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## GEOPOLITICAL POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES

26 August 1952

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Dr. Edmund A. Walsh, Regent, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, was born in Boston, Massachusetts, 10 October 1885. He was educated in Boston, New York, London, Dublin, Innsbruck (Austria), Woodstock (Maryland), and in France. He has received the following degrees: A.B. and Ph.D., Georgetown; LL.D., University of Delaware, University of Detroit, and St. Joseph's College (Philadelphia); and D. Lit., Georgetown. Soon after entering the priesthood, he was appointed Dean of Arts and Sciences at Georgetown University. During World War I he was a member of a special committee appointed to administer the Student Army Training Corps for supply officers of the U.S. Army. He entered Soviet Russia in 1922 for famine relief work, representing American Catholics on the American Relief Administration, and was named by the Vatican as Director-General of the Papal Relief Mission to Russia in the same year. Father Walsh is the founder and regent of the School of Foreign Service, and Vice-President of Georgetown University. He served as a member of the President's Commission on Military Training. He was adviser to Justice Jackson at the Nuremberg trials, and has engaged in numerous special missions throughout most of the world. He is a member of various academic societies and is the author of many books and papers on economics, history, and geopolitics. Some of his works are: "The Fall of the Russian Empire," 1928; "The Last Stand--An Interpretation of the Soviet Five Year Plan," 1931; "Political Economy of Total War," coauthor with William S. Culbertson, 1942; "Total Power," 1948; and "Total Empire," 1951.

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26 August 1952

ADMIRAL HAGUE: Good morning, Dr. Walsh, General Craig, gentlemen: Yesterday was a day of promise. Today we of the staff and faculty must start making good on the rather ambitious promises that were made to you yesterday.

You may recall my opening remarks in which I stated that in this day of total war it is no longer enough that a military commander should have a passing acquaintance with the problems of procurement and distribution; rather it is essential that he have a grasp of the complex problems of economic mobilization, not only as they pertain to the United States but on a geopolitical range.

It is quite natural, therefore, that our first lecture should deal with the geopolitical position of the United States. I am sure you will recall the promise that our speakers would be experts in their several fields.

When one thinks of geopolitics, the name of Dr. Edmund A. Walsh comes immediately to mind. You will already have noted from the biographies issued to you something of the distinguished accomplishments of Dr. Walsh. His fame as an educator and writer in the free world is equaled probably only by the infamy ascribed to him by the masters of the countries behind the Iron Curtain; for, quite naturally, those gentlemen have taken none too kindly to his calm, rational, dispassionate expose of their aims and ambitions, and the significance of their actions.

What the biography does not reveal is the fact that Dr. Walsh has been an old and true friend of the Industrial College from its inception. Father Walsh, as we affectionately call him, has, for the past several years, torn himself away from his manifold activities and the multitudinous demands on his time to come here to give the opening lecture.

His lectures to past classes have left such a deep and lasting impression that it is with the confidence of certainty I state that what he has to tell us this morning will serve as a broad, basic foundation of your work together. It is indeed a great privilege and an honor to present to you Dr. Edmund A. Walsh, Vice-President of Georgetown University, the founder and Regent of its School of Foreign Service. Father Walsh.

FATHER WALSH: Admiral, members of the staff, and members of this session of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces: May I at the

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outset express again, as I have had the privilege of doing over many years, the feeling of gratification and of service which I entertain in being permitted from year to year to be associated with the important work upon which you are engaged and with which you are concerned.

If I may be allowed to reminisce, I had the honor of lecturing to the Army Industrial College, as it was then called in the old Munitions Building, when it was not much more than a couple of offices and an auditorium--respectfully called an auditorium--probably achieved by knocking out the wall between two offices. Across the intervening years, this vine needs no bush, as the importance of the element that it emphasizes has become more and more apparent. Each year that I have had this privilege, one does not have to look for a topic. There has been one government on the face of the earth that has very benignly supplied me with a topic since 7 November 1917. One series of lectures that I gave to the public of Washington numbered 180, (which means 10 lectures a year for 18 years) until World War II took me off to Fort Leavenworth, Germany, Japan, and back home again.

So that each time I begin these discussions, despite what has happened in the meantime, I feel very much like a professor of the old, imperturbable German type who taught at an Austrian university, at Innsbruck--which I attended in 1914. At some time during his career as a German lecturer there, he had been imprisoned by the Prussian Government because he dared to question some of the infallibilities that resided in that seat of wisdom. When he returned to begin his lectures again, the student body and all the faculty were there in numbers to see what the old gentleman would say, whether he would launch into an indictment or defense. All he did was put on his "specs," look at his audience, and state, "Meine Herren (Gentlemen), as I was saying when I was interrupted---"

Similarly, I should like to say that it would be indeed a very profitable prelude to any discussion of our position and our policy vis-a-vis Soviet Russia to trace the course of those relationships since 7 November 1917, as there is an organic continuity which requires a knowledge of the whole picture. Such an achievement, to trace those relationships, might possibly be done in two fat volumes running to about 1,000 pages. Even that number of pages would demand that the author have a special genius for condensation and for selectivity, because of the amount of matter at one's disposal; he must also have a very terse and disciplined style.

