

MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

19 October 1954

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INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

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Brigadier General Charles H. Anderson, USAF, Director, Office of Manpower Requirements, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Personnel, was born in Cape Girardeau, Missouri, 3 November 1907. Since his graduation from the Military Academy in 1932, he has served in the following capacities: Pilot training squadron duty, adjutant pilot, operations officer, personnel officer, and director of training, 1932-42; from 1942-44 he was assistant commander of Craig Air Force Base and later Post Commander; from March 1944 to November 1945, he served overseas, returning to continental duty at Maxwell Air Force Base in January 1946. In 1949 he attended the National War College and upon graduation was assigned to Headquarters, USAF, Washington, D. C. General Anderson has been awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross, the Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster, the Bronze Star, and the Air Medal with oak leaf cluster. He has been in his present position since August 1953.

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GENERAL NIBLO: Admiral Hague, General Anderson, ladies, and gentlemen: Today we return to the subject of manpower. Approximately three weeks ago we were fortunate in having Dr. Levine discuss the subject of "Manpower Requirements of the Civilian Economy." Since then we have discussed many other problems pertaining to manpower. This morning we are fortunate in having General Anderson to discuss the subject of manpower requirements in support of our Armed Forces.

General Anderson has spent approximately five years in the Pentagon, which shows some degree of stamina. During 15 months of that time he has worked on the manpower requirements. In the past year he has been forced to orient two new Assistant Secretaries of Defense. I assure you he is well qualified to discuss the subject assigned to him this morning.

General Anderson, it is a pleasure to welcome you back to the Industrial College for the second consecutive year to address this year's class. General Anderson.

GENERAL ANDERSON: Admiral Hague, General Niblo, members of the faculty, ladies, and gentlemen: The subject of my discussion is "Military Manpower Requirements." Much confusion has been caused by this high-sounding term "military manpower requirements." I know that the problem of determining and reviewing manpower requirements for our Armed Forces was a matter of mystery to me when I was assigned to my present job about 15 months ago; I hasten to add that it is still not too clear to me.

Some of the confusion stems from the different interpretations that people put on the term and I think it is a somewhat misleading term. So, in order to avoid starting our discussion this morning in a semantic fog, I want to take a few minutes to try to clarify the meaning of this term--at least for the purposes of this discussion.

As you are all aware, there are many factors operating in the determination of the availability of resources and the allocation of those resources to the services. In addition to the military considerations,

there are the political, social, and budgetary or fiscal considerations which affect decisions as to the size of our Armed Forces and as to the amounts of other resources which can be made available to them.

These various factors are given greater or lesser weight as the situation changes. At times the fiscal or budgetary considerations may be predominant, and the amount of money made available for the purposes of defense will largely dictate the size and strength of our Armed Forces. In such instances, we are, in effect, faced with the problem of allocating shortages and our "requirements" for military manpower are a function of such shortages. Therefore, it seems to me that we probably should be speaking about "the determination of military force levels" or determination of military strengths rather than the "military manpower requirements." I think the expression is a little more descriptive of the processes of decision which result in fixing the military strengths from time to time.

Maybe we can make this bugaboo a little less foreboding by describing the development cycle for a fiscal year's military manpower program and then discussing briefly the determination of military force levels under the three following situations:

First, the present situation--or what might be called the "cold war."

Second, under a partial mobilization, such as another Korea--requiring a modest increase in the number of people in uniform.

Third, general war.

Now to trace for you the development cycle for a fiscal year's military manpower program: But first, let me caution you that each year's program is developed differently, depending upon the circumstances at the time.

As you know, the National Security Council (NSC), with the assistance of the principal Federal agencies, periodically revises our broad national objectives. In establishing these top-level policies, the NSC considers economic, political, social, and psychological factors as well as military factors. These important NSC documents serve as overall guidance for the development of all our military programs, including manpower. So I think all of us will agree that the NSC decisions, as published in NSC documents, constitute the starting point for the development of military manpower requirements.

In January or February of each year the Office of Manpower Requirements commences work on the "Guidelines" which are to be used by the services in building their manpower programs for the fiscal year which starts some 18 months later. There are several principal sources of guidance, in addition to the NSC.

First, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) prepares military plans designed to carry out the national objectives included in the NSC documents. An example of the type of guidance we get from the JCS is its annual recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on the major combat forces and their manning levels.

Second, the Secretary of Defense, both in writing and by verbal decisions, announces policies which have a major impact on the manpower programs.

Third, the other Assistant Secretaries of Defense contribute to the manpower guidance. In order to insure that the plans for things, people, and money are coordinated, we work with the other offices in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and get help on guidance from them.

