

EXECUTIVE ACTION

6 December 1951

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INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

Washington, D. C.

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COLONEL WATERMAN: It was my good fortune several years ago to have the opportunity of taking a course, which was directed by our speaker of today, at the Harvard Business School. The course was called "Administrative Practices," but its objectives were very much the same as those of our present course in executive skills. Because of the impression which this course made on me at that time, I asked specifically for the privilege of introducing our speaker, Dr. Learned, this morning.

I can assure you from firsthand observation that Dr. Learned is both a skilled executive and a very effective teacher and has a very deep understanding of human relations. He is also the coauthor of the book "Executive Action" in which you have been doing some reading lately. In addition to being a professor, he serves as a consultant and researcher in the business world. He has probably met face to face more top executives in business than almost anyone else and, what is of more direct importance to you, he has also served as consultant in the armed forces both during World War II and as of right now. Presently he is on leave from Harvard, acting as consultant to General Vandenberg on the matter of program control. It is my pleasure to introduce to you Dr. Edmund P. Learned of the Harvard Business School. Dr. Learned.

DR. LEARNED: General Vanaman and members of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces: I am very glad to be here this morning and talk to you on the problem of "Executive Action." Executive action in my opinion depends, first, upon the clear perception of problems; secondly, on human leadership. Both are of vital importance. The educational system of the armed forces and the mission of this school are designed especially to help recognize problems and provide substantive knowledge related to their solution. This particular phase of your course is giving recognition to the other important fundamental, human leadership. I am going to limit my remarks on problems and policies, but I will make a few points based on my connection with the armed forces over a period of nine years.

We need a broad view of military problems and their relationship to industry. Inside any one of the three services, and within the Department of Defense itself, we need officers who are men of executive talent, possessing a clear picture of the interrelationships of the parts. In other words, we are asking for general management talent and for men who see problems in all their implications. We need men who can start with a strategic plan, see it through its

program aspects, and finally into its production schedules. We need men who can conceive of the importance of standards for control purposes, whether these be standards affecting men, material, or money.

You can read the daily paper and see the issues before the armed forces. Some of the attacks being made upon us are reasonable and some are unreasonable. They frequently involve such questions as: Have we laid out our requirements soundly? Have we phased our programs? Or, have we interrelated our objectives of men, materiel, and money in such a fashion that they are achievable within the limits of the economy?

As you well know, we begin with intelligence, which leads to our grand strategy, and then to the statement of the missions of the services. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approve the required combat forces to accomplish assigned missions. Each service develops its own program of time-phased support forces. We then calculate requirements for end items and basic facilities. Finally, we make time-phased production plans. (This latter job the armed forces have not done too well.) In these times we must use men and material prudently in order that the demands on our economy shall be reasonable and that we will have continued public support for the forces in being which the strategic situation requires.

We must also plan for the prudent use of men. Whether it be materiel or men, we must face the realities of lead time--lead time in production or training, in the creation of facilities, and lead time for operational training before the attainment of combat readiness. We need to give more attention to the flow of material and men to meet our requirements. The questions involved are: What do we have? What do we require? We need to balance requirements versus resources on a time-phased schedule. We can reduce requirements if we do time-phase our needs. I am very much interested in this particular subject but I am going to pass it for the more important one that has been put on today's schedule.

I want to discuss human leadership in its broad aspects. I doubt, gentlemen, whether I will say anything that is new, but if I can merely re-emphasize the obvious and have you accept it as basic, we will have made progress. I have found in business and I am sure you will find to some extent in the military forces that what we know in our hearts to be true, we deny forcefully in much of our daily behavior.

I shall report observations on people and organizations and ask: What does this mean to an executive? How does one play the executive role? To some extent I shall speak in abstractions in spite of the fact that I have come to the conclusion that few people enjoy abstractions.

