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INDUSTRIAL MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

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30 September 1952

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Mr. Robert C. Goodwin, Executive Director, Defense Manpower Administration and Director, Bureau of Employment Security, U. S. Department of Labor, was born in Payette, Idaho, 8 June 1906. He received his B. S. degree from Whitman College, Walla Walla, Washington, in 1929, attending the University of Cincinnati the following year for graduate work in public administration. In 1930 he became supervisor, Cincinnati Public Employment Service, and from 1935-1937, Director, Cincinnati and Hamilton (Ohio) County Work Relief Program. From 1937-1942 he joined the Social Security Board. In 1942 he became the regional director of the War Manpower Commission, Cleveland, Ohio, and in 1945 became executive director, War Manpower Commission in Washington, D. C. At the end of the war he became director of the United States Employment Service, U. S. Department of Labor. He has been the Director of the Bureau of Employment Security, U. S. Department of Labor since 1949. In addition to this position, he was named on 23 October 1950 Executive Director of the Office of Defense Manpower in the U. S. Department of Labor.

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COLONEL NORMAN: Dr. Reichley and gentlemen: Thus far in our study of manpower we have heard able lecturers on the subject of manpower mobilization; manpower resources and supply; and the field of labor relations, from both the viewpoint of management's responsibility and labor's role in economic mobilization. I am sure by now, if we didn't already possess it, all of us here this morning have the realization that the responsibility for preserving our national security rests, to a large measure at least, on the proper utilization of our limited manpower resources.

We continue our study this morning in the field of manpower by taking a look at a very important phase, "Industrial Manpower Requirements." Our speaker is eminently qualified to discuss this subject with us. He has been associated with the field of manpower both before the war and during the war, as executive director of the War Manpower Commission, and, since the war, as Director of the Bureau of Employment Security, as well as being Executive Director of the Defense Manpower Administration of the Department of Labor.

Our speaker is not new to us, having appeared here in 1950 and in May of this year, at which time he gave us a very fine lecture on the role of the Labor Department in economic mobilization.

I take a great deal of pleasure in presenting to you Mr. Robert C. Goodwin.

MR. GOODWIN: Thank you, Colonel Norman.

Gentlemen, I am grateful to Admiral Hague for his invitation again to address the officers in training at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. It always gives me a great sense of satisfaction to meet and talk over manpower problems with men who have been selected for command, staff, and planning assignments in the Department of Defense. Every development in modern defense and military operations emphasizes that the manpower problems of the military departments, the civil government, and of industry are common problems.

There is only one manpower pool upon which to draw to meet our national needs. More and more the skills once peculiar to industrial and research activities are being required in order to operate and maintain military weapons. The combined needs of civilian and military activities for highly trained specialized manpower are gradually but surely outstripping our resources, making it essential that such manpower be carefully distributed and utilized where it can contribute most to our national security.

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As a consequence of these trends, it has become increasingly difficult to separate in theory or in practice consideration of civilian manpower requirements as distinguished from military manpower requirements. The nature of modern military equipment and weapons has had tremendous influence upon the size and characteristics of military forces. They have had no less impact upon the size and characteristics of the supporting civilian labor force. Behind every military unit stands a unit of civilian workers and both are indispensable to effective military operations. This, as I see it, is a central truth of manpower administration; and an adequate understanding of its implications is essential to our national security. That is one of the principal reasons why I always accept an invitation to meet with officers at the Industrial College.

The subject which was assigned me was "Industry's Manpower Requirements." I have taken the liberty of broadening this concept somewhat. The national economy is an integrated mechanism. I have indicated the difficulty of separating military and civilian manpower requirements. It seems to me unrealistic and misleading to attempt to establish manpower requirements of industry as distinguished from those of trade and service, research, education, and Federal, State, and local governments. While requirements as between these segments of the civilian economy shift with varying circumstances, manpower at some level is required for all of them under any circumstances. Thus for purposes of manpower mobilization, it is well to think in terms of the Nation's total civilian manpower requirements.

