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MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

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15 October 1952

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GENERAL GREELEY: I suppose that most of us can consider ourselves pretty well informed on the subject of military manpower. After all, we have spent quite a number of years and one or two wars in studying this subject. It seems to me, however, that there is a flaw in this, in that our thinking tends to neglect the fact that military manpower requirements for war are just one, and that we as claimants must consider the other major claimants for this vitally important and very limited resource.

Our speaker today has a lot of experience in this broader field and is prepared to give us the facts of life in military manpower requirements. General Lynch has served with the War Department General Staff and with technical assignments in the Air Force, and a great part of his service has been in military personnel and in manpower. He is presently Director of Manpower Requirements in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense.

So, Eddie, it is a real pleasure to have you with us. The stage is set; the platform is yours.

GENERAL LYNCH: Thank you, General Greeley. Good morning. I thought this morning that I would cover rather briefly the general problem of manpower requirements, how requirements are generated, and what the ground rules are on which they are generated, and then move into the problems we are faced with today under partial mobilization, which, in many respects, is far more difficult than in total mobilization.

At the present time the national objectives in broad terms are established by the National Security Council, and from them the services develop the necessary military forces to do the job. Those forces at the Joint Chiefs of Staff level are ordinarily expressed in major units such as divisions, groups, air groups or wings, and major combat ships and air groups for the Navy.

Those units are established on tables of organization, or some form of allowance, which is standardized and developed on the basis of operating experience over a long period of time. They represent only a small fraction of the total number of men required by the services to do the job. Generally speaking, it is about 40 percent of the total.

The major portion of the requirement is that which is needed to build the training establishment which takes new men in, trains them,

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and feeds them to the organized units, first for the build-up and then, after the build-up has been accomplished, for the maintenance of those forces. Even if you do not have combat losses, you have a continuing, steady attrition which must be replaced. The rate at which you build up the forces has a great influence on the number of people required for the training establishment because the trainers in particular have to be geared to the average population that you have in your training establishment. So, generally speaking, the forces that have been set up to meet the national objections take about 40 percent of the men. The balance, some 60 percent, are required for the training establishment, and that other thing, which you are all familiar with, the pipeline, the number of people who are ineffective because of being in transit from one point to another, in the hospital, and so on.

In the period of partial mobilization, and particularly the situation as it exists today, we are embarking on an experience that is new. We have not had past experience to guide us in any of the problems we face today. We are maintaining large forces in uniform, the largest in our history during peacetime. At the same time we are building the necessary material to equip those forces and we are maintaining our standard of living at a high level. These three requirements are mutually competing against the limited manpower pool. General Taylor in the Army expressed it in a little different way when he said, "We are mobilizing, demobilizing, and fighting a war all at the same time."

The biggest problem is that created by the turnover due to peacetime periods of service in this period of partial mobilization. As an added factor, and as you well know, the national defense program as it exists today is expensive. The high cost of the program, combined with disruptions to normal living, has brought about a very critical attitude on the part of both the public and the Congress since the Congress reflects the general sentiment of their constituents.

I am sure that General Marshall, when he was Secretary of Defense, clearly understood the problems that the defense establishment was facing as a result of the situation. It was largely through his efforts that the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Personnel) was established in December 1950. I might dwell briefly on the work and activities of that Office as background for the various problems that are involved.

The two major segments are the Office of Manpower Requirements and the Office of Manpower Utilization. The Office of Manpower Requirements has the task of determining how many people are required to do the job. That is concerned with both military personnel and civilian personnel under direct hire by the defense establishment.

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The Office of Manpower Utilization has as its objective getting the most use out of the people that we have on board.

In addition, there is the Office of Personnel Policy, which is the present edition of the old Personnel Policy Board, and which deals primarily with the day-to-day problems that you have in administering personnel pay, leave, rotation, overseas tours, and the like.