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Each individual, wherever he is placed in an organization, has a personality and an integrity that he seeks to protect. This striving has an impact on the supervisor because it results in the individual's trying to get a signal from his supervisor that that integrity and personality is being recognized for what it is. I think we all, whether or not we admit it, have a personality that we respect and would like to have other people respect. In so far as a leader knows how to recognize and deal with such a fundamental, he enhances his power to make an effective group.

The second observation--again which you all recognize--is that each individual seeks to obtain status in a group. This may seem to be a contradiction of the first point. Actually, individuals seek personal recognition and at the same time they seek group status. This search for status sometimes takes the form of empire-building. I think our Civil Service system contributes to this same objective--to our sorrow. I want to raise the question of how you can help people obtain satisfaction in group or organizational effort without building empires.

Bear in mind an observation that I think I read in a book by a psychologist at the University of Buffalo. He said that every individual makes logical sense to himself although he may not necessarily make sense to anyone else.

Each individual brings to the organization his own personal goals or objectives. Furthermore, he has a unique perception of the goals of the organization. The important thing to remember is that each individual's perception of his goal in the organization may be quite different from yours. He has his own concept of the requirements of his particular position, which may or may not agree with the requirements of the actual job. He attaches his own set of values to his concepts and his feelings are part of the context of an executive's problem.

Let us examine an example or two. One young man received a promotion from district manager to merchandising manager in one of our large corporations. He was being added as one of eight new men on the staff of a new vice-president. He was given three months to size up the merchandising problem. He studied his market; he studied the adaptation of the product to the market; he wrote a thick technical report for his executive and laid it on the vice-president's desk. For three months he heard nothing from the vice-president about this great work.

Our merchandising executive became frustrated--in fact, this case came to my attention because he came to me for advice. He had never put himself in the shoes of his boss, the vice-president, who

was also new to the job. The merchandiser had never surveyed the important issues facing his superior. He was thinking only from his personal orientation--a perfectly valid way to think. He had failed, however, to realize that his superior might have a different, but pressing, problem. Likewise, the vice-president had made no move to indicate that he understood the particular problem of the merchandising executive.

The merchandiser actually discussed with me how he could bring his report to the attention of the executive. One thing, I am sure we would all agree upon, is that a nice thick tome left on the desk of the vice-president is not the way to bring matters to his attention.

Another case concerns a man who was interested in his job but failed to understand the impact on others of his own point of view. Before the last war began, one of our large companies decided it would have to centralize purchasing. Top management had reached the conclusion that a centralized purchasing division, to deal with the fewest possible agencies of government, should be established. This was in a company in which the practice of decentralized management had been established. Each plant manager was almost autonomous and the purchasing agent in each plant had no functional superiors. Suddenly there was imposed upon them a centralized purchasing office.

The behavior of the new top purchasing executive was of this order--he issued directives without consulting the "independent" plant purchasing agents. This central purchasing agent assumed he understood the company's problem and did not consult plant managers or plant purchasing agents in defining it.

Gentlemen, it did not make any difference in that case what the new top officer thought or whether he was right. He got a bad reaction from people who had a different point of view toward the problem. He ignored the personal goals of these people and their personal understanding of the problem. Naturally, he encountered much resistance to what may have been a sound objective.

I am going on with the list of abstractions about people. Each individual in an organization is influenced by the codes and the beliefs of the group to which he belongs. To gain acceptance and prevent becoming a social outcast, an individual must accept some of these beliefs. Have you not seen men go from one office with a specialized interest to another office with a different interest? Have you seen some of those men completely reverse their former positions as they made the change? Does it always make sense? However, if you are going to have a good general management result, you want these varying views blended into a balanced whole. Proper executive leadership monitors this blending process.

While we are still on the subject of individuals, let us consider that an individual's capacity to understand a problem or procedure, or to receive instructions, is conditioned by his background, training, experience, imagination, and ability. One of the biggest jobs we have in the armed services is to communicate to those at the working level what they need to know in a way that is understandable to them. It is one thing to have high-level objectives; it is another to have those objectives understood by the person at the lower level.

