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MANPOWER MOBILIZATION; THE MILITARY VIEWPOINT

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15 September 1952

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Major General Lewis B. Hershey, Director of the Selective Service System was born in Steuben County, Indiana, 12 September 1893. He received the following degrees from Tri-State College, Angola, Indiana: B.S., 1912; Ph.B., and A.B., 1914. He holds honorary degree of LL.D. from Ohio State University, Tri-State College, Oglethorpe University, Albright College, Lafayette University, and Columbia University. He has also attended Indiana University, 1917 and University of Hawaii, 1935-1936. He is a graduate of the Field Artillery School, 1923; the Command and General Staff School, 1933; and the Army War College, 1934. He was commissioned first lieutenant in the Regular Army in 1916 from the Indiana National Guard and advanced through the grades to lieutenant colonel in 1940. In recognition of his work in preparing plans for the Selective Service System he was promoted to brigadier general in October 1940. He became Deputy Director of the Selective Service System 1 October 1940 and Director, 31 July 1941. He was awarded the DSM by the Army, Navy, and American Legion for outstanding service as Director of Selective Service during the war. He was promoted to major general on 28 April 1942. On 31 December 1946 he was retired but recalled to active duty on the following day, 1 January 1947. He has been Director of the Selective Service since its reactivation on 24 June 1947.

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## MANPOWER MOBILIZATION; THE MILITARY VIEWPOINT

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ADMIRAL HAGUE: The subject of the lecture this morning is, "Manpower Mobilization; the Military Viewpoint." Knowing our speaker, General Lewis Hershey, I suspect the subject should be "Manpower Mobilization and the Military Viewpoint."

General Hershey is so well known throughout the United States, not only in military circles but in every household, that introductory remarks would be rather superfluous. I may say for those of you who have not had the great honor of hearing General Hershey before that we are in for a most informative and stimulating discussion.

General Hershey, it gives me the greatest pleasure to welcome you to the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

GENERAL HERSHEY: Admiral Hague, General, and other gentlemen: I suppose that one thing a person can always discuss is a subject, and therefore, if I were making a substitution, I would put "versus" instead of "and."

It is a great privilege to be here. I have had a longer association with the Industrial College than with any other institution in, or without, the armed forces. I believe I started coming here somewhere around 1938. Since that year I have been present at every class, including the ones that came oftener and stayed not so long as you gentlemen are having the privilege of staying.

It is a great privilege to be an individual accredited with many powers that he doesn't possess. It is quite flattering to have people think that you are a great deal more potent than you are. There are some disadvantages, of course. You find yourself blamed for most everything that happens. You sometimes think of that long-whiskered animal whose head our fathers in the wilderness put their hands on so that their sins might flow into his body. Then they chased him out into the tall timbers; that was the goat. Sometimes I feel a little like a goat.

However, as a youngster I was a deputy sheriff and I used to go out to read a warrant once in a while to someone; I was on the defensive as to why the legislature passed the law, why the grand jury returned the indictment, why the petitioner filed the complaint, why the clerk hadn't any more sense than to issue the warrant by order of the judge. That was about all I had to explain to this man as I read the warrant. In this manpower business I'm in a situation not too different. Congress makes certain people liable; it makes certain people not liable. It promises a

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lot of others who are liable that there should be some way they shouldn't have to do anything about that liability. Then the armed forces tell me how many people they want and who they will and will not take.

I didn't have much to do with the birth rate of the thirties, but I am confronted with it--the scarcity at that particular time. I am also confronted with some of the youngsters who are now coming under the heading of fathers with growing birth rates. But that is neither here nor there. No problem would be very interesting if you knew the answer to it.

I want to say a little bit about manpower. Sometimes you wonder when a speaker gets through, what he said. Nothing unusual about that. Probably he did too. But I am going to try to prove, if proof there must be, that in the peculiar situation in which we--the male part of the manpower--find ourselves we are as scarce and as rare as we think we are.

I am going to hope that some of these things I am going to say may lead us to greater utilization through the years, I probably shall speak about some of the things I think will interfere with utilization, not necessarily in the hope that anything will be done about it, but just to fill in the time. I always figure that you are entitled to be irritated a little and I shall probably try to irritate you by charging sins against the services from whence you come. I shall perhaps irritate you still more as experts--and most of you are highly specialized personnel--by expressing a certain amount of contempt at some of the things we say and do now about this thing that we call specialized personnel.

Now, in the first place, one of our confusions undoubtedly flows from the fact that we don't know where we are. It is hard to know where you are going when you don't know where you started from. And we are in confusion about that. I don't think we ought to get too proud over the fact that we are confronted with more problems than anyone else has ever been, because I doubt if we are. I remember the old sergeant who said: "The Army is not like it used to be" and then he always said, as an afterthought: "As a matter of fact, it never was." And so I think that this world is dangerous and it always has been.

I was reading the other day that one of the specialist experts of the country said wars used to be rather fleeting in character, local in their containment, and didn't have very much to do with the economy. I thought of the people up in the Cherry Valley of Wyoming then. After the house had been burned, the crops destroyed, and their wives and children scalped, I wondered if that fellow up there was so aware of the local and the non-disturbing, nondisrupting, part of warfare as practiced at that time.

