

THE ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR IN
ECONOMIC MOBILIZATION

15 April 1955

2175

CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
INTRODUCTION--Colonel L. R. Bartlett, Jr., USAF, Chief of Branch	1
SPEAKER--Honorable Rocco Siciliano, Assistant Secretary, Department of Labor	1
GENERAL DISCUSSION	9

NOTICE: This is a copy of material presented to the resident students at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. It is furnished for official use only in connection with studies now being performed by the user. It is not for general publication. It may not be released to other persons, quoted or extracted for publication or otherwise copied or distributed without specific permission from the author and the Commandant, ICAF, in each case.

Publication No. L55-132

INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

Washington, D. C.

Honorable Rocco C. Siciliano, Assistant Secretary of Labor for Employment and Manpower, was born in Salt Lake City, Utah, 4 March 1922. He was graduated with honors in 1944, receiving an A. B. degree at the University of Utah. At the conclusion of study during the period 1946-48, he received an LL. B. at Georgetown University Law School. During the period 1943-46, he served as a first lieutenant in the Army. His business and professional experience includes: State Occupational Analyst, U. S. Employment Service, Department of Labor, Salt Lake City, Utah, 1946; legal assistant to board member, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D. C., 1948-50; and assistant secretary and treasurer, and supervisor of labor relations, Procon Incorporated, Headquarters, Des Plaines, Illinois, 1950-53. He is a member of the Chamber of Commerce, American Bar Association, and the Bar Association of the District of Columbia. Mr. Siciliano was nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate as Assistant Secretary of Labor in July 1953.

THE ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR IN ²¹⁷⁷
ECONOMIC MOBILIZATION

15 April 1955

COLONEL BARTLETT: The subject of the address today is "The Role of the Department of Labor in Economic Mobilization." Now the importance of the Department of Labor is evident by just considering a few of the bureaus and responsibilities which the Department has--the Bureau of Apprenticeship, Defense Mobilization Planning Administration, the Bureau of Labor Standards, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and the Office of International Labor Affairs, to mention only a few.

Our speaker today was confirmed by the Senate in his position of Assistant Secretary of Labor in July 1953. This is his second appearance on this platform. It is a privilege to present to you the Honorable Rocco C. Siciliano, Assistant Secretary of Labor for Employment and Manpower. Mr. Siciliano.

MR. SICILIANO: General Calhoun, Colonel Bartlett, gentlemen, and I think I have met the one lady who is here previously. I am, of course, delighted to meet again with you people to think through some of the mobilization problems with which America would be faced if a war should be launched with atomic and thermonuclear attack upon our cities. I look forward to these meetings because they give me the opportunity and the obligation to reflect upon the nature of atomic warfare as well as to think consecutively of the problems which would attend the fighting and winning of a war begun with devastation of our home front.

The more deeply we get into this problem, the more convinced I become that it is not susceptible to a solution by statistical analysis. I have read Appendix A to the "Final Problem" which you are trying to solve and I am frank to say that the statistics as statistics mean very little to me at least. I have heard of the breadth of the devastation that could be wrought by a single bomb. I have heard that a nuclear device can generate temperatures of a million degrees. Or is it 10 million? Or does it make any difference?

The current fashion is to try to quantify as precisely as possible the effects of atomic bombing so that we can calculate the cost in resources of reconstructing our industrial machine for the conduct of economic life as we now know it. Our current captivation--if I might use that word--is to attempt to measure, as though with laboratory scales, the value of resources--of metals and men and machines and motive power--that would remain after the kind of homefront attack envisioned in your problem. We sharpen our skill in handling numbers by engaging in such exercises as you have now. Of course, I recognize that there is a cultural contribution to be made by the improvement of techniques for high-speed calculation of unknowns.

For example, in the premises of the problem that you have, I think you recognize perhaps better than I that vastly different results can flow from slight and capricious differences in the homefront attack. A hundred thousand lives might represent the difference between a wind blowing east or a wind blowing northeast at the moment of detonation of a thermonuclear device. So far as your problem is concerned, I suggest that we are deceiving ourselves if we believe that we are able to quantify precisely the effect of Soviet bombardment of our industrial resources. But, of course, I see a value to continuing the kinds of exercises which have characterized the last couple of years in defense planning for atomic attack, but we must be fully conscious that we are engaged in "dry runs."

