ORGANIZATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

8 September 1955

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8 September 1955

DR. HUNTER: General Calhoun, Colonel Walsh, gentlemen: I want to talk to you this morning about the organization of our Government for national security, as it has been established and altered during the past ten years, more specifically since the close of World War II.

Not since the Federal Government was established back in 1789 have more far-reaching changes, both organizationally and policy-wise, been made in the security system of this country, Note that I speak not of national defense, not of the military establishment, but of the national security system. More of this later.

Now, all of you, as senior officers in the Armed Forces and in the Civil Service, have lived through the changes of which I will speak this morning. Most of you have been materially affected by those changes. Many of you have participated in these changes. Therefore, much of what I say will be familiar to you. It will be useful, nonetheless, to begin our course by refreshing your recollection of a rather hectic period in the history of the armed services and of the executive branch generally, because nearly all the major departments were involved in, or affected by, these changes in our system for national security.

I shall organize my remarks around the five major headings, as indicated on the easel card. The first item I shall dispose of rather quickly--The New International Position of the United States. I could talk on this theme for a half hour, an hour, or longer, and so could each one of you. I include it chiefly for the record. In substance, here is the situation we faced following the war.

For more than three centuries, Great Britain had been the classic exponent and supporter of the concept of an international balance of power. This was the idea that no one power or coalition of powers should be allowed to become militarily so powerful as to present a serious threat to the continuing security of the other nations. For more than three centuries, England had been the keystone of this balance-of-power system.

Two World Wars first weakened and then destroyed this traditional balance of power. When allied victory came in 1945, the major powers of Western Europe--victors and defeated alike--had been reduced to a condition of virtual economic collapse. France was on her back; Germany and Italy were occupied; the United Kingdom had been bled white by the long struggle which, for many months, she had carried on virtually alone. The major part of Britain's capital investment abroad had been liquidated to finance the war, and the large contribution made by this overseas investment to the national income went down the drain.

In the Far East, Japan was occupied and China was torn by civil war. On the great continental land mass of Eurasia, only the USSR remained in a strong, though war-weakened, position. But her economic and military recovery was rapid, owing largely to a vigorous and ruthless program of economic restoration and expansion.

Of course Europe's weakness was Russia's opportunity; and she moved in with an aggressive program of territorial and political aggrandizement. There was no power in Europe or in Asia capable of checking her. The result, in effect, was the wrecking of the traditional balance of power.

Here, of course, we have the great paradox: A global war fought to uphold and maintain the balance-of-power system which Hitler threatened actually ended with the virtual collapse of this system; and there remained no nation capable of stopping Russia except, of course, the United States.

Prior to 1945, you remember, we had been all but outside the balance-of-power system. We were, so to speak, like a fire department of one city which responded to the alarms from an adjoining city only when fires of disaster proportions threatened to overwhelm that city's fire-fighting resources. In both World Wars I and II we came to the rescue of the Allied Powers only when their defeat seemed imminent. After World War II, ours was, so to speak, the only fire department capable of dealing with a major conflagration. We were faced with the grim alternatives, either we must take the lead to check Russia, or Russia would take over. We were thus compelled to abandon our traditional role of holding our force in reserve and assume the lead role--or face the prospect of continued Russian advance with this country increasingly isolated and weakened.

Most Americans at the end of the war hoped that we might return to something like our traditional position of detachment from European affairs. But we soon learned that the good old days were gone forever. In place of the old balance-of-power system, we were faced with the harsh realities of a very different system--a kind of bipolar system, with one pole at Moscow and the other here in Washington.

These, then, were the postwar developments, all familiar to you, which compelled the United States drastically to revamp the policies and organizations concerned with national security.

This brings me down to point 2 in our outline--Organization for National Security Prior to World War II. This too, can be passed over rather quickly, for we are all more or less familiar with the principal features of that organization--or lack of organization, as it might perhaps better be described.

Before World War II, of course, we had a War Department, a Navy Department, and a State Department, each active in its own corner of the field, each doing its duty in the manner prescribed by statute and established by tradition, each with its own problems, its own headaches, and its own rather limited conception of the overall job to be done. Today, as we look back on those pre-1939 days, we are impressed by the separateness which marked the course of each of those major departments in dealing with the problems of national security.

In this prewar situation, it is important to note that there was no specific agency charged with responsibility for national security policy and planning on the national level, that is, on the national level as distinguished from the military-service level. Now, this does not mean that there was neither policy nor planning in respect to national security, but virtually no planning went on outside the military services; and security policy formulation rested almost entirely with the President, in consultation with such advisors among the Cabinet officers as he might confide in and rely upon.