I realize now, reading that in history, it doesn't disrupt near so many people as we think in reading about it in the paper. It does make

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a difference whether you are the person being disrupted or whether somebody else is. But I think we have always had dangers. I think we are descended from some people who had enough guts to live through the times they did and wonder whether they would now be happy with the thought that they had gone through the things they did to produce us. But that is a controversial question into which I shall not attempt to go. I think we are just confronting the problems that come with our times. It is a little tougher to get off the inner spring mattress and get on the bare floor. That is one of the problems that has to do with manpower as of the present time.

They said one time--this was back in 1913--that certain parts of our people in the United States were like Columbus. He didn't know where he was when he got over here and didn't know where he had been after he got back. I think one of the confusions of our time is that sometimes we are uncertain about where we are. I find it very much so, because a great many people are attempting to draw conclusions from what we did in World War II and striving to apply them now.

Well, I wear shorts most of the time in the summertime and they are quite satisfactory; but if I came around in them on the first of January, I would be using an expedient not applicable. That is just about what a lot of people get into when they try to talk about a situation in which we had 16.5 million people in the armed forces over a period of three or four years. As a matter of fact, we never had more than 12 million at a time; they were coming and going during that period, maybe until we wore them out, unless they were injured or killed or became 38 years of age.

Just the same, that was quite different from a system where you are rotating. It is comparable to the time someone asked a woman if she had a maid. She said, "Yes, we have two, one coming and one going." We now have a two-year term. You are confronted most of the time with people coming and going, and therefore it tends to put a greatly different outlook on the poor men who try to get out of it under this system.

That makes you deaf or partially so when the tears begin to swell in the eyes of the industrialist as he tells you that manpower is disappearing and he is never going to find any more, when there are a million men coming home within the next year; nor when the educator, looking out across the campus, says, "Wouldn't it be terrible to have this institution closed?" (especially with me its president) and then says, "Where are we going to get young men?" To which I answer, "They passed another GI bill. There are going to be a million coming home in the next year."

When we are mobilizing allegedly for keeps, the situation is quite different. In World War II, when we took them, we didn't expect to bring

them back until we had completed a finite thing, which was victory and the end of the war. Now, however, we are dealing with something that had no beginning and it won't have. We didn't know it when it started, and there is some question whether we will know when we get over with it. We are certainly engaged in an indefinite thing, but with finite terms of service for very large numbers of people, which makes the picture in the industrial world and in the educational world entirely different.

Now, on with a few figures, enough to confuse you, probably as well as to confuse the speaker, because I am not of the specialist type. I am not a mathematician. I am not an engineer, chemist, physicist, or what not. I went to a low-down liberal arts school, attended by people who were just preparing to try to know what to do in a world where everyone is engaged in his primary activity and obviously hasn't the time to get away from his specialty to see what is going on anywhere else.

Be that as it may, we have registered something over 13 million individuals who originally were between 19 and 26. But time marches on. They are older, some of them. So we have about 13 million between 18 years and 6 months and 29 or so. Congress initially made 19 to 26 the liable ages, and rather halfheartedly made 18 years and 6 months to 19 available if we can't get anybody else and can prove it. Congress compels registration of the youngsters at 18.

So of these 13 million--and that is a lot of men, especially when you only want 3.7 or 3.5 million in the armed forces--4 million of those get to be 26 before we get hold of them or they are veterans. At least they are over 26 now or they were over 26 before June 1951, so they are no longer liable. Well, that is a sizable number.

We have led or influenced about 2.5 million of them to enter the armed forces. Some of them we actually put in. Some of them we weren't quite fast enough to get. We drew back to strike but the blow landed up in the air, because they were already elsewhere. That left somewhere around 6.5 million. There are 1.5 million of that 6.5 million who are veterans within the meaning of the act and therefore not liable. That leaves 5 million. There are 1.5 million of the 5 million who have been already looked at and found not good by the armed forces, which were delegated by Congress with the responsibility--as it says--to say who shall be inducted, if found acceptable to the armed forces, by the armed forces. That cuts us back to about 3.5 million.

There are a million of those that we actually have in I-A. Not all of them are in the armed forces, because not all of them have been examined. That leaves some 2.5 million. Some 500,000 are between 18 years and 6 months and, while we will get them in due time, at the moment they are not part of the manpower pool that is liable.

I am about running out of men. A million of them are fathers. Anybody who has been following the papers knows I probably can't say anything new about fathers.

There are two or three small classes I want to speak about. I am quite sure that this will not all add up to quite 13 million. There is one-third of a million who are almost in it. These consist of about 300,000 ROTC's, whom you gentlemen--the people you represent--think you have in custody. They are civilians. They signed contracts they considered to be deferment contracts. If a man in this group stays with us four years, he takes a commission and thereafter he will be relieved from selective service induction. So there isn't much we can do about those. They are there. They are liable, but they are not available. You can't get them back, however, except by throwing them out of ROTC, because as civilians you can't call them unless you have had the foresight to get them into some of your reserves. You get them. They are in our lap and we can't drag them in for your support. You will probably be relieved as a professor of military science and tactics by an irate president if you lose students, especially if they happen to be outstanding in some of the things that take place in the fall--or even in the spring.

All the other 125,000 or 130,000 of this third of a million are in the National Guard or Organized Reserves. If we had things simple, then it wouldn't take a bureaucrat to administer them, but we try to keep them complicated. If a young man joins the National Guard before he is 18, he is not liable to be called if he stays in it and is satisfactory. So we have a part of this 130,000 in that group.

