

# RESTRICTED

MOBILIZING MANPOWER FOR THE ARMED FORCES

313

14 September 1953

## CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
INTRODUCTION--Rear Admiral W. McL. Hague, USN, Commandant, Industrial College of the Armed Forces.....	1
SPEAKER--Major General Lewis B. Hershey, Director of the Selective Service System.....	1
GENERAL DISCUSSION.....	15

Publication No. 154-19

INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

Washington, D. C.

# RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

314

Major General Lewis B. Hershey, Director of the Selective Service System, was born in Steuben County, Indiana, 12 September 1893. He received the following degrees from Tri-State College, Angola, Indiana: B.S., 1912; Ph.B.; and A.B., 1914. He holds honorary degree of LL.D. from Ohio State University, Tri-State College, Oglethorpe University, Allbright College, Lafayette University, and Columbia University. He has also attended Indiana University, 1917, and University of Hawaii, 1935-36. He is a graduate of the Field Artillery School, 1923; the Command and General Staff School, 1933; and the Army War College, 1934. He was commissioned first lieutenant in the Regular Army in 1916 from the Indiana National Guard and advanced through the grades to lieutenant colonel in 1940. In recognition of his work in preparing plans for the Selective Service System, he was promoted to brigadier general in October 1940. He became Deputy Director of the Selective Service System, 1 October 1940 and Director, 31 July 1941. He was awarded the DSM by the Army, Navy, and American Legion for outstanding service as Director of Selective Service during the war. He was promoted to major general on 28 April 1942. On 31 December 1946 he was retired but recalled to active duty on the following day, 1 January 1947. He has been Director of the Selective Service System since its reactivation on 24 June 1947.

RESTRICTED

## MOBILIZING MANPOWER FOR THE ARMED FORCES

14 September 1953

ADMIRAL HAGUE: This morning our speaker is Major General Lewis B. Hershey, Director of the Selective Service System of the United States, from the time whereof the memory of living man runneth not to the contrary. As a matter of fact, General Hershey, I think, is the most outstanding paradox that we have in this great white city of Washington. Administrations may come and administrations may go, but General Hershey as Director of Selective Service stays on forever. And for that the Lord be thanked.

Now, that is paradoxical for this reason: Of course, from the standpoint of the Department of Defense it is an obvious advantage to have in that position a Regular Army officer. But in a democracy such as ours it is passing strange that there should be continued in that position a military man, because his decisions intimately affect the lives of every one of the 40-odd million families of the country. I am certain that a military man would not have been named to the post in the first place, and would certainly not have been continued in the post, had the occupant of the White House and the denizens of Capitol Hill not realized that in General Hershey they had a man who would lay down the fundamental facts of manpower quite as vociferously in the Pentagon as he did in the White House and on Capitol Hill.

Now, I do not ascribe any great amount of personal credit to General Hershey. I think that he possesses one or two unusual advantages. In the first place, he was born in Indiana; and therefore he acquired by inheritance and environment the clear-headed, shrewd, common-sense approach to problems that is characteristic to Hoosiers. He went into the Army, he associated with the troops, and he developed a salty vocabulary that allowed him to express his thoughts with such crystal clarity that they could not be misunderstood. Those to my mind are the two great important advantages that General Hershey has brought to this job.

A few weeks ago we listened to a demographer expatiate on the great difficulties that gentlemen of his ilk had in predicting marriage rates and birth rates and therefore trends in the population. I submit that if the demographers of the country would properly evaluate the policies and principles laid down by General Hershey as the Director of Selective Service, they could predict with right good accuracy both the marriage rates and the birth rates in the country.

You have all heard of General Washington being referred to as the father of his country. Gentlemen, it gives me great pleasure this morning to present to you the second father of his country, General Hershey.

# RESTRICTED

316

GENERAL HERSHEY: Admiral Hague, fellow officers, co-workers in manpower problems, at least to the extent of the requirements of your institution: I am always pleased to come down here. My association with the Industrial College has been longer and more consistent than with any other educational institution which I have been privileged to be with. Perhaps, had I been a student here, I would either have graduated or quit coming. Most other schools that I have gone to I have either left by volunteer means or because I was directed to or eventually graduated from them. But since 1937 it has been my very great privilege to have been associated with this institution at the times it was operating. I am not going into any reasons why or why not. Probably the historians won't even have time to go into it. But it is a great privilege to come here.

This year I am particularly interested in you gentlemen. You are a very important part of our future, which we fervently hope we may have. You are in a very peculiar and significant place, because as individuals most of you have had experience in the armed forces. You are now engaged, and have been, in studies which make you conversant with and capable of being responsible for the support of the armed forces. In the manpower field we are going to have to maintain always some people who have enough clarity of knowledge to be able to support the balance that must come about in the division of manpower.

There are a great many people very much interested in those problems for very personal reasons. Sometimes those personal reasons transcend the good of the country and probably transcend their own self-interest, except they are too near some of the immediate things of their deeper interest to realize how they are doing themselves damage. But that is neither here nor there. It is a little late to find out that the boat leaks after it is at the bottom of the ocean.

So, therefore, the thing that I am very much interested in is that you gentlemen become a part of our public and a part of our national defense forces and a part of our Federal Government, with an appreciation of, (a) the necessity for requirements, both of the armed forces and of the civilian economy, and (b) some of the peculiarities of supply, especially as it has to do with the armed forces.

Now, it is the most natural thing in the world for an individual to believe that his maximum contribution can be made elsewhere than in places of danger. That is human beings, and I think we have to expect it. I think we have to refrain from thinking a person is unusual when he does that. On the other hand we have to expect that he is not going to say that that is what activates him. He is going to hunt some scientific, psychological, psychiatric, or some other scientific reason, because we are in an age now where the bedclothes of scientific things cover a great deal, to say the least. And therefore it is easy to say: "I would, of course, much rather be out somewhere getting shot at; but I have some very rare accomplishment, I have some abilities--most of them dormant perhaps--

RESTRICTED

but a few have been pitched up to a place that I feel I must as a martyr to my country demand that I be placed back somewhere so I can be used to my maximum capacity in doing something besides immediately killing people." That is the most natural thing in the world. It has been in existence ever since we have had people. But we have used different sorts of things at different times.

