no political objective. It is completely fallacious because World War III is exactly the thing we are trying to avoid.

What course then remains if we rule out "isolationism," "world order by agreement," and "world order by conquest"? The only answer is the middle way, a balanced program domestically and a balance of power internationally. The term balance of power is distasteful to many Americans. Yet as realists we must recognize that there is no such thing as politics without power or power without politics. The world situation has been relatively stable in the past only when there has been some balance of power.

What does this middle way, this balance of power, this instinctive tendency of free nations to band together against international bullies mean? Specifically, it means in the foreign field a five-legged program which we have been trying to follow:

1. Back the United Nations but don't depend on it for our security. Obviously, the United Nations cannot provide the United States or any of its individual nation members with political or military security, but the United Nations can provide if we will work through that organization so far as possible social, economic, and psychological benefits and gradually perhaps greater collective security.

2. Strengthening the political ties with our friends outside the United Nations by the Atlantic Pact and a proposed Pacific Pact, that is--filling the political vacuum in the world.

3. Economic aid, ECA, which has done a tremendous job. The one-time critics of ECA would be forced to retract many of their criticisms because it has accomplished its purpose, particularly in Europe; it has helped to fill the economic vacuums of power.

4. Military or MDAP aid.

5. Psychological programs to sell the United States case to the world.

The whole aim of such a five-legged foreign policy is to fill the vacuums of power in the world and restore a balance of power.

On the home front we must have policies compatible with our foreign policies.

First, we must, in the world of today, remain strong. This strength to my mind must assume a new pattern, not the old traditional pattern we followed. We must increase our readiness potential to a far-higher degree than we have ever done in the past. In the past our plan of preparedness was based upon mobilization potential, time in which to mobilize the manpower and factories of America. Today readiness potential or forces in being must have priority. This means more emphasis on Regular forces rather than upon Reserves. The size of these forces must be flexible and relative to the world situation. The 3,500,000-man ceiling that now governs the size of our armed forces seems about correct if you assume, as this ceiling does assume, that World War III is not likely this year or in the early part of next year. This 3,500,000-man force puts us on a higher platform of readiness than before; it gives us a force large enough to "hold the fort" in an immediate emergency but not too large to overstrain our economy in case the present crisis is of long duration.

This military force must obviously utilize the draft throughout the emergency, but the Universal Military Training measure as passed by Congress recently is of very dubious utility. UMT as approved by Congress provides for a period of six months' training for each 18-year-old, the program to be supervised by an autonomous civilian commission. This program does not meet the need for "readiness potential." It emphasizes the Reserve forces at the expense of the Regular forces and would tend to concentrate so much money and effort on "half-baked" training of a great mass of reservists that weapons development and equipment and training of our Regular forces might well suffer.

The Air Force and the Navy should be emphasized in any military program in the atomic age because, obviously, the only way attack can come to our home base is through the air or by sea, and the only way we can carry the attack to the enemy is in the same way. We should emphasize these services in peacetime moreover, because the Air and the Navy may be called upon at the start of any war--in the initial deployment--to use a greater part of their forces than the Army. The Army in other words may become "big" after war starts; in the atomic age the Navy and the Air Force must be "big" in peacetime. This does not mean the Army can be dispensed with. It is still basic to war. But none of the services are self-sufficient; Korea has again demonstrated the indivisibility of military force.

Behind the Regular forces we should have better trained Reserves freed of the dead hand of state politics, men who will serve not for what they can get out of service but for what they can put into it. The Korean War demonstrated the bankruptcy of some of our Reserve policies. Many of our Reserves came to the colors with reluctance; they were in the Reserves for what they could get out of it, not what they could put into it. We enticed men to service both in the Reserves and the Regulars by inducements and glittering promises, not pride of service. We offered in recruiting posters, "See the World; have an easy way of life."

A sound and effective global intelligence system is another essential element of security.

Research and Development.--There is today weakness in the Research and Development Board, yet second-best weapons in the atomic age can mean disaster.