Fourth, the services themselves provide us material for inclusion in our guidance by giving us comments and recommendations on our draft memoranda and directives. Incidentally, we send our guidance to the services for unofficial comments, and, finally, for official comments.

Fifth, Administration policies affect our guidance. For example, at the present time it is the policy of the Administration to use as many indigenous personnel as possible in foreign countries.

Sixth, the Bureau of the Budget is another source of guidance on manpower matters. An illustration is the Bureau's arbitrary unwritten policy that no more than 50 percent of all enlisted personnel should be in the upper four pay grades.

Last but not least, the Congress has an effect on manpower guidance. The reports of the various committees, in addition to the laws enacted by the Congress, must be considered when we develop our guidance. As an example, reports of congressional committees have criticized the number of military personnel assigned to military bands,

to military police work, and to training activities. We in OSD are interested in seeing the operating forces increase percentagewise.

It might be of interest to you to know that we publish our manpower guidance to the services in two forms--by Department of Defense (DOD) directive and by memorandum. This year we incorporated in a DOD directive, signed by the Secretary of Defense, all our manpower guidance of a more or less permanent nature. We supplement this by publishing annually a memorandum signed by the Assistant Secretary which includes material of a temporary nature, things that are specifically applicable to that particular year's program, such as planning ceilings on military strengths.

Our annual guidelines are usually published in the late summer or early fall. The exact date is determined to a large degree by the time the JCS makes its force recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. Obviously, we have to wait for its recommendations because the services cannot develop their manpower programs until they know what forces they must build and maintain.

As you probably know, the JCS makes recommendations for each service regarding the number of major combat units and their manning levels. This means divisions, regiments, and AAA battalions for the Army; ships and air groups for the Navy; divisions and air wings for the Marine Corps; and wings for the Air Force. The manning levels for all these major forces are shown as percentages of war strength.

Probably you are aware that the JCS does not submit recommendations on many combat units. For example, the Army has well over 100 separate battalions which are not covered by JCS recommendations. The number, type, and manning of these separate organizations are determined unilaterally by the Army. Similarly, the other services independently determine their supporting and other combat forces. We who work in the Secretary's office do not feel that we are qualified to review the need for and the manning level of such units. We are hopeful that the principal military advisory group to the Secretary--the JCS--will in the future give him the benefit of its recommendations as to the number and manning of all combat forces rather than limit its recommendations to the major units.

After the services prepare their manpower programs, they are submitted to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Personnel)--OASD (M and P) for review in the fall. We

review these overall programs and submit recommendations to the Secretary of Defense. Our recommendations include, among other things, the beginning, end, and man-year strengths for each of the services, for both officers and enlisted personnel. After the Secretary makes his final decisions on strengths, these decisions serve as the basis for the service budget estimates.

Although I have traced this cycle in a step-by-step fashion, I can assure you that it does not happen exactly that way. Each year there are situations or conditions which cause the steps to overlap or to be telescoped--we find concurrent planning by different levels and simultaneous reviews by separate agencies. In other words there is no such thing as a "normal" year's cycle that we can see.

The process might be likened to a man climbing a ladder--the rungs of the ladder representing the various steps mentioned. He climbs up two rungs and falls back one; up three or four and back to the bottom; finally reaching the top only to be told to go back and try it again. A concrete example was the program for fiscal year 1955--this current fiscal year's program.

In October of 1953 the JCS submitted recommendations on forces for fiscal year 1955 to the Secretary of Defense. These called for about the same major forces as approved for fiscal 1954, but for a rather substantial increase in strength. These went to NSC and a top-level Administration decision was made, after consideration of all factors, that some reduction in personnel could be made with no loss in overall combat strength. Consequently, the services were given planning ceilings on military personnel. At the same time, the JCS was working on the so-called "new look."

In November the services submitted their programs on those planning ceilings to us for review, and all save one asked for personnel above the planning ceilings. After review, the OASD (M and P) recommended to the Secretary of Defense that some of the service reklamas be approved. At about the time we completed our manpower reviews, the JCS submitted the "new look" recommendations to the Secretary. You are probably aware that the "new look" extended into and through 1957 and gave some force levels. At a series of top-level conferences, our findings and the JCS recommendations were discussed, and finally in mid-December the NSC approved the forces and strengths for fiscal 1955.

So much for the mechanics of determining strengths. Now I want to discuss briefly the determination of force levels under the "cold war situation."

