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MANPOWER MOBILIZATION

25 September 1951

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Major General Edmund C. Lynch, USAF, Director of Manpower Requirements, Manpower Personnel, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, was born in Philadelphia, 15 December 1900. He is a graduate of the United States Military Academy, 1922; the Air Service Primary Flying School, 1923; the Air Corps Advanced Flying School, 1927; the Tactical School, 1937, and the Command and General Staff School, 1938. He has advanced through the grades to major general. His tours of service include that of Assistant to: The Chief of Staff, G-1, G-2, and the War Department General Staff, 1942-1944; he was Chief of Staff, Headquarters Third Air Force 1945. In October of that year he was assigned to the Alaskan Department. He is a member of the American Society of Military Engineers, American Radio Relay League, and is a member of the Masonic Order.

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GENERAL HOLMAN: Gentlemen, this morning we continue with our studies on manpower; our principal interest in that subject this morning is manpower for the armed forces. This will bring us into the broad areas of requirements for the Army, Navy, and Air Force, legislative and administrative problems at the Secretary of Defense level and, possibly, something about manpower controls and the considerations of public opinion which are always present with manpower problems.

Our speaker, Major General Edmund C. Lynch, is the Director of Manpower Requirements, Manpower Personnel, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense. General Lynch, we consider it a privilege to hear you this morning and to welcome you to the Industrial College.

GENERAL LYNCH: Thank you. General Vanaman and members of the Industrial College student body: Perhaps I should clarify my status somewhat in the beginning. This is a pleasure for me. It is the first time I have been over to the Industrial College to appear before the student group. I am supposed to be on loan to the Office, Secretary of Defense, and also have another assignment as Director of Manpower, an organization in the Headquarters, United States Air Force. It has been customary for a speaker to qualify himself in the initial stages of a talk of this nature.

I got into the so-called personnel business in 1938 and have been in it off and on ever since then, serving a tour in the GHQ, Air Force, and also on the War Department General Staff. It seems that one gets tagged as a "specialist" or an "expert" of somewhat dubious distinction; but it has some advantages in that most of the problems we face today are basically the same problems that we faced some 10 years ago. This, however, is one point that I want to develop in the course of the talk this morning, the aspect of the problems is different today from what it was in 1941 and through the days of World War II.

I will address myself to the point as to the conditions that are different and the effects of those pressures as we appear before the Congress in connection with various manpower problems. I read a paper some years ago from the Director of Selective Service. In addressing his State Directors who were gathered for a manpower seminar, he said in effect that manpower is one of our most important and vital national assets. On the other hand, it was taken for granted by most people and understood by very few.

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There is no dearth of experts in the manpower business at the present time; everybody seems to be in the act. As an illustration, we were counting up recently and there are in the Congress 14 committees or subcommittees who are dabbling in various phases of the manpower problem. Some of them are at almost direct odds with the other committees in their approach to the problem and in their objectives.

Amongst the ways and means of reducing the pressure of living with my work too many hours a day, I subscribe to a magazine entitled "Audio Engineering," and, like in other papers and magazines, the letters to the editor are very fine as a source of interest, particularly as to how and why people think as they do. Some time back, in England, they had a radio show and one of the contributors to the letters column in the magazine wrote a very critical letter on the conduct of a particular company's representative at the radio show, or audio show. This particular company made a loud-speaker of some different design, and one of the specific comments was with respect to the "maddening smile of ignorant complacency" that was on the face of the representative of the loud-speaker manufacturer. This point is somewhat typical, so I thought I would read a short extract from the letter; this was a rebuttal by an Englishman, who identified his company through the nature of the remarks, even though the name of the company was not mentioned. He says: "It wasn't a 'maddening smile of ignorant complacency' that our assistant wore; it was an outer symbol of the mental indigestion that occurs during an exhibition through answering questions of innumerable people, a few of whom admit to knowing nothing of loud-speaker design, fewer still who know quite a lot, and a great majority who combine the knowledge of the first group with the authority of the second."

