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MANPOWER IN ECONOMIC MOBILIZATION

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21 September 1951

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COLONEL VAN WAY: General Holman and fellow members of the Industrial College: The discussion this morning, which will introduce our "Manpower Course" for the academic year 1951-1952, is not in any real sense the start of the Manpower Course. As you well know, that was started in Elmer Barnes' course. You recall that Louis Hunter talked long and in some detail about the situation of manpower in our economic picture. In the Orientation Course we also had frequent references to manpower, as we did, and have, also in our Technological Progress Course. As you know, in the Technological Progress Course we have certain problems relating to research in manpower, which is just as much a part of our manpower study as what we will present to you during our formal course. When we come to the end of the formal presentation of our course, on 9 November 1951, when the last student makes his oral presentation, we will not then have finished with manpower. Throughout the rest of the year you will have classes on manpower and references to our manpower subject.

In like manner we cannot present our course without talking in terms of other courses. In fact the outline for my talk this morning might very well be an outline for the whole Economic Mobilization Course. We are going to start talking about resources or what we have in the way of manpower. We are then going to talk a little bit about the requirements which we place against this resource of manpower. Following that we will discuss some of the things we can do to get additional numbers and to get additional productivity from our manpower resources. Then we go into a subject which is peculiarly our own--the matter of labor relations. Following that we will take up the matter of procurement, which is our term for conscription or selective service. We will end up this morning with a brief reference to our problem of communism. So you see that our outline is just about the same as our over-all course, which is no more than another way of saying that we have just one course here--Economic Mobilization. We are presenting our part of it now.

I will start with what we feel is the basis of manpower. Let us discuss now what our human resources are. We have at this time 155 million people. I am talking about the estimates that we have, carried forward into October. That is based on the last decennial census of 1950. That has been carried forward on the estimate of a monthly increase of 200,000. That increase is somewhat more than that enjoyed during the last decade. In the forties we increased our population at the rate of about 2 million per year, which is about twice the rate of increase of the preceding decade. So now we can take as a figure to work with that we have 155 million people as of October.

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Chart 1, page 20.--This chart illustrates the way we have that figure broken down. Really, this is our total population. We divide that initially into two basic groups. One is the labor pool and the other is consumers only. There is nothing sacrosanct about the definitions I will give about what I have on this chart. They are merely ones for convenience that we took in a way to harmonize with the Bureau of the Census estimates that we get and the reports that we get from our various sources of statistics. They are good to keep in mind, because it means that we are talking the same language as spoken by the people who are gathering our statistics for us.

The labor pool consists of all individuals over 14 years of age who are at work, able to be at work, or able to do some useful work. That in turn is divided into two groups. The first is those in the labor force. You notice that the entire distinction between them is in that word "force" as against "pool." That is the term we use. I don't defend it particularly, but that is just the way it is used. It is a good definition to keep in mind--that the labor force is composed of those who are actually at work or seeking work during a preceding period; I think it is two weeks. There are a lot of technicalities that are of more interest to the statisticians than to us. But the specific details concerned with people who are in this group are for the most part for those over 14 who are at work or seeking work during the period. That is enough for our purposes.

The consumers are those over 14, but they are not at work for pay. We hope most of them are working, but that is a matter of debate. They are composed of students and housewives.

This group (indicating) which is not included in the labor pool, is composed of those who are under 14 primarily, but also those who are in hospitals and in jails, where they are neither at work nor looking for work and are not expected to be available for taking into the work force.

As to numbers, there are a lot of big numbers there that I can't remember; but I would suggest that you just keep in mind that these percentages do not change very much from year to year. These numbers change theoretically every month, but the percentages don't change too much. The general breakdown is 40-30-30. Just remember that your labor force is 2 or 3 percent more than 40; but you can take that off if you wish and still have a fair estimate. You won't be very far wrong if you remember that breakdown of 40-30-30.

In times of urgency, the labor force can be expanded. There is one other point I would like to make before we leave the labor force. As a statistical device we have put the unemployed in the labor force, on the theory that if people are unemployed, they could go into the labor force. That fluctuates; and the fluctuation, which is seasonal, is in and out of the labor market from time to time. It would be rather difficult to keep track of them.

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For somewhat the same reason and not to give rise to any other conclusion, we put the armed forces in the labor force. There again we have a movement in and out of the labor force. It helps us to consider the labor force as including both of these groups. Occasionally you will read a figure for the labor force which does not include the armed forces and doesn't say so specifically. I haven't any way to help you on that except to take the number of 67 million. If it is 4 or 5 million less, it probably does not include the armed forces.