The very ultimate indeed are the individuals that I have to deal with who say very frankly they do not believe in war. They do not believe in killing anybody. And some of them believe it to the point that they are willing to die themselves. There are others who have different credence in that belief. Some of them believe it only when they are killing personally. Some believe it only when their own skins are to be saved. Of course you have to draw the line somewhere there.

But, going to the other extreme, we have very many other people, very honest people, who begin to talk very glibly of the change that has come over warfare. We have confused the how and the what. Sometimes we do it consciously, sometimes unconsciously, in our own interests. We have said that formerly it used to be all right to require most everybody to get into the armed forces, but things are different now. They have always been different. As the old sergeant used to say: "The Army isn't like it used to be. As a matter of fact, it never was."

We have now a rash, that is probably in epidemic proportions, of experts. I have looked at the armed forces from the outside for a very long time. My phraseology is not polished. At the moment I can only try to translate the things that are in your present experience as an old man who only knows by peeping through windows at times what goes on, which you are quite conversant with. But, just the same, in the Army I guess they call it military operational specialty (MOS)--I don't know what the Air Force calls it; I don't care what the Navy calls it--just the same, it is an old racket of going two weeks, two months, or six months and becoming an expert. And then two things immediately develop. The first thing, you demand that you do nothing except what you have learned in this short period. Second, nobody unless he is a graduate of the school that you have attended should be permitted to do this high-grade work which required you two or three weeks to become an expert in.

The armed forces aren't the only place where you find that. The country is just littered with people who are trying to defend the status quo by saying they either have belonged to a union or are a MOS number or have become an expert for probably no better reason than being a hundred miles away from home. But that is not right in the heart of the division of manpower. I don't know just what grade of security is on this, but by definition it should not have any. But that proves nothing in Washington and some other places.

But I know that a great many very honest people have spent several months concocting a method of trying to run this country on a volunteer

# RESTRICTED

310

basis so far as allocation of manpower goes in times of war, minus the armed forces. They are not arguing that we ought not to have plenty of compulsion on those people who are so unfortunate as not to have enough sense to do anything except serve in the armed forces. And they didn't say so in the preface to this 44-page report that I tried to read last night. But it is there nonetheless. It is aimed at attempting to fight the next war, if there is a war, with whatever may be left and can be spared by a grateful civilian economy that doesn't violate such things as the 40-hour week, that in no way tampers with the health, education, and vested interests of those who want this country of ours to arrive at a place that nobody else on earth has.

That is all very fine, but it is a question of whether or not the armed forces will be able to win when, first of all, anyone who has enough sense to find one of these places of preference is not prohibited from them. I don't know. It seems to me that the armed forces always must have, first, enough people with enough sense to learn how to materially kill other people without getting killed themselves, at least part of the time; and the second thing is that somebody has to be persuaded to stay out there and take it. And one of the things that doesn't persuade them is hearing that their brother-in-law or the guy that superseded them in the affections of some young lady has by his unique capacities at the age of 19 or 20 become someone the public cannot possibly get along without if he should be removed from the thing that he is doing.

This 40,000-word report that I read had the word "patriotism"--how I don't know--in there twice. It had "deferment of the people who are going to be necessary to carry on this war" in there at least a dozen times. And you gentlemen are the people who understand both and the necessity for both. You are going to have much to do with civilian economy, because it is your demands upon it that are going to penetrate it in the last analysis, when the civilian control, at least partial civilian control, has found that it cannot guarantee survival any longer, and withdraws into the wings of the stage of life and turns over the show to that which is called the armed forces. When that day comes, it is rather bad taste to say: "I have failed; but you will go ahead with what little I can spare you and try to negotiate survival and some form of peace."

Be that as it may, I think that we have to look at both the requirements and the supply base very carefully. I have a very deep feeling that the supply has a very peculiar capacity. In the first place, it is made up of around 160 million people. When you want to park, you would think there were more. But of these 160 million there are some 34 million that are 14 to 15 years of age and under. They are one of the greatest assets we have. They are our only hope for the future. They are the only reason we keep the thing running anyway. But just at the moment they can't be listed entirely as assets, as anybody who has either been a father or a grandfather would know when he has several of them on his hands. So therefore you lose about 34 million that are in future possibilities but just at the moment are sort of a drag on the market.

4

# RESTRICTED

Now, unfortunately, 25 or 30 million are nearer my age, an age to which you people are going, I hope not too fast, and I hope you have quite a way to go. But there are 20 million out there. If you want advice, you have come to the right place. If you want to know how they used to do it, they will tell you. You don't have to ask them. They will probably tell you anyway. But, just the same, if you have to get out here, you have to learn to roll with the pitch. You have to take it as it comes. And you have to eat food that isn't fried just like you like it.

I find you can always tell a man's age by the way he wants his food. When he is young and hungry, he just eats it. When he begins to get older, he begins to tell you he wants it cooked just so before he can eat it. He is in this 20-some million, where there are a lot of things that they can't do without so much assistance that it doesn't pay to use them. I will say that friendly. And while we are short on leadership of the vigorous kind, and we may be short of leadership of the older kind, it is not because we don't have enough people in that age group, because we have. But when it comes to doing a lot of things that the armed forces have to do, we don't want many of them around.

We can even have too many generals around. We can even have admirals piled up a little too deep in order to carry on. In the old days we used to even get some majors who honestly thought that without an orderly they didn't contribute much; so they contracted one. The orderly could have done something else if he had been trained. Of course we used to think in those days in the service that as soon as a man got to be a major, he wanted an adjutant. He had to get somebody to help him to make up his mind. He had to have studies made, had to have analyses, be scientific. He couldn't just stumble to a conclusion no matter how logical it was.

But, be that as it may, our manpower pool has limitations. Now, I realize that these limitations that we have, have to do with the fact that somewhat over half, not too many, who are of the female variety, are not as good as they used to be, because I think there are less and less places where we can use them. But I don't know how we are going to figure out how many we can use. We may have to do it just as we figure out the males. I don't think we are quite there, but I think we are perhaps approaching it.

On the other hand we may find that we have to find a way to train male nurses to take the place of the female nurses we are using somewhere else. But I don't see how we gain much when we begin to substitute so widely that we end up by having the ladies fighting the war and the men doing the baby sitting. There are some reasons why it won't work as well. I am not an authority in that line particularly, although I do have some passing experience with child care.

