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WORLD-WIDE DEMOGRAPHY

26 September 1951

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Dr. William Wendell Cleland, Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of Intelligence Research for International Sociological Intelligence, Department of State, was born in Aledo, Illinois, 14 December 1888. He received his A.B. degree from Westminster College, Pennsylvania, 1909; M.A. degree from Princeton University, 1914; and Ph.D. from Columbia University, 1936. He was also awarded a D.S. degree from Westminster College, 1936. Among his many assignments, 1911-1913, he was educational secretary of the United Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. From 1915-1917 he was secretary comptroller, State of New York. From 1918 to 1919 he was captain of the American Red Cross Commission to Palestine. He was also professor of sociology, American University at Cairo, Egypt, 1924-1947. During 1943-1944 he was chief regional specialist, Middle East Division, Office of War Information, and from 1940-1947 he was with the National Council YMCA of Egypt. He was also a member of Societe Fouad I d'Economic Politique, de Statistique et de Legislation. He was awarded the Egyptian-American University Fellowship, 1945-1946. He was chairman of the Committee of Awards for the State Department Scholarships of the American Embassy in Cairo. He was also a member of the Committee on Mission and Government of the Egypt Intermission Council. He is a fellow of the A.A.A.S., charter member of Council of Egypt Association for Social Studies. He is author of: "The Population Problems in Egypt," 1936; "The Causes of Poverty in Egypt," 1947; and is a contributor to scientific journals in Egypt.

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COLONEL VAN WAY: Gentlemen, for our first lecture on the resources of population in the world we are most fortunate to have been able to get the services of Dr. William Wendell Cleland, who is Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of Intelligence Research in the Department of State. Dr. Cleland will talk to us on, "World-Wide Demography." We take great pleasure in welcoming Dr. Cleland to our platform.

DR. CLELAND: Colonel Van Way and gentlemen: My talk will deal with the population of the world, with special reference to manpower, both quantity and quality, and touching only the high spots.

You have in your hands some tables and a bibliography. The bibliography is classified "Restricted" because it has on it one classified document. The table is by way of letting you have in your hands a memo to refer to as I talk.

This table no doubt has some mistakes in it, because a great deal of it is based upon estimates. It also divides up the world by continents and gives illustrations under the continent where there are no good figures covering the continent's population as a whole. Consequently, you will not find each of these countries reported in each column, because there was no intention of doing anything but offering illustrations of the rates or numbers which belong in any particular column.

As you know, the figures in a talk like this are based very much upon estimates. The census in any country is pretty much an estimate, an exact estimate in some countries, and in others it varies a good deal. But in some of the continents, particularly in eastern and southeastern Asia, there are very few figures on which one can base a statement. A great many figures are obtained by sample studies, and it is assumed that the sample study would illustrate the whole area. So what you have is not gospel in any sense. It is only a memo by which we can discuss the question here this morning.

Population Distribution

We are to talk about the distribution of the population of the world (map, page 19). I have put on the board over here a small map, which was blown up for me by the geographical office in the State Department; also an outline showing the areas where the population is densest. I think you can get an impressionistic picture from it.

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You can see that in the Far East, China and India are the main areas of population. In Europe and in North America, northeastern United States and southeastern Canada, are other principal areas of concentrated population. On this particular map every dot represents 50,000 people. Consequently there are areas that are plain white, like Alaska, where there is only one dot. It is impossible to show a proper distribution when you use one dot for 50,000 people, but you do get a general impression of the areas of the world where the population question is most acute.

As must appear to you from the map, 75 percent of the world's population lives on 12.5 percent of the land area. These four regions--the Far East, South Asia (India, Pakistan, Ceylon), Europe, and the eastern United States and Canada--are the principal regions where we have a concern for large numbers of people. There are other smaller regions. Egypt, for example, is one of the most densely populated areas on the face of the globe, with 20 million people living on 13,500 square miles of arable land. Java also is very densely populated. Nigeria is about as densely populated a section as there is in Africa outside of Egypt.

With regard to figures on world-wide population one needs to keep in mind--and this concerns us, because we are of European stock--that the 1950 estimate is that 30.7 percent of the world's population are of European stock, which includes, of course, the densely populated areas of Europe.

Table, page 20, shows the population estimates in growth from 1750 to 1950 and to 1960, with the percentage of the total population of the world for these particular areas. You can see that Africa, for example, which in 1750 had about 13 percent of the population; in 1950 had only 8.3 percent, and in 1960 at the rate of growth in the past 10 years, there will be 8.5 percent. The Americas have been growing very rapidly, from 13.7 percent of the world's population in 1950 to 14 percent in 1960. But the rapid rate of growth since 1750 is obviously slowing up.

Asia has the bulk of the world's population--53 percent in 1950 and it will be 53.2 percent in 1960. Europe is slowing down somewhat, with 16.5 percent in 1950 and 15.4 percent estimated in 1960. Oceania is very small. Australia, New Zealand, and the islands of the Pacific are only one-half of 1 percent.

For your information on the USSR and its satellites, the satellites are not included in the population of the USSR, but rather in the figures for Europe and Asia. The USSR has increased somewhat in the percentage of the population under Russian control.