There is the Office of Industrial Relations, which is a new activity. It is concerned with possible labor-management disturbances which may interfere with the production of goods for the defense establishment. It does not get into the details of trying to settle strikes or labor disputes. Its function is to learn of disputes that are in the making in the very earliest stages of their development to determine whether or not the disturbance, if it results in a work stoppage, will affect a Department of Defense production program, and to see that the proper agencies that are charged with mediating or settling those disturbances are aware of the facts and are adequate in efficiency, and if they are not, to speed them up.

There is also the Office of Manpower Supply, which was formerly a responsibility of the Munitions Board. That activity is concerned with the supply of manpower from the standpoint of our producers on the outside.

In the Office of Manpower Requirements, in developing the number of people needed to do the job either for mobilization or for partial mobilization, our approach is that the best way to keep down the number of people needed is to spell out as well as we can the guidance or policies that the services use in building up their manpower program. Military programs are built up somewhat like adding a series of blocks. You have, as I said before, the major operating elements, divisions, groups, and major combatant ships, which are easy to identify, and which exist in standard packages. To those you add the necessary supporting forces which they need to operate as military units. Then, on that you superimpose the necessary training establishment and logistic establishment that you need for the supply of men and materials to the operating forces. Lastly, you add the necessary provision for ineffective people --those in transit, patients, prisoners, and the like. When all those elements are added together, you have the total required to do the job.

Each of these segments is influenced by certain assumptions and ground rules that have to be laid out in advance in order that the services can do a proper job of programming. Some of the assumptions are, for instance, the extent to which requirements will be met by the recalling of Reserves, the likelihood of obtaining authority to extend regular enlistments as we have done in the past in order to conserve our skills, and so on.

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Policies which control the rate at which men are let out of the services have considerable influence on the size of the training establishment needed to replace them. All of these requirements added together produce the total number of people to man the armed forces. The total now for the 1954 budget estimates, which are in process of review, is in the vicinity of 3.7 millions. But it is the guidance or ground rules issued in advance that are the primary key to the development of the programs.

Our biggest task is the annual review for the preparation of budget estimates and that phase is about complete, at least for the first round on the 1954 estimates. The Office of Manpower Requirements, in collaboration with the Office of the Assistant Secretary (Comptroller) and the Bureau of the Budget personnel, reviews the military programs to check their consistency with the guidance or ground rules that have been laid down and to see whether or not they are phased according to the job that has to be done. Generally, there is very little question about the major combatant units. The biggest elements for discussion, review, and consideration are primarily in the supporting fields because it is here that minor variations in the interpretations of the instructions often cause large variations in the number of men required to do the job.

In the field of utilization, the ground has only begun to be scratched. It is a problem that gets into the day-to-day details of living and one which cannot be solved, in my judgment, from the Washington level, except to guide the objectives and the workings of the people that are at what we call the station level. It is there, where you have the man and the job associated, that the most can be done in the field of getting the maximum employment, both skillwise and volumewise, out of an individual.

It is a most important element and one which is fundamental to the command job because the old adage, "The devil finds work for idle hands to do," applies. A great deal of the attitude of the individual toward the service is expressed either directly or indirectly as a consequence of his impression of the organization that he is with.

I shall mention a little later our studies of the available manpower pool that we have been conducting, and in those one of the significant elements that is somewhat unknown because we do not have the experience is the re-enlistment rate. That can be markedly influenced by the attitude of the individuals who are in the services. The extent to which they are fully employed in their highest skill determines whether they will be better motivated to re-enlist when their tour is up. That in turn will be reflected not only in terms of a better job done in the unit itself, but in an improved re-enlistment rate.

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In the course of day-to-day operations many people are concerned with manpower. Everybody is an expert. It starts with the Congress. We made a count sometime ago, and 14 committees in Congress were interested in manpower in some degree or another, and they all did not have the same objectives. I think we in the defense establishment have been making progress but there is a great deal yet to be done.

When Mrs. Rosenberg first arrived in December of 1950--I am not sure of the exact date this meeting was held--she thought it would be a fine thing if she could meet all the people in the services who were dealing with civilian and military manpower. So she issued a general invitation. They brought the group together in one of the fairly small conference rooms in the Pentagon. There were about 100 who showed up for that meeting.

