MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

28 September 1953

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Brigadier General Charles H. Anderson, USAF, Director, Office of Manpower Requirements, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Personnel, was born in Cape Girardeau, Missouri, 3 November 1907. Since his graduation from the Military Academy in 1932, he has served in the following capacities: pilot training squadron duty, adjutant pilot, operations officer, personnel officer, and director of training, 1932-42; from 1942-44, he was assistant commander of Craig Air Force Base and later post commander; from March 1944 to November 1945, he served overseas, returning to continental duty at Maxwell Air Force Base in January 1946. In 1949 he attended the National War College and upon graduation was assigned to Headquarters, USAF, Washington, D. C. General Anderson has been awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross, the Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster, the Bronze Star, and the Air Medal with oak leaf cluster. Since August 1953 he has been serving as the Director of the Office of Manpower Requirements in the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Personnel.

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COMMANDER REEVES: Before we start the period this morning, I have a very short story I want to tell you that seems to apply to my particular position. There was a man walking down the street and a thief ran out of an alley, stuck a gun in his chest, and demanded, "Give me your wallet or else." The victim, being a very curious person, said, "Or else what?" The thief said, "Don't confuse me. This is my first job."

General Greeley, gentlemen: From our studies and discussions during the past two weeks, it should be apparent that our most important and limited national resources is manpower. Accepting this as a fact, it then becomes of paramount importance that planning for mobilization should be firmly based in the demands of the civilian economy on the manpower resources.

Today we have the first of two lectures scheduled on the subject of manpower requirements. This particular one covers the field of military manpower requirements, and we are indeed fortunate to have with us today Brigadier General Charles H. Anderson, United States Air Force, to discuss this subject. As you have noted, General Anderson is the Director of the Office of Manpower Requirements in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Personnel, and is very well qualified to discuss this very important subject.

It is with a great deal of pleasure that I welcome General Anderson to the platform of the Industrial College.

GENERAL ANDERSON: General Greeley and gentlemen: A student who had to sit through a series of lectures, probably not unlike this one, became bored and tired of the whole thing and wrote a little two-stanza poem which he entitled simply, "To Speakers." He said:

They may be short of stature,
They may be short of gags,
They may be short of listeners,
As the morning lags and lags.

But wistfully I wonder,
As I sit here bored to death,
If I'll ever run across one
Who, perchance is short of breath.

I hope you gentlemen won't find it necessary this morning to resort to composing poetry in order to keep awake. I promise to keep this an nonphilosophical and as nonstatistical as possible--if one can keep manpower discussions nonstatistical.

I think it is the generally accepted procedure, when talking to an audience such as this, for a speaker to give some of his background and qualifications. I have been in the personnel business, so far as the policy aspects are concerned, for the past few years; so far as the requirements aspects are concerned, for the past few months. That will give you some idea of how to analyze the remarks made, whether to accept, reject, or merely look upon them with suspicion.

Until a few years ago, I felt that, at least in my service, people assigned to personnel work were generally assigned there because they couldn't find anything else for them to do or they weren't qualified for anything else. Since I have been in this work--for about two years--I haven't changed my mind much about how they get their assignments--speaking, of course, for myself only.

Seriously, since I have been in this business, I have found that our manpower problems are not so clear cut and easy of solution as they appear on the surface. As a matter of fact, there are so many factors that tend to becloud the issue they make the solution more difficult to come by. These problems remind me of a little boy trying to pick up a feather bed--he gets his arms around it, thinks he has it, and then it slides out in every direction. That is pretty true about our manpower problems. You can't divorce them from the social, economic, and psychological aspects which invariably come into the picture.

I think this is particularly true of the situation that we face today, trying to build, maintain, and equip very large forces at the same time we are trying to maintain a level of production which will assure a healthy economy. It puts the military in competition for personnel, not only personnel in the gross, but particularly the skilled personnel. This presents us with a very real problem and not one that is easy to solve. We find industry in competition among the various elements of industry for this personnel. The military services are in competition between and among themselves for skilled personnel.

I think that General Hershey, when he was here, spoke to you of the manpower pool. I am going to discuss it this morning from a little different angle, giving you in rather general terms the status of our manpower pool today and then in a little more detail some of the potential results of what we might call a manpower depression or manpower shortage, that resulted from the economic depression in the early thirties.

First of all, our manpower pool has been depleted at a faster rate than it is being replenished and if we assume that force levels are to remain the same, that the present draft laws are to continue, and that our draft policies and enlistment policies continue about the same, the services are going to require each year somewhere in the neighborhood of 900,000 to a million men. Those are replacements required by the services.

Now, so far as the supply is concerned, each year, at least for the next four or five years, we will have approximately 1.1 million young men turning 18½ years of age, in other words, coming into the draft-eligible pool. Of that 1.1 million we deduct immediately about 22 percent that cannot meet the physical and mental standards which determine fitness for military service. That leaves us somewhere in the neighborhood of 850,000 new people coming into the pool each year.

