

THE MILITARY IMPLEMENTATION
OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY

2195

20 April 1955

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Washington, D. C.

Honorable Henry M. Jackson, Senator from Washington, was born in Everett, Washington, 31 May 1912. He received an LL. B. degree from the University of Washington Law School in 1935. He practiced law from 1935-38; prosecuting attorney, Shohomish County, Washington, 1939-41; member of the U. S. House of Representatives, 1941-53; elected to U. S. Senate, November 1952 for the term ending 3 January 1959. While a member of the House of Representatives, he was a member of the House Appropriations Committee and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. He served on the Special Subcommittee of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy which in 1949 recommended the immediate development of the hydrogen bomb. He is a member of the Senate Interior Committee and the Committee on Government Operations which was assigned to the Investigations Subcommittee conducting the hearing on the McCarthy-Army charges. During World War II, he served briefly in the Infantry, U. S. Army.

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ADMIRAL HAGUE: Our speaker this morning is the Honorable Henry M. Jackson, senior Senator from the State of Washington. He has served on the Committees of the Interior and the Government Operations, and on the vitally important Special Subcommittee of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

His address to the Industrial College last May was so outstanding that we insisted that he take time off from his busy schedule to address us again. Happily for us, he has agreed to do so.

His topic, "The Military Implementation of our Foreign Policy," is, of course, of vital interest to us all.

Senator Jackson, it is a great honor and a privilege to present you to the two Colleges.

SENATOR JACKSON: Thank you, Admiral Hague. Members of the Industrial College and the National War College, and gentlemen: It is good to get away from The Hill once in a while. I remember when I was here a year ago I had to break away from a television show. I am happy to be able to break away this year from some of our hearings in the Armed Services Committee on Atomic War instead.

It is a great privilege for me to speak with you today on the military implementation of our foreign policy. I should like to say at the outset that of course I speak as a layman, and I feel that it is a bit difficult to suggest to you gentlemen who are professionals and experts in this field how we ought to implement our foreign policy from a military point of view. However, those of us who serve in the Legislative Branch do have problems, and it is from that point of view that I would like to present my thoughts to you today.

When I spoke to the student body of the Industrial College last spring, I hoped that, if I were again honored by an invitation to speak here, it would be at a time when our Nation faced less immediate crises in its foreign and military policy. This was my wish--so that any remarks I might make could be directed less to the problems of the present than to a more general discussion of the conduct of national security policy.

Any such hopes, however, have been dashed by the events of the past twelve months. Although our Nation is still spared the ordeal of testing Communist strength directly on the field of battle, the strength of our rivals has shown an impressive increase in the past year.

On last May Day, the Soviet revealed for the first time its new long-range jet bombers--the counterpart of our B-47's and B-52's. The past twelve months have also seen disquieting indications of growing--already impressive--Russian competence in the field of missiles. To these must be added the major diplomatic gains registered by the slave world over this same period. The disaster in Indochina, if repeated elsewhere, could well lead to the extinction of liberty throughout Asia, leaving the forces of freedom to occupy a European beachhead on the vast Eurasian land mass.

As we meet here this morning, our Nation finds itself facing a crisis of grave proportions in the Formosan Strait. Even if the problem of Quemoy and Matsu is resolved with honor and without bloodshed, the future appears to confront us with a series of new and recurring crises. Any of these could plunge the world into the holocaust of all-out atomic war unless our diplomacy is wise, our strength adequate, and our resolution unflinching.

If we reflect upon the tremendous advances in weapons technology which have marked the past decade, we may at first think that these new weapons systems have outmoded the traditional axioms of national security policy. We may be tempted to conclude that the time-honored maxims of statecraft must be discarded, or radically amended, if our country is to cope successfully with the problems of the atomic age.

Yet I think nothing could be more misleading or dangerous. In fact, I would argue that the urgent need of the hour is less for some novel new approach to national security policy than for a reaffirmation of those basic and unchanging precepts which must govern the affairs of nations in this atomic age or in any other age.

It has never been true--and it is not true today--that a nation can achieve security if its military strength is inadequate to its diplomatic commitments. It is not true today, and it has never been true, that eye-catching slogans or brave talk represent effective deterrents to the guns and tanks and soldiers of a determined enemy. It is not true today, and it has never been true, that some single weapon can substitute for an appropriately balanced military force.

I will go further. I maintain that in all cases where our security policy has proved inadequate to meet the challenges we have faced since 1945, it has been when we have failed to heed those fundamental strategic truths which are as valid in this atomic era as in all times past.

Today, accordingly, I should like to discuss with you the basic considerations which must govern the military implementation of our foreign policy. My comments will perhaps seem homely and overly obvious. And yet I sincerely believe that it is such fundamentals which we as a nation may be overlooking today.