Well, she, of course, immediately appreciated the fact that you can't get much done with a committee of that size. One of her first actions was to establish a "focus of responsibility" in each of the services which would provide a clear-cut channel for handling matters which dealt with military and civilian personnel. I think that in the last 2 years a great deal of progress has been made organizationally to place the problems in clearer focus. But in the long run the idea is to get an understanding of the problems involved in this period of partial mobilization to permeate down through to the working level, and that is one of the important tasks that we have before us.

In that field and as a side issue of the mobilization problem proper, I think it is a very important point for people of your general position to understand thoroughly and take with you when you leave the course here, if this period of partial mobilization is to continue for a protracted period, because the handling of manpower as a resource is too little understood by a great many people. It is an asset which is taken too much for granted, and everyone, as I say, often thinks he is an expert. The more you work with it, however, the less you find you know.

I mentioned earlier the fact that we have many pressures generated as a result of the high cost of the program and the disruptions to normal living. After we review the military programs and they are approved by the Secretary of Defense and set up for budget purposes, we go over and defend or justify them--defend is the trade world and justify, I think, is the more polite term--before the committees of the Congress.

When you are dealing with a budget of 50 or 60 billion dollars it is very difficult to get a grasp of details of the program. The segments are of such size that unless the committee members or their staffs

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engage in extensive research, it is very difficult for them to get a grasp of specific parts. It is definitely true in procurement, except for certain items of, say, commercial motor vehicles which they can compare with their own experience or with civilian activities.

But they get a lot of correspondence from their constituents, and, of course, they deal with personnel matters, or manpower, depending on how you call them. And where they receive a large number of letters that strike at the same general topic, they feel that there definitely is some spark of fire underneath all that smoke. In a democratic country such as ours, that is a natural state of affairs and one that we can expect to live with, and that is all right. But the tenor of these letters, colored by the fact that many individuals are in the service against their will, is reflected in a critical attitude of the Congressman toward a number of these elements that show up in the budget, many in the personnel field.

Some of these issues that may appear mysterious when viewed from the outside become relatively simple when you understand the mechanics that generate them.

There are a lot of things which in many respects are prejudiced. If they feel that certain elements of a program are unsound then it is the old proposition, that if you challenge a witness's veracity or credibility on one point, his whole testimony falls down. It is much the same with the attitude of Congress. If your case falls apart on some minor element, then reaction to the entire program is bad.

Much of that attitude is generated by the way in which we utilize our people at the station level or wherever they are employed. If individuals feel that there is no important work to be performed, particularly if they are there involuntarily, we can expect pressure to cut down the size of the active forces. That is one of the major elements of concern to all of the high officials, not only in the Office of the Secretary of Defense proper, but in the departments. It is a concern that we will so handle our personnel resources that we may generate-- as a result of a combination of individual dissatisfactions, cost of the program, disruption to normal living, and other factors--pressures for demobilization which would force us into a helter-skelter sort of reduction of the armed forces. This would be a serious detriment to our state of national defense. So it is more than just a question of what is a proper number of people for the armed services; it is a question of a proper number in a given set of circumstances.

The situation today in a partial mobilization is particularly difficult in a combat type of unit where you have no particular job to do until the shooting starts. You can only train so far and then you

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have to report. If the training and other day-to-day conditions of living are not properly looked after by the commander, you are liable to get into a situation of staleness. It is like training a college football team for the Thanksgiving game, and then the day before the game you postpone it for a week, then for 10 days, then for another week, and so on. You can well expect that the quality of your team play is going to be drastically affected by the continual postponement. It is not too good an analogy, but we do have much the same problem in trying to maintain a state of military readiness over a protracted period.

You will probably recall that the Fortieth Report of the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee was critical of the number of administrative personnel in the tactical unit tables. Regardless of whether the numbers may be fully correct for a full combat employment, it seems to me that in a period of sustained readiness much can be done not necessarily to eliminate the functions from the tables but to reduce the number of people supplied to do those functions. Recognizing that the unit will not be fully capable of immediate employment, we could concentrate on the training of combat skills at the expense of providing people for administrative tasks.