In a cold war situation, all factors--military, political, economic, and psychological--are considered in the determination of strengths, but the economic factor is generally given relatively greater weight than the military factor in the equation. But, even here, the weight given the economic and military factors varies considerably, according to how hot or how cold that cold war happens to be, and is dependent upon the political and international environment.

For example, in the period 1947-48 we found ourselves in a situation where actual war seemed remote. We had sole possession of the A-bomb and a predominance of sea power. The USSR was in the process of rebuilding its forces and reevaluating the world situation. Guerrilla warfare in Greece was a problem, and possible civil war in Italy and France a factor to be considered. The United States at that time was making increasingly larger expenditures to aid in the economic recovery of Europe, yet it was the policy of the Administration to try to balance income with expenditures. In this climate the decision was made to allocate 11 billion dollars for defense and the resultant force levels were determined to be approximately 1.4 million.

The next spring, Czechoslovakia was lost behind the Iron Curtain and the military factor in our equation began to take on greater proportions. The military budget was increased slightly, by about 1.5 billion dollars, and the Congress passed the Selective Service Act because we could not achieve the desired military strengths on a voluntary basis. At this time our force levels were set at some under 1.6 million (1,539,000).

In the fall of 1948 the individual service estimates for fiscal 1950 totaled in the neighborhood of 40 billion dollars. Reviewing authorities in the OSD reduced this to about 23 billion dollars, which in turn was further reduced by the Administration to approximately 14 billion dollars, with Armed Force strengths of slightly over 1.6 million (1,617,000). In January of 1949, after reprogramming, the fiscal 1950 military manpower strengths were again reduced and fixed at 1.46 million.

Let's skip the period of the Korean War for a moment while we take a quick look at the present "cold war" situation.

The USSR has the A-bomb and the H-bomb, plus the capability of delivering them, and we, as a nation, are well aware of the true aims of the men in the Kremlin. Thus, the weight assigned the military factor has changed as compared to the pre-Korean situation, but at the same time the Administration realizes that this will probably be a long pull and that the fight against communism can be lost on the economic homefront as well as on the battlefield. Hence, the maintenance of a sound, healthy, and growing economy is essential. These and other factors have led to a reevaluation of our strategy and have resulted in a change in our overall strategic concepts. We no longer have war plans with an assumed D-day, but rather we are planning for forces which we hope will deter war but be capable of withstanding the initial onslaught should war come--next year or 10 years from now.

This new strategy reflects the effect of all the factors in the "cold war situation" in which we find ourselves today and, as a result, it has been determined that our armed force strengths for the present and the foreseeable future should remain slightly over 3 million.

Now, let us turn to a partial mobilization, such as Korea. In 1950, when war broke out in Korea, our Armed Forces were composed of some 1.46 million military personnel. But where budgetary and economic considerations had been the dominant factor ever since World War II, now the military factor took precedence. The Department of Defense went to the Congress with three supplemental appropriations between January and April of 1951. The decision had been made by the NSC, after General Marshall's advice, to build rapidly, but in an orderly manner, in possible preparation for a general war. Force levels were set at 2.8 million in the fall of 1950 and were revised upward to over 3.5 million after the Chinese entered the war. The peak strength of 3,685,000 was reached in April 1952.

As the Korean War developed and it became evident that we would probably not proceed to full mobilization, it appeared as though the manpower pool would be exhausted around fiscal 1956 if we were to maintain a force of 3.5 million or higher. This gave us some concern. Here the political and social aspects of our equation began to have a greater bearing on military strengths. If we were to maintain our forces at 3.5 million or higher, the term of service required by the Selective Service Act would have to be lengthened and other actions would have been necessary. However, Congress was loathe to take such actions. In order to stretch our manpower, we strongly emphasized the need to use more civilians in training and supporting forces,

thus permitting a larger percentage of our military manpower to be allocated to the operating forces. The need to recruit more women and the more effective use of the lower mental groups was stressed. That was the situation as the Korean War developed.

Now let us turn briefly to the problem of military manpower requirements in the event of another partial mobilization, such as another Korea. In looking at the problem of another "small war," we must keep in mind that we have a radically different starting point today than we had in June 1950. This statement applies to our production base and our reserve stocks as well as the personnel strength and combat readiness of our forces in being. I think we all will agree that we are much better prepared for another Korea now than we were four years ago. This is vividly shown when we compare the active establishment in 1950 with what we have today:

On 30 June 1950 the Army had less than 600,000 men organized into 10 divisions, all below strength. By the end of this fiscal year, the Army will have 19 or more divisions, much better manned, trained, and equipped with a total strength of 1,173,000.