Even within the armed services, military planning as carried on prior to World War II was of a very limited character. It hardly existed before 1917 except in a very rudimentary fashion. In the 1920's and 1930's war plans were prepared, as you will recall, by the Army and the Navy, but largely independently of each other, until the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939 brought the planning together

to some extent. A joint Army and Navy board, consisting of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff, Army, coordinated war plans, at least in those areas where agreement could be reached.

Only in the field of industrial mobilization was there regular machinery for joint planning as provided in the old Army and Navy Munitions Board. The relations of the two armed services to each other before World War II has been described in what may be somewhat extreme language by a former member of the Army and Navy Staff College faculty, as follows:

> ". . . it was all too clear that we had fought all of our wars with an Army and with a Navy. We generally have fought two wars, one on land and one on sea. Always we had fought with two separate forces; separate in organization, in tradition, and, worst of all, separate in sentiment. But they had this in common: Each was ignorant of the other."

If the two armed services had little knowledge and understanding of each other and operated in substantial isolation, this was even more true of the relations between the armed services and the State Department. It was the function of the State Department to formulate and administer the national policies of this country in our relations with other countries. These policies inevitably involved risks and commitments by the United States. These risks and commitments, accepted in the pursuit of our foreign policy goals, might well, sooner or later, involve this country, if not in war, in the threat of war. To pursue such policies, obviously, without recognizing and evaluating the possible military consequences and preparing for such consequences was a foolhardy business.

Today it seems axiomatic that an effective national policy requires, above all, the close coordination of foreign and military policy; and yet, during the 1920's and 1930's there was very little of such coordination, either formally or informally. No machinery existed for the purpose. Military departments and the State Department operated independently and, to a very large degree, in ignorance of each other's policies and plans.

Between 1939 and 1945, a World War of global proportions was fought, and during these war years we learned the facts of national security the hard way. Through grim necessity, and with virtually no advance planning or preparation, we learned, during this war,

how to plan, organize, and conduct joint operations and combined operations in the field. We learned how vital was the close interlocking of foreign policy and military policy, We learned, again the hard way, that you do not fight a war simply to win it; you fight a war to attain national objectives.

Still another lesson that we learned during the war was that lack of planning, lack of preparation, and ignorance added greatly to the material costs of the war and resulted not only in heavy financial burdens, during and after the war, but in a serious depletion of our natural resources.

The result of all this experience was that after the war was over--in fact, even before the end of the war, beginning as early as the spring of 1944--we got busy putting our house in order security-wise. A number of studies and investigations were made both within the military departments and by Congress, and there was a long and, at times, heated public discussion of the major issues. The end result of all this investigation, discussion and deliberation, was the National Security Act of 1945, passed in the summer of that year; and this act provided the statutory base for the elaborate set of agencies which I shall shortly discuss.

This act of 1947, as I see it, marks the great divide in the long evolution of our national security policy, and this brings me to No. 3 in the outline--The National Security Act of 1947. Now, many of you are already familiar with the act of 1947 and its amendments, but I would urge all of you to read, or reread, these acts carefully. Before considering the more significant provisions of this act, I want to point out certain fundamental concepts which give meaning and purpose to the entire system of security provided for in the act.

There are, as I see it, three such concepts:

1. The central concept is that indicated in the title itself of the act: National Security. This concept of national security contrasts very sharply with the traditional and rather limited concept of national defense conceived traditionally, almost solely, in military terms. Defense, military defense, of course plays a vital role, in many ways central role, but this functions within the larger framework of national security.

2. The second basic concept running through the act is that of coordination--the coordination not only of the armed services but, and at least of equal importance, the coordination of domestic, foreign, and military policies with relation to national security. Both prewar and wartime experience had made very clear again and again, as I have pointed out, the vital importance of having military and foreign policies that are not only consistent with each other but are mutually supporting.

3. Now, the third concept that runs through the entire act of 1947 can be summed up in the phrase: Security is everybody's business and, equally important, is everybody's responsibility. As we examine the various parts of the act, we will see that not only the military departments but also the major executive departments and agencies of the Government are again and again brought into the security picture.

Now let's turn to the act itself; and the first thing to note is the purpose of the law as described--I quote:

> "An Act to promote the national security by providing for a Secretary of Defense, for a National Military Establishment (including Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force), and for the coordination of the activities of the National Military Establishment with other departments and agencies of the Government concerned with national security."

Now, in this phrasing we have, in effect, the basis for what I have called the revolution in our national security policy. In brief, and as the remainder of the act makes clear, the Armed Forces are no longer the sole guardians of the Nation's safety. ". . . it is the intent of Congress," runs the introductory statement of policy, "to provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the United States, and to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relating to national security . . . ."; and so on.