Let me note at the outset that the basic aim of our foreign policy has not changed since the founding of the Republic. In the larger sense, it is nothing more than the preservation of our security as a nation in a manner whereby our historic freedoms, our culture, and our economy can grow and prosper. In the operations of our foreign and military policies, the aim must be to achieve a proper balance between the commitments of that policy and the power we have available to support them.

What are the real yardsticks, the bases of national military strength, by which the present and future power of our Nation and our Communist rivals must be judged?

The military power of a country is based on four factors: land, people, natural resources, and, last, but not least, industrial capacity. How do we appear when measured against our enemies in these respects?

In land, for example, the Communist land mass is six times the size of the United States. In people, there are 800 millions in the Red empire, to 165 millions in the United States. This disparity is reflected in the number of men under arms. As against the 1.3 million in our own Army, Russia has almost twice this number under arms. I might add that the ground forces of Red China add 2.5 million to this total.

In natural resources, the raw materials of the Communist world are in large part still unexploited or even discovered. They are probably larger and more diversified than those of our own Nation. In addition, we are today critically dependent upon the import of vital strategic raw materials.

In industrial capacity we find that the superior industrial might of America represents our trump card in the struggle with our Communist

rivals. Yet even here, the forced industrialization imposed by the Kremlin on the Soviet Union and her satellites is narrowing the gap.

In short, if the present international power struggle is regarded solely as a contest between the Communist orbit and the United States, we find that we are inferior to our competitors in three of the four basic elements of national strength.

Up to now, two factors have permitted us to correct this imbalance of power. First, the free world alliance system has served to offset Communist superiority in land, people, and natural resources. Second, our atomic weapons stockpile, the manifestation of our superior industrial capacity, has offset the Communist advantage in raw manpower.

Even in 1945, when we alone possessed atomic weapons, it should have been apparent to all that our atomic monopoly was at best a "wasting asset"--that the time would soon come when the Soviet Union itself possessed atomic bombs.

Some of us, head-in-the-sand fashion, tried to imagine that the atomic bomb was somehow different from all other inventions known to man. We hoped that Moscow would never achieve it, at least not for decades. In actual fact, our atomic monopoly lasted but four years. Our hydrogen monopoly was even more short-lived--scarcely nine months elapsed before our first full-scale thermonuclear test and the achievement of a hydrogen explosion by the Soviet. Today the Russians possess atomic and hydrogen bombs in significant numbers, and their stockpile is growing rapidly. I put it to you today that the Kremlin has the power to effect crippling, possibly even mortal, wounds upon the cities of America. A few short years hence, they will have it in their power to level our urban society.

All this is another way of pointing out that one of the fundamental assumptions of our postwar national security policy, our ability to inflict ruinous atomic damage upon our enemies without being answered in kind, becomes less and less tenable as each month passes. The policies which made sense at a time when we alone possessed nuclear weapons, or when the Soviet stockpile was small, need not make sense when intercontinental atomic war becomes a two-way proposition.

To say this, however, is not to say that the world is rapidly approaching an inevitable atomic stalemate. It makes no sense to speak of atomic stalemates without taking account of the deliverability of

nuclear weapons. Any stalemate will be fleeting indeed if either the free or the slave world achieves a decisive advantage in the area of deliverability.

This point can be emphasized with a formula for the measuring of a nation's atomic strength. Simply stated that atomic strength is the sum of the number of nuclear bombs, the power of the individual bomb, and the capacity to deliver the bombs in small or large numbers.

The moral of this should be clear. It is imperative that our Nation be the first to achieve the next technological break-throughs on the delivery front.

The delivery systems now on the horizon are the prime candidates for such break-throughs. I refer, of course, to the nuclear-powered airplane and the intercontinental ballistic missile. The race for these vehicles may prove as important for national security as the contest for the hydrogen bomb--a race which we won by less than a year's margin.

Like its naval counterpart, the atomic submarine, a nuclear-powered bomber could literally circle the world without refueling. The only valid limit to its operations would be the endurance of its crew.

The Soviet might benefit even more than we from an arsenal that included nuclear-powered bombers. We should remember that the Kremlin has no real counterpart of our own system of advanced overseas bases. Without such bases, the effectiveness of our strategic air command would be reduced to a fraction of its present strength. Lacking similar bases, the Kremlin now confronts a serious disadvantage in strategic air war. A nuclear-powered plane of unlimited range, however, could compensate for this. Soviet leadership in this field, therefore, could well break any impending atomic stalemate.

The same logic applies even more compellingly to the intercontinental ballistic missiles. Such weapons would travel in the stratosphere at many times the speed of sound, which represents an utterly new order of magnitude in delivery power. Against such a weapon, it is hard to conceive of any effective defense. If Russia achieves the intercontinental ballistic missile before we do, she may be able to accomplish--not in days, but almost in minutes--the destruction of both our urban society and our Strategic Air Command, thereby making effective retaliation impossible and paving the way for mastery of the world.