In considering the problem of civilian manpower requirements, we must first ask "Requirements for what? What are the goals which we seek to attain through the operation of the civilian economy?"

One way of answering these questions is to restrict our discussion to the present defense production program, backed up by a full-employment civilian economy. While this approach is certainly a valid one, it seems to insufficient for our purposes. I would suggest that the basic goal which we are attempting to achieve is not just a stated quantity of national defense production and an adequate number of jobs. What we are really driving toward is stable, long-term national security for ourselves and for the other free nations of the world which wish to share our peaceful development. We believe any realistic estimate of civilian manpower requirements must be based upon the concept that national security is our basic goal and that the present defense production program is only one significant element of it.

What, then, are the manpower requirements for national security?

The first requirement, as I see it, is to have as many people on our team as possible. In appraising our capacity to achieve national security, it is customary to examine the arithmetic of our manpower to determine whether we have the potential resources to achieve our objective.

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With present international alignments we might well find ourselves out-numbered in another war. Although there now exists a rough manpower balance between the Soviet bloc and the United States and its declared allies, this balance eventually will be heavily weighted by the undeveloped nations of the world which we are seeking to assist and which Russia is trying to control. These are the nations of the Orient, the Middle East, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere which are now struggling desperately against poverty, disease, and illiteracy. Whether they become our allies, enemies, or neutrals in any war which may develop in the future depends largely upon the effectiveness of the understanding and assistance which we offer them.

The danger that we may be outnumbered, in gross totals, in a future conflict emphasizes our need to rely heavily upon the quality rather than the quantity of our manpower. Because our strength lies in our productive capacity and in our skills, in the education and training of our work force, and in the imagination and flexibility of our society, we must maintain and increase these advantages. At the same time, we must preserve the democratic institutions which made them possible and which we are arming to protect.

The problem of numbers is further accentuated by the uneven changes in our population during the past decade. Although our population increased by 20 million between 1940 and 1950, the heaviest gain was in the numbers of young children and older people. We have an additional 20 million people requiring goods and services, but there has been an actual decline of 2 million among youth 10 to 19 years of age and a proportional decrease in the prime working age group of 20 to 54 years.

Although there is nothing we can do to alter the disadvantageous statistics of population, there are areas in which effective programs can be developed to help meet our manpower requirements. One is the field of industrial safety and health. Each year the Nation loses some 15,500 lives through accidental deaths through work injury and another 140,000 man-years of work through disabling industrial accidents and occupational diseases.

It is estimated that there are about 2 million persons having handicaps of such severity as to prevent their gainful employment. A large percentage of these, with proper rehabilitation, could be equipped to perform effectively in productive employment.

Underemployment of certain racial groups and of workers in various industries and geographical areas still constitutes a continuing reduction in our manpower potential.

It should be emphasized that the full use of manpower resources strengthens the economy and builds a broader base of skills and abilities upon which the national security program can rest. This is also

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true in the other free nations of the world. It is therefore an imperative aspect of national security that we maintain civilian manpower requirements at a high and increasing level and that our human resources be efficiently utilized.

The second aspect of civilian manpower requirements which I would like to discuss is the requirements for manning the broadened mobilization base. As you know, the mobilization base is defined as "that capacity needed, when fully utilized, to meet military, war-supporting, essential civilian, and export requirements in event of a full-scale war. It includes all elements of the production process, such as essential services, food, raw materials, facilities, production equipment organization and manpower." Present mobilization goals include expansion of steel capacity from 100 to 120 million tons annually, aluminum from 600,000 to 1.5 million tons, electric power from 60 to 107 million kilowatts, and petroleum refining from 6 to 8 million barrels per day. Further expansion in certain industries will be necessary to provide the mobilization base for full-scale war.

Within the next year the needs of defense production will require another million workers, for a total of some 7 million. Although peak production will be reached for some defense items, others like aircraft, electric power, and petroleum, will continue to expand. In addition to supplying the additional million workers, there will be the problem of maintaining the 6 million already employed in defense work.