There is going on what is called a demographic revolution, or "evolution" perhaps some people would call it; and in the process of the evolving population of the world there are certain factors that enter,

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such as political stability, degree of literacy, amount of scientific research, amount of food available, other economic surpluses, disease control, checking deaths, and adding to the length of life; and also birth rates have their part naturally in increasing the population.

The Demographic Cycle

The areas here might be divided into three groups. One is where there is "an incipient decline in population," and the illustration on the table, page 20, is Europe, where there is a decline, as indicated in the percentage of total population. This decline at present touches about 20 percent of the world's population, including Europe (central and western Europe particularly), the United States, Canada, and British Oceania.

An incipient decline means that the population is about at the place where the growth has slowed up so that they are barely replacing the losses. Indeed, in a few places they will soon be losing numbers.

Then the second group is "the transitional group," including also about 20 percent of the total world's population. That involves eastern Europe, the USSR, Japan, and eastern South America. These people are just at the point where, having started the process of checking the growth of the population, they will very shortly, say--in a generation, be at the place where Europe and North America are just now.

Then there is a third group, "high growth of population," which includes 60 percent of the total world population and practically all the rest of the world that has not been mentioned so far--eastern Asia, the Near East, Middle East, central Africa, Central America, and northern and western South America. Here one finds a high density of population, a high infant mortality, famines, endemic and epidemic diseases, and lots of poverty and ignorance.

You will notice the 20 percent for the area of incipient decline and 20 percent for the transitional area, and 60 percent for the bulk of the people where the processes hardly have started toward decline or transition. That is something for us to think about, because their growth potential is very high. They have very high birth rates. Also by looking at your table, you see that they have high infant mortality rates and high death rates. But as the techniques of the United Nations, through WHO, FAO, et cetera, become generally known in these areas and are practiced, we may expect a rapid increase of the population due to a quick decline in the death rate and particularly in infant mortality.

We have a fine example of what happens in Ceylon. Up until 1946 the death rate in Ceylon was about 20.4 per thousand. But those people are now trying by the use of DDT in large quantities to get rid of the mosquitoes that breed malaria. Since 1946, every six months, I think

it is, the island is sprayed with DDT from airplanes. In the four years up to 1949, the latest report available, the death rate has been lowered from 20.4 to 12.6; and Ceylon is down now to a death rate almost as low as central Europe, and, indeed, to parts of the United States.

In the transitional area, they have come down from a high growth potential to an incipient decline. That in the case of Japan has taken place in about three generations, during which and while the rate of growth has been slowing up, the population has trebled. We may take that as an illustration of what happens in modern times when a population begins to receive the benefits of modern technology and modern medicine and modern hygiene, generally, and still has not learned what to do about the birth rate. Consequently we may expect, according to the trends in the last 75 years, that the population of the world, in the 60 percent with a high growth potential, will probably triple at least before that part of the world gets to the place where Europe and the United States are now. A tripling of the population will be a considerable burden upon the surface of the earth.

The elements of this growth, as has already been suggested, are the mortality--particularly infant mortality, the life expectancy, fertility, customs of the people, migration, and urbanization.

Population Fertility

Speaking for a moment of fertility, we might classify the areas in four ways. The first is "low fertility," based on the crude birth rate, where the birth rate is less than 20 per thousand. You can see on the table, page 20, that those areas are the United States, Canada (although their average birth rate in 1947 was given as 25), and Europe.

The next is "medium fertility" with a birth rate of 20 to 30 per thousand. The third is "high fertility"--30 to 40 per thousand. The fourth is where there is "very high fertility"--over 40 per thousand. On your chart you will see that the birth rate in Africa, for example, is from 40 to 45 per thousand. In Egypt, where they are very careful to keep, so far as that kind of culture can keep, close records of the birth rate, it is around 44 to 45 per thousand. That is also true of Asia, except Japan where the rate is about 31 per thousand.

It is a very delicate matter to interfere with these natural processes, because we don't always know what we are doing. Puerto Rico is an outstanding example of what happens when generosity and good will try to help the population of an island. In 1900 when we took over Puerto Rico, the population was about one million. Now, 50 years later, it is over two million, with the birth rate still around 40 per thousand, while the death rate has gone down to 12 per thousand. At this rate of growth the population will double in 30 years. We are now subsidizing Puerto Rico to the extent of about 50 million dollars per year.

As I watch and study this process, particularly in the Near East and the Middle East, with the greatest good will that Europe had, and still has, toward the people out there, cutting down epidemics, improving the health standards, internally helping in their economic development, improving crops, improving production--with all that good will, what has happened? In Egypt the peasants on the average are much worse off than they were a century ago. How do we know this? In 1835 an Englishman named E. W. Lane, living in Egypt, published a book called "Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians." As an appendix to that book he put in the cost of various kinds of food, the cost for raiment, and the wage rates in the country for different kinds of labor. It is relatively easy for one to estimate the real wages that the laborer got in 1835. We also have estimates of the real wage, that is what one's monetary income will buy today; and the peasant in Egypt is worse off than he was in 1835 according to Lane's book. He is six times as numerous as he was in 1835. He has worse health, because of the irrigation system which the British installed back in 1890 and which has helped to spread bilharzia or schistosomiasis throughout the whole country.