It is supremely urgent that we be the first to secure both the nuclear-powered aircraft and the intercontinental ballistic missile; and no considerations of budgets, manpower, or priorities can be allowed to deter us from this goal. The stakes in this race may be no less than our national survival.

Now, if I may summarize my argument so far: To the fullest extent possible, we must try to increase the rapidly narrowing gap between ourselves and the Soviet in air atomic power. The surest way of achieving this is through a clear and demonstrable superiority in new delivery systems.

But a child ten years of age cannot remain twice as old as a child five years of age forever. No matter how large our own nuclear stockpile becomes in the future, the Russians will themselves soon have a great and growing stockpile of their own. So long as we possessed a monopoly or near monopoly of atomic weapons for both strategic and tactical use, it was easy enough to talk of answering aggression by means and at places of our own choosing. It is an entirely different matter to place overriding reliance on atomic retaliation at a time when our enemies have it in their power to inflict both terrible damage on the cities and industries and terrible casualties upon the armies of the free nations.

I hope you will not mistake the meaning of these remarks. I do not for one moment suggest that we give lessened priority to the development of our air atomic power. However, to favor the greatest possible air atomic strength is one thing; to see in atomic weapons an answer to all forms of Communist aggression is quite another. Let us remember that we could not prevent the collapse of Nationalist China even when we enjoyed an atomic monopoly; let us remember also that our superiority in nuclear weapons did nothing to prevent the debacle in Indochina.

If we could not prevent Communist successes when the atomic might of our enemies was slight, or even non-existent, how will we prevent further gains when our foes add a major atomic capability to their present superiority in conventional forces?

We have assumed that we could continue indefinitely in the future to overcome the quantitative advantages of the enemy in manpower through qualitative firepower. To adhere to this concept may well endanger our security. The rapid technological advances already

achieved by Russia in atomic weapons, air power, and guided missiles would indicate that technology in itself cannot overcome the deficit in manpower.

Up to a point--but only up to a point--it is perhaps possible to offset manpower superiority with atomic fire power. There is a definite limit to such a substitution. Many of our outstanding military leaders, in fact, argue that tactical atomic weapons, far from reducing our requirements for conventional forces, will actually have the opposite effect. They point out that the tactical dispersal demanded in the face of an enemy with tactical atomic bombs will call for far more troops to hold a given position. As General Bedell Smith has said: "For every new advancement in weapons, more men--not less--have been required to fight wars."

There is something else we should point out. In the political and military overlords of the Communist world we face men who are not stupid. We must not expect them to adopt strategies which play into our hands. On the contrary, we can expect them to provoke the kind of conflict with which our atomic superiority could not cope; the kind of conflict, I suggest, that might require ground troops and therefore be most unpopular with the American people. Just mention to any Congressman that you are going to use ground troops and watch the change in his position. President Eisenhower spoke wisely and well in his last State-of-the-Union message when he warned that "undue reliance on one weapon or preparation for only one kind of warfare simply invites an enemy to resort to another."

Today we find ourselves best prepared to fight an all-out atomic war, the kind of war the Russians have avoided to date and the kind of war which may never occur if we can stay decisively ahead in the technological race. Today also we find ourselves least prepared to fight the wars which have occurred--the Koreas, the Malayas, the Indochinas.

All these considerations impress me as arguing for a strengthening of the conventional military forces of our own Nation and our allies. I am frankly at a loss to understand the proposed reduction in our ground forces.

The armies of Russia and China total five million men as against the 1.3 million men in our Army today. Despite this fact, it is now proposed that we cut our Army by one-third of a million men by June of next year.

I do not argue for a moment that my own political party has any monopoly of wisdom on security planning. But in view of our existing weakness in conventional forces, and the rapidly increasing atomic strength of the Communists, the elementary dictates of prudence would seem to argue at least for keeping our ground forces at the present level.

As a legislator, I can assure you that it is much easier to vote for a few more bombs and a few more wings than the drafting of our youth into the undramatic ranks of a rifle platoon. It has been said, however, that "facts do not cease to exist because they are ignored." We are not going to survive these perilous times by turning our backs on reality.

And one of these realities is the urgent necessity of redressing the present imbalance between the conventional forces of the free and Communist worlds.

Here is where the alliances of the free world play a critical role in our strategy for peace. But for the troop contributions of our allies, I venture to say that we might well need 10 million men under arms if we had any real hope of keeping the peace. Today, the best means of closing the gap between the conventional forces of the two worlds lies first in helping our present allies make larger military contributions to our common defense; and, next, in persuading now neutral nations to become active partners in defending the cause of the free world.

I am not here to argue that we should try to buy allies. As a matter of fact, those allies whose friendship is for sale are at best fair-weather friends. I am not here to say that we must shape our own policy to fit any whim of our partners; a sound alliance must be built on give and take. I am here to say, however, that we cannot win this struggle alone, and that a vigorous and expanding alliance system can be our decisive advantage. I say "expanding system" because I firmly believe we cannot afford to assume that the allies we have today are sufficient for the success of our cause.

