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## JOINT LOGISTICS PLANNING BY THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

21 November 1951

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Colonel Edwin G. Simenson, USAF, Air Force member of the senior team, Joint Logistics Plans Group of the Joint Staff, was born in Valley City, North Dakota on 11 March 1908. He is a graduate of the U. S. Military Academy, 1932; Advanced Flying School at Kelly Field, Texas, 1933; Air Force Tactical School, 1940; Naval War College, 1947; and Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1950. He also attended Massachusetts Institute of Technology for one year in 1938. From April 1942 to December 1944 he was regional control officer and staff weather officer of the 18th Weather Region and the 8th Air Force. He had charge of writing the weather plan for the ferrying of the 8th Air Force across the North Atlantic early in 1942. As commander of the American airdrome at Port Reath, Cornwall, England, he dispatched 3,000 aircraft to Africa prior to and during the early phases of the African campaign, for which he received the Legion of Merit. Colonel Simenson is the author of numerous technical meteorological publications. He was a member of the Air Force's first long-range over-water flight in 1936 and in 1937 was awarded the Mackay trophy for the Air Force's outstanding flight. He has held his present position since graduation from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

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## JOINT LOGISTICS PLANNING BY THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

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COLONEL MATTHIAS: Gentlemen, after the conference yesterday regarding the planning cycle, I think you will all agree that the starting point of the military requirements is the Joint Staff. From the session that I sat in on, I gathered that everybody was trying to figure out what was going on in the Joint Staff. I can't answer that question, but I think our speaker can.

Our speaker was a student here a few years ago; I think he knows probably as well as any one what we want to know at this stage of the course. He as a student was looking for the same information. Following graduation he went to the Joint Staff and has been there for two years, where he is now a member of the senior team of the Joint Logistics Plans Group. I am sure he will give us the information we want about the Joint Staff. I take great pleasure in introducing Colonel Ed Simenson, U. S. Air Force.

COLONEL SIMENSON: General Holman, distinguished guests, gentlemen: My subject, selected by a member of your faculty, "Joint Logistics Planning by the Joint Chiefs of Staff" is extremely interesting and fascinating. The subject is the job actually performed within the Joint Logistics Plans Group (JLPG). My reasons for using the adjectives fascinating and interesting are that our work encompasses many fields of governmental activity connected with preparing for war or defending for peace. Mobilization in itself involves: economics, finances, policies, industry, foreign relations and policy, natural resources-- at home and abroad, manpower, and the manner in which these govern our continual formulation of strategy.

From this brief and inadequate description of the work of the JLPG, you realize that preparation of our papers might be described as a postgraduate course of the Industrial College. I feel greatly honored and privileged to have the opportunity to talk to you on this subject today.

The National Security Act of 1947, and its amendments of 1949, established: (a) the National Military Establishment, (b) renamed it the Department of Defense, and (c) gave, among other things, certain logistic responsibilities to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). These responsibilities are listed, as follows:

1. To prepare joint logistic plans.
2. To assign to the military services logistic responsibilities in accordance with the logistic plans.

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3. To review major material and personnel requirements of the military forces, in accordance with strategic and logistic plans.

From these statutory responsibilities, charters for the various committees and agencies within the Joint Staff were developed. The Joint Logistics Plans Committee (JLPC) charter in abbreviated form entails four general classes of work, as listed:

1. Preparation of logistic reports including recommendations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff action.

2. Development of the logistic implications of war plans during their preparation.

3. Preparation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff logistic plans to support joint strategic plans.

4. Preparation of the Joint Mobilization Plan.

You have now the responsibilities and the logistic tasks to be accomplished within the Joint Staff--in other words the job to be done. Let us take a very brief look at the present organization of the Joint Staff in order to see the administrative machine which handles the work to be done.

Chart 1, Joint Chiefs of Staff, following page.--The JLPC is one of three principal committees of the JCS as indicated on this chart. The other two are the Joint Strategic Plans Committee (JSPC) and the Joint Intelligence Committee; both of which have full-time working groups. Two other committees within the JCS have logistic responsibility; they are the Joint Military Transportation Committee (JMTC) and the Joint Munitions Allocation Committee (JMAC), shown by shading on this chart. Their functions are specialized, as indicated by their names; whereas the JLPC handles matters of a more general nature.