Experts estimate that before 1890 about 40 percent of the Egyptians had this disease. It is a blood fluke, which is also known in Indonesia and in China. Now 80 percent of the peasants have the disease. There is more dampness in the soil now, which is favorable to the growth of these worms. Indeed, a former minister of public health for Egypt, who was also a professor in the school of medicine, said he thought the most intelligent animal in Egypt now is the bilharzia worm, because it has discovered in a period of 50 years how to enslave the peasants, and now every peasant is no more than a breadbasket for the worm to live on. In spite of all the knowledge we have today, we have disturbed certain of these demographic processes that have been going on for thousands of years; and today we are faced with new problems as a result.

Economic Factors

To mention some of the economic factors which enter into the problems and the questions of world-wide demography: Two-thirds of the world's estimated 2.4 billion people are on a bare subsistence level. They cultivate today about the same number of acres of land as there are people; that is, one acre per head, or 2.4 billion acres of land.

It has been estimated by the Food and Agriculture Organization that if the population continues to increase at the present rate up to 1960, there will need to be at least a 30 percent increase in the production of food over what it is at the present time. Some 1.3 billion tons of food are produced today; but by 1960 we will need 1.69 billion tons of food to take care of the population of that day.

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If we could bring all the new lands under cultivation that are potentially possible, we could add 1.3 billion acres of land, and so bring the total food production up to 2.7 billion tons.

Now, you will probably ask: How many calories would that give each individual on the average? It would give as a maximum on the average only about 2,600 calories of food per day, as against the 3,000 and some which a laboring man is supposed to have to keep up his energy. And at that it would have to be largely a vegetarian diet.

With regard to the industrial and economic factors, 80 percent of the world's population live by hand labor with subsistence by agriculture and what small industries there are in the villages, and only 20 percent by machine industry. There is on your table, page 21, a section called "Technology," where the number of automobiles per thousand is given, the number of telephones per thousand, and the amount of energy in horsepower per capita per annum. So you can see which areas of the world are most backward in technology.

With regard to employment, How does the population of the world work? What does the manpower do? First of all, I would like to say that the State Department now estimates that there are about 65 million refugees on the face of the earth. Some of these refugees are employed, but many of them are not. These are people who are not in their own homes doing the type of work they are accustomed to doing. Some of them are utterly dependent on others. For example, there are three-quarters of a million Arab refugees in the Near East. Refugees are a very heavy burden upon the production of the population.

Since so many of the people live by subsistence hand labor, and much of that in cultivating the soil, just producing enough for themselves, probably you are wondering how efficient is that hand labor. It is mostly very inefficient. So far as hand labor is concerned, the product is sometimes pretty good. An official of UNESCO told me last night that the FAO people in Egypt have estimated that even with the very best techniques that modern times have evolved for farming, the people of Egypt could not improve their present cultivation more than 2 percent, which is a pretty good statement as to how the Egyptian farmer can cultivate intensively his soil. But he has advantages. He has very rich soil, and a steady supply of good water to put on it.

At the same time, the Egyptian farmer himself doesn't work more than one-third of the days of the year. The average cultivation is about two and a half acres per family, and two and a half acres are not enough to keep a family busy all the time. So that when he is irrigating his land, for example, for 3 or 4 days the land is flooded with water from the canal. Obviously, he can't do very much on it, because it is just a mud puddle; and, if he walks in there, he will disturb his crops. So he sits and waits for the water to disappear, and then he goes in with a hoe and

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does some work. There isn't enough work on the farms to keep all these people busy, and Egypt could get along with one-third of the people who do farming now, doing all the work on the present system of cultivation; and, if they had something else to do, they could be employed otherwise. It is extremely inefficient.

In Iraq, on the other hand, we have the reverse position. We have too few people, about 4.6 million, and a very large territory. There are two rivers, bringing lots of water down from Turkey. They have vast areas of cultivable land, but they just have not enough labor to cultivate all of it. So they have to allow it to lie fallow. But it is just as well that they do, because they don't have enough fertilizer. So they may allow it to lie for two years and then cultivate it again. In the Mesopotamian valley there is much land which is not worked as adequately as it could be.

With regard to the economy generally, there is a very large element of dependency. In every branch of society, such as in most of the Near Eastern countries, for example, every child is worth something to the parents. He has an economic value as soon as he is five years of age. If he can't do anything else, he can go out and keep the sheep from wandering out of the pasture. He can lead the buffalo to water and everything of that sort that a child can do. But still there are times when people have to live although they are not working and producing. There is a large group, particularly of women, who do a certain amount of family labor, and in some places and in some villages a good deal of field labor; but they only relieve their husbands, who sit and watch them all too frequently. Then there is the dependency of the aged, which at the present time is not too heavy, because the aged are not very numerous.

There is a column on table, page 20, marked "Total Life Expectancy." There you can compare the life expectancy from birth in the different areas. Just sample figures were put there. But, as you see, in Africa the total life expectancy is not over 35 years, whereas in the Americas the life expectancy from birth is about 65 years. For the United Kingdom it is 66, and for Oceania it is 64. In India it is 27.

That indicates also the burden that there is in the large numbers of children, because the birth rate is so high. Although children usually die early, because the infant mortality rate is so high and their health is not good, they are a drain upon the family until they can do the little bit that they do. Indeed, I have known some mothers among the peasants who think the best method of contraception is to continue to breast-feed the baby until he is two years old, for they have a superstition that as long as a baby is breast feeding, they cannot conceive again. Well, when a baby is breast fed for two years, you can imagine what the baby looks like at the end of that time. That is one element in the high infant mortality, but it is tied up with that superstition of trying to avoid producing more babies.