I am leading up, as I hope you may see, to the Labor Department's role in mobilization. I am staying away from the word "manpower" for the time being.

What we need is not more counting, but more thinking--and thinking is not expensive but it is very difficult. It requires the detachment and time that you gentlemen and the one lady here have at your command.

Permit me to give at this point the conclusion of my remarks, which I will repeat in its actual and proper place. The best preparation that we can make to defend this nation and to rebuild its strength after the kind of attack envisioned in your Unit IX is to strengthen ourselves morally and intellectually so that we can cope with whatever kind of demand the next war places upon us.

It seems to me beyond the realm of reason to expect us to anticipate the exact moment, volume and scope of the impact and to take steps to rectify the ruin. Let us rather agree that we shall try to understand the problem as well as we can; thereby, we who may have responsibility for leadership in the event of another war can prepare ourselves morally to see it through and intellectually to invent and improvise the administrative and productive devices appropriate to winning that war.

What all this means is simply that the best preparedness for the next war is a proper state of mind.

If I have made compliments here, I should also say that I envy you the opportunity which this nearly one year of reflection has given and is giving you to better understand our industrial, social, economic processes. I wish that we uptown could do as well in thinking through the problems of Government, with as much detachment and as little regard for custom and traditional ways of solving problems as you here.

We have not done too well, it seems to me, in thinking through the problems of mobilization after atomic attack. Our programs have been sometimes replete with contradiction and inconsistency. For example, every estimate I know anything about assumes that Washington will be a prime target for atomic attack. My office is on the third floor of the Labor Building at 14th Street and Constitution Avenue, N. W., Washington, D. C. --about as close to ground zero as it is possible for me to get. Just outside my office hangs a black and white sign pointing the way to a "shelter area." Shelter from what? Aside from defacing an otherwise tastefully decorated corridor, I can find little use for this sign and for everything it betokens in our civil defense and military preparedness program. We are led to believe that there is shelter where there is none.

The current thinking is that under the kind of attack you are studying, the only hope for survival is that we flee from probable targets at the moment the warning is sounded. That is reasonable enough, although with the latest announcements concerning the effects of fall-out, we haven't done enough thinking about where we should flee or for how long. But if I should undertake to flee at the moment I receive a warning, I would encounter, immediately upon entering any highway from this city, signs instructing me that the highway is closed unless I am on essential civil defense work.

In the event that it needs to be made clear, I am not protesting against the signs as signs. But I am striking at the inconsistencies which those signs symbolize. I could enlarge upon this theme in connection with relocation exercises, the buildup of stockpiles of materials, and many other aspects of our current mobilization thinking. I am being very critical because I think that is the kind of analysis you prefer. It seems to me that we are being driven through routines that have little virtue except the psychic comfort that they give us of doing something.

Before I go any further, I might say I have four children though the story I will tell has never yet been applicable to me.

I am told that when physicians make deliveries at home, their first instruction to the prospective father is that he proceed to the kitchen and cover the stove with pots of water to be brought to a boil. Never has an obstetrician found any use for these quantities of boiling water unless he chose to have a cup of tea at the end of his work. The purpose of the exercise is to remove the father from the scene of operations, to keep him out of the way, to keep his mind and his hands occupied, and to give him a sense of contribution and participation in an event for which he holds himself responsible. I suggest that some of the civil defense and industrial reconstruction exercises to which we are being exposed is the equivalent of setting the population to preparing hot water.

To turn to the specifics of your exercise, it contemplates the nearly total destruction of 50 American cities. Instead of the whole nation, indeed the whole world, rushing supplies and men and good will for the reconstruction of these stricken places, as was done in the San Francisco fire, or the recent earthquake in the Philippines, much of the whole world will be dedicated to the further destruction of these cities and as many additional cities as Soviet strength could destroy. Even within our own nation, the need to protect the survivors, the need to improve the defenses of the unbombed cities, the need to husband resources for the long war to come could combine to prevent supplies freely flowing for the rehabilitation of the stricken places.

Your problem proposes the most complete shattering of the nation's marketing, transportation, supply and production complex ever envisioned--far beyond what was experienced even in Germany in World War II. The thousands of bombers which over a period

of six years visited German cities with old-type blockbusters and fire bombs did not in that entire period visit upon the German cities more than a fraction of the havoc contemplated in your exercises. Ultimately, it was the breaking of the German morale that led to its defeat. It was their unwillingness to fight further, rather than their inability mechanically to produce goods that led to their collapse. Even they did not have a San Francisco fire situation or even a series of them. How much more difficult than any natural catastrophe we have ever known is the problem you are trying to solve.