If we examine some of the aspects of the manpower problem that remark seems somewhat appropos; we have a few, perhaps, recognized or alleged experts--but I don't claim to be one. There are a great many people who are very busy in the field.

As to some of the pressures, I think Mr. Finletter very well summarized the problem a couple of weeks ago when he gave the graduating address to a class of officers in manpower advancement that the Air Force was running at George Washington University. He substantially said: This country is embarking on a unique experiment that never in his knowledge had been done before; that we are all attempting to maintain a large standing Army and at the same time produce the goods necessary to make those armed forces effective fighting units; also to maintain a high level of production for the civilian economy. It is the effect of trying to meet those three somewhat conflicting objectives within a limited manpower pool that we obtain these various pressures that we now have.

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I think this speaks also for the reactions we get on the congressional side with respect to the dollar costs and other problems involved in such programs. The added complications--which result from a lack of clarity as to just what will happen if the United States in six months or a year continues the status of the cold war, semimobilization--lacks many of the clear-cut issues that ordinarily exist in the case of fighting a clear-cut military operation.

Now, just as a very brief point, I have some figures here (on the blackboard) which I got from Selective Service a year or so ago, which show the general composition of the population; later I will refer to the specific figures with respect to the military manpower pool. These are substantially the same figures that you have had before. They are all in thousands: 57 million in the labor force; 4 million plus unemployed; and 1.6 million in the armed forces; out of a total population of 148 million. Outside the labor force there are some 82 million composed of major segments--children under 14, 38 million; housekeepers, 30 million; students, 5.5 million; aged and infirm, 9 million.

In the study from which this was extracted, it was designed to show the problem facing Selective Service. In the case of mobilization, certain assumptions were made; one of them was that the country would have to provide 11.7 million for the armed forces during a period of 24 months from any given date--assumed here is July 1949--to bring the armed forces to strength of 13.4 million, which was at that time the requirement in one of the mobilization plans. Take that number out of the labor force and replace it in the labor force by a shift of 3.5 million from the unemployed and by a shift of almost 8 million from these categories outside the labor force, so that you have substantially the same working force. The problem today is that while we haven't taken out that many, our authorized strength today is 3.6 million. The effect of the increased military production and the high level of civilian production is what generates the pressure.

Back in 1941 we had a much larger number of unemployed--in the vicinity of 8 million, as I recall--and we also, during the course of the war, made a remarkable diversion of women from household or house-keeping activities into production. Today we have relatively low unemployment, and the women who were shifted into the labor force have either remained in the labor force or are raising some of the children under 14. They are not available to shift back, so that we don't have the flexibility within those categories today that we had in 1941.

The actual manpower pool of prime military manpower in the ages from 18 through 31 is estimated to be about 17 million, so that 13 million estimate calls for about 80 percent of the total available or the maximum use of our prime military manpower if we need forces of 13-plus million.

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The problem from the viewpoint of the Defense Department, then, boils down to first keeping our requirements to the minimum and, second, making the best use of those we have on hand, or utilization. I believe the problem presented in the manpower field was clearly recognized by General Marshall in the summer of 1950; it was through his activity that the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Personnel was set up in December 1950. That office has been getting underway slowly and more or less in conformance with the requirements of the situation as they have developed.

Initial activities of the office were primarily concerned with the Universal Military Training and Service Act which was finally signed in June of 1951. I will come back to the military manpower pool and the adjustments that resulted from that act and I will now speak more particularly on organizational matters. That legislation and similar items before the Congress required almost the entire attention of the small staff that Mrs. Rosenberg set up initially.

On the 27th of April, when I came into the picture, the President sent a letter to the Defense Department, which said, substantially, "Before I give you 60 billion dollars to spend, I want to be sure that you know what you are doing, (a) with respect to procurement and (b) with respect to people." That generated a major "flop" as we say in the trade, and Mrs. Rosenberg, not having a staff that was capable of taking on the project of writing a report to the President, drafted the necessary members from the departments, and I was assigned on a temporary basis to help out.