Let me temporarily discuss these latter two committees, as I will not return to them again.

The JMTC is the agency of the JCS charged with the preparation of recommendations to the JCS on matters relating to transportation and with the coordination and control of policies, doctrine, and procedures for all types of transportation to the extent that such functions are within the purview of the services. JMTC acts as the principal adviser to the JLPC and the JSPC on all transportation matters as may be necessary to assist those committees in performing assigned functions. In the performance of its assigned functions, JMTC obtains guidance on strategic matters from JSPC and on logistic matters from JLPC. The relationship of JMTC to the services is close and continuing, especially since its membership is comprised of general and flag officers serving


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# JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

CHART 1

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NOTE:  
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in logistic or transportation capacities in the services. Except in matters of major policy which require JCS approval, JMTC has authority to forward its decision directly to the services for implementation. Thus, JMTC is an extension of the JCS for transportation matters.

The JMAC is the agency of the JCS charged with performing for the JCS duties relating to the allocation of finished munitions among:

1. United States forces in accordance with approved over-all strategic and logistic plans.
2. Participating nations under approved military assistance program.

Its membership consists of the chief logistic officer from each military service.

In order to assist JMAC in the equitable allocation of Army procured materiel, a subcommittee known as the Allocations Committee (Army) has been established (similar subcommittees are in the process of being established for the Navy and the Air Force). The Army subcommittee meets monthly and, taking into account the total assets and requirements, recommends allocations among United States forces and recipients of the Mutual Security Program. The minutes and recommendations of this subcommittee are submitted to JMAC for approval. In case the subcommittee is unable to reach unanimous agreement, the dissent is forwarded to JMAC for resolution. This method of recommending and approving allocations is substantially the same as that used so successfully in World War II.

As a matter of interest, the strength of the agencies within the Joint Staff is: Joint Strategic Plans Group, 47; Joint Logistics Plans Group, 35; and Joint Intelligence Group, 27; totaling 109 of the 120 on the Joint Staff. I gave you these figures to show the difference in strength as an indication of work load in each group. In comparison the Staff of the JMTC has nine officers, and the staff of the JMAC has five.

The principal committees of the Joint Chiefs consist of a deputy director and three members, one from each service. Under the committees are the working groups with the title the same as the name of the committee. Each group has a team of assistant directors and numerous teams, each of which consists of three members, one from each service. With that general explanation, I will now proceed with the detailed organization of the JLPG. However, I wanted to point out the general organization to enable you to understand how members from any one group obtain from team members within any other group, information pertaining to the three services.

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Chart 2, Joint Logistics Plans Group, the Joint Staff, following page.--The JLPG has four members, one from each of the three services, plus the deputy director for logistics of the Joint Staff. They are: Rear Admiral Yeomans, Navy; Colonel William Hudnell, Air Force; Colonel Denson, Army; and Rear Admiral Campbell, Navy, who is our new deputy director for logistics of the Joint Staff.

The JLPG, headed by the deputy director for logistics, consists of three assistant directors, a secretariat, and ten teams, each having equal service representation. This organization, as indicated (on chart 2) was adopted on the first of February 1951. At this time I would like to point out the differences in the new organization, due to the fact that your reading may have been on the old organization. We formerly had an executive officer, 12 project officers, and 6 technical sections. The new organization differs in that we have no executive officer, but instead have a Senior Team, performing supervisory functions, and we have abolished the old, six technical sections and renamed them as working teams. These six technical teams are: Logistic Plans, Transportation, Construction, Personnel and Units, Petroleum, and Aircraft.

One additional change, which will be of interest to all of you is the addition of an Army member to the Aircraft Team. Formerly, the Army did not have sufficient interest in aircraft to warrant having a full-time member on this team, but as the Army is getting more and more aircraft, causing interesting problems, it now does have representation.