Economic Mobilization.--This is an essential element in a sound security system. In the distant future the problems of economic mobilization may almost defy solution. In a world in which the atomic bomb and new weapons exist, readiness potential must be continuously at a high level; therefore, the production of weapons and equipment must be at a considerably higher level even in time of peace when tension is gone.

Finally, there must be effective civilian defense. Today civil defense is pretty much of a joke. There has been no indication of priority targets--no concentration upon defense of the target cities the enemy might first attack. We have done very little about dispersion. We have done practically nothing about shelters.

Another essential of security is bases overseas. We cannot fight an intercontinental war today with effectiveness. Our own defense demands outpost lines. Our strategic frontier is and must remain, in this atomic age, in Europe and Asia.

In sum, so far as our military preparedness is concerned, we must be strong in this time of tension, but not too strong--unless, of course, intelligence estimates indicate world war is imminent. We must be prepared for the long pull, as well as immediate emergency.

Civilian authority must be supreme. We want no garrison state.

Neither do we want a bankrupt state. We don't want the Kremlin to win "victory by bankruptcy." So we must have economic security measures to accompany the military ones on the home front--adequate price and wage controls; pay-as-you-go taxation; reduction in nonessential budget items.

What do these essential elements of a sound security system imply? To me they mean three definite principles:

1. Rearmament of Germany and Japan as essential to the restoration of balance of power in the world--more properly the re-emergence of those nations as great powers.--Unilateral disarmament is historically impossible. If one is armed, all must be armed. The question is not whether Japan and Germany should be rearmed, but when and how. The time to start is now. If we fear to take action because of possible Russian reaction, then we can formulate no policy.

2. The defense of western Europe, not merely the liberation of it after conquest.--If western Europe is overrun and only freed after painful and long servitude, we shall have lost the peace even though we should win the war because the values and the way of life we are trying to defend in western Europe would, I fear, have irrevocably disappeared.

3. The political objectives of any war must first be clearly defined before we can tailor the strategy of that war to those objectives. To state this principle in another way, we must first determine the kind of world we want, and then, and only then, can we determine the kind of strategy we would use to win any war we might have to fight to get that world.

As Clausewitz put it, "Wars in reality are only the manifestations of policy itself. Policy is the intelligent faculty; war only the instrument, and not the reverse. The subordination of the military point of view to the political is, therefore, the only thing that is possible."

In other words, I cannot agree with General MacArthur when he declared that "War's very object...is victory," and that a limited war represents "New concepts of appeasement."

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On the contrary, I feel very strongly that unlimited wars with unlimited objectives can never result--least of all in an atomic age--in a more stable peace; such a strategy could only lead to political frustration and perhaps to military defeat.

This principle is especially true when applied to Russia, our potential enemy, who has frequently in the past been defeated in wars of limited efforts for limited objectives but who has beaten those powers who fought with unlimited means for unlimited or ill-defined objectives. No unconditional surrender or Carthaginian peace will, in a war against Russia, give our country the fruits of victory or promote a more stable peace.

An atomic blitz cannot lead to more security or any sound political objectives, nor can we expect the minorities in Soviet Russia or the peoples of the satellite states--potentially our greatest ace in the hole in a war with Russia--to aid us if we atom bomb them promiscuously. We can defeat Russia, but it will do us no good if we allow strategy to override national policy, or if ultimate objectives are not clearly defined.

As General Bradley states in his book, "A Soldier's Story," "At times during World War II we forgot that wars are fought for the resolution of political conflicts.... Today we are intensely aware that a military effort cannot be separated from political objectives."

General Vandenberg, in his recent testimony before the MacArthur hearing, took issue with those who believe the only victory we can gain is the complete crushing of communism when he said, "Another method is to have victory that does not require unconditional surrender, but that leaves a force still in the world that can be applied against the balance of power so that by playing the balance of power, if it is done carefully, peace can be preserved over a great many years under explosive situations."

