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DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING OF STRATEGIC PLANS
BY THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

18 November 1952

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**DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING OF STRATEGIC PLANS
BY THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF**

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COLONEL MARTZ: Admiral Hague, and gentlemen: In beginning your study of requirements, it is necessary that you have a basic understanding of the plans upon which the requirements are generated, and how these plans are developed and tested before approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and distribution to the military services for the voluminous and detailed work involved in service plans.

Our subject today is particularly timely, since the Joint Chiefs of Staff have recently approved a program for planning for their organization. I feel sure that your reading assignment of this Joint Chiefs of Staff paper has caused many questions to arise in your minds. Now is your opportunity to get the answers.

Colonel Paul D. Berrigan, Assistant Deputy Director of the Joint Logistic Plans Group of the Joint Staff, has kindly consented to come over and discuss these matters with us this morning. As you have observed from his biography, Colonel Berrigan is a graduate of the National War College, and so he is not a stranger in these halls.

It is a pleasure for me to present Colonel Berrigan.

COLONEL BERRIGAN: Admiral Hague, gentlemen: Strategic planning has come a long way since George Washington's hastily conceived crossing of the Delaware. The Civil War saw strategic planning advanced at least to the horse-and-buggy stage, even though you recall that Stonewall Jackson vowed that his first council of war with his subordinates would be his last. World War I found us riding the sudden storm in Model-T fashion. By World War II we had reached the era of what might be called the "fluid drive." A recent development in our present concept of strategic planning is a new planning cycle, the era of power steering.

Let me assure you that my remarks do not constitute an indorsement of Fords, Chryslers, or Cadillacs, but serve to emphasize that strategic planning systems, like automobiles, must keep up with the times.

Our subject this morning is a vital one, broad in scope, devised within the framework of law and regulations, and designed for effective direction of the military effort by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It encompasses areas of responsibility far beyond that of the Logistic Plans Group, to which I belong. I know you realize, however, that any one segment of joint strategic planning cannot be properly and fully comprehended unless it is presented in its relationship to the whole.

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Our subject is not only a vital one; it is also as timely as a free ticket to the Army and Navy game, for at least two reasons. A new program for planning within the JCS organization has been recently approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This infant has now begun to take its first steps. By the time you graduate from this College, those of us who assisted at its birth hope it will be walking with some degree of sure-footedness. It is also timely because your Requirements Course began yesterday. Strategic plans generate material and personnel requirements. Therefore, it appears to be appropriate to discuss development of the design and testing of the strategic plans by the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization at this time.

To acquaint you with the planning concept under which the Joint Staff now operates, I am now going to give you a brief description of the organization of the Joint Staff, and follow with a discussion of today's family of strategic plans, their scope, development, and relationship; their supporting logistic and intelligence annexes; and the method of arriving at the logistic implications of one type of plan.


The Joint Chiefs of Staff organization is charged by the National Defense Act of 1947, as amended in 1949, and by various Secretary of Defense directives, with certain responsibilities. Among these duties are: providing adequate guidance for the development of military forces and resources; insuring continuity of the U. S. military planning effort; and assuring close coordination with other governmental planning agencies--such as the Munitions Board and the State Department--and with international planning organizations--for example, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff give joint guidance which enables the Department of Defense to give coordinated military advice to executive and legislative agencies. This insures consistency between dollar appropriations, which affect the availability and utilization of military means as instruments of national policy, and our agreed military strategy designed to give us maximum security at minimum cost.

To accomplish these assigned duties and responsibilities, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are assisted by the Joint Staff. With the help of the organization chart on the following page (chart 1), let us examine these relationships. The chart shows the organization of the Joint Staff and its relationship to the three committees within the Joint Staff structure and to the Joint Strategic Survey Committee. In the area of our discussion today, these are the principal strategic planning tools of the JCS. Other committees of the JCS organization, not shown on the chart, have important contributory roles. The Joint Strategic Survey Committee is composed of two-star officers, one from each service. They are not under the Director of the Joint Staff, as you can see from the chart. They have no Indians. They write their own papers, although they can and do get help from any


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of the agencies in the Joint Staff. They are concerned principally with military-political actions ranging from courses of action in Korea to the military aspects of the Austrian Peace Treaty. The three principal committees of the JCS organization with which we are concerned today are the Joint Strategic Plans Committee, the Joint Logistics Plans Committee, and the Joint Intelligence Committee. Each Committee consists of three service members and a Deputy Director of the Joint Staff.

Under the Joint Chiefs of Staff there is a Director of the Joint Staff--Lieutenant-General Cabell of the Air Force at present--and the three Groups of the Joint Staff, each headed by a Deputy Director--Major General Bradley of the Army for the Strategic Plans Group, Admiral Campbell of the Navy for the Logistic Plans Group, and Brigadier General Porter of the Air Force for the Intelligence Group. The Deputy Directors, who are also members of the Committees just described, are on two-year rotation, and any service is eligible to head any Group.

The Groups act as a working staff of the Director, the Deputy Directors, and the Committees. On board in the three Groups at the present time are about 125 officers, mostly of the rank of colonel, USA or USAF, or captain, USN. The Joint Staff is a planning and policy staff, not a general staff nor an operating staff, as contrasted to the Committees, which are operating staffs as executive agents of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and which operate through the services.

