

THE MANPOWER RESOURCES OF EUROPE

357

16 September 1953

CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
INTRODUCTION--Mr. A. L. Maserick, Member of the Faculty, ICAF ...	1
SPEAKER--Dr. Dudley Kirk, Chief of the Planning Staff of the Special Assistant for Intelligence, State Department, Washington, D. C.....	1
GENERAL DISCUSSION.....	12

Publication No. 154-21

INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

Washington, D. C.

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Dr. Dudley Kirk, Chief, Planning Staff of the Special Assistant for Intelligence to the Secretary of State, was born in Rochester, New York, 1913. He received his A.B. at Pomona College, 1934 and Ph.D. at Harvard University, 1946. He served as research associate and assistant professor of Sociology, Princeton University, 1939-1947; chief, Population Branch, Division of International and Functional Intelligence, Department of State, 1947-1950; adviser on sociological research and various other assignments in 1951; chief, Division of Research for Near East, South Asia, and Africa, 1952. He was appointed to his present position in February 1953. He is the author of the following publications: "Future Population of Europe and the Soviet Union" (League of Nations, 1944); "Europe's Population in the Interwar Years" (League of Nations, 1946); "European Migrations: Prewar Trends and Future Prospects" (The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly, XXV, No. 2, April 1947); reprint from Modern France entitled "Population and Population Trends in Modern France," Princeton University Press.

## THE MANPOWER RESOURCES OF EUROPE

16 September 1953

MR. MASERICK: Admiral Hague, General Greeley, gentlemen: This morning we continue our study of manpower with a lecture on "The Manpower Resources of Europe." The subject will include the manpower of the USSR.

Our speaker today is Dr. Dudley Kirk, Chief of the Planning Staff of the Special Assistant for Intelligence in the State Department. Back in 1947 Dr. Kirk presented his first lecture to the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. It was entitled "Human Resources." Again, in September 1950 he participated in a stimulating seminar on the comparative world manpower resources.

His biographical sketch shows that he is a close student of European demography. The array of his work on population includes, "Future Population of Europe and the Soviet Union," "European Migrations: Prewar Trends and Future Prospects," and "Population and Population Trends in Modern France."

It is most desirable to have a lecture on demography early in the manpower instruction. Knowing Dr. Kirk's background, we were highly pleased to obtain him for this year's student class, to discuss with him the manpower resources of Europe. On behalf of the Industrial College, it is indeed a pleasure to welcome you back to the platform of the college. Dr. Kirk.

DR. KIRK: Gentlemen: It is a pleasure to be back here. My topic is "The Manpower Resources of Europe." I think we might agree right at the outset that the manpower factor in power relationships--to which I would like to address your attention particularly--is of two kinds. It is, first, a question of sheer numbers and, second, a question of the quality of the manpower resources. This morning I shall be talking chiefly about the former--numbers--not because numbers are necessarily most important but because they are tangible and measurable.

Introduction--the European Population Cluster

I would like first to call your attention to a major feature of population and manpower distribution in Europe; namely, the fact that despite divisive national boundaries, it is a single, coherent, integrated cluster of people. The European population cluster is, next to that of East Asia, the largest in the world. It includes 600 million people. And it is not just a happenstantial arrangement of people in different countries--they are all connected in a pattern of settlement which long antedates modern conflicts and political disputes. It is a

pattern arising from ancient agricultural settlement, from trade routes, from orientation to the seas. It is in fact related to the distribution of population in North America, because the population of North America is in many respects a part of this Atlantic population cluster.

I will tell you what I mean by that. The heaviest numbers of population in Europe are in the northwestern part of Europe. As you go out from the center of population, in a circle containing southern England, the low countries, northern France, and Western Germany, which is the most densely populated area, as you go out in any direction, the population density goes down.

In North America the heaviest concentration of people is in our Northeast, that is, in the habitable area closest to Europe. As you go out from this concentration--North, West, South--the density of population declines.

The Atlantic Ocean is as much a unifying influence as a separating influence. The two clusters attract and influence each other. Within Europe, as you go out a way towards the East, towards the South, towards the extremities of Europe, the population density becomes less. And of course as you go out into the Soviet Union it thins out very much as it thins out in our own West, and for the same reasons--increasing aridity, mountainous terrain, and so on.

