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MANPOWER IN ECONOMIC MOBILIZATION

11 September 1953

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MANPOWER IN MOBILIZATION

11 September 1953

COLONEL VAN WAY: Admiral Hague, Gentlemen of the Industrial College, and Visitors: This session this morning marks the formal opening of the Manpower Unit of the course of Economic Mobilization on which you are now well embarked. In a real sense, however, the course on manpower has started earlier than this. You have been hearing much about manpower during your economics and other parts of the Orientation Unit. In a like manner you will continue to hear much about manpower after we reach our formal closing on November 13 next.

That is merely one way of saying that the Economic Mobilization Course is all one course. It has many units in it, but no one of them can be completely isolated from the others.

Now, looking over the problems of the whole Economic Mobilization Course, we find considerable similarity in the way it is broken down and the way in which we have, for instructional convenience, broken down our Manpower Course. That breakdown of our Manpower Course into seven areas occurred to us as being a rather convenient way to outline this talk, so the talk this morning will follow pretty much the framework of our whole Manpower Course.

As you see from your curriculum book, we started with a short course in Management, which is a course in executive development. We then take up the matter of resources, an outline of demographic facts. Following that we consider requirements. This is a review of the way in which we equate what we have with what we will need in the way of manpower. Following that we will take up the matter of improving the potentialities of our people, and we consider how best to utilize and conserve our people and the efforts in their work.

All of those last ones are carried on concurrently. I might say that Management is a short part of this over-all unit and is completed early in the unit; but the other parts of it, the other areas, are carried on concurrently. With them we will take up the matter of industrial relations, and the talk this morning will be closed with a discussion of the powers of manpower mobilization agencies.

To go back to the management part of our unit, as we have said, that is a short course of five days. You will be divided up for case discussions into eleven committees to which you have been assigned since you have been here. Your instructors will be eleven members of the faculty who have had special training in this particular work directed toward this particular part of our course. They will meet with you this afternoon at four o'clock and will give you certain information about procedures.

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The course and its philosophy will be opened on Tuesday by the Commandant, Admiral Hague, so I will not at this time take any more time to explain the course.

Let us now go right into the matter of resources. This is one of the fundamental parts of our whole Manpower Unit. Many of you I am sure read last month that just a month ago yesterday the population of this nation passed the 160 million mark. Through the courtesy of a rather indulgent car pool, I was able to go down to the Department of Commerce this morning. In the lobby there's a big gimmick which shows, by flashing lights and other devices, the occurrence of births, deaths, immigrants, and emigrants in this country, and it gives a net running account of that on a gimmick like a mileage indicator at the top of this thing. It ticks off, second by second, the population of the United States.

So here is what we have: (Writes on the blackboard) 160,302,738. That is projected forward to this minute, 34 minutes after ten. That is a net that grows out of this: (Writes) B - 8 sec; D - 21 sec; Imm - 2 min; Em - 17 min.

We have a birth every eight seconds, a death every 21 seconds, an immigrant every two minutes, and--oddly enough, it surprised me too--an emigrant every 17 minutes. The net result of that is an increase every 12 seconds of one. That goes on around the clock. That means that we are increasing in the neighborhood of well over 200,000 a month. For the engineers I might say, if this was exactly accurate it would be 216,000. That will save your working that out. Actually, it amounted to something like 300,000 this last month, according to the estimates, and chances are that before the year is out the increase for the year will be in the order of about three million. That is considerably more than we have ever had before.

We take this: 1930 - 121 million; 1940 - 131 million; 1950 - 151 million. In 1930 we had 121 million. We gained ten million during that decade, because we had a rather low birth rate. We will have more to say about that later on, about the effect it had on our population. Then we doubled the increase during the war years, during the period of prosperity. We had a relatively heavy increase due mostly to the increase in the birth rate, with the accompanying decrease, somewhat, in the death rate. That is an increase of two million a year and, as I said, we are now running up to about three million.

Now, these figures are interesting enough to us and we have to know something about them so that we can make our plans work out. Actually, we are not sure whether this is a big figure or a small one. In fact it is small in some respects; if you compare it with the world figure of 2½ billion, it is only about seven percent. You recall that Hendrik Van Loon

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several years ago put out a remark that all the people in the world could be put in a cube with a half-mile on the edge, and if that cube could be thrown over into the Grand Canyon, it would disappear out of sight. Since we have only seven percent of the world population, we are not very big in that sense. If you think about how many people a million people are, however, it presents a different picture.