So much for the organization of the JLPG and the JLPC. I will now cover the four broad categories of work with which the JLPG deals. The JCS refer all general logistic matters to our committee for comment and recommendation. In turn, the problems are assigned to the JLPG. However, at times and when desirable ad hoc committees are formed from members of the three services, either with or without members from the Joint Staff. The first category is:

## Preparation of Logistic Reports

These studies or reports cover a very wide field of subjects-- for example, relationship between the JCS and the Munitions Board, necessity for a national petroleum program, and logistical support of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

To give you an idea of the scope and variety of these studies, some of the subjects covered recently are: "Distribution of Military Petroleum Required for a Future War Emergency," "Organization of the Armed Services Medical Regulating Office," "Allocation of Manpower Available for Military Service," "Aircraft Requirements," and "Policy

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
CHART 2

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## APPENDIX

### JOINT LOGISTICS PLANS GROUP

#### THE JOINT STAFF



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and Guidance for Overseas Port Operation." These multitudinous reports flow upward from our group in the form of letters, memos, studies, and joint papers.

## Development of Logistic Implications

The second category of work is the development of logistic implications of strategic plans during development of a strategic plan. One of the most significant accomplishments of the Joint Staff has been the change in planning in regard to the influence of logistics on strategy. Our strategic plans give due recognition to manpower, industrial capability, and the status of logistic readiness of the armed forces. This type of work was formerly referred to as a "limited feasibility test." However, within the past several months it has been realized that we were actually not conducting feasibility tests; we were merely developing logistic implications upon which suitable recommendations to the Joint Chiefs could be made. Therefore, in our group we have more or less banned the use of "limited feasibility tests" and use the term "logistic implications" instead.

Let me briefly picture for you the development of logistic implications during the preparation of a typical war plan.

The JSPC is responsible for preparing and recommending to the Joint Chiefs their outline strategic plan. This committee assigns the work to the Strategic Plans Group, which is organized into a number of teams of three officers each, gives the problem to one of these teams. That team has been furnished with the statement of the national objectives, assumptions to be made, and major tasks to be considered. They also have been furnished estimates of the three services' capabilities in the form of "force tabs."

Chart 3, Deployment of U. S. Armed Forces, following page.--These force tabs show the major tactical units available for deployment on the assumed D-day and also the time-phased build-up of the forces for deployment after D-day.

During the time that the Strategic Group is working on the development of a strategic plan, the JLPG maintains liaison with and assists the strategic planners in the preparation of their report. Initial information and assumptions are furnished the Joint Intelligence Group with a request for an estimate of enemy capability for the period to be covered. The Joint Intelligence Group prepares an estimate of enemy capability and returns it to the strategic team. At the same time the Intelligence Group requests the Intelligence Committee to formally approve this estimate.

The strategic team with statements of national objectives, strategic assumptions, available forces, and estimated enemy capabilities, now

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CHART 3  
**DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. ARMED FORCES**  
 (IN PLACE AND OPERATIONAL)  
**ARMY - NAVY - AIR FORCE**

	D-DAY	D+3	D+6	D+9	D+12	D+15	D+18	D+21	D+24	D+36
<b>I. DEPLOYMENT OF ARMY FORCES</b>										
<u>DEFENSE OF AREA V</u>										
INF DIV	2	3	5	7	10	14	20	16	8	8
ARMED DIV	1	2	4	8	10	14	16	10	2	2
A/B DIV	1/2	1 1/2	3	6	7	8	12	6	-	-
INF RCT	1	2	4	5	6	6	6	2	-	-
ARMED CAV REGT	1/2	1	2	3	3	4	5	2	2	2
AA BN	6	8	12	16	20	28	40	32	16	16
<b>II. DEPLOYMENT OF NAVAL FORCES</b>										
<u>OPERATIONS IN AREA "A"</u>										
<b>CARRIER STRIKING FORCE</b>										
CV/CVB	1	4	8	8	8	10	12	16	16	18
CA/CL/CLAA	4	6	10	10	12	16	24	24	24	30
DD/DE/DD-E-R	20	24	48	48	52	60	72	80	96	120
BB/CB	1	1	2	2	4	8	8	8	8	10
<b>III. DEPLOYMENT OF AIR FORCES</b>										
<u>SECURE AREA VI</u>										
H/B GPS	2	3	3	4	6	7	8	8	4	2
M/B GPS	3	4	5	6	7	9	9	9	4	2
STRAT RCN GPS (WX)	1	3	4	4	4	5	5	5	5	3
STRAT RCN GPS (PHOTO)	1	3	3	4	4	4	4	4	2	2
ESCORT FTR GPS	7	7	10	12	14	15	18	18	10	5
TAC RCN GPS	6	6	6	7	7	7	7	7	4	3
A/C C & W SQS	2	3	3	4	4	4	5	5	5	4

NOTES: 1. ONLY ONE SERVICE IS NORMALLY SHOWN PER FORCE TAB.