I wish I could believe that General Bradley's optimism was justified, that General Vandenberg was rendering more than lip service to a strategy of definite aims and limited force, and that we had learned the bitter lesson of the lost peace after World War II. But there are too many indications today that strategy is shaping policy and not vice versa. In part this may be because we have not yet worked out satisfactorily the proper relationship between policy making and security planning. To me the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council are the weak links in our security organization.

First, the JCS is too cluttered with detail and its personnel are concerned themselves too much with minor operational and administrative problems, such as whether or not each service should assign so many officers each year to Central Intelligence. That is no job for the JCS.

Second, JCS has too much power in nonmilitary policy formulation for three or four basic reasons: (1) because of downgrading of civilian secretaries in the Pentagon; (2) because of past lack of civilian advice to JCS (this has now been remedied); (3) remoteness between the individual members of the JCS and civilian top policy planners; (4) the weakness of our civilian policy planners.

Third, the relationship between policy and strategy on the National Security Council level.--A better working relationship might be achieved by having all members of the JCS attend National Security Council meetings as technical consultants.

These are some of the vexing problems of politics and power with which you as future senior commanders and staff officers must deal. Remember the unflattering definition of a staff officer once printed in the old "Infantry Journal" (now the "Combat Forces Journal")--but don't take it too literally! It reads: "The typical Staff officer is a man past middle life, spare, wrinkled, intelligent, cold, passive, noncommital, with eyes like a codfish, polite in contact, but at the same time unresponsive, cool, calm, and as damnably composed as a concrete post or a plaster-of-paris cast; a human petrifaction with a heart of feldspar and without charm or the friendly germ; minus bowels, passions or a sense of humor. Happily they never reproduce and all of them finally go to hell."

Unlike this definition, I hope that all of you will be extremely prolific, prolific in rich ideas and constructive thinking so that sound policies and sound strategy may guide our country in its greatest crisis. But the great commanders and the best staff officers will possess not only practical realism and the essential ruthlessness which war demands but the breadth of vision which peace demands and an understanding that--as someone has said--weapons are the servants of strategy, not its master, and strategy is the child of policy.

QUESTION: Mr. Baldwin, you have emphasized the successes of the Soviet Union in its gains in the Middle East and in the Far East, and our weaknesses in that area. To what do you attribute our failure to gain there as we have in Europe? Is it our economic weakness, a weakness of our ideology, our method of putting out our ideology, or is it just no policy? What do you think it is?

MR. BALDWIN: I think that is a two-barreled question. I don't think you can lump the Middle East and the Far East together. Personally, I think that there are--it is not a simple question to answer--a lot of factors involved.

Certainly there has been no policy to which we could cling and term it an affirmative policy in the Far East in the last four years. However, you all know the familiar story of the intervention in Korea when we

interrupted overnight the United Nations policy not to interfere in Korea. So we had a vacillating policy; it might be termed no positive policy as compared with the very positive policy of the Soviet Union, which, frankly, has been the domination of Asia.

Our mistakes, however, would include a lack of proper understanding of the Oriental mind and the Oriental psychology. I think we have people who understand that mind, but they are not in dominant positions of power in policy making or strategy formation. I would say that those two causes above all apply to the Far East and the Middle East.

In the meantime, I think we have displayed economic interest and at times a somewhat haphazard political interest. But, again there has been more of a stand-off attitude. We have felt, I think, particularly until recently, that this was a theater where the British interest was primary and ours secondary. Now I think we see the mistake in such a policy. I would say that our policy toward Israel alienated the Arabs, turned them more toward Russia, although I don't think they have a real identification of interest with the Soviet Union. We failed to establish a policy for the whole Middle Eastern area which was in any way positive--a vital interest in oil and its riches and that is about all.

I think in the military field here is a vastly important area. What does the Navy have in the Middle East now? What does the Air Force have in the area? How are we represented on the scene by forces in being? Practically not at all.