It is rather worth nothing, I think, that title I, which comprises about one-third of the length of the act, is not concerned with the Armed Forces at all. It describes the organization and functions of three new nonmilitary agencies, outside the military establishment, but having vital top-level security responsibilities. These are, of course, the National Security Council (NSC); the Central Intelligence

Agency (CIA); and the National Security Resources Board (NSRB). Note, too, that title I is headed, Coordination for National Security.

Let's take a very brief look at the three new agencies which are added to the security structure of the Nation. Of the National Security Council the act reads:

> "The function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security, so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security."

The membership of the Council is rather illuminating. As named in the original act, the members appear in the following order: The President; second, the Secretary of State; third, the Secretary of Defense, followed by the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; fourth, the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board. Finally, provision was made for adding still other members from among the heads of the executive departments and other agencies.

"It shall be the duty of the Council," reads the act, "first, to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to our actual and potential power, in the interest of national security, for the purpose of making recommendations to the President in connection therewith."

Note here particularly that two sides of the security situation are spelled out; on the one side, national objectives, commitments, and risks; and on the other, national power, actual and potential. Obviously, the two must be kept in some reasonable kind of balance.

> "Second, it shall be the duty of the Council to consider policies on matters of common interest to the departments and agencies of the Government concerned with national security, and to make recommendations to the President on the same . . . ."

Here in the NSC we have, at long last, a top-level policy agency, headed by the President, whose job it is to take an overall view of the security position and the security policies of the United States, and to advise the President concerning the same.

The second of the new civilian agencies established by the National Security Act of 1947, is the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Briefly summarized, the function of CIA is to insure, under the direction of the National Security Council, a sound and adequate intelligence base for the formulation and execution of national security policies. Very clearly, if our national security policies are to be sound and effective, they have to be based on accurate intelligence on all matters bearing upon national security. So it is the job of CIA to correlate, evaluate, and disseminate intelligence relating to national security, and to perform such other intelligence activities as can best be handled by a central agency. Obviously, this is a very big job, and an important one.

Most of you are familiar with CIA, and I need not go into it further here.

This brings us to the National Security Resources Board (NSRB)--in many ways the most important agency of the lot, from the viewpoint of our studies here at the Industrial College. As many of you know, NSRB no longer exists under this name; but the present Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) is, with certain modifications of function and form, a continuation of NSRB.

In my earlier talk I referred briefly to our experience in economic mobilization planning in the 1930's and to our failure to adopt the industrial mobilization plan when war came.

Now, during World War II, to a much greater extent than in World War I, as we saw, we came to realize the predominant role of productive resources in our national military strength. Accordingly, economic mobilization came in for a great deal of attention in the thinking and discussions which lead to the National Security Act of 1947. The result was certain radical changes in the organizational arrangements for economic mobilization planning.

First, except in respect to military functions related to procurement, economic mobilization planning was taken out of the military establishment, where it had been since 1920, and was given to a civilian agency, NSRB. In part, this was done from a widely held, although possibly incorrect view, that the War Department had fallen down on the economic mobilization planning job during the 1920's and 1930's.

But to a larger degree, I think, this reassignment of responsibility for planning from a military department to a civilian agency reflected the growing feeling that modern warfare demanded the fullest and most effective application of all the resources of the Nation, civilian and military; and that planning for the mobilization of the economy, no less than the direction of the economy in wartime, was preeminently a civilian job and one which best could be done by those most competent to deal with problems involving the civilian economy, namely, civilains.

Secondly, the responsibility for economic mobilization planning was raised from a minor branch of one of the military departments, where, unfortunately, it had enjoyed little prestige and not too much influence, and it was placed in an independent executive agency responsible directly to the President. NSRB had no operating responsibilities or authority. Its role was advisory only; but it was a staff arm of the highest executive authority, the President, In the language of the statute:

"It shall be the function of the Board to advise the President concerning the coordination of military, industrial, and civilian mobilization, including . . . ." And then the act enumerated most of the major areas to which your study will be directed throughout the school year: manpower; natural and industrial resources; maintenance and stabilization of the civilian economy; coordination of procurement, production, and related activities of Federal agencies and departments, military and civilian; requirements and their balancing with available resources; stockpiling and conservation of strategic and critical materials; strategic relocation of industrial facilities and services.

A third point I would like to make about NSRB ties up with what I expressed earlier about mobilization security being everybody's business. NSRB in its first organization was established as a board consisting of the heads of seven Cabinet departments, including Defense, State, Commerce, Labor, Agriculture, Interior, and Treasury. Further, NSRB was directed by statute to use to a maximum extent the facilities and resources of the executive departments and agencies. Thus, national security planning on the resources side was conceived as a job requiring the participation of every major executive department and agency.