This is the European population cluster, with the main transportation lines, main patterns of communication systems, and so forth, organized on a European basis, not a country basis. And in many respects we in the United States and the people in the Soviet Union have the same relationship to the main population cluster in western Europe. We are both in a sense peripheral. We are the western fragment; the Soviet Union is the eastern fragment. The settlement of some parts of the Soviet Union by Europeans (that is, Slavs, Germans) is as recent as the settlement of our own West. At least up to the recent past we have both represented the expanding perimeter of this European population cluster. The whole is the chief settlement area of the population of European race. Europe as a whole has grown tremendously from about 100 million in 1650 to 600 million at the present time, figured very roughly, and there are more than 200 million people overseas of European descent. But the great mass of people of the European race are still in Europe and the Soviet Union.

#### Divergent Population Trends in Europe

Now within this population cluster there have been quite widely divergent trends among the different countries. It is very easy to forget when you read the history books that there have been major changes in the population size of European countries, major changes that have probably been as much as anything else responsible for great shifts in power relationships.

Back in the 18th century France had the largest population in Europe. It now seems rather fantastic in a way since the Soviet Union has five times as many people as France. This refers to the territory of Imperial Russia before 1918, not the USSR as it exists today, but the boundaries are not significantly different from the point of view of this historical comparison.

The French population was growing, but very slowly. Back somewhere in the 18th century--we don't know just when--the present territory of the Soviet Union passed France in population. And of course in the Napoleonic Wars, France met its crucial defeat in the attack on Russia. Germany passed France along in the middle of the 19th century, and it is not altogether coincidental that Germany administered a crushing defeat to France in the War of 1870. Great Britain passed France and Italy passed France.

I don't want to exaggerate the significance of these things, but it is rather significant, historically speaking, that we have this rough coincidence between changes in the dominant roles played by the continental powers and their populations. There's rough correspondence, then, between the major changes in numbers and the historical changes in power.

#### The Demographic "Revolution"

Now, how did these changes come about?

In the course of modern history Europe has gone through a demographic "revolution" which has paralleled industrialization and urbanization. In this demographic revolution western Europe has evolved from a situation of high birth rates and high death rates, which are characteristic of primitive agrarian societies, toward a new balance of low birth and death rates characteristic of societies with high standards of living. Because this transition has not taken place evenly or at the same time in different parts of Europe, there have been major differences in rates of population growth.

The historical trend of birth and death rates in Denmark illustrate what has happened in western Europe. I chose Denmark because I happen to have the information readily available for a long historical period.

In the 18th century the populations of Denmark, Scandinavia, and of western Europe as a whole were growing, but slowly. They were growing slowly because the normal excess of births over deaths in good years was periodically wiped out in bad years by crop failures, famines; epidemics of plague, small pox, and other terrible diseases. Even measles proved to be quite a killer back in the early part of the 19th century. Scarlet fever, malaria, and numerous other infectious and contagious diseases were major killers back in those days. They kept the population down.

It didn't grow very fast. There was a high birth rate, but people died off--calamities killed them off.

War entered into this. Denmark was never very heavily involved in wars in this period so its effects are not so great as they might be for some other western European countries.

As western Europe became modernized, as it began to get improvement in the control of diseases, as it began to get higher standards of living, better housing, bath tubs, cleaner habits--the death rate began to come down. The general trend of the death rate in Denmark and in other western countries was downward in the 19th century, but the birth rate remained high. Consequently there was a big difference between birth and death rates, which is another way of saying there was tremendous population growth. This is what was occurring in western Europe in the 19th century.

By 1880 or so the birth rate began to come down. The population growth continued, because the death rate was also continuing to go down. But of course the death rate could not go down to zero. People are going to die, sooner or later. So the death rate cannot keep going down as in the past. As a result, in most western European countries the birth rate was going down faster than the death rate after World War I. In some countries--in France, for example, and Austria--the birth rate in the interwar period fell below the death rate and the population growth ceased. In western Europe as a whole the rate of population growth was falling fast in the interwar years.