QUESTION: You mentioned the need for a civilian political consultant in the Joint Chiefs of Staff deliberations and then subsequently you stated the JCS should be in attendance at the National Security Council meetings as military consultants. It seems to me if the political considerations are to enter in, the NSC level is the proper level. Therefore, there would be no need for civilian consultants at the Joint Chiefs of Staff level. Would you care to elaborate on that?

MR. BALDWIN: I think your amendment is probably quite sound. In the haste in trying to finish in the time allotted, I lumped the two together. It should be "either-or." It seems to me that if the Joint Chiefs are not in attendance at the National Security Council meetings, then it is important that there should be a civilian political adviser at the Joint Chiefs of Staff meetings. On the other hand, if they are in attendance at the NSC meetings I see no particular reason to have a political adviser there except under very rare circumstances.

QUESTION: In reaching your conclusion as to the middle way, I wonder if you have examined the consequences of the economic and political impact of the increasing demand for civilian defenses in this country? I take it as an assumption that the Soviet atomic stockpile will continue

to grow. This will eventually compel us to take increased action on defensive measures. I wonder if you have explored the point at which passive defenses will threaten to transform the basic character of our national life?

MR. BALDWIN: I have explored that as far as I can get a look into the blue in that field, but not in great detail. I have certainly tried to anticipate some of the dire consequences of the growing threat of Russian atomic power. When I said that civil defense so far is a joke, I meant specifically that, even in the letting of contracts for new plants to manufacture strategic weapons, there has been far too little thought given to dispersal, that is in the target areas which are easily reached by the Russians or in areas already saturated with defense plants. Do we want to put them in a part of the country not so thickly settled? We haven't done so until recently, at the instance of some of those interested in civil defense planning. The Air Force has taken particular interest in the relocation of certain existing plants and the building of new plants in nontarget areas, one thing that can be done at no great cost as we go along in the building of new plants. There is no reason why there isn't a requirement in the contract that they be located in certain places at very little added cost. There is no reason why this type of dispersion couldn't be effected.

Of course, if you are going to attempt to disperse cities and move the population out, the cost is astronomic, and I think it is impossible. You cannot accomplish that except over a period of 40 or 50 years as future city planning permits. However, you can make evacuation plans, which we have not done satisfactorily. You heard about the Mayor of New York saying, "Of course we won't evacuate. We will never take to the hills. We will stay and keep the wheels turning," which is absolute nonsense. You know a great many nonessential workers can be evacuated from New York. A great many people will have to be evacuated from Washington, New York, and other major cities if the threat of an atomic war exists.

Finally, a program of shelter construction is perfectly feasible economically if it is done gradually and if those shelters are linked with some economic purpose in peacetime. It seems to me they made a mistake in saying, "We won't give you money for shelters that have a peacetime purpose." I think they have to have some peacetime purpose unless the thing that is feared is economic disaster. You can't build nonproductive shelters for all the people in all the cities of the country.

That doesn't squarely meet your point. I don't know that anyone can meet it. It may be when the threat and pressure from Russia becomes so very great that all our big cities have simply outlived their usefulness, our people will simply tend to disperse. I think it would take an awful lot of threat and an awful fear to do it. I see very little indication of that trend in the near future. I don't think we can look into a

crystal ball to 15 or 20 years from now. I haven't the vaguest idea what the world will be like then. But for the immediate future, it seems to me the greater danger is that we are not doing enough civil defense planning rather than too much expenditure on it.

QUESTION: When you stated your historical basis for the fact that war is not inevitable, it seems to me, at least I wonder if, there has ever been any historical precedent for the things we are undertaking today? When we get our military bases, it seems to me the pressure to get it over with from the American people will be so enormous that I don't see how you are going to keep out of war. I wonder if you will expand your views on that a bit?

MR. BALDWIN: You certainly ask sharp questions. I said in my talk that I do not deem war inevitable. If you do, you close your mind automatically to any other possible political course of action. I also said there is quite a considerable gap between our saying war is probable and war is inevitable. I would go with you 100 percent in saying that as things stand today, war is probable. I would not agree that war is necessarily inevitable.