Now, for the last ten or fifteen minutes I have been talking about the new organization for national security, and I have barely mentioned

the armed services. Title II, comprising more than half of the National Security Act of 1947, by length, covers this side of the security picture. It is headed: The National Military Establishment. As later amended, this part of the act is the basic charter, of course, for the postwar military organization, and in many ways it really did give the armed services a new look. I don't propose to consider this part of the act in any detail. You are all more or less familiar with the results of title II, if not with its language. I shall limit my attention to some general comments on certain features of the act.

Let me remind you again of the reasons for this overhaul of the military establishment. The experience of the war had demonstrated very forcibly the hopeless inadequacy of certain features of the prewar military structure. The result was a hasty and improvised revamping of that structure, once we got into the war. This was done by Executive order and would expire with the President's war powers. So action had to be taken.

If we were to select any one major deficiency as outstanding, I am certain it would be the lack of coordination, and of any machinery for coordination, between the separate armed services. Even within a single service there was not a great deal of coordination in some respects. This had led, during the course of the war itself, to certain important departmental changes in both the War and Navy Departments. In commenting on this aspect of our prewar military establishment, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee on reorganization declared: "Adequate mutual understanding, which is so essential to unity, was lacking to an alarming degree."

From the military point of view, of course, this lack of coordination was significant primarily for its effect on combat operations in the field; in other words, on military effectiveness as measured in action against the enemy. But Congressmen, not being military experts, quite naturally tended to see lack of coordination between the military departments primarily in terms of efficiency in management and in cost in dollars. The various committee hearings leading to the Act of 1947 are filled with expressions of this preoccupation with costs, and innumerable examples were given, as you may recall, of the excessive cost and waste resulting from lack of coordination in procurement and supply matters.

So a major objective of the reorganization of the military establishment was, from the point of view of Congress, the elimination

of waste and excessive costs, especially those resulting, or seeming to result, from duplication of services and facilities and lack of standardization of supplies and equipment.

How did the framers of the Act of 1947 propose to deal with the problems growing out of this lack of coordination in the military establishment? Organizationally they proposed to accomplish it in two principal ways.

The first was by placing the three military departments, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force (which was given separate status by the act) within the framework of an overall organization entitled the National Military Establishment. At the head of this overall organization was placed a Secretary of Defense--a civilian, defined by the Act as "the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to national security."

As you will recall, this overhead organization was a compromise between the desire of the Army and the Air Force for a strongly unified single department, and the Navy opposition to this concept.

The second organizational device employed in the Act of 1947 to provide coordination within the military establishment was a group of joint agencies dealing with important activities involving the three services. There were four principal ones: The War Council; the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Munitions Board; and the Research and Development Board.

I shall comment only on two of these, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Munitions Board. The importance of the Joint Chiefs for our studies here rests on their responsibility for preparing strategic plans and joint logistic plans, and the assignment of logistic responsibilities to the three services. Strategic plans of course provide the primary basis for economic mobilization planning. The one must follow the other as the cart the horse.

The Munitions Board, under a civilian chairman, was assigned broad responsibilities of planning for what were called the military aspects of economic mobilization, and of coordinating all matters within the three military departments relating to procurement, production, and other phases of logistics. The Munitions Board was the military counterpart, or the opposite number, if you will, of NSRB, working within the framework of the national policies in this area developed by NSRB.

So much for the Security Act of 1947. This brings me to point 4--Changes Introduced in 1949 and 1953.

As most of you will recall, the new military establishment set up under this act operated with something less than the hoped-for results. Judged by the controversy, the confusion, and the bitterness of feeling which followed, the Act of 1947 resulted in very little either of unity or of unification. There is no time and no need for going into this unhappy period here.

For our purposes, it is enough to say that Congress was not satisfied with many of the results of the reorganization for national security under the Act of 1947, and in two years came up with the National Security Amendments of 1949, which became law in August of that year. These amendments were nearly as long as the original act. The interesting thing is they dealt almost wholly with the military establishment. The most important single result of these amendments was greatly to strengthen the position and authority of the Secretary of Defense throughout the military establishment. The three military departments lost their status as full Cabinet departments and lost their representation on the National Security Council. The Secretary of Defense became the sole representative of the military establishment on this key policy-making body. No longer, as under the original act, did the three departmental secretaries have direct access to the President and the Bureau of the Budget, as they did previously, over the head of the Secretary of Defense. In a variety of other ways, Congress in these Amendments of 1949 sought further to strengthen the position and authority of the Secretary of Defense; but they need not be taken up here. Read the amendments if you wish to have the details.