After the war, there was quite a baby boom in western Europe with a new resurgence of population growth. But this has proved temporary. Birth rates are falling back toward prewar levels. Despite new miracles in saving lives the birth rates in western Europe are again falling more rapidly than death rates. In other words the population growth is slowing down.

All European countries can be placed somewhere along this great historical transition from high birth and death rates to low birth and death rates. It is not a question of ideology; it is not a question of beliefs. There are some variations from country to country. There are certain exceptions such as the Netherlands, which is a highly developed country that nevertheless has a comparatively high birth rate. In general, however, there's a close correlation between an industrialized, modernized way of life and the progress of the demographic "revolution" I've described. The more developed the country the lower its birth and death rates.

Now, western Europe, as a highly developed area, is approaching a rough population balance with slow population growth. Eastern Europe, which has much more recently come into modernization and industrialization, is more backward, and is further back in the expanding phase of the cycle

where population growth is still rapid. In the recent past, eastern European countries--particularly the Soviet Union--have grown much more rapidly than the West.

But the Soviet Union has not proved to be immune to the impact of the demographic "revolution." The Soviet Union in 1900 had a birth rate that actually was much higher than Denmark ever had. In those days it was away up to 50 or so per thousand. Despite Communist efforts to check the decline, by the end of the interwar period the Soviet birth rate had fallen to 38--declining from 50 to 38. Today it is way down--as close as we can estimate--to somewhere between 25 and 30--in other words: You can think of it roughly as a situation very close to the situation in Denmark in the early part of the century. It is going along this same way today. We have no reason to suppose that the Soviet Union will not continue in the same experience as western countries as industrialization and urban ways of life come to be predominant in the USSR. Population growth is already slowing up.

#### Effects of War Displacements of Populations

Nevertheless in the recent past Russia and eastern Europe have been in a period of rapid population expansion. Even the great war losses did not wipe out the force of this expansion, which expressed itself demographically in the forced migrations that brought about the displacement of many million Europeans.

One major effect of the war on the population of Europe was the great westward migration of peoples. Because the East has been expanding more rapidly in population than the West, there has been a lack of balance between the political layout and the underlying demographic population pressure.

Before World War I western European countries, or central European countries, dominated eastern European peoples. Germany and Austria dominated much of Poland; Germans and Austrians dominated the eastern peoples in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. By direct or indirect rule, the more developed western European countries dominated much of eastern Europe.

The First World War resulted in a revolt against this, by the setting up of the secession states, which are now satellite countries. The Second World War resulted in even greater victories for the East. The demographic pressure from the East has greatly facilitated the pushing back of the West. This is reflected in numerous population movements to the West. These movements, from the Soviet point of view, from the eastern point of view, were relatively successful. The Soviets and their satellite peoples have been relatively successful in reoccupying areas from which they have thrown out western European peoples--Germans, and so on.

The Finns and Poles were pushed westward, out of the new enlarged Soviet Union. Soviet citizens moved into the vacuum of what was formerly eastern Poland. DP's from many areas went to central Europe, western Europe, and overseas.

Germans were thrust out from what is now de facto Polish territory. Czechs and Slovaks moved into areas from which Germans were forced out in Bohemia. Italians were thrown out of the Venezia Giuilia area by the Yugoslavs. It was a western thrust of people which occurred, reflecting the underlying demographic changes. The Slavs were able to do this effectively and successfully because they could take advantage of powerful demographic forces in their favor. The Germans before and during the war had much greater difficulty in ousting the Poles, for example, and settling the Germans, because they were going against the demographic tide. I am not trying to preach a moral. I am simply saying this is one of the facts we have to face in the European situation--the western thrust of people pushed from behind by the Soviets is one that, for better or worse, goes with the fact that the Soviets and eastern Europeans are still in this expanding phase of population growth. The favorable aspect, from our point of view, is that those people are moving into the period of slower population growth in which they may have to face the same problems western Europe faces.

#### Comparison of East and West

Up to this point I have been giving the historical panorama. Where do we stand now? Let us turn to the absolute numbers involved in the present comparison of the East and the West. (See page 7.)

This is a table showing European manpower in 1952. All of these figures are millions. I have not elaborated this nearly as much as it might be elaborated, but I have taken certain significant indices of European manpower for what seem to me to be the most significant areas.