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The wage rates among these transitional and high-potential groups are far from adequate. In the Near East a day laborer on a farm at the present time gets the equivalent of 25 cents for a day's work. There is no limit on the number of hours worked and, it depends on the season. A carpenter at the present time, working on his own, would get about two dollars, if that much, per day. The index of the cost of living since 1939 has gone up to nearly 300 in the Near East, particularly in the more populous countries like Egypt. So you can see that the people are in a very desperate condition so far as their level of living is concerned.

Wages in industry vary. Where modern industries have been started and large numbers of people are employed, wages are fairly good. They are perhaps from one dollar to two dollars a day, depending upon the job. But the owners of the factories are not quite sure how to pay their workers in order for the workers to get the maximum benefit. The head of the big textile industry in Egypt told me that some of them have thought they should pay their workers--and they are employing some thousands of them--a good living wage, so that they could have enough food. "So," he said, "we started doing that. But after the first few months we found it wasn't working, because the man bought himself food, but not the rest of his family. The family did not benefit to the same extent as the man. So we decided thereafter not to give wage increases in any large amounts, but to offer our employees social services." They built a hospital and they built restaurants for them, where they get nourishing meals. They gave them schools, they gave them playgrounds, they gave them better residences, and all as part of their compensation. Such conditions have to be taken into account in dealing with the economic factors in the area.

Health

With regard to the health of the people of the world generally, you will see various headings here on the table, page 21--"Health," "T.B. Death Rate," and so on. These figures are not to be taken as absolute for they are only an estimate. The number of population per medical doctor is also given between 1940 and 1947, indicating the health services that are available, or at least some indication of them. The infant mortality rate as well as the birth rate and death rate, especially the death rate, are something of an index of health.

I would like to say parenthetically here that the last column on the table, page 20, marked "Work Life, Years," was my own device to give you some index of the number of years that the people in the given area could expect to contribute to the economic progress of the area. I got that by subtracting 15 from the figure under total life expectancy, on the basis that 15 was the average age at which young people would become productive.

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There are better ways of estimating this figure and if you want to use it in your studies, I would recommend that you look up other methods of estimating, particularly the number of years that are available for work after age 15, that is, the life expectancy as of age 15, instead of the life expectancy as of age zero, which I use.

We have mentioned the life expectancy in the United States and in some of the other countries. We have a table of these figures. I have also indicated the effect of various endemic diseases on the health of the people, for example, in Egypt. But we have areas like India where cholera is rampant. It is endemic there. In the Near East cholera is pretty well checked with quarantine methods, but it breaks out in epidemic form every now and then.

Among the diseases which probably will play a very great part in interfering with their efficiency and happiness are cholera, malaria, schistosomiasis (bilharzia) plague, small pox, eye diseases, and all the various diseases that result from undernourishment, such as beriberi in the Far East. All these diseases have their effect upon the ability of the individual to work.

Not only that, but disease has its effect on the military potential of the country. In 1936 Egypt signed a treaty with Great Britain for the defense of the country. In 1937, as a result of that treaty, Egypt wanted to increase the size of its army from 13,000 to 50,000, so draft methods were employed. The draft indicated that only 4 percent of the men drafted were fit at the moment to go into military service. Another 12 percent could be made fit after a month of hospitalization. About 84 percent were sent home as utterly useless. That 84 percent was largely due to certain diseases such as bilharzia, hookworm, and trachoma.

Education

There is a column under "Illiteracy" on page 21, that gives you some idea of the amount of education. For some areas the rate of illiteracy is extremely high. Now, illiteracy is not synonymous with stupidity. There are quite a number of very intelligent officials throughout the world in some of these countries who are themselves illiterate. But they are, in spite of that, rather brilliant. The fact that they have gotten to where they are without being able to read is some tribute to their mental ability. But in these modern times there is no use in my telling you that in order to be able to exert leadership it is necessary to be able to read and communicate.

Education is something of a different experience in that part of the world from what it is in western Europe, and in the Far East and Middle East from what it is over here. It also is different in South America. Education is something that helps to give you social prestige. Never mind by what trick you get your diploma. If you can get a diploma, that

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is the important thing. You don't necessarily have to have much in your head to have the social ability to wangle your way after that.

That has resulted in many of these countries in what we call in the Near East "black coat unemployment," because the student frequently puts on European clothes with dark coats. So that they speak of the "black coat" as we speak of the "white collar." The students, although not so big a percentage, are still extremely numerous. They are not very well adapted to the condition of earning a living. Most of them want to work for the government; and the government, of course, cannot take all of them today. The traditional setup has been to conduct classes in order to train people for the civil service. They did that in Egypt after 1882. The general idea was that if you went to school, you eventually got a job with the government. But it has gone too far, and today too many people are being educated. So we have a large group of people in that part of the world, young men particularly, and an increasing number of young women, who are not very well fitted to work, because to work with your hands is socially unacceptable. Therefore you work with your head or with your tongue.