Very clearly, Congress was not satisfied with the degree of unity and unification obtained under the Act of 1947; and as the sequel proved, neither was it satisfied with the results obtained under the Amendments of 1949; nor was the new administration under President Eisenhower, when it came into office in 1953, satisfied with the situation. The result was the adoption in 1953 of Reorganization Plan No. 6, authorized by the Reorganization Act of 1949. The announced chief purpose of Reorganization Plan No. 6 was further to strengthen the position and authority of the Secretary of Defense.

In part, the administration sought to accomplish this by tightening up the language of the act describing the authority of the Secretary

of Defense. The original Act of 1947 authorized the Secretary "to exercise general direction, authority, and control" over the National Military Establishment. The Amendments of 1949 stated that the Secretary, under the direction of the President, "shall have direction, authority, and control over the Department of Defense." There was one minor change. The weak and weasel word, "general," was deleted.

Now listen to the words of President Eisenhower, in submitting the Reorganization Plan No. 6 to Congress:

> "No function in any part of the Department of Defense . . . should be performed independent of the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense. . . . The Secretary of Defense is the accountable civilian head of the Department of Defense, and, under the law, my principal assistant in all matters relating to the Department."

If words would do it, presumably things were taken care of.

To this end, the reorganization plan proposed to provide the Secretary of Defense with a more efficient staff organization. Specifically, this plan abolished two of the agencies, the boards established by the Act of 1947--the Munitions Board, which had had an unhappy and not too effective career; and the Research and Development Board. It assigned their functions, with certain other duties, to six additional Assistant Secretaries of Defense, each with a staff and an assigned area of responsibility. Later on three more Assistant Secretaries of Defense were added. For the remaining provisions of Reorganization Plan No. 6, I shall simply refer you to the plan itself, as it became effective.

Now, is this the end of the period of postwar reorganization? Are things at last beginning to settle down, acquire a certain stability? Possibly so; probably not. If you are inclined to optimism on this score, let me refer you to a report made to Congress during the summer by a rather distinguished group of American citizens. This is the report of the second Hoover Commission Committee on the Business Organization of the Department of Defense. The membership of this committee includes several presidents and board chairmen of large corporations such as the American Rolling Mill Corporation; Champion Paper; RCA; Bell Telephone Laboratories; Lackawanna Railroad; Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. Here you have much the largest business enterprise in the United States, perhaps

in the world--so you make up a committee of bigtime business operators to give it a going over. So they did. There were some 20 businessmen, industrialists and engineers on this committee. Three-fourths of them had wartime experience in procurement and production.

This Committee on the Business Organization of the Department of Defense directed its attention specifically to the problem of how to improve the business management of the Department, which, as it pointed out, takes more than 60 cents of every taxpayer's dollar.

The first objective of such improvement, their report reads, shall be: "Clear and unchallenged direction of the entire Defense Establishment by the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the three military departments, and their secretariats."

I don't propose here to summarize the contents of this report, but I call it to your attention and suggest that you may at one time or another find it very desirable to read through it with some care for what you think it may be worth. I will simply cite a few of the points it highlights.

The report contends that the structure of the military departments has not kept pace with the vastly increased importance of supply activities in present-day warfare. They believe:

> ". . . the organization of the departments has given inadequate recognition to the impact of the new military support demands on the available natural resources; the industrial resources of the nation; the national labor force; and the public purse."

A central thesis of this and related reports of the second Hoover Commission is:

> "The management of the Defense Establishment is no longer principally one of managing tactical operations. Of equal importance today is the development and production of implements, supplies, and services of war. . . . This aspect of Defense management has come to require as much specialized knowledge and expert direction as is traditional in the command of tactical operations."

This is a concept which you will find presented in many different forms here during this school year. The committee report further

urges: ". . . the pressing importance of securing greater recognition of the support (that is, logistic) activities"--in the services. They call attention to the repeated efforts by Congress and by the administration to coordinate the common supply and service activities of the military services and the very limited success of these efforts.

The report advocates changes in personnel policy so as to increase the use of civilians in management and technical positions for supply support activities, and to improve the effectiveness and career outlook for military personnel assigned to such activities--issues with which most of you are familiar.

Finally, the committee recommended the reduction of the present number of nine Assistant Secretaries to four, so-called, "management secretaries," and proposed the establishment of a separate civilian agency to administer common supply and service activities--the most controversial matter of all.