Let us remember that people actually associate in small groups or small administrative units. The small group may be an informal organization or may be part of some well-established formal organization, but the people composing it share the same beliefs, codes, and feelings.

Another fundamental about people that I think we should accept is that people like to be developing personally. An organization has high morale when it is doing things that its members feel are worth while. People like to solve tough problems and obtain satisfaction therefrom. Work never hurt anybody. People like to do a job. Our problem is to give them the opportunity and provide the leadership so that they will be complicating their experience and growing personally.

As supervisors or executives we must recognize that when people come to work, they do not leave their personal lives at home. If one has indigestion, a row with his wife, or his children are behaving in a manner which does not make him proud of them, he doesn't forget that when he shuts the front door. If a basket is full of R&R's, one may be unhappy. Under these conditions one may be snappy with either subordinates or superiors. Let us recognize the inevitable fact that people must blow off steam. Those who don't may get ulcers. I think it is wise to recognize that a certain amount of blowing off is good.

Another characteristic of humans is resistance to change. They don't like to do things in a different way. Executives or supervisors have a real problem on how to get people to accept and participate in change.

Another fundamental is that people are judged by their behavior more than by their words. One of our prominent generals once said to me, "I don't understand why more ideas aren't coming up from the lower echelons of the staff and the commands." My answer was a very simple one--"They were cut off in the process of coming up."

Let us turn to a few observations about the fundamentals of an organization. I have referred to the small administrative unit. Actually, an organization really becomes an organization when its

small administrative components are tied together by common purposes. This does not require the destruction of the unique integrity of the personal values and viewpoints of the small units. Rather, the executive has the burden of helping the small units to understand the complex set of relationships of which they are a part. Each little unit has a job to do. It is a fairly specialized job but it fits into a big whole.

Have you not found in your experience that, although you talk until you get "blue in the face" about the big broad picture, there is no effect because your people know only the small segment represented by their own unit. Only a few people stand out; these are anxious to get ahead. They are going to try to learn and understand things beyond their immediate activities. However, you will not have a good organization until the administrative leaders of smaller groups understand their interrelationships with other units. Your administrative leaders must be oriented within and without their own groups; they must live in a variety of worlds.

If the group is going to fit into the pattern of the whole organization, the administrative leader must understand his own subordinates, his superiors, staff personnel, and other line personnel. Executives who are trying to develop men as administrative or executive leaders must help these men to achieve the capacity to live and understand these many interconnected groups. The executive's capacity, psychologically, to shift his point of view from first one small group to another, determines to a very substantial degree whether he makes his full contribution to the building of an organization.

We should recognize as well that an organization is always in the process of being built. The job of executive leadership is never done. This is especially true of the military establishment, where there is a greater turnover of leadership personnel.

The problem of communicating the over-all objectives from the top echelon to the working level is done through the administrative leaders. One of the realities we must face is that the actual goal achieved by an organization is under the control of these lower echelons. We can do planning in the Department of Defense, the Munitions Board, the higher levels in the Government, or at the headquarters of any one of our three services, but in the final analysis these plans are only as good as the understanding of them by the men who execute them. Why is it that Congressmen are constantly turning up one incident after another in the procurement area? Is it not because the buyer who does the job does not have the concept that is held at the top? He does not understand, or he does not share the concept or the objectives of the top. I am fully aware that some of our congressional criticisms are purely political. Many of them, however, arise from the fact that men at the

working level, where an organization may be fairly judged, simply do not understand or conceive the concepts held by the top.