Although the labor market is relatively tight, it would appear that the manpower requirements of defense production can be met in gross numbers and for the most part in terms of skills. It must be emphasized, however, that manning the industrial facilities at the current level of production does not constitute an adequate manpower mobilization base. Actually there are 61 occupations in which workers are in critically short supply now. The development of the contemplated full industrial mobilization base would generate manpower requirements which simply could not be met with our present supply of skills.

In order to meet this potential requirement, several large-scale, continuing manpower programs are necessary.

First, industry and labor working cooperatively should greatly increase apprentice training in the skilled trades, particularly those found in metalworking industries. Today the Nation has about 8.5 million skilled craftsmen. Each year we need about 250,000 additional skilled workers just to replace those lost to the labor market and to sustain a reasonable rate of growth. The most efficient method of training such highly skilled workers is through organized apprenticeship programs, but in 1951 there were only some 40,000 apprentices who completed training under organized programs.

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Craftsmen are, of course, trained through other means, such as long experience on a variety of related jobs. But this is a wasteful, time-consuming way to broaden the base of our skilled manpower when our national security is so urgently involved. For example, through apprenticeship a toolmaker can be trained in five years. Recent studies have shown that unorganized on-the-job experience can produce toolmakers-- but it takes from 10 to 15 years to do it. In my judgment the manpower to man our industrial mobilization base requires a great increase in the field of apprentice training.

Likewise there should be a vast program to improve and multiply the skills of industrial workers in jobs of all kinds. Greater mobility and flexibility is one of the most important aspects of an effective labor force. Such a program has been launched by the Department of Labor and we are hopeful that industry will give it the attention which it deserves.

Likewise there is the problem of developing greater versatility and competence among the several million managers and executives, and for the 750,000 semiprofessional workers.

In a very real sense, the whole economy of the United States is our mobilization base. There is no part of it which does not require workers of growing efficiency and capacity for the tasks that lie ahead as the needs of national security are being met.

The problem of manpower to man our key industrial facilities becomes particularly vivid when we consider the possibility of attack upon the United States. The civilian defense and military departments have stated that potential enemies have the capacity to launch attacks in force upon major American cities. Estimates of casualties from a single attack have run as high as 11 million. Should such a situation occur, the problem of rebuilding and operating our essential industrial capacity would be of staggering proportions. The manpower requirements which would be created could be met only if measures are taken now to develop a labor force characterized by highly developed skills, flexibility in the performance of jobs, and a habit pattern of rapid occupational mobility.

The third manpower requirement for national security is leadership in science and technology. The over-all equation in scientific and engineering manpower is striking. Even though our supply of scientists and engineers has grown rapidly in the past few decades, their total number is still very small--about 600,000. One whole fundamental aspect of our democratic survival and growth depends in the greatest part upon a few hundred thousand men and women--about two-fifths of one percent of our total population. Is this number adequate to the great task of world leadership which confronts us? I think it is clear that it will not be adequate unless additional steps are taken.

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One of the most far-reaching effects of the defense program is an acceleration of research and industrial technology. As a result, industrial and scientific development which normally would have been spread over a decade now must be telescoped into less than half that time. This means an unprecedented and sustained demand for specialized manpower in a great variety of fields.

New discoveries and the development of new techniques of inquiry call for an increasing number of persons capable of doing research; and as each area of knowledge becomes more complex, increased specialization of individuals and longer periods of training are required.

The advance of scientific knowledge also results in an increasing degree of utilization of specialized personnel as technical discoveries are applied in industrial operations.

The number of workers per engineer in the basic commodity-producing and transportation industries, for example, has decreased continuously from an approximate 250 in 1900 to about one-fourth of that in 1950.

Even the defense program as heretofore outlined does not tell the whole story. One of the most urgent problems of national defense lies in the expansion of research and development as such.