So again I say that the best preparation to survive and fight on to win will come from our moral and mental preparedness. Only from fully understanding the challenge will come the determination, the flexibility and the ingenuity to combine our surviving resources in the best fashion we can then contrive.

I think you will remember that in 1939 the Lindbergs visited Germany. The Lindbergs were tremendously impressed with the German armed might in being and felt that it was almost pointless to fight this wave of the future because no nation could overtake the Germans, who were so obviously ready for war. The Lindbergs failed to take into account the enormous capacity for production that resided in the American industrial machine. Indeed, many of our own industrialists failed to do so. The 100,000 airplanes per year program which was announced after Pearl Harbor was greeted with disbelief even by many aeronautical engineers. We were given time to turn our industrial machine around in World War II, and its strength, of course, was the deciding factor. We were able to outproduce the Germans handily because we had the time to convert our enormous capacity to war uses.

Are we not now in terms of attitude preparing to fight a World War II? Are we not consciously or unconsciously thinking of converting an industrial machine to war production after the onset of hostilities? Are we not thinking of rebuilding a shattered industrial machine so that it can produce the weapons of war? Is it not altogether possible that the mobilization base for war, in the face of the problem you are studying, consists really only of the weapons we possess the day before M-day? Perhaps we cannot count confidently on having the resources, the time, the strength, to rebuild our intricately integrated industrial machine for the resumed manufacture of complex weapons of war.

Perhaps what the Lindbergs envisioned incorrectly in 1938 is a practical fact in 1955. Are we behaving essentially differently in planning our mobilization for atomic war than for a World War II type of undertaking? Our 'stockpile program--a wise and necessary thing, of course--assumes that even our domestic sources of metals will be substantially damaged by enemy attack, yet in our planning we must provide that the requirements for those metals would be significantly curtailed by the same enemy attack. We could not assume that the Russians would knock out lead mines by atomic attack, but that they would not knock out the battery factories that use the lead.

We are planning an Armed Forces Reserve program that will quickly bring semitrained recruits into the line. But to carry on what kind of tactics, in the face of a probable inability to sustain a very high level of armed forces strength with modern and intricate weapons. If the premises of your problem can be accepted, is there any likelihood at all that we will be able to build after M-day weapons like B-52's or heavy tanks?

It is still fashionable among mobilization planners to insist that in the event of another war the civilian population is going to have to wear the hairshirt as it never did in World War II; that it is going to have to be brought down to a rugged level of bare subsistence so that a larger residue of our gross national product can be made available to our Armed Forces. Is this a tenable proposition? Is it not reasonable to presume that the destruction of work places, the destruction of productive capacity, the destruction of the markets and transportation will be such that we will have relatively a larger population than we have industrial capacity to support? Even considering the casualty effects of the fall-out, is such a probability to be dismissed? Hence, we may not be able to reduce the fraction of the gross national product to make more available for the Armed Forces.

The mere sustenance of the survivors, their feeding, clothing, shelter, and medical care may take more, not less, of the gross national product than we devoted to civilian uses in World War II. If the destruction of our cities is as great as we are led to believe, it is reasonable to assume that we will have to provide relatively much more in the form of consumers durable goods than we did in World War II. It is just these kinds of goods which most compete with the Armed Forces for the resources the Armed Forces need, for the resources they have to fight with.

I have dwelt at length on the foregoing considerations without once mentioning manpower for a very simple reason. Manpower in a mobilization context has been defined as a resource of production which must be matched with other resources for production, so that the greatest product will flow from the wisest combination of these resources. Now, of course, this is a highbrow way of saying that we in the Labor Department are in the business of providing manpower to home front production and to the Armed Forces in time of war.

We feel that we are the civilian manpower agency. As such agency, our authority has been very substantially supplemented by delegations which were given us by the Office of Defense Mobilization last May and the Federal Civil Defense Administration last September. I can perhaps get into those delegations more specifically if you care to in the question period.