There are in the generalizations that I shall speak of about three groups of men. Taking the 35 and up as group number one, I think the war is going to get awfully bad before they are not almost wholly, with some exceptions, available to the civilian economy. I think most everybody would agree with that. In fact I know some people in the armed forces that would be glad to turn over to the civilian economy some of the people above 35, and they think there would be no loss of effectiveness to the armed forces. But that is a personal opinion. I used to have kind of a list when I was on more active duty with the armed forces of people I thought we could spare, and most of them were senior to me.

So I think probably above 35, with the exception of those who have gone quite pro either in the Regular forces or the Reserves, they should be available for the civilian economy. I would go to the other end of the scale and say that the boys in their late teens and early twenties--and this will not reach such universal agreement--but I have a firm conviction that, in spite of the H-bomb or the A-bomb or any other kind of bombs or bums, the armed forces should have the first priority on that group.

But I realize that the future is going to be dark if we delay the entrance into scientific ranks for a year or two or three of some of our budding geniuses. But I still believe--and I believe that here is the proper division of manpower--that the people must come to believe that as the civilian economy gets older, all those below 26 have to be primarily--until this world gets a whole lot different scientifically than it is now--earmarked to carry the burden.

There is nothing new about that; Washington knew it. He told some people, too; but, somehow or other, they didn't believe him or they didn't transmit it or didn't carry it out. We have had a great deal of difficulty several times when we mobilized because, first, we were not in a position to readily pick up the boys under 26 and use them in the armed forces--many had gotten into industry; however, in 1939 I can remember very clearly that there were many boys who hadn't been at work very much. They had grown up in rather hard times; but when certain companies began to expand, it was a great deal easier to hire these young smart kids that didn't remember too much and didn't have to be paid too much, than it was some other people. Of course, when they got them, they only had to keep that kid about six weeks and he was a partner or a vice president or would be as soon as there was a vacancy, when anybody wanted to take him away for some other purpose. So in trying to equate history I think we ought to always look at some of our troubles at the beginning of the war and see what shape we were in when it came.

Now, I don't want to belittle planning, because I think as Director of Selective Service that was one thing that made it a success in 1945. And I am saying this knowing it is not generally admitted by everybody that it was. But, just for the sake of the argument--and don't interrupt--

I will say that the success that it was, was because of very good planning. And yet I shall be the first to say that planning must always be a slave and never a master.

Don't get your plans to the place where you try to shape events so that you can use your plans. It is a great deal more healthy to have plans that meet circumstances than to try to change the circumstances to fit the plans. But, just the same, one thing we have to watch about our planning is not to get the how so it begins to try to dictate to the what, because generally the what is dictated outside the country or we wouldn't be in that sort of racket in the first place.

So, therefore, it seems to me if we are going to do anything healthy, we must be prepared at all times to mobilize. Again I would say to you as planners--and I say this to my planners--don't get your plans so they must have a datum point to start from. I have heard a lot of men say, when events came along and upset their plans: "Something is wrong here. I believe it is time to invoke this, but these are not the kind of circumstances that we had figured on. Therefore we just have to wait for that sort of situation to come along." Of course it never does.

Remember, you always start mobilizing from some "now," and it is not the now that you had in your presumptions. Therefore I have always felt that people who were going to operate anything should be more conversant always with the now, because that is where you start. From now we move to somewhere else. Now is never a good place to start. It is never a good time to start universal training. It is never a good time to start a war. It is never a good time to start anything.

It probably wasn't a good time to start school this fall, as hot as it was. But you always start now, and therefore you always must have enough flexibility in your plans so you can start from the situation you are in, rather than trying to convert and build a situation from which it would be convenient to start the plans you have.

So in this manpower business it seems to me that there should be somehow gotten over to our country a realization that we have three groups of people--an older group, that is converted always to the civilian economy today. With very rare exceptions, unless we get invaded, we probably can leave them there; those are the people over 35. It seems to me there has to be some belief that a great majority--and I mean a majority--of the individuals under 26 are going to have to be available to serve.

Now, you say, Where are the engineers, where are the physicists, where are the atomic scientists, where is everybody else, coming from? Well, in war, when we mobilize, the people between 26 and 35, I think, are almost wholly available to the civilian economy. The extent that these can remain available depends upon how many people we have eventually to mobilize.

Now, don't misunderstand me. I have no desire to go out and fight everybody and whip everybody. I only say this: If we are going to figure feasibility, we had better figure feasibility before we start throwing stones at people and they start throwing them back; it is a poor time to decide that we have to send X number of troops, X number of ships, or X number of planes somewhere after we have become actually involved in a war where X is required.

And I do not subscribe to the theory that the armed forces are going to be bound by the economy. This is polishing apples on nice runs for engineers on the railroad. It is polishing apples with something less than 60 or 70 hours a week. I do not happen to subscribe, as this plan that I was talking about does, to the fact that we are entitled to have the same amount of civilian luxuries, if you will, as we had during World War II. Not if we are fighting for existence we won't. And we had better not start out getting the public thinking they can have butter and they can have guns, that they can have two suits of clothes and a lot of other things, because when we are fighting for survival, there isn't any use saving, because the fellow you saved it for is not the fellow you intended to bequeath it to.

I think we have to be pretty practical in what we are trying to do, and not get the how all cluttered up in our minds with the when. So I do have some difficulty in a very simple thing, that is, every man should be used where he can give his maximum contribution. That is fine sense. It just sounds beautiful. Who would be against it? Why, you can't get people to oppose that any more than you could get a guy who was running for Congress or something else down in certain states to say that he didn't believe in high prices for cotton or some other staple, or high prices for wheat. It is just as simple as that. Yet what does it mean? Nothing. Who is going to decide, first, what is important? The stupid kid who stuck his hand in the dike had no MOS number or anything else. There wasn't much to that. I suppose if he had been a Ph.D. and somebody had wanted to know something about relativity, he should have taken his hand out of the dike and gone to explaining it, because that would have been the maximum use of Little Peter.

Things in the service are that elementary. I used to talk to people during the war and I asked a simple question. I said: "I think I am quite important." They didn't say they did, but they didn't interrupt me. I said: "There is a noise down in the basement. Somebody is down there. Obviously, if I believe in my country, if I want to preserve my country, since I am so important to my country, I will have my wife go down and chase that guy out. She isn't the Director of Selective Service. What are we losing?" Well, some of the things that are said about scientific and professional people--don't get the idea that I have them particularly in my craw--might be just as stupid as that.