If men joined the National Guard or the Reserves before 1 February 1951, they can also stay in if they are satisfactory; and I can't get them. There are somewhere in the neighborhood of half a million in the ROTC and in the National Guard or in some Organized Reserves who are not available so long as they are satisfactory, or somebody says they are. There is a little distinction there, but I won't take that up at this time.

There are a third of a million more who are occupational. Sometimes I marvel that we have had so few occupationals. But when I remember that most people are over 26 years of age and that there are 30 million more up in the direction of 50--they are above the group we have registered and we can't find many of the people we seek up there--you can see that about 90 percent of the ones we have we don't have. So therefore we hope that the skills and things of that type are found in those groups. But once we actually defer them--we have, first of all, just over 30,000 who are deferred for all other reasons except being students, or allegedly so, or farmers. That is a relatively small number. Some 30,000 takes in all the professional people, all the skills, and all the people who are in schools teaching.

There are about 100,000 farmers. I doubt if that number will ever be much less. The fear of starvation and the fear of the activities

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necessary to grow food will generally keep the nonagricultural people reasonably quiescent. So that the pressures of the agricultural group will probably hold them. We will be lucky if we stay not much above 100,000.

Still, I have the major part of that third of a million to account for. There are the students, some 200,000. The colleges also have more than 300,000 who are in ROTC programs of one kind or another. There are a great many of them not old enough to be classified. But we do have about 200,000 that we have deferred either under the test system or the percentage of class system. Whether that is good or bad, time will have to tell.

Obviously, the pressure of World War II and the scientific and professional things that were developed and used made a very good argument, at least for those who said we were slipping behind in the training of our technical personnel. I don't happen to agree to that, but it is controversial, because nobody knows how many of the students we need and nobody knows how many we have. Until we discover those two things, we will have a little difficulty striking a balance.

In fact we don't know how many of the professional and college groups we have. We don't know how many of them are selling insurance or a dozen other things entirely nonprofessional in character. Then we subtract from them all the people who are engaged in manufacturing, maintaining, promoting, and designing, not only for this year but for the next three or four years, all the things we have for our somatic comfort. Then we still won't know much about what we are using our specialized manpower for.

I am not quarreling about the 1954 or 1955 model of television. I would like to see electric refrigerators, electric ranges, automobiles, and a hundred and one other things that go into our market made better. But it is a little tough for the Director of Selective Service to take some mother's son and drag him off and send him to Korea so somebody else can stay at home and study so that he may take a wartime job and relieve an older man for the making of a great many things that have very little to do with our existence, except to make us a lot less able to meet our existence because we have forgotten how to make war, forgotten how to sleep on something that isn't pretty soft. That is all right for aged people, who are not worth much anyway except to do a little thinking. But our youngsters are in a different situation when they have all of that and somebody wants them to go and sleep on the ground. That is asking quite a lot. So manpower is scarce. Manpower must be husbanded, must be utilized.

We are going to run out of manpower. That is not a very intelligent forecast when there were 3.6 million potentials two years ago and just

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over a million now. It doesn't take any higher mathematics to see that the curve is going down. It got pumped up a little a year ago when Congress threw to the wolves men with wives only, half a year's growth when they dropped down to 18 years and 6 months.

What are we going to do when we begin to get near the bottom again? We have several choices. One quick one is to increase the age. That is really a "good" solution, because we have 30 or 40 million above 26 who are about like those you can't use under 26. In other words if you are looking for fathers, you will probably get 16 or 18 million under 50 and above 26 and you will get a million below. If you are looking for veterans, we have 1.5 million below and 15 million above. If you are looking for skills, you have the unusual fellow who is under 26. You have quite a few more who are not too unusual, because they are occurring more often above 26. And when you get into the professional field, most of them are above 26 years of age. So I don't happen to favor going above 26 to find a lot of those whom I still can't use.

Another thing is that a manpower specialist doesn't like to hunt for 100,000 people if he has to sort 10 million to find them. It takes a lot of effort for what you get. The rejection rate is bad enough below 26. We have already sorted out 1.5 million in examining just over 3 million. What do you think we are going to find when we get above 26 if they are that unusable below?

Do you think we were tougher in the old days? There are some grounds for thinking that. But most of it is our own confusion. You can't use this in trying to determine acceptability. You can go below 18 years and 6 months. How far? Where it gets to be enough. We went down to 18. People weren't happy about it and neither was Congress. But we went down. We could gain about 400,000 or 500,000 gross, or 250,000 or 275,000 net, by doing that. That would be a shot in the arm. When it is over, then we have to look around again.

The basic difficulty there is that, especially during the years of the thirties, when our birth rate was low, we did not produce enough people to maintain 3.5 million or 3.7 million, or 3 million, so far as that goes.

You must assume that 2 million of the 3.7 million will be permanent individuals, which never has been true, and assume they came from anywhere, which is a little difficult. They did not disturb the rest of the supply, those 1.2 million. We have to get 800,000 each year in order to make the replacements.

I merely state the proposition. I am trying to make it as easy as I can, to show you we can never work it this way. At the present time we will do well to get 500,000 or 550,000 out of that 1.2 million.

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By the time you take the physical, mental, moral, and the emotional rejects on the one hand and then you take the smart ones, the ROTC people, on the other, the middle gets to the place where it just about gets squeezed out. That is where we are working--in that portion.