We in the Labor Department fill orders for people. Other people make the production decisions. We have a manpower problem because we have a production problem. The problem becomes bigger or smaller depending upon how much we are able to produce. How much or how little we are able to produce depends upon the way we combine resources with the item in shortest supply dictating the limit on our production.

We in the Department are developing our manpower programs for full mobilization to keep in step with production decisions. Our determination is that production must not be held up because of a shortage of labor. The more I think about this problem, the more confident I become that it will not be manpower as manpower which limits our capacity to make war. I have already indicated how you may have surplus labor rather than a shortage.

Sure, we will run out of highly skilled workers before employers are satisfied. Of course, workers will have to be upgraded to jobs they never held before. Naturally, people will be trained above their skill-- and in some cases above their heads.

We are prepared to assume the responsibility for seeing to it that this training and improvement in capacity takes place. We are preparing to arrange to help workers shift around the country to the areas where they are most needed. Our programs will be geared so as exactly to reflect the priority and importance which is assigned to the making of the various kinds of goods and services.

We think that we can do these things best without the forcing of workers to take jobs or to live in places against their will. We are getting down to a very crucial philosophic point here, and we believe, we are convinced, that a worker is most productive when he is doing the thing he chooses to do. We are further convinced that American workers, properly informed, properly guided, properly led will choose to do the things that best advance their own and their Nation's survival. After all, within the terms of reference of Problem IX that you have, every citizen is pretty much in business for himself. His own survival and the Nation's survival come down to about the same thing.

Our people are intelligent, alert, cooperative and possessed with an abundance of good will. Let us capitalize on that. Let us not attempt to substitute the bureaucrat--which I am, and I am not speaking disparagingly--and his decisions for the collective wisdom of our people, properly informed.

The most dangerous tasks in a military operation are performed by volunteers. We have duplicated that approach on the home front in every war we have ever fought. I think we can do it again. Of course, there may be aspects of the labor market in which Government may have to intervene, may have to insure that there is industrial peace in those sectors of production upon which national health and safety depend. We can't permit arbitrary and capricious attitudes on the part of management or of labor to tie up production. It will also be necessary for the Government to intervene in the labor market to review the wage-setting process, because if wages are not so reviewed their additions to the cost of production could lead us into another wild surge of inflation.

By my questions I do not wish to convey cynicism nor skepticism about our preparing to meet such an attack as contemplated here. Only by such planned groups as this right here, multiplied in different forms, in the classroom or office, home or club, can an understanding by the American people be achieved. Fear vanishes before the known, and though uncertain expectancy may remain, knowledge brings confidence, courage, and strength. All this is just another way of saying an informed populace is an alert one--trained to sense the next, the right move.

We in the Labor Department, working with the Office of Defense Mobilization and other Government agencies, are proceeding with our manpower plans on the assumption that with the help and cooperation

of representatives of labor and management, freely chosen, we can muster our population in the numbers and in the places where they are needed. This assumption is coupled with another assumption that borders on dogmatic faith: that our people in their free tradition cannot be driven against their will.

With that conviction, may I close with again reiterating this point: Our best preparation for fighting and winning a war that starts as your "model" war does is to have the intellectual flexibility and the moral fibre developed in advance sufficient to perform whatever unanticipated challenges that war might bring.

I will be glad in the question period to get into some of the specifics of the Department's activities. I think that concludes my formal remarks.

COLONEL BARTLETT: It might help you to frame your questions if I tell you that for daylight attack without warning in our final problem, the computations which will be given to you indicate over 13 million dead, over 8 million seriously injured, or a total of over 22 million lost in this hypothetical attack.

Mr. Siciliano is ready to attack your questions.

QUESTION: I am interested, sir, in a little more explanation as to how these few remaining people that Colonel Bartlett has left us could be moved around the country where work was required?

MR. SICILIANO: Of course, at first there wouldn't be much moving, except probably into the earth of those people who are dead. I think that would take some time because that will be an immediate problem of putting people to work. This falls under one of the delegations we have from the Federal Civil Defense Administration, the immediate post-attack period, which means leading, or guiding, or inducing people to immediately start cleaning the streets and burying the dead. This is going to take time, with 13 million people dead. How long a time, I don't know. Of course, I would guess it may take several weeks.

We have fortunately in this country an organization that we are able to rely on, the employment offices, some 1,700 of them throughout the United States. The fact that a substantial number of those employment offices would still be workable might serve as a sort of starting point for referrals. That would have to be on a regional basis.

