

IMPLICATIONS OF THE COEXISTENCE POLICY UPON U. S.
DEFENSE AND INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION

17 December 1954

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Publication No. L55-71

INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

Washington, D. C.

Mr. Leo Cherne, Executive Director of the Research Institute of America, was born on 8 September 1912 in New York City. He is a graduate of New York University and the New York Law School; he has served on the faculty of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service; lectured at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces since 1939; and was a faculty member of the New School for Social Research from 1945 to 1952. He was awarded an honorary LL.D. from Parsons College, June 1951. Mr. Cherne participated in drafting the Army and Navy industrial mobilization plans for the last war, and worked closely with virtually every military and defense agency during that period. At the joint request of General Douglas MacArthur and the War Department, he went to Tokyo in April 1946 to prepare a program for the revision of the Japanese tax and fiscal structure. He is also well known to national radio and television audiences. He has covered every national political convention, starting in 1940, and frequently serves on panels. As chairman of the International Rescue Committee, Mr. Cherne made several trips to Berlin in 1953 at the invitation of the late Mayor Ernst Reuter to review the problems of the escapees coming across the Iron Curtain. With other members of the Board of Directors of IRC, he is presently completing plans for several major projects to aid those who seek freedom from Soviet tyranny. His writings include: "Adjusting Your Business to War," 1939; "M-Day and What it Means to You," 1940; "Your Business Goes to War," 1943; and "The Rest of Your Life," 1945. His articles have appeared in "The Saturday Evening Post," "Colliers," "Look," "The Saturday Review," and "The Atlantic Monthly."

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COLONEL BARTLETT: Admiral Hague, General Niblo, gentlemen: When a branch chief schedules a new lecturer for the first time, you can be sure he is usually nervous about what the results will be. When a lecturer is invited back for a second time, then the branch chief can be confident that you are going to hear a good talk. But when he invites someone back for the sixth time in four years, you may be confident that the lecture will be outstanding.

Mr. Cherne's talks in the past have been so excellent that in recent years we have invited him twice a year. You will find his lectures in the library, and they bear specifically on your final problem. In fact we are having a special printing made for you of his last lecture, of last May. The title is "Lessons from European World War II Experience in Industrial Rehabilitation" (L54-132). We hope that we will have it in your hands very shortly.

As you know, Mr. Cherne is head of the Research Institute of America; and our library receives his periodical newsletter.

The topic today is one which is currently featured in many editorials. I have seen four on this topic in local newspapers within the past month. It is one on which Mr. Cherne has burning convictions.

Mr. Cherne, it is a great pleasure to present you to this year's class.

MR. CHERNE: Thank you, Colonel Bartlett.

I have accepted each lecture at the Industrial College during these recent years with a feeling of deep responsibility. But I'm not sure that I have ever worked on a lecture as hard as I have on this one.

Analyzing, as I have, the consequences of the preoccupation with coexistence, I encountered difficulties I had not previously experienced. In preparing for this lecture I had to change my own evaluation of coexistence as the leaders of our Government were changing their

expressions about it. Within the last two weeks alone, there have been four separate definitions or interpretations in speeches by important members of the Administration from President Eisenhower down. As a result, there is so confused an understanding of what is meant by co-existence that any evaluation of the consequences is doubly difficult.

It seems to me, therefore, that before we can examine any of the consequences we must at least attempt a definition. Something of an indication of what is meant is usually provided by the adjective which accompanies "coexistence." Thus, for example, within recent weeks there has been an evolution from "peaceful coexistence" to "democratic coexistence," and "competitive coexistence."

The words yield still more meaning, I think if we take a look at the various stages of our relationship with the Soviet Union since the end of World War II. The events since the end of that war can be divided into reasonably sharp and identifiable periods. We first went through a period which extended through the latter portion of the war to September 1946. This period was brought to an official end by an historic address by Secretary of State James F. Byrnes. Throughout that period we were persuaded that, as a matter of national policy, the Soviet Union was an ally of the United States. To be sure, the ally was crude, rough, suspicious, and unpredictable. But not until December 1946 was there any real or fundamental official questioning of the fact that we were dealing with a great unwashed ally.

The change, when it came, was not dramatic. It preceded the series of tragic events such as the blockade of Berlin. The change reflected the less obvious difficulties in Iran, in central Europe, in the councils of the United Nations. The change, however, was none the less real and involved an altered official view of our relationship with the Soviet Union and of the nature of the Soviet's drives and purposes.

The second interval, the one in which this change occurred, extended roughly from the beginning of 1947 to the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. It was during this period that we increasingly recognized that we were facing a dangerous antagonist. The Soviet we saw was neither an ally nor an enemy, but rather it was clearly an antagonist. In place of our previous conviction that he was merely unwashed and unpredictable, we began to learn that he was predictably dangerous.