Chart 2, page 21.—This is a population pyramid. It is usually referred to as a Christmas tree. But this pyramid represents the same 155 million that we were just talking about. It shows across the bottom, in millions, the numbers in each of the five-year age groups represented in the horizontal lines along the chart. Here (indicating) is the five-year group, and the chart goes up to 80-plus years. It is divided also into females on the right of the vertical line and males on the left, with the numbers represented by the figures in millions across the bottom. Actually this figure is composed of two bar charts put together. That is what this means.

There are a lot of interesting things on this chart. In the black portion the first thing that we might notice is the characteristics of the population that we can divine from looking at the slope, which is fairly regular, on each side. Quite obviously, the degree of angle of that slope is determined by the relationship of the scales that are used on the sides. So that hasn't any real significance. But the significant thing about the slope is that, if it is convex, as it is on this chart, it is good; but if it is concave, as it is, for instance, in the case of India, it represents a population in which there is a high mortality rate, a low life expectancy, heavy losses in the early years, one in which the birth rate is relatively high. This chart, in one part at least, shows the effect of a low mortality rate. We keep our people alive longer. The Russian pyramid is concave, so far as we can tell. We are not too sure of the details of Russia's age breakdown but, so far as we can tell from older ones, Russia has one that shows a deep concave condition in that slope, as has India, possibly because they don't keep their people alive or they are not particularly interested in staying alive so long. Here we do make an attempt. Most of our people, I think, do make an effort to stay alive longer.

There is one thing that is very conspicuous about this pyramid; it is not uniform on both sides. That notch in the 15-19 age group is the result of our depression in the thirties. If we square the 15-19 age group with the 20-24 age group we find that the latter group is where the kids would be that were not born during the depression and because of it. That is one of the most significant facts shown on this figure.

Before we leave the black part of the chart I would like to bring to your attention the effect of our war casualties in World Wars I and II. The World War I veterans are around the ages of 50 and 60. If you look

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here (indicating), you are not able to see much difference between the two sides, which would be an indication of war casualties if it could be seen. But you can't see it. Actually, World War I wasn't too rough on the United States so far as war casualties are concerned. There were a lot of casualties in 1918, but they were at home as the result of the influenza epidemic, which made a great change in our death rate for that one year. But so far as war casualties themselves are concerned, we don't see it.

Now let us look at the situation for World War II, which is about the 30-34 age group. On this chart it probably accounts for 150,000 and some-odd casualties, which can be attributed to the war. But that is compared to the 200,000 that could be attributed to normal mortality rates. We didn't lose very many in the larger picture even in World War II. We killed lots more people with automobiles.

Now let us see where the labor force fits into this picture. The labor pool includes both the "in" and "not in" labor force on chart 1. Again, the point we make is the fact that this practically takes in our adult age group and that this little figure down here (indicating) grows out of the fact that I am using on this chart five-year groups starting off with 15, but there is a small group from 14 to 15. You will notice that the 67 million area is the true labor force and the 48 million area is not in the labor force. Students and housewives are in the consumers' group. There is a small group between 14 and 15 in the labor force. The labor force also runs up here (indicating). We don't have figures showing it up here, but we do know that there are some people in some useful endeavor at this point. The statistics don't seem to show these; so we have stopped arbitrarily at 80.

We are going to talk considerably about, and spend a lot of time on, resources. We have our first problem in dividing the resources. We have a problem covering world demography. It is under the supervision of Mr. Al Maserick.

The next thing we are interested in with respect to United States manpower is the matter of requirements. What do we put against these? I think here we can fill in the missing part of this picture. Of course, all of you, being mobilization minded, are wondering, "Where do the services fit in here?" We could put into this picture the 3 million-some-odd people that we now consider as our armed strength. It wouldn't make too much of a dent in there. But we think sometimes in terms of 5, 8, or 10 million, or some other mystic figure that we think we might have in the event of a real mobilization for an extended period. In order to avoid any conjecture, where we get figures, and because we have statistics on the age breakdown of that force, we have decided to use 12 million, the maximum stage during the war, and just show where that 1945 force fits in our 1951 manpower resources.

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That is worth considering for a moment, because that is our manpower situation. We don't call it a problem, nor do we call it a bottleneck, because it is a situation we should be able to face. There are lots of problems. The question is, "What are we trying to do about them?" It is those that we will talk about now for a while.

Our requirements grow out of the concept by the National Security Council as to what our national objectives are. Those are given to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who determine the missions and the functions for the services. The services in turn determine their own needs. Out of a summation of those needs grow our requirements. I haven't time to go into great detail on that.

We are interested in the matter of requirements in what we can do to increase our numbers. We start with 155 million. There is nothing we can do to increase that any faster than the rate of 200,000 a month of which I have spoken. But we can do things to increase the numbers in the labor force. What are some of those things? The first thing is to turn to the 48 million area immediately adjacent to the 67 million force. That is what we did during World War II. We got about 6.5 million from male students who were virtually ready to go into the labor force anyway; and we got about 5 million from the housewives. The total increase from sources outside the labor force was about 12 million. We had an unemployment then of about 9 million, which was absorbed for the most part.