We gathered material from the services in the course of firming up a report to the President. Our objective was to be, first of all, frank and if we were not good, admit it, and second, to be affirmative in our plans of what we intended to do about those items. There was at that time no clear-cut relationships for the Office of Secretary of Defense in the manpower field, except the general deduction from the act setting up the Defense Department. It dealt primarily in policy matters and operated through the services.

So, in developing the report to the President, we had to do a little more than really make a report on what was being done. We had to go further and develop a general scheme of operation and a scheme of relationship between the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Personnel and the military departments. Then, as soon as we had that task behind us--that was on the 22nd day of May--the next problem was to organize the Requirements Division.

I might digress there and mention that the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Personnel) as set up consists of a Director of Requirements, a Director of Utilization, Directors of Industrial Relations, Manpower Supply, and Personnel Policy. It is

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fairly self-evident, I think, from the titles, that the Personnel Policy is the old Personnel Policy Board which has been re-established as a staff division within Mrs. Rosenberg's office and as distinguished from being a separate board under the Secretary of Defense.

The method of operation of the Requirements Division is essentially a formalization of the method of operation that has been in effect over a period of a couple of years. An officer who worked with me, Colonel McGlashan of the Marine Corps, and I had participated in the justification of military manpower programs before representatives of the Secretary of Defense and the Bureau of the Budget. Representatives of the Secretary of Defense then consisted of both the Assistant Secretary (Comptroller) and also General McNarney, representing the Secretary of Defense.

Immediately following the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, when we were justifying supplemental appropriations for increases in the armed forces, it was quite apparent that you could not review a program for dollar cost until you had first disposed of the manpower program on which the dollars were based. As a matter of necessity, perhaps, rather than choice, the usual procedure was that you justified your manpower program, what you proposed, in terms of the job to be done, which of the forces had been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and what supporting activities were required to go with those forces.

In working up the concept for the Requirements Division, we synthesized, or put together, all of the bits and pieces of practical experience that had happened to us in the past and translated it into a formal working arrangement. So that, as far as the end result is concerned, representatives of Mrs. Rosenberg's office, or she herself, will preside at the manpower review in much the same way General McNarney did in the past when he represented the Secretary of Defense.

We believe that there is one major field in which our office can be of major assistance to the departments, and that is in the field of program guidance. Going back to some of the prior programs--we in the Air Force would work up a manpower program and it would be based on certain unilateral assumptions which had to be made in order to complete certain computations within the program. Assumptions had to be made because of the very broad guidance we had from the Secretary of Defense or the broad statements that had appeared in the JCS papers. When you reach the review table there is no meeting of the minds on the assumption that you had made. That usually occurs about Friday afternoon at 4:00 o'clock and, almost invariably, I don't know why, you have to have something by 8:30 Monday morning. So you work maybe Friday night, Saturday and most of Sunday, and you come up with something new on Monday. That is a two- or three-day job, when

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it should have taken two or three weeks, and you get that kind of a product. You still may have missed the ball on a couple of points; so, everything has to be done over again the next week end. After several of those flaps, you have finally gotten something that looks pretty well on the surface, but may be out of balance when you get down to the details of making it work later on.

Our interest in the development of this concept was to reduce the week end flaps, and I was ably supported by Colonel McGlashan, who, unfortunately for him, went down to Rio--he made his contribution and left. We were to reduce the number of week end flaps by getting a meeting of the minds first on the assumptions and guide lines, and then develop a program. We look at the program in the review from the point of view of consistency with the original guide lines, and of finding out what additional assumptions or decisions had to be made in the development of the program, to see whether they caused any deviations from the original plan. After the manpower plan is approved, then you cost it; but you don't get involved in a lot of detailed costing until the manpower part is well-firmed up.