So I don't know what the future is going to be. I don't know how to solve it. But I know we won't make quite so large an error if we look at ourselves on two or three fronts.

In the first place, I am not going to have a pat solution; I don't know it. The armed forces are going to have to hold on to these ROTC men; I can't. I happened to spend four happy, and, I thought, fruitful, years in the ROTC, from 1923 to 1927. I was very proud of our product in the war. I am very jealous of what they do to it now. I am afraid it is going to be prostituted on the one hand by the armed forces, who tend to think it is great to grow and grab more people whether you know what you are going to do with them or not. Second, it is pretty tough for an administrator of the educational world to promise to do something that is going to keep 300, 500, 600, or 1,000 men away from the hand that is coming from Selective Service. So it is a bad situation.

It is a situation where it is too easy; therefore, it will probably be worse before it gets better. It will get bad enough that it will be so unsatisfactory as to cause the public to react. How the public will react I don't know. I only hope we will get sanity before we get elimination. You know, we went to prohibition once because we didn't have enough sense to be temperate. That was unfortunate, judging by what happened.

Now, the next thing is the 1.5 million I spoke of who had been already rejected. Out of 13 million that is bad enough, but out of 3 million that is infinitely worse. Unfortunately, somehow or other the armed forces have got to do it, because they are the ones responsible for deciding on acceptability. I didn't spend 17 years as a captain not to be somewhat aware of the pleasure of having an outfit made up of a rather large percentage of eight balls. I was around when we got them at 21 dollars a month. In industry part of the time they were doing well, sometimes not so well. We didn't do so well. I don't recommend it. I hope no one else is going to go through the same thing we did. But, just the same, we have 1.5 million that we don't use.

There are several reasons for that. I was a guardhouse lawyer at one time. Any time the boys went before the court-martial with something that worked, next week everyone would try the same defense. A good many times it didn't work. A few times it did. So whenever you have someone who gets rejected, it gives somebody else an idea. I have said many times that we have some people who just don't know enough to get into the armed forces, but we know some that just know too much to get in; they use the same principle.

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I am not a psychologist. I have some interest in that field, but it is utterly impossible to take a test set up for use primarily under an incentive basis because somebody wanted a job and then try to use that test to find out who is acceptable for a job a man doesn't feel a pressing and immediate need to acquire. You can imagine three boys coming in to take a test. They are going to try for a 15,000-dollar-a-year job. One of them will get it. You can get about anything there is in them if they all want it. But suppose you tell them you are going to give them a trip somewhere for a couple of years and all expenses paid. There just isn't enough incentive.

We have to figure out some way to find out about a man's mental equipment without using that kind of test. I have to tell the public I have found that 95 percent of the students I have talked to in the last seven years in the service schools believe that the Selective Service turned down people and accepted people. I have had to tell them the armed forces do that. If the armed forces select the people and the armed forces don't know that themselves, what do you suppose the average person knows?

If anyone gets in the service who should not, that is our fault. If anyone gets rejected, that is Selective Service's fault. As a matter of fact, we don't have anything to do with either. All we do is to get them up to you and transport home the ones you won't take. We have worn some people out sending them to induction stations; I suppose we will continue to do so, because we have to find men. Here is a man who is making 50,000 dollars a year and it seems funny that the armed forces don't see something good in him.

One of the problems of utilization is how to reduce this very large 4-F group. I don't know how we are going to do it, but we are going to have to do it. Probably starting in the fall of 1953, I believe we are going to have to reduce the number of people we are affording to send to college. There are two reasons why we must do it. One is we must have the men. Second, a lot of people who ought to be coming back from the armed forces this year will want to get into college sometime during this year, so they will be freshmen this year and sophomores next year. There again we are not going to bother these colleges during the next two or three years for trying to get a disproportionate number of individuals out of this returning group and apprentice programs. Somehow or other we have to get this rotation, so that at replacement time we won't need to have it working the other way around. That is another area from which we must find some men.

I would like to say something about the question of what I think is the most impossible impediment to ever getting rid of this 1.5 million. I happen to have four kids. They are grown now, but at one time they were about as young as, we might say in passing, the armed forces are in their new integration. One daughter--if I had bought half the clothes she wanted, the rest of the family would have had none; no question about

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it. Not that she wanted many clothes but the income was not particularly large. I suppose if I sentenced one of the kids to eat spinach and asked him whether we had better order a couple barrels of spinach, he would have been against it. He would have seen himself eating it all. At the present time this 1.5 million, so far as I am concerned, stand in jeopardy of one of the kids who obviously is eating everything he can. He has to eat his spinach, but he is not inclined to eat any more until he gets help, until some of the other kids set a tooth into it.

Two years ago we started gradually taking part of these people rejected for mental reasons. We have to feed them in. You have some dumbbells, certainly, at some places. You have to be careful where you put them. But the longer it goes on, the more you tend to accumulate in the Reserve force intelligent men organized to live in this age group that somebody looked upon and frowned.

I was in Switzerland a year ago and they were running an army in which four languages were spoken. Now if someone says "No savvy," you don't take him. You don't want them all to be graduates from an English highschool but you do want them to understand English. You say: "Obviously, we don't want them unless they can speak and understand English." I know it is convenient, but I do know that somehow or other we have to find ways to take these individuals.