Those are the two immediate reserves that we have--the students and the housewives. But there are other reserves that we have in numbers, not in as large numbers as those, but they will increase our effective force. Included in those are youngsters who can be used in services to assist in the care of the younger kids, provided they are willing to do it. I don't know about that. Then there are oldsters. There is still another group which, while small in number, is very important in effect--that is the handicapped.

There are certain things that must be done in planning the employment, the introduction into the labor force, of these additional numbers. Primarily, among the things we must do is training. We must recognize the necessity for training all of these groups. In some cases, if we pull back an older man, retired, he really has to be refreshed in his skill. But in the case of students and housewives most certainly we have to train them in something that may be entirely new to them.

The thing we have to take care of to a degree is the working conditions, including hours, places, and other service arrangements. For example, if we pull in the housewives, we must make certain provisions for them. They still have responsibilities with respect to their families. If they have youngsters, some provision must be made for child care. At least we must recognize that such problem exists. We must provide for shopping and for time off to do some of their household chores, by regulation of the hours and so on.

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If we pull in the oldsters and the handicapped, we must provide working conditions that are within their physical capabilities. We must increase our use of machines, of labor-saving devices, such as weight-lifting devices, in order to enable some of the less physically capable to do the work.

All these things are pretty obvious, but they serve to delay the rate at which we can augment our labor force in numbers. That is why they are important to us. We can't merely say, "Let us pull in the housewives and the old folks and put them to work." We have to take the time to make these necessary arrangements.

There is another direction we can turn to for increasing the effective production; this does not involve the increase in numbers that I have just been talking about. The obvious need there is to increase the hours of work per week. Theoretically, if we increase from 40 to 48 hours a week, we have made an increase of 20 percent. Actually that never holds quite true. But there is a real source of a fairly fast increase in effective ability to produce.

We must remember the increase in productivity. For the past 50 years or so we have been increasing our rate of individual productivity about 2.5 percent each year. We don't have a very sound measure of that, and the figure is susceptible to change under urgency. I have heard it mentioned not long ago that in times of stress and urgency we can get a greater increase of that rate of productivity; it grows out of several things. I like to think of it primarily the result of good management and the natural intelligence and ability of our people. Those things can be speeded up under the spur of urgency.

Another reason why an emergency can help us increase our rate of production is that it enables us to have funds to build new, more modern machines, which are one of the ways in which we can get more production. Some of the machines are not economical to build in a normal industrial period. It is only under the stress of great emergency that we can build some newer and more expensive machines and thus get a more rapid increase of the rate of productivity.

The next way in which we can increase our productivity is by research and development in materials, in methods, and in human resources and human utilization. There again we find our enlightened management playing an important part. We are interested, as I have said, in research and development, insofar as our branch is concerned, into human utilization--on which we have a problem this year. This problem will have to be narrowed down because of the limitation of our time to research and development in the uniformed services; but we do have such a problem, which will be under the supervision of Commander Castelazo. He is assigned to us from the Naval War College. We feel pretty lucky to have him here.

We make a rather fast jump to research and development in another field that affects productivity in a very measurable way. We will turn now to the matter of labor relations. I am inclined to feel somewhat irked at the situation where considerable power and authority is exerted when at the time it appears that the corresponding responsibility is not there. In other words, it sometimes seems that labor leaders may be a little bit arrogant and irresponsible; that they take these actions without due regard to the responsibility that they have and the result of the actions that they have taken.

I think we must, in connection with that irritation that we may personally feel, consider the history of what has caused the growth of labor unions. They grew up not because of somebody's idea, but because there was a real need for them in the development of our economy. There is no question in my mind that, despite some of the irritating actions which some labor leaders have taken, our present situation is due in a large measure to the fact that we have tended to push the results of our industrial expansion and our industrial know-how down to the worker's level, where he can get some of the rewards that the improvements have made possible. He can then have the money to spend on the products that we are making and he will have the leisure to use those products. I think that is one of the sound bases that we have for our prosperity as of today and we must give a large share of the credit for that to the fact that the labor unions did develop. Actually, they developed because of that need and not because of anybody's idea.

It is perfectly true that the pendulum swung a little bit too far and sometimes we don't know where it will stop. But we did realize that it was getting completely out of hand; we now have the Taft-Hartley Act, which has tended to push it back. Whether it is in the middle, or will swing all the way to where it was before, I don't know. But that is a question of the adjustment of natural forces. We have to recognize that.