Now, those are problems somebody is going to have to confront in this country. We are going to have to confront them whenever we have a

little mobilization. We are going to have to confront a lot of them if we have a lot of mobilization. We are going to have to get some sort of clarity. It is all very well to say that we must have these college students; if we don't have college students, how are you going to have colleges? If you don't have colleges, what are you going to do with the colleges you already have? Just look at the faculties that are dying to teach something. Whether it is worth anything or not is a separate question. Here are these millions and billions of dollars invested in facilities. Obviously we shouldn't stop them. No; we shouldn't stop anything. But this bird that keeps bothering us all the time doesn't have any interest in our colleges. The fellow is threatening our survival. He is somebody who doesn't appreciate a great many things that we hold quite dear. Unfortunately for us, the only way we can do something about it is probably to fight.

That doesn't mean that at the beginning of an emergency we are going to take everybody. In the first place, we can't. And this is another fallacy of our planning. We talk glibly of 10, 12, or 13 million in the armed forces. And we can get there if we mobilize long enough. But what we get is 2, 3, or 3.2 million whatever the latest figure is. I don't have it; I have been out of town for a few days. Whatever that number is, if we had to mobilize tomorrow, it would go from 3 to 3.5, from 3.5 to 4. It would not go from 3 to 15. It doesn't go that way. It doesn't go that fast.

You people know much better than I do that a million, two million, or five million springing to arms has one fallacy. They have the spring, but they don't have the arms. And therefore the mobilization is a long process. We can plan how to start it. We can hope that we can finish it. But if we get ourselves so well planned on how we are going to finish it, somebody else may make other arrangements; and it is going to be a little bad.

It seems to me we have to draw pretty heavily on this group under 26 in the initial mobilization and hope that with their help we will get enough for the eventual mobilization. But if we can't, then we have to go from 26 up to 35; and somewhere around 35 we probably get to the place where about everybody who is acceptable under that age represents about the maximum that perhaps can be obtained.

But I believe we still have to think of military forces competent and large enough to do the job, and I think it is the business of the civilian economy to maintain them. Now, that doesn't mean we would be so stupid as to get twice as many people in as we can support. It doesn't mean we would be stupid enough to get twice as many as we can utilize.

And I am quite aware of the lot of criticism that can be aimed at the armed forces for nonutilization. I haven't gone through 13 years of this without finding some lack of utilization in other places besides the

**RESTRICTED**

armed forces. I have seen guys asleep under gear. When building the Kaiser flat tops and some other sorts of things, I have seen the time when we had a pool, and the guy who saw a man move on the deck of the ship being built got the pool; and he had to work for it. It was a graveyard shift. It was a rough time.

Another thing we can't afford to lose is this: All some people talk about is stressing seniority. I wonder if the war would ever get bad enough that we could put a guy with rather high seniority on a graveyard shift. When we do that I will begin to believe we are really at war.

So I believe the armed forces have to look to their utilization. I don't believe there is any question about it. And I don't happen to be one of the people that wanted to make all of my four children into one or make them all alike. I think we had an integrated family, but I wouldn't want them to be duplicates. But, on the other hand, there are certain things that we have to consider. When you have all the kids eating at the same table, you can't let one kid eat all the ice cream and make another eat all the spinach; that doesn't work either. We have it in manpower, but it is not a good family. I am, of course, not of the defense family, perhaps; but I have been the hand-maiden to it for quite some time.

We need utilization. We need to increase our area of acceptability; no matter how many potatoes we have in the field, if we rule them all out of the gravy, they are not going to feed anybody. And yet this morning I am sorry to tell you that we have 1.8 million people under 30 years of age, most of them under 26--the age isn't against them--but the services have said they haven't enough brains so they can use those people. And yet they are born. They are here. They are a part of our manpower pool.

Now, I think that is a very serious charge on utilization. One of the reasons, to the guy who looks in at the window, is that not all of the people are getting nutriment out of the same trough. Some of them drink before it goes into the trough. Some skim the cream off and want somebody else to eat the rest of the milk. While I think some protein in the diet is good--I have read a lot about it--some like just a little bit of fat in the diet too. I don't believe we will ever have complete utilization until all the boys step up and get their share of the good, the bad, and the indifferent. All classes are well represented. There must be greater utilization; no question about that.

But once we have done the best we can in utilization--and we can't argue when the enemy is upon us--I still believe the armed forces, after the commitment has been made that they must grapple with the enemy, must be given what they believe to be the number they need. And if the guy that is figuring it doesn't follow it to suit the civilian authorities who are running the Government, relieve him and let somebody else figure it. But as long as that fellow is there figuring it, I think the civilian Government has to dedicate itself to support him.

**RESTRICTED**

I do not believe that Dan Boone, at Boonesbury, could tolerate the womenfolks and the cripples, who are loading the guns, sitting down when they have worked eight hours, and letting the guy come off the line to load his own gun. That I do not believe can be tolerated. But we have a very considerable part of honest thinking in this country that wants to run a war with what we have left after we have built up the supporting part, plus the part that supports the civilian economy.

I know we are not at war. I don't know what this Korean business was that we have gone through, and I don't know what it has now become. We have gone from a war we did not understand to a truce that we understand no better. It is difficult to understand a truce unless there has been war. We live in an age difficult to understand.

But, just the same, at the present time we are short of engineers, we are short of scientists; I don't think there is any question about it. We are so short that we can spend hundreds of them using their brains to make air-conditioning units and to build television sets and automobiles for next year and the year after. We are not so hard up for scientists yet that we can't afford everything that goes for somatic comfort for a nation whose belt line is increasing more rapidly than its chest line, or anything that appeals to entertainment or somatic comfort.

We don't have enough intestinal fortitude to stop that, either by public sentiment or by any other means. I have had to see men deferred in the last two years, after the War Industries Act came in, young guys just out of school a very short time. What for? Not because they were the only engineers in existence, but because the engineers who were reliable didn't have to work in the shops that will shut up as soon as the contract is gone.

It is all very well to talk about this scientific age, but scientists are slaves to society the same as everybody else and not the masters. And the one thing we have to remember in this division of manpower is what we are trying to do, and not get too confused on the how, and never let the how get to the place where it dictates to the what. Whenever it does, we had better not have the what. But we will have the what, because it is pretty rough, but when the enemy is upon us, some of the boys will have to go 40, 48, or 55 hours, or some other length of time, if we send help. We cannot lose the things we have gained in welfare and in the betterment of humanity. Of course, if we get licked, I don't know just what we are going to do.