Very few of us have seen a million people. If you were ever at Times Square on New Year's Eve, you might have seen it. We don't very often see a million people, though. It's even hard to visualize what 160 million is.

Let's break those down into some more manageable proportions. We are using them in the labor force. Let's break them down to something that has to do with the labor force.

I have a very simple chart here; I hesitate a little bit to show it to you. It is not complicated enough to call a chart, but we will work on it. I will have a more complicated one for you later. This is for definition purposes only. These definitions are admittedly arbitrary. We get them from the place where we get our labor statistics, the Bureau of the Census. I don't hold much brief for the definitions, and offer them only to insure that we will all be talking about the same thing when we use these terms.

DISPLAY DEFINITION CHART (see page 4)

Two of the main terms we have are "labor pool," by which we mean all people over 14 who are capable of useful work. Here we have them represented by these two colored blocks. That leaves these people over five that we have indicated more somberly by the black. They're consumers, such as youngsters under 14, those people in institutions, which is a euphemism we use to indicate jails and hospitals for the incurable. Those are the people we presume are not making any useful contribution in the way of work.

To go over to the labor pool, we divided that again into the "labor force," which includes those people we already defined as being over 14, who are at work, looking for it, or working for themselves, like farmers or private business men, or who are employed in some other way.


That leaves the blue outfit here. When we named that, apparently we had very little imagination left. We call that "those not in the labor force." Some people call that the "labor reserve." Let us stick to this, "those not in the labor force, but in the labor pool." That definition leaves us with those over 14 who are not working. They are mainly housewives; about 37 million are housewives; the rest are students.

Let us look again a little bit at those in the labor force. Before I do so, let me hasten to assure this audience, which I had forgotten for

CHART 1

U. S. POPULATION

SEPTEMBER 1953



the moment was a military audience, that I didn't mean anything by putting those two together (Unemployed and Armed Forces). Actually, we put them there for statistical convenience. Sometimes you will read "civilian labor force," and sometimes plain "labor force" that has excluded the armed forces. You have to be careful in reading any statistics about the labor force to be sure whether it includes either or both. I have included both.

That has shown us some information. I might say before I leave it that this population over here changes, and I might check that again. This would come up now to about 160,302,755 (writes on the blackboard). Don't bother to remember those numbers. If you can think of these as percentages, that will help you. They're fairly stable. Think of 40, 30, 30. That's about what it is. They can be varied, as we will discuss later on. This was raised to about 50 percent during World War II. (Pointing to Labor Force.)

We have an area that is going to go into this rather thoroughly, not only the national pattern but the world population as well. That area will be under the supervision of Mr. Al Maserick.

DISPLAY PYRAMID CHART (see page 6)

This will give us a little more information about the same labor force we have been talking about. This manpower pyramid represents the same 160 million people we are interested in, and shows that figure broken down by age groups and by sex. It is in five-year age groups, which are indicated on this left side here and shown by the length of these bars, showing the men on the right and the women on the left. As I said, they're shown by the length of the bars, and they are measured against numbers indicating millions at the bottom. They show how many there are in each of these five-year age groups.


Popularly, this chart is sometimes called a Christmas Tree. More technically, it is known as an sliding bar chart or sometimes paired bar. The pyramid is good enough for us.

There are some things we can see on the black chart before we cover it up. First, we are concerned with the effect of our mortality and birth rates, as indicated by this slope up here. Not the angle of the slope, because that angle is determined by the accident of the selection of scales here, but rather by whether or not the curve of the slope here is convex, as this is, slightly, or whether it is concave.

A nation like India, which has a high birth rate and a relatively short life expectancy, a high mortality rate, will have lots of kids shown here on the base, and they will die off fast. The more hardy souls will live on as long as our people do. With them it has a deeply concave effect.

CHART 2

U.S. MANPOWER MOBILIZED FOR WAR
1953



With a population such as ours, which has a much longer life expectancy and a much lower mortality rate and a moderate birth rate, we have this tendency to be somewhat convex. But there's a hooker here. This is the important thing to get from this picture. These two concave portions here, which are symmetrical on either side, are caused by the low birth rate I spoke to you about occurring in the thirties, the lowest being in 1933, when we reached the low birth rate of about 18.4 per thousand per year. That dent in here should be the kids who weren't born during the thirties. That will be with us from here on out for probably the next century. It will be of less importance, of course, after forty or fifty years. It has to be there; it's affecting us even now.