But, we do not know just what kinds and quantity of research and development is required to maintain our lead. This obviously poses a very grave limitation upon an accurate assessment of our manpower requirements. Although an effort is made by the government departments responsible for development and research to project an orderly and comprehensive program, this is by no means a fully accomplished fact. Moreover, only about 25 percent of the scientific research was performed by the Government in 1950. Sixty-five percent of the workload was carried by industrial organizations and another 10 percent by universities and nonprofit institutions. Thus some 75 percent of scientific research in the United States is largely carried on outside any organized pattern specifically directed toward national security goals. In short, at the present time scientific and engineering manpower resources must be evaluated in the absence of a comprehensive strategic plan for research and development. This in large part accounts for the fact that we have thus far been able to develop only vague and inconclusive manpower requirements, in totals, by discipline or level of professional competence.

Part of our specialized manpower requirements relate to development of strategic materials resources. Over half of our imports, including many of our strategic materials, come from the world's underdeveloped areas. They supply virtually all our natural rubber, manganese, and tin, as well as a quarter of our zinc and copper. A third of our lead,

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bauxite for the production of aluminum, and the largest part of our uranium ore is imported, mostly from these underdeveloped areas. Of the imports which are of sufficient military importance to be included in our stockpiles, 73 percent in total value are obtained from these areas. They supply 65 percent of the required imports of our allies in western Europe. Thus, we cannot fail to commit some of our scientific and engineering manpower to the peaceful development of the material resources of the underdeveloped nations. This problem has been recently underscored by the findings and recommendations of the President's Materials Policy Commission. This Commission found after exhaustive study by competent experts that, unless we develop new materials resources and fully exploit our technological knowledge, within 25 years the United States will join the list of "have-not" nations. The recommendations of this Commission will place an additional strain on our already critically short specialized manpower resources.

Even the techniques for ascertaining our specialized manpower requirements--particularly long-term requirements--are still rather primitive. This is in part because our economy is a vast and dynamic mechanism which does not lend itself easily to analysis of manpower requirements. However, part of the reason is that the urgent need for these data has not been as widely recognized as it must be; and a greatly accelerated program of research in manpower resources and requirements must be undertaken by the Government with the aid and cooperation of management, labor, and professional societies. This need is fully recognized by the Federal departments and agencies. The Department of Labor has been working very closely with the Department of Defense, Federal Security Agency, National Science Foundation, National Security Resources Board, and the various professional societies on a coordinated program for improving our resources and requirements data.

In spite of the inadequacy of our data on scientific and engineering manpower, much useful information does exist and is being continuously expanded. The information which we now have is sufficient to indicate that the Nation is threatened with a serious shortage of scientists and engineers even to meet the requirements of the present limited mobilization program.

In the academic year 1950-1951, approximately 85,000 bachelors and 15,000 advanced degrees were awarded in all fields of science and engineering, and for various reasons this number of graduates is already sharply on the downgrade. It is estimated that engineering requirements over the next several years will be about 40,000 yearly, yet only 26,000 engineering students are expected to be graduated this year, 20,000 in 1953, and 17,000 in 1954. In 1952 and subsequent years, about half of the engineering graduates will be liable for military service. Not until 1954 will the number of engineers returning after completion of a period of military service sufficiently augment the flow of new entrants into the profession to offset the number of graduates becoming liable for military service.

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In marked contrast with this situation, reports indicate that Russia is training about 30,000 engineers a year, and is placing them where they are most needed in the economy.

The fourth major manpower requirement, as I see it, lies in the field of developing more effective relationships with foreign peoples, particularly those who are now or who may be persuaded to become our allies. One of our most critical manpower shortages, now and for the future, is that of persons expert in the language, geography, economy, psychology, and the social institutions of the areas in which we must act to protect our national security. This shortage is extremely acute with respect to the Asiatic areas. It is practically impossible to find Americans with a thorough knowledge of the Korean language and people; the situation is even worse in the case of Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, and Central Asia. Our manpower resources for understanding and dealing effectively with Middle Eastern countries are inadequate in the extreme.