I might illustrate my point by an example. I mentioned earlier that we have this personnel turnover under peacetime periods of service. For instance, a man who is inducted spends only 2 years in the service. If we concentrated on combat training for those men and he performed, say, certain administrative functions as additional duty, we would give him his basic training in the combat element, and his primary assignment or skill would be as a combat trained man. To the extent that it was necessary, after his initial training was provided, he would accomplish part of the administrative tasks in a sustained period of readiness. When such men move on into the Reserve components, they would have had basic combat training this is better than bringing a man in for 2 years, training him as a clerk, working him as a clerk, and then having him go out with the Reserves as a clerk.

One of the major projects that the Office of Manpower Requirements has been working on for the past year has been that of the manpower pool available under the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as amended. I would like to spend a few minutes matching supply against the over-all requirements for people to meet active armed forces of 3.7 millions.

As you know, the amendment to the Universal Military Training and Service Act, in June of 1951, reduced the age limit to 18½, reduced mental standards, and broadened the scope of dependency deferments. We tried to get the average period of service, extended to 36 months, but the best we could get was a 24-month period of service for inductees.

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The Defense Department, working with other executive agencies, such as the Selective Service System and the Bureau of Labor Statistics, began a study about a year ago to determine how many people were potentially available under the draft and how long we could maintain the armed forces with that supply. No one agency has all of the essential elements of the puzzle. The Selective Service System has records which deal with the men who have registered and who have been processed by the system. It does not have data on men who have not yet registered, the potential registrants, nor does it have data on men who were recalled from the Reserve components or who enlisted.

Then as to the future, we look at Census data. We get from the services the future requirements for new men to maintain the forces.

To illustrate the complexity of the problem, when we compare Selective Service and Census data to check age groups that have already registered, we find that about 5 percent more men show up in the Selective Service registration than the Census would indicate is in the population. That is because of the fact that the Census enumeration is voluntary, whereas General Hershey has a little more authority for his registration. So when we look at the future age groups shown by Census data, we increase them by 5 percent to correct for the underenumeration.

General Hershey frequently mentions the fact that 45 or 50 percent of the men are rejected when they come up for their preinduction examination, and the inference is that 45 to 50 percent of the men reaching the age of 18½ are rejected on physical or mental grounds. The statement of General Hershey is correct, but the inference is wrong. His statement is correct because it is based upon the number of men handled by the system and what happened to them. The inference is wrong because he does not correct Selective Service data for the number of men who were enlisted and the men who were recalled from the Reserves. Both groups are all physically acceptable.

We reconstructed the total military age groups and found that a fraction more than 20 percent had been rejected. That doesn't compare too badly with the experience of the Dutch. When Mrs. Rosenberg was in Europe a couple of months ago, she checked with the Dutch and they are using 21 percent rejection rate. In our planning, we have been using 22 percent as an over-all figure which was agreed to by several of the agencies. On the basis of maintaining a force of 3.7 millions we can run through the fiscal year 1954 without difficulty on our estimated manpower supply, as we see it under present regulations.

As a matter of fact, during the fiscal year 1954, the number of new men required from the pool is about the same as the number we expect to be added to the pool so that the situation as it exists in July 1953

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should continue much the same through the fiscal year 1954. The Universal Military Training and Service Act expires in 1955, so we haven't attempted to project our estimates beyond that date because we must go to the Congress for a change before that time. Our experience clearly indicates that an active force of the size of 3.7 millions cannot be maintained without some form of compulsory service.

There are other points I might mention in connection with the problem of manpower supply. One is the question as to whether the voluntary enlistment programs are in competition with Selective Service. I just mentioned that, on the basis of past experience, we cannot maintain an armed force of 3.7 millions without some form of selective service. During this period of partial mobilization with peacetime periods of service our primary concern is to try to maintain the highest average individual period of service.