In the course of developing the fiscal year 1953 budget estimates, we are doing our best to adhere to those objectives. When you get down to the working level, they say, "This is sure fine, if you can make it; but I don't know whether or not you can accomplish everything you set out to do." One of the problems you run into when seeking to help the working people, is that some of the detail may seem to be a little bit more than broad policy which should be announced by the Secretary of Defense; but, on the other hand, if the working men agree that this is the type of answer they need in order to make their problem easier in program development, we think they ought to have it in the beginning.

While I am on organization, I might touch briefly on the Utilization Division, which is an important counterpart to the Requirements Division. There has been considerable discussion as to whether the two divisions should not be amalgamated, because they work pretty much together, but, for the time being, at least, Requirements and Utilization are set up as separate activities.

Their major activities in the Utilization Division in recent months have been in establishing qualitative distribution, that is, prorating the different quality groups within your military manpower among the four military services, so that they each get their fair share of the top and bottom of the pot; also, in establishing a working relationship with the services through the armed forces examining Station Policy. We use consolidated examining stations to get an over-all assurance of standardization in the examination and in the handling of people. These policies are established by a group of service representatives that meet periodically to handle various operating policy problems. The Army is the executive agent of the policy which is laid down by this group.

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The Industrial Relations and Manpower Supply Divisions are concerned essentially with the same basic problems that you are, except that they are primarily concerned with the operating aspects. As you may know, the recent revision of the Defense Production Act requires that the Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with certain other government officials, certify critical labor areas. This certification provides special credit for housing as well as for instituting rent control. They are also concerned with the problems growing out of strikes which affect defense production. The copper strike was one of them, and there was also a problem connected with getting sulphuric acid out of a strike-bound plant for the high-test aviation gas production.

The other division is that of Personnel Policy. It is concerned more with personnel administration problems affecting the different services, such as the Career Compensation Act, promotions, discharges, and the like. The question often arises as to what is the distinction between manpower and personnel. As I see it distinction is largely in the relationship of the mission and personnel as a resource rather than relationships resulting from dealing with people as individuals. In the Air Force the basic control of manpower is centralized in the Directorate of Manpower and Organization, which is an activity under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations. The reason behind putting it there is that manpower is one of the basic resources that we use in getting the job done. We are in the "numbers" business--and I know the personnel people don't like this, but they are in the "body" business. The distinction is that they deal with people as individuals--obtain them, train them, and place them in the positions which are created as a result of the mission. The problems definitely interrelate, and there is a more hazy borderline in the utilization field than in the field of requirements.

As a result of the creation of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Personnel, there have been of necessity some adjustments in the four military services. Perhaps I should speak more specifically of the departments in this case, because, when you deal on the departmental level, the Navy Department speaks for the Marine Corps.

When Mrs. Rosenberg first got into Washington, she had a meeting of all the people from the three departments who were concerned with personnel or manpower. I don't remember what the exact number was that actually showed up, but it was somewhat the size of the group in this auditorium, without bothering to count noses--and she said it looked like too many to deal with and get anything done. So she started by establishing a "focus of responsibility" for manpower in each of the departments. The Air Force was pretty well off in that respect, because the Office of the Director of Manpower and Organization had been established in December 1949, and the interest in manpower, both military and civilian, at the secretarial level was already consolidated in

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the Assistant Secretary for Management. Both the Army and the Navy had to make certain changes in order to comply, primarily because they handled military and civilian personnel through different channels-- that may be an interesting point to discuss for a moment.

During World War II when General Gasser set up the War Department Manpower Board, they found early in the game that you had to treat both civilian and military manpower as a package if you were really going to do any sort of a job in requirements. So the Army made G-1 responsible for over-all military and civilian manpower, which is handled by one of the Assistant Secretaries of the Army. The Army problem was a little easier than that of the Navy because it has the General Staff where you could obtain focus before it came to the Secretary level. Navy personnel is under the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, which handles both military and civilian manpower. They are in the process of working out the details to get clearer-cut channels of communications on the subject.