With the beginning of the Korean War, our understanding of the Soviet Union entered what appeared to be the final phase. It is no

exaggeration to observe that with the beginning of the Korean War the Nation overwhelmingly recognized that the Soviet was neither antagonist nor an ally but was indeed an enemy. There were times when it seemed certain the Soviet would remain an enemy to death.

Certain aspects of our belief were subject to fluctuations--the question of whether or not final conflict was inevitable and the question of ultimate alteration of the aggressive character of the Kremlin. But at no point was there any question that we were facing an enemy.

This conviction prevailed until the death of Stalin. It began to wither after the first few months of the new Malenkov government. As evidence increased that the new and shaky Soviet hierarchy was encountering a small difficulty in welding an effective government over its own territory, we became less preoccupied with the danger to our territory. And as the Soviet seemed increasingly preoccupied with its own problems, the focus of our antagonism began to shift increasingly to Communist China.

It is my belief that the concept of coexistence with the Soviet Union was absorbed by substantial groups throughout the world before the first use of the word, "coexistence." The first use of the phrase which caught international attention came from the Kremlin almost immediately following the disastrous Geneva pacts which divided Viet-Nam. Now there is an increasing chorus that agrees that we are in a period of "competitive coexistence."

The best definition of competitive coexistence I have seen is by Cy Sulzberger. In an article in "The New York Times" several weeks ago, he defined it as "a dynamic condition in which ideological and economic and political systems seek to dominate each other by means short of war."

To understand the dimensions of the change which has taken place, and something of the implications in terms of future attitudes and action, I think we must make some assessment of where we have been during the last few months. The year 1954 was one of frustrations, uncertainties, and contradictions, and for the most part of continued cold war. It was a year in which we suffered at least one humiliating defeat. That year was for the majority of the American people a year in which we did not go to war. More closely than most Americans realized, we skirted the possibility; but, as a matter of national policy, we decided not to go to war.

In the Kremlin, in the White House, in London, and in Paris, the world leaders seemed to conclude that our civilization could not live much longer within the shadow of the mushroom cloud. The only alternative appeared to be for the West to get along with the Soviet Union. Since the advent of thermonuclear weapons, it seems clear that there is no longer any alternative to peace if there is to be a happy and well world. So the United States and the European free nations began to cultivate the idea of achieving coexistence and began studying methods to achieve it.

By the year's end these are the questions that we are left with: What kind of coexistence? Where will it take the West? What will be the risks and the consequences? The search for answers to these questions will be the next order of business of international leadership during 1955. But less expressed, and undoubtedly most persistent, will be the remaining nagging question, "How reliable and permanent will coexistence be?" There are several kinds of coexistence. Some are as unacceptable as the consequences that would follow an atomic war. But this I think is an understanding which is not yet generally shared by the American community.

Among the kinds of coexistence, one, I think, can be accurately described as Soviet domination--a peace in which the Communist scheme of things would dominate the world. This is obviously completely repulsive, and no American leader in his right mind would accept it knowingly. I am not equally persuaded that we would refuse to accept a course of behavior which could, however, lead to this.

The second approach to coexistence is based upon the status quo. This approach would accept, without approving, the fact of Soviet domination of a substantial portion of the world. It involves containment of the Soviet within that area without, however, any affirmative effort to diminish it. This approach to coexistence involves an unstable world and, of course, provides no assurance of a durable peace.

The third approach is something in the neighborhood of cohabitation, a permanent living with communism. Here more is involved than merely accepting a fact. There is also the suggestion of moral acceptance of Soviet behavior. This is as fundamentally unpalatable to the West as the acceptance of democratic institutions would be to the Reds.

And finally, there is "cold war coexistence" or "competitive coexistence" which involves neither stalemate nor accepted world division.

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It implies the continuation of contest, the jockeying for position, the ebb and flow of influences, and a fluid world which we and the Soviet continue to struggle over by means which are short of full war. This, in my judgment, is the state of coexistence in which we now find ourselves.

So long, however, as the phrase "coexistence" continues to intrude on public consciousness and to affect national judgment, the effect upon our security remains. The effects will flow less from the type of coexistence we are in than from a less precise interpretation emotionally made by the American community. The very emphasis on coexistence has already given birth to a preoccupation with a possibility that there is indeed a fundamental change in the relationship between the Soviet Union and the free world. And it is this preoccupation which may well have the most disastrous consequences.

First of all, let's examine the conviction that there has been indeed a change within the Soviet Union, because the fundamental premise behind this preoccupation with coexistence has been that there has been a change in the Soviet Union.