I want to say a word or two about our present operation. In the first place, we started in 1950 doing something we had never done before. That isn't unusual. We generally do. But one of the confusions that have gone on with our job has been to compare it with the World War II operation.

In World War II we started to mobilize eventually about as many men as we could. We had a policy of taking the guy and keeping him as long

## RESTRICTED

as he lasted, that is, for the war and six months, provided he didn't get to be 38 years old. When he got to be 38 years of age, we had to let him come home. He was taken at the time they could spare him. We spent several thousand dollars training him; and now, because he was 38, we had to let him come home and take the guy that we hadn't been able to spare at 36, who was within three months of being his age, and put him in his place. But by and large we took people and kept them until the thing was over.

By the same token we had to freeze certain people who either were important or had good sales managers. We had to freeze them in those jobs because the job had to be done and there were no replacements. So, therefore, we had some parallels who were deferred just as long as people were taken, both for the war and six months afterward.

This thing we got into in 1950 was something else again. In the first place, we didn't keep the guy till he wore out. We kept him two years or some fraction of it. The statisticians figure he stayed two years. As a matter of fact, he generally didn't stay more than 20 or 21 months. Of course, I was running behind all the time a few hundred thousand man-years, and the difference between a million men who stayed 21 months and a million men who stayed 24 months is somewhat marked. Of course, statisticians, we must have them; I realize that.

So we kept this fellow for two years and then let him come home. And by the same token the fellow who was deferred to keep the thing running until he got back there was so stupid as to think that he had a vested interest there, that he should be left there eternally, because he wasn't in a place where men were staying for the length of the war and six months. And yet it has been pretty hard to blast the boys out. If they get a deferment and are necessary, obviously, unless they are pretty stupid, if they stay a year or two more, they ought to be more necessary than they were in the beginning. That is perfectly logical. And, of course, there is no firm, no vice president, no president, who would not rather run what he is running with somebody he has and have him deferred than to get somebody else. What a terrible thing it is to be a foreman and have to show a new man around! If the organization was running so well, they generally let the foreman have his say. So he said: "I had everything running so well, and the war came along and disorganized it."

No one likes to keep taking new people. In fact I could go out here and point my finger at the services that have been in their hearts opposed to UMT. Therefore they have young kids with running noses coming in every six months to do the work, because it is much easier to get guys 12, 14, 16 years old than older ones. The first thing they knew, they had leadership. They can't do that when they are changing the guard all the time. Every new guy that comes on hadn't been on before.

But, just the same, we did have a lot of problems. We had some 3.5 million men, but they are either in or have gone out. We frightened a

RESTRICTED

few more, about 150,000, of that 3.5 million. But they are coming back and they have been coming back. It is the hardest thing in the world to make some colleges understand that the boys who are coming back would like to go to school. They can't hang the students they have and let these students come in. But I have the impression that some people might have been deferred as fathers that I had given some encouragement, shall we say, to become such. I did go out of business in that field, as you gentlemen know, on 25 August 1953. But, just the same, we have had a proposition where everybody was applying our experiences in World War II, which was another experience. It was something quite different.

As a matter of fact, the Congress decided who would serve--men 18½ to 26--provided they do not get deferred before they are 26. And if they do, this great country will not deny them the privilege of serving. And therefore they have nine years more of liability to their credit. Congress figured: "If the services can't get them all before 26, we will give them nine years more to chase those men."

The next thing they said was "what"--two years. The only thing they didn't say was "when." That is what they delegated to the Selective Service System. And yet we have a great many people who believe that a deferment is an exemption. I would like to say one word on that.

Congress knew what the word "exemption" meant, because it exempted certain people--preachers, divinity students. Some lawyers, of which I am not one, said that if the Congress used the word to apply to certain people and didn't apply it to certain others, it didn't intend the word to apply. And therefore I assume Congress didn't intend to apply it to engineers and physicists and some other people, including farmers, that I could mention.

Therefore, we are now in the position where I understand Congress has said who is going and how long they are going to stay. All we have to decide is when they shall go. Yet I have a great deal of difficulty with that, because a man was deferred for two or three years and then said: "I can't go this year." I said, "Then we will sign you up for next year." He said, "I don't know what next year is going to bring." I said, "Do you want certainty?" He looked at me and said "No." Certainty is the one thing anyone who asks for it doesn't want. Certainty would be going now. That isn't what he is asking for when he asks for certainty.

So we do have a different situation. We will always have a different situation. Planning has always to be plastic enough and movable enough to take care of whatever comes. But still there are certain things--and I revert again to the fact that the younger men have always carried the burden of war, and I am afraid they always will have to do so. It is just a question of whether we use them before, first, they are deferred

**RESTRICTED**

and, second, the 10 percent isn't here and the other 90 percent is going to do its share of the fighting for the 10 percent. When they won't, then there won't be anybody holding the line; (a) we will either lose the war or (b) some of the 10 percent will have to up and help instead of all being deferred.

At times I have worried about keeping too many from service. There have been times that I have worried about alleged intelligence keeping people from the service. There is no reason, I think, for either one.

We have had a little experience with occupational inductions, in a left-handed sort of way. That was the doctors' draft. If we have learned anything from that, we ought to have learned never to get into that again. You are withdrawing people by classes or occupations. It is a planners' paradise to have everybody in the requirements listed down to the last detail by capabilities, abilities, and other things, alleged and actual. It is also their paradise to have your supply so broken down, so classified, and so tagged that it looks like a storeroom that the better class of supply sergeant used to run. And then the only thing that remains, of course, is to issue requisitions on time in the phraseology that somebody had tagged on to requirements, and hope the supply had like phraseology. Then these people in the manpower supply barrel simply go and pull the tags off the shelf.

The only trouble is you are trying to apply to human beings what works with some degree of certainty on steel and a lot of other products. I happen to have been a party to sending out about 60 million questionnaires; I suppose I should be hanged for it. But this was an effort to categorize and classify occupationally and professionally everybody 65 years old and under. What we got was what they thought they were. But there is some difference between what they think they are and what they really are. And there is enough difference in there that I don't want to bet much on furnishing people on that basis. I'd just about as soon take that, however, as the thought of the specialists whom we would have available when we got into war to make the decision about somebody else and thereby remain out of service during the time they were making that decision, which sent other people in. There are some difficulties involved in that.