The Navy in June 1950 had less than 400,000 officers and men manning less than 600 active ships. By 30 June 1955 we will have a fleet of over 1,100 ships, with a greatly enlarged and improved air arm. The strength of the Navy will be 689,000, officers and men.

The Marines in mid-1950 had a strength of only 74,000, organized into two skeleton divisions and two air wings. At the end of the year, there will be 215,000 Marines with three full-strength divisions and air wings.

In mid-1950 the strength of the Air Force was about 400,000, and we had only 48 wings. By the end of June 1955, we expect to have an Air Force of 970,000 men with 120 or more wings of modern aircraft.

Comparing our present military posture with that of fiscal 1950, both cold war situations, we can readily see the different values applied to the various factors in our equation. The interaction of the same factors is present, but the results are considerably different.

I want to talk briefly about what we would have to do to again reach a strength of 3.6 or 3.7 which we had for the Korean War. Depending upon our general starting point, we would be able to reach that strength a great deal quicker with much less disruption to our economy.

Let us assume that we would have to expand the strength of the Armed Forces by 600,000 or 700,000 men in case of another "small war." And I think that any expansion to a size much larger than 3.6 would probably mean that we would start toward full or all-out mobilization. With the forces in being that we have today--trained, equipped, and ready for deployment--our problem in terms of manpower is simpler than it was in 1950. We have forces available which could be sent into combat. We would not have to man and train the forces first. We could take care of an expansion of 600,000 to 700,000 by increasing draft calls and enlistments and maintain such a force for some time without changing any laws or regulations, and probably without involuntarily calling Reserves or National Guardsmen to active duty.

This is one solution to the problem. There are other means of meeting the requirements of another Korea--extension of enlistments, callup of reservists, extension of the two-year draft period, and so on. The means and methods of procurement used to meet the requirements would depend upon the size of our forces, as well as the speed with which the buildup would be accomplished. The steps involved in the determination and review of the military manpower requirements would be essentially the same as I outlined previously for the present situation. However, the process would be speeded up greatly. I visualize, rather than taking almost a year to complete the work, it would probably be done in something like a month.

Now, in regard to mobilization for general war--after the JCS prepares a "joint mobilization plan," based on a strategic concept, the services prepare their detailed plans. These plans are then submitted to our office for review. OASD (MandP), assisted by the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM), the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and other Federal agencies, reviews the requirements primarily from a feasibility standpoint and furnishes the JCS the results of the analyses. The last study of this type was made a couple of years ago, before I came into this office, but I am told that the plan did not get beyond the OSD because our office and the Munitions Board determined that the plan was infeasible both from a manpower and industrial production point of view.

Here are some of the questions we asked when we reviewed the plans:

In the light of World War II experience, as tempered by present conditions, does it appear that the services can increase their strength

after M-day at the rates shown in the plans? Obviously, we would be able today to assimilate effectively into the active forces much larger numbers of people and at a much more rapid rate than we did in World War II, but the plans submitted called for accessions of 45,000 persons per day. The equipment, the uniforms, the housing were not available, to say nothing of the hardware that would be required. They also assumed in that plan that they would have in uniform 1.5 million women. In World War II we had a top strength in all services of about 277,000, and our experience in the Korean situation when we made every effort to increase the number of women in the Armed Forces indicated that we would never be able to get any such number without some law for drafting women, which did not appear to be in the books.

Recently, the procedure for development and review of manpower requirements for mobilization has been revised. Rather than waiting until a mobilization plan has been prepared in detail and then testing it for feasibility--which is the method I just touched on--we now prepare estimates of manpower availability before detailed planning starts.

Early this year, the JCS requested us to provide phased estimates of that portion of the national manpower pool which would be available to the military forces in case of full mobilization. We furnished the JCS our estimates, based on a given set of assumptions. This information is being used by the JCS in preparing its latest mobilization plans. When that plan is completed we will review it for feasibility, both as to whether the people will actually be available numberwise and, in addition, from the standpoint of whether the service buildup plans seem to be capable of being carried out. When that general feasibility test is completed, we will be ready to work with ODM and other Federal agencies, and finally, the NSC, to look at the phased military requirements in relation to the manpower requirements of the supporting civilian economy. These requirements will be compared with the total manpower resources and decisions may be needed in order to bring demands into balance with supply. When demands materially exceed supply, it means a major readjustment in the programs unless we follow some such system as this.

Requirements for general war inevitably leads to a discussion of our reserve forces. I know that you all have read articles in the newspapers or heard the President's speech lately about the "new reserve plan" being developed by the Department of Defense. I think it worth while to spend a few minutes on the reserve problem.

