ADMINISTRATION IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

25 August 1955

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DR. REICHLEY: General Hollis, Gentlemen: Early this summer Captain Mott and I had the good fortune of being official observers at High Point during Operation Alert. There we listened to the deliberations of the Interim Assembly in its efforts to try to solve the many problems facing this country in the event of a nuclear attack.

One fact struck us both. Once a decision was reached, invariably the Chairman of the Assembly, Dr. Flemming of ODM, would turn and say "Now Roger," or "Mr. Jones," "You will take care of that." Needless to say, we were greatly impressed with the tremendous knowledge of the complicated workings of the Federal Government exhibited by Mr. Jones.

This event occurred so often that finally I turned to Nelson Rockefeller, who was sitting beside me, and asked him, "Who is this Mr. Jones?" He very quickly answered, "He is one of the smartest young men in the Government today."

We quickly decided he was the man to come to this College and speak on the Administration in the Federal Government. Gentlemen, it is a pleasure to introduce the Assistant Director for Legislative Reference of the Bureau of the Budget, Mr. Roger W. Jones. Mr. Jones.

MR. JONES: General Hollis, Gentlemen: When I first discussed the possibility of appearing before you today, I talked with Dr. Hunter about the advantages and disadvantages of a formal address. Finally we decided that it would be better if I did not attempt a formal address, which at best I would end up by reading. I would rather talk from my experience and my heart on a subject about which I feel very deeply, have a good many convictions, but am not an expert.

I feel some kinship for the Industrial College, by virtue of the fact that two of its originators, almost founders, you might say, are men with whom I have had many associations over the years. In fact, both of them were my bosses during World War II--Major General James H. Burns and Major General Sidney P. Spaulding. I know something of the dreams which those two gentlemen had back in the twenties, before we even had an Army Industrial College; so I have

followed with a great deal of interest what this institution has done, and have an outspoken admiration for it.

I was told this morning when I came in that my predecessor of yesterday, Dr. William Yandell Elliott, referred to the fact that I was coming and, as usual, proceeded to give you a marvelous talk and leave it to me to pick up the pieces. A friend of mine who had the misfortune to be taken prisoner in the Battle of the Bulge was for a short time in a German prison camp. He told me that the only German he ever knew who had a sense of humor was the Commandant of the prison camp, a German major who had lost an arm early in the desert campaign in Africa. According to my friend, his sense of humor was definitely non-Germanic. This friend of mine was the senior officer of the American prisoners and consequently took over command. The food was not very good. On one occasion the major himself came around when they were distributing the food for the day, which turned out to be just a few loaves of black bread. My friend asked if that was all the rations for that day, and the major replied: "Yes, but cut it up and you can make sandwiches." My friend asked, "What shall we use for the filling?" The German looked at him and shook his head. He said, "Colonel, the same kind of filling that we have been using in Germany for a long time--imagination--ersatz."

In comparison with Professor Elliott I am a little ersatz, but nevertheless I will do my best. First, I would like to indicate to you that the major emphasis of what I am going to say has to be in terms of the President and the presidency. It is the cornerstone around which I am going to build the structure of this discussion.

Second, I thought it might be worthwhile to refer to four fairly recent books which, if you have leisure time, I think you will find it worthwhile to browse through. All of them are readable; all are short; all of them are pertinent to the subject. The first is "The American President," by Sidney Hyman, published by Harper in 1954. The second is "The President and the Presidency," by that grand old man of Government administration, Louis Brownlow, published by the Public Administration Service in Chicago, in 1949. The third, the most recent of the books, is "Behind the President," by Edwin H. Hobbs, published here in Washington by the Public Affairs Press last year. The fourth, a kind of checklist document, very valuable for reference purposes, is "The President and His Staff Services," written by my colleague in the Budget Bureau, Fritz Morstein Marx, published by the Public Administration Service in 1947.

These books I think will give you a kind of postwar picture of the presidency not to be found in the standard works, such as those of Laski, George Fort Milton, Herring, and others.

The first topic assigned to me in the outline of your course is "Federal Organization and Management Problems Resulting from Expansion of Economic and International Responsibilities During the Past Generation." This first major aspect in itself is worthy of more time than I have today. The second topic is "Problems of Adjusting the Executive Branch to the Enlarged Management Task," about which I wish to say, parenthetically, "Don't overlook the military, and particularly, don't overlook this institution." The third topic is "Evolution of the Executive Office of the President;" and the fourth, "Recent Developments and Current Trends."

Each could be a course. Each could be the subject of a long individual seminar. Consequently, all I can do is hit a few of the high spots and then hope to fill in when we come to the question period, which I always like much more than hearing the sound of my own voice.

I take the points in order. "The Expansion of the Economic and International Responsibilities of the Federal Government in the Last Generation"--first, let us look at the international responsibility question. The United States of America emerged as a world power after World War I. That we all know, and, most of you being, I think, of my generation will recall that as boys we did not understand it. We wondered a bit about it in our high school and college days, and we tended to think a little bit harshly, perhaps, about all of the efforts that had been made by President Wilson to make America recognize the place which it had achieved in world affairs.