2. EACH FORCE TAB NORMALLY WILL SHOW A RECAPITULATION OF UNITS DEPLOYED BY PHASE DATES.

3. PLANNERS MUST COMPUTE SUPPORT PERSONNEL AS REQUIRED TO BACK-UP ALL DEPLOYMENTS.

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develops a concept of war calculated to fit the national war objectives; and in turn develops an outline war plan to fit this concept and to meet enemy capabilities.

This war plan is submitted to the Strategic Plans Committee and to the Logistics Plans Group simultaneously. In the JSPC each service member, using his own planning staff, reviews the plan. While this work is going on within the Strategic Plans Committee, the logistic implications are being determined within the JLPG. This is the process that was formerly referred to as a limited feasibility test.

Six major logistic features are tested within the JLPG. Our effort, in advance of approval by the JCS of the plan, is to determine whether logistic requirements are sufficiently close to estimated availability to justify the large amount of detailed work required for service planning. In addition, the investigation of these logistic implications enables the Joint Chiefs to determine whether or not the plan merits further consideration without major strategic changes.

The six features chosen for logistic implication analyses are:

1. Personnel
2. Tonnages of supply
3. Transportation
4. Petroleum
5. Aircraft
6. Construction

You will note that the names of six of the technical teams shown on Chart 2 coincide with these logistic features. These six features selected are basic, comprehensive, common to all plans, and can be readily computed in from 10 to 14 working days. It may be said in general that these six features are the major limiting logistic factors for any war plan.

Due to the fact that there is a lack of detail, in the war plan, logisticians are required to make assumptions. These assumptions include such items as:

1. Which sea routes will be open or closed?
2. How many and what type airplanes will be available from civilian air lines?
3. What damage will occur to continental and overseas ports and how will this damage affect delivery of supplies?

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With these assumptions and the strategic plan we proceed with the development of logistic implications.

Chart 4, Development of Logistic Implications, following page.-- This chart shows the mechanics of developing logistic implications, which is largely a comparison of requirements and capabilities. The two center columns indicate the manner in which requirements and availabilities for the selected logistical features are determined. The left-hand column indicates the basis for determination of requirements. The right-hand column indicates the basis for the determination of availabilities.

The next chart is not so detailed as the preceding. It shows how information pertaining to force tabs, coordination, and assumptions is poured into the hopper along with information on availability. The crank is turned and this information is distributed to other teams which in turn conduct the same type of a mechanical operation.

Chart 5, Hopper Chart--Personnel, following page.--This is the manner in which the Personnel Team goes to work to develop its portion of the logistic implications of any particular war plan. Consider first what the members of the Personnel Team have available upon which to base their work. They have received in the force tabs the number and type of units in place and operational, by phase dates in various areas. To these force tabs they must add combat support and logistic support. And in order to do just that, they pull out of the air a big "slice." The determination of the slice is based on climate, terrain, length of the lines of communication, attrition rates, whether or not the area is active, semiactive, or inactive, the amount of logistic aid to be received from allies or native labor, and so on. The Air Force performs similar calculations in determining its requirements. The Navy adds supporting ships to the list of combat ships.


In order to determine the number of personnel required in uniform, the Personnel Team must determine the number of units to be in training and the numbers required for pipelines, combat losses, and ineffectives. These numbers, consolidated and plotted against the estimate of availability, which is received in the form of a report from the Munitions Board, are later used to determine air and sea lift, tonnages of supply required, and amount of petroleum needed. This pictures for you, in detail, how one team performs its functions. The information obtained by this team is transmitted to the other teams as indicated on the chart.