This period of shortage of manpower is going to continue until the 1960's when there is a rapid upturn in our availability curve, due to the increased birth rates, of course, generated during the last war. Until recently, we predicted that if we maintained the forces that we have and all other factors remained the same, we would reach the bottom of the manpower pool sometime about 1956 or 1957. It now appears that we will be able to squeeze by the 1950's without scraping the bottom of the barrel. I would say this is due primarily to a reduction in force. As you know, we have come down from approximately 3.6 or 3.7 in 1953 to a much lower figure, and it is anticipated we will continue that reduction-in-force level until the end of 1954.

That reduction-in-force level is primarily responsible for our conclusions now--I must say they are very tentative conclusions--that we can get through the 1950's maintaining forces of 3.3. I want to stress the word "tentative." That is based on enlistment rates and reenlistment rates being maintained at the current level. There is a great deal of question about that. The services seem to think that they will be able to maintain their enlistments and reenlistments at the current level. That remains to be seen. If there are any changes, such as a sudden increase in requirements for personnel, if combat opens up again in Korea or somewhere else, or if our enlistment or reenlistment rates are not kept up, we probably cannot maintain the size of force we contemplate now under the present recruitment policies.

Another factor, when talking about the pool--I am sure General Hershey brought this out--the Selective Service must have a working capital of about 300,000 to 400,000 people if it is going to deliver the men at the time the services need them. This is so because the Selective Service has about 3,700 local boards and the population is not distributed evenly throughout those boards.

I said we came up with a tentative figure at the present time of a pool of around 600,000. I would like to tell you how we arrived at that. That was done in the Department of Defense alone. Normally, in arriving at this figure and the projections, the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Selective Service come into the picture. We wanted to run this out for another purpose. As you probably know, the President has directed that the Office of Defense Mobilization make a study to determine whether it is feasible to begin a UMT program concurrently with the draft. We have just furnished some figures to the Office of Defense Mobilization and in the next few months we hope the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the Selective Service will give us some more precise figures. We hope they will not be too far from what we have come up with in the Department of Defense.

In passing, I would like to say that so far as General Hershey and his organization are concerned, we think that he has done and is doing a most outstanding job and is truly deserving of the respect and esteem in which he and his organization are held by the people of this country.

This rather severe manpower shortage has influenced indirectly or directly many of our defense manpower policies and procedures. I would like to mention just a few of these. The first, of course, is the fact that industry and the educational world being in competition with the services and the services being unable to compete with them from a pay standpoint, we have had to go to the draft.

The second important outgrowth of the manpower shortage is the low-physical and mental qualifications which determine fitness for military service. The Universal Military Training and Service Act directed that the services accept personnel so far as physical qualifications are concerned at the same level set in April 1945. That was the period in World War II when we were scraping the botton of the manpower barrel.

That law, in addition, required that the services accept for induction or enlistment men who could pass the armed forces qualification test with a score of 10. Somebody pointed out that anyone who gets a score of 10 in the armed forces qualification test could qualify for entrance to any of the feeble minded institutions of the country as well as for enlistment in the armed forces.

Now because of the insufficient number of personnel in the normal distribution in the higher mental group, we have a problem of distribution between the services of those higher mental groups. In 1951 the Secretary of Defense took cognizance of this problem and issued a directive which established a qualitative distribution system. This was handled by the armed forces system for inducation and enlistment,

(armed forces examining station) under the Army as executive agent. Everyone comes through this system and those coming in are put in one of four categories and allocated on a prorata basis to the services.

I think it is rather interesting to note here that since this system has been in effect each service has come in at one time or another--some of them more than once--to secure relief from taking category 4, in other words people on the low end of the totem pole. Each service has indicated that if it is forced to continue taking men in the lower part of category 4, it is going to utterly fail in carrying out the mission of the service. But I don't see any change in the law; as yet no service has been able to demonstrate that it needs a greater proportion of the one's, two's and three's than another service. In other words we have no yardstick which can measure actual needs so far as mental categories are concerned.

Another result of the manpower shortage is the institution of a very vigorous reenlistment campaign. We have made some headway, but we think this is something that has to be pushed and there is still more that can be done. Certainly, if we ever reach the point where we can't keep the noncommissioned officers--particularly the officers that we need to do the training and instill discipline and to perpetuate the traditions of the services, the service reaching that point is going to be in grave danger of not carrying out its mission. It is not only the procurement and retention of the noncommissioned officers that is troublesome but we have the same problem with the Regular officers. I don't think any of the services at the present time are getting the Regular officers that they require in the number they require. They are getting enough applications numberwise, but qualitywise, they are not. An example of the noncommissioned officer problem is pretty well shown by Air Force experience.