One aspect alone of that story, which dealt with the 30 years of Soviet espionage in the United States, requires 70 pages for a bare enumeration, an epitome of personalities and incidents, a report that was published in the House of Representatives Report No. 1229 and released on 30 December 1951. That would be merely one short episode.

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Then you have the Canadian Spy Case of 1946 which was reported in that sober and very objective report of the Royal Commission in 1946. That report required 733 pages to set forth the various ramifications of the conspiracy that was conducted under the cloak of normal international relations and under the immunity of diplomatic status.

Therefore, I feel that I have to omit a great deal. I must confine myself to a very limited discussion of an enormous and still growing field. I intend to speak not only of the physical and geographical facts of geopolitics, but I intend to discuss with you today certain aspects of our present foreign policy as revealed in the diplomatic processes now en marche, as the French would say, that are now confronting us.

First of all, I feel it a duty before every class to emphasize the fact that the underlying and the permanent strategy of the Politburo, though it often comes up with changes which are only tactical changes and with frequent zigzags, has been persistent and consistent since 1917. Now, as each one of these zigzags takes place, particularly in its diplomatic procedure, there is always a recurrence of optimism to the belief that we are about to witness a drift to the right and that consequently coexistence may be possible. If so, any maneuver of that kind is usually traceable to some setback in their program or to some unforeseen shift in the over-all balance of power.

You and I have seen in recent days the spectacular announcement that Mr. Stalin has called a meeting of the All-Union Communist Party for 5 October 1952 at which important reorganization and structural changes will be made, and therefore the public prints are filled with speculation. That always means something more than appears on the surface. It means either that something has failed or something important is being projected.

We could tell that in Moscow during the two years I lived there by the internal pressures that would be brought to bear on us. Thus, when the Russians were suffering in 1923 at the hands of Lord Curzon, the British strong man at that time, we felt it in Moscow. Your chauffeur would be arrested; the mail would be tampered with; and, as happened in my case, they shut off the water in the house for non-payment of taxes by the previous owner during the Czar's time. I know many who could willingly accept that burden at the present time with regard to the nonpayment of taxes.

In the present situation let us look at it both geographically and politically. The great gamble in Korea failed in its basic objective. Therefore, a year of false armistice negotiations ensued. The Communists welcomed this respite in order to build up forces for the next assault, wherever it may be launched.

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In Europe the crucial struggle for Germany has been going against the Kremlin. The Marshall Plan clearly had a profound effect on the European economy. Then the North Atlantic Treaty Organization came into being and is being strengthened militarily, though not yet sufficiently. The Schuman Plan has progressed and the various other political and economic devices have strengthened resistance. They have displaced a demoralization and the affairs we all saw in Europe in 1945, 1946, and 1947. The final vote of the Bonn Convention on the European Defense Unity Treaty is expected in West Germany's Bundestag by October at the latest.

So you have a new meeting of the Communist Party with its new meetings for reorganization, for 5 October 1952. Those familiar with the Soviet political zigzags and with Lenin's directions for such cases clearly see that about this time a zigzag is indicated, unless the Politburo in desperation is ready to hazard a provocation that might tip the scale toward the ultimate horror of open warfare with the United States.

I have always maintained that the Russian Revolution of 1917 and all its subsequent consequences combined to make that revolution the most important single political event since the fall of the Roman Empire. I promulgated that doctrine in this hall, and later in the other hall, at a time when people in high diplomatic and political echelons were saying, "Don't you think this has got on your nerves, Father?" One high diplomatic officer once said to me, "Why not run down to Miami with me and we will bake it out on the sands." I notice in later years they go further south than Miami, even to Key West, to bake it out.

Although I hold that I do not think hostilities are imminent, the fact that ultimate hostilities are inevitable has been clearly predicted in the statements of Lenin and Stalin and is the Soviet official belief today. It is a dogma basic to their conduct and has never been repudiated. However, the belief and expression of it are often toned down and minimized for tactical purposes in hours of danger.

Lenin set that pattern himself, both for Soviet diplomacy abroad and for internal organization within Russia itself, when he insisted upon signing that humiliating treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918 because his world revolution was endangered by the approach of the German Army toward St. Petersburg. He did not hesitate to scrap integral communism within Russia itself during the years that I lived there--1922 and 1923. He did not hesitate to restore private enterprise in the new economic policy of 1922 because Russia was faced with the appalling famine of that period.