The first column shows the total population for the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Western Germany and for the total West, which includes some 20 jurisdictions or sovereignties besides these four--326 million is the total in 1952. USSR has 207 million. The satellites have 91 million. You add them together and you get a total East of 298 million people as of 1952.

I will just run down those figures again: UK 51 million; France 43 million; Italy 47 million; Western Germany, the Federal Republic, 48; the total West, including all the minor areas and smaller countries, is 326 million. USSR is 207 million; satellites 91 million. The total East is 298 million.

EUROPEAN MANPOWER, 1952

(Millions)

	Total Population	Population 15-59	Males 15-24	Labor Force	Nonagri- cultural	Agricultural
<u>West</u>						
United Kingdom	51	31	3.1	22.5	21.5	1
France	43	26	3.3	20.5	13.5	7
Italy	47	29	4.1	19.5	11.5	8
Western Germany	48	30	3.5	20.5	14.5	6
Subtotal	189	116	14	83	61	22
Other west Europe	90					
Greece-Turkey	30					
Yugoslavia	17					
Total West	326					
<u>East</u>						
USSR	207	117	21	90 a/	50 a/	40 a/
Satellites	73					
East Germany	18					
Total East	298					

a/ Rough estimates, in each case excluding slave laborers.

It is a picture of rough equality between the West and East--326 million in the West; 298 million in the East--call each very roughly 300 million. At the same time there is a rather rough equality between the 189 million who live in the four major powers of the West and the 207 million in the USSR--roughly 200 million for each. In addition there are the satellites and the lesser western powers each something like 100 million--more, in the case of the West; a little less in the case of the satellites.

### Age Structures

But these gross population totals are only one basis of comparison. We must look further at the composition of these populations to get a firmer basis of comparison.

To illustrate I want to call your attention to this diagram, which is called an age pyramid. This is a comparison of Sweden, which I just take as representative of the West, in outline, and of the USSR, in black. This is a distribution of the populations of the USSR and Sweden by age. (Chart was not reproduced.)

If you concentrate on the USSR for the moment--that is the black--it is as though you took a crowd in a football stadium and put the children, 0 to 4, in the first tier, put the children, 5 to 9, in the second tier, the youths 10 to 14 in the third tier, the 15- to 19-year-olds in the fourth tier; and so on, until, when you come up to the press box you are dealing with people 85 years and over--the males on the left and females on the right, like a Quaker meeting.

These are percentage distributions, of course--the population of Sweden is nowhere near the absolute size of the Soviet Union; the purpose is to show the great differences in the composition of the population. The Soviet population has a very broad base--lots of children. In Sweden, owing to the decline in birth rate, they don't have very many children. What does this mean in terms of manpower? You will see quite clearly that Sweden--and this speaks for western Europe--has a high concentration of its population in the adult ages; in the ages from 20 up to 50 or 60.

### The Military and Labor Force Age Groups

From the point of view of military manpower, you will notice a disturbing fact--that in Sweden (and western Europe) each succeeding group reaching age 15, 20, and so on, is smaller than the one that preceded it. In other words the reservoir from which we draw military manpower is receding in western Europe at this time, whereas in the Soviet Union, despite terrific war losses, there are very large younger groups moving into the military ages; so each year in the Soviet Union the size of the base of military manpower is increasing--the young military manpower.

Thus when you break down these populations by age we get a different picture of the effective population as over against the gross totals. The second column of the table shows the population of ages 15 to 59. This is a rough measure of the labor-force ages. When you make this comparison--because the other western European countries have the same characteristic that Sweden has, of a concentration in the working ages--you get almost exact equality between the USSR with 117 million in those ages and the four major countries of the West, which have 116 million; this though their total population is substantially less--189 versus 207. But look at the prime military ages of 15 to 24-- I realize this is not a precise measure of the military ages, but it is as good as any. If you are thinking two or three years ahead, your 15 to 24 people in 1952 are your 18 to 27 people in 1955. When you look at this prime military manpower, our four western countries have only about 14 million men at ages 15 to 24; I estimate that the Soviet Union has some 21 million. The Soviet Union has 50 percent more in the prime military ages.