In 1950, pre-Korea, we had approximately 354,000 that might be considered hard-core, well-trained personnel. Of that experienced group there are 185,000 remaining, and I think the same thing is probably true of the other services. This problem was serious enough to come to the attention of the President and he directed the Secretary of Defense to conduct a study to determine what could be done to improve the attractiveness of the services as a career. That study is going on at a very high level and Dr. Hannah, my boss, has been given the responsibility for it.

I think a word in passing would be appropriate in regard to this problem of making the service a more attractive career. We are too prone a lot of times to point our fingers at some outside agency or Congress and say that they are the cause of our lowered morale. You have probably heard a lot or read in the papers about the Van Zandt

amendment, the Davis amendment, and all the others. I think, however, before we can go outside and point our fingers we have a lot of things, we can do in our own shops or in our own houses to improve the attractiveness of the services. It means giving a little more consideration to the individual and not thinking always in terms of numbers and bodies.

This current manpower shortage also explains, at least in part, why the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the services are stressing the problem of utilization of people; utilization not only so far as the number required to get a job done is concerned but utilization of the skilled personnel to see that the skills are in fact being used to the full capacity or full capability, which explains why we cannot release men to the Reserves after basic training. I will speak more about the Reserves a little later. It finally explains why we say that eventually every young man coming of military age can expect to see military service voluntarily or involuntarily, either by the draft or by enlistment.

By draft or by enlistment brings me to my next point and that is the method of procurement in times like this--central procurement versus the system which we presently have, which is a combination of enlistment and induction.

The proponents of central procurement say we can save money by cutting out recruiting costs. We can improve effectiveness and efficiency of our Selective Service System. This is probably true to a degree but I think we have to look at the other side of the ledger.

The Department of Defense is firm that our policy should be a combination of the two, voluntary to the extent we can get them supplemented by Selective Service to the extent necessary. In support of this, I would like to cite a few points which must be considered and weighed against the savings that might be made or the more efficient operation that would result from central procurement.

Men generally enlist for four years as opposed to the 24 months for an inductee. If we took time out for the training of the inductee--about 4 months, travel 1 to 2 months, and take 2 months' leave, we end up with about 16 to 17 months of effective service for inductees. On the other hand from the 4-year enlistee, with the same type of training, we can expect to get about 37 to 38 months of useful service. Thus, you can see that one 4-year enlistee will give us the same service as $2\frac{1}{4}$ inductees. The result is fewer men called from the manpower pool, fewer trainers required, and a reduced overhead in the training establishment.

Another factor interesting to note is that the reenlistment rate of the volunteer is considerably higher than that for the inductee. Another reason we want to continue voluntary procurement is the fact that we get considerably more men and women from outside the draft-eligible pool.

To give you an idea of the difference in drain on the pool, if we were to attempt to maintain one million trained men on a 2-year basis, it would require in the neighborhood of 1,333,000 people on board. The same number required--a million trained--of 4-year enlistees, would require a strength of 1,143,000, a difference of 190,000. Now the intake for the two would be 55,000 per month to maintain this force on a 2-year basis as opposed to about 24,000 for the 4-year people. So you can see the difference in the drain on the manpower pool.

These figures are rough. There are other factors to be taken into consideration, to be sure, such as additional overhead for training that would be required for that 55,000 per month as opposed to the 24,000.

The other aspect of this difference in procurement systems is the effectiveness of your force. Your 16 months of productive effort leaves little time for any advance training and if an individual was given advance training of any kind, it would further cut down the amount of his useful service to the point where the useful service obtained would not give a sufficient return for the training investment. If you give a 10-month course and you have him for 16 months, obviously it is not very economical; also it cuts down the effectiveness of the force. The enlistee can take such a course and still give us a reasonable return on our training investment.

It has been suggested that we go to a central procurement system for everyone, once they are inducted and in uniform. Then we can do a recruiting campaign from within the service, try to get longer-term volunteers. We don't think that is practical, nor is it realistic. It is not realistic to expect as many men to enlist for four years after they are already in uniform as would enlist when they are, shall we say, under pressure of the draft; and certainly it is not practical to transfer the men from one service to another after they are in. So we have rejected that as not being feasible, and I don't think it will get us the number of men we are getting now on a four-year basis.

Now I have enumerated some of the problems with which we are confronted in partial mobilization. I would like to discuss just very briefly what we run into in full mobilization in some of these same areas.

Where, in partial mobilization, our concern is to balance military requirements with a production level which is going to maintain a healthy economy, in an all-out mobilization, I think, we would be more concerned with the level of production that we would have to maintain to assure the essential goods and services for the civilian economy. The rates I have seen on that were an assumption that the production for civilian consumption would be planned on the same level as that maintained in World War II. When we are planning for this cold war, obviously we have to continue planning for the eventual hot war should it come, and plan to win it if it comes.