Each of the Groups consists of a Deputy Director, three Assistant Directors (Army, Navy, and Air Force), and a number of functional teams--14 in the Strategic Plans Group, 9 in the Logistic Plans Group, and 7 in the Intelligence Group. There is equal representation, Army-, Navy-, and Air Force-wise, on each team.

Studies are received by the Committee from the Joint Chiefs, usually, and assigned to its Group with an appropriate directive to the cognizant teams. There may be collaboration between two or more Groups. For example: A paper on lines of communication for logistic support of western Europe would be handled probably by the Transportation Team of the Logistic Plans Group in collaboration with the western Europe teams of the Strategic Plans Group and the Joint Military Transportation Committee staff. Another example could be a study on U. S. base requirements in Iceland. This might be assigned to the Joint Strategic Plans Committee, with the Joint Logistic Plans Committee and Joint Intelligence Committee in collaboration. Team solutions are considered by the Group and by the Committee, and are presented finally to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration and approval. Amendment is customary--in fact, the team members allege that their papers are thoroughly mutilated by the time they reach the Joint Chiefs.

Joint outline strategic plans provide the basis for all related plans. They guide the use of military forces and resources to advance our national policies and objectives which will serve as a deterrent to aggression and for conflicts short of global war. They are an adequate basis for immediate military commitments in the event of global war or

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a threat thereof--for example, the deployment of joint task forces to the Middle East--and also serve as an adequate basis for rapid mobilization if war does come.

No single strategic plan can cover all these purposes. Until recently, only two types of strategic plans were prepared. One was the Joint Mid-range War Plan with the D-day three or four years in the future, and the other was the Joint Outline Emergency War Plan. These were not always properly related, and consequently they precipitated crash planning from time to time.

To correct this planning deficiency, three years ago, in 1949, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the Joint Staff to prepare a coordinated program for planning. It applies only to planning by the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization. This program schedules planning cycles in relation to several time periods throughout a span of years. It was approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the 21st of last July, five weeks after reaching them. Since it has been made available for your study, we will hit only the high points, with the expectation of eliciting questions.

It covers three essential time periods: long-range; intermediate, or mid-range; and immediate, or short-range. The long-range period will be covered by a Joint Long-Range Strategic Estimate. This estimate will be predicated on long-term national objectives, intelligence on the predicted strength and capabilities of probable enemy nations, and the anticipated status of future weapons systems and national resources. Broad in scope, it will contemplate virtually the entire world. It will establish generally the probable areas of conflict, the type of war to be expected, and the basic undertakings. It will be the basic strategic guidance which evaluates the strategic effect of long lead-time factors such as the development and production of new weapons. It provides broad guidance to the Munitions Board and to the services on mid-range and short-range planning. It insures orientation of the U. S. military potential towards requirements for the employment of future weapons systems. It projects five years into the future and for five years thereafter, in annual increments. It provides guidance for the mid-range planners for obligations and expenditures on long lead-time items, and it provides guidance for the joint research and development programs so that technology may keep aware of future needs.

The mid-range period is covered by a Joint Strategic Objectives Plan, hereinafter called the "Objectives Plan." This plan narrows somewhat and focuses long-range guidance to fit restrictions imposed by time and material upon the development of military strength, and it reflects more reliable intelligence for the specific period. It is based on requirements limited by present industrial capabilities and on anticipated monetary restrictions. It must be disseminated sufficiently in advance of its

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D-day to permit preparation and processing of service budgets; attainment of the required level of peacetime readiness through the expenditures during the fiscal year prior to its D-day; and determination of total mobilization requirements from D-day to D plus 48 months and the industrial implications thereof.

Mobilization requirements range from undershirts to intercontinental guided missiles. Industrial implementation might involve a decision as to the time when heavy bomber plants should be converted to guided missile plants. Other industrial implications are myriad in number.

The short-range period is covered by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan. Hereinafter we will call it the "Capabilities Plan." This outline plan must be in sufficient detail to permit preparation of supporting plans by the services and by specified commanders. It must be based on strict military capabilities. Its strategic concept must be based on limited specific objectives and the best intelligence for the immediate period.

It must consider only those forces and resources that will exist on the assumed D-day, or which can be feasibly developed from D-day to D plus 48 months. It must be disseminated, with its implementing directive, six months prior to its assumed D-day, in order to permit preparation of supporting plans, that is, the services' plans and the plans of the major commanders. It also must be prepared six months before to permit reallocation of forces by the services and by the unified and specified commanders. I would like to emphasize that we will always fight under the currently effective Capabilities Plan or some modification of it.

To produce a strategic plan, an intelligence estimate is first required. It must be available to the strategic planners before they start writing the strategic plan. It evaluates enemy capabilities on a nonopposed basis. Opposed enemy capability cannot be determined until after the strategic planners develop the initial strategy to counter the enemy's initial actions.

Concurrent with preparation of the strategic plan, the development of joint logistic planning is initiated. This gets close to home for us in the Joint Logistic Plans Group. For the Joint Long-Range Strategic Estimate this guidance will be in the form of a logistic annex. It provides a basis for continuity of logistic support required as the result of technological advances; for example, the provision of trained operators for new weapons.