We are still working on the matter in the Department of Defense and it will be some time before we have the program complete. However, I will outline to you and comment on several proposed plans. As you know, almost everyone has a plan to solve our reserve problem. Every organization, whether it be an educational organization, a Reserve officers organization, or even individuals who have a son about to be drafted, can give you a plan for reserves, depending on the point of view. I would like to review briefly just some of the highlights of one or two of these plans.

But before going into these plans, I might talk for a moment about the manpower pool since its size has a considerable influence on our reserve forces planning, as well as on any active, or regular, program we might undertake.

There is adequate manpower to carry out the currently approved security programs which, translated to manpower requirements, means the maintenance of an active Armed Force strength of slightly over 3 million. However, a change as small as 10 percent in our total military strength alters our demands on the manpower pool to the extent of developing a shortage of military eligible men if the change is an increase in strength; or, on the other hand, if the change is a decrease in strength, we would have an excess in the pool. As the manpower pool is extremely sensitive to such small changes in the Armed Forces strength, the formulation of manpower policies requires a continuing reappraisal of our procurement factors, such as rejection rates, enlistments, reenlistment rates, and deferment policies. Recently we took a look at the manpower pool in the light of our declining reenlistment rates. When we thought we would have slightly over 1 million men in the manpower pool by 1957, the drop in reenlistment rates indicated we will have only 890,000. I will mention that point of a million in the manpower pool again in relation to our reserves program.

Now, back to reserve force requirements--our reserve forces today are not adequately organized and trained to meet the needs of a national emergency. The services have indicated a total service-callable reserve force mobilization requirement of about 3 million men, yet we have less than 700,000 participating in drilling programs. Further, our forces and units are not in balance officer-enlistedwise or skillwise.

For example, in the Air Force Ready Reserve, there are over 140,000 officers, but only 80,000 airmen, and of these only approximately 25,000 officers and 10,000 enlisted are participating in reserve

training programs. The Army has a service-callable reserve mobilization requirement, including the National Guard, of approximately 1.7 million officers and enlisted men, yet less than one-third of those men are participating in training programs. In the Army Reserve itself--exclusive of the National Guard--there are 900,000 enlisted in the so-called Ready Reserve, with less than 10 percent taking training. Of the almost 300,000 enlisted personnel in the National Guard, more than half have not even had basic training. Many of the enlisted personnel in the Naval Reserve are young men who enlisted before draft age and they likewise have had no recruit training. The Navy has only about 130,000 participating enlisted reservists to meet a total reserve requirement of about 700,000. The Senate Preparedness Subcommittee took cognizance of this and wrote a report on the status of the reserve force. This, as much as anything, caused the President to start action to improve the Reserve.

What can we do to improve our reserve forces, to get the participation in those programs that is so essential?

The Department of Defense is still working on the reserve problem; hence, there are no details available now. However, I can give you the objectives of the uncompleted, overall manpower plan for the active and reserve programs as expressed in NSC 5420/2--they are:

1. To provide personnel to man the active forces at planned numerical strengths and at a high state of combat readiness for immediate employment.
2. To provide prior-service personnel other than nonvolunteer combat veterans to build up the Reserve to the required strength called for in Department of Defense recommendations.
3. To maintain a pool of at least 750,000 militarily classified and available men to meet the first impact of increased manpower requirements of the military services under an all-out war situation.
4. To maintain the age of induction into the Armed Forces at a level that will supply men best fitted for active military service and assure a reserve of men of sufficient youth and immediate readiness to be effective.

5. To remove as expeditiously as practicable from reserve status combat veterans who do not choose to serve voluntarily in the Reserve.

6. To provide for equity of service for all qualified militarily eligible young men in both the active and reserve forces.

I would like to stop on that one a moment because there have been many proposals to achieve this objective of equity. In discussions with the ODM and others interested in this, it has been determined that equity can be achieved if we can say that all young men coming of military age are going into the military services for at least two years and none of them will escape this obligation. We feel that can be done if the manpower pool is not permitted to grow beyond 1 million men.

7. To maintain the age of induction into the Armed Forces at a level which will have the least serious impact on the lives of the men inducted and on the civilian economy.

8. To provide a ready reserve force of men of sufficient youth and to the greatest extent possible without critical occupation status so that their mobilization will have the least serious impact on defense supporting activities and on the civilian economy.

9. To provide a reserve category into which men vitally necessary to civilian activities in support of the military effort may be placed and selectively allocated at the time of and during mobilization to military service or essential civilian activities on the basis of needed skills.

As stated previously, almost everyone has a plan to solve the reserve problem and I would like to mention the high points of several of these and comment on them briefly.