I have a few figures that I have picked out of the air and are not to be accepted as part of any plan. We could assume that in the event of full mobilization we might build an armed force of 13 or 14 million people. Obviously that couldn't be achieved overnight. We might expect to increase from about 3.3 or 3.5 to something like 6.5 or 7 million men in uniform at the end of the first year, reaching a peak sometime toward the end of the third year. At the same time our labor force would probably be increased from somewhere in the neighborhood of from 66 to 67 million to some 74 million. This is not a plan but it gives some idea of how our manpower might be divided in an all-out mobilization.

This 14 million is about 1.5 million above what we had in World War II. When we realize that if we were today to reinstitute the draft laws that existed in World War II, we could get only 300,000 additional men over what we had in World War II, that, of course, poses the question: Where are we going to get the rest of this 1.5 million? Well, in spite of the complaints and cries of the services with respect to category 4, we would have to reduce still further our mental and physical standards. We would have to take more women and we would have to increase the take from each of the age groups from 17 to 45 by about 5 percent. Now I believe that this is about the maximum that we can take out of the civilian population without adversely affecting the civilian economy and industry, the thing that supports us in war.

The last few minutes I have been talking about some of the effects of the manpower shortage and just touched briefly on the full mobilization problem. Now I would like to pose a question to you gentlemen, one which we have been kicking around the Pentagon and wrestling with for sometime. It may be that in this atmosphere, we can get a little more objective thinking than we can over there between the flash fires with which we seem to be continually confronted.

This problem relates to our overall reserve structure. When we consider that we have a law on the books which requires every individual coming into the service to assume an eight-year obligation for service, counting active and reserve, then we can see in the not-too-distant future we are going to have a reserve somewhere around

5 million people or so. You are also aware of the Armed Forces Reserve Act which requires a tremendous amount of administrative effort on the part of all the services in keeping track of their reserves. Although this act was passed in July 1952, the Department of Defense is still putting out regulations and directives in implementation of that bill.

Here are some of the things that are required. First of all, it divided the Reserve into Ready, Standby, and Retired. In addition it divided the Reserve into training categories, depending upon the number of training periods it gets during the year, and the number of paid drill periods. It required also that the service secretaries make a determination as to the grade structure, requirements by grade, by number, by rating, and so forth. It established priority of call, not only between the Standby and the Ready Reserves but within those categories, depending upon the individual's previous services, whether it was hazardous duty or not, whether he fought in Korea or served in Germany. In considering priority call, we have to take into account the individual's dependency status, and finally his employment status, whether he is available for immediate call, whether he has to be delayed for six months, or whether he is essential to the national health interest.

I mention all these things merely to point out the colossal job of administration. It is going to require a lot of time, effort, and money merely to administer this force according to this law. I might add, too, that the House passed a Reserve Officers' Promotion Bill which I am certain will get by the Senate this next session and that, too, is going to add to the administrative load of taking care of the Reserves.

I haven't said anything yet about the training problem. It is going to require considerable effort on the part of the active establishment to give any kind of training to such a large number of people scattered all over the country. And I wonder, are we going to spread our resources so thin over this large reserve that we will, in fact not have a reserve that is ready to go when we need them? I wonder, too, if we, in attempting to administer and train this reserve are not going to lower the effectiveness of our active forces.

We have a problem here; it seems to me another one of those quality versus quantity problems. Would it be possible to maintain a really high-quality reserve, one that is trained, equipped, has the facilities comparable perhaps to the active establishments, a gold-plate reserve, tailored to do the job required from D to D plus 6, D plus 9, whatever figure may be settled on? If we had this type reserve, the question arises, of course, what do you do with the rest of the Reserve? There are going to be those people who can't take training due to their geographical location, who do not want to take training, or who have skills in excess of our actual needs.

It has been suggested that the remainder of the Reserves be turned over to Selective Service and their records kept up to date by the local boards. I throw this out as one part of the solution to this problem. There is one other reason, I think, for giving consideration to turning over the remaining Reserves to Selective Service. There are many organizations throughout the country and many people who are seriously concerned and worried when they look at the number of people that the armed forces are going to have their fingers on in the event of a recall of major magnitude--full mobilization. They are concerned as to how we will handle that Reserve recall and their thinking in this matter is conditioned very much on the experience of the Korean recall. Certainly that was about as mixed up as anything could be. They can't see that we are going to do it any differently in the future.

We had no procedures. We had no records. We called in a fighter pilot only to find out he was an ordained minister. We called in clerks to find out they were aeronautical engineers. Obviously, those people are remembering this. When the Armed Forces Reserve Act came up on the Senate floor, an attempt was made to amend the act to take the recall of all out of the hands of the military Reserves. They wanted to take that out of the Department of Defense entirely and place it in the hands of a civilian group. Not only the CIO and other labor unions back this policy but organizations such as the Engineers Association were hot for it and were considerably worried. Industry backed it to a large extent and even members of the Administration were prepared to go over on the Hill in support of it.