So in closing I want to say that, regardless of the scientific age, we are going to have to have somebody in the armed forces. They can't be all old men and they can't be all screwballs. They can't be completely dumb because they have to learn many things. They must have about the same qualifications and classifications as the men who do other things on the outside. And it is a rather rough way to treat them, but I would split my mobilization initially about 26. They would have to be Einsteins below that. There wouldn't be much of anybody above that until we had exhausted what there were below.

Then I would call up X groups at a time. I know Americans don't like to classify by ages. But people who have been running compulsion much

**RESTRICTED**

longer than we have ended up there, which has some validity. We ran a lottery, drew people from all different areas in World War II; and I happen to know we drew from a lot more areas than where we got anybody. In other words, they had some belief of importance, believed the armed forces wouldn't take them, mainly because they weren't young enough. We can generally find something wrong with most anybody; but even at the age that you are now--and I have the highest respect for you as thinkers--but if I went out from here this morning looking for men for the armed forces, I would feel a great deal of satisfaction in knowing that the country, as bad off as it is, wasn't bad enough off yet that I would draw on this source.

MR. POLUHOFF: General Hershey is now ready for questions.

QUESTION: General Hershey, you commented with respect to UMT and made the statement that now is the time for UMT. I wonder if you would elaborate a little on that.

GENERAL HERSHEY: Everybody has his own UMT. UMT, as I have seen it, always has been in the position a little like the group in Arkansas. When those people were scared enough to have it, they couldn't afford it; but when they weren't frightened enough to have it, they didn't think they needed it.

In 1946, when I thought was the ideal time to have UMT, the country didn't think so, and there were still enough in Congress who didn't think so. Of course, in 1950, when everybody was for it, we had to use people that we could give six months' training and put in the Reserves.

Getting back to what I said a while ago about starting a plan, there is never a good time to start a plan. I happen to believe that now is not a good time to start UMT, but that it is possible to plan for it.

One of the things, fortunately or unfortunately, is the fact that we have no second line, with some exceptions. Maybe we have some reserves. The Air Force has some reserves, the Navy has some reserves, the Army has some reserves. We have the National Guard. But, by and large, the number of individuals that are callable on a little fracas is extremely limited, because--and I don't think I am betraying any secrets when I say this--Congress didn't like to recall the people who had served in 1950; and they are going to like a great deal less in the future recalling people who served once or twice in 195X or 196X. So, therefore, I think we will have to build a second line which has some people in it, who have not had their service yet, so that when we want to call them for service, they won't have had any.

One of the problems, it seems to me, in trying to have UMT is deciding what UMT is. And that isn't the simplest thing, because some of the

times, when we have fallen down, the reason we did it was because we didn't know what we were really talking about, and the people whom we were talking to didn't understand what we were trying to tell them, not knowing ourselves.

Now, to me UMT is training men for a period considerably less than the service time of an individual and then parking them in some sort of reserve so that they are available immediately--and I mean immediately--when we want them. It happens that I can't look too critically on a ready reserve. I didn't think we needed one at the time. A ready reserve to me are people obligated for service, who have had certain training, whom we are not giving any more. Therefore there is no use pretending that they are in service, because I am a bureaucrat; I want them in our shop. I want to handle the people who are in the ready reserve units.

I am an old soldier and to me the ready reserve is a ready reserve. If they are not ready, I don't want them named that, and I don't want to have them in. To me the Regular forces and the ready reserve should have the units and the equipment and the training organization. They could probably be implemented 20 or 25 percent in case of necessity by units that we must have immediately. The ones we are going to form afterward is another matter. I happen to feel we can handle everybody more efficiently that way. If someone wants to give them some emoluments, I am not going to quarrel; but the more we give them, the less we have for the ready reserve.

So I happen to feel that UMT should be the means whereby we are training people for less than the service requirement and then parking them. Now, we can park them for seven and one-half years if we only take them for six months. I think that is pretty long, but I would start with that. Then we train them, and when they get to the place where we don't want to train them any more, that is the time to put them in a state of obligation for the rest of their period and let it go at that.

My practical solution--I don't know whether it is practical or not--it is at the present time--is for the armed forces, all of them--and I repeat, all of them, because one of the things that has hurt UMT many times has been the fact that, even when national defense was for it, the defense establishment always has a great many people who give it lip service and very little more--sometimes only one lip. This is the age of specialists and that is all right. When the fellow went to the doctor to have his throat looked at, the doctor looked at one side of his throat. The patient said, "What about the other side?" The doctor replied, "You will have to see another fellow for the left side. I am just the doctor for the right side. I am a specialist." We are very highly specialized in these days.

But I think a practical solution is for all the armed forces to start taking 10, 15, or 20 thousand, whatever they can accommodate, per

month. If they take 10,000, we will have 120,000 in about 18 months' time to put into the reserve. That isn't very many, but it is more than they are getting now that they can use, because the fellow who is coming back from some two years in the service, unless he wants to volunteer, is not going to be enthusiastic about it. And I don't want to have any part as Director of Selective Service in prosecuting people under our law for refusing to participate in the activities of the ready reserve units after he comes back from two years. That would be less than popular, I can assure you.

So it seems to me that if I were to tell the Congress that we would like to expand selective service in order to provide adequate forces for the ready reserve, already trained with their basic training, that might be the way to avoid having UMT. I don't know what the chances are of getting it done. I am sure they are small.

QUESTION: General Hershey, it is my opinion, not backed up by statistics, that we had a tremendous loss of effective manpower, both during World War II and preceding Korea, that grew out of the group between the time they were classified for active service and the time they were called, primarily because organizations, both private and public, refused to employ them. Perhaps having UMT calling the men up on an age basis might give you a better scheduling. Would you care to comment on that?

GENERAL HERSHEY: I agree with you wholly. As cash they are no good in the forces except to meet current obligations. You will get no interest on cash lying on the counter. There are two difficulties that we have never been smart enough to overcome. First, we have never been able to guess very consistently on what the armed forces were going to want. Perhaps some of you gentlemen can correct that as you go on up to higher and higher places.

One of the things that makes us keep more people on hand than we would like to is because we never can predict what we are going to have to deliver. During the war, for a period of 17 months we delivered 2,000 an hour on a 60-hour week basis, which is quite a few men. But that isn't the hard part of it. The hard part is the number of people we had to keep irritated because of the number we had to deliver.