The labor force shown in column 4 also favors the Soviet Union. It has some 90 million in the labor force, versus 83 million in the major western countries, even leaving aside some 8 million slave laborers. This difference exists in spite of the fact that the Soviet Union has only about the same number of people in the working ages as the four major western powers. This is because the Soviet Union uses its potential manpower much more than does the West.

The Russians use women in the labor force more than we do in the West. About two-thirds of the women in the Soviet Union in the age group 15 to 59 are in the labor force, whereas in the western countries it is much less; in the United States it is only about 30 percent.

#### Agriculture vs. Nonagriculture Labor Force

Let us turn now to another aspect of the labor force. The labor force of course, includes two major segments--nonagricultural and agricultural.

The amount of manpower wasted in inefficient agriculture is an important factor in relative effectiveness of manpower. Just one illustration of this: Despite the great discrepancy in the total populations of Germany and the Soviet Union in the interwar period, Germany nevertheless had a larger nonagricultural labor force than did the Soviet Union and all of the Slav countries combined--the Soviet Union plus the Slavic countries of eastern Europe. So that in a sense the really effective comparison of population in that period was this large industrial population of Germany with the small industrial population of the East. Of course the Soviet Union has and is changing that very rapidly.

From the point of view of industrial potential, the only part of the population that counts is the nonagricultural. So long as the agricultural population can feed the rest, there is no problem. In the case of the United States, we have only 10 percent of the population feeding the rest and providing a lot of surplus to send overseas.

But in the eastern European countries, owing to inefficient agriculture, they still have to have a very large agricultural population in their labor force. Until very recently half was agricultural. In the West it is much smaller. The agriculture of western Europe is much more efficient than that of the East. In this sense, of course, western Europe is using its potential labor force much more effectively. It has three-fourths of its labor force in nonagricultural pursuits, especially industrial and commercial activities.

The USSR by contrast still has 40 million people in the agricultural labor force and in this regard has a great reservoir of manpower for potential use in industry. The West and the United States have already largely used up this reservoir. Though they have been industrializing rapidly, eastern Europe and the Soviet Union have still not used up this reserve, and as they industrialize further they can increasingly draw people from the agricultural segment over to the industrial segment of the economy.

#### Labor Reserves

This leads us to the question of labor reserves that may be drawn upon in an emergency. There are three aspects of labor reserves. One I haven't mentioned is unemployment. There is, to all intents and purposes, no unemployment in the East. There is some unemployment in western Europe, but except in Italy this is not large in relation to the total labor force potential. The second factor in the labor reserve is the women. This is the most flexible part of the labor force. The men in the age group 15 to 59 in Europe are almost all gainfully occupied. The Soviet Union is also using womenpower almost as much as possible. When you consider the problem of raising children and what not, they have gone about as far as they can. There's very little flexibility there. By contrast the West has a very substantial reserve in women not now gainfully occupied, that could be drawn into the labor force in an emergency.

A third element in labor reserves is underemployment in agriculture as I mentioned earlier--the West is already pretty effectively using the bulk of its manpower outside agriculture. It has some cumulated reserves of agricultural underemployment in Italy and Spain, but nothing to compare with the East. The East has enormous reserves of inefficient farmers to draw on as it industrializes. It has this great manpower reserve.

### Labor Productivity

I am not going to say much about labor productivity. This is a complicated question. I think perhaps the simplest way to refer to labor productivity, or to measure labor productivity, is the gross national product per capita. The average per capita income is 561 dollars in western Europe. Of course this is an average combining some very low income areas with some quite high income areas. Portugal is down around 200 dollars; United Kingdom has something over 1,000 dollars per capita.

The USSR has an estimated gross national product of 413 dollars per capita. In the satellites it is 409 dollars. In the United States by comparison, the per capita income is 2,200 dollars.

The difference is not quite so great as is suggested by these figures, because the purchasing power of the dollar in Europe is greater than it is in this country. But there's an enormous difference in labor productivity in this country as compared with western Europe or eastern Europe.

Eastern Europe is coming up very fast. There has been 50 percent increase in Poland and Czechoslovakia over prewar. This is, however, as much as anything else, because the Poles and the Czechs moved into industrial areas vacated by the Germans. In the West the increases over prewar are generally less. There was 40 percent increase in productivity in Spain, which is the leader; 30 percent in the United Kingdom; ranging down to zero in France.