In the period after World War I, it is perhaps unfortunate, particularly in this field of international responsibility as well as in the field of public administration, that some things happened which did happen, because in the light of history they certainly represented impediments, and they slowed us down. However, they did happen. First off, there was our rejection of America's place as the leader of the Free World, the Democratic World. Secondly, there was the great emphasis on "the return to normalcy"--the false boom of the early twenties. Then the great depression came and we turned our attention to other things. Finally, the effort we made to mobilize and then to fight--the things leading up to World War II--all tended to make us think of domestic problems, not of our real place in the world.

In all of that period America was truly the sleeping giant of the Western Hemisphere. We did not know our own strength. We had a kind of blind faith in it; but we did not take a good look at it; and we certainly did not create and put into operation the machinery with which to make it most effective as a moral force for world good.

Now, on the economic side the story is hardly one of historical development in the literal sense. It is a much more complex thing. It is very difficult to simplify, but it is still important. Perhaps the culmination of this economic development and the growth of the United States responsibilities in the economic sphere may be found in the Employment Act of 1946. This is a rather small federal statute, as statutes go, but it is one which has the great virtue of clarity, even though it be general in its terms. I commend it to your reading at some time. Particularly think about the impact of what it states. Its purpose is mainly to express in words the fact that the continued policy and responsibility of the Federal Government will be to promote the maximum employment, production, and purchasing power of the American Nation.

Now, that is a pretty big economic order. It represents the culmination of a great many things which happened in the preceding twenty years. I think it is worthwhile to go back and take a look at two or three things as they happened.

After World War I, and as we moved into the period of the middle twenties, we moved into a kind of prosperity to which America had never before paid very much attention. I think all the economic historians will agree with me on that. We had had periods of prosperity before, we had had periods of great expansion before, but that prosperity and expansion had always been geared to the concept of an ever-expanding frontier.

After World War I, with the new improvements in communications of all kinds and the rapid speedup in methods of travel, we suddenly realized that we did not have an ever-expanding geographical frontier of our own within the continental limits of the United States. The frontier no longer provided an automatic means for economic expansion and growth. Consequently, our concern with economic expansion began to take a slightly different form. We began to wonder what made for prosperity and what role government had in it. These wonders did not come to be expressed, except in very halting ways, in the structure of the Federal Government until after the depression began in 1929.

That cataclysm made the United States recognize that state boundaries were merely geographic things; that regional interests, although a kind of a consolidating force, were not enough to insure intelligent economic action. They did not give us the freedom of action, freedom of concerted action, that was necessary. Individual action was not enough. The economic needs of the country as a whole demanded Federal action.

Consequently, if you will study carefully the records of Mr. Hoover's Administration, that is, in the form of the day-to-day operations, you will find a mighty striving toward a realization of what the Federal Government's economic role should be; how, in times of stress, it should concern itself with handling the business of the Government and in managing the affairs of the people on the economic and social front.

There was only one major expression of this kind of thought which came forth in the form of Federal legislation, and that was the creation of the RFC. That was a milestone because, for the first time, except in a very sporadic way in World War I, the Federal Government assumed responsibility for making loans to American business when it got into trouble. Then, of course, came the rapid succession of events in Mr. Roosevelt's presidency and the New Deal years. A great many things happened; just happened. They weren't planned. Even though the laws that created them sounded quite finished and certain, they were purely experiments. They were recognized as experiments, designed to fill an immediate need. The United States was left to perfect them or to judge them empirically, on an after-the-fact basis. But they did form a kind of Federal response to general needs, and they created the confidence with which we moved forward. What would have happened had not World War II come along we can only guess. The fact remains that our economic and international responsibilities did grow, and their growth did create management problems. We have coped with those problems.

From the point of view of what I have to say today, there was one thing of chief importance that occurred as a result of this striving by the Federal Government toward finding expression of its role which began in Mr. Hoover's Administration and then moved on into the veritable welter of new activities which the Federal Government undertook in the era of the New Deal.

There was, slowly at first, a very major shift in the focus of communications by the people of the country with the Federal Government.

Up to the time of the election of Mr. Roosevelt, the American people usually talked to their Federal Government through the Congress and its members and then only on the subject of service activities like the Post Office, or paying income taxes, or getting the Marine Band to come and play at some patriotic observance. By and large Federal programs and laws did not affect the life of the majority of our people. They did not think of the Executive Branch as the normal focus for communications. Even administrative matters, like applying for a veteran's pension, were usually handled through a member of Congress.

The shift came about very readily as new programs were authorized and Federal Government employment climbed. The center of the Federal Government in the Capitol disappeared. Though Washington remained the nerve center and the heart of government, its real center shifted back into the states, counties, cities, and towns. Executive Washington moved to the field. New problems, and old, could be taken up at home. Congressional Washington stayed in session most of the year and was seldom at home. Furthermore, individuals were affected by such things as housing programs, minimum wages, social security, and stock market regulation. There began to be built up a vast structure of federal activity in the cities and towns and states. It was made up of people who came from those particular areas, for the large part, neighbors of the folks who had problems or who were affected by this new role of the Federal Government.