I am going to comment, before I stop, on some of the legislation that we didn't get during the last year--take UMT. I felt, but I can't prove it, that one of the big reasons we didn't get UMT was because we didn't know what we were asking for when we asked for UMT. When we were asked the 64-dollar question, that is, "What are you going to do in addition to what you are doing now?" most people could not answer. They said, "Well, lock--"

I don't know whether you know that we have UMT, but we have. Universal anything means that everybody is liable and most everybody is. The reason some don't have to do anything is that somebody won't take them or we excuse them. By and large, outside of a very few people, everybody between 18 years and 6 months and 26 is liable. Before he gets to be 26, he is liable now and a great many are liable to 35. If they are doctors, they are liable until 51. So we are not very short on liabilities. We have everybody liable and I think the law is broad enough. In the medical load specifically, if there is anybody who is not liable, I wouldn't know who it is, because I think most everybody is liable until 51. So I don't think we are too short on law.

We also have a provision in that law--it is in section 4-D-3--which says that any time the Secretary of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and the Secretary of the Treasury for the Coast Guard, shall provide regulations, which will be as near alike as possible--and I suppose there was a smile there--that men may be permitted while in the service under

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the two-year clause to revert to the Reserve forces. There is nothing that stops anybody from training someone in six months if we have anyone we can train in six months. If we can afford 50,000 this year to be trained for six months, we will get the same number of men we had last year, plus the ones born, minus the ones that died. Therefore, so far as manpower is concerned, we have the same situation that we went to Congress with. We already have the power to do it.

I think one of the things that Congress was confused about was what we were trying to do. I had the feeling, and I feel, without knowing too much about it, that we added to the confusion by not knowing what we did want to do. Sometimes you can't sell what you want on the Hill when you know what you want, and you certainly can't go over there and sell it if you don't know what you want. Another thing, when four brothers come over wanting something, and two or three try to see if they can trip each other up, it sometimes ties you up a little bit.

So I think one of the things we ought to make up our minds on is whether we want something, make up our minds what we want, and then present it in terms that are very definite. And when anybody asks, "What are you going to do if we give you this law?" we should start talking, instead of saying, "Then we are going to plan." Congress wants to know what we are going to plan.

I think we have two choices. I think undoubtedly we will go back for some legislation. Personally, I believe we should start using the legislation we have, because we certainly have all we want to build up the Reserves, and certainly we won't build up the Reserves except out of people you won't take. This is like the fellow who asked the girl, "May I have the last dance?" and she said, "You have had it." Reserves are people you are sending back now after they are two or four years or whatever their years are in the Reserves. Congress is not going to let you mobilize them unless you get into the very thing you are trying to create the Reserves to avoid. We are trying to create a force in being, reserves, to protect us and keep us out of war. Therefore the people we are putting in the Reserves now, except the ones who enlist in the Guard before they are eighteen years and 6 months of age, are by and large individuals whom you can only use if you get into the things you are trying to avoid.

I don't know whether we can afford to have people in the Reserves or not. That is a difficult question and I don't know anything about it. But if anyone wants some things they say they desire, I would like to know a way to get them; and I have had less than anybody else interested. I went over one time to a meeting and made quite a speech about this particular section. As soon as I had finished, they went into something else quite different. I don't blame them particularly because they

didn't want to do anything about it. But I don't think that Congress is going to be too much interested in somebody wanting legislation to do what they already have the power to do if this somebody has enough initiative, desire, or sense to carry it on. No criticism intended.

As they say nowadays, I think this is a good time to pause for station identification.

QUESTION: General Hershey, do you believe that it is compatible to have a system of selective service operating at the same time that you permit voluntary enlistments?

GENERAL HERSHEY: I don't know what you mean by "compatible." If you mean, is it possible? I would have to say, yes. I have been through it several times. I don't at the present time have the feeling that we ought to abolish the recruiting system at all. I happen to believe we are in an unfortunate situation where we are using two systems of recruiting. One system attempts to attract by pay and the chance to learn how to be a careerist outside the armed forces. The armed forces ought to be engaged in trying to train a fellow so his best skill could be used in the armed forces, so he will stay there. I think that is their business. Anyway, each day by that sort of thing we try to attract them. That failing, we come along with a club that many times is not too well concealed and drag them in. I think it is very unfortunate that we are using that sort of system, because a fellow doesn't know just why he is in; and when and if he thinks about it, it might worry him and give him stomach ulcers or something.

It seems to me that the time has come when we can commend the service to everybody. To me it sounds all right. I personally think our forces are good enough, that they are attractive enough, that, especially if we would make differential of pay, we could take our people under compulsion and compel them to take their basic training. I don't care whether 18, 16, or 12 weeks a year--whatever you want--the services should run them out at the end of that time, if they want to go out, based on whom they have looked over, but then they should offer him a contract. I do think that the contract ought to have a differential in pay.

I realize that a lot of people snicker and say, "If you wait for that, you can't get it." There may be some truth in that. I am not ready to admit that the service that I spent my life in is bad enough that I can't sell it to a fellow who knows something about it. This thing of going down back alleys and enticing, that is, frightening, for three or four years, boys into the service, when you don't know any more about them than by seeing them, and they know no more about you than by seeing you--I don't believe is a good way to do it, even though it seems to solve problems of the moment. However, I am not involved in the necessity of training this individual.