During the past 30 minutes I have covered the organizational or, rather, the reorganizational, waterfront. You may well be wondering just what it all adds up to. The past seven or eight years in which all these changes have taken place have been a trying period, a period of almost continuous change and adjustment, a period of much confusion, controversy, and conflict.

The Korean War, of course, brought a partial mobilization which both tested and strained the new organization for national security. The Office of Defense Mobilization was established to coordinate and direct the limited mobilization required by this emergency, and, toward the end of the emergency, ODM, under Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1953, was assigned the planning functions heretofore exercised by NSRB; and NSRB was allowed quietly to wither on the vine.

A change of administration took place in 1952 and the new administration brought new men, new ideas, and new policies. Yet, in spite of all the difficulties, turmoil, controversy, and confusion attending these changes, there is no question that the overall security position of the country, from an organizational viewpoint, at least, represents a tremendous advance over the prewar situation--even if we grant that the national security structure has not yet reached a definitive form.

Let me review briefly the major developments I have stressed in this talk. The economic collapse of Western Europe, and especially of the United Kingdom, at the end of the war, brought the breakdown of the old balance-of-power system. The Soviet Union moved quickly into the vacuum and this country was obliged to assume the leadership in organizing the free-world forces to check Soviet expansion.

Our new international position and responsibilities in turn led to a reexamination of our whole security position. It became evident not only that our military establishment must be maintained on a far higher peacetime level, as regards both size and efficiency, than in the past but that national safety must be seen in much broader terms than simply military preparedness.

The new concept of national security stressed the vital importance of the close coordination of military and foreign policy and of these policies in turn with related domestic policies, especially domestic economic policies. This new and far more comprehensive concept of national security not only stimulated a thorough overhauling and revamping of the military establishment but, as I noted, it resulted in the creation of several important new civilian agencies charged with key responsibilities in relation to national security, especially the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Resources Board, later replaced by ODM.

Within the military establishment the armed services were brought together in the Department of Defense and under a Secretary of Defense whose position was gradually strengthened; and a series of joint agencies was created for the purpose of coordinating policies and functions in a number of vital security areas, not only in military strategy and military policy, but in research and development, procurement, and production.

Time and experience, plus personalities and politics, led to the changes incorporated in the National Security Amendments of 1949 and Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953. The situation, as I suggested, both organizationally and policy-wise, is still fluid. The adaptation of our governmental structure and of our national security policies to the shift from isolation to leadership in world affairs is not something that can be accomplished in a few years.

Now, in my discussion of these far-reaching changes in our policies and organization for national security, I have placed particular emphasis upon two things:

First, the broadening of the traditional concept of national defense into the far more comprehensive concept of national security; and, secondly, upon the coordination of foreign, military, and related domestic, especially economic, policies, and the organizational innovations adopted to facilitate this coordination.

In the several minutes which remain, I want briefly to call attention to two other aspects of the security problem. One relates to economy in the military establishment, which I have already referred to in speaking of the second Hoover Commission's committee report. The other relates to civil-military relations within the national security structure. Both questions, both problems, for they are such, grow out of the greatly expanded peacetime military establishment which has resulted from the postwar situation. The Department of Defense military expenditures in recent peacetime years have exceeded forty billions of dollars. They constitute from one-half to three-fourths of the total Federal Budget, and amount to one-seventh to one-eighth of the gross national product.

Military expenditures thus account for half or more of the heavy Federal tax load borne by the American people. Here, of course, we have the primary explanation for the tremendous pressure within Congress and from the public, for the reduction of the military budget in the face of the continued international tension and for greater economy and efficiency within the military establishment. The impact upon the economy as a whole of the tremendous sums annually expended by the armed services is of course great and far reaching and a subject of much concern to those responsible for keeping the economy both stable and expanding.

Understandably, then, concern for the effective organization and efficient operation of the Executive Branch of the Government focuses upon the military establishment, which is in truth the colossus of the executive branch.

The second problem relates to the maintenance of civilian supremacy within the national security structure. At first thought, you may not like the sound of this. It may seem to suggest, by implication if not directly, that the military are trying "to take over." You can rightly point to repeated statements by our military leaders for many years emphasizing civilian supremacy as a basic military doctrine in this country. Nevertheless, there is ample evidence of a growing concern since the war, both in and out of Government,

over trends, or, at any rate, tendencies, toward a weakening of the civilian control that has been traditional in this country. Whatever the justification for this concern, it clearly is something to which the military should give careful thought.

I don't propose this morning to discuss this problem of civilian-military relations, but simply to call attention to it. It raises certain critical issues relating to national security organization and national security policy in this postwar world of ours--issues which received much thought and attention in the discussion and debate leading to the Act of 1947.