One more thing we might look at--those of you on the flanks perhaps can't see it too well, but it is here, slightly. You will notice where the World War I veterans are, up along here, we cannot see too much difference in the figures of the men and women, but if we come down where the World War II veterans are, we will notice there's a marked difference in this chart here, which we think probably is explained by the 130,000 to 150,000 casualties that can be properly attributable to the war deaths.

Now we will take this off (takes off the black cover) and have a look at the labor force. The labor pool will come first. There's the blue labor pool, which actually includes all our workers, both the blue and the red sections there. It shows where it is placed in there by age.

I would like to call attention to this projection down here, which is caused by the fact that our definition, you will recall, had the labor pool starting at 14, whereas my convention here has this running from 10 to 15. So here's the group between 14 and 15, but you can see the rest of it where the consumers are, most of them, down here under 14. The rest of them are around the fringes of the other.

Now let's take this off and have a look at the labor force. (Takes off the blue cover.) By the same token, we have this same little group down here, mostly farm kids, or kids working part time, enough to be counted in the labor force.

The main thing I would like to suggest to you at the moment is this. You will notice about 28 percent of the labor force are women, which works out that about one-third of the women are in the labor force. Now, that's important, because it shows immediately where we can turn for our first ready reserve of labor force, of workers right in this area here. We will talk about that a little more, later.

The next thing I think we are concerned with is the relationship of the armed forces to this picture as we have it. Of course it is something we can worry ourselves to death about, about whether it is going to be five million or 20 million or some other number. Let's go back

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and take a historical figure we will not have to worry about. Let's take as a figure the maximum amount we had in the armed forces in World War II, in August 1945, we had 12 million. Let's take that 1945 figure and go ahead and show just how such a force would look in a present-day labor force. This is by the same scale. (Puts a white overlay on the chart.)

I think it shows rather clearly that right at the time we decide to make the most demands on our labor force for increased production, that is just the time we take right out of the heart of the labor force a large segment of their strength. That is the basic situation on which all of our manpower policies and all of our planning must start. That's the main thing we want you to get out of this particular picture.

Now, before we go on, let's keep this figure up to date. (Writes on the blackboard) 160,302,905. I sometimes wonder if the Kinsey report was really necessary.

We have a problem now that we will work on, this matter of equating these requirements, such as the armed forces to the manpower we have. That area will be under the supervision of Commander Mickey Reeves.

Now, let's consider what we can do to help us match up these things in the way of making some of the shifts which you can see must be necessary on this figure. Obviously, when mobilization comes on us in a hurry, we have to do it with what we have when we start if we cannot find new sources, new resources. Of course we have this continual increase. We can rely on that. But there are other things we can do.

We can increase our labor force in numbers. We can also increase the effectiveness of our labor force. We should do both of those concurrently. Let's discuss something about the numbers. We can't be too exact about how many there will be, but I can give you some outside figures.

First, as I said, the ready reserve is right here (women). During World War II we dug up from among the housewives something like five million, and we had essentially not quite as many as are here, but almost the same number. That, I would say, would be probably the base figure that we could start with. We feel that, if the urgency was great--it wasn't too great in World War II--we could do better than that. There are 37 million. Obviously we can't put them all to work, because of this bunch down here, because of their home responsibilities. But there are about 18 million housewives who do not have youngsters under six. We suggest that we could make appropriate provision for their training, and enable them to accomplish their household responsibilities. With child-care centers and that sort of thing we can get useful work out of many of those women. How many I would suggest depends pretty much on the degree of the urgency. We have there a rather wide guess between five million, which we did have before, and a possible 18 million from this one source here.

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What other sources do we have? There are several very much smaller sources. Here are the students down here, young men who probably will be coming into the labor force here. We can hasten that, and increase our numbers a little bit. We can't do it without considering the cost--at least, we should not do it without carefully considering the cost in loss of education. If we are going to take the long view, we must consider that. During World War II we did get about seven million from there in the period of four years, many of whom would have come into the labor force anyway, had there not been a war. We know we can get a matter of a few million from that source.

We can delay the retirement of older people, perhaps call some of these people up here back into the labor force. Some of them have skills that could be used, and some could be retrained for new skills.

We have next the handicapped programs being carried on by federal and state authorities, and by private agencies, to the extent that we are returning about 100,000 handicapped people a year to useful work. That program could be carried on, continuing, and probably could be--although it is doubtful--accelerated. We can make gains from that source, although they would be relatively small.