The first and only important one of Harrison Salisbury's articles on the Soviet Union was the article which paved the way for preoccupation with coexistence. Salisbury gently insisted that there have been certain alterations of conduct, behavior, and conditions within the Soviet Union and within the Soviet bloc of nations other than Red China.

First, there undoubtedly has been a letup of repression within the Soviet Union--not an end to it, a letup. The secret police has been subdued, not eliminated.

Somewhat more consumer goods are available--slightly more in the Soviet Union, considerably more in the satellite states. I have had occasion to visit the Soviet section of Berlin each year for the last four years. I have seen the dramatic change which has occurred in East Berlin, a change visible in the shop windows, visible on the faces of the residents, a change visible in the atmosphere, and, unhappily, visible in the lessened contrast between East Berlin and West Berlin. This change was inaugurated not by altered Soviet policy as much as by the 17 June 1953 revolt, one of the most shattering events which has thus far occurred in the entire orbit of Soviet control. This date as a matter of fact, may well have been the signal for the beginning of the letup of repression.

It is obvious that within the Kremlin there is for the moment government by committee. Government by committee is less strong, less affirmative, less dynamic, and less certain than government headed up by an unchallenged leader. But at the same time I think that it must also be assumed that the committee membership will change. Members will die, perhaps even by purge. Such domination by committee is not stable nor does it provide the basis for any alteration of or even anticipation of policy.

Therefore, if our persuasion about coexistence results from the present nature of the Soviet hierarchy, we must at least be prepared for the very probable change in the personnel which make up that hierarchy. The expectation of durable peace, therefore, rests on at least one fragile and changeable circumstance.

There has been a new politeness in Soviet diplomatic conduct. And here, incidentally, is where I think we have been most foolish. I have the feeling that the United States has responded more to the new politeness of the Soviet representatives at the United Nations, for example, than we have to any fundamental or more significant change. We are traditionally good sports. If, for an interval of time, someone has been calling us names and then desists, we automatically respond with gratitude without any critical examination of whether or not the new behavior may itself be tactically far more dangerous than the previous vulgarity.

Evidence of the real change which has occurred is to be found in an area with which I am particularly familiar, the reduced number of escapees from the Soviet Union and from the Soviet satellite states within recent months. Unhappily, what at one time was 4,000 a day is now more nearly 3,000 a month. And it is very clear that closer patrolling along the borders is not the major reason for this. The major reason is diminished incentive to escape. Let me also add that there is another reason for the reduction, and that is that western behavior toward those who escape has not been an unqualified inducement to others, who learn thoroughly what the future is for those who have escaped.

It is obvious, too, that there has been a definite political softening in the satellite states, that such things as the release of Cardinal Mindszenty, whether true or not--it may not be true, but I am concerned with the very existence of the rumor and the soil in which it can be born--are reflections of a changed political attitude as between the Soviet Union and the satellites, and within the satellites themselves.

I am not persuaded that this change has made the Soviet Union and the satellite states a less dangerous bloc of enemies. On the contrary, strategically, or at least tactically, in terms of any potential injury which might be inflicted, I would far prefer a continuation of the old repression.

There is increased trade between the Western World and the Soviet Union, and this, too, is pointed to as evidence of a change. I am not sure that it is.

There has been one apparently significant change with reference to the West. Soviet representatives have demonstrated an apparent willingness to discuss the possibility of their participation in plans for atomic control. I have put an emphasis upon the words "apparent" and "possibility," because in the absence of actual willingness and an actual functioning of a system of inspection, I am inclined to be cynical concerning the depth or the character of change.

These, then, are the major indications which are cited to demonstrate that the Soviet Union has changed and to support the belief that a policy of coexistence in our relationship with the Soviet Union can indeed be durable.

There can be no question that there has been change in certain aspects of Soviet attitude and behavior no matter how temporary or peripheral to the main stream of Soviet intention. An understanding, however, of the nature and durability of coexistence may be easily attained by examining things which have not changed. There has, for example, been no increasing readiness on the part of the Soviet Union to sign an Austrian treaty. I regard this as fundamental, because it is inconceivable to me that the Soviet Union would not have done so years ago for purely propaganda purposes had it had even the slightest desire to encourage an atmosphere of coexistence, persuaded as I am that continued occupation of Austria serves no useful purpose to the Soviet Union. I wouldn't be the slightest bit surprised to see the Soviets reverse their policy within the coming months and sign an Austrian treaty. And I am hopeful that one step will not be misinterpreted as absolute proof of a complete alteration of Soviet behavior. To me, it is significant that there has not been even this less fundamental concession on the part of the Soviets.

There has been no acceptance of free elections anywhere. Incidentally, this is required by every agreement that has been entered into with

the Soviet Union from 1942 to 1954. Roughly, my guess is that we now have somewhere in the neighborhood of 11 separate treaties with the Soviet Union that require free elections in different parts of the world; and we continue to sign them, and so do they.