I mention that because I think that feeling still exists and I am sure, in spite of the letters that have been written by the Defense Department to say we are considerably interested to see that industry continues production at the highest possible rate in time of war, that it still does not allay the fears of people who are still trying to get this into law. I think, personally, that Mr. Hershey's outfit is admirably qualified to handle these people.

One of the points we have to look at in considering this group is that we have 5 million people. You have to keep track of them. Everyone of these factors on which we have to keep records is variable and changes overnight. A man's employment today indicates he is available for military service when the balloon goes up. He works for a toy plant. But when the conversion of industry to war production takes place, by the time that man is reached a year later, or even three months later, he probably isn't going to be there. That company probably has a subcontract and is making munitions of war. So all the effort which has gone into taking care of such personnel is lost.

In World War II we took 43 percent of the 17- to 19-year group; we are figuring now on taking 50 percent. In the next age group, 20 to 24, I think they plan to take 75 percent as opposed to 70 percent in World War II. I merely mention these figures because they are the age groups in which the Reserves will be. If we can't have them all when we want them, we are maintaining a lot of records and giving a lot of training to people who are not going to see service and we are wasting time, manpower, and money.

I know there are a lot of bugs in this. I know it has many road blocks. It is just one thing that has been kicked around. I give it to you for what is is worth.

In conclusion, we must recognize the complexity of our manpower planning. The solution of our manpower problems must be related to the social, economic, and psychological factors that affect that problem. But there is one thing, it seems to me, deserving of mention--perhaps it shouldn't have to be mentioned--but we seem to find it difficult to keep from compartmentalizing personnel planning within the services. We have that problem regularly and daily. I think if our personnel plans are going to be sound and geared properly, one of the major things we have to do is condition our thinking by a full and detailed knowledge of the strategic and operational plans, and I am sure that if you think back to World War II, you can think of many examples where that was not the case.

Gentlemen, I will be glad to answer any questions that you have.

Thank you.

QUESTION: General, I spent the last two years in the Air Force Reserve Corps and I am afraid I may make a speech myself, but part of the problem is that there are only so many good people. Industry wants them and so do the services. We had one commander who was quite a wheel with a large company. He was told when the balloon went up he was going to have to stay with that company. I think somewhere along the line you are going to have to make the decision of whether these people are going with the Reserve. An aircraft corporation stated that the reservist had to make up his mind. He was either going with the Reserve or staying with the company. If he wanted to make progress with the company, he would have to stay there. It was only natural for the reservist to say, "To h--- with the Reserves," and make progress with the company. Somewhere you have to predetermine where these people are going.

GENERAL ANDERSON: I think that is absolutely right and that is one of the things that the Armed Forces Reserve Act tried to do when it established a requirement to keep all these records current, adequate records so they would know whether a man was going to be

there on D-day; whether he would be there on D plus 90, D plus 180. That Gold Plate reserve has to be made up of people whose availability for service is known. It puts the reservist in a rather unenviable spot. He is expected to make up his mind whether or not he is available and what his availability is in terms of delay. That determination certainly should be made with those forces which we are going to need shortly after D-day, not only with the people in industry but that extends to the people in Government. We have a lot of civilians in Government who are Reserve officers. They don't want to give up their reserve status, yet in our planning the Pentagon is full of those people. We are counting those people twice, once in the box as civilians and once as a Reserve officer. Those decisions should be made. A lot of them have not been made.

QUESTION: General, right after the war there was some agitation to take National Guard Divisions, remove Federal recognition as National Guard (NG) and bring them into the Reserves, bring the two together, having one reserve rather than two systems, the NG and a separate reserve organization. What is the status of that now? Is it definitely dead?

GENERAL ANDERSON: As I pointed out in my talk, a lot of these manpower problems are not easy to solve, and the most logical solution has to be looked at in the light of other factors. In this case it is a political factor. I don't think it is politically feasible to do away with the NG. When you have 48 governors all against it and they can get a lot of backing, particularly in the Southern States, for not taking the NG away from the governor, and a lot of backing from all your Senators and Congressmen, I don't think it is at all feasible.

QUESTION: General, Gordon Dean, former chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, made a very disturbing statement last week about the Russian capability of using the H bomb on the United States within two years and possibly one year. Now do the military requirements and the determination of how many men are needed in the armed forces take into account these new types of warfare that Gordon Dean, at least, thinks we are going to have in the future? He said in his statement that if this eventuality comes about, the kind of war we fought in Korea would not be fought under those conditions. Do the manpower requirements which you are generating reflect this new kind of warfare? Particularly, you talked in terms of 14 million and also a buildup of some three years. Would the next war give you time--three years--to work into the peak requirement?