Another source of small gains similar to that is the alien workers. We have itinerant workers who are brought in from time to time, and who amount to perhaps as many as 400,000 on a seasonal basis. Most of these itinerant workers are the farm laborers, who are largely from south of the border. We can expect relatively little further increases here that would be useful for any urgent emergency.

There are other minor sources, but those are the major ones we can consider.

Now we are concerned with the fact that in each case there is the problem of training that comes up. We are going to devote one of our areas this time to the matter of developing their training and education, to the full potentialities of our people. That problem will be under the supervision of Colonel Price.

Now, then, we will take our next step, and consider any given number of people and see how we can improve the effectiveness of that group in the way of production.

First, you have heard discussed by some of the economists this matter of the normal, accepted increase in productivity we have had for the past half-century. We can't measure it too well, but it has run, let us say, between 2-1/2 and 3 percent--the ability of any individual worker to turn out a certain volume of goods. That has been achieved as the result of several factors. Probably the first and most important has been the increased use of power and machinery, which has multiplied our ability to

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produce tremendously. That has continued, and we can fairly well count on it; in fact, we can accelerate that increase.

Another way in which we have improved productivity has been in the field of manufacture, with improved methods and materials.

Lastly, we have improved our management techniques. We feel that this is the most important, although it is not as readily measurable as the improvement in machines and power.

That increase in productivity has been going along regularly. When a war comes along and we have the dislocation of retooling and the moving about of people, it tends to slacken off a bit at first. As the war moves on, if World War II is a suitable example, we can increase the rate above normal, and raise the rate of increase in productivity to 5 or 6 percent. We can count on that pretty well.

There's another aspect--perhaps the quickest way we can increase our output is the obvious way of increasing the work week. Theoretically, if we increase the work week from 40 to 48 hours, that is a 20 percent increase. It can be worked out fairly well that way in practice.

Obviously, there are certain limitations. You can't go much beyond 50 hours a week without running into trouble. Sometimes when you go even to 48 hours you run into the problems of scheduling, maintenance, and things of that sort which will cut down the theoretical increase. But for a ready increase, the increase in work week must be carefully considered.

This matter of gaining full utilization and achieving conservation of manpower is worth to us another area of consideration this year. We have that area under the supervision of Colonel Roy Norman.

We can't get very far in consideration of the efficiency of our labor force without considering the problem of industrial relations. It is a difficult problem for us to consider, I think, because I am sure, as one who has spent his life in the military service, that I share your feeling of exasperation at what sometimes appears to be irresponsible actions on the part of some labor leaders. Be that as it may be, we have a union movement and there are laws on the books which govern the play of power between management and labor, and I think there may be some conclusions we can draw which might be useful now.

In the first place, organized labor does not include all of the labor force. Actually, it includes only 25 percent. We are not sure how many there are. There are conflicting claims which run in the order of 16 to 17 million people who are in the organized labor ranks.

Next, they are not nearly as cohesive in most respects as the labor leaders would sometimes suggest. We have seen that happen from time to

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time. There's internal bickering between labor unions, CIO, AFofL, and the independent unions. There's considerable failure on the part of leaders to be able to defeat people at the polls that they have put the Indian sign on. They're not nearly as cohesive and strong and large as they sometimes claim to be.

However, there are some things on which they are thoroughly agreed. I will take time to mention only one now, which is probably the fundamental accepted premise of the labor movement. It is, the way to achieve settlement of labor-management disputes in this country is through collective bargaining. There are other ways we could do it, of course. We could have government fiat, have some board sitting here in Washington that would settle all those things. We could have a group of management people set up to settle those things, or we could have a group of labor people set up to do that, or we could handle them some other way.

We have worked out in this country, after 100 years of bickering among the unions, we have worked out this way of doing it the democratic way, by having representatives of labor and management sit around a table and settle their differences by collective bargaining. Most differences arise over arguments about pay or some aspect of it. Incidentally, most such problems grow out of this same problem of increased productivity.

How are we going to divide up the returns for the increase in productivity? We have found we can settle most of the arguments by collective bargaining. When that can't do it, there's no recourse except to some sort of strike action. Strikes are always a nuisance. Many of them are spectacular. They're intended that way. A strike nobody knew was happening would not be much of a strike. We are going to have that with us as long as we have labor-management, and we may as well accept that fact.