Logistic guidance for the Objectives Plan is also in the form of an annex. It indicates the necessary logistic actions to provide for peacetime readiness and for mobilization and demobilization planning, such as the industrial reserve program.

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Now, the logistic guidance for the Capabilities Plan is a logistic plan. It indicates the pre-D-day measures to alleviate deficiencies as in the establishment of petroleum mobilization reserves stocks. It insures maximum use of the available logistic structure. It provides guidance for planning so that the logistic pattern best supports the operational pattern.

Joint planning guidance in the Logistic Plan (or Annex) is provided by two means. First is general treatment by reference to sections of "Joint Strategic Policy and Guidance." For example, the use of this in a logistic plan would be to say, "Medical Service, Hospitalization, and the Policies, as set forth in a specified section and chapter, 'Joint Logistics Policy and Guidance' are applicable." I believe there are five copies of this book available in the College library. The distribution is to all planners within the services and to the major commands. The book has been prepared so that all planners can have available the logistic policies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in one document. It is a compilation of approved logistic policies and the assignments of such responsibilities as transportation, port operation, construction, etc. It is applicable to any strategic plan or estimate, and it is relatively static.

The other type of logistic guidance would be detailed guidance within the plan or within the Logistic Annex. These would be subjects not covered by the book "Joint Logistics Policy and Guidance"; for example, on maintenance of naval ships, the guidance would read: "The maintenance of all combat fleets and merchant shipping will be on an austere basis, in proportion to the available mobilization reserve."

Bearing in mind the several types of strategic plans, let us consider the procedure used in their coordinated development. My discussion is based on the type of treatment used on plans now in preparation. Experience may indicate a need for modification. These procedures about to be described have their fullest applicability in relation to the Capabilities Plan.

Referring now to chart 2a (see following page), we see the typical developments of a strategic plan. Action is usually initiated by a directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Joint Strategic Plans Committee, which in turn assigns the project to the Joint Strategic Plans Group, which gives it to the appropriate team. The directive usually specifies the D-day. If it does not, the team recommends one to the Group, and the Joint Strategic Plans Committee approves the D-day.

The basic assumption based on the assumed D-day is formulated; for example: "On or after 1 July 1953 total war has been forced upon the United States and her Allies by acts of aggression committed by Lower

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Slobovia and/or its satellites." Concurrent strategic and logistic planning commences. The Joint Strategic Plans Group team considers basic guidance. It is from basic guidance that we derive out national objectives, our national goals, both in peace and in war. These include: the U. S. Constitution and the Acts of Congress--for example, the Selective Service Act, as it affects the manpower acquisition rate; Presidential directives--for example, the one to the Seventh Fleet to prevent attacks on Formosa; National Security Council policy decisions--for example, a general U. S. objective with respect to Lower Slobovia both in peace and in war should be: "To reduce the power and influence of Lower Slobovia to limits which no longer constitute a threat to peace, national independence and stability of the world family of nations"; international obligations--for example, our commitments to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; announced policies--for example, the speech by the then Secretary of State, Marshall, at Harvard, when he promised aid to the free nations, which became the Marshall Plan.

Special assumptions are formulated by the Joint Strategic Plans Group to answer such questions as: What is the timing of M-day in relation to D-day? What is the political alignment of nations--allied? neutral? enemy? Will we use special weapons? Will the enemy? Will there be any warning of attack?

Basic guidance plus special assumptions are then furnished interested Joint Chiefs of Staff agencies and the planning staffs of the three services to derive:

- a. Combat units availabilities--that is, the force tabs of the services as of D-day with the subsequent monthly build-up.
- b. From the Joint Intelligence Group: intelligence estimates for the period under consideration and information on allied force capabilities.
- c. From the Logistic Plans Group: logistic estimates in regard to our own forces.
- d. From the Research and Development Board: information on the development of new weapons and techniques available for operational use during the period of the plan.

Based on the information received, the Joint Strategic Plans Group prepares a Strategic Estimate--the last one was 160 pages long. It is usually in three sections: intelligence estimate of enemy strategic objectives; the survey of relative war strengths; and finally, an overall allied strategic concept. The strategic concept is subject to concurrence by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee. It is the "decision" of the Strategic Estimate.

Chart 2b (on the following page) shows further steps in the planning progress. The draft estimate is considered by the three collaborating

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committees. Split views on any part of the estimate are submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff at this time for immediate decision. An example of a split would be whether India is going to be ally, enemy, or neutral.

Only a summary of the Strategic Estimate is included in the Strategic Plan--37 pages in the last one. The draft of the plan itself is then begun. Collaboration with the Joint Logistic Plans Group becomes intense at this time, and the development of the logistic implications begins on completion of the draft strategic plan.

I will discuss the logistic implications in more detail a little later. The logistic implications, as agreed by the Joint Logistic Plans Committee, go to the Strategic Plans Committee for consideration, leading to modification of the plan if necessary--for example: rephrasing the force build-up and deployments, or recommending that the Joint Chiefs of Staff accept the plan as written, subject to certain calculated risks--for example: the use of obsolescent equipment in the early phases; accepting overseas requirements being met on a marginal basis; or recommending that the services take action to alleviate deficiencies--for example: increase the aviation gasoline stocks.