GENERAL ANDERSON: Let me divide that question into two. First, we do not determine manpower requirements as to numbers without the guidance, of course, of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They come up with

force tabs. The question you asked so far as personnel requirements are concerned is: Are the Joint Chiefs taking that into consideration in determining force tabs? They are taking a look at that now. I am sure they are.

The hypothetical plan I pointed out earlier, the time it would take to get 14 million people into uniform, of course, assumes that the war would go on that long. If we fought a different type of war from what was envisioned in the light of different and new destructive weapons, I think your answer to that is as good as mine. Whether a stalemate may be arrived at and force us to continue a war, I think you can envisage the situation as well as I can. That is something that the Joint Chiefs are going to have to determine, what forces are required to fight the type of war that they foresee.

QUESTION: General, you mentioned the need for the services taking steps within themselves to improve the morale from the point of view of maintaining the career people. What is being done at the Secretary of Defense level to bring that about in the three services?

GENERAL ANDERSON: Well, when the President directed this study, Dr. Hannah set up a working level committee under Admiral Womble, our Director of Personnel Policy. That committee has gathered a tremendous amount of data and has made an interim report to Dr. Hannah which I saw in draft form sometime back.

What they are trying to do is divide the reasons for apparent unattractiveness of the service, at least in the eyes of the people who are doing the talking, into those things that can be done within the service and those things that can be done or must be done by legislation. I think there has been considerable effort to correct some of these things.

For example, stability--when Korea hit, obviously in the expansion we had to move people around at a rapid rate. That is one of the things people object to, instability. They get an assignment for six months and they are gone again. The Army recently came up with a study which it has completed on ways and means of establishing a little more stability in assignment. One of the things that comes up is this business of traveling overseas and leaving your dependents at home. We established a policy due to lack of dependent housing overseas which required that dependents follow in six months or a year after an officer is assigned overseas. When an individual gets an overseas assignment, arrives at his duty station, and he sees that there is dependency housing available, he justly so can't understand why he couldn't bring his dependents along. There are things like that which we can take care of within our own family.

QUESTION: General, in your remarks you saw a problem of getting enough Regular officers in the armed forces. You left the impression, at least with me, that we actually were not being able to get enough Regular officers to fill our requirements. I previously had the impression that the applicants amounted to more than our requirements. My question is, first, have we had a shortage of applicants, of qualified people, to fill our regular requirement, and if so, has there been any consideration of another integration? I think all of us know alert, very qualified Reserves on active duty who are outside that regulation who might be taken in.

GENERAL ANDERSON: My statement that we were not getting the number of Regular officers required is correct. We are getting sufficient applicants numberwise, not qualitywise. The reason that we don't want a further integration program is the fact that our officer strength which should approach the ideal pyramid is so far out of shape now that sooner or later we will have to use a meat axe on it to get it into shape. Any further integration into the armed forces is going to aggravate that problem because the officers who are Regulars now and your Reserves came into the service at the same time during World War II. They all trained at the same time. The majority of the officers in the Air Force, for example, were integrated. Any integration from this age and experience group merely gives an even worse bulge, a worse officer grade structure. It doesn't do any good to integrate a man now and five years later say, "We can't use you." You are going to operate on the Regular officer structure just as on the Reserve officer structure.

QUESTION: General, my question is in reference to the utilization of those of lesser mentality from a troop level. When a draft call went out the Navy, Marine, and Air Force recruiting stations did a tremendous business and the Army received the difference. What effort has that joint committee made to take into consideration the distribution of those people to compensate the Army for getting the lowest grade of 10?

GENERAL ANDERSON: Maybe I haven't made myself clear on that. Everyone who is enlisted or inducted is counted. Everyone is given the same test, under the same circumstances, and if he enlists in the Navy or the Air Force and he is category 1, he counts in that quota and they can't go over that quota so each service is getting its quota of each category irrespective of whether the man is enlisted or inducted.

QUESTION: General, with reference to your statement on the mental qualifications, isn't it true that the JCS makes decisions as to forces necessary on the basis of weapons systems employed by the several services--that is, comes up with force tabs?

GENERAL ANDERSON: Yes.

QUESTION: Wouldn't that same criterion, the weapons systems used by the various services, be a good indication of the mental categories to be divided among the several services?

GENERAL ANDERSON: This has been gone into by people since 1950. Even before that studies were started. No one has yet been able to come up with facts and figures that would prove that one service has a greater requirement for a higher mental group than another. We had a meeting last week. Dr. Hannah had all the services assistant secretaries of personnel, personnel chiefs, and a couple of others, and we met in an all-day session. One of the first things that they wanted to discuss was the qualitative distribution question. That was kicked around at some length. The purpose of the meeting was to get the problems on the table and discuss them a little bit, not to come to any solution necessarily in that day's meeting. But it was significant that every one of the personnel chiefs had this subject on his agenda and the Army was the first one to bring it up.