For example, the Secretary of the Air Force, the Chief of Staff, and the Commanding General of the Air Materiel Command all agree that our objective is to use our resources and materials prudently. We know that we should review our tables of equipment. These tables are the basis of issue, and to some extent, the basis of requirements calculations. How can we solve the problem of adding a new and better item but still use up old assets? We can't afford to scrap everything already bought because we find something better for the future. In some cases military judgment would say you should do it, but in most cases it may not be necessary. Gentlemen, think through the problem of communicating that message down to the men who figure the new procurement requirements and who pick the items out of the stock bins. These are the places where the final action takes place.

What do these observations mean to executives and supervisors? Number one, in my opinion, is the need to distinguish between your personal beliefs and goals and those of the people you are trying to administer. Are you able to develop the capacity in your supervisory subordinates to distinguish between themselves and the people and problems before them? Unless they can understand the forces of human personality, of organizational beliefs and codes, of the cross currents of people in an organization, they will have difficulty.

I recall a company where for eight years men in the top management had been trying to plan a stronger organization. They invariably referred their ideas to a management group which was composed of operating men. They called in industrial consultants to advise them on the organization, and these men listened to the operating executives, the department heads, and the section chiefs. The operating group expressed itself clearly and the consultants also reported the same findings, but the top managers were unable to hear what was stated because it disagreed with many of their preconceptions. Obviously, there was a complete gap in communication.

Gentlemen, it isn't necessary to agree with one's subordinates, but if one fails to listen to what they say directly, or what they try to say by indirection, he will not have an understanding of the actual situation in which he must work.

I recall a situation of a supervisor who was very loyal to his boss. He reported the sentiments of the people in the organization and stated them on an abstract basis. If you could have heard a recording of a particular conversation and you had known a little about the personalities of the executive and the supervisor making

the report, you might have been willing to draw the inference that the supervisor was talking about how he felt. His loyalty to the boss was strong and he wanted him to know the facts, but he did not want to be so blunt as to say, "I am talking about you."

When listening to subordinates, try to listen objectively to what they are trying to say. Maybe they are talking about themselves or maybe they are talking about the organization. It is necessary to read the latent as well as the direct meanings of remarks. If a person comes into your office on a "blowing off spell" and you cannot understand what he is saying, be sure to ask yourself, "Is it me or is it the other person?" If you just stop and ask, you will find your mind opened to hear more than before.

Gentlemen, subordinates have expectations of superiors. I am sure you remember what you have expected of your superiors at various stages of your career. Just remember, as you assume successive jobs, that you are not different from your previous boss. Are you measuring up in any degree to some of your subordinates' expectations?

I am convinced that what is important to your subordinate is important to him whether it is to you or not. If you want to give him an instruction or help him with a job, you must remove the mental block that is in his way. This mental block may arise out of difficulties outside the establishment or organization. If you will just listen carefully to some of his talk, though that may seem irrelevant to you, I think you will have a better opportunity to communicate to him some of the things he needs to know.

What is the real nature of the executive or supervisor's job? It is to integrate the needs of the organization with the requirements of the individual for growth and personal development. A leader has a responsibility to transmit policy instructions in meaningful terms to the receiving group. He must listen to those people in order to understand the language that is meaningful to them. He has got to interpret instructions at different echelons because words have different meanings on account of the difference in experience. The leader also has a responsibility to transmit ideas of the members of his group up the chain of command.

How do you convey recognition to individuals? Let me tell you how one general recently recognized the work of subordinate specialists. This general officer, under whom an important study was recently conducted, took the experts who did the work with him when he was to present their findings to the secretarial level. The general asked the specialists to speak when their knowledge was needed in the presentation. The specialists could answer questions asked by the Secretary because they had firsthand knowledge of the work. As you well

know few can foresee what another man will ask. The response of the Secretary was especially good. The morale effects, gentlemen, on the men who did the work was terrific. I think the danger the general faces is that the specialists he took with him will kill themselves with overwork because of the personal satisfaction derived from this incident.