Twelve German divisions, if added to the NATO forces now in Europe, may be the factor which will keep the Soviet from launching a drive to the English Channel. A revitalized Middle East, with well equipped ground forces adhering to the common cause of freedom, could present a real barrier to Communist ambitions in that area of the

world. Military contributions made by the presently neutral nations of South Asia could likewise add tremendously to our pooled strength, and, I might add, would more than offset the conventional forces of the Soviet Union and its satellites.

Is there some bold new approach to foreign policy which, if pursued, would not only take the neutral nations off the fence but make more stalwart friends of our present allies? I frankly doubt it. In my opinion, there can be no substitute for a foreign policy which speaks in sober and responsible actions rather than in bold manifestoes, a foreign policy that balances power and commitments, that errs neither towards rash talk nor groundless timidity, a policy which demonstrates that we stand ready to help all those who share our vision of a better world.

In our efforts to traverse the critical years ahead and reach the better world of tomorrow, we have on our side one tremendous advantage. The idea on which our Nation was founded almost two centuries ago, the idea of equality of opportunity and justice for all men under law and under God, is still the great revolutionary idea of the modern age. When honestly measured against this concept, Communism, both in theory and in practice, appears for what it truly is--a reversion to all the injustice and indignity against which men of courage have fought since time immemorial.

It was Napoleon himself who said: "There are only two powers in the world--the sword and the spirit. In the long run the sword is always defeated by the spirit." It is this spirit behind the sword that will some day break the bonds of Communist enslavement, tear down the unnatural barriers now splitting the world, and thereby bring about the realization of universal brotherhood.

Thank you.

COLONEL BARTLETT: The Senator wishes me to tell you that he would welcome questions outside the scope of his lecture if you are interested.

QUESTION: Senator, what is your feeling on the adequacy of our civil-defense program?

SENATOR JACKSON: We don't have any. I think there are two things that have to be done, and they are concurrent with everyday

requirements. Now that we have the hydrogen bomb, with its destructive power in term of megatons, you can't dig holes in a city and stay there and survive. The first thing, therefore, involves the evacuation of people from large metropolitan areas. I don't think there is anything unique in that. I have tried, and I am sure you have, to watch Washington, D. C., evacuate at five o'clock. It involves the problem of ingress to and egress from our big cities. I would suggest, therefore, that the wisest thing that we can do now is to take the highway program and place first priority on building a road system to and from our major cities in such a fashion that we can evacuate the people every day more effectively. Then we will be able to evacuate them, and they will be, shall we say, conditioned to evacuation by being able to get out if the worst should come.

The money would be spent wisely. We need this money, for everyday traffic requirements. It would have the concurrent value of being able to remove our people from the target area in time of disaster.

The next problem, of course, is the fact that you have to evacuate them in the right direction. Well, that is something you are going to have to face when the time comes. I don't think it is necessary to build a lot of shelters in other areas. Move them to other communities. Small cities, other cities, can support those evacuees.

This road program I have mentioned will take another ten years to accomplish. By that time I assume there will be an intercontinental ballistic missile and you won't be able to evacuate anyway. In the meantime we will have spent our money for a need that exists every day for our people.

Does that answer your question?

STUDENT: Yes, sir.

SENATOR JACKSON: We try to make complicated something which is very simple. Too much time has been spent by people who try to think in complicated terms--I make the accusation against both administrations, both mine and the present--in trying to dream up all sorts of fancy means and devices by which you are going to save somebody. They should have spent their time planning the evacuation of the cities.

QUESTION: Sir, you pointed out that these new weapons have not changed the historic principles of strategy. I think that perhaps it's

easy to go overboard on these new weapons. Remember, that same principle applies to the nuclear powered airplane which I think has arrived slightly late, in view of the counter measures you have mentioned, and the missiles, to be really effective in strategy warfare. The intercontinental missile also--I wonder how it is going to invalidate the existing methods of retaliation. You still will have those old arms. Even though they are obsolete, they will be able to perform retaliation. I think perhaps we give too much weight to this technological break-through and are actually looking much further ahead, not to the break-through, but to what I call the follow-through, which means that you have a quantity, you are trained in their use, you have got them where you want to use them, and all those things.

SENATOR JACKSON: Well, I probably did not make my point clear. My point was this--that the difference in their atomic superiority and our superiority, the atomic superiority between the United States and the Soviet Union, is no longer in numbers of bombs. The difference--the area of competition--has now been narrowed to deliverability. If the Soviet has only ten hydrogen bombs and we have 200, but they can deliver all ten of theirs, and we can only deliver five, do they not have hydrogen superiority? Now, I say the area of competition has been narrowed to deliverability. You reach a point where the number of bombs is meaningless unless you can follow in with an effective delivery system.