My lecture topic is supposed to include all other factors affecting the manpower potential in Europe. I am not going to have time to elaborate on this, except simply to mention certain things that do enter into it. They are: health, of course; the washed of western Europe, versus the unwashed of the East; the comparatively literate population of the West, versus the comparatively illiterate population of the East; different attitudes toward work--there are much more regular work habits in the West, in the past, anyway. The Russians, however, seem to be increasingly successful in building up an effective industrial labor force, one that can deal with machinery, and so on; the different attitudes towards death and hardship--a factor which, of course, favors the East; there is much less regard for human life in the East than in the West.

### Morale

Perhaps the most important thing of all, one that is completely intangible, in a hot war or a cold war, is the will to fight, to resist, to expend one's self on behalf of national purposes. I think it is fair to say that the real purpose of either a hot war or a cold war is to

undermine the will of the enemy, or potential enemy, to fight or to aggress. It seems to me the ultimate purpose of warfare is not merely to destroy the enemy. You may have to do that; but the purpose of destruction is not the destruction itself, but to convince the enemy that resistance is hopeless.

Thus this whole question of morale is a tremendously important thing. We have not got far in the analysis of the factors that go into morale, how it can be controlled or manipulated. In psychological warfare we are feeling our way somewhat feebly towards a greater knowledge and understanding of this problem. It is obviously tremendously important in the whole evaluation of manpower. But I can only mention this importance in closing the main part of my talk.

### Summary

Very quickly to summarize the comparison of the West and East: Total numbers are roughly equal. Trends favor the East. The East is growing faster than the West. Composition of the population is more favorable in the East--there is a younger eastern population versus an older western population.

One minor favorable factor I forgot to mention is: At the moment there are larger groups of young people coming along in the West as a result of the baby boom. This will be advantageous to the West 10 or 15 years from now.

Western Europe has the greatest reservoir of skills in the world; not excepting the United States. But the East is making much more rapid progress in training and developing technical skills--not in basic science so much as technical trades.

As to labor reserves--in the West we have the several million unemployed and huge numbers of women who could be drawn into the labor force in a crisis. In the East they have underemployment in agriculture.

Above all, and, in a way, this is the overriding factor, the East is organized, comparatively unified; the manpower of the West is scattered amongst some 25 different sovereignties. Combined, the free manpower of the West is far more than a match for the manpower of the East. Divided it is at a tremendous disadvantage.

That's the picture, gentlemen. I have talked enough. I give the meeting back to Mr. Maserick.

MR. MASERICK: Gentlemen, Dr. Kirk is now ready for your questions.

QUESTION: Doctor, referring to Denmark's death and birth rates as an example of the decreasing tendency in the population in Europe, it appears to me from your chart that the rate is still about 10 per thousand and has been for the past 150 years.

DR. KIRK: Actually Sweden has a lower birth rate than Denmark. You are quite right that Denmark is an unfortunate choice to illustrate my point since the birth rate has held up more in Denmark than in some of the more industrialized countries. I took Denmark because I had a series that went far back historically. But that population growth is tapering off. In the interwar period it was about 7 per thousand; before that it was more in the nature of 10 to 12. The Swedish population increase has fallen to two or three per thousand before the war.

I think there's this point that might be made. Perhaps this was behind your question. Maybe the western European picture is not quite so dolorous as might appear. Is it really true that western European populations are going to decline? The picture has certainly changed from the gloomy one that emerged before World War II. The interwar picture was one in which a continuation of downward trends in the birth rate would soon bring about a rapid loss of population. The recovery of the birth rate after the war has changed this to a certain extent, and the prospect now, the best guess, is that western Europe's population will roughly stabilize rather than decline.

QUESTION: I have one question to follow up that. If it does remain stable at a low death rate and a fairly low birth rate, it means the population of the countries is getting to a place where the average age is much older.

DR. KIRK: That's right.

QUESTION: Would you care to discuss the influence of that on human nature or the ability to carry out war?

DR. KIRK: This is a difficult thing to answer. It is a two-sided thing. The most advanced countries in the world today have older populations; the least advanced have the youngest. In the underdeveloped countries; in India, for example, half the population is under age 20-- the average age. Almost half of the population are children; it's a very young population but also very backward.