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The Marxist groups next invaded the united front with democracy. They organized against Nazism and Fascism in 1925 because their sensitive revolutionary nose smelled the menace of a powerful competitor for the leadership for the world revolution in the person of Adolph Hitler. Thereupon Stalin executed a diplomatic somersault and entered into partnership with Nazi Germany in 1939 when the wind began to blow from another direction.

That made World War II inevitable, and Stalin next congratulated his fellow totalitarian on the rape of Poland. But when his Nazi bedfellow rolled over on him in 1941 and nearly suffocated him by invading Russia, the Politburo straightway turned to the hated bourgeoisie of the West for aid, comfort, and lend-lease. We have cold facts of record before us. There need be no repetition of what has happened since 1945. It must suffice to recall for my present purposes that once the Nazi menace was eliminated, Soviet foreign policy soon reverted to the unchanged party line.

Because of indecision on our part, misconception of the issue, divided counsel, and, alas, too great confidence in Soviet pledges in certain quarters that should have known better, western diplomacy was outmaneuvered and was checkmated in the game for international stakes, played with the greatest chess players of the world. I wish again to emphasize that I conceive it now to be a sterile approach to the problem for me to make that incredible record of misunderstanding and overconfidence a sort of whipping post for recrimination and for the indictment of any personality or personalities. Therefore, I refer to it only insofar as the costly errors of the past may serve as lamps to our feet in the future.

Above and beyond all contemporary statements and documents, above and beyond what happened at Yalta, Teheran, and Potsdam, stands one indisputably malignant geographical fact. That is what ought to be kept before the minds of the leaders of America alike and should be the target of their best marksmanship. I certainly reserve the right to criticize public policy that I consider unwise.

Let us look, then, to the facts. Seven years of study and planned conquest by the Soviets since 1945 have resulted in a new Communist empire which is the greatest in recorded history. Some 800 million human beings are, directly or indirectly, subjected to the control of the Kremlin. That means approximately one-third of the human race and the end is not yet in sight. I see it in this panorama as it has unfolded, some of it under my own eyes in 1945 in Germany and later in the Far East. It has evolved with foresight, forethought, and with geopolitical wisdom.

The reason why I insist upon that so often is because of something the Admiral has mentioned, that I have done something in the field of

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geopolitics for a good many years. As early as 1924, after my return from Russia, I began to notice a magazine, crossing my desk headed for the library in German, called the "Deutsches Geopolitik." It was then I got my first contact with the remarkable figure, General Karl Haushofer, that later I interviewed at Nuremberg. From that new, highly intellectualized magazine, from the geographical discussion in it and the type of maps drawn, I realized here was something more than a conventional place geographer. It showed a dynamic force at work. It showed a global perspective. It showed the slow building-up of a philosophy of power for the then German Government.

Haushofer adapted the famous statement of Mackinder--which has been so often repeated and which seems to me to have been one of the most brilliant hypotheses of modern political science--namely, "Whoever rules the Near East can control the continent of Europe; whoever controls the continent of Europe controls the heartland; whoever controls the heartland controls the world."

I don't mean to go into that particular aspect of geopolitics again, except to cite the circumstances that occurred when I was assigned by the Judge Advocate General and the Provost Marshal of Munich to go out in the hills of Bavaria and bring Haushofer in for final interrogation; he never realized the tragedy that was to follow. I found him at a place called Hochshimmelhof, which is between Munich and Chrispartengarten and which some of you doubtless remember, a place we used to go for penance in that occupied area of Germany.

He was a little annoyed and said to me--there was a guard with me and two more patrolling outside, waiting--"Why wouldn't your government send someone who knew something about geopolitics?" As I was not dressed as I am now, but in an officer's uniform, he didn't know who I was. I was not there to present credentials. My credential was standing right here. (Indicating). I said, "Whom would you suggest?" He suggested three.

"First," he said, "a man like Isaiah Bowman." He was a very good selection. He was a distinguished geographer, as we all know. Later he was President of Johns Hopkins University. "Second," he said, "a man named Owen Lattimore," not for reasons later connected with the notoriety that surrounded his name but for the present writings on the Far East and other geopolitical aspects. "Third," he said, "there is a priest in a university in Washington, who has been writing against me for many years; I have all his writings in my file. Any one of these would have known what this is all about." Of course I said nothing at that time, but later on, during the interrogation, as it developed into a sort of seminar in which I brought various documents before him, he said "Wer sind Sie?" (Who are you?) I wasn't ready even then and didn't feel that we were obliged to make ourselves known outside our commission.