The completed plan with its covering recommendations goes to the three Committees for approval. The service members present the service views. As approved by the Committees, the plan is forwarded for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. At this point a later service view may be entered by any of the various Chiefs of Staff. If the plan is approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it is disseminated.

In the case of the Capabilities Plan, a Logistics Plan is developed by the Logistic Plans Committee within 30 days after Joint Chiefs of Staff approval of the Strategic Plan.

This has been a quick outline of the procedure. Within the available time I wish to show you the manner in which this planning procedure is set up time-wise, the interrelationship of the plans, and finally, an outline of the logistic implications testing.

On chart 3 (following page), we see the time schedule for the preparation and Joint Chiefs of Staff action on the three plans. This covers one calendar year. The term "plan" will be used loosely and will include also the Joint Long-Range Strategic Estimate. Two months are allowed for the preparation of the Intelligence Estimates--there are three of them at different times during the year. Four months are allowed for the preparation of the plan for approval by the three committees. Two months are allowed for consideration, noting, or approval and dissemination by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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You will note here the one additional month I spoke of, for the preparation of the Joint Logistics Plan supporting the Strategic Capabilities Plan. This is because of the need for more logistical detail for this plan. Of course, this will fall in January of the subsequent year for the plan that is prepared by the end of the calendar year.

These are our goals, and experience will show how good they are. As I said before, the Chiefs approved this program last July 21, the date when they directed that the completion of the first Objectives Plan would be advanced four months. In other words, it will go to them on 1 January of 1953 with our new mid-term plan. The current mid-term plan is out of date. In the case of the Capabilities Plan, we had a not-too-old emergency war plan, and the Chiefs therefore delayed the completion of the first Capabilities Plan by four months. That is the present status of this planning. It is intended in February to start on the first Long-Range Strategic Estimate.

The program, as I say, has been recently approved. Until the cycle of plans overlap each other, the purposes and advantages of the program cannot be fully realized. This point can be demonstrated on chart 4 (following page). I think in the question period we may bring out some points on this chart in greater detail. Note the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan, and its related Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.

Here we have two related plans--that is, the D-day for both of these plans is 1 July 1956. The Objectives Plan we have broken down to show the preparation period, the budget cycle, and the mobilization planning cycle. After dissemination of the Objectives Plan, the services prepare budgets which are translated into appropriations--a two-year period from the start of the preparation of the budget within the services until the fiscal year when the money appropriated by Congress is available. Thus, this appropriation is received one year prior to the assumed D-day of the plan.

Concurrently, during this two-year period, after approval of the plan, the services operational plans, based on the operational patterns of the Objectives Plan, are prepared. From these are derived the mobilization requirements of the services.

The Munitions Board consolidates the requirements and conducts an industrial feasibility test. The Joint Chiefs of Staff review the results of the industrial feasibility test and thereby derive a feasible build-up of mobilization capabilities for a new and related Capabilities Plan.

Further expenditures and obligations of funds during the fiscal year 1956 result in additional capabilities in the effective period of the related Capabilities Plan.

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The relationships of the plans can be further demonstrated by another chart, number 5 (following page).

Here we see the three ranges of planning depicted in three annual revisions of each type of plan. The first year of the long-range projection is naturally more apparent and firm than the other four years. Therefore, the related mid-range planning can well consider long lead-time requirements beginning in its second year and which have to be reflected in its spending year. In other words, the first of the crosshatch zip-tone block with the second year of the Objectives Plan.

Likewise, tangible gains in capabilities acquired in the first mid-range plan would be reflected in the period of the second revision of the short-range plan.

Also, to repeat what we saw on the preceding chart, the mobilization build-up of the first mid-range plan provides a feasible four-year build-up of the second annual revision of the short-range plan. So you see that the family of plans is in fact a family with interdependent relationships.

Now let us turn to the development of the logistic implications of the Capabilities Plan. The Joint Logistic Plans Group performs a limited logistic implications test of the Capabilities Plan. These tests are limited inasmuch as only six major logistic features are tested by the use of broad planning factors. The capability of industrial productive capacity of the country to meet the requirements of the plan is not fully tested in this study.

Our effort is to find, in advance of the approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of a plan, whether the estimated availabilities are sufficiently close to the logistic requirements. The test indicates the major logistic implications that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should recognize in approving the plan. The Group analyzes the Capabilities Plan in the elements of personnel, supply, transportation, petroleum, aircraft, and construction. These six features have been selected because they are essential logistic aspects of any military undertaking, and any limitation in these features affects the operational capabilities.

The Joint Logistic Plans Group is in on the preparation of the plan, has studied it thoroughly, and determines what logistic assumptions must be made. Factors may be considered assumptions, and there are three broad types of factors--joint factors; those applicable to the three services, such as the amounts of lubricating oil consumed per barrel of gasoline used. Jointly agreed factors are those applicable to one or more of the three services and acceptable to all--such as the personnel factors. Unilateral factors are those applicable to one service, with no requirement for the other two--such as the Army division slice.