There has been no evidence of any increased willingness to accept or encourage German unity on any other than Soviet terms; and the Soviet terms are terms which in one way or another would assure to the Soviet Union total permanent neutralization of Germany and political control of the German state. Anybody would, of course, be mystified if the Soviet Union would not accept unity on this basis.

There has been not the slightest repression of the activities of the Comintern or the functioning of the Communist Party in any country anywhere in the world, despite the fact that the Communist Parties in certain countries represent a definite loss to the Soviet Union, not a gain. They are a hazard, an irritant, far more important than the marginal utility of the Communist Party's influence in certain areas. Thus, for example, in England the British Communist Party's damaging effect to the Soviet because of its irritation to the Englishmen is acceptable to the Kremlin solely for the subversion, espionage, and sabotage value of that small dedicated band in the event of a future war.

It is important to observe that neither the Soviet nor its Asiatic satellites have accepted or lived up to the terms of the two most recent armistices--those involving Korea and Viet-Nam. The cease fire in Korea required certain action with reference to airfields in North Korea, action which was violated within hours after the signing of the treaty. The treaty bringing about the division of Viet-Nam required the departure of Communist troops from South Viet-Nam. There has not been any genuine departure. Communists are now in control of important areas of southern Viet-Nam and are increasing their efforts to control the whole state.

There has not, in other words, been a single fundamental concession from the Soviet Union during the entire time when our conviction of change has induced us to welcome the possibility of coexistence.

Now, I think it is obvious that the Soviet Union is not seeking war in the visible future. But I think it has been equally obvious since 1945 that the Soviet Union was not seeking war in that interval. The worst disaster that the Soviet Union has suffered since 1945 came about in Korea as a result of the stupidity of an old and stubborn man, Stalin,

who forgot the lessons he himself taught the revolutionary movement. The Soviet Union has undoubtedly had the most to lose by war and the most to gain by piecemeal aggression or subversion.

And I think it is safe, as I said before, to assume a very real Kremlin fear of atomic or thermonuclear war. I believe we have every reason to be more afraid than the Soviet Union. I think we are in certain respects infinitely less prepared and far more vulnerable, as I had occasion to say here at the Industrial College several times in recent years. The fact is that, as time goes by--and there is not much more time that need go by--the margin of vulnerability as against capability will have shifted from the Soviet Union to us, with most elements in their favor.

If, as these facts would suggest, the preoccupation with coexistence is not based upon real or reliable facts, is not based upon a substantial or permanent change, then I think we must double our watchfulness of the consequences of an emphasis on coexistence. Let me emphasize that, whether coexistence is reliable or not, justified or not, durable or not, there are nevertheless certain consequences flowing from our belief in it. These are the aspects with which you are particularly concerned.

First, whatever the statement, and however high the level from which the statement may come, whatever even the present intention, any continuing preoccupation with coexistence, whatever it is called, whether competitive or peaceful or democratic or any other kind of coexistence--any continued preoccupation with coexistence must result in lessened American expenditure on armament. There cannot simultaneously exist within a democratic community even the partial acceptance of the prospect of peace and also the kind of discipline and sacrifice which would motivate continuing high and abnormal expenditure on arms. This means that the first consequence would be a reduction in military strength.

Tied directly to this, any playing with the prospect of peace must result in a reduction of the Government's ability to sustain unpopular high taxation; and I don't know whether this should not have gone first. You can maintain taxation at the level at which it has been imposed only in the presence of a popular assumption that danger is imminent. You cannot do so indefinitely otherwise. And I feel that the Eisenhower Administration will face very real difficulty even at this session of Congress in its desire to postpone the reductions which are due to go into effect this spring.

I believe the area in which we are most vulnerable is one in which our own inadequacy will be increased should we delude ourselves about coexistence. If there is an extended period of time in which our people are persuaded that a peaceful rapprochement with the Soviet is possible, it will be almost impossible to achieve the required industrial dispersion and even a minimally adequate civilian defense. Dispersal and civilian defense are peaceful measures. If they are to be genuine and not merely morale or propaganda phrases, they must involve substantial and uneconomic expenditure.

Dispersal means vast dislocation. Preparation of this character bucks the tide of normal community resistance. All of our everyday instincts militate against additional expenditure and dislocation. And this resistance would be indeed decisive if there is any disbelief that any actual danger confronts us. Every normal obstacle in a democratic society would be multiplied if we pursued even a real prospect of durable peace. It would be little short of tragic, therefore, to sacrifice the kind of protection against atomic war we require at a minimum in exchange for a fictitious and glib acceptance of an empty phrase, "peaceful coexistence."