The atomic strength or the hydrogen strength of any country is simply stated in this simple formula: The number of bombs, times the strength of the individual bombs, times the bombs' deliverability. Unless you spell out the whole formula, it doesn't mean anything. I don't agree with you that if the Soviet Union gets the intercontinental ballistic missile before we do, we will be in a position to retaliate and be effective. The intercontinental ballistic missile will make it possible for the Soviet Union to lay down a missile with a hydrogen warhead on this continent in thirty minutes.

I want you to disagree with me if I am wrong. You are not here to agree with me on everything. I'm saying that, if they have the intercontinental ballistic missile and they have it in any quantity, how can we retaliate against the Soviet Union, when they have a good map of the United States? They could pinpoint every target. We can't do that. We have a general idea of where their targets are, but they can pinpoint our targets. Remember that their delivery system does not have to be too accurate if they are laying down 5, 10, 25 or 50 megatons.

STUDENT: Well, you see you have already bought one of my assumptions there. You say "and they have it in any quantity." Now that's a little more than a break-through.

SENATOR JACKSON: Well, I will take you one step further. I will pin it down. I say that they would have the edge if they get the first one before we do. Remember now, we were only nine months ahead of them on the hydrogen bomb. Pretty close, isn't it? If they get that IBM before we do, I hate to think of the impact in the Islands of Britain, when some of their leaders become frightened at the very mention of the hydrogen bomb. Five of them placed on the island and there will be no England.

STUDENT: Agreed. We have the edge on numbers in bombs, too. We agree it is not a decisive edge.

SENATOR JACKSON: Numbers don't mean anything unless you can get them on the target. What good are they in the stockpile, if you can't deliver them? The present controversy is based on mixed-up thinking. People talk about having so many bombs and forget about delivery. Don't underestimate these Russians. I understood they couldn't make planes until they came out with the MIG. Now they don't talk about that any more. They have a type of B-52 that has more power, I understand, than our B-52, greater thrust. I may be wrong. I hope our intelligence sources are right. I think it is a good idea to assume that they have. That will keep us busy.

I don't get discouraged about all this business. I think the Russians in the long run may be the best ally we ever had. They are making us work overtime.

May I interject by just telling a story? You have heard the story, probably, and I hope you will forgive me for telling it. Arnold Toynbee tells the story of how the Scotch fishermen used to go to the North Sea and catch herring in open boats. By the time they returned to port, the herring would be spoiled. Then they developed a boat with a tank and put the herring in the tank, and of course the herring could swim around and keep very fresh; so when they would get to shore they would have fresh herring.

Somehow or other there was a skipper on one of the boats--we will call him Captain MacDonald--who had the same facilities aboard his ship, the same kind of boat, caught the same kind of fish from the same

fishing grounds as the other fisherman, but when he got to shore he had much fresher herring. The other skippers couldn't figure it out.

One day they decided they would search his boat to find the secret. They searched the boat from top to bottom and couldn't find anything. That evening they got hold of Captain MacDonald and asked him. They said, "Now look; we go to the same fishing grounds in the same kind of boats, have the same facilities, and catch the same kind of fish, and when we bring them into the same port under the same circumstances, you present a much fresher fish and you get a better price. We want to know how you do it." Captain MacDonald said, "It's very simple. For every thousand herring I get in the tank, I put one catfish in. That catfish pursues the thousand herring with great diligence and receives for its wages the one or two herring it might catch."

Of course the point is that the Soviet Union is the catfish which is pursuing the Western World, the thousand herrings, and keeping us fresh and on the ball. They are smart, but sometimes stupid in dealing with free people. Let us never forget that fact. Don't ever get the idea that they are super-people. On the other hand, I don't believe we should underestimate their ability in the scientific and technological field. If we are ever conscious of this competition we will be so strong and so healthy, and our allies will be so strong and so healthy, that, if they have any men of prudence in the Kremlin left, they will weigh the wisdom of fighting a strong, free world, and they will not move.

QUESTION: Senator Jackson, would you apply your reasoning to the current situation, explained either in political terms or in military terms, why we can't, if we choose, defend Matsu and Quemoy with bullet-size atomic weapons, and why should we need ground forces there?

SENATOR JACKSON: Well, I assume that, if we want to move against many Chinese cities, we can do it with atomic bombs. I would suggest that the real problem is not necessarily our ability to do that particular thing, but the fact that the Chinese can mount a delivery system, if the Soviet Union backs them, to a point where our position on Formosa, could in the future become almost untenable. Now, I don't know anything about the military aspects of the problem. That is a matter for the professional military people to advise on. My own position on this matter has been: No. 1, I voted for the Formosa resolution. No. 2, I suggested that all these alleged experts stop

telling President Eisenhower how to defend Formosa. The Executive Branch was given the authority by us to do the job, and I say that, if Quemoy, from a professional military standpoint, and Matsu, are essential to the defense of Formosa, they ought to be defended. But I think it is now in the hands of the President and he should decide, and we ought to stop bothering him. We have so many so-called experts it certainly must be confusing to the Russians and to the Chinese as to what move we will make.