Chart 6, Hopper Chart--Transportation, following page.--When all teams have completed their analyses, a coordination team puts the story together. The results of the analyses of a final comparison of requirements balanced against availabilities enable us to draw conclusions and make recommendations. Both are transmitted to the JSPC and the

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# DEVELOPMENT OF LOGISTIC IMPLICATIONS

CHART 4




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
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JLPC. If necessary, the strategic plan is then modified. It is then presented to the Joint Chiefs by the strategic planners. The Logistics Plans Committee by separate action advises the Joint Chiefs of the logistic implications of the plan, together with appropriate recommendations as to the action to be taken to increase the United States readiness.

When the numerous cranks are turned and each team submits in writing its portion of the logistic implications, the logistic plan to support a war plan is born. This leads me to the third category of our work.

## Preparation of Logistic Plans to Support Strategic Plans

In discussing this third broad category of our work, I will mention first the types of plans in existence which require logistic activity. Second, the processing of a typical plan, and third, the contents.

First.--Types of plans. There are three types of strategic war plans:

1. The Emergency War Plan.
2. The Mid-range War Plan.
3. The Long-range War Plan.

In addition, there are Mobilization Plans; North Atlantic Treaty Organization Plans; Mutual Security Program Plans; and lastly, plans for budgetary purposes only. The development of these plans constitutes the major responsibility and the major portion of the work of the Joint Staff.

Second.--Processing a plan.

What happens when a particular problem, for example, a problem to develop strategic guidance in the form of a war plan for some future war which might break out is assigned to the Joint Staff? First, the problem is assigned to the JSPC, which in turn passes the problem to the working level, the JSPG. This problem further drops down the line to the "Indians," a team in the War Plans Section. This team is provided with guidance on national policies recommended by the National Security Council; broad missions prescribed by the President and the Congress, and other information which may be provided from the Department of Defense. The working level team forwards this guidance and certain general assumptions to the Joint Intelligence Committee, in order to obtain from it an estimation of the enemy's capabilities during the period of the time to be covered by the plan. When the Intelligence Group returns the enemy's capabilities, the War Plans Team then develops

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a concept of war, calculated to further the national objectives, and produces the joint outline strategic plan to fit this concept. During this working period, the War Plans Team confers informally with officers on the planning staffs of the three services. Each service prepares at this time a list of forces available as of the assumed D-day, and prepares a best estimate of the rate of build-up by phase dates for the duration of the plan.

When the strategic plan is approved by the JSPG, it is sent to the JSPC and to the JLPG, simultaneously. This plan in its present form is not an operational plan and is not intended as such. It contains:

1. The estimated enemy's capabilities.
2. The national war objectives.
3. The assumptions under which it was conceived.
4. The broad concept under which our military forces will operate.
5. The number of military tasks to be performed.
6. The major tactical units to perform these tasks.

(See following page for principal features of a Joint Logistics Plan.)

## Third.--Principal features of logistic plans.

Chart 7 very briefly indicates the purpose of the logistic plan, its contents, and the planning of the implementing procedures. In other words this is a very brief outline of a logistic plan, the type of logistic plan which supports a typical strategic plan described in the two preceding paragraphs.

A joint logistic plan to support a war plan covers the expenditures and use of resources in support of military operations. It contains sufficient information, instructions, and policies for the very top of the command structure to utilize in implementing war plans. Further, it enables commanders under the JCS to prepare their own logistic plans and annexes.

The plan treats with logistic relationships between the JCS and the services; between the three services; between the services and the commands directly under the Joint Chiefs; and between these commands (unified commands) and forces of allied countries.

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Principal features of a Joint Logistics Plan to support a war plan, follows:

## 1. Purpose.

- a. Assures adequate logistic support.
- b. Provides for coordinated effort of the services in logistic support of commands directly under Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- c. Prescribes logistic responsibilities of these commands and their relations to other commands and forces of other countries.
- d. Prescribes policies to assure world-wide development of logistics in pattern required to support Joint Chiefs of Staff strategic concept.

## 2. Contents.

- a. Introduction (summaries of strategy, situation, forces; definitions; operating responsibilities).
- b. Part I--supply.
- c. Part II--materiel maintenance and modification.
- d. Part III--medical services.
- e. Part IV--transportation.
- f. Part V--construction and base development.
- g. Part VI--personnel.
- h. Part VII--administrative management.