Now, on the question of strikes—they are a nuisance, just what they are designed to be. That is why workers strike. It is the only way in which they can bring the issue home to a great mass of the American public. As long as they are nuisances, there will be constructive action taken to correct what has been the basis of the trouble. Right now we have a very effective method of solving these various issues by collective bargaining and by mediation and arbitration. Sometimes it seems slow, sometimes it doesn't seem to come out with what is necessary; but we are always making progress toward getting some industrial stabilization.

Those strikes actually are nuisances to us but don't cost us too much. During the war the losses from strikes and work stoppages ran in the order of nine one-hundredths of one percent up to about forty-seven one-hundredths of one percent, less than half of one percent. That is not a very large price to pay for what we have achieved in labor-management relations, considering the issues that brought them about.

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After the war, work stoppages went up until they reached more than 1.5 percent of the total man-days. But by and large our work losses, while spectacular in some sectors, are not in the over-all picture very serious. We feel it is important enough to have two problems on it. We turned both of those over to Mr. Sam Hill.

When we talk about labor relations, we very frequently begin to think of controls, because many of us feel aggravated by some of the excessive labor actions. In this country our controls actually are voluntary for the most part, with one exception which is mostly indirect.

The indirect controls are exercised by the control of materials. These controls have an obvious effect on the workers in a nonessential industry which may have its materials cut off, of being prevented from working in that industry. So the industry releases those workers, who are then channeled with the assistance of the Department of Labor into more essential fields.

Our controls so far have been voluntary, because we find that is the most effective way to get the maximum output per man. With sufficient urgency and under the spur of patriotism and the economic urge, we have been able, as we did in World War II, to turn out a large military force and at the same time realize some increase in productivity. It seems to me, looking at the system as it worked under considerable stress before, that there is not much reason to believe that it is immediately necessary to abandon that system for an authoritarian system, which may be beyond our knowledge of how to use properly.

We do have, however, one important control that should never be overlooked. That is in the field of procurement of people for the armed forces. We call it conscription or selective service. That is one manpower control that we now have.

We have not accepted the principle of conscripting people for work in particular industries. We don't seem to like the idea of forcing a man to work for the profit of someone else. We haven't seen fit to abandon our free-enterprise system of economy, which was based on the profit motive. We have not found it necessary to get involved in the conscription of women. But we have long accepted the principle of conscription of men for the uniformed services.

There are several reasons for public acceptance of conscription in this country. We have done it several times successfully. I think perhaps a great deal of credit must be given to the fact that our people understand the necessity for it. They have been told all about it.

The next thing is that we have had a good administration of conscription. Throughout its history we have had a series of administrators with good judgment. We have considerable confidence in the administration of the Selective Service System, somewhat akin to the confidence we all

have in the FBI. Possibly it has to do with personalities, but, principally, it is because of the sound management of the System.

There is, however, in my mind a greater reason for the acceptance by the American people of the principle of selective service; that is, Selective Service is not a part of any organized group. It is not a part of the Labor Department or the Defense Department. It represents no fixed group. It does not represent any professional group. But it is decentralized for the real basic decisions down to the local level. It is actually operated by the 3,700 local boards, composed of unpaid, voluntary citizens of the community in which they do their work, in which they have to make their decisions. These unpaid volunteers are professional men and businessmen of a varied nature in each board. The board is no organ for any particular profession or any particular industry or business.

These people who have to make the difficult decisions as to whether Joe Doaks or the other man will go know the hundreds of lads concerned. The board knows the industries and the places of work of these lads. It knows whether, if a man says he is employed as a machinist, he is really working and being employed as a machinist. It knows whether a company really requires him to do the business that needs to be done in connection with the mobilization effort. The members of the board are the ones that make the decisions.

Now, of course, the policy in some instances has been sent out from headquarters in Washington, but Washington does not make the decisions. There is in the field, machinery available to bring appeals of individuals up to the President, if necessary. But the fact that this is done at the local level is to my mind the basic reason for the popular acceptance of selective service.

Despite that, there are some serious problems that face Selective Service even now, when we are not trying to drum up a very large force in terms of the force we had in World War II. The first of these problems rose out of the necessity that in the uniformed services we must have certain physical standards. Perhaps we have been a little bit too strict about those in the past. We have been quick to recognize that, and we are taking steps to make a selective adjustment of it. We don't want to make an across-the-board lowering of our standards, but we can lower them selectively for some purposes. I think we have made progress in that field, not only during World War II but since then as well.

The next problem we have is the one of dependency. The United States recognizes the necessity and the importance of the family unit. We like to keep the family together and we recognize the responsibility of the head of the family. So those dependency considerations loom very high in our consideration of conscription. It further reduces the number of people that are available for us to call into active service. That matter presents us some very difficult questions.

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We have also a keen recognition in our industrial economy of the necessity for maintaining those industries that are highly essential during the emergency. So we have the problems of occupational and educational deferment, which present serious difficulties. Many people are working on them; they are in the development stage.