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But I believe our recruiting should be done not earlier than the end of basic training. I would hate to face an emergency with a lot of individuals who had been attracted to me by fright, thinking they were escaping something else. I don't want to be leading escapees. I see I can get you all mad if I go on in this way; so I guess we will call that an answer.

QUESTION: General, would you be willing to elaborate for one of the slow members of the class your parable of the spinach? I am not sure I got the moral of it.

GENERAL HERSHEY: My moral was this: We have people who are less fit. I don't know whether 1.5 million measures them. I am willing to consider that 25 percent of that 1.5 million are unusable. But that still leaves a sizable amount--1.1 million or 1.2 million. During the war we had 5 million of them, which was a pretty good-sized army, that we didn't accept. I think we could have used probably 15 or 20 percent of that number.

Now, I believe that you will never sell the less fit in a situation where part of the augmentation of the armed forces is done by skimming the so-called willing that are bubbled up and take what you want of them and rejecting what you do not want, under the assumption that some permanent agency can do something with the ones whom the services, who are doing the recruiting, will not accept. We have nothing to do with them except to put them by to become 4-F's, or give them to the Army. I am in the Army, but I hold no brief for the Army simply because I was attached to it for pay purposes for 30 years. But that is neither here nor there. I have one boy who has a Reserve commission in the Navy, and another one who is a Marine, who sometimes belongs to the Navy at least, and a son-in-law in the Infantry; and I am in the air most of the time.

But I do say, regardless of which one of these four services it is, that if one is drawing from the compulsory end, they will in any way they can, fair or foul, prevent the induction of the less fit to the maximum extent they can. And I know something about that, because I saw Congress take some action with the armed forces about 1943 or 1944 and it got just about nowhere with that 5 million it was trying to sell.

So I don't happen to believe that law or regulations can do everything. Being an operator, I think most things are solved by operation. And I believe that if we divide, just to make it numerical, out of every 100 men at the moment, and give 50 to the Army, 28 to the Navy, perhaps 6 to the Marine Corps, and 22 to the Air Force, good, bad, and indifferent, they will let out the worst when they must; they will take most of the worst for two years and then try to sell them to someone else. So you have to make up your mind that you will be for the rest of your life in that situation.

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Now, the sponsor is the boy at the present time who is getting all of the less fit, because if I were recruiting, and if I were in the Air Force or Navy, I wouldn't just go around seeing how low I could go on recruiting. I never saw rules that could completely hold me in telling me who my number ones were. I would have some men take an examination and maybe I would find to my surprise they were not number ones but number threes, but so far as the examination went, they were intellectuals. I am not trying to tell you anything. A lot of the boys know how to do grading that fits the need.

QUESTION: You haven't touched upon the field of, let us call it, the foreign legion, if we may. There was something in the papers not too long ago about that. It was frowned upon. It may have an age group of 24 to 26. Why couldn't we go, say, to Europe and enlist in this age group and select them as to educational requirements and what not, and then give them citizenship when their two years' tour of duty is over?

GENERAL HERSHEY: I am not too competent to speak on that subject. One thing is, I don't know anything about it; the other is, I think I do.

In the first place I have no quarrel with creating all kinds of armies you want to create. But I remember that Washington said one night when things were tough, "Put only Americans on guard tonight." The Spartans, dumb as they were, didn't give their spears to the Helots, not as long as they were operating.

I have some deep feeling about the fact that any time an American gets out of defending his country by hiring somebody else to do it, he hastens the time when he will have no country to defend. I personally believe that free men live by defending their own hearths and I don't believe you can hire people to do it. I have no quarrel with hiring all the allies we can get but I want them to wear their own suits. I realize that we did for many years in this country have many people who came over here to escape military service but enlisted as soon as they got over here.

But, just the same, I am afraid--some have been very much in favor of it and they may be right--that the pressure to have somebody else in the foreign legion carry guns for us was because we wanted to keep our boys who were available from going. I don't believe we shall ever survive by trying to let somebody else carry the guns for us. If there is any gun in the family, I want to tote it, I think I will be a free man as long as I tote it; but when I let somebody else carry it, he will tell me when to fight and how. And when he gets out, I am afraid that, unless I am pretty smart, he will want more for carrying the gun than I will want to give him. However, I don't pretend to know much about it.

QUESTION: Regarding your problem of this diminishing 3 million, of which you get about 1.5 million each year, as you explained it, if the two years were increased to three or some larger amount, what in your opinion, would be their effect?

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GENERAL HERSHEY: Any time you increase the time, you create men. If you have 500,000 men you keep for two years now, in theory we are getting a million man-years out of that group. Now we are getting a 1.5 million. However, it is just like your money. It is always gone before you figure it would be.

Let us see what is happening at the present time. We have some people coming back in 15 months or 24 months. I am not quarreling with that. They have probably given enough, probably given all they are going to give. That is just supposition. But it means we lose a million men, or somewhere around 250,000 man-years. Then you have the boy who comes home after serving 18, 20, or 24 months. We are losing all the way. We haven't gotten anywhere yet on the 24 months, as a great many men are coming out much short of that.

I think the ideal solution is to increase the time. But the difficulty we are in at the present time is that we have a population of 153 or 154 million people--men, women, and children, old and young, the lame, the halt, blind, stupid, a foot off, all sorts of things. But, just the same, the people who are actually being used anywhere in the armed forces are only 3.7 million a year or maybe 3 million, plus something now, whatever it is.