So much on organizational matters--now a brief word in closing on the manpower pool and the effect of the Selective Service Act of 1951 on the pool. As I said earlier, our authorized strength is 3.6 million. Back in June, starting immediately after the passage of the act, the Department of Defense started its first independent analysis of the pool. We were assisted by representatives of the Department of Labor and the Director of Selective Service. We used the same raw material that later came out in Manpower Study No. 9 from the Bureau of Labor Statistics; our results are so close together that if I speak of any questions on that point I will refer specifically to Manpower Report, Study No. 9, rather than to our own studies.

To summarize briefly: We can maintain 3.6 million men in the armed forces with the present selective service pool without any particular difficulty. General Hershey calls for a minimum in the pool of four to six times the monthly induction call, and this is merely a very brief summary of the pool question in thousands. We started the fiscal year 1952 with 930,000 in the pool. That's the military age group, 18-1/2 through 26, adjusted for three factors. As you may recall, the new Universal Military Training and Service Act cuts the age to 18-1/2; it reduces the scope of dependency departments; it lowers the mental standards; actually, it prescribes both mental and physical standards, but the services were already on the lower physical standard. In effect the only change with respect to the pool was a lowering of the mental qualifications. So the pool at the beginning of 1952 is 930,000. During the year we gain 580,000, consisting of the new group of 18-1/2 year-olds, plus those who had been postponed to go to high school or college, to make up this total. The services will require 880,000 to maintain a force of 3.6 million. We have a net at the end of the year of 630,000. This same cycle follows through 1953, which leaves about 400,000 at the end of the year, and which is substantially more than the minimum required by the Director of Selective Service.

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That minimum, within limits, is a real requirement, because the people are not distributed by local boards in accordance with the way the draft quotas are issued. You may have a surplus in one board and a shortage in another, this reserve takes care of that maldistribution. There are a few "hookers" in this estimate. The Department of Defense is strong for the maximum number of voluntary enlistments and goes to Selective Service as a last resort. The reason for that is very simple. The volunteers enlist for a period of three or four years--mostly four. The man inducted has to be replaced in two years. Then our experience is that the reenlistment rate among the volunteers is reasonably high, say about 50 percent. Now the reenlistment rate among the inductees is zero. The requirement to replace people is much less through volunteers than with inductees who have to be replaced in toto every two years. Our estimate of enlistments is based on the service estimates of their procurement through voluntary enlistment. To the extent that they fail to get their people through voluntary enlistment, this pool will be knocked down, because what you get in 1952 through the draft over this number has to be met by replacements in 1954--two years later.

How to increase the armed forces to four million, which we used as a feasibility check of the manpower pool, we would be scraping the bottom of the barrel with the available pool we now have under Universal Military Training and Service Act. We think it can be done by squeezing or by stopping various leaks that we have in the bucket. It would mean tightening student deferments, tightening up on all losses from the younger age groups to any other sources except a strict interpretation of deferments--or into the military service.

I think that about covers the major elements and I also might mention at this time that there is an excellent issue of the "Scientific American" for September which is devoted entirely to the human resources of the country. It covers the labor force, armed forces, technical and scientific aspects, and it is a very interesting issue. I haven't really had time to digest it myself, but it covers in a much better way than I have ever seen before all the different aspects of the manpower resources, both as to quality and quantity. One of the real problems in any detailed and worth while analysis of the problem is that we lack a good qualitative understanding of what is in the manpower pool. It has been dealt with almost entirely by numbers; we have a great deal of difficulty in trying to establish any qualitative analysis of the pool. We can make certain guesses by extrapolating World War II experience on people who passed through the Selective Service System, but that is a rather crude way of making estimates.

Thank you very much for the opportunity of appearing before you.

MR. POLUHOFF: Gentlemen, we are ready for your questions.

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QUESTION: General Lynch, as we well know, the services have been plagued in the past by the absence of agreement on the part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the force tabs for the three departments in their demands to establish manpower requirements.