We have one more problem which is bordering on an ethical one. It is a characteristic that we have at the present time but did not have during World War II selective service. That is the problem of the veteran.

Heretofore the veteran has usually been a man who was usually seen with a paunch and a funny little hat who stood on the side of the street and waved the boys off to war. But now the veteran is a very choice source of trained military manpower. It is a temptation to say, "Reach in and grab him back for more service." It is an ethical problem whether you should drag him back for more service because he is trained and competent, whether you should pick a new man and train him and let the veteran have his deferment, or whether to pick a veteran or a man who is on an essential machine. I don't know what the answer is; nobody does. But it is something that plagues us. We are working on it and will work it out as we have worked out most of our other problems, as we go along.

Selective Service is one part of a very extensive organization that we have for the mobilization of our people. It is concerned, as I say, with the procurement of people for the uniformed services. We have many other agencies that are concerned with mobilization. We always think first of the Labor Department, in which we have a Committee for Manpower Policy.

We have a new agency set up during this emergency, the Office of Defense Mobilization, in which is the Defense Manpower Administration. We also have in that office the Manpower Policy Committee, which is parallel, I think, to one in the Labor Department. The head of the Manpower Policy Committee in ODM is Dr. Flemming. Dr. Graham heads the corresponding committee in the Department of Labor. Those are departmental committees that work together, with a dual chairmanship.

In addition, we have the Labor-Management Policy Committee, which has combined representatives from labor and management and people in the Government.

We are particularly interested in this group in the organization within the Defense Department. All our manpower agencies in the Defense Department other than those that are parts of the services have been more or less pulled together under the direction of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Anna Rosenberg. In her office we find the Personnel Policy Board and also the old Civilian Components Board which is now the Reserve Policy Board. In there has also been moved the principal manpower responsibility of the Munitions Board.

Only policy control is exercised by that office over the services which still maintain their own personnel and manpower organizations. We have a problem on mobilization which will take up organization. Mike Poluhoff as instructor will supervise the work of the committee on that problem.

This leaves us with one more item that I would like to mention--that is, the question of Communist infiltration. It is a rather difficult problem to discuss. There are two or three things I would like to offer for your consideration with respect to that.

The first thing is that the Communists have a very peculiarly strong sense of loyalty to the USSR--when I say "Communists" here I mean what I think are real Communists. In deciding people's loyalty we have to go by what we can see from outside the person. We don't know what is inside his mind. To me that sense of loyalty is what determines whether he is a Communist or whether he is something else. All I can say is that we can draw some inferences from his actions and behavior as to whether he feels that way or not. We can judge perhaps from his associates, although that is not too reliable. We can judge somewhat by whether his public utterances and his actions tend to shift with Kremlin policy, whether he follows the party line in its various deviate trails. It is not always good evidence, but we can draw conclusions about him. That is one of the difficult things. We have these individuals who are named whenever the question is brought up.

We have thought in terms of a gradation of these groups, with perhaps the fanatic Communists on the one hand, through the fellow travelers, the pinkos, to the dupes, over to the people who are real anti-Communists, who really take action through their abhorrence of the products of communism.

There is one more class of people or agencies that I would like to put into that picture that will help you understand it. That is what I would term the anti-anti-Communist. He is the character who is against every move that is struck by the anti-Communists. At least he hampers every move. That doesn't mean that the anti-anti-Communist is himself a Communist. I don't know just what he is. I don't know why he does that. But we have them. He doesn't belong in the middle. Maybe he is just as patriotic as any anti-Communist; I don't know. But he certainly raises h--- with our efforts to do something about this menace that we have in our Nation today. It is the anti-anti-Communist.

The Communists themselves have shown great skill and effectiveness in infiltrating wherever they can do the most harm. These places, roughly, are, first and always, where there is a possibility of creating tension--racial, labor-management, or any other place where there is tension--that is where we find the Communists, making the tension worse, widening the breach. Next, we find them in places where they can influence thought or public opinion--the press, radio, the entertainment field, and education.

We find them infiltrating places where they can take charge of things that must not be interrupted in times of emergency, like transportation and communications, power, and so on. Of course they infiltrate the labor unions. They infiltrate government agencies, even the military services. So we find them moving into our whole structure. They present a real menace that none of us can overlook.

We haven't done too much about it so far and haven't been very effective, for many reasons. We think that the actions taken by our Government are increasing in their effectiveness.

If we just keep on subscribing to our course, there will be a presentation, about the ninth of November, from which will come more nearly an answer to this question. We have a committee to work on just that problem and what we are doing about it. That will be under the able direction of Colonel Tom Ennis.