Most of this kind of organization will have to be done regionally because we will assume the major cities of the country will be hit and pretty well destroyed. So we will have to have regional civil defense and manpower centers, and we will have to have, of course, radio type telephones, or what not. These are some of the problems. I don't know the whole answer, of course, but this is the idea.

All I can say specifically is that it is going to take some time before we can even talk about transporting people from area to area for working purposes.

COLONEL BARTLETT: Mr. Siciliano, I think perhaps the class would like to hear your explanation of the use of the word "regimentation" attributed to you recently.

MR. SICILIANO: This was about a month ago. The Sunday Washington Post had a little column on the front page, "Government official implies regimentation of workers coming in our next war." I was wondering who was saying this. I read it, and of course it was me.

Actually it was not literally correct. It came about in our appearance before the House Appropriations Committee requesting funds for carrying out both FCDA and ODM delegations. At one point I was asked questions about the protection of reemployment rights of people taken from jobs, not for military service, but people to help in the cleanup work, who would not want to do it if they felt it might result in their losing their own jobs. I spoke about "taking" or "requisitioning", and then I said, "That's a bad word." I said "requisitioning"; I didn't say "regimentation." If I had said, "That is the wrong word," they wouldn't have had a news story. I said, "That is a bad word." If I had said, "That is the wrong word," there would have been no question.

Regimentation actually, of course, can't work. We don't favor any kind of regimentation of workers. On the contrary, we believe a voluntary system will work, but people have to be informed before you can fully expect a prompt reaction to the needs, the kind of reaction we expect from American people.

QUESTION: You spoke of the 1,700 offices through which you would operate. You also implied that everybody in Washington will have difficulty in maintaining a nerve center. Can you tell us anything of your plans for a postwar nerve center for the Department of Labor in this effort?

MR. SICILIANO: I think I can. Sometime ago, under the aegis of the ODM as well as working cooperatively with FCDA, relocation centers as such were indicated for each of the major Departments of the Federal Government. The Labor Department has one. The site of relocation centers vary according to agencies. The Labor Department is setting up a relocation center--many miles from Washington--in such fashion as we may be able to operate partially with the responsibilities that would remain after this attack. We have a long way to go in this direction.

I might mention, in our own Department, right now, in fact, we have sent out to each of the Department's bureaus our estimate--when I say "our" I mean a half dozen or less of us in the Department--as to what that bureau should do, if anything, in the event of this kind of attack. This means that many of the functions of the bureaus in the Department will be scrapped, either permanently or at least for an indefinite time, such as a six-month period or possibly a one-year period. We are waiting now for the screams to come back. They might feel that the keeping of financial data of labor unions is essential in the postwar period, or some other such duties that we have. But we try to pare it down to what we consider would be the real functions of the Labor Department, which I have indicated already are those of a civilian manpower agency. Whether we will be designated the overall manpower agency is another thing, but we do have in our present organizational setup the functions that at least might be carried on. Another kind of organizational setup, I think Dr. Flemming is in a better position to describe than I.

QUESTION: To what extent have labor unions been brought into this type of planning and thinking, and, if so, what has been their reaction?

MR. SICILIANO: Well, we have a small Labor Advisory Committee that we have been meeting with respect to our FCDA delegations. Those delegations are six in number. Maybe I could just quickly enumerate them so you can see how the Labor Advisory Committee might fit.

The first one, paraphrased, is to plan a national program relating to the utilization of the labor force during a civil defense emergency.

The second is to conduct research and provide a method of estimating survivors by occupational and social characteristics and for determining their availability during a civil defense emergency.

The third is to provide technical guidance to the states and at the same time direct the Federal activities concerned with the coordination of the nationwide system of Employment Service Offices. I have already referred to the use of employment offices for determining requirements, of recruiting, referring, and so on, of workers. This actually is one of the points asked about earlier.

Fourth is to plan a national program that would concern itself with the methods of compensation for authorized workers in civil defense work.

The fifth is to plan a national program concerning itself with Federal activities in the compensation payments for the injury or death of authorized workers who were engaged in civil defense activities.

The sixth and last is to plan a national program to direct Federal activities concerned with financial assistance for temporary aid to members of the labor force who are out of work as a result of the destruction of their working places.