GENERAL LYNCH: That has not changed as of, say, Saturday.

QUESTION: If we are still in that position, isn't it true that we will continue to be accused of not knowing our business, as we have in the past; of establishing manpower requirements that vary from here to there, depending on the daily flow of guesstimates as to what our manpower numbers are?

GENERAL LYNCH: The problem is not so much in the specific combat forces. They are usually associated with a definite, known number, based usually on tables of organization. The hooker is in the details of the logistic and training establishments; they are what cost the most people. It is in that area where the JCS have rather broad guidance that it is subject to varying interpretation it goes down through the various service channels; it does not state the degree of readiness which is to be converted into manpower requirements. The argument is not with the arithmetic; it is with how you define the state of readiness that should be provided to meet the JCS plans.

That is one of the objectives in the Requirements Division, which takes some time to accomplish. But only to the extent that we can get Mr. McNeil, the Comptroller, and Mrs. Rosenberg, speaking for Requirements, to highlight the essential problems facing the services, and keep needling JCS to get a better solution, we can make progress. As it stands now, those problems are often set at the working level in building a budget, and involve a matter of considerable compromise some time later.

We feel that if there is too big a disagreement, then it comes back to the JCS, because it concerns the state of readiness of a service. The Air Force has just designed a new program, the 138 Wing Program which, in a sense was designed to meet the limited manpower requirements that are available. It is a read "deterrent" force and has certain calculated thinness in the logistics support. It was started by a special group under Dr. Learned, who is a professor in business administration at the Postgraduate School of the Harvard Business School and consultant to the Chief of Staff, U. S. Air Force. His committee worked to develop what you might call a tailor-made requirement within manpower limitations; this is the first step I know of in that direction. It is a problem we are working on; I don't know now soon we will solve it.

QUESTION: In your office in the Office, Secretary of Defense, have you taken over the responsibility of civilian employees of the military establishment, or does that still rest in the Comptrollers Office?

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GENERAL LYNCH: No, that has been transferred to us. We establish civilian personnel ceilings now.

QUESTION: When General Marshall resigned here a few weeks ago, the President stated he had held him there until he completed the study on UMT. Can you tell us anything about that?

GENERAL LYNCH: Well, I may not be completely accurate as to detail, but you remember the act established a commission which was to look into the problem of universal military training and to give Congress, I think, within six months, detailed plans which called for the special rules and regulations, and a lot of other things. Mrs. Rosenberg has a special assistant, General Dabney, Army, who worked with the commission headed by Senator Wadsworth. Various representatives of the departments have discussed various problems with them. I believe they are in the process of completing their report now.

One of the questions we got into in a specific way is: How big a start do you make, recognizing any start of UMT has to come out of the manpower pool and would be lost unless you have total mobilization? This is unofficial, because I have not seen it appear as yet; but the figure suggested was about 60,000 for the pilot start, split between the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

MR. POLUHOFF: General, can you tell us how your office works with Selective Service?

GENERAL LYNCH: We work in two ways. We are the people who assemble the Defense Department call on Selective Service each month, and we review the call from the standpoint of whether it is consistent with service plans for gains and losses. We submit that to General Hershey and he produces the people. In connection with the study of the manpower pool, we worked with General Hershey's statistical people because we had to use certain of their data in order to estimate what the pool was; but there are certain limitations on Selective Service data.

Here is a specific illustration of the point: Selective Service only considers people who pass through its system. Now, in order to determine what we can get out of a class of 18-1/2-year-olds, say in 1954, we must go to the census and estimate how many there will be in the total group. But to figure out how many would be rejected for physical and mental reasons, and so on, you can't use Selective Service data, because it won't count people who enlisted directly. Therefore, enlistment is in effect a zero rejection. We have to take its data, and use it in conjunction with other material. We discuss it with Selective Service people, to see if they can find any flaws in our reasoning. We have our differences of opinion with Selective Service.