If an administrative leader is going to release the creative talents of his group, and if he is going to understand them, he must have face-to-face contact. There are exceptions. I have known executives in the military, and some in business, who do practically everything by R&R, by manual, or by letter writing. Fortunately, they are exceptions to the rules. A written document is too much a one-way communication. True communication takes place in a context that includes the various people, their personal backgrounds, experience, and aspirations. The questions a subordinate will ask--if you will allow an atmosphere of questioning--may do a great deal for you. The questions will enable you to know whether or not you have transmitted to the men in clear language that which they need to know in order to bring their potential contribution to bear upon the organization problem. Too often we neglect face-to-face contact.

A good leader, at whatever executive or supervisory level, needs faith in his subordinates. I quote an example from one of the large companies in this country. The president told a story about one of the decentralized divisions, where full responsibility for management decisions was given to the general management of the division. The division made a serious blunder in engineering design; this was known to the central engineering staff of the company. The central staff reported the possibility to the general manager of the division. The manager of the subordinate unit, however, supported his own engineering department and eventually the product had to be withdrawn from the market and redesigned. The president made a very important point about this incident, saying, "If you are going to give men responsibility by decentralization, you must let them take it and you must be willing to accept some mistakes as the price of the growth of men."

One of our major problems in business and in the military services is to keep organizations from overcomplicating themselves and overorganizing. In the Civil Service, the status of the administrative unit--be it division, branch, or section--has a bearing on the compensation and social standing of its leaders and members. Thus there is a tendency to overorganize. As an alternative to personal satisfaction from organization status, I offer personal satisfaction from problem-solving. Licking a difficult problem may be all the satisfaction required.

An outstanding example is the practice of Mr. Lincoln, President of the Lincoln Electric Company. Mr. Lincoln believes in setting a goal difficult to reach. He has actually turned down investments in new equipment with pay-outs which many businessmen would regard as good investments. He will continue to use old equipment in order to permit his men to figure out a new jig or fixture that will get the desired results from their old machines. They get satisfaction through the exercise of their creative abilities.

You are all familiar with the doctrine of completed staff work which bears a close relationship to what I am saying. Fundamentally, you assign a task or problem to some office in the staff. Assume that a particular problem is assigned to "Personnel." This is the office of primary or leadership responsibility. It is this office that should get the broad answer that the higher echelon would obtain if it had the time to do it. In order to get the answer, this office draws upon people from various portions of the staff, such as Operations or Materiel. In principle this is a simple military task force organized around a problem. The answer prepared by the office of primary responsibility should be a staff-wide, well rounded one. Any recommended actions affecting various sections of the staff or any commands should be included and clearly stated.

Another thing we have to do to develop executives is to let subordinates make some decisions. Gentlemen, when you give a job to a subordinate and he comes up with an answer, you can tell him that he is right or wrong. But you can use another course. You can ask him questions: Have you considered this? Have you considered that? Have you talked with this office? Have you talked with that office? By these very questions, you give him ideas. You can demand an immediate answer, which has one kind of effect on the individual, or you can respect the potential capacity of that individual and let him go out of the office and provide his own answer to those questions. When he gives you his final conclusion, you will have more of a measure of the man's capacity and you will have preserved his self-respect as well. What I am suggesting is that the attitudes and behavior of the executive have a great bearing on whether men grow under his sponsorship.

I am thinking now of an executive who read a report prepared by one of his subordinates. In the course of the conversation, he asked: "Have you thought of this question in connection with this report?" He went further and said, "If I were writing this report I wouldn't include this paragraph." After the subordinate deliberated, the executive, however, signed the report in the form the subordinate wrote it. The paragraph remained in the document. By his behavior the executive in effect said: "There is room for a difference of opinion." The executive told me that he wanted the subordinate to learn to take responsibility, including all the consequences as well.

The attitude and the ability of a leader of men will show. During the war one of our generals directed the commander of a group to make a division of personnel into two equal groups. He was not told which of these he would command after the division was made. The original group commander was assigned to one group and a new commander to the other. It was the opinion of the general that the original commander had made a fair division of personnel by skill. Three months later the general could tell by the differential ability displayed which group belonged to that group commander. The second commander was not as good an organizer or leader as the first.