Manual education, however, is having a very happy effect in places. In Saudi Arabia the Arab-American Oil Company is training Arabs right out in the desert. In some of their operations the Air Force at Dhahran are having to train Arabs from the desert. They have found that the Arab from the desert, because he does not have any wrong sort of education, is a pretty good candidate for an efficient job. They are very pleased in ARAMCO and the Air Force with the quality of the young Arabs who come right out of the desert and with their ability to learn.

In Egypt they have had the same experience. At Camp Huckstep, near Cairo, a large repair unit for motors was set up during the war. Egyptians were taken in and trained. Peasant boys who had had little or no training before in any mechanical trade were taken right out of villages and were quite satisfactory.

Sociological Factors

I wish at this point to speak briefly of some sociological factors, because they are all too often neglected when we deal with modern nations but in oriental settings. What are the mental and emotional settings of the people and what is their scale of value? This is important, because if we as Americans or others from western Europe have to go and deal with a person in the Near East or Far East or the islands, and if we assume that they have our scale of values, that they like what we like, that they will work as well as we for the same sort of compensation, we are utterly wrong, because their scale of values is very different. If we are going to get the maximum cooperation out of them in any kind of operation, it is important that we know how they think and feel.

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Things go wrong at times because we do not know how they estimate value. Their loyalties are not the same as ours. They are loyal to their families. The family in that part of the world ranks number one. Much of what we call graft is simply successful wangling or getting something away from some other family and getting it into your own family's lap. They don't regard that as graft. That is just clever living. So that we have to take into account the loyalties of the people and their attachment to local groups. In Egypt we have the farm and the village. In China it is attachment to the family. The Communist government, as we know, is determined to smash the family loyalty of the Chinese, which they are doing by the most ruthless methods.

An acquaintance of mine, Dr. James Yen of China, who had promoted the literacy movement among the Chinese before the war for a number of years, a fine, scholarly fellow, has had the great sorrow to find that his son has joined the Communist forces. His father is now somebody that his son has to hate rather than love.

The British in their efforts to get groundnuts out of Africa discovered also that they hadn't studied enough the habits of the black people whom they expected to work for them, in order to get the maximum service out of them. Some of these black people don't care a hoot for money unless they can buy cows or buy wives, because they measure their value, their riches, by the number of cows and by the number of wives that they have. So money is of little or no use to them.

Then there is the religious element. Perhaps we had better discuss this later. But it is a very big one, and to my mind one of increasing importance. Secularly minded people, like westerners, whose religion is a kind of super way of life just can't understand people whose every motivation is tied up somehow with religion. The 300 million Mohammedans throughout the world are mostly like that. The Hindus and Buddhists and Confucianists are of that mind. Large numbers of Christians in different countries are still of that mind. Religion ranks first. But there is little time to discuss that.

Then there is the whole political question, the attitude of the people toward their government. But we will not take that up in detail at the moment.

I would like to say in closing, carrying the point one step further on religion and on the question of giving more attention to the ideologies of foreign peoples, that this is, after all, the basis of their lives. The springs of their conduct lie in their ideologies, as indeed they do in ours. What won't we do to defend the individual's rights in this country? We will go to any extreme to defend individual rights. But there are very few countries in the world where the individual is respected that much. It is group rights in the rest of the world--the family group, the tribal group, the village group.

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The Communists are able to trade on that very much today. In China, in India, and throughout Central Asia, and in other places of the world, the individual is unimportant if he is not in line with the ideology of the state.

Well, the whole thing totals up to something that I think all of us in the United States and in western Europe who are working together now, the NATO and other groups, need with regard to the rest of the world. We need to understand them better. We go out there and it often happens, indeed I observed it happen in the American Army group that came to Egypt in 1939 and with larger groups later on that the best intentioned officials were neophytes in the local situation. They didn't know the local customs. They didn't know the local processes. There were lots of things they didn't know. It became very necessary for them to learn some local facts in order to be successful in carrying out the functions for which they were there. So we need to give attention to what we are doing and not be too amateurish in our approach to the other peoples of the world.

At the Presbyterian General Assembly they told a story which I would like to repeat here. There was a man with a golf ball who was quite an amateur at golf. He didn't know how to approach the ball. He took his first swipe and knocked off half an ant hill and dislocated and killed quite a number of ants. His next swing hit the same ant hill much farther down and scattered the ants and killed a lot. One ant was heard to remark to the other ants: "Fellow ants, if we are going to survive, I think we had better get on the ball."

QUESTION: My question concerns political factors, but it also has to do with the demographic factors in the Near East. First, What is the prospect in the foreseeable future of a league of Arab states, Moslem states? Second, Can Egypt take the lead in such a movement, in such an organization, in view of the burden of its heavy overpopulation? Does Egypt have the potential strength to be a leader in such a movement? Lastly, Would such a league remain in the framework of the United Nations and function there, or might it be expected to pull out and be an independent body; and, if so, what would its position be with respect to the rest of the free world?

DR. CLELAND: There is, you know, an Arab League today, which takes in the seven Arab states of the Near East. The Arab League got its start in December 1945. Their purposes were economic cooperation, political cooperation, and cultural cooperation.

Its Secretary-General, Azzam Pasha, who is really a very fine man, has been trained in medicine in England until about 1911, when Italy invaded Tripoli. He then went over there to fight the Italians. He laughingly said one time: "I was once the president of the Republic of Tripoli for just 24 hours." That is the quality of the man. He is a man of long experience.