I don't say it is backward because the population is young. You get my point. Nor are western Europe and the United States so far advanced because they are older. In fact the cause and effect works the other way round. The changing composition of population goes along with advancement. You save lives; people don't die young; they live to be older.

Within western Europe I think there seems to be some plausible evidence of the dangers of an aging population. The oldest population in Europe is the French population, and France is certainly the least progressive of the major European countries. Whether that is because of age changes or not, I am not quite prepared to say; but at least there is that coincidence.

QUESTION: On your European manpower figures, Doctor, on the labor force, do you include in that consideration the slave labor that is presently available behind the Iron Curtain?

DR. KIRK: It is not included. This is the so-called civilian labor force.

QUESTION: Doctor, in this potential of the USSR in their agricultural population, I assume that can only be made available through increasing their technology and their agricultural pursuits, with a lower requirement for food. Will you comment on how they are going to make that available?

DR. KIRK: They are being successful in increasing their agricultural output faster than their population growth by mechanization. This is the means we use in this country. It wasn't consciously done here as it is now being done in the Soviet Union, but the effect is the same—mechanization of agriculture frees labor to go into industry.

QUESTION: Dr. Kirk, governments have from time to time attempted to increase the birth rate, and I assume they have attempted to decrease the birth rate. Have those attempts been successfully significant, and what efforts are being made, particularly in the Iron Curtain countries, at the present time?

DR. KIRK: These efforts have generally been unsuccessful. The outstanding prewar case was Germany. The Nazis, you recall, tried to increase the birth rate. They were temporarily rather strikingly successful. The birth rate in Germany rose approximately 50 percent between 1933 and 1938. Superficially, it looked as though they were tremendously successful in raising the birth rate. But the curious thing is that when the other western European countries experienced a comparable increase of employment to what Germany had, they experienced the same increase in birth rate, without any policy. The United States has experienced the same increase in birth rate without any policy, which tends to undermine the thesis that the specific German policies resulted in this increase.

It may have been a factor; the marriage loans that they gave induced couples to marry earlier and hence to have their children now rather than later. Perhaps this may have been a factor; but it probably wasn't a crucial one.

In the Soviet Union for a time they did have a very effective population policy. The old Soviet approach to this problem--was rough and ready--they saw people didn't want to have children, so they said, "If they don't want to have children, we will give them free abortion clinics." So abortion clinics were set up in all major cities in the early thirties. There was a huge free abortion clinic in one of the finest old palaces of the Moscow aristocracy that was working full blast in the early thirties. The birth rate in the Soviet Union dropped spectacularly. In Moscow it was cut in half in three or four years. It was an amazing thing.

The Russians got alarmed at this, and Stalin made a trip to Tiflis, his old home, to see his mother and to deliver a speech on the sanctity of the family, the importance of the family, and the importance of having children for the fatherland. This was followed by an entire reversal of Communist policy. They closed up the abortion clinics overnight. They set up a system of awards for mothers of many children which is still continued--family allowances--so many rubles for the fifth child, so many more for the sixth child, and so on; it was an increasing thing, so it might pay to have a big family. They gave out motherhood medals to "Mother Heroines of the Soviet Union."

This worked for a while; seemed to work, due, I think, much more to the closing of the abortion clinics than the awarding of all these medals and the baby bonuses, because the baby bonuses were never really enough to take care of the costs of additional children, except for people living at the very lowest level.

The same desire to have fewer children existed. To accomplish this they found other means, so far as we can ascertain. At the present time, according to the figures they put out themselves, the birth rate cannot be higher than 30 per thousand; it is probably lower than 30-- somewhere between 25 and 30 per thousand, which is not very much higher than it is in this country. In this country it is around 24 per thousand now.

Either a great many people have died, or are dying in ways that don't get recorded, or even estimated, in our statistics, or the birth rate in the Soviet Union has gone down very much; and I think it is fairly safe to say the latter is the case. In other words this policy of promoting a high birth rate worked for a while. They cut off what were then the means of reducing the family size. Since the basic motivation of reducing family size continued to be present, the Communist measures were effective only for a time. They are apparently not very effective now.