One of the things you mentioned is one of the reasons why war is probable. I think historically there has always been a precedent for conflict in the world, using "conflict" in the broadest sense, when two great nations dominated the known world--that was the conflict between Rome and Carthage. I do think the existence of superstates so much greater in power than all the other nations of the world is traditionally and historically a cause for conflict. I spoke at the start of my talk of the five factors that were making the interrelationship between power and politics so much more important. One of those was the rise of great nation states, the concentration of power in great entities, and I think we face that inevitably--due to the fact that Russia and the United States are superstates that cannot be or will not be dismembered--very obviously a superstate war in which one is victorious. How then do you determine that is all potential? The only answer possible is the success of this middle way, balance of power process.

If we can conceive of a Germany not perhaps as powerful as before World War II; if you can conceive of France as having truly the best Army in the world--as we once characterized it before World War II, you immediately would see a whole change in the political order in Europe overnight. Then the fact that we had great armament and Russia had great armament--the economic consequences of these armaments amount to a great deal to the American people. If they were suddenly cut off, there might be economic disaster. Those facts, I think, would be subordinate to the fact that there was balance of power restored. There is no doubt in my opinion if we do build up and nothing does happen over a long period, we are going to have a very painful economic adjustment to make, both the American taxpayer and eventually the American producer.

QUESTION: Mr. Baldwin, you discussed the Soviets increase of capability in the near future and the possibility of their severely crippling us. I am wondering at this time if we are not more a combat zone than a zone of the interior. What is the need of possibly a national defense commander behind a state of that kind?

MR. BALDWIN: You are really getting into a disputed problem in that one. I didn't say they could severely cripple us in the near future. I would doubt that very much. It depends on how far the near future goes; certainly not in the next six months. I don't believe the Soviets could severely cripple us with the atomic stockpile that they now have or may have at the end of the next six months. If you extend the near future forward two or two and a half years, you could take some bad losses without any doubt.

All I would say is you must recall that we are no longer a continent, but are in an insular position. We are similar, roughly, I should say, in the position which the British Isles occupied in the nineteenth century. In other words, the Atlantic, more or less from the point of view of modern weapons, has shrunk to the dimensions of the English Channel or the North Sea, and the Pacific has similarly shrunk. So that is why we must change our basic military concept to emphasize the readiness potential, or mobilization potential which is stressed in the past.

I would agree that in a sense we are no longer a zone of the interior, but we still occupy--and this is the important thing--the continental United States, and the continental United States is still the base, and obviously a basic military principle is the security of that base. That is particularly true when that base contains all the productive facilities.

I would certainly agree thoroughly that one of the basic problems of the future is the air defense of the continental United States and the defense against the snorkel submarine and the defense against eventually long-range trans-oceanic missiles, and also, of course, short-range missiles fired from submarines or ships.

I don't feel that this demands a single continent commander. Where to stop in this process? I think we tend to become so much absorbed with organization and blueprints that you can draw on the chart a very nice organization which will provide the greatest possible efficiency, but, if you analyze that closely, you will find that this efficiency is also provided at the expense of democracy. You will often find that perhaps a dictatorship is so good that it is the most efficient, theoretically, so far as the blueprint lines on the chart are concerned. We have had an example in Germany of dictatorship in the past showing that, where there is one man controlling the greater part of the dictatorship, they tend inevitably toward lack of fresh ideas and a hard crystallization of that man's thoughts or the thoughts of that group at the top. So I think when

you talk about organization, and what is the desirable organization in the military sense and the political sense, you cannot lose sight of the fact that this is a democracy, with its checks and balances, which make for less efficiency. We are constantly balling out Congress. That is a rather dangerous trend. Certainly Congress makes mistakes, but its members represent in our country the American people more nearly and more accurately than any other body that I know of in the world. There are a lot of able men in Congress who are honestly trying to do a job.