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The teams carry out tests with frequent contact between themselves and with the staffs of the three services. The Transportation Team enters the picture first. They take the plan and they develop a logistic area map. This is a map dividing the world up on the basis of shipping lanes. It has no relation to the strategy of the plan or to the command structure. This map is furnished to the other teams.

The Personnel Team next enters the picture. They take this map and they develop it from the major force tabs of the plan. The plan has only divisions and antiaircraft battalions for the Army, major ships for the Navy, and major wings for the Air Force. They develop overseas area and continental U. S. populations. For example, in the division, the overseas for each division in each of these logistic areas would be 45,000 personnel; in the United States for each division overseas, 25,000. But with the use of these broad factors they determine the personnel in each of the logistic areas and in the zone of the interior, phased throughout the period of the plan.

They also determine the over-all personnel requirements, compare them with the availabilities which they receive from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for manpower and personnel, and determine whether or not the personnel requirements over-all can be met. They do not examine whether or not we can meet the specialist requirements. This is left to the services. They give the data on the personnel to the other teams.

The Aircraft Team, taking the carriers on the Navy force tabs and the wings on the Air Force tabs, develops the over-all aircraft requirements on training aircraft and, using approved attrition rates, they compute the aircraft numbers by type. They compare this with what we know of the present and predicted capabilities of our industry and determine whether or not the aircraft requirements can be met. They also furnish information to the Petroleum Team on the number by type of aircraft in the plan, and they furnish to the Transportation Team the number of single-engine aircraft that are required to be deployed overseas and which are incapable of flying the ocean.

The Construction Team examines the plan and determines the requirements for construction and for the over-all construction battalions. They compare the requirements with the availabilities they receive from the services on the engineer aviation battalions, the Navy construction battalions, and the Army construction battalions, and thereby determine whether the construction requirements can be met. They also determine the construction material requirements.

The Material Requirements Team goes to the services for the other supplies, the tanks, the electronics, the clothing, etc., and by contact with the services on the requirements of the plan, they determine whether or not the requirements for other supplies can be met. They

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also, using factors, determine the dry cargo that must be shipped overseas, phased throughout the period of the plan. They turn this dry cargo information, along with the construction requirements, over to the transportation team.

The Petroleum Team, considering personnel factors for utility and motor transport fuels, ship fuel requirements, and aircraft needs for jet fuel and aviation gasoline, determines the petroleum requirements. They also make a study of the crude requirements, the refinery requirements, and refinery capacities, and determine whether or not we can meet the petroleum requirements, both in crude and refined products. They also turn over to the Transportation Team the shipping requirements for both crude and refined products, and provide the construction team with storage and distribution data.

The Transportation Team ends up the show by taking the personnel requirements and determining whether or not there will be sufficient transports or converted passenger liners to move the personnel overseas. The dry cargo and construction material requirements are compared with the availability of cargo ships, to determine if the stuff can be transported. The tankers are measured against petroleum transport requirements, and the aircraft carriers for moving the single-engine aircraft overseas.

By the use of broad factors, they determine whether the Military Air Transport Service, as augmented by civil air transportation, can meet the requirements for air transport. They also make a study of land transportation requirements in the area of combat, and the communication zone shown, to determine whether or not we can meet the requirements for land transport.

The Logistic Plans Team steers the whole implications study and coordinates between the teams. They analyze and summarize the implications as determined by the other participating teams, and then prepare a report listing the broad logistic conclusions.

After Group approval, the report is submitted to the Joint Logistic Plans Committee for consideration. The result of the analysis, as approved by the Committee, is forwarded to the Strategic Plans Committee. The implications are studied, along with the plan, and the plan is either modified in the light of the Logistic Plans Committee's recommendation, or the facts of these logistic implications are noted, and certain calculated risks may be acknowledged.

See chart 6, which shows schematically the procedure (page 19).

A report, with the logistic implication as a major conclusion, together with the plan, is forwarded to the three Committees for approval, and is finally sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval.

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Now, Gentlemen, having led you through the development and testing of joint strategic plans, I would like to summarize briefly the salient points covered.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff organization is charged with the responsibility for continuity and coordination of the U. S. military planning effort. The organization is designed functionally to discharge effectively that responsibility. The Program for Planning has been developed to fill the need for continuous and coordinated effort in joint strategic planning.

The family of strategic plans is closely interrelated and interdependent in terms of time spans, phased mobilization requirements related to economic capabilities, and the strategic employment of military forces and facilities in being. Intelligence, strategy, and logistics are inseparable components of military planning. Close coordination and cooperative effort within the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization and with the military services are necessary throughout the entire planning process.

Finally, logistic implications must be studied apace with the development of a strategic plan, for no strategic plan, no matter how brilliant, can succeed without the necessary resources to execute it.

I thank you.

QUESTION: How about these tests? What do they consist of, the feasibility tests?

COLONEL BERRIGAN: Well, we have factors that we use. For example, in airplanes, and the amount of gasoline they consume, we have factors on the B-36 activity rate, and for each B-36 that is in action under the plan, there will be so many barrels of aviation gasoline consumed; and it is just a matter of multiplying out the number of aircraft times and amount of gasoline per aircraft, and adding them all up.