The only department that really understood this change at first was the Department of Agriculture. It had had a similar setup since its creation. Interior, to a lesser extent, sensed what was happening, and so did the Army Engineers to an even lesser extent. Agriculture really understood it and, in the early days of the social and economic experiments, Agriculture people did a great deal of talking about what those men of the Federal Government were doing in your backyard.

It is hard now to remember when many of the activities we now take for granted first came into being. Let us stop and look back. We had no Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, when Mr. Roosevelt took office. We had no Housing and Home Finance Agency. We had no civil-defense organization, no program for rural telephones and electricity for farms. We had no United States Information Agency to explain America and its way of life to the world. We had no Small Business Administration; no Tennessee Valley Authority; no Bonneville Power Administration; no Export-Import Bank; no Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Of course, there was no Atomic Energy Commission--to list a few. All of them represent expansion of Federal

activities which brought about a shift in the focus of communication and with it, of course, Federal response to the problems of the people, first in the Executive Branch and then, later, in the Congress.

Congress, naturally, reacted against the change. It had come about too rapidly for Congress to adjust to it quickly. They accused Mr. Roosevelt of trying to become a dictator, of trying to organize the presidency above the Legislative Branch, to push the executive into a position of domination of our entire governmental structure. Be that as it may, the people of the country recognized that communications to the Congress by and large were less productive than communication with the Executive Branch.

Furthermore, as the programs became more complex, it became more and more difficult to write legislation on the Hill without the fullest executive agency cooperation and participation in the drafting process. To write a bill that would carry the full implication of a policy enunciation required that the mechanics be more definitive than being up on the interrelationships of other agencies which might have interest in what was to be done. Congress, as a whole, did not understand it. The Committees and many individual members tried hard, but they were still struggling after the World War II period, and, until the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, they did not begin to equip themselves to do the kind of job which, ideally, I think, the constitutional founders assumed the Legislative Branch would do. Incidentally, I think the Congress is still understaffed.

Under the circumstances, what could Government and the country do? They looked to the President as the Chief Executive to come in and pull the situation together, to become in effect the manager of the federal structure. That he did so, and remains so in the fullest sense of the Constitution, is a matter of history which will be written about for a long time.

We have moved, with very little discussion, from a statement of fact about expansion in our international responsibilities and our expansion in the economic and social fields to a most superficial illustration of the kind of adjustments made in the Executive Branch to take care of the enlarged management task. Now we are ready for some discussion of the evolution of the Executive Office of the President, after one concluding comment on Executive Branch organization. It will be almost an "aside" because I do not know quite how to handle it.

I do not know how to comment on the role and development of the regulatory agencies--the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Power Commission, and the several others.

There are some authorities who argue that the whole intention of the Congress in creating the independent or regulatory agencies was to put them in a position in which they do not have to be responsive to overriding policies of the President and are to find their salvation in the way in which they work out the rather general charters which the Congress has given them. The proponents of this theory say that these agencies would promptly be brought to book for any misuse of power by pressure from the people registered in the form of a complaint to the Congress, with the Congress enacting the necessary remedial legislation. Other authorities say that it was never intended that these "independent" agencies be independent of the President and the Executive Branch in so far as general policy is concerned.

I wish to take no part in this controversy. I say that we are still too close to the whole history of the development of regulatory agencies to be sure which theory will become reality in the light of the public good.

I have no fixed conviction about whether these so-called independent agencies should be or can be fully responsive to presidential direction in terms of policy enunciation. Certainly they have to be organizationally a part of the Executive Branch under the separation of powers decreed by the Constitution. Also, I am sure of this one additional fact; that, as the President adopts one of the roles which I will discuss in a moment, that of Chief Executive, they are aware of his fulfillment of that role or lack of fulfillment of it. Once you are aware of something that is a verity, a reality, you are very apt to take it into account in your planning and day-to-day activities.

Now, let me discuss evolution of the Executive Office of the President, and, with it, recent developments and current trends. I shall try to keep it distinct from the evolution of the presidency itself. How the two interrelate would be the subject of a very good talk that I am not smart enough to fit into a few minutes.

There are six different functions of the President which are pertinent here. First, and I shall dismiss it almost immediately without further comment, he is the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. That has a certain bearing on the growth of economic and international

responsibility which I shall come back to, perhaps, if there is time. As Commander in Chief he must have the information upon which decisions can be based. The structure of the National Security Act provides the means to get that information.

Second, he is the Chief Executive. The Constitution says he is the Chief Executive. All executive power is vested in the President. The Executive today, by every concept, is a manager. He is not a person who sits in an ivory tower in a room with magnificent furniture and pronounces policy without any consideration of what the impact of that policy is going to be on operations. This is a very far cry from the concept of the Executive in the period after the Civil War. But I think you will find that all writers on the modern presidency have commented on the very rapid growth of the managerial aspects of the President's job, beginning in President Theodore Roosevelt's days, roughly, 50 years ago.