Plan A

Our reserve forces should be composed of volunteer veterans and individuals receiving six months' basic training. This plan would permit anyone having two or more years of active duty to go directly to a so-called "selectively callable reserve" where he would not be required to train, not even the annual summer training, and would be available in the event of war, or an emergency declared by Congress, through a selective process. The main source for the reserve forces under this plan would be from individuals having only six months' basic training; such individuals would go to a "service-callable reserve" where they would be required to participate in the reserve training programs.

This plan fails to meet the NSC objective of building a prior-service reserve. The result of this plan would be a reserve composed primarily of men with six months' training and would not have sufficient technicians and leaders to make it a readily available force.

Plan B

Procurement for and participation in the service-callable reserve should be on a voluntary basis to the maximum extent possible. If voluntary methods fail to produce adequate numbers, men without prior military service should be inducted for initial active duty training, and such personnel would be required to participate in annual training only; participation in periodic drills throughout the year should be on a volunteer basis.

This plan completely ignores the requirement for highly trained personnel in the Reserve and, in addition, fails to take into consideration the fact that experience teaches us that voluntary participation in the Reserve will not produce results.

Plan C

This plan provides that every fit male between 18 and 19 who will not be needed for active service when he reaches the age of induction should be given six months' military training. Keep in mind, however, that the age of induction is now over age 20. This plan recommends that permissive deferments now authorized by regulation for men liable for induction for service be disallowed. This means there will be no deferments from induction for training because of student status, occupational pursuits, or dependents. The trainee, in this plan, the man with six months' training, would become the basis of our reserve forces-- this plan would provide for a nonveteran reserve.

This plan would quickly reduce the manpower pool that we want to maintain and would have adverse effect on our long-term enlistments. It would not furnish us a combat capable reserve and would not take into account the need for certain types of deferments.

All three of these plans have one thing in common: They overlook the first objective I mentioned, that is, to provide personnel to man the active forces at planned numerical strength and at a high state of combat readiness for immediate deployment.

In the development of a reserve program, we have the same set of factors operating that we have in the determination of force levels for the active establishment; political, social, economic, and military factors interact and often appear to be incompatible.

Note, for example, the first requirement was to maintain our "active forces at planned numerical strengths and at a high state of combat readiness"; and at the same time remember that the sixth objective called for "equity of service for all qualified militarily eligible young men." Both of these objectives could be accomplished if we were permitted to increase our active forces to take care of the added training load, but if we are to provide for equity of service for all qualified young men and keep our force levels at their present strengths, it means cutting terms of service and taking other actions which will prevent the manpower pool from getting larger and larger--which is the crux of the equity problem. If we have to take on this added training burden with no increase in strength, then our training base is increased, our operating forces are reduced, and combat effectiveness is sacrificed. It is evident that some of these objectives are incompatible and compromises must be made.

In summary, I have touched upon the process of determining military force levels and I have discussed the interaction of the factors affecting decisions on force levels. I have tried to show historically how the importance attached to these various factors change from time to time with resultant changes in the military strengths of the services. I have touched very briefly on our reserve programs and outlined the broad objectives which an acceptable reserve program must achieve. If, in your discussion and work here at the Industrial College, you can come up with a reserve program which meets all of the stated objectives, I can assure you that you will find many ready listeners in the Pentagon, including the Secretary of Defense himself who is taking a great interest in this program.

Thank you.

CAPTAIN REEVES: General Anderson will now answer your questions.

QUESTION: Would you expand a little bit on the 1 million manpower pool and why that figure is critical, plus and minus?

GENERAL ANDERSON: Well, it was decided that 750,000 should be the minimum in the pool in order to take care of the large initial requirements in all-out mobilization. General Hershey has indicated that he needs an operating pool of about four times any monthly call that we may make on him. So that sets the lower limit. The higher limit was merely an arbitrary figure established which said that if we

don't go above this figure, we will say that any plan you come up with in the utilization of manpower will satisfy this objective of equity. In other words if your pool doesn't continue to get bigger and bigger and you don't permit some people to escape service, there are those who will accept that as satisfying the equity objective. Does that answer your question?

QUESTION: I think it does, sir. But this is not clear--is this a changing group of personnel, the 1 million, people come in and people go out?

GENERAL ANDERSON: Yes, because the Selective Service law requires that we call the older men in the pool first, therefore we have the 18-1/2-year-olds coming in at the bottom of the pool and the calls being made from the older men at the top of the pool.

QUESTION: I know this is outside the scope of your discussion this morning, but have you any information on what is to be done to make the service attractive in both officer and enlisted grades?