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Finally, one day it did come out. Haushofer was explaining his dependence upon Mackinder and upon the adaptation he made of Mackinder's famous theory of the heartland and how he applied it to Germany, but it had been distorted by Hitler. When he was explaining that, he insisted he had never done or said anything against the United States that might have contributed to the hatred and therefore to war psychology. I told him to be careful because I had all his works before me. As he looked at them, at all the volumes of his own publication and the 30 or 40 other books that I had brought from Georgetown, he said, "Have you captured these in Germany?" I said, "No. These all came in a C-54 from Washington." It took up a good bit of the space, also. "Ach," he said, "then they complain about my poor Institute of Geopolitics. What facilities you Americans have!"

Then he made a rather striking offer, which was not feasible because of his physical condition. He said, "If you will fly me back to the United States, I would like to stand before your learned societies, your military organizations, and geographic societies and explain what went wrong." Of course he was entering a plea in his defense. I pointed, however, to the various articles, one of which did incite a great deal of hatred against the United States and which he transmitted to Hitler. That article was part of the psychological preparation for the final debacle of 1 September 1939.

As he read his own statements that we brought to him (they were pretty evident), I noticed the color rise in his cheek. He began to tremble. He was a man 76 years of age and already had suffered a slight stroke. I saw the preliminaries of a serious apoplectic seizure and I could see the "Washington Post" next morning with headlines in letters an inch high: "Father Walsh Kills Haushofer During Interrogation." So I dismissed all the guards and the court stenographer; we were alone.

Then I think one of the most tragic moments of my life ensued. He said again, "Bitte, wer sind Sie?" (Please, who are you?) I thought there could be no loss then, either of authority or compassion, so I told him my name. "Ach," he said, "Sie sine der Walsh" (You are Walsh). I said, "Yes." There was a complete change came over him. "Now," he said, "I will go on quietly." He knew I was a priest, though camouflaged, in combat attire. Because my work has been to deal with the powers of darkness for many years, I said, "Now, General, we are alone. There is no record here. You have been a professor since World War I. You are one of the outstanding geographers of the age," which he was, "but I do want to say now, face to face, that I think you have acted in a most despicable manner to have, as a result of your geographical knowledge, planned the force and aggression of Hitler. "This is not on the record," I said, "because we are alone, but I think it was rotten." The tears came into his eyes. Then he said something--because of the fact that he wasn't entirely sure of my status--that is, "You Americans

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will never know what it meant to be married to a Jewish wife." So I said I would understand that on two counts, not being married to any wife. He pointed out how this pressure had been brought to bear upon him, which was not altogether true. His advocacy of this systematic application of power in the use of environment as power had antedated the plea he then made about his wife.

He then pointed out that Hess had been his protector and that when Hess fled to England he lost his protector and nothing stood between his wife and the extermination camp at Auswich, which was for women. Nothing stood between her and that fate except his favoring the cause of Hitler.

I did not mean to speak of that at this time but I will mention one other aspect of it which is very illuminating. I asked him, "When you visited Hitler for the first time and saw him face to face in the prison at Albrecht, what books did you bring him?" He said, "I didn't bring him any books. I brought them to Hess and he handed them to Hitler." I said, "What were they?"

The first book he mentioned was by Clausewitz, "On Warfare." What he did was apply those tactics to geographic facts in the manner that was suggested to him by Mackinder. Now today, geographically, let me suggest to you how far and to what extent I think the German geopolitician is still active in Russia. By "German geopolitician" I mean those of the Haushofer school, since he committed suicide the following March--though that was not necessary. I released him, as I was authorized to do. He was 76; his life was finished and was in ruins. There was no need for doing what he did. I was really shocked, both spiritually and from the point of view of unnecessary loss, when he and his wife killed themselves in the following March. He left a letter with me, a testament, which I had printed in the appendix of that book called "Total Power," in which he analyzed the defects, both from the point of view of the military execution and the geographic distortion of his teaching. Maybe some other time we can go into it. We will need the whole day, a very large seminar. He gave me the letter, signed it in my presence, and then, not long after, decided that now it was all over and killed himself.

What have the Bolsheviks done, geographically? Either in your mind's eyes or by concentration on a map, you will see that there are three great power centers in the world. By "power centers" I mean great areas where there are concentrations of countries which are distinctly recognizable for their power, economic resources, climate, and organizational advance; in a word, all those elements that go into national power.

I think they fall broadly into three recognizable reservoirs. The first, of course, is the European complex, which would run, say from

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England over to Poland, and to what at present is the beginning of the Iron Curtain, namely, western Europe, including a certain amount of the heartland. That is obviously a power area, and going south as far as the Mediterranean.