Third, the President is responsible for the conduct of our foreign relations. It falls to him to recognize and interpret and propose how we should meet the growth in our international responsibilities.

Fourth, he is the protocol head of State, and in that I would distinguish carefully between the protocol head-of-state duties and the ceremonial duties of lesser scale that have gone along with the office and our own internal political affairs.

Fifth, he is a legislative leader. I maintain this very stoutly. In fact I asserted it once as an undergraduate, and was promptly challenged by the professor to prove it. I referred to three things that are legislative powers of the President under the Constitution: He shall recommend measures to Congress for consideration; he has the veto power over legislation; and he shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed.

The professor accepted my explanation, but, being a very strong believer in the concept that laws were vetoed only when they were imperfect in form, he dismissed my argument by saying, "Only time will tell whether exercise of the veto is really a form of legislative power."

The last time I saw him I asked him if he remembered the discussion. He said, "Only vaguely," but added, "You can say at least that an old man can change his mind."

Finally, the President is the representative of all the people. The people, all of them, elect him despite our continued adherence to the trappings of the electoral college. This fact also makes him a political leader, but I have no time to discuss that aspect of the presidency.

Now, in relation to those roles I would like for a few minutes to talk about the growth of the Executive Office of the President, and to take a look at how it has helped the President to carry his burdens.

On the foreign side, of course, a great many things happen as circumstances dictate. Policies (and even thoughts) are often overtaken by events. I have been told by men who were here in Washington at the time that the rejection of Mr. Wilson's program after World War I led to prompt soul searching within the State Department in an attempt to build better mechanisms to do staff work for the President as the protocol Chief of State and as the man who has the final responsibility for our foreign affairs. Whatever the cause, there has grown up over the years since World War I, and more rapidly since World War II, a new concept of State Department staff work for the Secretary of State and the President. The Foreign Service has dedicated itself to these new concepts with a singular kind of dedication.

So much for that. It is not essential to the mainspring of our discussion, but it serves to illustrate the development of Presidential staff work, and I hope one of your guests this year will develop it further. Suffice it to say that, while every President must remain his own Secretary of State to a great extent, the mechanisms of doing staff work for the President in the State Department and in related activities (like those of the United States Information Agency and in the foreign agricultural and commercial programs) are vastly improved over those of 25 or 30 years ago. They still are not perfect. Neither are any of these mechanisms. If I may jump around among the points, the most imperfect of all the mechanisms is our way of helping the President carry the burdens of being Protocol head of State.

The Chief Executive is also the manager, as I said a few minutes ago. A vast panoply of new agencies has been created in the last 30 years. In fact, as well as in theory, he has become the manager and coordinator of their efforts, and to a very considerable extent the determiner of how they are going to carry out the legislative mandate vested in them by the Congress.

Statistics are boring. Sometimes they are dramatic, nevertheless. How has the job of the presidency grown in terms of the management function? George Washington had on the average 44 bills a year to sign. He issued on the average one Executive Order a year. He had two vetoes in eight years.

Mr. Truman, to go back to the prior Administration, handled on the average of 814 bills a year, issued 186 Executive orders and proclamations, and averaged better than 25 vetoes a year for the entire time that he was in the White House. In the last session of Congress President Eisenhower took action on 891 bills, vetoing eleven.

Just on the purely routine side, President Washington made almost no more than a handful of nominations in the entire eight years of his presidency. President Wilson made only 3,418 in the year 1914, before we got into World War I. Mr. Truman handled 40,557 nominations for federal posts in 1947. The number has continued to grow.

In the period from Washington to Hayes, over 90 years, federal agencies increased from 9 to 11. By the time Mr. Wilson became President there were 39. Franklin Roosevelt had 62 when he took office in 1933. They mushroomed during World War II to 70 or 72, depending on how you make the count. That figure has been cut lately, and President Eisenhower has 60 to 63, depending again on how you make the count.

It was not so very many years ago that only one person in a thousand was a federal employee. Today it is one in 62.

Within his own White House office, the President may, or may not, I think, depending on personal equations, have the necessary equipment to do the job as he sees it. But I think it is interesting to note that as recently as Mr. Hoover's Administration the President had only one secretary. Congress increased the number to three in Mr. Hoover's Administration. Perhaps sarcastically, and perhaps a little wistfully, Mr. Roosevelt afterwards referred to it as an "accomplishment."

The office which Mr. Roosevelt took over was small. It was pretty strictly confined to the Executive office wing, although there were still a few people who had offices in the White House itself. The tremendous volume of mail in the early days of the New Deal was an outpouring of the aspirations and fears of Americans. It was so big

that the White House spread across the street to the State, War, and Navy Building. (These Departments long since had outgrown their building, but they maintained they were still there. You could get an argument on appropriate division of space by going around and looking at the door knobs. If you know that old building, the door knobs have seals or crests of the three departments. Many an argument has been settled by taking a look at a door knob.)