Linked closely to this is the problem in a democratic society, not equally true in a totalitarian state, of maintaining the community results which are produced by the awareness of danger. Without that awareness, without fear, without the constant presence of external threat, it would require a voluntary discipline and willingness to sacrifice, with an understanding that the discipline and sacrifice may prove to have been unnecessary, greater than our society has thus far been able to achieve.

There will be greatly enlarged difficulty of maintaining our foreign alliances and foreign support. I don't know why I say "there will be." Realistically I would have to say there already has been. In defense against the Soviet Union, we already have paid a severe price because of the neutralism which has grown through Europe and a diminished fear of the Soviet Union which now exists throughout Europe.

We are at the beginning of vast difficulty in our political relationship with the European states and the collective arrangements which are indispensable to a defense against the Soviet Union. A preoccupation with coexistence will give the fatigued and weary nations that much more reason to resist doing what for us is indispensable and for them frequently seems unwarranted. Not a single nation on the continent of Europe wishes to be the target of thermonuclear warfare; neither do we.

But we have neither their immediacy nor their fear; we have neither their fatigue nor the desire to cohabit which they have.

There will be an increased difficulty, not only in Europe, but in the United States in the winning of support for German rearmament. I have seen one measure of it. A year and a half ago the International Rescue Committee, of which I am chairman, was able to raise among American corporations and American private contributors approximately a million dollars for aid to Iron Curtain escapees in Berlin. In 1954 we have been unable to secure even 50,000 dollars for the same purpose. And the reason most frequently given is antipathy to Germany, the feeling that Germany is well able to take care of itself. Other reasons are increased anxiety at the prospect of German rearmament and increasing concern about German economic competition. In this atmosphere securing the support which is needed within the United States, as well as on the continent of Europe, for effective German rearmament is one of the things which will become infinitely more difficult under increasing preoccupation with coexistence.

We will have difficulty in sustaining the defense effort abroad; for example, take Viet-Nam. I have just returned from Saigon some two months ago. I know how difficult the job of our own Government is in that strategic corner of the world. I am persuaded that if Viet-Nam falls, so also will Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, and Burma.

I think there is small prospect of the retention of the balance of Southeast Asia if we lose Viet-Nam. And I wouldn't hold out much future promise for support from India if Southeast Asia falls. India is not exactly our most durable ally at this moment, and its neutralist concern will be increased if it is flanked on all sides by Communist states.

Viet-Nam can be saved. Yet there is one chance in ten that this will be accomplished. It is one of the roughest problems we have ever undertaken.

The unhappy fact is that under the terms of the armistice an election is scheduled to take place in North and South Viet-Nam in 1956, some 19 months from now. If that election were to take place today in free Viet-Nam, the vote would probably be overwhelmingly Communist. Even among the half million refugees who have come down from Hanoi and Haiphong to seek sanctuary in Saigon, there would be a substantial Communist vote. The reasons are many and complex.

A free ally of ours is a major reason. So long as France is present in Viet-Nam, the free Vietnamese Government will suffer in any vote which is taken. Those who vote Communist would not be registering their affection for communism or even their support for the Communist leader Ho Chi Minh. They would be registering a nationalist protest against the remnants of French colonialism and the residue of feeling after eight years of colonial subjugation. I very much doubt that France will ever be eager to leave Viet-Nam. I doubt equally that there is any prospect of saving Viet-Nam if France remains.

But in order to save Viet-Nam, it will be necessary in the United States not only to secure vast Government support, but also to secure support from the American people. When I returned from Saigon, and at the request of the president of Viet-Nam and with the cooperation of their government, I made an appeal to a group of American corporations for quick emergency aid to go to the refugees who had come into Saigon. The minimum required for that purpose is the sum of 200,000 dollars to function on an emergency basis; less than 20,000 dollars was raised.

This is a measure of the indifference and resistance that has been growing within the United States. With continuing preoccupation with co-existence, how much likelihood is there, then, that there will be either popular support or the possible political base for the kind of action which may be necessary to save an apparently critical area of the world? In a world in which major nations are persuaded that peaceful coexistence is a real possibility, even our diplomatic conduct must become effective. It will be less possible for our diplomacy to give even the appearance of rocking the boat of peace, thus making resistance to aggressive action more difficult. So long as the embassies of the world are preoccupied with coexistence, then the United States cannot appear to be the truculent one. It is one of the ironies of the years through which we have passed that the Soviets have already succeeded in making many people throughout the world believe that it is we who seek war and the Soviets who seek peace.

And so especially now, in the long-range battle for the minds and hearts of the illiterate millions in the backward areas of the world, we cannot appear to be the nation which resists peace. That is why I am afraid that coexistence propaganda is a real threat; it is here that we may end up being the sucker for every phony proposal, for things which we know are phony, but which under the impact of world propaganda, focused on the hope of peace, we will find difficult or impolitic to resist.