You see, out of 1.5 million, one-fiftieth of them are carrying a load away out of proportion to the other forty-nine fiftieths. If you load them up with some more, it is going to be somewhat less than popular. You can't blame them. You know how it is. You say, "Let's get the duty roster and see how they look." But the duty roster is going to be about three months, and you are surprised at the number of people who are so important they don't do guard duty. Then you have to go back and say everybody has to do guard duty and then go through it again.

One of the things we are badly up against now concerns getting the names of more people on the list, guys going in for two or three years. When the legislation was under consideration, I wanted the term to be about 30 months in the service. I figured we would get more than when we went out for 27; we did. We got 24; 27 was a sure thing, I thought. I am sure the reason we went to 27 was it was right in the bag. You never can tell about those things. You always get less than you ask for, although, at the present time, frankly, I am not sure we hadn't better get some more people in before we keep the ones that are in a little longer.

CAPTAIN ALEXANDER: I am worried a little bit, General, about whether we are going to get into trouble in building up the armed forces. We are getting more nonliables all the time. As these people go through in 15, 18, or 24 months, what are we going to do? Are we going to depend on the Reserves?

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GENERAL HERSHEY: Do you mean you are getting in trouble or staying in trouble? I am not trying to be facetious. The problems we will have if we get into an all-out war will be bad enough, especially if everybody wants to work at his particular occupation and doesn't want anyone else to work at it.

We are better off in an all-out war than anything else. The thing that surprises me sometimes is that we know how to solve an all-out war. We have some plans. The only thing we don't know what to do with is something short of that. We are a little like the old doctor who couldn't cure anything but fits. So he had to turn all his patients into ones with fits no matter what they had, because that was what he worked with.

If we stay with this present situation, we are going to be in for tough going. We are going to have to get more service out of the individuals that we have, that is, get a broader group or keep the ones we have longer. So we are going to have to go into some age groups that we are not using now, either younger or lower. We haven't too much further to go with the lower and I don't believe we are getting anywhere with the upper. We will have a very serious manpower problem even if we stay out of trouble more than we are in trouble now.

I want to call your attention to the fact that a sliver is the most unstable form of geometrical design. You certainly have to pile a lot of them together to get them to stand up. They won't stand up alone. Unfortunately, when we are specialists, we tend to be slivers. We know everything there is to know about practically nothing.

MR. POLJHOFF: Would you care to discuss greater utilization of women in the armed forces?

GENERAL HERSHEY: I guess it is safe. I always said during the war that we had enough problems without trying to draft women. I think we have moved quite rapidly in the last 10 or 12 years on the use of women. I think if we had a disaster of any consequence, there would be no trouble in getting any number of them made liable for anything you want. If we have enough disaster in the civilian community, and people are getting killed, any aversion that anybody might have had originally quickly disappears.

It is like the story they tell about the bombing of London. One night they pulled an old girl out of the ruins and they said, "Where is your husband?" She said, "The coward. He is in the army." If we get into a disaster, all our people will be in dangerous places. I think they will find that going into the armed forces is going to be very intelligent. I don't think there will be any question about it except the question of getting Congress to act.

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But I don't think at the present time you are going to get Congress to call women into the service except on a voluntary basis. You people know a great deal more about that than I do. When I left the armed forces a great many years ago, we had a lot of trials and troubles, but we didn't tackle this last one. I don't pretend to know anything about it. While I am seven or eight miles from home, I don't care to raise my voice in trying to tell you anything about how to handle women; I just don't know. I believe in using them all we can to save manpower, but I would hate to get to the place where I would have to defer a man to take the place of a woman who had gone into the armed forces. I think if you can ever explain it to them, you will be all right; but you know much more about that than I do.

Again, if we do it and permit American manhood to escape liability, I am against it. We may change, but just now we are supposed to do the fighting. We are supposed to be the boss, too, but that has changed.

QUESTION: You obviously are not happy about this 1.5 million people the services have rejected, and you propose that we divvy them on a prorata basis. What practical steps will be necessary for doing that? Do you think the services will come around to that voluntarily or will they be required to do it? Or should you examine these people and tell the services who are fit?

GENERAL HERSHEY: I happen to come from the armed forces, so I want the armed forces to retain the right to accept or reject. The thing that frightens me is that, if they do not assume the responsibilities that go with it, they are going to find the privilege may be taken away.

I would recommend a lot of things before I would go to the extreme of having some sort of public health service or somebody else do it. We started to examine for the services in 1946, with no illusions. We did it because the Surgeon General asked us to. He said he had difficulty getting doctors and asked if we would do some screening. We continued that until it became a laughing stock. A couple of our older doctors who worked together would accept a man. Then he would be sent to some big station at which they would hire some young fellow to work with the old doctor. They kept turning down men whom the old doctors accepted and they had a morale problem. It got to the place where the doctors were retiring, got very bitter, and wouldn't examine. They said if we were running it, we could run it. At the present time we are supposed to reject a registrant if he is obviously unfit. But it gets controversial.

So the last thing I would do is to try to let some agency move in; I don't say that as a citizen. Lots of citizens think that is just what we ought to do. Because of my experience of a good many years, I would like the armed forces to retain it. But I fear if you don't use it better, you are risking losing it.

The next thing is how are we going to get them to be less choosy. Will we have to have legislation? Well, probably, although that won't get the services--you can't legislate them into a place where they will do it. You are not going to legislate them into it.