## 3. Planning and implementing procedures.

- a. General planning responsibilities.
  - (1) Joint Chiefs of Staff.
  - (2) Services.
  - (3) Commands.
- b. Implementation instructions.
  - (1) Action prior to operations or prior to D-day.
  - (2) Special instructions and information.

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A JCS logistic plan cannot be completed at the time a war plan is completed since detailed operational planning must be filled in by the three services. Therefore, the logistic plan is issued in sections with precedence given to the sections essential to initiating planning in the services and in the unified commands.

## Preparation of the Joint Mobilization Plan

Our fourth category of work is the preparation of the Joint Mobilization Plan, sometimes referred to as the outline war plan for mobilization planning and industrial mobilization planning. It indicates the phased wartime deployment of tactical forces by areas for a three-year period after D-day. The D-day may be assumed to occur from three to five years in the future. What is a Joint Mobilization Plan (JMP)? Of what does it consist and what is its purpose? The following answers these questions:

1. Provides the basis for detailed planning by the individual military services for a general mobilization.
2. Establishes scope of logistical effort involved.
3. Serves as a basis for mobilization of industries.
4. Provides strategic basis for objective computation of total requirements.

The purpose of the JMP is to guide the development of logistical and mobilization plans by the services, to enable them to develop requirements for full mobilization, and to provide a means of coordination between the services and between the military and industrial mobilization planning.

Although logistics planning for the JMP and for war plans could be included under the same broad category of work, I have separated them in this discussion--due to the fact that there is considerable difference between the two types of plans. The JMP provides the basis for developing military resources in general support of Joint Chiefs strategy. It is a goal or base which we seek to attain in the period before D-day and upon which the rapid expansion and deployment of combat forces with adequate logistic support can be accomplished.

On the other hand, the joint logistic plan in support of the Emergency War Plan provides the basis for employing these resources in the support of the strategic plan. In general, then, it can be said that the JMP is principally concerned with pre-D-day attainments while the joint logistic plan for the Emergency War Plan is principally concerned with post-D-day actions. They are, thus, teammates.

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The JMP is a document of three parts: First, strategic guidance; second, logistic policies and the assignment of logistic responsibilities; and third, instructions for carrying out the mobilization planning cycle. Before leaving this topic, I want to emphasize that the JMP does not take the place of the mobilization plans of the separate services. It does prescribe the basis for them and the means for coordinating them. When the JMP is complete, it includes the principal features of the mobilization plans prepared by the separate services. Further, it is one feature of the planning done by the Joint Chiefs, the separate services, and the Munitions Board in the so-called mobilization planning cycle. As the last of the topics which I will discuss with you, I believe that an explanation of the mobilization planning cycle illustrates better than anything else the relationships in the field of logistics between the Joint Chiefs, the Munitions Board, and the three services.

Chart 7, Mobilization Cycle, following page.--This chart illustrates the mobilization planning cycle. Based on national objectives developed by the National Security Council and announced by the President, the JCS develop strategic guidance in the form of a joint outline war plan for mobilization planning. This guidance, together with established joint logistic policies and responsibilities, form the JMP. This plan is furnished to the Services, with pertinent parts of it going to the Munitions Board. In accordance with this plan, the services prepare joint campaign or operational plans and supporting logistic plans. The services then compute their requirements for personnel and materiel and, from these, develop their mobilization plans. The Munitions Board calls upon the services to submit their requirements for personnel and materiel, and determines from the National Security Resources Board what portion of national resources and manpower is available to meet these military requirements. When requirements exceed capabilities, necessary adjustments are made by the Munitions Board working with the services, and if agreement cannot be reached, the matter is referred to the Joint Chiefs for a decision. The decision may be to change the plan and thus reduce requirements, or to take the risk involved in not having enough materiel to supply the forces listed in the plan. Firm feasible requirements are then used by the Munitions Board in the development of the Industrial Mobilization Plan.

The completion of this planning cycle results in: the Joint Mobilization Plan, the Mobilization Plan for each of the three services, the Industrial Mobilization Plan of the Munitions Board, the Procurement Programs of the Munitions Board, and the Procurement Plans of the services.