QUESTION: If one enlistee equals $2\frac{1}{4}$ inductees and if the core of our problem is noncommissioned officers (NCO) it would seem that, at least in partial mobilization, you have there a proposal to go to Congress and to show our manpower requirements in direct proportion thereto; and at the same time get a money saving to pay to that career NCO that would make it attractive to him?

GENERAL ANDERSON: You are suggesting, if I understand you correctly, that we increase our reenlistment bonus?

QUESTION: Pay.

GENERAL ANDERSON: I think that has been suggested. In fact, Admiral Radford came out with the suggestion to give a reenlistment bonus in the neighborhood of 2,000 dollars. A lot of people held their breath when they heard that. These eight balls that we can't train, let us not reenlist them--but reenlist those people whom we really need, then give some such reenlistment bonus as that to those selected for retention; I don't think it is at all out of line when we consider what it costs to train one individual who comes in from civilian life and what we get back from him in terms of useful service.

I am sure that is going to come up and some effort is going to be made to increase the reenlistment bonus. I think the Strauss Committee--Lewis Strauss was appointed by the Secretary of Defense to consider pay matters--took that subject under consideration and recommended that the reenlistment bonus be increased and put on a

graduated scale, the greatest reenlistment bonus coming after the first hitch. By the time the man got up to 20 years or above, there would be no reenlistment bonus. That was the committee's recommendation.

QUESTION: That wouldn't work very well if you were going to point it at the NCO?

GENERAL ANDERSON: I think the logic was once we get a man in long enough he will stay, and the big problem is to get him for that second hitch. That was what they were thinking of, I am sure.

QUESTION: General, I recall rather vividly at the beginning of World War II the War Department Reserve Pool which was a pool of so-called critical skills, engineers, and scientists who were not going to be subject to recall. Yet very suddenly in April 1942, the pool was dissolved and every man was called immediately. Have you any plans for a pool such as that?

GENERAL ANDERSON: There is no pool such as that and no plans for one unless one of the services is in the act of creating one which we know nothing about. I have no knowledge of it at any rate.

QUESTION: General, I have often heard reservists in nongovernmental organizations say that they would like very much to devote more time, particularly in periods of active service, in keeping up their reserve qualifications but are reluctant to do so, either because their employers feel they cannot be spared for that period in addition to regular vacation period, or for real or imaginary reasons the employer is not interested in it. Is that a significant problem in the reserve program? And, if it is, would you comment upon the methods or the policies of the Department in proposing to deal with it?

GENERAL ANDERSON: There has been considerable discussion even among reservists themselves who are not in Government agencies and who complain bitterly about the fact that the Federal Government does in fact give the reservist two vacations. I have forgotten the term they use for this--the "double bite," or something like that. However, there are many major industries doing just that. They are giving them a two-week period off for summer camp and in addition they are given paid vacations. Obviously, the smaller companies for the most part are the ones that don't feel they can do it. So far as I am aware, we have no plan to try to get industry to do it.

QUESTION: General, do you have any figures that indicate whether your rate of loss because of low physical or mental qualifications is increasing or decreasing, and, if so, do you have any ideas as to what that indicates? I am talking about your enlisted manpower pool now.

You indicated that 22 percent, I believe, were found unqualified out of the present group. Is that an increase in percentage or is it fairly constant?

GENERAL ANDERSON: I think that has been fairly constant. I believe it has been questioned on occasion. I think if General Hershey were here he would probably tell you it is higher, and his records probably would show it because many of the people pulled in by the draft board may have already tried to enlist and been rejected; also his records do not take into account the men that have gone in through enlistment and been accepted. So his records are not going to reflect the overall percentage.

QUESTION: General, a short time ago you spoke of the possible political opposition to be expected from State governors in the consolidation of the National Guard and the organized Reserves. Now would it not be feasible from a Defense Department standpoint to allow the Federal Reserve to be under the State National Guard--in other words make it all National Guard--and let the individual governors command those National Guard troops as they do now, provided they maintained required standards of training, selection, physical standards, equipment that the Federal Government would require. In that way, we would have readiness units controlled by the States, decentralized, and in time of mobilization they, of course, would be brought in the Federal service as usual with the National Guard. Has that been given consideration?

GENERAL ANDERSON: Not that I know of, but I think the National Guard Association, the National Guard Bureau, would strongly approve. However, I doubt seriously that the Departments would want to further complicate their problem by putting all the Reserves under State control, and I certainly am sure that your reserve organizations would oppose that action as strenuously as the National Guard Association would oppose the proposed action of taking it out of the State. I think it is a case of just facing the political facts of life.

QUESTION: General, as our weapons become more complicated, our requirements call for a higher proportion of bright boys. There is some question whether the population can produce that proportion. What is being done to balance our requirements qualitywise against the actual population that we have to meet those requirements?