GENERAL ANDERSON: There has been a lot written about it. Perhaps you have heard of the Womble report. It started when General Bradley wrote a letter to the Secretary of Defense a few years ago, pointing out his alarm at what was happening in the services. There have been some things done; some things Congress has done; some more legislative bills are in the mill now.

One of the most enlightening things has been discovered by General Carmichael in the Air Force in a study that he has been making. Secretary Talbott has taken a personal interest in this thing to the point of practically taking personal charge of the problem, and General Carmichael is spending most of his time on it. Any of you who know him know that he is a ball of fire and is going to get everything he can out of this problem, get to the root of it.

There were so many things that they found causing this drop in reenlistment rate, which is the thing they are concerned about now. But I think there are many things that we in the services can do, and I have felt so for some time. Just pointing the finger at Congress and saying, "It's all your fault" isn't going to lick this problem.

Probably the underlying cause of most of this can be found in the general public's attitude towards the military and all military things

at this time. We were just talking to Admiral Hague and he mentioned this very thing. It is clarified pretty well by a story in the paper recently where a Congressman said he couldn't get anybody to go to the military academy from his district. He finally found one guy he was going to appoint, but he said he wasn't any good and couldn't pass the examinations anyhow. I think that is probably one of the underlying things.

The man in uniform going home isn't particularly proud of his uniform because he is not accepted. People frown on that sort of thing.

QUESTION: General, you have given us three different plans, proposals, or methods of solving this reserve problem, none of them very satisfactory. Is there an official design or plan worked up or in the process of being made that would fulfill the requirements better than any of these that you have outlined?

GENERAL ANDERSON: As I pointed out, it is still under study. There are several proposals within the Department of Defense. These proposals I mentioned came from outside the Department of Defense, some pushed rather strongly by influential groups.

I think anything I would say so far as the solution of this problem by the Department of Defense is concerned would be premature because I don't know what they are going to come up with. However, Mr. Wilson has said, "We do have one idea. We are going to use that until something better comes along." As the Secretary says, he throws balls up in the air, sees where they fall, and sees how he can make the pattern fall into place. I can't give you an answer to the problem. We don't have one as yet.

QUESTION: One of our previous speakers said that in an all-out attack we couldn't muster any more than 10 or 12 million men in the Armed Forces. Would the Department of Defense go along with that or would your outfit care to comment on that?

GENERAL ANDERSON: That is a problem that is constantly under study with the ODM. When you start talking about how many men we can have at peak mobilization--and that is what we are talking about--we have to establish certain assumptions and certain ground rules: When are we going to reach that peak after M-day is one item, and it is difficult to say you can have 10 million or 15 million unless we do settle those basic assumptions.

A recent study which I saw--it was only in its formative stage--indicated that, if I recall correctly, it was in the neighborhood of 14 million, but the peak wouldn't be reached for four years after M-day. That is under one given set of assumptions.

The Department of Defense, of course, doesn't make these determinations alone. That is something that has to come out of cooperative effort on the part of the State Department, the ODM, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Selective Service--practically everybody gets in that act.

QUESTION: My question concerns the civilian manpower required to support the industrial effort that goes with full mobilization. It is my understanding that the ODM has not yet completed the inventory of industrial skills. Therefore, I am curious as to what is the base for determining whether we can or cannot support any given materiel program and hence can or cannot release a given number of men for military service?

GENERAL ANDERSON: I think you are right on your first statement that ODM has not completed the study which it is currently working on. It does have estimates. And when we say we can release X number of people to the military, we have the experience of World War II and that can be our point of departure and has been, I think, for the ODM and those who have made studies in that area.

They review the population by age groups and they estimate what proportion of that age group can be made available to the military services, based on the assumption that our economy is perhaps going to be the same as in World War II. In the age group of 17-19 and 25-34 in World War II, we had approximately 43 percent of that group in military service. For planning purposes we have estimated that as many as 50 percent might be taken, if necessary, although that would require the application of stricter deferment and exemption criteria and a reduction in physical and mental standards. From the military age group between those two, that is, 20-24, they had about 70 percent in World War II. They have assumed that about 75 percent might be available under the provisions of similar exemptions, deferment policy, and so on.

I know this doesn't completely answer your question, but that is the basis that they have used for their overall calculations. When we

get into specific skills, we are getting into another problem for which they do not have the answer--so far as I know.

QUESTION: In your point 6, you talked about equity and how it would be achieved. I wish you would explain that and explain how it could be achieved under any circumstances.