Let me emphasize that every Joint Chiefs of Staff war plan does not initiate a mobilization planning cycle. Only those war plans specifically designated by the Joint Chiefs are used as a basis for mobilization planning.

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CHART 7

# MOBILIZATION PLANNING CYCLE



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This concludes my discussion of the logistic planning activities of the Joint Staff. I have touched on the statutory responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs, the charter functions of their Logistics Committee, the preparation of logistics studies and reports, the analyses of logistic implications of joint war plans, and the preparation of Joint Logistic Plans of the Joint Mobilization Plan.


Logistic considerations are almost invariably limiting factors in military operations, therefore, in military planning this must be recognized by insuring the integration of logistics with strategy. The JCS do recognize this fact and the effect of logistics on war plans is studied during every phase of planning. Logistics is given the same consideration as it is given in actual operation in time of war. The logistic planning organization of the JCS is a vital connecting link between military strategy and utilization of national resources.

Chart 8, Joint Logistics Plans Committee Flow Chart (not mentioned in text), following page.

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CHART 6



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AB	Staff
SC	
IPC	
EA	
ISIR	Bookkeeping BUD
	Planning NSRB
	Compliance { JD FTC SEC

g, tion	Special Services
AEC	
CCC	
DEF	
DMPA	
DTA	
{ EPS MB	
NSA	Contract Settlement RB
	Research RDB
	Small Business Aid SDPA

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## KEY TO GOVERNMENT MOBILIZATION AGENCIES

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- A -Army (Part of Defense)  
AEC -Atomic Energy Commission  
AF -Air Force (Part of Defense)  
APB -Aircraft Production Board  
BPR -Bureau of Public Roads (Part of Commerce)  
BUD -Budget Bureau  
CAA -Civil Aeronautics Adm. (Part of Commerce)  
CCC -Commodity Credit Corp. (Part of Agriculture)  
CDTS -Committee on Defense Transportation and Storage (Part of ODM)  
CEA -Council of Economic Advisors  
CFSR -Committee on Foreign Supplies and Requirements (Part of ODM)  
CIA -Central Intelligence Agency (Part of NSC)  
CISR -President's Commission of Internal Security and Individual Rights  
COM -Department of Commerce  
DEF -Defense Department  
DEPA -Defense Electric Power Adm. (Part of Interior)  
DFA -Defense Fisheries Adm. (Part of Interior)  
DMAA -Defense Manpower Adm. (Part of Labor)  
DMIA -Defense Minerals Adm. (Part of Interior)  
DMB -Defense Mobilization Board (Part of ODM)  
DMPA -Defense Materials Procurement Agency  
DPA -Defense Production Administration  
DSFA -Defense Solid Fuels Adm. (Part of Interior)  
DTA -Defense Transport Adm.  
EIB -Export-Import Bank of Washington  
EPB -Electronic Production Board  
EPS -Emergency Procurement Service (Part of GSA)  
ESA -Economic Stabilization Agency  
FCDA -Federal Civil Defense Adm.  
FHA -Federal Housing Adm. (Part of HHFA)  
FRB -Federal Reserve Board  
FS -Forest Service (Part of Agriculture)  
FSA -Federal Security Agency  
FSS -Federal Supply Service (Part of GSA)  
FTC -Federal Trade Commission  
GSA -General Service Adm.  
HHFA -Housing and Home Finance Agency  
HRAC -Health Research Advisory Committee (Part of ODM)  
INT -Department of Interior  
JD -Department of Justice  
LMPC -Labor-Management Policy Committee (Part of ODM)  
MA -Maritime Adm. (Part of Commerce)  
MB -Munitions Board (Part of Defense)  
MPC -Manpower Policy Committee (Part of ODM)  
MSA -Mutual Security Adm.  
N -Navy (Part of Defense)  
NAB -National Advisory Board of Mobilization Policy  
NPA -National Production Authority (Part of Commerce)  
NSA -National Shipping Authority (Part of MA)  
NSC -National Security Council  
NSRB -National Security Resources Board  
NSTC -National Security Training Commission
- Frank Pace, Secretary  
Gordon Dean, Chairman  
Thomas K. Finletter, Secy.  
Harold Boyer, Chairman  
Thomas H. MacDonald, Commissioner  
F. J. Lawton, Director  
C. F. Horne, Administrator  
Charles F. Brannan, Chairman  
D. W. Rentzel, Chairman  
Leon H. Keyserling, Chairman  
William C. Foster, ex-Chairman  
Walter B. Smith, Director  
Chester W. Nimitz, Chairman  
Charles Sawyer, Secretary  
Robert A. Lovett, Secretary  
James F. Fairman, Administrator  
Albert M. Day, Administrator  
Frank P. Graham, Administrator  
Wilburn C. Schroeder, Administrator  
Charles E. Wilson, Chairman  
Jess Larson, Administrator  
Manly Fleischmann, Administrator  
Charles W. Connor, Administrator  
James K. Knudson, Administrator  
Herbert E. Gaston, Chairman  
Edmund T. Morris, Chairman  
A. J. Walsh, Commissioner  
Eric Johnston, Administrator  
Millard Caldwell, Administrator  
Franklin D. Richards, Commissioner  
William McChesney Martin, Jr., Chairman  
Lyle F. Watts, Chief  
Oscar R. Ewing, Administrator  
Clifton E. Mack, Commissioner  
James M. Mead, Chairman  
Jess Larson, Administrator  
Raymond M. Foley, Administrator  
Howard A. Rusk, Chairman  
Oscar L. Chapman, Secy.  
James Howard McGrath, Atty, General  
Flemming & Graham, Chairmen  
Edward L. Cochrane, Administrator  
John D. Small, Chairman  
Arthur S. Flemming, Chairman  
W. Averell Harriman, Director  
Dan A. Kimball, Secy.  
Chas. E. Wilson, Chairman  
Manly Fleischmann, Administrator  
Charles H. McGuire, Director  
James S. Lay, Jr., Exec. Sec.  
Jack Gorrie, Chairman  
James W. Wadsworth, Chairman