In calling attention to it I shall simply cite several evidences of the growing public concern about it, evidences coming from different sources.

First, it is interesting to note that in 1952 the Social Science Research Council established as one of its major operating committees a Committee on Civil-Military Relations Research. The SSRC, as you may know, is the national organization representing the six leading scientific societies in this important field.

This new committee, in an early report, called attention to the fact that for the first time in its history the United States is compelled to maintain a state of high mobilization and a large peacetime military establishment. This situation, the committee went on to say, posed grave problems of public policy. Why? I quote:

> ". . . if only because military considerations and military influence inevitably would play a greater part in all aspects of policy making than ever before in a country that traditionally has been inclined to fear military encroachments into the policy sphere."

Secondly, let me cite the example of the House Committee on Government Operations in its adverse report on those parts of Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953 giving certain functions to the newly created Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In denying authority to perform these seemingly modest management functions to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the committee expressed its deep concern, and the concern of leading public figures testifying before it, lest in the greatly enlarged military establishment the long cherished principle of civilian supremacy be weakened.

"If any single man could control (the military establishment)," their report declared, "he would have the potential control of the United States."

Finally, let me cite President Eisenhower's message to Congress submitting Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953. In reviewing the objectives of the reorganization of the Defense Establishment, he placed foremost the maintenance of civilian responsibility. I quote:

> "There must be a clear and unchallenged civilian responsibility in the Defense Establishment. This is essential not only to maintain democratic institutions but also to protect the integrity of the military profession."

To strengthen civilian control was a primary objective of the National Security Act of 1947 and its amendments, and of Reorganization Plan No. 6.

I thank you.

DR. HUNTER: Before you begin the questions, I would like to make a comment--merely that the theory is that the guy behind the pulpit is always an expert. An expert is supposed to answer and not dodge the questions. I am not an expert on the Department of Defense or the Federal Government. And if I were an expert I should hesitate to admit it before this formidable audience of 150 experts. Final comment: Speeches or comments from the floor on this large subject will be even more welcome than questions.

QUESTION: Louie, one of the important functions of ODM is the business of dispersal. What progress are we making on that?

DR. HUNTER: I would hesitate to speak on that. Don't we have an ODM representative in the audience?

STUDENTS: The fellow who asked the question is.

DR. HUNTER: Thank you. I am glad to have your comments.

ANOTHER STUDENT: I will try it. I don't know whether it is fair to say there is very little progress made on the actual dispersing of industrial facilities. I might say it has been chiefly tight, in the whole field. There have been very few contracts placed in dispersed

areas. The problem is inherent. You can only accomplish it if you want to pay for it. There has been an increase in weapon size. A policy was announced in 1950 where they set up a criterion of certain target areas and there was a ten-mile radius in the target areas. Well, with the weapon development, it has become obsolete. But the economic cost of putting plants in new areas without the facilities to furnish them, even utilities, is a major deterrent; and while we have inherent in the law certain things, such as tax amortization, which has not proved too effective, and loans and other commitments, there has never been an outright stated policy that we would direct those things for this realignment of industrial facilities.

There has been a committee, an interagency group, working very extensively on this subject for a matter of twelve months. It has been before the congressional hearings. There has been a suggestion that we set up a commission somewhat similar to the Hoover group to develop a national policy on this.

I don't know where it is going to end up, but if we would take it to what might mean limited objectives we would certainly disrupt our economy as we know it today. There is practically no spot in New England that might meet safe criteria, no central area, and all our industrialized metropolitan areas would probably disappear.

So it is one of the tough questions. I can come back to say that one of the three areas in the Truman statement of August 1950--I believe it was on dispersion--had as one of the bases that we would place defense contracts in safe areas. Nothing more has been accomplished in that area than in the dispersement of industrial facilities. It is the same problem.

CAPTAIN MOTT: I think we are very fortunate to have an expert here in the crowd.

DR. HUNTER: We have lots of them. I overheard a discussion in my office where this was summarized in a much more blunt remark--one to this effect:

> "Hell, all this talk about industrial dispersion is window dressing. If we disperse adequately for protection from atomic attack we will have to make this country go on an austerity basis for at least twenty years. It can't be done."

CAPTAIN MOTT: May I suggest that if possible we keep these questions somewhere near the subject matter.

QUESTION: Louie, it bothers me a little bit that we have this opinion that it is bad for the country to have a military man placed in a position where he would be in charge of all the Armed Forces of the Nation. Our organization up to recently has actually prohibited that type of authority from being concentrated in anyone except the President. Our last reorganization it appears has concentrated all that authority in one man--a civilian. What is there that makes it all right to concentrate that authority in a civilian and makes it all wrong to put it in a military man?