COLONEL MARTZ: What is your time on that now, Colonel Berrigan?

COLONEL BERRIGAN: We try to do it in two to three weeks. The plan is four months in preparation and approval by the Committees, and we, of course, come in when they have the plan in what we call a flimsy form, as soon as the force tabs, concept, etc., are in the plan. You have that subject ahead of you--we have gone through it many times now. I think you are going to become thoroughly familiar with detailed implications testing next April, and you will get thoroughly confused, in arithmetic, at least, the first few days.

QUESTION: What does the cut in the budget presented to Congress do to the feasibility test?

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COLONEL BERRIGAN: Well, we work through the programs and estimated appropriations. Of course, we have to anticipate what programs will be in the budget, and if we get considerably less money, why the plan becomes less feasible.

QUESTION: When does your plan show the revision? Assuming you have a considerable cut, and assuming that they stretch it out, based on some higher authority which does not tie into the original plan at all, as I understand it--when does your revision reflect those things?

COLONEL BERRIGAN: The Chiefs approve the force tabs twice each year. The Chiefs approve the short-range plan. When they approve the plan, the services go ahead with their supporting plans. Six months later the Chiefs revise and reapprove the force tabs part of the plan, so every six months we are taking a picture of the force tabs. It is every year that we bring out a new plan.

QUESTION: My question is, does that affect only the short-range plan?

COLONEL BERRIGAN: That is only the short-range plan. We always fight under that. You will note here we fight under the plan that is developed and approved here (see chart 4). The service plans are approved here (indicating). That is what we will fight, up to this period (indicating), although during the most of the period we are developing a new plan. In fact the Chiefs have approved a new plan, but the services have not developed the service and unified command plans for another six months. It doesn't take effect until the end of this six months' period.

QUESTION: You mentioned that the teams under the Joint Logistic Plans Group test the requirements to see if they can be met. I wonder how that ties in with the feasibility test of the Munitions Board. Is it sometimes the same thing, or is one a long-range and one a short-range?

COLONEL BERRIGAN: That's right; the Capabilities Plan we test, and the mid-range plan is the one the Munitions Board tests. They test the feasibility of the industrial capacity to meet the future requirements in the Objectives Plan, and this short-range plan is strictly based on the present capabilities of industry.

QUESTION: In other words, that is not through the Munitions Board?

COLONEL BERRIGAN: No, sir, although we get certain factors from the Munitions Board that deal with current production--they're their form 436's--they show what they can do with current production if the bell rings. But it is not related to mobilization planning.

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QUESTION: You mentioned that the long-range plan is based on the requirements in this directive that they write. To what extent does the Intelligence Estimate influence your requirements?

COLONEL BERRIGAN: First I would like to say, we have now started work on developing the first Long-range Strategic Estimate--we have never had one--I think I ought to bring that out. We are going to start sometime--I believe it is in February or March of next year. This chart (pointing to chart 5), shows when we are starting. This will be the first one of these. We don't start work on it until next February in the Strategic Plans Group, and what we have to work on is entirely what you have in the program for planning. We are not too familiar with how it will develop. We are hoping to get some idea of the guided missiles and those things that will be developed that are now in the research and development stage. In five years from now--we are going to have these intercontinental guided missiles, for example. How many do we want five years from now?

QUESTION: Colonel Berrigan, you lost me on one turn when you were going over this chart (chart 5).

COLONEL BERRIGAN: That's why I put it out here this time.

QUESTION: If you look at the vertical column, CY 1957, as shown on your chart, I think you can answer my question. At that time in the future--if all goes according to intentions here--would there be nine plans in evidence and batting around, or would there be only three?

COLONEL BERRIGAN: Well, there would be nine in various stages. Let's put it that way. Maybe there's one that is just going out, one just about to come in, one probably just starting to be prepared. Let's take CY 1957, this one here (indicating). This is the spending period for the Objectives Plan prepared back here in the end of 1953 and not approved until probably the first of 1954. This one (indicating) would have been prepared, and the services would be going through the budget cycle, and this one here (indicating) would be in the process of preparation. So there are lots of plans in various stages.

QUESTION: Maybe I didn't make my question clear. What I am curious about is--if you look at the top three, the three long-range plans, in 1957, would the third one, the lowest of those three lines, be the one you are currently discussing, and would the other two be discarded, or, as you visualize it, would all three be still batting around?

COLONEL BERRIGAN: No; in the case of the long-range plan, in 1955, when this one was approved here, (indicating the third line) that would be the one that is in action, and it is dealing with an effective period five years from then, and those others would be out of the picture,

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because they would have been revised and replaced by their subsequent revision.

QUESTION: My question is somewhat along the same line. In an attempt to visualize this thing, can you put your short-range plan, your mid-range plan, and your long-range plan on the same horizontal axis, that is, one right after the other, and consider they all together represent the over-all plan, that one is simply a continuation of the others? Or are they three separate and distinct plans?

COLONEL BERRIGAN: They are three separate and distinct plans, and they have three different purposes. One is to see what you are going to do years from now; the objective of one is to get your budget and your mobilization planning properly related; and the lower one is the plan you have so you will always have a plan, based on capabilities, on which to fight, so you can know what your capabilities are and what your plan is if war comes at any time.