Where is the place of the military man who is concerned with not losing the output that we have and that he needs for military production? The way in which he can achieve this is by remaining absolutely impartial. We have found time and time again that by being impartial and going to both parties we can get them to settle their differences, at least for military production. Let us see what the cost of labor strikes was during the war. Figures have shown that during the war years, because of the innate patriotism of the people concerned, and the restraints of everybody involved, they were able to hold down labor loss due to strikes to a range of about 9/100 to 45/100 of one percent. That is a very small price to pay for what we are getting out of our labor base.

This thing keeps on going up. (Puts 160,302,955 on the blackboard.)

We do have a problem this year on labor-management relations. This area will be under the supervision of Mr. Sam Hill, and I now introduce him.

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We have one more area we would like to cover briefly. This is pretty brief coverage of all of these areas, as you obviously can tell. We now go into the field of manpower mobilization.

The tendency for many people, when they think about mobilizing manpower, is to immediately think in terms of controls. I don't want to fight words, but to me controls are not too useful in connection with manpower, because, in the first place, the word "controls" has a threatening connotation to many people. To many others it means different things. It means different things to different people. Some people will come up with the slogan, "Freeze everybody," "Work or Fight," "Follow the British System"--whatever those things mean.

It is very difficult to boil down the abstract theory of controls to something which is really practical. The idea of having everybody rush immediately to wartime posts is fine. Everybody agrees with the ideal or objective. It is when you come to convert that slogan type of objective to a practical, bona fide work measure that you find yourself in serious difficulties.

Now, we do have certain things we can do. I might say, before I go into those, that we have a real, live control on our hands right now. Despite my distrust of the term "control" I don't know a better word to apply to it--that is, Selective Service. That is a control if there ever was one. Actually, it is conscription for military service. In this country it sounds better to say selective service. We have that because it is pretty well accepted by the people for about three reasons, which I might mention.

First: People recognize the need for selective service.

Next: They have confidence in the administration of selective service. There has never been any really serious scandal in the national administration of selective service, at least within recent memory. People have a feeling toward selective service somewhat like they have for the FBI. It has general respect; however, it does not necessarily have the affection of the people.

Last: And perhaps the most fundamental reason for general acceptance is that the difficult decisions made in selective service are decentralized into the local communities and are made by unpaid, voluntary citizens.

There is much I can say about selective service, but I don't want to tell you now. It will be told to you better Monday by General Hershey when he talks to you.

I want to continue a little bit on the subject of what we can do about manpower should the emergency come to us. I think the over-all type of thing, such as the blueprint planning in great detail, won't work. We don't know enough about where our people are. We don't know enough about what they can do to enable us to make a final blueprint. Nor do we know

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enough about what sort of requirements are going to be placed against our manpower. Undoubtedly, to handle such a thing, what we can do is set up certain principles.

First: Our basic approach is that our best foundation, or best base for mobilization of manpower is a full-employment situation in a growing economy. Now, the necessary thing is, we can follow certain principles of handling manpower by setting up policy groups which will set up plans and policies beforehand so that when the punch comes they can be implemented by the many operating or using agencies of manpower. ODM has set up in their deliberations in the past two or three years a set of principles on which we can base such operations. They have been enunciated in their quarterly reports. You will find them worthwhile reading.

Some of them have to do with the necessity for identifying what needs to be done, that is, what we need for training people who need training, or training people with skills to have additional skills; for localizing sources of information on employment and so on. Those are the principles on which the operations they suggest are based. The operations actually will be carried out by using or operating agencies, such as the Labor Department, the Department of Defense, the Civil Service Commission, and many state and other similar agencies.

But we do not seem to go along with the idea of one central agency which will somehow have the knowledge to go out and make this outline which just is not going to be used.

So much for the area of manpower mobilization. I would like now to introduce to you Mike Poluhoff, who will be concerned with that area in our studies.

Just to be sure I haven't confused you by running through these seven areas rather loosely: The first area, the one on management, will be carried on, as I say, in the next two weeks.

The other six areas of resources, requirements, developing the full potentialities of our people, the matter of utilization and conservation of our people's energies, our industrial relations, and our manpower mobilization--those six areas will be studied concurrently. You will have lectures more or less in any order convenient on those various areas. Now, all of you gentlemen will work on all of those areas for part of the time. However, you will also specialize in those areas and will take back the results of your specialization to your committees. You will get the details about that this afternoon.

I don't want to take any more time on that. Let's take a seven-minute break, gentlemen.

COLONEL VAN WAY: I am now ready for questions.

QUESTION: How do you account for the big difference in the two bottom age groups on your chart--the ones under five, and the five to ten?