There was a psychologist who was trying to explain to an admiral how he analyzed teamwork within a naval air group. The admiral looked at the charts and said, "This is so and so's group"; he was right. The admiral knew nothing about the scientific methodology of the psychologist, but from the description of the psychologist he recognized the operating pattern of one of his better group commanders.

Let us now consider the role an executive can play. In one role he can make all the decisions, issue all the orders, and work on a one-to-one basis with his subordinates. In other words, he will call his subordinates in one at a time, give them instructions, and see that they obey them. Or he can play a second role. He can have staff meetings in which he works with a group and tries to foster a team spirit. He can ask questions and stimulate group discussions and encourage the staff to reach well-balanced conclusions and plans.

You men might ask yourselves some questions regarding the executive role you will play--the attitudes you will express and the assumptions you are going to make about people. Are you going to listen or not? Are you going to put emphasis on problems and try to help your subordinates understand the breadth and scope of these problems and the people that should help solve them? Are you going to allow open discussion and permit criticism? Are you going to accept some criticism of how you are running the organization? Are you going to foster participation on the theory that the more men who participate in solving a problem and working out a plan or procedure, the more they understand what has to be done?

I notice the time for my formal talk is almost up. I have one or two more points to suggest. They may be picked up in the discussion period. Everyone shown on the same horizontal line of an organization chart is not on a par. Then, you may ask, "What is the function of an organization chart?" An organization chart shows who is responsible for what. It designates the office of

primary responsibility for a function, an area, a service, or what you will. The designated office has more responsibility and authority in its assigned area than any other office on a comparable level. The other offices have a participating or coordinating interest, but not necessarily a vetoing interest. Each office is supreme on some assigned responsibility.

This last observation raises another question. In the discussion of a problem, should rank or technical competence dominate? I realize that rank often does dominate but that is not necessarily correct. Let us assume that the problem is assigned to an office under the leadership of a colonel. He seeks assistance from other offices and a brigadier general as well as some lieutenant colonels and majors attend the meeting. Should the general control the meeting or should the responsible colonel--assuming, of course, that he is competent--govern the proceedings?

In closing let me ask you--are you going to be a leader who helps an organization to do? Gentlemen, a good executive is not judged by the number of decisions that he makes, but by the number of good decisions that come out of the organization for which he is responsible. Thank you.

QUESTION: Would you discuss the feeling of insecurity that you just passed over lightly in your discourse, that management should look for and work with.

DR. LEARNED: That is a very good point. People do want to know where they stand. That is one of the values, I think, of face-to-face contact by the administrative leaders. People come in with all sorts of problems. Some of them are essentially those of personal insecurity. They are uncertain about their work or they have family problems. They want to talk to their superior because they have confidence in him. I also believe in periodic personnel reviews. Any superior ought to talk with his employees and subordinates periodically, at least once a year, or twice a year, or on some other informal schedule.

In either type of personal discussion it is important to place the person at ease and give him a chance to make comments. Do not start an interview with "Do you have any problems?" There are many right questions but this is not one of them. People don't like to wear their problems on their sleeves. Some people do but most don't. I would advocate long periods of silence if necessary. In other words, if your caller has nothing to say, do not force him to talk. If the person wants to talk about what is important to him you may hear personal things; you may hear about his job.

If people do not perform satisfactorily, you should talk about their deficiencies instead of following the age-old practice--used by civilian and military organizations alike--of passing the misfits on to someone else. Sometimes the misfit is given a better rating than he deserves in order to promote him out. It usually turns out badly for the man concerned, and it hurts an organization to have people promoted who are not able to do the job confronting them. Early in the career of all individuals, as early and as low down in the organization as possible, there should be a sound evaluation of their capabilities, their aptitudes and personal aspirations, so that the misfits can be reduced and the round peg can be placed in the round hole.