And one of the things we are caught in is that 90-day cycle. You can sacrifice the opportunity to ask for a rehearing. However, there were 3,000 boys born 18½ years ago. But during a war there are about 3,400 by the time that we get them.

If we sent out a questionnaire the day the boys registered, we could expect around 33,000 questionnaires to be out and not returned at a given time. If we can get the local boards together the minute the questionnaire gets back, which isn't practical, and have them immediately put the

## RESTRICTED

fellow in 1-A and notify him, he then has 10 days to take an appeal. So there are 33,000 trying to find out whether they are going to take an appeal or whether they are not. If they ask for a hearing, it puts off the appeal time and extends the time some more. Numbers of them take an appeal to the Appeal Board. You may get several thousand of them there, and even have several hundred come to the Presidential Appeal Board.

After you decide who is in 1-A, you then have to order them to a pre-induction examination. He must be notified 21 days ahead of time that he is inducted, that he has passed the other examination. You therefore have to give him 10 days' notice to go for pre-induction examination. You can see a few hundred thousand in there. I have 21 days in order to put him up for induction after I have found that out. And sometimes when the induction station is dragging its feet, it may be from 10 days to three months before I find out--that is the time the recruiting is good--because they know he passed and I don't. So they are going to prostitute the service and proselyte the local board to do it.

At the present time, with 25,000 or 30,000 called, I think we have about 250,000 in 1-A. But how long has it been since we had 250,000, and when are we going to have that 250,000 again? I don't know, and I wouldn't believe anybody who told me, because it is not a determinable thing by anybody I know or you know, but anybody has a right to think what he wants to.

It is the same old question of the fireman. What is the fireman doing when there isn't a fire? He sits around. He is a fine-looking example of efficiency sitting around the firehouse! But he is one reason a lot of things don't burn up.

We got caught in 1944 with another little error. It was only 300,000 that time. We had to stop inducting and get caught up. We got 2.25 million 1-A's because the President of the United States listened to Paul McNutt and issued a memorandum. A good many people said we were going to need them. We started working night and day during the month of March 1944; and then worked through the month of April putting them back in the deferred classifications when we found they didn't want them.

It was not efficient; it was not effective. I don't know whether you served in the Army or not. I don't know about the other services. But how many of you have had to stand around because they said they were going to have a parade at eleven o'clock? The division commander said the division will be formed at nine thirty. He said: "I am not going to take any chances. We are going to be on time." The regimental commander said, "Well, we will get the boys in line about seven." The major said "about six," the captain said "five," and the first sergeant said, "I will have them out at two o'clock in the morning."

I am not apologizing for this, but that is the reason we got caught. We are caught now with more 1-A's than we would like to have. One reason

RESTRICTED

for it this time is that we have come from higher calls to lower calls. When you take a man out of a higher classification and put him in a lower one, you get into a psychological problem, getting him to believe you don't want him. Then, after he gets out and gets set, you go and get him. If he didn't like it the first time, he likes it less the second.

Those are facts and you can find my address. If anybody can get a solution, I would certainly like to have it. I don't mean to say that because somebody doesn't know something about it, he couldn't have a solution. He might be the guy that could offer something. I really have felt that because we live so close to things, we are like bad sanitation; we don't do anything about it because we just get used to it.

QUESTION: General, do you have any remarks to make on comparative selective service systems that have been used in the past by other countries or that are presently in use?

GENERAL HERSHEY: No; I don't think so. I don't know very much about that. Each one of us has seen things in other countries that he could sell to his own.

I think other countries have a much higher rate of acceptability. I don't know whether they are content with less brains or less physical stamina among those that they accept, or whether their officers are brighter and can get more out of the dumb ones.

One of the principal things we gripe about normally more than anything else is higher acceptability. One thing is, we have a champagne appetite with a beer pocketbook. It is pretty hard to take a fellow who is making 10,000 or 20,000 dollars a year or higher and then find that we can't use him. I can't remember names too well--just as well I can't--but I have heard a great deal about a fellow who has done very well in the baseball world. I have worn him out sending him back and forth between the local board office and the induction stations. But he is never accepted. They won't accept him.

The public ought to be taught. But I think one of the big differences between us and other countries is probably on acceptability. I hear a great deal from some of the people I am associated with about how England, Germany, Japan, and everybody else is letting everybody go to college. I am not sure of all the facts. I happen to know, and I have some pride in the fact, that in America there are more Negroes in college than there are people in England. And I suppose that is one of the reasons why they have to be a lot more careful who they take out of school, because they don't have as many to start with. They are not engaged in mass education. They haven't gotten to the place where they think everybody can stand a college education without it having some adverse effects on him.

QUESTION: General, in your remarks you talked about inducting age groups. Then you made reference to the unhappy experience with doctors,

RESTRICTED

334

about the experience you had pulling doctors into the service. I didn't quite understand what you meant. Are the doctors put in a special category or in the medical service generally?

GENERAL HERSHEY: What I tried to do was this: Going back to the report I raised the bubble about this morning, because it was the last thing I read, and I don't read much--one of the things which that recommended was that we have calls on an occupational basis, that is, so many machinists, plumbers, carpenters, and so on. They said there is no doubt we could do it, because we had run the doctors' draft.

Well, I was flattered to think we had run it in the first place, because actually the doctors' draft was the most peculiar series of contradictions that you could think of. In the first place, the purpose was to get doctors into the armed forces voluntarily. The idea was that if you put force on them, they would volunteer. There was no idea of filling the quota by calls. The calls were merely the red flags or something else that you waved to encourage them to volunteer.

We have had a pretty tough go at it. We have taken in a total of volunteers of, I guess, only 8,000 or 9,000. We have inducted 40 or 50 that for one reason or another didn't quite get away. Those 40 or 50 were ones that Congress told us to take, and they were complete failures. They were complete failures because we gave them something in a way that they couldn't use. The Supreme Court did go far enough to say that we could use a physician as an enlisted man. But it is not very popular yet among the people who happen to be in that profession.