The White House spilled across the street. The East Wing of the White House was reconstructed to provide more space. Ultimately the expansion forced all State, War, and Navy activities out of their building. Now it is the Executive office building exclusively.

Mr. Roosevelt improvised with Executive office machinery during the early thirties in a variety of ways. First he created the National Emergency Council, which had a somewhat checkered existence between 1933 and 1936. In many respects it served as an adviser on the pressing problems of the day, no matter on what side they came up. It was devised, perhaps to be brought into cabinet status, but not of the cabinet, and was composed of people whom the President wanted to consult. Why he did not choose to bring them into the cabinet deliberations I do not know. Mr. Eisenhower has found it serves his purposes better to expand the number of persons invited to cabinet meetings. Such matters as these must remain matters to be settled by Presidential preference.

Mr. Roosevelt also used his cabinet in a way in which it had not been used so much before, by the creation of small cabinet groups, interdepartmental groups, assigning one cabinet officer or another to be in charge.

He also had another device. He would assign overlapping jobs to two cabinet officers. The results were sometimes rather devastating, if you were someone at a very low level, as I was, in a coordinating agency.

However, the experiments were not a long-range solution to effective Executive office machinery. Finally, Mr. Roosevelt decided that the time had come when he must press to expand the functions of the Executive Office of the President. I do not know how long that idea had been in his mind, how long it took to germinate fully, but by 1937 there were under way the Brownlow-Merriam studies on reorganization of the Federal Government. They led to the forwarding of five major reorganization plans to the Congress in 1939.

One of those reorganization plans created the Executive Office of the President. What was put into it first, of course, was the White House Office. Second, the Bureau of the Budget was pulled out of its uneasy resting place in the Treasury Department. The Bureau had had difficulty over the years in really knowing to what extent it reported directly to the President (as the Budget and Accounting Act contemplated) and to what extent it must be responsive to the policies of the Secretary of the Treasury.

There was also created the Office of Government Reports, designed in a somewhat fumbling kind of way to be a contact agency with the Congress and with the grassroots public at large. It passed out of existence after World War II.

Then there was the National Resources Planning Board, much maligned, much misunderstood. On the whole, although sound in concept it was not too successful. Its critics say that it took on more than it was thoroughly equipped to do, and it failed, for reasons that we do not need to go into today, to gain and hold the confidence of the Congress.

Finally, the President prescribed that there would be in the Executive office such office of emergency management as time and circumstances might require. That was, perhaps, a little prescient, in the sense that in almost a matter of days, in fact just two months later, the Germans moved into Poland and an Office of Emergency Management really came into being.

There were other things in the picture--administrative assistants, those nameless gentlemen with a passion for anonymity, and the Office for Personnel Management, an effort which deserves a great deal of consideration in terms of presidential organization, but which we have to pass over today without discussion.

With World War II breaking around our heads, there had to be a very great expansion in this concept of the Office of Emergency Management. In fact, it included, conceptually, all the war agencies, from the War Production Board and its successor and predecessor organizations to the Office of War Mobilization, and its successor, the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion. Many of the concepts under which the combined boards operated grew out of the original concept of the Office of Emergency Management, the special group in the President's staff, to which he could turn over some of the necessary planning functions, as the military does in its use of

the one, two, three, four, and five, (civil-affairs) sections of the General Staff.

Now, this, of course, was not all planned. It was not ordered. Nobody saw quite where it was going. Changing conditions begat changing organization, but the basic connecting thread was help for the Chief Executive. The structure may have had failures, but it did provide the President with some mechanics which he did use and could use, because he had to.

Then, before the War's end, of course, came the death of Mr. Roosevelt. Mr. Truman, in his early days, quite frankly, as I think he will record in his forthcoming memoirs, held to the belief that the Executive should not be as strong or as predominant in policy shaping as Roosevelt had attempted to be. His was a traditional concept of separation of the "equal" powers of the Federal Government. The Constitution does not use the term "separation." I think the connotation of both "separation" and "powers" has changed somewhat since the days of the founding fathers, but that is another story. I will not go into it today.

Now, this Executive-Office structure which we have today is much what it was before the war in most of its responsibilities, except the names are a little bit different. The Budget Bureau's name has not changed. As to the old National Resources Planning Board, almost all of its functions are now to be found in either the Office of Defense Mobilization or the National Security Council, in which all of the war planning advisory functions are now vested.

One new thing that has been added is the Council of Economic Advisers. At the outset of my remarks I referred to the purposes of the Act which created the Council and its declaration that it is the policy of the United States to maintain maximum employment, and full production and productivity. There is the area, gentlemen, in which Uncle Sam has moved into your lives and into mine, into the lives of each one of us. You cannot separate the economic from the social. You cannot separate the economic and social as a combined kind of entity from the political, in the literal sense of that word.