QUESTION: What are some of the more common techniques employed in this so-called empire-building?

DR. LEARNED: I have seen situations in which a tough problem was subject to a staff study and instead of the problem being resolved, the study recommended that an organizational element be established to solve the problem. This new element would then be duplicated in every lower echelon of command. Sometimes a recommendation originates because a person wants to build an empire. Too many people get into the empire-building business because of queer rules. We judge a person's importance by the number of people he supervises rather than by the quality of his problem-solutions. If you want rank and the only way you can get it is to build an empire, this naturally tends to create empire-building. If you want a Civil Service rating, you try to increase the importance of the office or raise the status of your organization.

Competition for ratings may be overdone. In other cases we should improve ratings. Some military rank and Civil Service ratings are not adequate. As you rise to the higher echelon of command, you ordinarily obtain more rank, whether Civil Service or military. The notion that rank is not needed at the bottom is a false one. We have a false organizational philosophy because we fail to recognize that ability at the working level really counts and that sometimes you can use more rank at the bottom than you require at the top. We recognize this in the ranks given major commanders, but not as much as we might in staff officers and lower level subordinate commanders.

QUESTION: I would like to have you tie your discussion of what we were saying before on calling in these people and talking with them, having group or individual meetings, to the situation in the armed services. Today our policy generally when we make up efficiency ratings is to call the people in and discuss with them the idea we have. How can you get that across unless you discuss it with them? I believe

the Air Force Regulations do not specify that you have to call the individual in unless he is materially out of line in some particular fashion.

DR. LEARNED: I am not sure of the practice in the Air Force. I have heard that the bad points are discussed but not the entire rating. If you establish the right atmosphere--one in which you are responding to their problems and they in turn are responding to yours--then I think you can have a discussion of efficiency that is worth while. But if you tie all your discussions to efficiency ratings and do not have other face-to-face contacts, you weaken your chance to inspire and develop men. Under these circumstances the efficiency rating conference is given undue weight.

QUESTION: Doctor, you made a statement to the effect that we should spend more time on problems and less on organizations; but, problems are always with us. Maybe I missed your point--but it seems to me that the better the organization is, the easier it is to solve the problems.

DR. LEARNED: You say problems are always with us and I agree. I say we ought to get solutions--good solutions--faster. I hope you do not disagree with that. You are throwing out another observation--if the organization is right, it should help in the solution of the problems. I can't see that your observation is inconsistent with what I said.

Let me be very concrete--have you ever been in operations in any one of the services, suffering at the time from shortage of materiel? Did you say anything complimentary about the Materiel people? Didn't you continue to plan combat operations or operational training on a schedule of your own making without facing up to the limitations of logistics? I felt throughout the war that the one certain characteristic of planners in all departments was their capacity to overcommit. More than once we had to delay a plan. The operator's urge is to "do it now," regardless of restrictions. Let the man from Operations be transferred to Personnel or Materiel, where he must try to overcome the shortage of which he was critical before, and what happens to him? He says, "What in the world is the matter with those operators? They refuse to face up to the logistical facts of life."

Gentlemen, why are the services being properly criticized right this minute? It is because the schedules you made were worthless. What is more, some of the schedules were known to be so by the people who made them.

Operations, Personnel, and Materiel offices, all have a valid point of view. What is needed is a coordinated merger into a master plan.

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Right now the people of the country are struggling with the question of the extent to arm or not to arm. So we have conflict. We must find a balance and the planners will have to make plans accordingly.

What I am pleading for is that we should not allow a military program to be determined by a single set of considerations. We have to solve the problem. The organizational elements and their points of view bear on the solution. But we must not let organizational interests obscure or prevent a solution.

COLONEL WATERMAN: On behalf of everybody here in the college, I would like to express appreciation for a very fine job on "Executive Action." Thank you very much.

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