Of course, these things affect, very vitally, organized and unorganized labor as well as management in this country. They all are very keenly interested in our planning in these various delegations. These, as I indicated, were given us last September.

In any event, we are working on these plans. The labor movement is very much concerned with this idea of compulsion. The labor movement is joined by the management group in a 100 percent agreement that the only kind of activity we should plan on would be based on voluntary movement of American workers. That doesn't get down to the aspects I mentioned in my formal talk with reference to national emergency strikes and other requirements pertaining to wage regulations or price regulations. The organized labor movement, of course, is very much alert and has a few people that are almost full time on this whole question of the kind of planning we are to do in the postattack period. You may have another question as a followup of that.

QUESTION: I am afraid that there are some of us who don't share this feeling with you that you are going to get this done voluntarily. Would you mind enumerating to us the basis on which you arrive at this viewpoint that it could be done voluntarily and what could be devised as compulsory measures in the event it couldn't be accomplished voluntarily?

MR. SICILIANO: It is going to be necessary at first, at least, to indicate what has to be done. I am sure those who may be engaged 100 percent in the recovery effort would be in the position of, immediately after an attack period, wondering just how to get around to start ordering people to do anything with the premises of your problem here.

We think--and the longer I hear arguments about this the more I recognize that the easy "answer" seems to be to conscript workers, with nonmilitary uniforms perhaps, and order them to do this or to do that--you will get the same kind of reaction as countries of Europe, Russia particularly now find where conscripted workers are used. You will get the same kind of productivity, or lack of productivity, that those countries have if we attempt to do that with Americans.

We feel that Americans know their country. They want to help it. They will want to do all they can to get their country back on its feet. They will have to be shown how; they will have to be told where. We are not saying we will get 100 percent glorious patriotic response perhaps but we will get a response from an overwhelming group percentage-wise of American workers. But it will not do any good to simply talk about conscription of American workers.

How would you go about conscripting American workers after this kind of attack? What do you use? The Army? Are they in position to know what should be done in this field of work? Are they going to be so organized and undamaged by the kind of attack you contemplate here that they will be able to start out with rifles on their shoulders to put people to work?

I am not too sure we can even use the military people to conscript workers. I am not so sure the military is going to be so nicely set up that it is just a simple question of rounding people up, putting them on box cars, and sending them to essential industries.

I think by all possible means of announcement available at that time--including loud speaker systems by self-generated batteries--we should proclaim to the people what is necessary to do. The immediate problem might have to be, as I have already indicated, to clean up, and bury the dead. The next announcement might be that such and such work is available in such and such areas.

We are going to have to gather the people most familiar with what will have to be done, not all military people, not all people receiving training right now, advertise, so to speak, what should be done. I think the American people will want to get busy and will respond.

So I just don't see how conscription as such--and that is actually what we are talking about when you are talking about any other system than a voluntary system--is even going to be operative.

QUESTION: The question is hypothetical, based on an assumption that probably won't happen. Let us assume that the labor unions would buy conscription of labor, Would that change your organizational problems?

MR. SICILIANO: No.

QUESTION: Your organization chain there seems to be pretty strong.

MR. SICILIANO: I shouldn't hope you would ascribe to us the motivation--

QUESTION: No, I mean if they were behind you.

MR. SICILIANO: No. In fact, you might put it that even if both the labor unions and management were to buy conscription, the answer is no. I come from management.

QUESTION: You remarked what you will have to do. What are you going to do about this? The military already has the job.

MR. SICILIANO: You mean me as an individual--I hope not?

QUESTION: Yes.

MR. SICILIANO: Well, actually I attempted to give you an outline of what the Labor Department is doing and my particular role, which I don't think is permanent. My kind of job is not permanent. All I can say is, we are moving along in this problem we are charged with as rapidly as we can.

I mentioned outside to General Calhoun the Labor Department's role in the whole planning field and I pointed out how short we were of people to do some of the planning because of congressional cuts. I was

describing our woes to the Secretary, Mr. Mitchell, and he said, "Are we to assume that, because we don't have funds to do any planning, we won't have any attack until after we do have the funds?" Of course, the Secretary's remark pointed up the obvious course of action.

We have gone ahead to divert people within the Department and put them to work on this FCDA delegation as well as the delegation from the Office of Defense Mobilization, given us last May, which is a very, very broad thing. This latter delegation says that the Secretary of Labor will be responsible for the development of preparedness measures relating to the expansion of the labor force, to improve its skills, and the distribution of the labor force. We do have a great deal of responsibility, but we can't just wait and hope to get more funds. And so we are moving in the Department.