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<b>ODM</b>	-Office of Defense Mobilization	Charles E. Wilson, Director
<b>OIT</b>	-Office of International Trade (Part of Commerce)	Loring K. Macy, Director
<b>OPS</b>	-Office of Price Stabilization (Part of ESA)	Michael V. DiSalle, Director
<b>ORS</b>	-Office of Rent Stabilization (Part of ESA)	Tighe E. Woods, Director
<b>PAD</b>	-Petroleum Adm. for Defense (Part of Interior)	Oscar L. Chapman, Administrator
<b>PEC</b>	-Production Executive Committee	Clay P. Bedford, Chairman
<b>PMA</b>	-Production and Marketing Adm. (Part of Agriculture)	Gus F. Geissler, Administrator
<b>PMPC</b>	-President's Materials Policy Commission	William S. Paley, Chairman
<b>RB</b>	-Renegotiation Board	John T. Koehler, Chairman
<b>RDB</b>	-Research and Development Board (Part of Defense)	Walter G. Whitman, Chairman
<b>RFC</b>	-Reconstruction Finance Corporation	W. Stuart Symington, Adm.
<b>SAC</b>	-Scientific Advisory Committee (Part of ODM)	Oliver E. Buckley, Chairman
<b>SACB</b>	-Subversive Activities Control Board	Charles M. LaFollette, Actng. Chairman
<b>SDPA</b>	-Smaller Defense Plants Adm.	Telford Taylor, Administrator
<b>SEC</b>	-Security and Exchange Commission	Harry H. McDonald, Chairman
<b>SSB</b>	-Salary Stabilization Board	Raymond B. Allen, Chairman
<b>SSS</b>	-Selective Service System	Lewis B. Hershey, Director
<b>STATE</b>	-State Department	Dean G. Acheson, Secretary
<b>TRES</b>	-Treasury Department	John W. Snyder, Secretary
<b>USDA</b>	-United States Dept. of Agriculture	Charles F. Brannan, Secretary
<b>VA</b>	-Veterans Administration	Carl R. Gray, Jr., Administrator
<b>VCRC</b>	-Voluntary Credit Restraint Committee	Oliver S. Powell, Chairman
<b>WSB</b>	-Wage Stabilization Board (Part of ESA)	Nathan P. Feinsinger, Chairman