The Federal Government is no longer a collection of service and regulatory agencies. Even the concepts of the military are no longer purely geared to the concept of the police force. They can't be.

Our economic structure is much too complex to permit that. If it were not so, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces would really have no mission.

It is not the job of a soldier today just to live within a stockade and be prepared to go out and fight, whether to chase an Indian or to repel an invader. It is the role of the soldier today--I use that as a generic term; I include sailors and airmen--to be the interpreter of the defense needs of this country. He shares with others the duty to see to it that those are understood, that they are met, and that America is kept strong--kept strong economically, socially, and politically, in order that we may carry out our destiny as the leader of the Free World.

So it has become the function of all agencies in the Executive Branch working together, to provide the kind of programs and the kind of information about those programs which enable the President always to stay on top of the situation. Haltingly, over a good many years, now, we have tried to do what has been called by many titles but recently has been called program reporting to and for the President. When it gets too formalized, it always gets stilted. It breaks down when reduced to charts and put in boxes which the President does not have time to see. But such reporting becomes very vital when it is personalized in terms of the names on the President's calendar. For example, is it not significant that the President finds it both necessary and advantageous to have fixed appointments, week after week, with the Secretary of Defense, with the Secretary of State, with the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, and with the Administrative Assistant in charge of economic affairs, Dr. Gabriel Hauge? Is there not similar significance in the fact that the Budget Director has access to the President on a regular and fixed basis, although not a fixed appointment each week? The overall military and strategic planners have fixed appointments with the Administrative Assistant in charge of matters of the National Security Council, which body, in turn, meets with the President each week.

Those things are important. They are important because they are all manifestations of the way in which, haltingly, but nevertheless, I think, on the whole, successfully, we have measured up to the responsibility of providing machinery in the Executive Office by which the presidency can function.

The presidency is different from the President. The President functions in terms of the personal equations which he establishes.

He is concerned with all of us, and, in a sense, must be aware of our personal hopes, fears, ambitions, diverse capabilities, and lack of capabilities. He must be concerned with political commitments and lack of political commitments--all in a whole welter of interpersonnel relationships. The presidency is concerned with the responsibilities vested in the President.

Regardless of the man who sits in the President's chair, he is required to be not only the Chief Executive but also the legislative leader, the man who has the responsibility of recommending measures to Congress, who has the power and right to require agency heads under the Constitution to supply views to him in writing on any subject, who has veto power over legislation which the Congress enacts, subject, of course, to enactment over his veto by a two-thirds majority vote (not too frequently done as the years have gone on) who has final responsibility for seeing to it that the laws are faithfully executed.

Every single one of you in your role here in the Industrial College today, and your colleagues in the National War College, as you move back to the jobs which you have to do in your military or civilian careers, will find if you will look at it as I think you should look at it, a projection of the concept of the presidency of the United States carried on down through the chain of command to you. You will be doing something which makes it possible for him to see to it that the laws are faithfully executed. You will respond to the leadership of the man. You will find in him the living symbol of the office and in your jobs you will share in the development of the policies which should be recommended to the Congress for ratification and enactment into statutory law.

Now, this has been fragmentary, gentlemen. I am, in a sense, apologetic that I could not have developed a number of these themes further. I will do the best I can in the question period which will shortly follow.

I would like to make one request--an admonition--if I may. Please do not ask me the kind of question which requires another speech. It is not that I object too much to giving speeches, but that is not the purpose of the question and answer period.

I thank you for the privilege of being before you. I hope what I have had to say is of some interest and that you will forgive me for not having had a formal address to give to you.

MR. JONES: I am at your disposal, gentlemen.

MR. NIKLASON: Mr. Jones is ready for your questions.

QUESTION: Mr. Jones, you mentioned the greatly increased responsibility of the President in the last 20 years and how he has become the manager in Government, or the Executive. I would appreciate your comments on increasing the responsibility of the Vice President and making him more or less an assistant manager for the President.

MR. JONES: A good question and one I am glad to answer, because I have convictions about that, too. I don't think you can split the presidency. There have been many situations where the Vice President did get a more active role. But, if you advertise a Vice President as the political leader, so to speak, you immediately get into trouble, because all too frequently in our history he has represented another element in the party which has elected the President and the Vice President. You can't build him up too much or too fast, or he undermines the presidency. He can't be a political leader. He is simply the presiding officer of the Senate. You can't clothe him with the final responsibility for partisan or, for that matter, for nonpartisan political leadership.

In the early days of World War II President Roosevelt used Vice President Wallace in the Executive Branch as the head of several agencies. Here again, you get into trouble. When agencies outlive their usefulness, as they did in World War II, they must be changed or abolished. If you abolish an organization headed by the Vice President, you are firing somebody that the people of the United States have elected. It is a very difficult thing to do. Mr. Truman used to point to a sign on his desk which read, "The buck stops here." A decision of a Vice President you can always appeal. There's still that man above him.