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There is, however, something else which may prove to be the most important consequence of coexistence. There is reason to believe that, whatever the present intentions of the leaders of the Kremlin, the dynamic of Soviet repression will likely prevent any extended interval of genuine peacefulness. There is reason to question whether the Soviet Union can afford to permit the appearance of external peace.

Even if Soviet dynamics or strategy indicated the advisability of an interval of years of minimal tension, even if strategically they were to conclude that minimum international tension would permit the greatest prospect for them of ultimate victory, there remains the question whether this is a feasible environment for a police state. It is clear, for example, that the Soviets clearly desire an American depression. It has been equally clear that American rearmament has contributed to some portion of our high economic activity. And it is most clear of all that the Soviet conduct has been responsible for American rearmament and consequently for an American boom. It is at least possible to speculate that it is not because the Soviets wanted this but because they could not help it. It is improbable that the Kremlin can long retain its internal power if the appearance of international threat and pressure is removed.

The Soviet Union cannot live without repression, and repression can be sustained and justified and will be accepted only so long as there is an appearance of danger. Therefore, even if their present policy flows from a genuine desire for coexistence, the pressures within the Soviet Union itself for an alteration of that policy within a few years may prove irresistible.

Then what will the consequences be? And here I just ask you to reflect on one of the most remarkable facts of all history. In 1945 we were locked in deadly warfare with two nations and two peoples uniformly and deeply hated by the citizens of the United States. There was, as a matter of fact, an attitude which prevailed, especially with reference to the Japanese--an unjust attitude and unfair attitude, but a really deep-seated attitude--of fundamental inability to live at peace with these people; and only to a slightly lesser extent was this true of Germany.

How long did it take after 1945 for these attitudes to change: How long did it take for us to begin to build a possibility of coexistence with them? Three years? At most five. By January 1950 we were well on the road toward complete coexistence with both Japan and Germany.

The point I am making is this: Don't for a moment accept the present attitude toward the Soviet Union, as an assurance that this attitude,

no matter how national or how deep seated, is any protection against the dangers of coexistence. It is not, because the danger is in the concept of coexistence. If this is bought, then the Nation's attitudes will accommodate themselves to it. And it is not inconceivable that a five-year interval of Soviet reasonableness will find us deep in the process of admiration and affection and recovery of the years of lost hope and patience. And it is in this direction that the real danger lies, because when this occurs, then indeed must we rely upon a permanent and unchanging desire on the part of the Soviet Union to live at peace.

Bear in mind that we cannot match the Soviet Union in subversion. We have tried and we have not succeeded. We cannot match the Soviets in the exploitation of ignorance and want. That is why we are losing India. That is why we are losing Viet-Nam. We cannot make promises we don't believe in. We cannot make misrepresentations that fellow politicians can challenge and call lies. We are responsive to and subject to the weights and balances of a democratic society. We cannot force results at home or compel alliances abroad, as the Soviet Union can. We cannot start a preventive war, assuming there were any desire to do so, without losing the support of most of our own people and an overwhelming portion of the balance of the world. We cannot resist the strategy of peace, which is the Soviet strategy at this moment, without appearing to be the war-seeking nation.

What can we do? I would like an hour to define the possibilities, as I have defined the difficulties. I will sum them up quickly.

We can and must redefine "coexistence" so that it does not confuse the American community. There must not be on any level of American life any public confusion of coexistence with peace. Coexistence must not be made to have either the appearance or the semblance of peace, because it has no element of peace in it and no lessening of the danger of war. We must on every level emphasize the continuing danger.

We must seek within the United Nations and elsewhere permanent controls against war, such as are involved in the Baruch atomic energy plan. We cannot rely on promises or on treaties. We must have the protection of an effective apparatus of inspection and control.

We must prepare for war. Nothing has occurred which has diminished that future possibility even as we seek to avoid it.

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We must make a continuous effort to compel fundamental Soviet concessions--in Viet-Nam, Korea, Austria, Germany--lest we find ourselves settling for politeness and cocktail parties. Delightful as they are, they are no solution to international difficulties.

We must, in my judgment, reassert the policy of containment, because I am afraid we have had neither containment nor liberation. We must at minimum resist any further Communist expansion by whatever process.

We must be prepared to risk war when we are provoked by real danger. That means patience, as President Eisenhower has asserted; but it doesn't mean carte blanche, which patience can too easily come to resemble.

We must intensify, not relax, our military and scientific preparation. We must intensify and not relax the actions designed to compel dispersal--to compel, not to persuade. There will never be an adequate dispersal achieved by voluntary corporate action.

We must implement the announced return by Secretary Wilson a week ago to the policy of purchases from multiple sources. It must not merely be the vocal rearticulation of an earlier policy. It must actually be the governing policy of procurement.