COLONEL VAN WAY: I will have to turn to the doctors in the class to explain why it is. I don't know why it is. I do know it is a fact that there are more male babies born than females, but for some reason they don't last as long. There's a little higher mortality rate in male infants than there is in female infants. The tendency is to have more young males, and then it cuts off later in the proportions. I understand there is a slight preponderance of females in the over-all population right now, but the birth rate is a little bit in favor of the males.

STUDENT: I mean the difference in totals of the group under five and the five to nine.

COLONEL VAN WAY: I am not too sure what you mean.

STUDENT: The total difference of both males and females under five and the total in the group five to nine.

COLONEL VAN WAY: You mean here (indicating) this is so much longer than this?

STUDENT: That's right.

COLONEL VAN WAY: The birth rate has been much higher here. This reflects the birth rate of the last five years, and it has been much higher than it was the preceding five years.

QUESTION: Colonel, I note your armed forces figure is very low. It does not go to the right of the line. Is that because the numbers are not significant?

COLONEL VAN WAY: Well, no. I am always sure that will not be forgotten. We always save this to the end. I don't know whether it is due to the natural gallantry of a military audience or to perhaps something a little more fundamental. (Adds a narrow strip of white to the white overlay.) Does that help you? In actuality, from a pure labor point of view, that line is more important than it seems to indicate. That represents 286,000 women who were in the uniformed services during the war. Divided up, the total is about 100,000 in the Army, which then included the Air Force; another 100,000 in the Navy, on the basis of 70,000 Navy and 30,000 Marine; the others were 60,000 Army and 26,000 Navy nurses.

That was an important pioneering job that was done to get those women in the uniformed services during the war. I will try to explain

why I feel that is so. Actually, as I say, the numbers are not too significant--not much more than is indicated by the size of that very narrow line--not larger than it would be to the scale of 286,000 anyway.

Actually, what we are trying to do, as I am sure you gather from our other remarks, is move people from here ("those not in the labor force") into here ("labor force"), if we are going to take out a bunch here. Eighty percent of the jobs in industry can be performed by women. Some of them they do probably better than men do, such jobs as those requiring extreme meticulousness and patience, and perhaps jobs which to men would be extremely monotonous. Many times those jobs are done well by women. In many cases by tradition and training they are already doing such things, such jobs. I mean assembling of small parts like radio tubes or small pieces of equipment, assembling radios themselves, places that require meticulous hand work, certain jobs which also require patience and stability, and certain other difficulties they face where women can be trained to do them when we cannot always train men to do the job as well. Other types of jobs are those in the clerical fields, and of course we have the great fields of the health activities that women do so much better and traditionally are used for.

If we have such jobs in the military services, and obviously we do, it is only sensible that we take advantage of the women who are trained in that type of work and move them into the services. That saves us training time. Men can be replaced by women who have perhaps already been trained and leave the job for marriage or some other reason. They can be returned. We can let Mr. Bell train telephone operators and we can get his operators and put them in uniform. That's one of the things we gain, saving the training time. Women become more efficient in certain types of work and we save the training time. That's where we gain, by using them in the uniformed services.

QUESTION: I can see no explanation myself--why is there a greater percentage of consumers in the male population over the age of 40?

COLONEL VAN WAY: Well, there's an old saying that a man works from sun to sun, but a woman's work is never done. There comes a time when the old rocking chair gets the men, and the women are classed as housewives to the bitter end. That's about the way it is.

COMMENT: I notice you have left President Eisenhower and a few other people out of the military overlay. There's nobody on there above 45.

COLONEL VAN WAY: That's a practicality. We did not wish to have a long line up there. When I first put it up General MacArthur was very much in evidence. He still is, but he's not in the service right now.

QUESTION: Is there any significance in the fact that the line on the right is sort of erratic as compared with the one on the left, as

for instance in the age group 60 to 64 among the women? There appears to be almost no deaths, compared to 50-59.

COLONEL VAN WAY: I am not too sure I know what you mean.

STUDENT: In the age 45 to 49 there's a greater reduction than in the age 50 to 54 at the extreme right.

COLONEL VAN WAY: Some of those figures were gained by interpolation; some were actual figures. I am not too sure they're completely accurate. In that particular sense I don't know what significance, if any, can be attached to them.

COMMENT: You said 80 percent of the jobs in industry can be performed by women.

COLONEL VAN WAY: Eight percent of the jobs in the total number of jobs, if you listed the jobs. Eighty percent of listed jobs could be done by them.