Now, I would say this. I think there are possibilities that Presidents increasingly are going to have to recognize that they have far more effective use of the Vice President. Certainly he can help on protocol responsibilities and the ceremonial work. You people have been in Government service for a long time and you know there is a great deal of importance to the ceremonials. I don't mean going around to public dinners.

You can use him as President Eisenhower has used Vice President Nixon, to help out on the protocol Head-of-the-State type of activity, which I distinguish from the purely domestic ceremonial sort of thing. He might be expected to take on more of the burden of being an effective channel of communication on essential nonpartisan matters between the Executive and the Legislative Branches. I don't know.

All of the Presidents have recognized over the years that the Vice Presidency was a tough kind of job to prevent from becoming the job of a nonentity. The fact that very few Vice Presidents have succeeded to the Presidency, except in case of death, of course, creates a historical atmosphere around this position. Is he really the No. 2 man, or is he somebody who has to be there to be a running mate for various reasons of political expediency? I hope that answers your question.

QUESTION: Mr. Jones, I think a matter of peculiar interest to this audience is the wartime titles of Chief of Staff and Commander in Chief. I refer specifically to Admiral Leahy's job. Is there any executive foundation or requirement for such a title in a future emergency? The reason I ask is the job itself appears to me to derogate some of the statutory responsibilities of our Joint Chiefs of Staff.

MR. JONES: Well, I have heard that argued. Now that I look back on it, I had the good fortune to spend the entire war period--3 years, 9 months, and 20 days--with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, so I have some little appreciation of that machinery. I do not think that there is in any sense at all a derogation of the responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs by having a presiding officer for them in the form of a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which essentially Admiral Leahy was. The arrangement has been continued. When you add the title Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, you have added nothing except a limitation of function. I don't know why that title was picked. I have never inquired, but I suspect that, to a certain degree, it was picked because there was a Chief of Staff to the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, in Great Britain.

I think there was a certain amount of the question of where the salt cellar was--who was going to sit above, and who was going to sit below, the salt. In addition to that there was the very real necessity of moving from the Joint Chiefs to the Combined Chiefs.

The Constitution does not provide, and I don't know of any statute that does, for a Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief. In the Army the Chief of Staff function has been very successful at various levels. Chiefs of Staff, or Executive Officers, in some organizations, had pretty effective channels of communication. They have had knowledge, so to speak, of what the combat troops were doing. That is the concept Mr. Roosevelt had. Certainly you will not find one indication anywhere of any departure from that concept on the part of Admiral Leahy.

QUESTION: This growth in the size of the Office of the President has led some of us in the line organizations to wonder if perhaps we are not developing a group of people who have no direct responsibility, but still are closer to the ear of the President than we are. This challenge has been particularly leveled at the Bureau of the Budget, as you well know.

MR. JONES: Yes, indeed it has.

STUDENT: Speaking for some who perhaps have seen a worthwhile project killed by the Bureau of the Budget and have no responsibility to get the effort completed, I would like to ask you your views on this type of organization and its potential good or evil for the country.

MR. JONES: A good question; and I won't make a speech in answering it, Captain, although it will take more than one word. Let me ask you to think back over your own experience. How many times have you asked the same thing about the Executive or some other officer not in direct command? Roughly, what it comes down to is this: There are only 24 hours a day. There's a limit to the number of things the President can do. There's no limit to what people would ask him to do. He has to have machinery, good or bad, for seeing that those things which he really has to do get done.

Every President is going to change the machinery, or the impact of that machinery, a certain amount, regardless of what the statutes say. I don't think there's any real threat, for this reason. Your department heads and the line officers under them must be advocates for their programs and what they want, or they are not doing their job. They have to be vigorous, "partisan," ingenious at times. They have to be naturally competitive. It is the President's job, and in fact his responsibility, to balance the one off against the other.

He has to have help doing it. It is the job of the Budget Bureau, or the Council of Economic Advisers, or any other staff organization that he sets up, to do a good and objective job of giving him the pros and the cons on things, usually ending up with a recommendation as to what his course of action should be.

I think you can defend the structure from Alpha to Omega and back again. What gets out of focus and causes misunderstanding are the times when, because of stresses or strains or this or that, a delegation of authority is made to the Budget Director or someone else in the Executive office really to be for the moment a kind of Assistant President, particularly in saying, "No." This is not a pleasant task. In far more cases than most people recognize, the negative decisions that you get from the Budget Bureau, and purported to be those of the Budget Director, are actually not really his. They represent merely the Budget Director's interpretation of a very clear policy guide line that he has been given in discussions he has had with the President. For quite obvious reasons, you don't cite the President unless you have to. There must always be a line of guidance when any man becomes a channel for what amounts to an adverse executive decision. When the President is quoted, you may be sure it is his personal decision.

We are not the least bit hurt when people jeer at what we will put in quotation marks, "Budget Bureau Decisions." If we gave you every decision as a presidential decision you would know we were lying. We can't do that. The President couldn't possibly make them all. There are many Budget Bureau decisions, but they are consistent with the line of policy laid down, and they can always be appealed.