The second great power center is recognizable on the eastern end of the heartland: it would include Japan, China, Manchuria, and particularly Southeast Asia. That area, though actually not as great as the western end, is, however, full of undeveloped resources that could make it the leading center of world power if properly developed.

Then, obviously, the third great center reservoir of power is in the Atlantic world—mostly on the eastern borders of the United States, inward to a certain extent and northward to Canada. That complex is the third center of world power.

Now, of these, you will note that number one, western Europe, is threatened by Soviet power, number two is occupied by Soviet power and is spreading every day; and the only untouched but threatened reservoir is number three at the Atlantic world. That concept, I think, has led to the next part of the developing pattern. Whereas Mackinder and Haushofer would say, "Who controls east Europe commands the heartland; who controls the heartland controls the world," and so on, I think what they are saying now is "Whoever controls the rimlands, the borders of Europe and Asia, can protect the heartland of the world revolution." That, I think, is the geographic pattern. We all know the political and the social pattern.

Now, that is merely a hypothesis on my part; but, if you treat it as you treat any problem and make an overlay and throw your overlay on the problem underneath, you see how far the peripheries of your hypothesis touch the actualities of the map.

But the Soviet powers control the northern borders of the Old World and lay claim to 50 percent of the land lying in the Arctic Circle. But around the edge we know what is going on, the feverish activity in northern Siberia, new airfields, and a great push toward Kamchatka and toward the periphery which is only about 60 miles, if that much, from Kamchatka to the coast of Alaska. We know that the Army and our defense in general have been withdrawn from some of the furthestmost points of the Aleutians to a point that is more defensible. There is no restricted material here. It was published in the newspapers that they have withdrawn to a certain line which is more defensible. A Congressional Committee reviewed the circumstances with approval.

To continue my hypothesis, all around the coast, the Russians control everything now, on the coast of China, all of Sakhalin, and the Kuriles, because they were handed them on a platter. At every

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point the objective has been the rimlands, in order to erect offensive or defensive installations that can protect the heartland and be a springboard for whatever lies in the obscure future.

The same is true in Europe, from Petchenka, which is in the north of Finland, called Petsamo or Petchenka; from there, under the same hypothesis, in my opinion, down to the Adriatic ports, always going by Yugoslavia, which will be repossessed when the Russians think it advisable to do so, down as far as Greece. They tried to make Greece an eastern anchor of their power, but were foiled by what has been called the Truman Doctrine, which stepped in and strengthened Greece and Turkey.

In their plan, after taking Greece, the next acquisition would have been Gibraltar and Spain. One would have been the eastern anchor of their power; the other the western anchor of their power. They would control the Mediterranean. These are all in their program and are frequently mentioned as objectives; not objectives in the sense general staff would want them to be, but in their social propaganda. That is why they were so annoyed at Franco. Not that I have any particular brief for General Franco, but the fact is that Spain was a test case in the cause of 1935.

That is why there was an international brigade there; the Russians knew that once a revolution could be started, only a Soviet form of government was the natural and, in their opinion, inevitable form of government to ensue in any social disorder. They would then have practically bracketed Europe and Asia with this theoretical rimland hypothesis.

That particular geographic development, in my opinion, is not typically Marxian; it is Pan-Germanic. I have not the slightest doubt that there are members of the old Haushofer school in Russia today, as there are many technicians. We have nothing to complain about in that respect because I think we took a few ourselves. I think we have the top drawer in the atomic process because of that infusion of new blood, just before and after the cessation of hostilities.

Another point, which is amusing to me, is that at one time the Russians even demanded from Ecuador fishing rights off the Galapagos Islands; fishing rights for the country that has the greatest maritime fishing backyard on the face of the earth. It is clear the fish they wanted were swimming in the Panama Canal. They also demanded a protectorate in Libya which was turned down by the United Nations.

You have to watch each move the Soviet makes; its moves are planned and connected. When you take these geographical moves I suggest, they all sum up to something like the hypothesis of Mackinder

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but changed to the rimlands, where he emphasized the heartlands. I suggest that the possession of the rimlands for recognizable purposes is their present policy and, alas, how wonderfully they have succeeded! They now control directly or indirectly about 800 million human beings. That means approximately one-third of the human race and the end is not yet in sight.

In terms of space and geography, nearly 500,000 square miles have fallen to the new Genghis Khan in Europe, with more than 4 million added to his garrison in Asia. A study of the map and the speed of each of the significant features will clarify, as nothing else can, Soviet Russia's new geopolitical position. Its strategic boundaries are no longer lines on a map, but they are peripheral zones of power in Europe and Asia to be constantly pushed outward from Moscow, thus providing both depth for the defense of the center or the heartland and forward bases for offensive installations.