Very clearly, with the use of atomic weapons, we can do the job. I don't believe, though, that we can say that we can use small atomic bombs in every instance without killing civilians. I would like to think that we are still mortal beings and that, being mortal beings, we are fallible, capable of error, and we might err. Maybe the Air Force won't admit it maybe the Navy won't admit it; maybe the Army won't admit it; but we are apt to hit civilians, and I believe it would be a mistake to assume anything different. I believe if we get into one of these situations there is no reason why we should not use the atomic bomb against men in uniform wherever we feel we must do it. It ought to be used sparingly. I am afraid the enemy would be smart enough to probably deploy a lot of their forces in the heart of some big city.

Let me put this question to you. Wouldn't the smart thing for the Chinese Communists at this point be to quit talking about taking Formosa and just keep building up a big delivery system opposite Formosa, and then, two or three years from now, launch an attack. What could we do about it? We are now out-numbered in the area of Formosa. Two or three years hence Russia will have a substantial number of tactical atomic bombs. I am sure Chou En-Lai made a fool out of himself by saying he was going to launch an attack this year. He should have kept his mouth shut and stayed quiet for two or three years. We wouldn't have been able to do anything about it then and we would have lost face. Aside from that, what are we going to do now? Should we launch the attack? Aren't we caught? I mean, if we don't destroy them, they are going to destroy us, are they not? What are we going to do in that situation?

QUESTION: Senator, do you know what the Chinese Foreign Minister is saying in the conference in Indonesia--what he has in mind?

SENATOR JACKSON: He apparently is backing away now, taking the soft line. I think that he must be aware of the fact that possibly the Russians are not going to back him up at this point. But two or three

years from now he will be in a formidable position. I never could figure out why he made those statements, because he would be in a much more effective position by waiting. Maybe that is what he has in mind.

QUESTION: Senator, in World War II we spent about three billion dollars in chemical warfare. In the past five years we have spent a billion and one-half in chemical and biological weapons. We still have the retaliation policy, which says we won't use them until they are used against us. We don't have this policy on any other weapons systems. I have two questions. One: Why do we have that policy? How can you justify our spending 300 million dollars a year in an area in which we don't have plans to use it?

SENATOR JACKSON: We don't have plans to use it?

STUDENT: Until it has first been used against us--which puts us in a pretty untenable situation.

SENATOR JACKSON: I assume that in dealing with gas you have a problem, or you did, certainly, in World War II, as I understand it, in being able to control it. The reason why the Germans didn't use it, of course, is that they knew that they stood to lose more by it than they could possibly gain, and it sort of balanced itself off.

This, again, is one of those situations where, when the enemy has it, we must have it, in case they do use it. We don't want to engage in that kind of warfare, I presume, primarily because of the fact, that morally our allies and friends would not go along with it. They are not conditioned to the use of it. I am not saying that in itself it is necessarily any different than an atomic explosion, because in the end people die, but I think the moral abhorrence of the weapon has been the main deterrent to its use.

I am not sure that we will ever use the atomic bomb but, if we get into an all-out war at this juncture, of course, we must use it. The difference in Western Europe between 42 divisions that we have and 175 divisions on the part of the Soviet is the number of atomic bombs that we have. I would like you to give some thought to the fact that we constantly make the argument that we can outflank the enemy, with its quantitative superiority in numbers, through qualitative fire power in every kind, nature, and description--army, navy, and air force. I don't believe that premise will continue to be sound in the future,

because the Russians are gaining industrial capacity. I think it points up the need of expanding our conventional forces through our system of alliances, which I tried to point out in my remarks. The fact that they have 800 million people doesn't mean that we can't get a billion on our side. We ought to build up that balance as well as our ability to win these scientific races for discovery. The conference in Indonesia is an important one which we ought to move in on and take some of these people off the fence. I think it is a grave error to assume from here on out that we can continue to rely simply on American technology to outflank the superiority in numbers of the enemy.

COLONEL BARTLETT: Will you tell us how you would take some of the neutral Asians off the fence, as you say, at the Bandung Conference?

SENATOR JACKSON: One thing I'd do right now--I have a resolution in the process of preparation in our Joint Committee on Atomic Energy which would state in effect that the President should make available to the free people of Asia and Africa the peaceful atom; that we stand ready and willing to introduce the peaceful atom into those countries. By making that declaration clear and unequivocal, I think we will do more to remove the Communist lie that we are war mongers; that we want to use the atomic and hydrogen bombs only against the colored people, whether they are yellow, brown, or black. I don't know how you feel about that, but it would be the most potent argument we could have.