It is a first-class operation. I don't think anyone has to fear that the overgrown bureaucracy in the Budget Bureau will take your jobs away. It can't, obviously. The boss won't permit it.

QUESTION: Mr. Jones, in addition to the duties that you listed for the President, does he not have tremendous responsibilities as the leader of his party?

MR. JONES: Yes.

QUESTION: How does this fit in with his schedule? I can imagine close to the election year it is a pretty difficult responsibility.

MR. JONES: The President becomes, of course, the party leader on the day of his nomination. He is immediately bound by two things: the party platform, which he must explain and interpret, and the good of the Nation, which he must work to get his party to support. He cannot reject the responsibility to decide what is right and what is needed for the good of the American people. Those two things have their rough edges worn off as he goes on through the campaign. Various advisers come in. The platform slowly develops into what he wants to advocate as a program of the President. The public good becomes shaped by practical reality and possible courses of action. He lays out his program in various ways, some of it in the inaugural speech, some of it in the State-of-the-Union speech, some of it in the Budget Message, and some in special messages which he gives over the radio.

He is a party leader in each pronouncement he makes. Ideally, the party is prepared to go with him. If it fails to support him, division and dissonance are created, which the party lieutenants have to do something about. Generally, of course, the political machinery of the party sees to it that the President is kept aware of the cross currents of public thinking, so that he doesn't get too far away to lose effective leadership.

To sum it all up, I would say this: that party leadership requires that the President--and every President has to a very considerable extent done this--become a molder of public opinion. He sends up trial balloons. If the public response is good, he then seeks to consolidate that response into something concrete. As a party leader he has the responsibility of trying to see that his party gets credit for things accomplished. If the response is not good, he must decide whether to drop further action or to push ahead.

I don't know whether that gives you enough of an answer. There are other facets, but I try to hold myself down on the length of the replies. Will that suffice for the moment?

QUESTION: Mr. Jones, sometimes I have heard objections on the part of people in the departments to the Budget Bureau's making administrative decisions as against financial or policy decisions. Do you think that trend will continue, in view of the expansion of the Office of the President, in future years?

MR. JONES: It is a little bit hard to answer you in terms of your question, for this reason--I don't mean to duck it--the term "administrative decisions" has a lot of connotations. An administrative decision can be whether you are going to increase the size of the filing force as opposed to the size of the stenographic force. Generally we do not make such decisions. But some people also argue that when the Budget Bureau says you have to confine some part of your operation within certain resources, that also is an administrative decision. I do not agree.

When you get into the field of policy formulation, we have to make many decisions in order to do our job. For example, Executive Order 8248 says the Budget Bureau will assist the President by coordinating the views of agencies on proposed and pending legislation and unrelated bills.

A good many of you have been in the position of having a letter from the Budget Bureau over my signature which will tell you something is or is not in accord with the program of the President. Obviously that advice in a great many cases has not been discussed with the President and he has not made the decision. It has been made by the Budget Director and given expression in the words of my letter in accordance with our general lines of authority that flow from the President, to the Director, to me. He has told us what policy would be in this, that, or the other field. We have had to implement that policy.

We do make that kind of decisions. But we don't make them in any different sense from the decisions which any staff agency has to make if it is going to do the right kind of job for its commander.

The trend will continue. It has to continue. There's no other answer for it. It is better, if I may venture this thought, that there be an institutional decision in most such cases, to the adviser.

QUESTION: Sir, during the expansion of the Executive office during the war years, it spread laterally pretty rapidly and in several instances people had two, three, and four jobs at the same time. I am thinking of Mr. Steelman, for example, There appears to be with the present organization rather a spectacular falling off in the extent of control, principally in that the President seems to be talking to everybody--chiefs, Indians, etc. I wonder if there is any hidden control mechanism between the agencies and the President, sort of a super Chief of Staff.

MR. JONES: No. In terms of individual cases you have to express it in terms of, well, let me say, loyalty, and desire that your action as an individual will not get the President out on a limb. By far the most effective means of coordination is the coordination of informal communication, over the coffee cups at lunch, over the telephone, in meetings, at home at night, or at cocktail parties; wherever you run into your colleagues.

I am sure Mr. Grady will remember the experience that we who were at High Point had back in June when communications broke down and the presidential staff could not communicate, one with the other. As long as that means of communication is there, your mistakes are not going to be too severe.

Furthermore, I have not seen any institution which, so to speak, has profited by its mistakes so much as the Executive office has. If you look back over the history, you will find they rarely make the same mistake twice. Everybody is entitled to make a mistake once, but not twice.

That is not a good answer. There is no coordinating, overall mechanism. You do as I said earlier. You stop and think, "What is the impact on the President and his program and policies." If you don't stop and think, somewhere along the line something may go awry.

MR. NIKLASON: Mr. Jones, you have breathed life into a subject which often becomes a very prosaic one. On behalf of the Commandant, the staff, and the student body, I wish to thank you for a job well done.

MR. JONES: Thank you very much.

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