I think the same parallel can be applied in a sense to the military command in the United States. Where does command stop? Where does it leave off? I have all sorts of difficulties in pinning that down.

I wouldn't see, short of complete chaos and actual armed invasion or attack on the United States, the need for a single continental commander. It would be inadequate and incomplete unless you could get Canada to join us. Then where do you stop? Do you get the Central American countries to join us? Obviously, the world is getting smaller all the time. The same argument that you use for a continental commander can be applied to a world commander. I don't believe it is necessary. I think if you can get the proper coordination between this country and Canada and the proper personalities--which in my mind are more important than the blueprint of the organization--if you can get men who will work together, I think you can get a very complete and effective organization for the continental United States. I would say definitely that this country has come a long way in the last six months, fortunately.

QUESTION: You closed your talk by saying weapons are the child of strategy. When the Russians get a stockpile of atom bombs do you think this would still hold true, or do you think strategy will be the child of weapons?

MR. BALDWIN: I think in any case weapons must still be the child of strategy if you like to fight a war for any useful purpose, which is the point of my whole talk. Now, you can fight a war of annihilation. That has been done before. You can have a Corinthian peace. That has been done before. You can destroy a city-state and spread the fields with salt. That never leads to any productive peace. History could do it with a city of 100,000 people. Rome could do that with Carthage, which was a relatively small city-state. Do we propose to do that in the case of the 200 million people in Russia? Can we do it? Is it physically possible? Obviously, it is not. Does Russia propose to do that in the case of the United States? I would question that very much, because the Russian Government--which is the important thing, because we cannot reach much of the Russian public opinion--is still anxious to expand its power, still anxious to extend communism throughout the globe. Do the Russians do that by such force?

I would doubt whether even the Russians with their ruthlessness would lose sight of the objective for which they were fighting the war. In fact, in the case of communism, I think the political objectives are always foremost. Therefore, if they use the atomic bomb indiscriminately and without any regard for the purpose for which they want to get hold of the United States, the atomic weapon becomes the father of strategy rather than vice versa. I doubt very much that you will see a war like that. If you do, obviously no holds are barred, and the thing I think we have to fight for is the political objectives or winning the peace will have no meaning.

QUESTION: General Vandenberg in his testimony has indicated that the 95-group Air Force won't be enough and that we really ought to be building a larger Air Force. He also has questioned what he calls the 30-percent gun and the 70-percent butter philosophy and the fact that by 1953 we could expand production enough to be able to have adequate military readiness and at the same time have a booming civilian economy. I would like some of your comments on that philosophy and program.

MR. BALDWIN: I think we tend sometimes to indulge too much in citing numbers--95-group Air Force, 130-group Air Force; so many carriers; so many divisions. I don't think that is the real basis of adequate preparedness. Obviously numbers mean something, but I think we tend to put them up on a high pedestal and say that if we have that much we are prepared. The basic elements of preparedness and the ones I tried to outline in my talk were, first, unless you have an Air Force completely and thoroughly equipped and trained, regardless of how many groups you have, unless you have planes and equipment as good as or better than anything the enemy has, there is not much use in having those groups. The same applies to all other services. So I don't like to emphasize numbers. I think on these numbers 3,500,000, it has to be flexible, depending on the world situation.

I would doubt at this time that it would be a good idea to greatly increase that 3,500,000 unless the intelligence estimates are that war is imminent--in which case the sky is obviously the limit. But if we feel war is not imminent, we had better think of the long pull, and I for one certainly think we have to watch our economic strength. If you start to build a 135-group Air Force, I don't know what the cost would be--140 groups or what not. It certainly would be extremely high, and we would run into considerable difficulty simply supplying the gasoline--I don't know whether you have made a study for all those planes if they were to be actively employed--that would be particularly true if by chance the oil from the Middle East should not be available.