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For example, we don't think it needs as big a margin from the bottom of the barrel as claimed; but we can work that out. It has a long history of fine cooperation with the Department.

**QUESTION:** General, apparently the deferments in different categories must tend to decrease the effective manpower pool. Would you comment on the meaning and importance of these critical occupations and essential activities which I presume Selective Service screens and determines what is critical and what is essential?

**GENERAL LYNCH:** You brought up two points there. "Critical skills" is a sort of a "bucket of worms" in some respects, because there is no clear-cut definition, and it is hard to get your feet on the ground and find out just what are the true requirements. For example, we may find in a plant producing electronic equipment that they think the clerk in the stockroom has to be an electrical engineer, but he doesn't have to be. The Utilization Division in Mrs. Rosenberg's office is working on that problem to actually find out what the job requires, and then, what our requirements are on critical skills within the services and how you can meet them through training within or without the service.

There is a certain amount of cloudiness in the water, I think, because of the agitation of particular groups who want to see their people taken care of. More specifically, as to the deferments, the age group we are talking about is 18-1/2 to 26. We made some estimates of deferment and the Bureau of Labor Statistics has also made estimates. Of course, the big deferment is the student deferment, but we get them back eventually, because that is just a postponement of services. We estimate there will be deferments with around 500,000 in the school population. With a squeeze down of deferments you can get part of that out; but that is a onetime take. From then on you get only the number of students who graduate or fail in their course.

The number of men who would be ineligible for induction prior to rejection because they are proud fathers is estimated as insignificant in the 18-1/2 to 19-year-old group; and about 10,000 of the 19; 20,000 of the 20; and 20,000 of the 21 to 25. Other than those who have already been deferred and are carried on the books, we estimate a deferment of 10,000 in the 18-1/2-year-old group for critical occupations and miscellaneous reasons. A fairly big slice is the group that goes into the National Guard and organized units direct, estimated at 30,000. Other than those there is a very limited number of deferments in the younger group. Those are where they should be, in the manpower pool.

**QUESTION:** In connection with stimulating high voluntary programs, and at the same time controlling the quantities and qualities inducted into the three armed forces, Would you comment on the effectiveness of that control, that is between enlistments and inductions?

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GENERAL LYNCH: Both enlistees and inductees are run through Armed Forces examining stations so we know what each service gets in quality and based on an over-all analysis, we correct it by changing the percentage distribution of mental grades. Strangely enough, the actual quality of the take through volunteers has not be exceptionally out of balance with respect to what we have been getting through induction. It varies. If you look at a particular, short period of time, there may be a discrepancy. For a time there was a feeling that they were getting a lower quality through induction than through voluntary enlistment. If qualitative distribution has not done anything more, it has opened up and put on a factual basis an area that was subject to a lot of debate. We know that the assumption that a service made that it was getting lower quality through induction than enlistments proved to be incorrect, when considered over a period of time. There may have been zigs and zags in the curve, but so far it has not required any particular effort to level off. We have not attempted to go back and inventory what everybody had on hand and establish a new base. The qualitative distribution started and makes equitable distribution from there on.

QUESTION: In the event of an all-out war, what will be our military manpower requirement, and how long can we support it?

GENERAL LYNCH: I don't think I can answer that question specifically, because there are too many intangibles. You have heard Senator O'Mahoney argue about atomic weapons and re-examining the military requirements for people in light of modern weapons. We have the 13 million estimate that you saw, which refers to a particular mobilization plan, but we haven't used mobilization plans before. I remember I used to work on nice plans back in 1938 and 1939, but no one ever used them. The actual number we need will depend more on the situation as it jells. Then it will be a question of squeezing it out of the labor force, because there is no other place to get it. It will be a problem of trying to figure how many people you need to produce material. You guess how many people you will need for the needs of the civilian economy, and how you can squeeze out more as your production program passes its peak and a certain amount of stockpiling has been provided.

QUESTION: Several of our lectures on technical progress have taken research engineers under progress and have blamed the armed forces considerably for the fact that there is not a large stock of them and because there is not enough deferment of engineers and scientists and research workers.