Men enlist for 3 or 4 years in contrast to 2-year terms for those who are inducted or who are involuntarily recalled. If you consider the necessary overlap of training for replacement, it takes about two and a quarter 2-year inductees to equal in service one 4-year enlistee. So as a basic policy, we try to get as many men through enlistment and re-enlistment as possible, and the balance through induction.

In order that the individuals will be fairly distributed between the services, particularly the various mental categories or groups, in May of 1951 armed forces examining stations were set up which examined all men under common physical and mental standards whether they were brought in through induction or enlistment.

You may recall that there was considerable discussion in the hearings on Public Law 51 about our mental and physical standards. We already had the physical standards at about the level of January 1945, which was considered to be the low point in World War II, and Congress in Public Law 51 reduced the mental standards so that we are required to take all but the lower 10 percent.

All individuals brought in, either through induction or enlistment, are examined at the armed forces examining station and assigned against quotas in the various mental groupings I to V. Quotas are based upon the estimated proportions of these groups in the population. A service is permitted to take men of a lesser quality as a substitute in their quota for a higher group. For instance, they can take more group II's as a substitute for group I's, but they cannot take more of a higher group than the percentage established. Furthermore, the quotas are on a monthly basis so that they cannot be used to stockpile in one month against the future.

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There was a belief in the past that the Army was getting the short end of the deal because the enlistment programs of the other services skimmed off the cream. One result of keeping records on the qualitative distribution experience in the last year has been to show that that statement was not correct.

In June 1950 the Army had $3\frac{1}{4}$ percent more in group I. At that time all of the services were on voluntary enlistments. There was an insignificant number of inductees left in the Army. In March 1952, which is the last date for which we had any information, the percentage in group I in the Army had increased to 4.5 percent. Last August they got 9.7 percent of their personnel in this group where as the average for all the services was $8\frac{1}{4}$ percent. Counting both I and II, the Army is 16 percent better off today than it was in 1950.

Of course, that has to be balanced by a shift in groups III and IV. Also, between 1950 and today the base--particularly for group IV-- has been broadened by the reduction in the mental qualification score.

While not strictly in the field of requirements, I would like to close on the note that I think we all have a great deal to do in the way of improving utilization. This is a function of the commanders and the key staff officers all the way down the line, particularly at the point where the man and the job come together.

One officer, who worked for me in G-1 of the War Department some years ago and about the only one I know about--though I am sure there are others--did something specific about the usual complaint that you get from organization commanders, "Who is going to do something about these "eight balls" that I have hanging around my neck and who keep me from doing a good job?" He was then G-1 of the Fourth Armored Division, and he got together a board in the division headquarters that consisted of the division surgeon, himself, and three experienced troop officers.

Some of you undoubtedly remember the days when officers spent as many as 15 years in the grade of lieutenant and learned a lot about handling people in the small unit. He got three of those senior officers who had a great deal of troop experience. He had each unit commander turn in his single blackest "eight ball" for consideration by the board.

They spent hours, if necessary, talking to these men to find out what the real trouble was, not just what excuse they may have given out in the first 5 or 10 minutes of an interview. They spent enough time to get to the real, fundamental troubles of the men.

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They found a few who really were "eight balls," and these were separated as medical cases. However, more than 90 percent of those men were reassigned on the basis of the interviews and within 6 months practically every one of them had been promoted at least one grade. These men were not "eight balls" as such, but they had not been either evaluated and assigned properly or handled properly. It is the function of the commander and his officers to dig in and to see that the most is extracted from the people they have to work with.

I don't recall at this time all of the cases he told me about. But one of them, I remember, was a chap that had a history about the same as many of the others. Every weekend or maybe twice a month he would go to town, have a few drinks, and end up in the hands of the M.P.'s. Then, the commander would have to bail him out over Sunday and put him to work on Monday.