QUESTION: I am wondering, when you finish these plans do you have some idea of how much money it is going to cost to implement each plan in each successive year? Is that information available?

COLONEL BERRIGAN: Well, of course, in this one here (indicating short-range) the Chiefs are approving the plan at the beginning of a calendar year, and they have some idea of the money they are going to have during this fiscal year, so you know about the time you have it approved how much money you are going to have to spend and whether or not you can carry out the plan.

In these other ones, you anticipate how much money Congress is going to give you. You work through the cycle and come up with a budget and hope it will go through Congress. There's a dollar sign on the Objectives Plan, because that's the one in which you really ask for the dollars.

As you know, the services spend a whole year working up the budget. It goes through to the Advisory Committee, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and, finally, the Bureau of the Budget. About January it goes to Congress and the congressional committee. So it is about two years from the time they start putting figures on paper until they get the money.

QUESTION: Looking at the CY 1955, mid-range and short-range plans, you say that the tweed zipatone part that you are working on in 1955 Objectives Plan for 1956 will eventually, or a year later, become the short-range plan?

COLONEL BERRIGAN: No.

COLONEL MANN: May I add one thing to that? It won't become the short-range plan, but it increases your capability. It has bearing on it, although it does not in itself become the short-range plan.

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COLONEL BERRIGAN: It will permit you to write a better short-range plan, because it increases capabilities.

QUESTION: When you are in the process of testing the Capabilities Plan, you state you are testing it against the potential capability of the industrial economic system. Where do you get the capability on petroleum? Do you get it from some other source, and the manpower from Mrs. Rosenberg, or does someone give you the whole thing in one package?

COLONEL BERRIGAN: No, we work with the Petroleum Administration for Defense; we work closely with them on petroleum. On personnel we get curves from Mrs. Rosenberg's office that indicate how many people will go into military service. They are reviewed by the Munitions Board to determine that they are not putting everyone in uniforms, so they will have a few left in industry to produce tanks.

QUESTION: Do all these factors come from the Munitions Board?

COLONEL BERRIGAN: They took personnel away from the Munitions Board and gave them to Mrs. Rosenberg. Originally, there was a Munitions Board Personnel Committee. Some things come directly from the services, and they work through the Munitions Board. The colonel up there can give you a better answer than I can.

COMMENT: The petroleum answer is worked out with the Petroleum Committee. The manpower answer is worked out with the Munitions Board and Mrs. Rosenberg's office. All the rest is gotten from the services, and whom they get it from, I don't know.

QUESTION: Colonel, I noticed on one of these charts which you introduced before, that before the plan is finally approved, it goes to service committees for comments.

COLONEL BERRIGAN: That's right.

QUESTION: Is there any reason for that?

COLONEL BERRIGAN: We have a committee which has the services represented on it. Ours is Logistic Plans Committee. Service representatives are from G-4 (Plans Office) of the Army, DCS/M of the Air Force, and OPS 40 of the Navy. They bring in the service view at the Committee level. When the paper gets to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, someone, usually the Army member of our Committee, briefs General Collins, and if General Collins doesn't quite agree with something in the paper after the Committee man had agreed to it, General Collins at the Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting can bring in the Army view again. In other words, the top service comments were the comments of the Chiefs themselves in the Chiefs meeting. The lower, service comments are in the Committee where we bring in the service views and mutilate, as I said, the group papers.

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QUESTION: Once these plans are completed, what distribution will be made of them?

COLONEL BERRIGAN: The Emergency War Plan would go to all the unified commanders and specified commanders and services, and then extracts would go to the Munitions Board and the Research and Development Board on a "need to know" basis. In other words, the people who need the whole plan, i. e., the services and unified major commands and specified commands, get the whole plan. Others get extracts on what they need to know from the plan.

QUESTION: Colonel Berrigan, you are familiar with this background, but I might just repeat it for the benefit of the students. About July the Munitions Board made a presentation to the Joint Chiefs which demonstrated that more consideration should be given in planning for the economic capacity of the country to support a plan in order to avoid doing a lot of elective planning and coming up with a plan which turned out to be completely infeasible.

As a result of that activity stirred up by the Munitions Board, the Office of Defense Mobilization, Defense Production Administration, and National Security Resources Board, and the civilian mobilization planning agencies are very much excited by the so-called new approach or mobilization-based program which the Munitions Board calls the mobilization production program. This is designed to attack this problem from the resources end, the resources availability end, rather than from the requirements end.

The question which I would like to ask is, which one of these plans of the Joint Staff will be affected by the estimates which the civilian planning agencies and the Munitions Board develop as to the actual capabilities of the country?

COLONEL BERRIGAN: I didn't go into that subject. I understand General Metejka is coming over here in a couple of weeks and he will go thoroughly through the mobilization production program. But as to this plan here, if you want my opinion of what our troubles are in developing a requirements plan, we can write all kinds of adjectives in a plan, "modest," "austere," "meager," but the only adjective anyone seems to understand is the dollar sign, and this mobilization production program is getting the dollar sign into the plan as you come down to lower and lower levels of planning. If a man is trying to figure out whether he wants two undershirts or three, and he may decide three is a modest figure, but if you give him a dollar sign and tell him he has only 80 cents for undershirts, he can come up with a figure to two.