So, by and large, we failed when we carried out the congressional mandate. Therefore, I don't think that the occupational call has been a success. In the first place, if we had a war, we wouldn't have time to fool with it, because I tell you very frankly there is three times as much effort in my headquarters spent on the doctors, dentists, and veterans as there is on the regular calls. The regular calls haven't taken any time. But to try to handle in a mass operation a custom-tailored job--it is just the wrong shop. What I said--and I repeat--is that I hope we learned enough by our failures and our difficulties with the doctors' draft never to try any more occupational drafts if we can avoid it.

One good thing about that is, you know what a doctor is. You don't know whether he is worth anything, but you know he is a doctor, because he has proved it. He has a license, in some states. But when you get into a hundred other occupations, you can't go much further than just to say he is an engineer. You can get into a lot of discussion about whether he is or isn't, and if he isn't, why and why not.

As you go down the list you can see that you are going to get a man making an appeal because he claims to be something and everybody says

RESTRICTED

he is not. Of course all the boys have a pat answer on that point. Just appoint three experts in the Employment Service. They are going to look at him and tell you. They weren't able to tell industry during the war. The boys that had to hire them tended to do their own looking. I don't want to take down anybody, but one of the difficulties of trying to handle people in certain classifications, especially when you get all sorts of professional occupations, specialists, is that only the fellow who has it knows that he has it.

QUESTION: General, there are several jobs that women can definitely do better than men; and, if a man had his preference or choice, he would take a woman for those jobs. Yet it seemed to me that during the war, and even at the present time, we could have used several times the number of women we did. Will you give us your ideas on the drafting of women the same as we do men.

GENERAL HERSHEY: I think I have gotten into trouble on that question as much as I have with any other that I know of.

My position on that has been quite clear. I don't think we should start drafting women individually until survival is involved. So far as right or wrong is concerned, equity, there isn't any equity, because when you take 18½-, 20-, or 25-year-olds in and leave somebody my age or some other age out, there isn't any equity. It is a question of taking the age groups that the country can use. Therefore from the occupational standpoint I think that you ought to draft them. From the practical standpoint I don't think at the moment you will sell Congress on a so-called peacetime draft of women.

Now, I do believe there has been a very great change in the last 13 years. I don't mean to say that it will pass now, but such a bill will have lots more votes today than it had in 1940 in the Congress. I don't know whether it is going to take 5, 10, or 15 years, but I think we are undoubtedly going to get to the place where, if we have enough who have had experience, that we can use in preference to men, we will be in a position where I think Congress will some day to come be willing to draft them.

One thing that a great many people say about women in the armed forces is that we won't have to worry about drafting them; they will all volunteer. I never happened to believe that. I know they are somewhat different from men, but they are not that different.

I don't believe, though, that you will get such legislation short of something that is a little more of a crisis than what we have now. But there is no equity in it. I think there are some limitations on them in the forces today, the same as there are some limitations on men. There must be or I wouldn't have 1.8 million 4-F's at the present time--that is out of 9 million. But 4 million women wouldn't be too high.

QUESTION: General, of all the men who are in the  $18\frac{1}{2}$  to 26 age group, or under that, what percentage actually will go into uniform?

GENERAL HERSHEY: That is a good question. I think I am going to impose some figures on you. I certainly don't ask you to remember them, because I can't.

We have registered 14.5 million individuals since 1948. That means that all those people at the time they were registered were under 26. Some are older now. At the present time, of those registered, 400,000 are not yet  $18\frac{1}{2}$  and therefore are not liable. So that leaves 14.1 million that are either liable or have been.

Five million got out before the lid dropped. I mean by that, that 5 million got to be 26 before Congress said that being 26 was not significant if he had been deferred prior thereto.

Now, I don't worry too much about those 5 million. The great majority of them are veterans and they wouldn't be liable. Some are 4-F and most of them wouldn't be acceptable. So the great majority of these 5 million are either individuals who are not liable or not acceptable--but that leaves 9.1 million.

This is a pretty good idea of where your money goes. I have here 9.1 million of whom 3.5 million have either been inducted or were too fast for us and got in just ahead of us and therefore became volunteers--that leaves 5.6 million. We have 800,000 veterans still under 26, which leaves 4.8 million. We have 500,000 individuals that are deferred by Congress. I can give you two of the larger groups of those. We have around 70,000 who are in college finishing this year's work. As long as they are satisfactory--and that is not too difficult any more--they can stay in school.

Of these individuals 363,000 got into the Reserves before February 1951, or into the National Guard before 1951, or enlisted in the National Guard before they were  $18\frac{1}{2}$  subsequent to 1951, or got into ROTC. I call those almost in; for my purpose they are in. For your purpose they are out. They are not in the armed forces, because they are not, and we can't take them, because they are. Resolve that and you are all right. That leaves 4.3 million.

We have 1.4 million who are deferred by Congress--by Presidential Executive orders. The biggest group, 1.1 million of those are fathers. We have 160,000 who are students and have been smart enough to get somewhere in a class where administratively they are eligible for deferment, or who passed the Princeton test and made people think they have intelligence, whether they have it or not. We have 90,000 or a few more in 11-C. We have about 30,000 deferred for other reasons. That makes 1.4 million.

# RESTRICTED

337

That brings it down to 2.9 million--1.8 million of those have been examined and found not wanted in and not wanting to get in. No one else wants to use them, and they are not acceptable to the armed forces. That leaves 1.1 million.

Out of those some will not be accepted--6 to 10 percent of those will be rejected when they go before a doctor, or before a different doctor, or the same doctor a different day. Of the other 750,000 that have been examined, we will lose something up to 40 percent of them or a little more on the physical examination.

You say, What percentage will get into uniform? If I take the 1.4 million and the 3.5 million, the number that got in was pretty small. But we ought to remember that we had probably about 6 million veterans in there, who are not liable. That makes the position a little more favorable.

Getting right down to brass tacks, if we want to be responsible for ROTC, get the National Guard and the Reserves, I would say at the present time that the ones who didn't get in are mostly the 1.1 million fathers and the 1.8 million 4-F's, and some assorted people like the 160,000 students and the 80,000 or 90,000 farmers and the 30,000 others. That will give 325,000 total deferred from day to day.

We tried pretty hard to get the President to make this father business retroactive. If they had, we would have 1.1 million of them. But we didn't get them. We shall try again, because I don't like to be in the position of denying to a citizen the right to serve in our armed forces.

MR. POLUHOFF: General Hershey, you have given an excellent insight into your problems of mobilization. On behalf of the college, thank you very much, sir.

(16 Oct 1953--750)S/ibc

# RESTRICTED