This man was from the Northwest. He was a logger by trade and ordinarily spent 10 or 12 hours out in the open air at hard manual work. When they finally pinned him down and found out what it was that was troubling him, it turned out that he didn't have enough work to do in the Army. By Friday he was just so full of vigor that he went downtown and picked a fight with a few M.P.'s to work off his steam on. That, of course, was stimulated by a couple of drinks.

They called up the Engineer battalion commander and said that they had a man who was in trouble but he was a bear for work, and knowing the Engineers was a pretty tough outfit, they asked them if they would take this man and really work him to see whether he could take it? Instead of being a yard bird, that man was a technical sergeant in about 6 months. He just wasn't in a place where he had enough responsibility and hard work to use up his energy and his ability.

I think that we have a great deal to do in the field of exploiting the potentialities of the people we have. At this level we have to deal with numbers, but certainly it is a serious mistake for the commander, particularly when you get close to the individual in the work situation, to ever make the fundamental mistake that people are dealt with as numbers. They are individuals and must be treated as such. To get the most out of them, the commander has to put in extra work to see that he understands the people he is working with.

I will be very glad to answer a few questions if you have any.

QUESTION: I wonder if you would comment, on the limitation in the Reserve force that we have in being, ready Reserve force, which is a million and a half?

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GENERAL LYNCH: I don't think anyone can give a good clear presentation of that problem at this time. That was put in by the conferees at the last minute, and the statement in the report is to the effect that it was intended to concentrate available training funds in the striking force. It is not consistent with the use of ready Reserve in other sections of the act and in the testimony where it was considered as a degree of individual obligation or status of vulnerability for recall in contrast to the stand-by.

In the service programs and discussions it was generally considered that there would be different degrees of, say, imminence for recall in the ready. The Army in particular, they are the only ones that I know of that used the terms "early ready" and "later ready" to draw a distinction between units which would be fully manned, equipped, and ready to go in the first month or so in contrast to those that would not be ready for 6 months or a year after mobilization day.

The general recommendation that has been made to Mrs. Rosenberg is that we go to the Congress as soon as it convenes and get a suspension of that limitation until we have a chance to present testimony, have hearings, and get the matter clarified because that million and a half includes those on active duty. We estimate that we will be up to a million and a half in the spring and we are practically at that now. It depends on how you count what you put in the ready Reserve and what you count of those on active duty. The lines of action are first to eliminate the ceiling or to find out what Congress intended, and then make the ceiling large enough to cover what Congress intended.

QUESTION: General, you spoke of the budget activity as a major share of your problem and of your coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). Would you elaborate a little bit on what his particular interest is in the problem? Is he concerned with your policy decisions or the computations and processes of budgeting?

GENERAL LYNCH: The first collaboration comes when we and the Comptroller get out the guide lines for developing the budget. In that is guidance on procurement of manpower and a lot of other elements. We work with them in preparing those policies or guide lines that pertain to manpower procurement, promotion policies, and similar personnel items.

In most of the estimating, once you get a number, the budget is developed by multiplying out to get the costs. Little can be done in building an estimate until certain numbers are established for military personnel, officers and enlisted men, and the spread of grades. Generally speaking, the Assistant Secretary for Manpower and Personnel has

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the primary responsibility for setting the number, and then the Comptroller checks the computation of the dollars from those numbers.

QUESTION: I have two questions. I think that our departments have made a study or partial study on the utilization of handicapped. I was wondering if that had been consolidated or whether any study has been made on the three-department level, and, if so, are any figures available?

Regarding the second question, I note that Mr. Johnson's committee has applied the pressure for another survey by a civilian team. It seems we have had investigators investigating investigators in the past, and I know those people are in the field almost constantly. What does this particular team hope to accomplish?

GENERAL LYNCH: I will pick the first one first. It's easier. The use of the handicapped breaks into two phases--one, civilians, and the other, those in uniform. The Defense Department is represented on the Manpower Policy Council which develops national policies on the employment of handicapped civilians, overage, and so on. There has been a considerable increase of emphasis on the use of handicapped in the civilian economy.