That brings me to the end of the material that I want to discuss. We have covered very sketchily the matter of resources, the matter of increasing our resources in both numbers and effectiveness. We have discussed labor relations. We got in a few comments on the views and philosophy of selective service and the employment of our people. And at the end I have made a comment or two on the urgency of keeping a watch on this matter of communism.

I would like to go now to the question and answer period.

QUESTION: I hope you will enlarge on your remarks about the natural growth of organized labor. I recall that around 1920 up until 1932 we had a normal growth and then it jumped up, but it wasn't too big until 1940. But the moment the government expenditures came into play in the summer of 1940, there was a vertical increase in labor union strength, which doesn't indicate to me much of what you were talking about as to the cooperation of labor, but a forced growth through the forced collecting of exorbitant initiation fees and so on. They carried that on even in the South, where they didn't need a larger membership. That is not natural growth. That is forced growth.

COLONEL VAN WAY: The question has been raised as to what I meant or was referring to as "the natural growth of labor union membership." He went on to say that the growth has varied from a rather slow growth until 1932, and that the growth has been almost vertical since the summer of 1940. That the growth has not been a natural one—I am still quoting the questioner—but has been due to forced methods, particularly in the southern regions, where they did not need more membership, but that they were more or less urged into it by economic means.

I don't have any statistics on hand to either confirm or deny your views except this: I don't believe from my reading that the increase of

membership has ever been vertical, as you say, or even anywhere nearly approaching it. The growth in the last two or three years actually has not been proportional to the increase in our population as a whole. I know the membership in labor unions is about 15 million, which is less than 25 percent of our labor force. That is an organized and highly vocal force in labor, and so it carries more weight than perhaps its 25 percent proportion should.

There is a certain element in which you have present an economic pressure being brought to bear to increase the membership. I offer no defense for that at all, but I submit that this economic pressure is not always present; and that through the Taft-Hartley Act we do preserve to the working man a considerable element--this is a matter of opinion--of self determination on the part of the individual as to whether he will join a union, or, if he does, which one he will join and would like to have represent him.

I don't recognize your point, implied at least, that there is an artificial building up of union membership either by the Government or by force. I think it is something that could be stopped by our people if they were ever determined to stop it.

QUESTION: Referring to the chart showing the manpower pyramid, it occurs to me that maybe we are working into that condition of concave sides that you say is quite undesirable, looking at the base of the pyramid from under 5 years of age to 10-14. Is that possible.

COLONEL VAN WAY: Yes.

QUESTION: That as this group grows up, it will work into a concave side.

COLONEL VAN WAY: It is not only possible, but in my opinion it is inevitable that as this cohort moves up, we will have some indentations. It will never get bigger, because immigration is now negligible for all practical purposes. We have now an immigration of about 20,000 to 50,000 a year, as against the normal 200,000 increase per month. Our immigration is negligible. So as the years go on, this same group will go on this way, but the numbers will decrease slightly. We will still have these indentations on the side as we go on up. But that will be a negligible thing insofar as it affects the numbers of our working groups.

I only want to offer this one comment in offsetting the undesirable effects of that: There is no sharp line of demarkation between these large groups. Whether these people work or not depends largely upon whether the place is there for them.

The same is true for the age limit groups. You will notice that we don't have any age limits to our labor force, because there really aren't any. We have adopted sort of a customary retirement figure. It used to

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be 65, but it has been greatly reduced. Reading the insurance advertisements of annuity retirement at 55 on—it used to be \$100 a month, more recently \$150 a month, and now it is "Retire at 55 on \$200 a month." That is merely a measure of our standard of living. We have a short workday. We have moved down from 12 to 10 and now it is 8 hours a day. We have moved the workweek from what it was about the turn of the century, in the order of 70 hours, progressively down to 40. We are talking in terms of today. If we didn't have this degree of urgency to carry us on, we would probably have dropped it down below 40.

That is all a measure of our standard of living—a short workday and a short workweek. I might also say a short work life. We have pushed up from underneath the time at which youngsters start work and we have pushed down from the top the time when people stop work. That is our standard of living. It occurs that way because we are able to do it. You recall what Mr. Notestein said—that the same forces that enable us to keep people living longer also are forcing them out of useful labor earlier. That is one thing we have to look at. Also it is a form of measure of our standard of living. It is considered desirable that we quit work at an early age, which to some of us may not seem to be too good; but that is the way it is now.

If you run into a shortage in the labor force; we have an expansible type of labor and that is to use more of those not now in the labor force. The reason we have not pulled them into the labor force is that we have enough people to do the work without them. If we ever run short, there is always that reserve.

QUESTION: Going to this question of communism, it was pointed out that at the end of the war some of the urgent pressures for demobilization were directly due to communistic effort. Has there been any study made as to the extent of that or the reliability of that premise?

COLONEL VAN WAY: I couldn't answer that authoritatively. I believe that they certainly had a hand in it, but to what extent I couldn't say. Do you have anything to say on that, Colonel Ennis?