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Just a year ago I had a long chat with him in Alexandria about the Arab League and what he thought he could make of it. He admits that politically it is in a bad way. The quarrel with Israel has resulted in some setbacks. He regretted that he has to deal with Israel as it is today. But he hopes on the economic and cultural side and on social service lines to do more than they have been able to do on the political side.

There have been in 1949 and 1950, at Beirut and at Cairo, conferences on social welfare at which all the seven Arab states have been represented. Egypt has led in social welfare, particularly among the peasants, in social planning, in noncontributory social security; and the other Arab states are following Egypt's lead somewhat in some of these social welfare activities.

On the cultural level they have a commission, which has met several times to standardize the textbooks in the schools, because the Arabic language is a little bit difficult. Its classical form is not quite modern enough for all the vocabulary of the present day. The classical form is the standard, which everybody wants to speak if he can; but only a few do so satisfactorily. So they have revolutionized their vocabulary for modern scientific affairs with all of our scientific vocabulary of today, which have been taken over mostly from the European Languages-- French, Italian, and English particularly. Azzam Pasha is very anxious that the work shall succeed in all the social welfare fields, and he says they are doing pretty well.

As for leadership, Egypt has more educated leadership in the Arab world than any of the other countries. First of all, it is the largest of the Arab countries, with 20 million population, whereas Iraq has about 4.6 million, Syria 3.5 million, Lebanon 1.2 million, Saudi Arabia about 6 million (nobody knows just how many) and Yemen perhaps 3 million. Among the Arab states Egypt is the most populous and has had modern education for a longer period than the other countries.

Furthermore, it has a great many very capable men. If they can get some help and can break away from the bonds of the old traditional outlook, which holds the public and which is used by the political opposition and the hostile newspapers always to make trouble for anybody who starts a reform--if some of these leaders can only get a little help, they can really lead off in the Arab world, I am sure.

There is another point which you mentioned--about the Moslem League. The Arabs are only about 50 million, whereas the Mohammedans are about 300 million. There is an effort on the part of Pakistan, which is the largest Mohammedan nation, to try to produce some leaders and make Mohammedans all work together. However, the Arabs are a little bit suspicious of that. The Turks don't receive it with any enthusiasm at all. With the Arabs and the Turks holding out from the Pan-Islamic group, the rest of the countries wouldn't be very much of an organization.

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So it doesn't look like Pan-Islamism is likely to take place very soon. There is more likelihood of their succeeding on linguistic and sociological lines than there is on political lines.

As for its position in the United Nations, the Arab League did propose that they be recognized as a regional group in the United Nations. The only hitch there was that right off they ran into the question of Israel. The Arabs wouldn't receive Israel into their Arab League (I don't know whether Israel would want to join the Arab League if they were able to) so they were never able to get recognition for the Arab League as a regional unit in the United Nations, as our Conference of the American States has and as NATO has and so on.

QUESTION: You mentioned that in the overpopulated sections of the Far East—India, China, and those places—we could look for a tripling of the population as this process goes on. That would mean, if I got your figure right, about 5 billion people there. Is it possible, if we concede that figure, for that population to increase inasmuch as it would be impossible to feed that many people from the outside, and they certainly can't do it themselves? If there is medical aid and these other things that bear on the death rate, Wouldn't these other factors tend to nullify the potential drop in the death rate by raising famine and some other compensating factors?

DR. CLELAND: You may have noticed in the newspaper a few times last week the report of the meeting in New York of the World Science Group, where one of the botanists said that it would be possible, if we used efficiency and corrected a lot of the sociological factors (and that is a terrible order) to produce enough food on the face of the earth to feed 4 billion people with little or no trouble.

There has been a lot of talk in the last few years about cultivating food in the ocean. They say that algae, after all, are very nourishing. Why should they all be devoured by the fishes only? If we can find a way to make them edible, we can cultivate a good deal of food in the ocean. It certainly is a big problem.

As a sociological obstacle, probably 1 million of those 6 million tons of wheat that we are now sending to India need not have gone if the sacred cows had been kept under control. In India they are aware of this problem. As you know, no Indian will molest a cow. The cow is sacred. Consequently, cows roam around and devour whatever they can find. They say that at night the villagers put guards around their fields to drive the cows away. Cows can go to some other place and feed. But, the cow being sacred, it eats what it wants and it gives so little milk that it is not an economically valuable feature in the community; furthermore, many cows are ill and nobody bothers about it.

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In India also the monkey is a semisacred animal. The monkey descends from his perch every night and helps himself to fruit and grain and anything else he can get. So we are certainly going to have to interfere with the religions of the people of the world if we are expected to feed them.

You may have read William Vogt's book, "Road to Survival." Something of his complaint was that we are in this country (indeed, in the world generally) exploiting the surface of the earth to get more food, particularly grain, than we need. Since we can't sell it abroad, because nobody has the dollars to pay for it, we are giving it away. He says that the food (for example, the 6 million tons of grain that were sent to India) is just that much of our capital from our soil being transferred to the Indians.

There are qualifications, I suppose, that could be made to that answer. But it is an extremely serious problem. As we are dealing with foreign people, with inferior ideologies that are uneconomical, we may have to find some way of curing them of these things in order that they may successfully live in their economy.