From the standpoint of men in uniform, I don't know of any specific detailed studies in that field in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. It is my own opinion that the necessary studies to develop policies and preparations should be made, but that the primary basis for using such people in uniform is when they have been disabled after they have had their basic or technical military training, and in the course of their service and during the period of the emergency, you are capitalizing on their military experience and training by putting them into a job that they are fully qualified to fill and releasing someone else for a better assignment. It is what you might call an ace in the hole that should be exploited after fighting starts, as a means for capitalizing on your training investment of the people in uniform.

Now, as to the second question. Before the Fortieth Report of Senator Lyndon Johnson's Preparatory Subcommittee was issued, he had brought up the question of administrative top-heaviness in tables of organization and equipment in previous discussions with Defense officials. He talked to General Bradley on the subject, and the topic has come up a number of times, usually from the point of view of comparing the number of men and the firepower of, say, a Russian division versus a United States division.

That discussion spreads out into any number of lines. The general argument has been that the United States forces in contrast to Russian

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forces have built into them a much greater sustaining power because of the type of supply support that is provided. This, I think, is another version of the same general question.

There have been a number of administrative positions that have been questioned at various times and, generally speaking, if you look at the individual assignment as such, you have a difficult task of justifying it. For example, someone on one of the committee hearings was questioning the assignment of an historian on a table. Now, part of that perhaps was lack of understanding of what the historian did. It may have been a poor choice of title for the position.

Actually, it turned out, as I recall, that this man was not an historian exactly, but he was a combination of technical and operational intelligence. He gathered together all of the experiences of the organization and evaluated it to see what could be done to do a better job. The actual history was a by-product of operations. But, the only purpose for having the man was to evaluate what was going on in terms of what should be transmitted back up the chain of command as suggestions to do the job better.

You could say, "Take the man out," and it would slow down the compilation and transmission of the current experience of the unit because the operations people were busy in the day-to-day conduct of the fight. It would slow down getting that material in a form that was usable and transmitted back up the line. The operations people were too busy to do this type of work because their energies were concentrated on the day-to-day actions that they had to take care of. It is a question as to whether it is worth the work of one man to get that type of material collected and transmitted back.

In some of these areas, as I mentioned earlier, in a sustained state of readiness, it is a debatable question as to how many people should be around because you just haven't enough work to do to keep them all busy. A standard table is primarily for working 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and our general training activities are running 5½ days at 8 to 10 hours a day. You just can't keep that number of people in a war too busy.

Those criticisms come from a lot of letters saying, for example "We have three men in the supply room and one of them could do all the work with one hand tied behind his back." But, as a more specific example, we have sheet metal workers in fighter units. Sheet metal workers are there on the basis that airplanes will get holes shot in them, and for a time, at least, over in Korea our airplanes weren't getting shot up too much. Consequently, there were too many sheet metal workers for the work to be done. No one seems to know exactly

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how many sheet metal workers you need until they start counting the bullet holes that they have to patch up. There is, I think, a more fruitful area in the organizational structure and certain procedures that grow out of it that generate the need for those people.

The Citizens Advisory Committee and the staff to help them are already set up, and the general scheme of operation is that the services will be the primary agent for doing the work under the guidance of the committee. The chairman for that committee has not been selected yet. It is a tough job, and if you approach it scientifically you ought to define how the next war is going to be fought and then design your organization tables to fit it. But I think we are probably going to have to do something more practical in the way of making adjustments for the period of sustained readiness.

As I said before, my personal opinion would be that you can do that by applying "cut sheets" to our existing tables and by streamlining the administrative part. Leave all the combat elements alone, and train those elements, and to the extent administrative work was necessary, do it as an additional duty.

COLONEL NORMAN: I am sorry, gentlemen, our time doesn't permit us to go on with this very interesting discussion period. Thank you very much, General Lynch, for the very able manner in which you have covered this phase of the manpower problem. We appreciate your generosity with your time. This is the third time the General has been over this year. We appreciate it very much.

GENERAL LYNCH: Thank you.

(16 Jan 1953--350)A/G/rrb.

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