Even with respect to Russia, our resources are below the danger point. Last year, for example, only a few Americans took Ph.D. degrees in Russian language and literature, the field most necessary as a base for increasing our supply of Americans who are experts on Russia.

These shortages cannot be corrected quickly. Not only does the training required for language and area competence require several years, but in many cases the materials for conducting such training either do not exist or are entirely inadequate. Last year the Department of the Air Force sought information on where personnel could be sent for training in 26 selected languages important to their operations. It learned that instruction is offered in not more than 10 of the languages anywhere in the United States and that there are not basic materials available for teaching 8 of them. For example, several English-foreign-language dictionaries which were in production during World War II were discontinued at the end of the last war. Burmese was one of these and it is still in card-file form.

There are now only 8 or 10 universities in the United States equipped to give this type of comprehensive language and area training. Even these are staffed with a bare minimum of competent specialists and some of these specialists, having reserve status, may be recalled at any time to active duty in the armed forces.

Many of the experts in this field are foreign born. Consequently, the difficulty of obtaining security clearance for them is a very serious obstacle to their employment at the points where they are most needed within the Government.

In contrast with the bleak resource outlook in this highly important field, our requirements are already pressing and growing rapidly. As our

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broad security programs develop, specialists in foreign languages and cultures will be more urgently needed as policy advisers, as administrators, as technicians, and for the intelligence needs of the United States.

In addition to these needs, there is the problem of American staff for the United Nations and for its specialized agencies and missions. Undoubtedly, additional needs will develop in the economic and production planning agencies of NATO. As we move toward the possibility of a Pacific Pact, and participation in possible enterprises for development of Southeast Asia, even greater needs will develop for language and area specialists. The number of specialists that are needed is not large--at most a few thousand--but they are of critical importance to these programs.

Requirements for such specialized personnel must include the needs of private agencies and industrial concerns as well.

In the light of this demand, the Government is giving attention to the development of the number and kinds of experts in languages and cultures which the United States needs to sustain its position of world leadership. The expansion of American activities abroad will in itself increase the number of persons with firsthand experience in foreign areas. To be most valuable, however, this experience must be coupled with a systematic program of training through permanent institutes in area studies, and through supplementary language and area studies given in the business and professional schools.

To summarize quickly: As I see them, the principal manpower needs for national security are to (1) equip as many of our people as possible with productive skills, (2) develop the skills in the numbers required to staff our industrial mobilization base at maximum capacity, (3) develop and utilize the scientific and engineering manpower to maintain our lead in technological fields, and (4) train and utilize the specialized manpower necessary to achieve effective collaboration and development of other nations of the free world.

As you readily recognize, I have not attempted to give you the details of civilian manpower requirements. On the other hand I have sought only to identify the major fields in which manpower requirements must be met if we are to achieve national security.

These requirements cannot be expressed in simple numerical terms. They are not of a crisis nature in that they must be met tomorrow or next month in order to prevent delays in specific production schedules, though some of those may occur. They are basic to the whole strength and forward movement of our industrial, economic, and social life, upon which both our security and our standard of living depend.

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We Americans are a great people for going allout; we have a sense of the dramatic and confidence in effort on a grand scale and those qualities have indeed made this Nation great. But as we enter upon a new period of American leadership in world affairs, we must also cultivate the virtues of wise planning and sustained and purposeful action toward our goals. We must learn better how to develop and use the manpower resources at our command for the long pull toward national security and a constructive solution to world tensions. It is only in these terms that we can properly determine what our manpower requirements are. When we have done this, I am confident that we can develop the resources necessary to meet them.

I will now answer your questions.

QUESTION: Mr. Goodwin, I haven't seen any indication that there has been a detailed census taken of the entire Federal labor pool, as to job classifications, skills, and so on. There has been considerable thought expressed as to how short we are in gross quantities in over-all fields, but I question whether that is adequate under current circumstances. Is any effort being directed toward taking a detailed census of our skills and abilities in the entire labor pool?

MR. GOODWIN: No. There is nothing under way at the moment for such a census or such a tabulation.