Of course, lots of them don't want to live according to our standard of living. If they can just exist, that is all they want. The Egyptians, for example, have the same thing--"I just want a little bread for my stomach. I want to eat bread." If the fellow eats bread, he hasn't much ambition beyond that.

QUESTION: Are the South American countries capable of supporting a larger population either by the arable areas or by their natural resources? If so, What conditions of the people must be improved? Also, Do the people of South America have any characteristics which might prohibit that increase, such as the inviolability of the cow in India that you just mentioned?

DR. CLELAND: I don't have very many figures about South America; but I have been reading some books on South America, particularly "Road to Survival," where the author implies that a great deal of increase can still be made in the South American population (whether they could double the population safely or not I don't know) provided that soil conservation is practiced. He intimates that most of the good soil is being washed out into the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, and he gives illustrations of this.

He says that the Indians, who used to live on the highlands of the west coast because they had their terracing methods, now no longer till these terraces, because the modern people have come in and cut down the trees; and, of course, the soil has washed off. Chile is in a very desperate position in this respect. Productivity is less than it could be,

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simply because the land has been eroded. Argentina is probably in a fine position for population growth, with its vast pampas. Brazil could probably stand a great deal of an increase, too.

QUESTION: You mentioned many demographic factors affecting world population, but you did not give a considered judgment as to how in the next 10 years the free nations will stack up against the Soviet bloc. Are all these demographic factors working for us or working against us at the present time?

DR. CLELAND: That is a very interesting question. I have been discussing it somewhat with some of our analysts in the State Department. You can see from the figures on page 20 that the USSR seems to be gaining slightly in population over Europe. In the next 10 years, if there is no war and no large destruction of population, the USSR will probably be advancing at a faster pace than Europe. Indeed, Europe may settle down again to its former state between the wars, of actually losing population.

One might mention how it must look to the USSR itself. There seems to be some reason to believe that Uncle Joe Stalin and his crowd are conserving Russians just as much as possible. Russia probably lost 10 million people during the Second World War. Stalin said in 1946 that their losses had been 7 million; but western observers are inclined to place the figure much higher. If Russia did lose 10 million people during the five or six years of fighting, it is in no frame of mind now to lose any more if Russia can prevent it.

If you read between the lines of the acts, so to speak, of the Russians, it looks as though Russia today is using everybody else's manpower where there is any risk of life--the satellites in Europe, the Chinese and the North Koreans in the Far East--and letting the non-Russians bear the brunt of the war.

At the same time, as you see from the record of the deportations in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, where thousands of people are hustled out of their homes on a couple of hours notice and transported in freight cars and other ways to unknown destinations to the east, it may be that Russia is borrowing slave power from the satellites for its activities inside Russia, whether for war production or other purposes.

It looks as if the USSR's policy was to conserve Russians as being the most orthodox and best kind of Communists that there are living, and to keep them for military occupation and advisory purposes, and let the countries that have too many people, like China, bear the brunt of the hostilities until they wear down the outside nations as much as possible, wear them down either emotionally or spiritually, or wear them down demographically.

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That is a very hypothetical sort of statement and a guess based on observation of the techniques of the USSR today. You will notice that no Russians have been caught in combat positions or in any of the airplanes that have been shot down. They probably have Russian advisers, but they are not running any risks.

QUESTION: Isn't the Communistic or Russian scheme in China, of disrupting the family life and the habits of those people, apt to backfire on the Russians? Of course, we would like to think that it would, but with the control that they have established, maybe it won't. What is your opinion on that?

DR. CLELAND: Those who are active agents in doing that are Chinese themselves, Moscow-trained Chinese. They are the ones who have set up this policy of disrupting the family ties, of generally breaking up the old class distinctions in the community. Consequently, any mistakes that they make could easily be repudiated by Russia any time Russia finds it advantageous to do so.

COMMENT: Their methods, as you know, are very ruthless. Their techniques are such that you can hardly believe it. One teacher from an American mission school in central China escaped and got to Hong Kong, and he told the story of what was happening. It is very discouraging to see how cleverly the Chinese have been tricked at every stage until they would agree to go along. Then, as they went along with a local program, they found that they had sold themselves out at the end of the whole thing. This man said under the old Chinese regime there always was hope, but now even hope is dead. That was his interpretation.

QUESTION: In the Middle East, Which areas are best fitted for Communist infiltration because of economic conditions, environment, and so on? Also, What are the chances of Israel landing on the Communist side?

DR. CLELAND: Well, in the Near East it is quite obvious that Turkey is no place for Communists to come in. They have them very well under control there. The Turks don't seem to be minded at all to accept any Communist doctrine.

Greece is also perfectly safe, it seems to me, and for the time being at least, very promising. Iran is uncertain, because, although the Communist Party has been outlawed, it is still very active and is now taking full advantage of the disruption of conditions in Iran.

One cannot tell what will happen to the present Iranian Government, or whether it will continue. It looks as if some revolution is just bound to happen there and another government take over. The Tudeh party may get enough support to create a lot of trouble, whether it actually takes over or not. It is not expected that this party will take over in the near future.