QUESTION: What percentage of those was done by women during the last war? Do you have the figures?

COLONEL VAN WAY: No; about 31 percent of our labor force was women during the war. I don't know how many of the jobs were done. I suspect it is considerably less than that 80 percent. They were more or less in certain restricted types of occupation such as I have just described to you. I don't know how many. The ones they're restricted from are those few that require heavy lifting or heavy work, some jobs in hazardous places, some in difficult locations, and that sort of thing.

QUESTION: Getting back to the question the man up here asked to start with: Usually, following a war, there has been a decline in the birth rate. Do you know of any reasons why our birth rate seems still to be climbing? Are we biologically any different than we were after World War I?

COLONEL VAN WAY: I don't know why. I wasn't aware that a war necessarily caused a decline in the birth rate following it. That may be true, but I wasn't aware of it. But the reason in my opinion for our increase in the birth rate is--perhaps we could go back and outline our birth rate a little farther back. After the turn of the century, we had a general descending birth rate. It was on the general continual decline and, when the depression came on, it took a sharp decline down to what I said before was the low, of 18.4, in 1933. I believe it was the same in 1936.

Now, the demographers decided that the long term was the one that was going to continue, for some reason, that this decline was a permanent one and would continue on into the forties. The result of that was the

decided upturn which occurred in the late thirties. It began to climb again with the imminence of war and the return of prosperity.

The thing that caused the decline in the thirties was the depression, the lack of jobs, the lack of security, of outlook--that sort of thing. It started to rise again when production and prosperity began returning, which was the end of the thirties.

The demographers discounted that rise by saying that was a phenomenon somehow connected with the war, which was accepted. They said it would go back down to the old decline. There was a slight leveling off during the war, but in 1946 it started climbing up sharply and has continued. It is now up around 25 per thousand per year.

That is not a huge birth rate, as world birth rates go, but, taken in conjunction with our low death rate of about 9.7--I think it is now--it is a tremendous rate. However, that wasn't anticipated by the demographers, but it has happened, and how much further it will go up we have no way of knowing, of course, but certainly it has not taken a turn downward after the war.


One of the reasons I think it has continued up is that we have had continued prosperity and we are paying younger people more in comparison to what the average pay has been, more than we have ever done before.

The over-all percentage of people who ultimately get married has not gone up greatly in the past fifty years. Even in the last century about 95 percent of the people ultimately did get married. In those days they didn't get married so young. Now most of them get married by the time they're through the twenties. We have a longer period of marriage, and that is one of the things which to my mind has accounted for the high birth rate. As long as we keep paying young people as much as we are now in comparison with the over-all average pay, there is no reason why the birth rate should fall off again.

I don't know that that fully answers your question.

QUESTION: There's a very serious problem facing us now which may not be part of the whole manpower problem, the situation which we face in our schools in Montgomery and Arlington counties, and others, where there is a shortage of teachers. We will have a tremendous influx of children coming into the schools in the next few years. I wonder what the solution will be. Do you have any idea? Certainly we don't have teachers to take care of them.

COLONEL VAN WAY: I have another chart, see page 18. I can make that question do to pull out this other chart. You are right; this is a real problem. Now, before I show this chart I want to call attention to the fact that we got away from those good, honest colors of red and blue.



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We have here some tricky colors. Also, it is not a chart which was made for this auditorium--you can't read all the numbers.

This chart shows the percentages of different age groups in the past nine decennial censuses. It shows four principal age groups. This infantry blue represents young people up to 20. This orange represents people 20 to 40. The green represents people 40 to 60, and this color, which I am reliably informed is old rose, represents those over sixty. The significance of your question is this: What has happened to our different age groups through the years? While I refuse to make predictions--I don't believe in the predictions in this field, even my own--I think you can draw some conclusions which will help you make your own predictions.

This group under 20 in 1870--I should say these columns show the last censuses, 1870 and so on up. These are percentage marks up here, up to 100 percent. Back in 1870 half of the people were under 20, just about. That was the median age, 19.8. That same median age now is about 30. In other words, if it is fair to say that in 1870 a man was half dead when he was 20, he is not half dead now until he gets to be 30. What has happened in that period is also interesting in its effect on the working group of 20 to 40. You notice by inspection it has been about the same all during those years.

That is true. If you read statistics, you will find that in 1910, when we took in a lot of immigrants--1907 was the peak immigrant year; we had three million that year--we took in a lot of immigrants in this age group. It ran up to 33 percent. All the rest of the years, including recently, it has been in the neighborhood of 31 percent. It has not changed at all to speak of.