GENERAL ANDERSON: I know what you are getting at. We don't have equity at any time and never have had equity of service even among men who are actually in uniform. There is little equity between the man shot at and the man that stayed at home. There is little equity between the man that spends a year in the military service and gets out and the man that spends four years. Certainly, we know we are not going to have any military service--you can't maintain men in the Armed Forces--without the draft. We probably can't maintain more than 1.4 million, judging from past experience, by purely voluntary means.

Your question, as I see it, is: How do we get equity between the man drafted to spend two years in uniform against his will as opposed to the man dragged in for six months and sent home to be in the Reserves for 7 or 7-1/2 years?

It seems to be the thinking of some people dealing with this problem that equity is achieved as long as an individual spends some time on active duty and acquires a reserve obligation.

I didn't define equity for you; I can't. I know what you are thinking of and I know what some people who are advocating equity want. I agree with you--I think I do--when I say we don't achieve equity that way.

QUESTION: General, from my reading I get the impression that we should be pretty well convinced by now that we need a reserve force approximately equivalent to our Armed Forces. Is that correct?

GENERAL ANDERSON: As of right now that is just exactly what the requirement calls for.

QUESTION: If so, it would seem to me that, with our experience in the past two or three wars where we have been caught each time without any reserve force, the members of Congress--and it seems to be a political situation--could be shown the picture so they would realize that some action is necessary. Could you discuss that a little bit?

GENERAL ANDERSON: I think that Congress has shown a very definite interest in this reserve matter. When the Armed Forces Reserve Act was passed a few years back, they hoped it was going to solve a good many of our problems so far as the Reserve was concerned. That act established ready and standby reserves, but I believe most of the thinking of the people at that time was pretty well conditioned by the Korean situation which we had just gone through.

What they were trying to get at was the establishment of a varying degree of liability for service, and this resulted in the creation of the standby and ready reserve. They adopted a number of other things which they thought would make the Reserve a little more attractive to the people in it, but it still left active participation in the Reserve on a voluntary basis and this hasn't produced desirable results.

We then come around to the question: Why don't we get a law that requires these people who are in the Reserve and who have a reserve obligation to actually take part and maintain their competence. Maybe we can, but with some of the groups on the Hill with whom that has been discussed they throw up their hands in horror. They want the Reserve but politically it is a hot potato and they are not very anxious about forcing obligated reservists to participate. Maybe we will get some kind of forced participation. I know that certainly is one thing that the people working on this problem are anxious to get.

QUESTION: It seems to be just a matter of the education of the American people, particularly the Members of Congress, to forget their local constituents and face reality.

GENERAL ANDERSON: If we could do that, maybe we could ignore a lot of those things and really set up the type of reserve that the military would like to have.

QUESTION: General, it has been said that if we increase our Armed Forces any more, we will have to go into general mobilization. Would you like to discuss that?

GENERAL ANDERSON: I don't think I said that. If I did, I apologize for giving a wrong impression. What I did say was that I felt we could go to something in the neighborhood of 3.6 or 3.7 under the present regulations of the Selective Service law, and so forth. I also said I felt that if we went much beyond that we would be going, in all probability, into general mobilization.

QUESTION: General, I would consider that the civilians working for the military, plus the military, as the total military requirements. Have we exploited in the United States the subterfuge of getting more civilians working for us in the military and continuing to reduce our military level, and if we do, who determines or originates those requirements for the civilian force?

GENERAL ANDERSON: That is done in the OSD. You are right. The military and civilian make up the manpower package. The determination of civilian requirements is somewhat different from the military. As far as employing the subterfuge of hiring more civilians in place of military, thereby increasing our armed force capability, we have limitations. One, of course, is the budget, and when you go to Congress, they say, "How many are you hiring?" For graded civilians, for example, there is a congressional limit of 475,000 for all of the Department of Defense. That must be apportioned among all Services and OSD.

We did go to considerable length to hire civilians to replace military personnel a few years back and get the military out of the supporting echelon and into the operating force. But as our forces go down, as our procurement is reduced and other activities of the military are reduced, the need for those civilians is reduced. The Administration is well aware of that and it aims to reduce civilian employees.

But there is one other factor that you can't overlook when we are talking about replacing military with civilians. This gets back to a question that was asked about making the services more attractive. We have X number of people overseas. They have to come home, and they must have jobs when they come home. So you must have a military base here sufficiently large to take care of the rotation problem.

CAPTAIN REEVES: General, since you are battling a slight case of flu, I think we should not keep you any longer. On behalf of the college, I want to thank you for a most realistic picture of manpower requirements.

(10 Jan 1955--250)S/gw