Suppose that in a given country we introduced the peaceful atom, in the form of atomic reactors, and one of these apologists for Russia would say, "Well, the Americans are a bunch of war mongers--they are only interested in using the atomic bomb against the people and they talk about using the atomic and the hydrogen bombs every day of the week;" and our friend would answer and say, "Yes, I am tired of hearing the Russians talk about peace. The only thing I know after all this talk is that it was America that first introduced the peaceful atom into our country."

It would be pretty effective, wouldn't it? I suggest it would be the smartest move that we could make right now. We are not too wise on the things that appeal directly to simple souls. We rush out to Asia and Africa and try to impress them with the skyline of New York and our fancy automobiles and refrigerators, when all they are interested in is an extra bowl of rice to stay alive. We miss the boat.

I think that would be the wisest thing, Colonel Bartlett, that we could do at this time. I am convinced that we can win over a lot of the countries. I don't think it is a hopeless task at all. I think the showing so far is that the conference is a reasonably good one--much better than I thought. If we can get even a half of that area of 750 million people, we will not only have the technical superiority in weapons, but we will have the numerical superiority, as well.

I do think we are making a great mistake if we fail to emphasize the need for expanding our system of alliances to include more people. The more we can do that, the more secure our position will be. We will be able to see to it that they have modern weapons. What we need are people to carry our rifles and our guns in the defense of their liberties, which are our liberties as well.

QUESTION: Moving from your last comments back into your estimate of the situation, I had the impression, perhaps erroneous, that you were comparing the United States alone with the Communist bulk. I'm sure that is true of your figures on land. Why should we develop a comparison and disregard our present alliances--not our prospective alliances, but our present alliances?

SENATOR JACKSON: I don't believe I said that. I compared the over-all Russian strength with the United States strength alone. Then I pointed out, did I not?, in my remarks that that deficiency was not overcome completely, but as to land and resources and people--we add to our strength through our system of alliances--and that only in one of the four factors of military power, namely, industrial capacity, are we superior as an individual nation. I pointed out that the only way we can overcome the deficit in land, people, and raw materials is through our system of alliances. I wanted to start from the point that we can't do this alone.

The North Atlantic Treaty Alliance and the United States, together with SEATO, will give us, let us say, 400 million. They still have 750 million. I don't think you can discount that China and Russia together create a real problem. So that, from a land standpoint, the second basis of military power, the land mass, they also have a tremendous advantage. They have a compact land mass. From a military point of view, that could be far more effective in many ways than a dispersed land mass.

Holding Western Europe is certainly vital. You have more people in Western Europe than they have in the Soviet Union, and you have a

greater industrial capacity than they have in the Soviet Union. In any event, the only way we can overcome these deficits in land, people, and raw material, is through a system of alliances. We need to expand our alliances. If we stand still and fail to bring in more people, we are going to be in trouble. The Soviets are prodding. Let's take advantage of it. I think we can win more people to our side. And one of the ways, in the Middle East and the Far East, is through the peaceful atom. I will tell you why. If we challenge the Soviet Union now to make available the peaceful atom to the free peoples of the world on an industrial basis, we will lick them; because the problem of placing the peaceful atom in active use, is not one for the scientists; it is one for industry. It is an industrial problem. It requires industry to build these plants. The Soviet Union cannot meet us in that area at this time.

Let us challenge them where they are weak. We can build these atomic power plants. We can build one in every country in the next two years in the Far East. They would not be able to match the challenge. We would call their bluff, and they would look ridiculous. We are spending billions in foreign aid. I would rather spend some of it in an enterprise where we could do two things at once--we could provide power to increase the standard of living, and have a lasting symbol that would be the most effective answer to the Soviet charge that we are war mongers. It would demonstrate once and for all that we practice what we preach.

COLONEL BARTLETT: Senator, I know you have commitments. I see a great many hands, but that is certainly--

SENATOR JACKSON: I will go on. I'm not in any hurry--

QUESTION: Senator, I gather from your remarks that you are in effect in favor of increasing the military budget to take care of the status of the conventional weapons and to increase our status in technology. That means higher taxes, or at least not a decrease in taxes. What are your views in this regard, especially as to public opinion?

SENATOR JACKSON: Let me tell you why I feel that we ought to at least maintain our present forces at the existing level in the Army and the Navy. As a layman, I ask four common-sense questions. The first question I would have to ask, if we are going to reduce the budget, is: Are our military commitments greater or smaller than last year? Well, since a year ago we have had a new treaty of

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alliance, have we not, with new commitments--SEATO, the South East Asia Treaty Organization. That covers four million square miles, and will take quite a few divisions. Then we have the Formosa problem. I must say I get completely confused because I read one day that the situation looks better, and the next day we have a crisis in Formosa. All I know is that it is better to have enough forces in being to take care of these situations. Just because we didn't have enough forces prior to Korea does not mean that we ought to brag now that we have more than we had before Korea. We have had more problems since Korea. I do hope we learn from past mistakes.