COLONEL ENNIS: No. In all the reading I have done on that I have seen only one reference suggesting that it might have been Communist-instigated. I made some inquiries as to whether there were any studies within the Department of Defense, and I got a complete blank. If there is such a thing, it has been kept very definitely under wrap.

QUESTION: Why do they pick 14 years as the entry to the labor force? Wouldn't 16 be more realistic?

COLONEL VAN WAY: I am not sure what you mean by "realistic." I think 16 would certainly be a better age at which to let people enter the working force. But if you want to speak realistically, they actually do, many of them, enter the labor force at 14. I think that is the only answer I can give.

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MR. POLUHOFF: I would add that we have these newsboys who enter the labor force under 16. Also there are the boys who work after school who are included in that group. If they work 15 hours a week or more, they are considered as in the labor force.

QUESTION: Colonel, what significance do you attach to that base line on the side, where the males tend to be a little more than 8 million and the females about 7.75 million? Is that a normal situation or is that an abnormal situation?

COLONEL VAN WAY: I think it must be the result of some war casualty situation. There is a tendency toward balancing. There is some natural law that seems to work in there. But actually the balance stays pretty close to 100 percent. There was a predominance in this country of males throughout our history until just recently, due probably to the effect of immigration, because during the immigration era more men came in than women.

GENERAL HOLMAN: As I got the question, he was referring to just the birth rate as between males and females. Is that correct?

STUDENT: Yes.

GENERAL HOLMAN: There are, statistically, 105 percent of males born to 100 percent of females. There is that differential. We checked on this last year. Mr. Poluhoff looked the same thing up at length. He may have something to say on that from the statistical point of view.

MR. POLUHOFF: Yes. There was a slightly favorable percentage of boys over girls in the birth rate, but the death rate for the boys was slightly higher than for girls. So it tends to even out.

GENERAL HOLMAN: But we still have some over 8 million boys there under five and about 7.75 million girls in that age group.

MR. POLUHOFF: That was before the war. In wartime there is a slight increase over the girls.

COLONEL VAN WAY: There is a very real theory that where there is a shortage of one sex, there is some natural law that works to bring that sex up in the birth rate. Don't ask me why it works that way.

As I was saying, to carry that a little further, immigration did tend to give us a slight preponderance of males in this country. But, due to the statistical condition that the General mentioned and what Mike said, the thing that has erased the difference is the fact that the infant mortality is greater in males than it is in females. But more recently there has been a preponderance in the birth of boys, which has not been accounted for so much by the infant mortality rate, which has been reduced, and which has led to a situation where we now have less

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males than we have females in the over-all population. We have cut down on immigration, which formerly gave us a preponderance of males, and now we have a preponderance of females. It is a very slight one, and it fluctuates back and forth. It is nothing to worry about, however.

QUESTION: We still have quite a few women in the armed forces. I notice that you didn't include them in your chart.

COLONEL VAN WAY: I have given this lecture many times, and always to a military audience, and I have never failed to get that question. It really is most reassuring. I don't know whether that is attributable to the gallantry of the American male or something more fundamental.

That is a good question. I don't mean to make light of the contribution to the uniformed services made by the women during the war, because it was very important, much more important than I have indicated here. This overlay is statistically correct (putting an overlay on the chart). In numbers it was very few. I don't know what their ages were. Actually, there were about 286,000--divided about 100,000 in round numbers in the WAC's and another 100,000 in the Navy, including a ratio of about 70 to 30 between WAVES and Marines. Is that right?

COLONEL ENNIS: About 37,000.

COLONEL VAN WAY: The other 86,000 were nurses, in the ratio of approximately 60,000 Army nurses and 26,000 Navy nurses. That is not a very impressive number against the 12 million that we had. But I think the contribution that they made is very impressive, particularly because it was a sort of introduction to the kind of program which we can set up if we have another serious emergency.

What do we gain--I think that is a reasonable question to ask now--by having women in the uniformed services? Well, in my view we gain several things. First, there are lots of jobs that women by their training and normal habits, and perhaps by their psychology, can do better than men--jobs having to do with patience, meticulous attention to detail, perhaps even monotony, and jobs requiring them to do precise work. They do those things better than men. If any of you had to suffer, as I had, trying to supervise male switchboard operators, you will realize that they can be a real headache. There are many jobs that men cannot do well at all, but women can do the same jobs quite well.

Practically 80 percent of the jobs we have in industry can be done by women. That percentage does not hold true in the armed forces, but there are many jobs that they can do. Most of them fall in the realm of, considering the ones they can do best, the communications services, clerical duties; the communications services, of course, include telephone switchboards and equipment, radio work, and cryptography. Then the great body of health services, such as nurses and nurses' aides--that sort of thing. They do those jobs by and large better than we can get men to do them.