And new circumstances, which the Russians faced with extreme realism after 1945, required a new type of diplomacy and of international relations. International peace by international negotiations formed the hard core of the art of diplomacy in past generations. Mutuality, reciprocity, and respect for international law were assumed. But these premises never existed in the political philosophy of the Marxian diplomats. All Marxian diplomats consider themselves as agents, not of a government but of world government, of world revolution. They have been ordained to the apostolate of universal domination by one privileged group. Their ultimate reliance is on the diplomacy of power, not on the power of traditional diplomacy. Soviet diplomats are not negotiators. They are trained revolutionists assigned to the office of special services in the camp of the Philistines.

It is indeed gratifying to observe a gradual realization of that cold reality in our present policy makers. However, why the obvious was so long suppressed, or at least minimized, remains a closely guarded secret. I remember once discussing this matter with President Roosevelt. We differed radically on this sector of international relations, but he did me the courtesy of calling me to the White House on the day in 1933 when he recognized Soviet Russia--the day when he invited Litvinoff to be there.

Today, however, we have observed a welcome realism, slowly evolving into concrete measures. International comity and the practice of international law have always recognized the validity of measures that are short of war. International law always recognized such things as repression, retaliation, reappraisal, and even specific blockades. Cautiously but surely, I think, in the right direction, American policy is now exercising its rights, by imposing on Soviet officials and diplomats certain pressures as they have long been employed against all foreign representatives in Russia.

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Therefore, our State Department now limits the movements of Soviet and satellite diplomats. It forbids their traveling without permission beyond a circumscribed distance from Washington, exactly as the Kremlin has been doing to American officials in Russia. They live, however, under this advantage, one that is unique: They still have the United Nations, in which they plant their agents, with full freedom to circulate any place in the United States. The virtual strangulation of "America," the publication in Russia sponsored by our Government, has, as you know, been countered by the discontinuance of the communication which the Soviet Embassy had here in Washington, the so-called "Bulletin of Information." These mild assertions of inherent reciprocity, and I have enumerated only a few, are instantly understood at Moscow, where only power is respected. The state of rearmament of America and Europe, with American assistance, is a form of diplomatic development immensely adapted to the cold war that has been waged against the United States since the beginning of the Russian revolution.

The normal functions of our ambassador to Moscow have been substantially curtailed under conditions deliberately created by the Kremlin. Hence, the new diplomacy of power, getting up our courage and talking in monosyllables to Russia. That of course is a late development but the only practical development which they understand. It is a historically necessary substitute for what they have abolished in the world, namely, reciprocal confidence and respect for international law.

President Truman's recent visit to New Haven for the ceremonies attending the laying of the keel of our first submarine to be powered by atomic energy--that was worth a dozen unnecessary odd memoirs--and the work already begun on the giant aircraft carrier Forrestal have needed no clarification whatsoever for the boys in the Kremlin.

However, recently I believe we have suffered a setback in our psychological warfare which has distressed me considerably, because I have, and I believe you have, a personal regard for the author of it. I first made this statement at Colgate University in New York about three weeks ago. I regret that I have to repeat it again, but I would not be honest unless I confessed to the considerable surprise I experienced at certain statements of our present Ambassador to Russia, Mr. George Kennan. I have been acquainted with Mr. Kennan personally for many years and I have much respect for him, as few men know Russia as he does. The Industrial College of the Armed Forces, the National War College, and the State Department have all profited from that knowledge. Therefore, what I say is based entirely upon objective facts.

In his latest publication, "American Diplomacy, 1900-1950," which he published in 1951 just before leaving for Moscow, you will discover a train of thought which seems to be quite in contradiction to the public policy expressed by a long line of American Presidents, statesmen,

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and Secretaries of State. Cordell Hull, for example, comes readily to mind. I am referring to more realism in our foreign policy and less idealism.

Mr. Kennan now recommends that American policy makers abandon what he describes as the "legalistic and moralistic approach to international problems." He further hopes we will refrain from "moral appraisals" and that we should cease "making ourselves slaves to international law and international morality." That is worth a division to Mr. Stalin, since honest adherence to international law and observance of the moral law, even by government, has been a constant theme in American state papers and in the official denunciation of the last of the German Kaisers and of the successor to them, Adolph Hitler, and of the present dictator of Soviet Russia. I am extremely puzzled, to put it mildly.

Self-interest obviously has been and will continue to be a weighty factor in every international decision of every government. George Washington himself warned us, in one of his most direct sayings, that it is a delusion that any government ever did a completely pure and unadulterated favor to another. "That is a delusion," the first President said, "that only time will cure."

But Mr. Kennan, to my amazement, is now prepared to go much further. He favors the position of those who maintain that there is no place for the concept of right and wrong in judging the actions of a sovereign state. He holds as untenable "the assumption that state behavior is a fit subject for moral judgment."