The next question is: Is the military situation better or worse at this time than it was last year? What do you think? I don't think it is better. They are all ready to shoot the works in Formosa. I don't see how anyone with common sense is going to argue that it is better. The only logical conclusion you can come to if you are going to cut the budget is that it must be better and our commitments are less. Isn't it?

The next question is: Can we depend on atomic superiority as a substitute for strength and numbers? I don't know, but I think we have yet to find an army ground-force officer who maintains that. I think it makes no sense to think that because we use tactical atomic weapons we can get by with fewer men. If the enemy does not have them, sure we can. If he does have more men and you have to mass in order to attack, and demass in order to save yourselves, you are going to need more men.

The ordinary infantry line is about 3,000 yards--for a battalion to hold. You can't spread this out. You reach a point where it is so thin it is ineffective; it is ridiculous.

Then, I would finally answer your question by saying that there was no justification for cutting taxes last year.

I think that at the minimum we ought to keep our forces at the present level. Perhaps no one knows how many men we should have, but I don't think there is any justification for the reduction. I have not been able to get from anyone a logical answer to the questions I just asked that would justify a cut. Maybe there is one. If someone has a suggestion that would justify it, I would like to have it. But I don't know of any means by which you can justify that position, other than it is wonderful to cut the budget and to cut taxes. I think the American people are a lot smarter than that, though.

QUESTION: Senator, in view of the increasing danger that the future may hold for us, would it be logical for us to take a far strung line and put forces to it, if necessary? I realize it is going to have an unpopular sort of public impression, yet at the same time we should have a show-down.

SENATOR JACKSON: To have a show-down?

STUDENT: That's right.

SENATOR JACKSON: You mean, shall we say, "Let's deliver the stuff against them right now?"

STUDENT: No, not necessarily.

SENATOR JACKSON: What kind of show-down?

STUDENT: Make arrangement for some sort of modus vivendi that we could stand for a period of time, and we would be largely protected.

SENATOR JACKSON: Well, let me just suggest this--that there comes a time, and certainly we have reached that point, I would think, where we have to tell the Soviet Union that if they should trespass any further it is war; because, if I am correct in my understanding that the four bases of military power are land, people, natural resources, and industrial capacity, whenever the Soviet Union gets control or has a preponderance of those factors, they have won. And that is their present approach--they are nibbling, taking piece by piece. It reminds me of the fight between Mr. Young and Mr. White for the control of the New York Central. Mr. White thought he was invulnerable, and Mr. Young was going around picking up a proxy here and a proxy there and all of a sudden he was in position to take over and it was too late for Mr. White to get the number necessary. Mr. Young got control of the company.

Well, the Soviets, by taking one bit of the world's real estate after another, with its land, people, industrial capacity, and raw material, will have won control of the world corporation, if I may use that analogy.

So, from the standpoint of our national security, our planners must determine how much of the world's land mass, together with its

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people, its industry, and its raw material, they can permit the Soviet Union to control and still not be in a position to defeat us. Isn't that it?

Now, we have tried to put up the "No Trespassing" sign. We have effectively drawn a line in Western Europe and we have in South East Asia; but we have a big gap through Asia proper, and we have to hold that line and maintain it. I don't think we can permit them to take any more of the world's real estate. If we do, they will have won this fight without having engaged in an all-out war. I think that's what they want to do; because they have done pretty well despite our long atomic lead.

I don't know how you get into a showdown. I must confess that I have always found that we all like to indulge in this habit of: "Isn't there some obvious solution to this problem?" Every American certainly likes to look at it that way. I think that is part of our conditioning. We are brought up in an industrial civilization, where we do a lot of things automatically. If our automobile breaks down and we find a mechanic who cannot fix it in an hour, we start cussing him out. If you have a Russian problem and can't solve it by tomorrow, there's something rotten in Denmark.

I don't think there are simple solutions to these problems, because we don't control the partners that are involved in this enterprise. We are only seven percent of the world's population, and we have to get along with these people. I don't know of anything more frustrating than to have to deal with all these allies, when something seems to us to be very obvious, and they don't even see it. Yet the foundation of our alliance, the thing we are fighting for, is freedom of action, freedom of thought, and the right of our allies to have their position as well as ours.

I do think that I may make a suggestion that might be helpful. It is that we ought to practice a little more humility. If you are big, strong, and powerful, there is a tendency to throw your weight around. Wouldn't it be kind of dangerous if you were living in a small town and you were the wealthiest person in the town--you were seven percent of the town, you and six others, out of 100, were the wealthiest people in town--would you dare to go around town and throw your weight around among half of them who had not enough to eat, without doing something about it? Bear in mind, we are seven percent. Over half the world wakes up every morning without enough to eat and goes to bed without enough to eat.

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