Most of all that we have accomplished by using women in the uniformed services is a saving in training time. If we can get a trained typist in a woman, it certainly saves us training a man to do that, who may not do it as well when he is trained. So we save on training time. Where we get skill and training already accomplished, that will save us time.

Now, the last thing, and as important as any of the rest, is that it gives women a sense of participation in the national effort, which to my mind helps make a cohesive over-all attitude in our people in support of the mobilization effort in which we find ourselves.

There is one other important point that I would like to mention. That is the publicity that is given--I think it is perfectly sound publicity--that a girl who goes in the service releases a man for combat. That is probably true in a certain way. But I venture the opinion--this is just within these confines here--that if we need a man in a foxhole, in an airplane, or on a ship, we will put him there. We don't have to wait until some girl replaces him where he is. We will take him when we need him and replace him later.

Now, suppose we take a man from a typewriter and put him in a foxhole. We have to replace him with another man, whom we may have to pull off an important machine. We have to train this one man to be a typist, and train the other man to be able to live in a foxhole. If we can, on the other hand, take a girl who is already trained to be a typist and put her in to take the place of the man that is being sent to the front, we will then save training one man to type, and also we can leave this man on the machine, which may be where we want him. But it is not the best public relations to tell this girl that she is going into service to let a man stay on a machine.

There is another thing. If you move men from light work to heavy work, it is a little easier to get a housewife to work on a part-time basis. So we have made a gain in the labor force. That is to my mind one of the real gains. But for publicity purposes perhaps it is just as well to say that she is enabling us to get a man up where he can do the fighting.

QUESTION: You said that our losses due to strikes during the war only ran from nine one-hundredths of one percent up to one-half of one percent. What is that figure based on? Man-hours?

COLONEL VAN WAY: It is man-days not worked as against man-days that could possibly have been worked. It is man-days of work lost because of labor disputes and work stoppages growing out of labor disputes. I mean it would include some of the end products.

COMMENT: I think it should be more than that. It should include the work lost in related industries. When there is a strike on carburetors, it will stop work on automobiles and everything else that uses carburetors.

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QUESTION: Does that figure include work losses in related industries?

COLONEL VAN WAY: As far as I know, it does. Of course, when 60 million people are working, each day worked will ring up a lot of man-days. It takes a lot of work stoppage to run up to one percent.

COMMENT: I was in charge at Oak Ridge for some years, where we had a considerable number of people working. We had a lot of work stoppages going on all the time. I don't know of a single day when we didn't have a work stoppage in some place or other; but, as far as the statistics were concerned, there were none.

QUESTION: If you could eliminate featherbedding among the unions, I think you could increase your labor force. Do you have any figure on that?

COLONEL VAN WAY: I don't have any figures on that. Does anyone have any figures on it?

COMMENT: I think it is in the neighborhood of 20 percent. So in those occupations we could increase the labor force by 20 percent by speed-ups and by just making them do the normal work.

COLONEL VAN WAY: I am sure you are right. I read a few things to the effect that you could demonstrate that our efficiency is only 30 percent of what it should be. That is not only from the featherbedding rules, but also because of many other inefficiencies. We don't make maximum use of our power. We don't have the newest machines, for economical reasons. We don't have much urgency to do it at our maximum peak of productive ability. So I think it is fair to say that we work only one hour out of every possible four.

QUESTION: I meant to confine my question a little more specifically to the increase that we could get by eliminating featherbedding, where they are duplicating the men, such as where the unions insist on having a conductor and motorman on a car where one man could do the job, and also on the trains.

COLONEL VAN WAY: I know you did. There is certainly a loss in that. But the loss is only general, in maximum efficiency.

QUESTION: On chart 1, I wonder if you would explain the philosophy behind including the armed forces as part of our labor force, since they are not actually available for producing things. I think we want to avoid a situation where we have to detract from our military strength to fill gaps in the civilian economy, which happened inadvertently the last time and which we are now trying to avoid. Why not carry them as a group under themselves, a department of the civil government? Why include them as part of the labor force per se?

COLONEL VAN WAY: The only reason I can give is that it is statistically more convenient to carry the armed forces as part of the labor force on a chart.

MR. POLUHOFF: Obviously, they are employed, and they do receive pay. You must include them in the labor force. The armed forces receive pay and they must be included in the labor force on that premise alone.

COLONEL ENNIS: And because they are employed.


MR. POLUHOFF: Where else can you put them?

COLONEL VAN WAY: I am really very grateful for your interesting questions and your attention. Thank you.

(6 Nov 1951-350)S/RSB


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CHART I.
U. S. POPULATION
SEPTEMBER 1951



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CHART 2
UNITED STATES MANPOWER PYRAMID
SEPTEMBER 1951



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