Now, in international relations, in the huge complex, the physical and the political and the economic complex we call a state, what acts is a body of individuals, human beings, men, whether you call them a cabinet, a supreme council, a politburo, or a council of ministers. The claim of Mr. Kennan is that what might be immoral or criminal in the individual suddenly achieves a mysterious immunity when conspirators band together and act in unison as a government.

Now, that, of course, is the old Augustinian creed of absolutism. That is the creed and the practice that leads straight back to the paths of the jungles. We heard it actually pleaded at Nuremberg, as a defense for Hitler's extermination of 6 million Jews in the horrors of Dachau, Buchenwald, and Auswich. I see no difference between such a pronouncement as the basis of American foreign policy and the basic policy of totalitarianism of Hitler.

I am still more puzzled when I read Mr. Kennan's celebrated article in "Foreign Affairs" of July 1947. It must be known to all of you. It is a classic. You will see that he ended that basic analysis with a measured warning that the entire security of the American people "depends on their pulling themselves together and accepting the responsibility of moral and political leadership that history plainly intended them to bear."

He then ended that fine research document by expressing a sense of gratitude to Divine Providence. I quote his words with reference to an implacable challenge presented by the Kremlin to American society. He said, "To avoid destruction, the United States need only measure up to its own best tradition and prove itself worthy of preserving this great nation."

That is the real George Kennan. That is my picture of the problem that faces you.

Thank you.

COLONEL BARNES: Father Walsh is ready for your questions. Who has the honor of asking the first question in the Class of 1953?

QUESTION: Sir, you mentioned the fact that you did not think hostilities are imminent. We have run across that statement from time to time; but why isn't there a very grave danger of hostilities being imminent, if they're going to be inevitable, anyway? It would look as if time ought to be running in our favor on account of our superior industrial machinery. Those people are not dumb enough to not realize that, either. What is it that I don't get in that statement?

FATHER WALSH: Let me be historical. I think the Russians lost their best moment in about 1946, for reasons which I am sure would need no development to an officer of your rank. At present, time is running in our favor. The build-up and all that you know about is progressing to an extent that may have something to do with this rather sensational calling of the congress, which they have not done for the last 12 years.

My reason for saying that is I don't think they are ready yet for the supreme gamble. That they are committed to it is clear. Last year I left a collection of proofs of that which, I think, the College had either printed or mimeographed. Those statements I have taken out of the Russians' writings up to Stalin's statement of a couple of years ago that eventually war between Russia and the United States is inevitable. Lenin has said, "You will sing the requiem either for world capitalism or for world communism." It is only postponed, since Stalin has said, "The various nations of the world will form themselves around two great centers. One center is the Soviet Union; the other is the United States of America."

But, to come to the core of your question, I don't think they are ready. They have to be so ready that success is almost certain, as far as any certainty is possible in human affairs, since the danger of defeat at the hands of the United States is one gamble, one nightmare, that Stalin cannot risk.

Again, some years ago, Mr. Stalin gave a sort of five-year plan; he will probably give it again in this new meeting. If you analyze that with the detailed knowledge of cost, time, material, and manpower, what he said in 1946 in one of these statements on analysis would require at least 10 years to do. We couldn't do it in 10 years and if we can't, I doubt if he could. Similarly, these statements in which they say they are convening mean that these members of the party will come, listen and vote aye. In that call he speaks again of a new Five-Year Plan. It is the fifth Five-Year Plan to be done in four years. Of course, that means something to me, calling for a new Five-Year Plan. They are perpetually getting ready. By that means they have kept the Russian people keyed up to a tension which is necessary for their very limited domination.

But, in answer to your question, they are not ready as yet. The risk is too great. In fact, I have thrown out to some classes and some audiences an extreme opinion sometimes, in order to stimulate discussion. I have asked somebody to debate this: Is it possible that the whole attitude has been the greatest bluff in history--in view of the internal situation, the lack, particularly at the beginning, when they started this bluff, if you want to so call it, when they had nothing but chaos? They have a very inferior transportation system; their economic productivity is never what their statistics claim it is.

Putting it all together and remembering, every time the United States of America put its foot down, toe to toe, looked them straight in the eye and said, "No; let me know in 48 hours," they backed down. I don't say that is true, but I throw it out for thought.

I remember specifically where that came to an issue on one occasion. I was invited to a meeting in the State Department. Our opinion was asked, in order to get a cross-section opinion of American life. We were all asked for our vote; I voted to hold fast--say no. With regard to the airlift, when that came up, my vote was to go right straight through; that we should mobilize an umbrella of airpower, tanks, and all the rest, and go right through. I was asked, "Would you take the responsibility?" I would, because I was convinced the Russians would not try to stop it.