We must fight the battle of the backward areas of the world with huge resources and very considerable courage and imagination.

We must wait and watch for the change of the Soviet line, because the Soviets cannot remain the Soviets and permanently enjoy peace.

In other words we have to find a line for ourselves somewhere midway between being trigger-happy and being slap-happy.

The problem is in many ways a semantic one. It has been multiplied by the very existence of the one word "coexistence." There are vital, even critically important, debates throughout the world today about the meaning of that word. Our entire national behavior and conduct, preparation, and planning will be affected by the meaning of a word and by the analysis and examination of that word.

Yes, there is no question that the problem is a semantic one. But that doesn't mean that the problem is any less real, because semantic

problems have very deep psychological consequences. It is not for nothing that the Soviet Union is always insisting that it is a democratic and peaceful nation. It knows the semantic consequences and psychological response to those words. Again, it knows very clearly the psychological response which attaches to the word "coexistence" throughout the world. We must be equally aware of the psychological consequences which arise from our responses.

Psychological consequences of semantics can shape national posture and action. Wars have been started, and some of the most bitter wars have been fought, for purely semantic reasons. Almost every religious war was a semantic one.

I recognize that I have not given too sanguine an interpretation of the prospect of coexistence. I think it is clear that I am a prejudiced observer. I have several prejudices. I don't trust the Soviet Union. I loathe the Communist system. I do not believe it can permit peace for its own citizens. I know it cannot open the doors of its empire.

I have other prejudices as well. I have in this instance a prejudice against the easy willingness of democratic people to snap at the bait called peace. I know how deeply we desire it. I know how unacceptable war has always been to us and how impossible the A- and H-bombs have now made it. But I also know that doesn't mean it will not occur. There is no law against mass self-destruction. There is no assurance that mankind will not commit suicide. There is no promise that this civilization must survive. And there has been no law in history that virtue is inevitably rewarded.

There is in my judgment no alternative to strength and to the preparations that you are participating in.

It has been a privilege, as always, to share these thoughts with you, with the hope that they may have made some small contribution to the vital, perhaps the most vital, purpose to which your studies are devoted.

Thank you.

QUESTION: You spoke in your conclusion about containment and helping to defend backward areas. Specifically, in Viet-Nam, would you make some suggestions on how in your opinion we could proceed down there?

MR. CHERNE: Well, I conveyed some suggestion at least to one agency of our Government involved therein. I think in some respects recent weeks have seen a change in American policy that promises much more favorable results.

The cornerstone of American action for now, in my judgment, must be in the realization that fundamentally we will not be able to save Viet-Nam so long as the French are present and in control. It is in my opinion impossible to sustain Viet-Nam while there remain anywhere in Viet-Nam 150,000 to 175,000 French troops. I do not believe the Vietnamese will trust the meaning of the word "independence" or the nature of the fight against communism or any of your premises with which we are involved so long as the French are there.

The Vietnamese have reason to believe that their dislike or hatred of the French is much more real and much more pressing than their concern about communism. Most of them, as a matter of fact, don't know what communism is. In those areas in which we are thoroughly against the expansion of communism, they do not feel that they have equal reason to fear it.

This means that the first step, as I think General Collins has asserted is to have the United States dissociate itself from its previous policy of several years which involved a rather unfortunate association with the French Government. We have already paid a very high price for those years of mistakes.

We are now in the process of beginning the American training of Vietnamese troops. I hope this will permit the French to avoid the heavy drain on their own treasury which must be represented by their troops remaining on Indochinese soil without our financial support.

In the achievement of this objective, there is a wide variety of steps in both the economic rehabilitation of Viet-Nam and the creation from scratch of the Vietnamese Government administration. They haven't had any experience in government. I think we must expend our energy, our money, our assistance, and our advice for a long time to come. I think it is very important that from the first we establish the conviction in their minds, and continue to maintain it, that we will not run their government; that they will run it; that we will advise them on how to run it, but not run it, because it is very easy to fall into the trap of being regarded in much the same light as the French.

We have to find a difficult solution to a difficult situation. The heart of it is the French. The French are in too much trouble at home to extend their forces so widely.

COMMENT: Sir, as a member of Intelligence I would like to tell you that I find little to be dissatisfied with and a lot that is stimulating in your talk. I would like to make a couple of comments, however.

We have succeeded in Intelligence in trying to gear our thinking and our action to the implications of the new Soviet attitude. As a result of that policy we have found ourselves blocking the Soviets in all areas of the world. But it is a problem of trying to block so many holes in the dam with only so many fingers. I feel that we have stressed this anti-communism thing to the extent that all our national objectives and policies are now directed toward anticommunism. I sensed some of that in your talk. We feel--and this is a remark that you may want to comment on--that if we spent more time on pro-American and less on anticommunism, this thing would pretty well solve itself as far as we are concerned.