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Among the Arab states there is some infiltration of Communist ideas. Not that they are ever labeled "communism," because the Communists are too clever to do that. But in Egypt a rich man, who owned a very big estate, 6,000 or more acres of land in lower Egypt and had a terrible reputation for mistreating his peasants, had rented out the land to them on a share crop basis. At the end of the season--in August, when the crops came in, he demanded that the people pay him enough crops to make up a monetary figure which he had set as the amount of rental for each piece of land, let us say, 20 pounds for a certain amount of land. But in Egypt prices have fallen and the people could not pay that much. They gave him all their cotton and they gave him various other things, but they couldn't give him their maize. Maize goes to make the bread that supports them in the winter time. However, he requisitioned their maize.

A few of these poor people came to his beautiful palace--a palace such as a king would live in--and they protested. He ordered them away. They refused to go. So the guards shot and killed one of them.

That stirred up the peasants for miles around, and they came in a great wave and protested against his way of treating the people that had worked for his father and grandfather for so many generations. He again spoke to them in a provocative way and made them so irritated that they burned down his palace.

Now, if humble peasants who don't have gumption enough to pick a fight, partly because they are in ill health and partly because of tradition, will come out and burn down a landlord's palace, it shows that there is a degree of boldness in them that hadn't been known before.

Similar occurrences have taken place in the last two years in Egypt, and the Egyptians are a little afraid of what may happen. This attitude on the part of the people is being played up by unemployed literati. Whether it is labeled "communism" or not, it makes a very fruitful ground for revolution. There is always lots of discontent. The government thinks it has the situation under control. Let us hope it has.

Some governments are doing their level best to diminish the grounds for discontent in one way or another. But it is a long sort of process; and, where the conditions are like those in Egypt, there probably are grounds for disturbances.

MR. MASERICK: Dr. Cleland, on behalf of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, I thank you for your very fine lecture on "World-Wide Demography." Thank you very much.

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Region	Population in 000's						Pop. Ages-15-59 (1947)	Infant Mortality Rate 1949	1947		Work Life, Years		
	1950		1960		Birth Rate	Death Rate							
	%	1950	%	1960									
I. AFRICA	1750	13.1	198,000	8.3	234,000	8.5	15	40-45	25-30	37-203	35	55	20
1. Egypt													
2. So. Africa													
II. AMERICAS													
1. U.S.-Canada	1,300	0.1	165,534		182,200		11	25	10	31-U.S.	65 M.	64	50
2. Latin America	11,100	1.5	162,166		199,000		20	40	17			55	23
3. Total	12,400		327,700	13.7	381,200	14				169	38		
4. Chile													
5. Brazil													
6. Argentina													
III. ASIA*													
1. Near East	479,000	65.8	1,272,000	53	1,453,000	53.2	15	40-45				55	
2. So. Cent. Asia								40-45	30-35	206-Burma			20
3. Rem. Far East								40-45	25-30	275-China	35		12
4. Japan								40-45	30-35	122-India	27		35
								31	15		50		
IV. EUROPE*													
1. U.A.	140,000	19.2	396,400	16.5	421,200	15.4	6	16.1	11.7	34	66		51
2. N.W.-Cent. Eur.													
3. Western Europe													
4. Yugoslavia								28.3	13.6	56			
5. France													
6. Germany													
7. Greece													
8. E. & So. Eur.													
9. Poland													
V. OCEANIA													
1. Australia	2,000	0.3	12,900	0.5	13,900	0.5	21	28	9.3	30	64		49
2. New Zealand								25.7					
3. Hawaii								29.5	6.2	34			
VI. USSR													
1. Satellites	71,270		193,000	8	228,000	8.4	12	23	13	104	47	(1940)	32
												(48)	
VII. TOTAL.	799,670	100	2,400,000	100	2,731,000	100	14						*Excluding USSR.

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	Economies			Health		Illit- eracy (1950) Percent	Autos		Technology		Culture Type	Religion	Political Attitudes
	Density Sq. Km. (1949)	Income Per Cap. (1959) \$	Diet Calories	T.B. Death Rate (1939) (100,000)	Pop. Per M.D. (1940-7)		Per M.	Per M.	Energy Per Cap. Per Annum(1957) (h. p.)				
I.													
1.	85	2469	52	4,200	86	2	3	1.7	Pastor.	Islam	Natl. Pass.		
2.		2354		2,400	60		15	10.1	Agr.	Anim. Xnty			
II.													
1.	554-US	3098-US	47-US	730-US	5-	250-US	148-US	37.6	Ind.		Dem.		
2.									Agr.	Xnty			
3.													
4.	46	2193	250	3,000	62	4	5	5			Natl. Pass.		
5.	218		103		17	21	27	1.9					
6.													
III.													
1.	47												
2.	29	2234	400-500	25,000	85	0.2	0.5	0.5	Agr.	Confuc. Hindu Buddh Islam	Natl. Pass.		
3.	34	1976	283	8,350	91	0.3	0.2	0.5					
4.		2250				3	16	6.6					
IV.													
1.	22	468	62	870		53	59	27.1	Ind.	Xnty	Dem.		
2.													
3.		3000			5-								
4.					45	1	3	2.1					
5.	283			1,300		59	37	13.4					
6.	520		50										
7.		2700	128										
8.				3,000									
9.													
V.													
1.	1	400	45	1,060	5-	125	86	15.4	Ind.	Xnty	Dem.		
2.													
3.													
VI.													
1.	158	2627	160	1,320	19	5	3	6.8	Agr. Trans.	Xnty	Comm. Pass.		
VII.													
18													

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