I would personally like to see a very flexible policy insofar as numbers are concerned. I think that you will see that the military budget for next year, which has already been asked for, is based on that assumption

and that later on there will be supplemental budgets as required. I think there will unquestionably be three or four supplemental budgets. You will see this 3,500,000 figure increased, and it will have to be increased, if the war situation becomes worse.

QUESTION: We had one speaker who stated he didn't feel communism was our enemy, in contradiction of General MacArthur. In view of the announced purpose of communism and in view of your statement about the balance of power, how do you feel about the possibility that communism might possibly be our enemy and, by disguise in Germany, come in and take it, assuming that Russia pulls out of the picture? In other words, would you comment on who is our enemy in the final analysis?

MR. BALDWIN: It has always seemed to me sort of an idle argument to say whether communism or Russia is our enemy. To me the facts are clear. A combination of the two is the enemy. Certainly communism is the enemy of all the principles that we have believed in politically, psychologically, and economically, and it has concentrated upon this terribly pernicious philosophy that the end justifies any means which I mentioned as a clear indication that such type of philosophy is an enemy of the American philosophy. On the other hand, communism did exist for many years before World War II, but there was not sufficient Russian power to give it the world-wide threat it now possesses. However, Russian power today does exist and the balance of power in the world has been upset. Today it is the combination of the two, communism plus Russian military strength, which are the enemy. I can conceive of a world in which Russia might be, not destroyed, but her offensive power destroyed, and yet communism would still continue to exist. That is one of the big things, it seems to me, we have to watch in our war strategy. Conceivably we could evolve a very successful war strategy which might destroy Russian power but which might end up by actually strengthening communism throughout the world. Therefore the political objectives of war must always be kept before you and you must tailor your strategy to them.

QUESTION: I hate to take you away from a subject that is very interesting but I would like to draw you out on one point. In previous writing you indicated that during World War II material was the important thing, and that the need for generalship had merely evaporated. Would you care to carry that into the present and into a probable World War III, the importance or lack of importance of generalship?

MR. BALDWIN: I used the term "generalship" in the old term. I emphasized in the same article as you remember, that the importance of leadership never decreases. You can see it in Korea today. You can see it in any battle or any campaign that you examine. Leadership seems to me of fundamental importance. However, I think at the top level generals have become in a sense general managers, supply sergeants, if you want to call it that, and perhaps several of the combinations of commercial

talent that have made the men who are at the top of our biggest enterprises. The old opportunity of personal direction on the battlefield on the part of top-ranking generals is largely gone. But the capability for leadership still exists. Rommel was an example of that. One of the greatest things that Rommel possessed was a peculiar quality of generalship. The test of generalship in the last analysis is whether you do much with little, and Rommel did. We had only a few such generals in World War II. He did much with little against material odds. We always, after the first, had the material odds on our side. That is the best way in the world to fight a war. It is very important to keep them on our side.

That is one reason I feel that UMT, especially in time of peace, is not necessary in this country. In time of peace there will obviously be pressure to reduce the military budget. Public opinion will say, "This budget is too high." You have seen it. You see it day after day. Looking ahead five or six years from now and assuming the Russian threat is ended and we think that peace exists--however, the atomic bomb still exists in the world--and we put all that money into training reservists, universal military training, there is going to be a bunch of criticism on a lot of it. People will say, "Watch the budget." There are going to be large forces, but there will not be the production of new material in quantity for the forces that you have. While you are training the men, building new divisions, obviously you will have to keep a constant flow of materials coming to those forces. I would say that is a new problem in economic mobilization--how do you maintain a high enough level in our industry in peacetime to keep a constant flow of new weapons? In 10 years these new weapons will commence to be very, very new indeed, and some of them very highly important. How do you keep those coming out at the terrible expenditures that they will cost? At the same time, how do you train 800,000 boys every year? I see insoluble conflict between the two demands. For me, I would favor new material and emphasis upon the Regular forces.

COLONEL BARNES: Mr. Baldwin, on behalf of both colleges, I thank you for your outstanding and stimulating discussion.

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