MR. CHERNE: I have no quarrel with your comment. It contains very fundamental thoughts. I think I would just concern myself with the phrase "pro-American."

I am as convinced as you are that the preoccupation with anticommunism as the sole test of national policy is inadequate to meet the problem we face. I am particularly persuaded that the abnormal energy, emotional and otherwise, which has been expended here at home on certain variants of the anti-Communist theme has been incredibly harmful to us throughout the world. More harm could not have been caused had this campaign been guided by the Soviet Union itself. So much harm has been done, in fact, that I have never been fully persuaded that the Soviets may not have been somewhere in the background.

I think we are emerging from some of the shadow and giving evidence of returning to something which resembles mental health. And should we continue this long road back to more complete maturity and sanity, I would like to see us go one step further; I think this step is implicit in your comment. I feel strongly that anticommunism or resistance to communism, and what is involved in containment, is not in itself adequate for a fifty-year war against the Soviet Union. This is why I said I wish I had an hour; I would have spent some 10 minutes at least on the battle of the backward areas. And, very honestly, I would not have used the word "anticommunism" at all because, although anticommunism

may be the motivation for, or the result of, our efforts, it must not be the guiding principle or determinant of what we do in that direction. There are other considerations, which are thoroughly understood here and to some extent outside this room, that must guide our future affirmative and not negative, as we have been in the intelligence aspects of anticomminism for many years.

QUESTION: I get the impression from your lecture that you are persuaded that virtue is not its own reward. Is it not true that the principle that virtue is its own reward is the basis upon which we have built the successful results of this program? And, specifically, is not the Technical Aid Program really just such an approach?

MR. CHERNE: I would like to advance a more substantial justification for the Technical Aid Program than virtue or generosity. As a matter of fact, I think some of the fundamental difficulties in our posture toward the world since 1945 result from the fact that we have presented the world with generosity rather than vision in too many instances. We have presented to the world the desire for peace rather than any very creative or affirmative program to achieve peace.

What I did try to convey in my closing remarks was that we can be virtuous--and, incidentally, I think in many of these recent discussions we have not been virtuous at all--and overwhelmingly we have been, and still fail as a society.

There have been civilizations which were virtuous but which collapsed in the face of totally unvirtuous adversaries. The one point I was making is that we cannot rely on the hope that history will accord us victory just because we have been virtuous.

I do not mean for a moment to imply that a virtuous course of action could not therefore be fine; on the contrary. But I would like to add that our virtue needs to have a very real concern with the practical results we seek, and that our virtue must be accompanied by a knowledge of the environment in which we operate. There has been more than one occasion when what seems to be virtuous here gets to be pretty stupid in Saigon or elsewhere.

COMMENT: I would like to make this comment on that: I think there is something shortsighted in the long-range view in your concern about what happens in the short-range problems in Viet-Nam today, tomorrow, or next week; and that is really the standard upon which you

are criticizing. I don't believe that is true at all. I think that saying that the issue of communism versus anticommunism, with all its complications, is our most important concern for this generation certainly imposes a task that is too much for us.

MR. CHERNE: There I think we have our fundamental disagreement, which nothing that I can say is likely to resolve.

I do believe that we have a long-range and a short-range problem. I believe we cannot select between those two. I think we have immediate battles that must be won, as well as the long-range struggle which we must also seek to win.

I think we cannot too easily relinquish Viet-Nam. I think if the chances were one to fifty rather than one to ten, we would still have to make the giant effort to enlarge that one in fifty chance to a fifty-fifty chance. I'd like to point out, incidentally, that we have not lost that vital area; we have taken a very severe defeat, for which a price will have to be paid in the future, but we have not lost Viet-Nam.

I think that wherever effective action against the Soviet Union is indicated, wherever victory for the Soviet Union is probable, we must apply the maximum energy we can summon.

Right here we come to the problem that I think is of fundamental importance for the United States. I do not for a moment believe we have overextended ourselves. I do not for a moment think we have exhausted our resources or even used them more than marginally. I think we in the United States have been unwilling, and have not had adequate leadership at any point in recent years to develop the willingness, to take the action that should come from this society, for both its own survival and the strength of the free world, against the Soviet Union. So I would worry less about whether we have done too much than about how little we have done effectively.

COLONEL BARTLETT: Mr. Cherne, our clock has caught up with us. In my introduction I promised the class that they would have an outstanding talk. I know that the number of hands that are still raised here is the best indication that you have accomplished that outstanding job and the best compliment we could pay you. On behalf of the class, I sincerely thank you for your very vigorous talk.

(2 Mar 1955--450)S/gmh