GENERAL LYNCH: They are more of our stronger agitators. I don't believe it is the fault of the armed forces. In the first place, they just weren't entering the schools and they were not graduating with specific availability. For example, there would not have been as many doctors now if the Army had not put them under the ASTP program during the war. There were a lot of engineers that went to school at that time.

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There again you get into the question of just what is the real need. Is industry using properly the people it already has? Does industry have engineers as office boys and not in the right place within its own setup? We are trying to evaluate our own problem within the Department with respect to the real need for such personnel, but I don't know of any action on the outside that corresponds with this, to see whether or not they are making the maximum utilization. A lot of them go through school but never specialize in the work they take.

QUESTION: General, assuming that the Secretary of Defense comes up with its requirements, with, say, 13,000--who comes up with requirements for the civilian economy, and if so, who makes the balance between the two? You mentioned a minute ago that this had to be done.

GENERAL LYNCH: Well, the President has a special assistant on manpower by the name of Mr. Stowe, who covers the entire manpower field. There is the office of defense manpower which reviews the various problems in the manpower field. So far they have gotten into the broader aspects of talking about some of these problems like increasing the number of engineers, training them to meet critical shortages, and so on. The Department of Labor gets up manpower data for the quarterly reports for Mr. Wilson and evaluates where we are going in the production effort--how the manpower is holding out, where we are going military-wise, and so on. I would presume in answer to your questions, because I don't know the specific detail, that the question of the relative balance would be determined at the National Security Council level after all these staff agencies have gotten the facts together to give them some grasp of the problem, and final determination would be made by the President. There is the machinery set up for gathering the facts and gradually winnowing out the major elements so they can be presented to the President or the National Security Council.

MR. POLUHOFF: General Lynch, can you tell us anything about the problems we might have in dealing with Congress, if we have any?

GENERAL LYNCH: I might illustrate one point in particular. We have plenty of problems, but that would be a topic of its own. I might add that I was the principal witness for all civilian manpower and the witness for the military requirement of the Air Force. We solve the problem of being consistent by having one witness who answers all the questions on civilian numbers. The budget people talk about money and I answer all questions on numbers.

I will say this, from my observation the members of the House Subcommittee on Appropriations are very hard-working and the most thorough workmen. They go through estimates line by line--some of you students here appeared over there--and ask questions in order that they can understand and better defend the requirements of the Department when they get on the floor. They want to know why you have certain things

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in there, and they are not satisfied with generalities; they want to know the specific detail, which they are entitled to know. So that the relationships in dealing with the Appropriations Committees are much different from some you see in the press, that get highlighted with publicity; they are sincere, hard-working men, and often come to the help of the service witnesses when they are not bringing out key points in their testimony. They want to be sure that the things asked for are consistent with the programs, and indeed are quite helpful in bringing out the various details and facts. They, like other Members of Congress, get letters from their constituents, and we get a lot of specific questions that are more or less directed to problems in the field, which seem to run through all the various congressional mail.

We had a particularly hard time on the recall of reservists. Well, to put it frankly, in my opinion, at least, the trouble was with our reserve plan. Our reserve programs were just not geared to a situation such as Korea. That is really the whole thing in a nutshell. It was based on the theory of the bell ringing, then you mobilize and fight. We just didn't have our plans and our reserve personnel orientated to a situation such as Korea. The only way we could meet the requirements for building up rapidly the armed forces, the only place we had the know-how, was in the reserve forces, and if we were going to build our forces in a hurry, we had to call them to active duty. The problem now in the Congress can be boiled down to this: Are we moving fast enough to train new men to phase the Reserves out? That is really what they are pressing for.

MR. POLUHOFF: Thank you, General Lynch. Our time is up and on behalf of the Industrial College, General, I wish to extend to you our deep appreciation and thanks for the sacrifice of your time and effort for our instruction. Thank you.

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