That, of course, is some years ago, sir. Each day is building Russia up, but I leave it to you for the comparative total of striking power.

QUESTION: Father Walsh, is it your opinion that the struggle for what might be the heartland or the rimland of Iran is just a part of the Russian expansion, a movement stimulated by that, or is it a nationalist movement, strictly, or is it a happy combination of the two?

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FATHER WALSH: The situation in Iran of course duplicates in many respects the age-long battle between England and Imperial Russia for a power position in what was old Persia. That was a part of the old Czarist imperialism. To that extent, politically and geographically, there are certain identities between the policy of old Russia and Soviet Russia. But the new elements that come in are what differentiate wholly from the Czarist policy. Certainly no Czarist government had a worldwide revolutionary program. No Czarist government, for example, based its dynamism upon dialectical materialism. No Czarist government promulgated the dictatorship of the proletariat. "God forbid," they would say in old Russia. They didn't have, in a word, all the essence and dynamism of the dialectic which is part of the driving power of the present world revolution. I do think it is probably the weakest link in the non-Communist world at this time.

If you remember, there was a striking cartoon about that in Sunday's "New York Times." I have it here. It shows--and it is quite true--the Russian Bear sitting under a tree in a storm, waiting for this little nest of eggs right here (indicating a branch of the tree) to drop into his lap. The nest is marked "Iran."

Therefore, to sum up, Russia's policy in Iran is partly the traditional Russian imperialism re-enforced, stimulated, and made a sort of Messianic mission of Marxian communism.

QUESTION: Father Walsh, I would like to follow up on the Colonel's first question. In view of the balance of power perhaps moving in the direction of the United States, and time being on our side, is there a possibility that as the years pass the gamble will get too large, and in that sense war will not be inevitable, even though the Soviet theory is that war is inevitable?

FATHER WALSH: Certainly; that must be the basis of the tremendous cost we are spending precisely in that direction. If I were to graph the danger, it would have been at its maximum in 1946 or 1947. It then began to subside, as we began to recognize it--at least, the proper persons began to recognize it and take the proper steps. However, it is not so easy graphing it as you and I might like to think, because that cost has had a crashing sound; I believe that the Russians' policy at present is "Let them bleed to death, economically." They know what it costs us--51 billion dollars this year for military expenditures alone, with a 265 billion deficit for next year and it may be 275 billion. They know what it costs for us to produce and support one division--I have all those statistics, what it costs per division, per man. They know it is the most expensive in the world, whereas their labor costs, I think, are ten to one against us. They have the forced labor. It is their least worry.

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I think their present policy is the "bleeding to death" policy, if possible. There are compensations. I know that this is not going to be a continuous, unchanged relationship, because, after a while, by means of the European defense and mutual security policy, by creating an army there, this same man-to-man relationship will not remain the same as it is now. The costs in Europe will be less; sometimes one-half, other times one-third. So the tremendously big amount thrown in now is not necessarily to be continued in the same ratio, because it will be absorbed somewhat by the others.

I agree that the longer this goes on, it is possible the practical danger will diminish. But what are you going to do with this tremendous striking power that we have? Is it going to merely stand sentry duty and for how long? History has shown that such a striking power eventually goes somewhere. Therefore, I don't think I could answer you satisfactorily on either side; if I could, I ought to be put under a glass case and moved around to every chancery in the world.

QUESTION: Father, what would you assess as the possibilities for disaffection within the Communist empire, particularly Russia and Red China at this time--disintegration from within?

FATHER WALSH: I would assess them as second to the possibility of disintegration and resistance in the satellite countries. That is a question of psychological warfare. I have the pleasure, as well as the responsibility of teaching psychological warfare to about 100 students in the Air Force at the university down town, where we have been studying that problem for several years; it comes up as a profile project.

My answer has always been that I would not begin within Russia at present. I would begin in the satellites, work inward, strangle their vitality that way; because to do it directly in Russia means you have to overcome what has been traditional in Russia, whether under Joseph Stalin or Ivan the Fourth. They are used to it; they have been tyrannized for 300 years. Now it is merely another group doing it; this group has such control over communications, armament, the meeting of people, the press, and so on, by what I first met as the Cheka but is now called the NKVD. That is such a tradition in Russia that we have two strikes against us historically--psychological and traditional.

Whereas if I had to decide before luncheon--shall we use what we have? We have a certain striking power. Shall it be Russia or some of the satellites? I would say the satellites first. Southeast Europe is inhabited by people who have been more used to freedom, have been used to parliamentary procedure, and to whom the terms and the semantics of a free vocabulary are more comprehensible.

COLONEL BARNES: Father, the time has caught up with us. You have done it again, as we knew you would. On behalf of all of us, I thank you for this splendid talk and discussion. Thank you very much.

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