The President can issue regulations. I suppose I can speak on this objectively. There is some indication that we are going to have a change. But again, we will be up against the same factors.

Therefore there is only one thing we can do and that is to sell people like you. It is pretty hard to get one of the girls to give up her dress so the boys can have some shirts, but that is exactly what we will have to do. We have to get some self-denial, we must do more looking at it from the broadside. There is a little bit in there of the personal end, too. Sometimes if you get the public and Congress recalcitrant about something, it tends to be reflected not in the things you do but in other things. Sometimes you wonder why in the world a certain measure didn't go through. One of the reasons assigned was that somebody had something in his craw. There are all sorts of reasons why you ought to try to do the fair thing.

The only reason I have been passing around apples is that I know very well I could get along with a battery with 4 or 5 buzzards in it, not very good, but get along better than if I had 50 of them. That doesn't mean I am worth anything--anybody could.

One of the things we have to do is to absorb our less fit as we develop them. We do have great pools of the less fit. When we started out the last time, we didn't run more than 300,000 or 400,000 in the obviously unfit group. That number has gone up. It has gone up as our potential went up.

The number has gone up so it has passed any group we have. It has passed fathers. It has passed occupations. It has passed about anything. It has passed 1-A's--they are going to continue to fall until probably June 1953 there is going to be about 100,000. This is another state I don't want to get into. When this pool of mine gets low, at the bottom, I can't use a scoop shovel. I have to get in and dig them out by hand. But you can't make goals of 80,000 to 150,000 a month when you dig them out by hand. You have to keep the level up. Everybody you talk to thinks it is safe to plunge down to 250,000 or 300,000. They say, "There are 3,000 boys born every day." But there are many things that happen after a boy registers at 18 years and 6 months. A good many don't even register; they have already enlisted and a few are delinquents. After they get their questionnaires, they have 10 days in which to answer and if they ask for a personal appearance they can get it. If they don't like their 1-A classification, they can appeal. Or they may ask for and get a postponement.

I am like a banker who has all sorts of paper; this paper isn't cash. Somebody says, "How much is the bank worth"? I say, "I have a million 1-A's. If I bring them all over, I will have that many." They are all in, in 120 days. No use talking about the pool as if it were some static thing. When they get to the induction station, the first thing is, I can't give everybody an examination because that is the bottleneck.

We have people all the way on this belt. It starts about 90 days. That is a pretty good time to get them from the time they are first classified on to that belt, because they are entitled to 21 days after they take their induction examination before I can put them on. If I don't hear in three weeks from some of my induction stations, that doesn't hasten the time they go in. Then, of course, there are the people who do get sick. They are turned away sick. There are a hundred things that can happen. In order to produce 47,000 men a month, I believe you ought to have somewhere between 300,000 and 400,000 in your pool. I believe that is a pretty good factor to use six times monthly. Any time the pool falls below it, you are in trouble. Nobody asked me to say that.

QUESTION: Talking about these students, hasn't the system been in effect long enough now where they ought to start graduating and you can have them? If so, they won't be a permanent loss. Or is there a catch to it?

GENERAL HERSHEY: The answer is yes and no. It is true that these fellows are graduating; we are inducting some of them and we are in an ideal position to tell you why we don't induct some of them. You people are interested in instruction, making radar engineers who can work for some television company because he is there, which creates a vacancy and when the fellow comes out in four or five years from now, he can fill it. "Isn't that a shame? Don't you think he could do more for his country working as a radar engineer than as a private in the Infantry?" If I have heard that once, I have heard it 500,000 times.

That is the sort of thing we have to resist. We have about 480 calls per week, when Congress is in session, inquiries that have to go to the local boards and back. Of course there are boys graduated. I believe when we started in 1950 with the Korean affair, we ought to have figured about five years to get ourselves into rotation, so that 90, 96, or 98 percent of the men who were available could serve in this and then go jolly well into anything they wanted.

There are so few doctors, and some of these individuals you use as such, that it is probably easier to let them train first; if they do not, you will have to use them twice. You send them in, they go up to the doctor, and you get them back.

I think if we get into a jam, there will be people who will slip out and do no service. But I have insisted that this is not the policy.

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That is the exception--those who dropped through the cracks somewhere. In the early part there will be more people dropping through the cracks than there should be later, if we get to the place eventually when we have rotation schools for students, apprentices. They are already working. Both of them have been in service. By and large we move on. Everybody runs his business. We don't have shortages in the armed forces.

But that is not where we start. It is like the old story--I wouldn't have to start it there if I start it here. Certainly I wouldn't start from Korea. If we had started in 1947 trying to train individuals, as Congress was asking us to do, we would have been all right. But again I say the armed services have been handicapped some, because in 1947 we wanted yet wouldn't take six months, until we couldn't get it. Then we said we would take it.

You people in the forces know just as well as I do that you are not one in believing we ought to have universal training or universal service. Some of you give support to it and some just give lip service. We are always going to have trouble with Congress until we all agree, until we speak the same language. I believe in it--have since 1908. I wouldn't have much reason to keep on except for stubbornness.

We ought not to have people kicking even during peace. There are some people who believe we are doing all right the way we are. This may not be the time to say we are doing all right because manpower is getting short.

MR. POLUHOFF: General Hershey, you have given us another very stimulating talk. On behalf of the college I thank you very much.

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