I personally have some question whether it is desirable or not, because I think that the information available to us through the sampling techniques that have been used are adequate for a vast majority of the estimates made of the labor force. I think the sort of thing that you indicate is very much needed in some of the technical areas. There we must have much more specific, much more detailed, information. I think the same thing is true to a large degree for the skilled trades.

There was a proposal made in the early period of World War II for a census. The idea was there that we would register--I guess you would call it--or we would list, all the skills.

One of the things that makes that type of approach questionable and very difficult to utilize is the dynamic character of the labor force. The idea which was discussed in the early stages of World War II was abandoned, because the feeling was that the information would be out of date almost as soon as we had gathered it.

Now, those criticisms, in my opinion are not legitimate against the need for detailed information in the scientific and skilled and technical classifications. But I think they are well taken for the labor force as a whole.

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QUESTION: One of our basic reading texts mentions that an effort has been made so far as requirements are concerned, taking what is called the end product and working backward, figuring out how many people it would take to make all these things. Could you elaborate a little bit on the status of that project, how far has it gotten?

MR. GOODWIN: I am sure that it relates to the so-called input-output technique developed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Are you going to have someone who will talk about that?

DR. REICHLEY: Yes. We will have it in the Requirements Course.

MR. GOODWIN: Well, if you are, you will get a much better explanation of it at that time than you will from me. I know what it is supposed to do, but when it gets into the technical aspects of it, I don't know.

QUESTION: Is the organizational structure now in effect with respect to the mobilization of our manpower, that is, the Defense Manpower Administration, in a better position than just prior to and during World War II? Are the responsibilities more clearly defined and is it a better operational structure than we had just prior to and during World War II?

MR. GOODWIN: Yes. Without any question. It is infinitely better than it was at that time. For one thing alone, it is manned by people many of whom went through the experience of World War II and know what the problems are and how to meet them.

There are some gaps, I might say. We have a gap in our labor-management advisory committee structure. We have what you might call the minimum number of committees that are operating pretty much on a stand-by basis. We have one in each of 13 regions. We have about 30 in those local areas where we have our major problems. But the organizational structure is such that it could be quickly expanded to meet the needs of a much larger program.

We were caught short in World War II, as you may know. It took us the better part of a year before we developed an efficient organization. It was five or six months after Pearl Harbor for instance, before the War Manpower Commission staff appointments were made. I was one of the first regional directors appointed; that was in August of 1942. That condition would not prevail now. We are in a much better situation to meet the problems.

QUESTION: If the situation should require that we pass or invoke a national service act, would the organization have to be removed from its present position within the Department of Labor, that is, the Defense Manpower Administration?

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MR. GOODWIN: I don't know why it should. As a matter of fact, I think if it came to that, the general agreement is that it better be left there, because if you don't have the cooperation of organized labor, the controls will cause more trouble than they are worth.

QUESTION: In your outline of the requirements for filling industry's manpower needs, it seems that the first three are essentially fulfilled on the home front; but the fourth, the development of better relationships and understanding with our potential or current allies, will have to be performed overseas. It seems to me that it is probably the job of the diplomatic services to develop this program. Is that being coordinated with the State Department to develop the structure for such a program?

MR. GOODWIN: In my opinion you are right--that much of the leadership has to come from that source. The key military services, however, have a large stake in it too.

As I understand it--I don't know too much about it firsthand--but there are a number of governmental departments that are tied in to what is happening now on these technical and scientific programs. The personnel is being borrowed from various departments of the Government. So that the problem is one of coordination of a good many administrative units that are working on it. But the leadership does have to come from the source that you have indicated--the State Department.

QUESTION: You spoke of the importance of having mobility in the labor force, mobility between trades and skills and industries, as well as geographic mobility. We all know of the fluctuating nature of the requirements for certain skills, such as toolmakers, in periods of conversion and things like that. To what extent, do you think the emphasis on restricting the jurisdiction of trades--for example, the operator of a machine cannot touch it to repair it; that is especially so in the key metalworking trades--limits the versatility of our labor force and its ability to shift from one trade to another?