What has happened? We reduced this bunch of youngsters here, despite the age group up to five years old--we have reduced the over-all percentage of youngsters from 50 percent, which it was then, to 35 percent. That 15 percent reduction has been added on to the 40 and up groups. We have added 8 percent to that group here (indicating 40 to 50 group) and 7 percent has been added on here (indicating 50 to 60 group). So it's really not too bad. We have traded the young people for these older people.

As far as your school problem is concerned, we have plenty of people who could be teachers. All we have to do is find out how many of them want to be teachers. They can be trained, if we make the job attractive to them. It is apparent many of them do not want to be teachers, or we would have more. It is not right to wait for something to happen before we know what to do. We have five years' warning on school problems. That is one of the easiest thing, in my mind, that we have to predict--how many children we will have in school.

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QUESTION: Various countries have tried ways to increase their birth rates, including, I believe, France, since the war. What has been the experience of other countries as to their birth rates in the recent years, particularly, including countries like France?

COLONEL VAN WAY: I haven't made a specific study on that at all. I don't know any country that has had any great results from it. Nazi Germany tried it and it didn't have any great effect. Some of these things just can't very well be regulated.

QUESTION: Has the birth rate gone up in other countries in a way that matches our rise?

COLONEL VAN WAY: Our rise has been chiefly through a reduction in the death rate, that is, on a long term--except that since the war there has been that rise. I am not too sure of the specific answer to that question. Do you know, Mike, about that?

MR. POLUHOFF: I think there has been a world-wide sharp increase in population in the last ten years, somewhat comparable to that of the United States.

COLONEL VAN WAY: Again the problem is: How much of that is due to a reduction of the death rate and how much is due to an increase in the birth rate?

MR. POLUHOFF: Most of the other I think is due to increase in the birth rate.

COLONEL VAN WAY: Any other questions?

QUESTION: Do you have any population distribution figures on Russia's potential growth?

COLONEL VAN WAY: I don't have very extensive ones at hand. I believe the population of Russia is in the order of 204 to 215 million. It is bigger than ours, of course. We are about the fourth country in population in the world. China, India, and Russia are leading, in that order. Russia does have something like, as I say, over 200 million. We are not sure of the breakdown of the population, or the over-all numbers. We don't have that sort of information.

QUESTION: Does anyone hazard a guess as to whether this rate of increase will continue for a long period of time, provided we do not get into another war, or will it gradually taper off?

COLONEL VAN WAY: As I pointed out, the demographers made a serious mistake by assuming that the long-term tendency trend was going to continue. In 1947 a very able man by the name of Whelpton came out with

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some extensive and specific estimates based on figures and theories that were being accepted at that time. Those have since been proven to be very wrong. So the demographers are now a little bit leery of giving specific predictions. When reliable demographers now make a prediction, they make it so wide that almost anything could happen. I think the assumption is, barring anything we cannot now anticipate, that these rates will generally continue.

It will mean that the percentage rate will be about the same, and of course that means our number rate, our absolute number rate, will go up as our population increases--sort of compounding the interest. It will be affected primarily by births and also by deaths. We will probably keep the death rate down below ten per thousand per year. It has been hovering around 9.7 to 9.9 for a number of years. It is hard to see how much lower it can be than that. We have reached a plateau on the death rate, at least. Whether we will reach a peak on the birth rate I am sure no reliable demographer would tell you for certain.

There is nothing you can see which suggests immediate change. There are these factors that might have something to do with it. Some people claim this will have a major effect--perhaps it will--as this group comes into the child rearing age group, it is intended that there will be a reflection, as we have down here, again. If that is so, it will be much less marked than this.

QUESTION: I am interested in that big segment of unemployment. How do they get away with it?

COLONEL VAN WAY: Well, much of that is transitory. I think many of those people are just not looking very hard for work. In theory they are looking for it, but they are not putting out very hard. I am convinced that at least a million of those, if we ever get pushed, could be put to work. Actually, in World War II we never knew what the figure was, but we thought it was reduced to 600,000 or 700,000, which some people claim was the irreducible minimum. That means that people go from job to job or are just plain lazy. That's probably the best we can do.

Gentlemen, we will all gather this afternoon again at 1:30 in your conference rooms with your manpower instructors, as shown on the committee assignment sheet you will get when you get back to your desks.

I thank you for your attention and your interesting questions.

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