QUESTION: Dr. Kirk, my question pertains to the qualitative aspect of population, particularly that of the Soviet Union. As I recall, in 1928 or somewhere near that time, there were around

250,000 collective farms. The latest indications are that they have reduced that factor to something under 100,000 collective farms. Is that an increase in urban population or is it a centralizing of the smaller farms? What effect, if any, is that having on the quality of the Russian population that is half agricultural and half nonagricultural?

DR. KIRK: Answering the first part of your question, I would say it was both. The reduction in the number of farms represents centralization and later the use of mechanization; this was at the same time made necessary by the great withdrawals of people into the industrial labor force. This is again one of the things in which cause and effect are related. You centralize your operations, mechanize them, and you don't need as many people. At the same time cities are a magnet for the people in the Soviet Union. In many cases centralization and mechanization was thrust upon them because the labor force was leaving the farm.

I would say the former case was true in the more remote areas, and the latter case was true in areas close to Moscow or near other big cities where there are industries in need of an expanding labor force.

With respect to the effectiveness of the labor force, I would say there is no question that it has increased. They reduced the size of the labor force necessary to keep up the agricultural production.

QUESTION: Doctor, I wonder if you could give us a little information on the distribution of the death rate in the USSR, my question being, with this major baby crop, can we expect a higher percentage of deaths, so that they will not reach the labor-force and military age, as they do in our country?

DR. KIRK: This was formerly true; it is not true now, insofar as we have any evidence. The Soviets have made great progress in cutting down deaths. They have drugs; they have cheap means of cutting deaths. They don't have fancy hospitals but they have the elementary things--vaccinations and elementary cheap public health methods--that have resulted in great savings of lives. There's no reason to suppose they have not been successful in this--maybe not so successful as they said but certainly successful.

I would say this factor is no longer of great consequence. They are fast approaching a place where the majority of babies born will reach adulthood as they do in this country.

QUESTION: Can you tell us if the population of the Soviet Union is uniform throughout the Asiatic portion as well as the European portion? Is the Asiatic portion contributing to the East and the West, or is that population pushing East?

DR. KIRK: That's a very good question. That is one thing I did not bring out. Of course there has been a great eastward expansion of this population cluster, as I chose to call it, of new settlement to the East, as well as new settlement to the West, in North America and other overseas areas. But more than half of the Russian territory is still occupied by minority peoples. The great expanses of Asia are inhabited, rather sparsely, by indigenous populations of non-Russian background.

Of course there are increasing intrusions of the Russian population from the West into the East, which give Russian control increasing force.

The Great Russians and related Slavs, the Ukrainians and White Russians are three-fourths of the total USSR population. Those are the heartland peoples of the Soviet Union, and they have strong colonies in cities and on major transportation routes in all areas.

In Asia there are these tremendous areas inhabited by apparently discontented minorities, with varying degrees of discontent. The Moslem peoples, particularly, who occupy the whole southern Asiatic part of the Soviet Union, are to some extent discontented with Russian domination and they have a desire for closer relationships with other Moslems. It is a vulnerable place, the southern boundaries of the Soviet Union, but very isolated, of course, and difficult to get at.

But coming back to your question--it is certainly true that these people are not as effective parts of the Soviet population as the majority who are Slavs; and, second, their geographical location is such--in these compact areas of settlement--that potentially they could be a great source of weakness to the Soviet Union.

QUESTION: Doctor, is the USSR agriculture efficient enough now that it would carry the country through a crop failure such as you have shown on a chart now, or would one year's crop failure force Russia to take some people out of the labor force and put them back to farming?

DR. KIRK: In the past when they had a crop failure they starved rather than transfer the labor force back into agriculture. This was design. They were prepared to take that risk. I would strongly suspect they put such great store on heavy industry, on an industrial base for war effort, that they are willing to take that risk and that they would prefer to have a minor famine rather than to transfer any part of their labor force back into agriculture.

MR. MASERICK: I see that the clock has arrived at the witching hour. Dr. Kirk, on behalf of the Industrial College, we thank you for your very fine lecture on the European demography and for your interesting discussion of the questions that have been raised. Thank you very much.

(23 Nov 1953--250)S/en