MR. GOODWIN: It has been something of a factor. It is probably impossible to measure it in objective terms. I am sure that it is.

There have been a lot of other factors which have tended to cut down on the mobility of labor. Some of the developments of the last 10 years have been very important. Any of the developments that tend to tie a man to his specific job, limit at least his geographic mobility.

I would say upon the specific point that you mention, it has not been so serious a problem in the metalworking trades as it has in certain others, and therefore it has not had so much effect upon the defense program directly as it might have in certain other trades.

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QUESTION: It seems to me that it is most noticeable in the building trades. There is another case in which there are very great fluctuations in requirements. At the beginning of a mobilization period, when we are tooling up and building facilities, these people more or less acquire skills which will help them to go into the production field later. Am I right?

MR. GOODWIN: So far as I know, they are not doing it. I think the tendency is not for them to do it. But that is largely because of the requirements of the specialization itself, rather than union requirements. I don't believe that is a very serious problem.

QUESTION: You spoke of the need for apprenticeship training. The requirement for wartime skills distribution is much different from that in peacetime. We are rapidly facing in the next few years the existence of a mobilization base that must produce in order to exist. How do we educate the public to keep training these men in those skills which are needed in peacetime?

MR. GOODWIN: Well, I think there are many methods that can be employed. I think that we have to keep telling our story over and over again to as many people as possible.

It is difficult to interest a person in training for something that he is not going to use immediately. That is the basic problem. You can't stockpile skills the same way you can stockpile materials. But there is a good sales argument in terms of the value that this training is to the individual, whether he uses it immediately or not; I think that we have to multiply the contacts and tell the story to as many people as possible and interest them in it.

I think that we have a natural advantage in the interest on the part of our American people generally in bettering their own position and getting a broader educational base. But we have to get some of the urgency of the national defense program into that picture.

QUESTION: I think, Mr. Goodwin, the problem that is bothering most of the class is the question of how to arrive at our total requirements; and, after having arrived at our total requirements, how those requirements are allocated to the three agencies to which they have to be allocated. We have industry, the armed forces, and the Government. What Federal agency at the present time has the responsibility, after this mobilization base has been established, of allocating to these three the manpower that is available? Since the National Security Resources Board (NSRB) has been eliminated as a defense agency, what agency has taken over NSRB's planning functions? What agency will go to these three and determine what their requirements are and then refer that information to the right point for decision and allocation?

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MR. GOODWIN: That is a very good question. We could spend a lot of time on it.

In the first place I must say that I think NSRB would be surprised to learn that it had been eliminated.

QUESTION: Well, reduced to almost nothing.

MR. GOODWIN: They have just been reduced 95 percent or some such figure.

I think the function that you are talking about has not been actually performed as yet. There have been a great many discussions and a lot of work has been done; but it has been mostly in terms of planning. But in the allocation between the major manpower claimants it has not been done.

I think there has been an issue within the last few weeks in terms of some military requirements to relate them to civilian requirements. The figures were just not available.

I think that in an emergency under present conditions, if that function had to be performed, it would be performed by the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM). What has been done so far has been done under the leadership of ODM.

QUESTION: Who would determine the governmental requirements? Would that be the Civil Service Commission?

MR. GOODWIN: When it comes to an allocation between the military and the civilian economy, an allocation of the labor force in over-all terms, that decision, as things stand now, would be made by the President. I am talking about the over-all allocation. For instance, in the last six years the military has had an expansion of its forces. The decisions have gone to the National Security Council and have been made by the President on the recommendation of that Council.

That leaves a lot of questions unsettled. One is in terms of how you subdivide the labor force and make the specific detailed decisions. I am talking about some of these highly trained scientists, doctors, and other specialists. The President, obviously, doesn't make those decisions and cannot. The important thing is, what kind of machinery do we have for making them?

Now, about the over-all decisions, such things as have been operating in the last two years, they have been made by the President on the advice of the National Security Council.