We are hoping that in our planning for how our country can produce the requirements for an Objectives Plan we will approach some degree of feasibility, so that the dog can see and smell the bone, and it is not five miles away.

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QUESTION: You indicated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Joint Staff are planners and not operators; still they turn out war plans. If an emergency came up in which one of these plans had to be implemented and outlined in its basic form, it seems to me there would be a lot of questions and decisions that would come to the Joint Staff level for decisions. That, it seems to me, would turn the planners into operators, if indeed they are not already operators. Will you comment on that?

COLONEL BERRIGAN: Under the unified command we have other executive agents. For example, in Europe, through the Chief of Staff of Army to General Ridgeway, the Army Staff operates General Ridgeway, and General Ridgeway is the Joint Commander. He commands everything in Europe. They are the operators. Although we go through the Joint Chiefs and develop joint plans, General Ridgeway, through General Collins, would do all the executing of them. Does that answer it?

QUESTION: I can't quite visualize it that way. Perhaps it will work out that way.

COLONEL BERRIGAN: That's the way it is designed to operate. We complete a plan; it goes to the commanders in the Army; they send it to General Ridgeway. It is up to him to carry out the plan. He is the operator.

QUESTION: Those blocks are still bothering me. Take the tweed zipatone in the first bar of the block mid-range plan--to what crosshatch zipatone block does that relate? I understand it is your procurement plan, when you delegate and expend funds, and expect to receive something in return. Your Capabilities Plan is what you are capable of doing today. When the crosshatch zipatone block begins, it is the effective period. They could not relate one above the other in top bars of the plans. You don't have the things in that way. You have a procurement lead time of maybe two years.

COLONEL BERRIGAN: That is true. Under this plan we write the plan during this period based on strict capabilities, but the capability is related to the hot line that is producing tanks. In other words, we can speed that tank production up. We have the money to speed it up, and we can get more tanks because we have some money six months before. When we are writing the plan, we take into consideration the fact that we are to spend this money; it gives us increased capabilities.

QUESTION: You relate the tweed zipatone block in 1956-1957 to the crosshatch zip tone in 1957-1958.

COLONEL BERRIGAN: That's right; this one here (pointing to the tweed zipatone block of the second bar of the mid-range plan) you show up in here (pointing to the crosshatch zipatone block on the third bar of the short-range plan). Long lead times things won't show up; but you have at least got the money and are spending it, maybe for things you started two years before.

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COMMENT: That's what I thought it was; one year later.

COLONEL BERRIGAN: That's right.

QUESTION: Is there any effort made to coordinate your budget directive with your plan?

COLONEL BERRIGAN: Oh, yes. In other words we are going to start drawing a plan. We have to anticipate what kind of money we are going to get out of Congress. In other words, a plan we would write along here (indicating "Mid-Range Planning") would be based on how industry can grow with more money, and what we are going to get out of Congress. But a plan you would write here, an Objectives Plan, would have bigger force tabs and a shorter war period than what you would write here (indicating "Short-Range Planning"). That is based on capabilities.

COMMENT: That would permit getting a budget directive out a year in advance, in lieu of the present way of getting it out the day before you need the budget.

COLONEL BERRIGAN: Of course, there's supposed to be a budget cycle. It takes a year getting the information from the services, and then it goes to the Bureau of the Budget. There's a two-year period from the time they put down figures on the service level and finally get the money. What we are trying to do is give them strategic guidance for budgetary planning.

QUESTION: Is it worked out with the Bureau of the Budget for this plan?

COLONEL BERRIGAN: No; the Bureau of the Budget enters the cycle in somewhere in the middle of this block (indicating block "Preparation and Support of Budget"). We anticipate what the Bureau of the Budget will do. I don't think the strategic planners would go and ask the Bureau of the Budget how much money we are going to get two years from now.

QUESTION: Do you figure on going into war, if it happens, with the Capability Plan? The Capability Plan is based on money you actually receive?

COLONEL BERRIGAN: That's right.

QUESTION: You are not going into war with the mid-range or long-range requirements. The Capabilities Plan is predicated on when you have the money.

COLONEL BERRIGAN: These plans are to see what we can do with industry and how much money we ought to have to give us a better military posture

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two or three years from now. You can't do it in five minutes. You have to ask for appropriations, and you have to do that at least two or three years in advance.

QUESTION: In the last budget cycle, which started just before most of the students got into school, I noted that the first guidance seemed to come from the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The comptroller put out a piece of paper showing what the services were supposed to do with the budget. Do you anticipate that when your plan gets far enough along OSD planners will use your plan as basic guidance? That is something within the Defense Department that can be straightened out?

COLONEL BERRIGAN: One of the purposes of the program for planning is to get some strategic guidance into budgetary planning, which we have not had before except on a crash basis. In other words, that is one purpose of the Objectives Plan. One of the two purposes is to get some budgetary planning tied into strategic guidance.

COLONEL MARTZ: Colonel Berrigan, it would be a gross understatement to say you have given us something to think about. On behalf of the Commandant, I want to thank you for this presentation this morning.