GENERAL ANDERSON: Frankly, I haven't looked at it in that manner. There is something, at least throughout the services, that in the event we can't get the type of people, and for a longer term, too, than the two-year inductee, that the force is going to have to be reduced. The reduction would be due to a lack of people over a long enough period of time, a lack of the people in the mental categories required to really maintain a higher force over the years to come.

So there is some thinking in this line, that we may have to reduce certain types of forces because we haven't got the people of the mental group and haven't got them long enough to train them properly and to maintain combat effectiveness of a larger force. Is that in line with what you had in mind?

QUESTION: What about the all-out war picture when you will have them for as long as the war lasts?

GENERAL ANDERSON: If the war lasts for an indefinite length of time, the man that can't be trained as an inductee may well be able to be trained as a person whom we will have for the duration plus. He cannot perhaps assimilate the training in the normal time. We are going to have to set up training schedules that take into account the capability of the individual we will be training and make more use of the lower mental categories.

QUESTION: Two years ago, General, I remember, I think Senator Lodge sponsored an idea to enlist intelligent people from other nations, something like the Foreign Legion idea, to take care of part of the manpower shortage that we have. I don't know what the present status of that is or what happened to it. Would you comment on that?

GENERAL ANDERSON: I think we were given authority to enlist a certain small number, but not with the idea of creating a Foreign Legion. It has been the feeling of most of us, and I think probably most of you, that the day when we can't go out and fight for our own country, haven't the people to do it, and have to rely on some other nationality, have to rely on the creation of a Foreign Legion, it is probably the approach of the last days. That is my feeling and I think an awful lot of people feel that way, enough so that it would be pretty difficult to even get something like that through if we wanted it.

QUESTION: General, you indicated that you anticipated a 5-percent increase in take over the World War II Selective Service figure which was about the maximum that could be feasible. May I ask whose estimate is that and who agrees with that estimate?

GENERAL ANDERSON: That estimate is made by the Office of Defense Mobilization. There is a committee called the Labor-Management Manpower Planning Committee--something like that--that works for the Office of Defense Mobilization, and on that are members of labor and members of industry. It is their best judgment, which has been approved, I think, by our top people--I am sure it has come up at Cabinet level and the National Security Council--and that is their best estimate on the thing. We haven't questioned or qualified it.

When I gave that figure of 5 percent--maybe I had better clarify that just a little--we just took that in order to avoid getting into some more statistics. But in World War II we had about 43 percent in the 17- to 19-age group in the services. This plan figures they could go to 50 percent in that age group. In the 20- to 24-age group they had in the neighborhood of 70 percent. That figure picked up another 5 percent, going to 75 in that age group. In the 25- to 35-age group they figure on taking 50 percent, which is about 6 or 7 percent, perhaps, greater than they had in World War II.

QUESTION: General, along that same line, what percentage of women do you think you can get? I notice you indicate you could raise your number by getting more women.

GENERAL ANDERSON: I think we could plan on having about 500,000 which is about twice what we had in World War II. I have forgotten the figures for World War II, but I don't think we had more than 200,000.

QUESTION: General, during the recent draft we had quite a few people from Puerto Rico and Hawaii. Have you included these people in your available manpower and also in the figures for rejects due to intelligence, and so on?

GENERAL ANDERSON: I don't know what the percentages are. I know they are included but I don't know what the percentages are or what the relative rejection rate is.

QUESTION: I just wondered whether they included Puerto Rico and Hawaii in the available manpower.

GENERAL ANDERSON: I don't know what the rejection rate is. I know it is higher, but I don't know how much.

QUESTION: General, I wonder if the services have given any consideration to the fact that, for instance, there are a lot of things we could contract for with large companies. I am thinking particularly of specialized fields. We train them for four years and then they go to work for a civilian concern. We could capitalize by cutting the aircraft control and warning SKADROW operation. When we take and train these boys, we may have them for four years, then they can get 5,000 dollars a year with some civilian concern. I wonder if any consideration has been given to contracting with civilian concerns to do this particular high-type job for us under the supervision of the military?

GENERAL ANDERSON: Well, you are absolutely right. The services were the greatest training establishment that industry ever had so

far as electronics was concerned; everyone we trained went into industry as soon as he could take off his uniform. So far as contracting for it, there has been some contracting in certain areas, but in maintenance, overhauling, and things like that, the actual operation in the field of maintenance, I personally would think it would be a little difficult for that company to handle a job of that magnitude. I don't know whether we have ever gone to them on it or not. I, frankly, don't know.

COMMANDER REEVES: General, I think that is about all the time we have. On behalf of the staff and the students, I wish to thank you very much for a very interesting and informative discussion of the manpower situation. Thank you.

GENERAL ANDERSON: Thank you.

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