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QUESTION: What is this operating agency that advises the President? Is there such an agency in existence at the present time?

MR. GOODWIN: The staff work behind these decisions has been under the leadership of ODM--Dr. Flemming's organization. That has been participated in by the Department of Defense, representing the military; by the Defense Manpower Administration of the Department of Labor, who represents the civilians; and by General Hershey, of the Selective Service System, representing Selective Service.

QUESTION: In the past two weeks we have all been impressed with the fact that manpower is going to be our biggest bottleneck in any national emergency. If it is a fact that we must make the best utilization of the manpower we have available, is it not also a fact that we can no longer afford labor strikes during periods of national emergency?

MR. GOODWIN: I think that you are right. I think we cannot afford them. I think the question is, can strikes be eliminated? How can they be eliminated without paying a greater price for so doing?

Although not taking any active part in the political campaign, I have been interested in the points of view that have been put forth by the candidates. So far as I can see, neither one of the major candidates has found an ideal solution to this problem of how to eliminate labor strikes. I don't know the answer to it, but I know that just passing a law saying we are not going to have them won't stop them.

QUESTION: How closely are labor and management participating in manpower mobilization decisions, such as the policy on eliminating strikes and things of that kind?

MR. GOODWIN: The best answer to that is this: I think you have got to recognize that up to now in the Korean emergency we have not had a crisis kind of problem connected with manpower of the type that we had even in World War II. We were in a relatively good position in the United States in manpower in World War II. We haven't had even the type of crisis problems that we had in World War II so far in the Korean situation.

Now, when we recognize that, I would say that we have had, first, nationally, good cooperation from labor and management on our National Labor-Management Committee. That committee has been dealing with manpower policy questions. Most of them are significant in terms of meeting problems that we would have if we had an all-out emergency. Some of them are of importance now, but for the most part they are important in the long term.

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I might mention that we have about 30 local labor-management committees. We could have more but we didn't want to get committees in areas where we did not have some manpower problems. I think we could well have them in a few areas where we don't now have them, but we here tried to avoid setting them up in places where they would have nothing to do and might lose interest.

I think that we have had good cooperation from labor and management, and I think we can count on them for meeting the tougher problems if and when they arise.

Both labor and management are dead set against controls, as you probably know. In World War II they were also against them, although I think management at different times in World War II, or part of management at least, favored controls.

At the last meeting of the National Labor-Management Committee, held about 10 days ago, it was decided to set up a subcommittee to take a close look at the military assumptions of the next war, to determine whether or not the kind of manpower program that was used during World War II would be adequate to meet those assumed conditions. They have carefully guarded against any attempt at this stage to go to any kind of controls, or to go any further than or even going so far as we did in World War II.

But I think it is a very healthy trend; and I am hoping that we will get some of the kind of detailed planning that I feel is necessary, because, if you military men are even half right in your assumptions about the next conflict, we are going to have to have plans that will be in operation within a matter of hours at the most, rather than of months, as I indicated it took us to get ready to do a halfway decent job in World War II.

So, taking this question of bombing and the problems involved under atomic attack, even if you have your plants in a given community intact, you still have manpower in your labor force killed through atomic attack, or at least put out of commission. The problem involved then in moving manpower from one center to another is something that we didn't have in World War II.

It is my feeling that we need to face up to the assumptions as to the problems in detail and come up with plans in detail, which we have not yet done and which needs to be done. I agree that the major conclusions of labor and management on this problem ought to be worked out in so far as possible without controls. We all know that better results come from people if they are on a cooperative basis than if they are under controls. Of course, if labor is controlled, management and profits have to be controlled and that, I think, goes a long way down the road

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that we are trying to avoid in this country, that is, a socialistic society. Beyond that I will not try to answer the question, but it looks very hopeful to me in terms of cooperation.

COLONEL NORMAN: Mr. Goodwin, on behalf of the Commandant and the student body, I thank you very much for a very informative and interesting discussion of this problem.

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