QUESTION: We have had some labor leaders speaking to us here and they have expressed, as you have, very keen interest in this planning, but have been most critical of the planning as it is being done in that they allege an almost complete lack of opportunity to participate. Would you care to comment on that allegation?

MR. SICILIANO: Of course, part of it is true; part of it is because not too much has been done. So far as we in the Department are concerned, once we were given the FCDA assignment, immediately thereafter, the Secretary established the Labor Advisory Committee to meet with us. We are now meeting with them once a month. We have an agenda and a prepared paper. We argue it over with them. We have different topics every time. With respect to the Labor Department, they at least haven't made that factor of nonparticipation known to me. So far as we are concerned, we think we consult with them and work with them.

I don't want to overemphasize one aspect of our consultation, the labor aspect. Just as important to us is the management group that we want to work with, too.

You know for a long time, nearly two years, there was a program that was being developed and which finally emerged in April of last year, a Manpower Program for Full Mobilization. This was developed by the National Labor-Management Manpower Policy Committee, which was made up of members of both labor and management. They had full opportunity to express their thoughts on this subject. The Government

people were just chairing the meeting. This document, which I think is available here, is the product of their deliberations on what should be a manpower program. So in that respect, they have been consulted, both labor and management.

QUESTION: Mr. Siciliano, I think that the Great White Father and the Congress have decided that conscription is O. K. to get soldiers to fight a war overseas. What is so bad about getting it after attack to clean up, except that the unions don't like it?

MR. SICILIANO: Once you bear a tag--Department of Labor--many people think of it as being a Department of Labor Unions. We are trying our best to overcome this attitude about the Labor Department. Actually, the services that we do in the Labor Department have a greater value in many respects to the unorganized worker. The 75-cent minimum wage is for unorganized labor. All organized workers are getting more than that. I just wanted to get off on this thought a little bit. I welcome every forum opportunity to explain we are a public service agency.

To get back to your question, so far as conscription is concerned, here again you say Congress has authorized conscription for military purposes. We have to assume a period when there may not be a Congress able to operate promptly. They can pass a law right now that would say, in the event of an attack on this country, there would be conscription of civilian workers. They wouldn't do it but they could if they cared to. A law would not be any more effective at that time than to talk about conscription after attack. We are still not going to be able--this goes back to the question of organization which I mentioned earlier--to just talk about conscription after the attack period without knowing what kind of organizational setup we will have running our Government at that time. We may have the law on the books buried somewhere in Washington, but we are going to have to depend more on the responsibility of the people throughout the United States at the time of attack than on a law which was passed and burned to pieces.

So that is my point, not just the point of opposition by labor or management to conscription. How will you handle the operational aspects of conscription under such an attack problem as you have here? Who is going to be available on a nationwide scale to suddenly order all workers to report to such and such a place and get their orders as to where they should work? You just have to get away from the concept that we are going to have a nice orderly Government laid out for us and that we will be in the same position as we are in right now.

QUESTION: Sir, in your planning, have you considered the fact that in every disaster in the past we have always had to have martial law of some kind to maintain order and stop looting? With Fort Meade, Quantico, and the Naval Academy on the perimeter of Washington, wouldn't they naturally furnish men to maintain order? So, whether you liked it or not, you would have some kind of military organization.

MR. SICILIANO: I think it is conceivable that they would be brought in when available. That is different from conscription of American workers. We may put martial law into effect to maintain order, to do some policing or to prevent looting. The answer is yes, you may have martial law, but not in the vein of the industrial defense effort.

COLONEL BARTLETT: On the question of martial law, the lecture by Professor Fairman last year, listed in the bibliography, is well worth your reading because of the common assumption that we will have martial law under any condition of major disaster.

Mr. Siciliano, I am so confident of the worth of your material, particularly in the question period here today that I want to tell the class that we are trying to make special efforts so that the lecture will be edited and available to them in complete form by the time they have need to refer to it in their final work.

On behalf of the class and all our faculty, I want to thank you a great deal for the obvious thought and preparation that you put into this, as well as the frankness of your remarks on these difficult questions, sir.

(17 June 1955--400)K/ekh