DR. HUNTER: We simply have, I think, there, to refer to the political facts of life. I use "political" in the broad sense, not the narrow partisan sense. One of the basic facts of political life in the working democracies in the world--there are not too many--is a distrust of military authority. This goes almost as far back as Magna Charta in English experience. This distrust has been handed on from one generation to another. It has become almost instinctive, not so much in the thinking, as in the feeling, of the people. Each one has to decide for himself whether this "feeling" is a good thing or bad thing. Let's leave out the moral issues and say he must decide whether it is a desirable or an undesirable thing in terms of national security for the country. Would anyone else like to comment on that?

CAPTAIN MOTT: Is there a comment back there?

COMMENT: In reading over last night this big essay on the National Security Act and the troubles we are having, especially in getting standby legislation, I see it is because Congress emphatically distrusts the President and won't give him any powers in advance. It seems to me that we don't know how fast we could throw out the Secretary of Defense if he got too powerful. Don't we want somebody who is nationally elected by the public, rather than any political appointee or career man, or anything else, in charge of the entire military establishment?

COMMENT: In the last year we got all this apprehension about this grave concern. Is this grave concern concentrated in the minds of a few, rather than being the grave concern of the public as a whole? That is what I would like to know. I think you can find a lot of views expressed in small groups that are vociferous. If you tap the depth

of public opinion, I doubt that they are concerned about military control. They love Eisenhower. They know him. They know he is a military man and they feel he is on the civilian side and things are pretty good. I wonder if they get to the basic roots of public opinion on that.

COLONEL WIRAK: Louie, I would like to make an observation there. You remember Mr. Drake who came over and talked to us last year. He was the Director of Storage Distribution and Disposal under Mr. Pike, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Supply and Logistics. Mr. Drake was a businessman who was in the department one year. He is gone. That important business has to go on. So the Civil-Service people are making the decisions. There is nothing wrong with the Civil Service. Some of my best friends are in there. But that is not civilian control.

COMMENT: I would like to make one comment on the last comment. It seems to me that this feeling that was also mentioned by the colonel is the feeling of very possibly only a few people. Those few people are rather loud spoken. Many of them are in public places. I am wondering if perhaps the loud spokenness of those few people, if they are a few people, does not have quite a strong bearing on the desirability of the military as a career and if that is not one of the reasons why we are having a hard reenlistment, officer reenlistment primarily. That is not in line with this subject. That is a side observation.

DR. HUNTER: Your comment puzzles me a little. Do you feel that there has been and is no basis for the traditional civilian distrust of the military; or is it that you simply resent--and quite understandably--a distrust that is directly at the members of profession?

STUDENT: My last comment actually was a concern about the feelings of the people toward the military. There have been a number of articles published about that. Of course some of those articles bemoan the fact that apparently the military man is relegated to the position of a second-class citizen. But I say that is not in line with your talk or the subject of the lecture. That is a side observation.

COMMENT: I would like to point something out. I might say I am a civilian, also a reserve officer--but I have a balanced point of view on it. I feel that there is a very strong conviction in Congress against giving the military too much control, and that is something

of recent origin. Also I might cite Public Law 436 of the 87th Congress, which took out of the Munitions Board catalog expenditures and special functions, one of which I was connected with and stated simply that the director of those organizations could not be anyone who had been a commissioned officer in the Army, Navy, or Air Force, for a period of ten years. Congress turned right around then, and because of the confidence they had in the retired admiral who was handling the program they made an exception by saying that he could become the first director; but henceforth nobody could succeed him. I point out that as late as 1952 that was still congressional thinking.

DR. HUNTER: May I throw in a comment before we have the next question? Reference has been made here more than once to distrust of the military and distrust of the President by Congress. Going back to Mr. Somers' talk, isn't there a certain measure of truth in saying that distrust is an essential feature of our political system? It is, in important respects, built into it, as for example, in the so-called checks and balances as they operate between three branches of the Government--Federal, Legislative, and Judicial. It may well be that a certain amount of distrust, however much we personally resent it, has a useful functional role in Government.

It is quite natural, perhaps, for civilians to distrust the military. It is perhaps equally natural for the military to distrust civilians. One could doubtless give other examples of what might be called this built-in distrust. It would no doubt, be much pleasanter or happier if Congress and the President would get along more amicably than they do most of the time; but it is part of that checks and balance system, which we generally hold to be a very valuable feature of our govermental system.

COMMENT: It seems to me the Hoover Commission, as well as some of the others, have muddied up the basic question as to what kind of control we are talking about. In our system political control, I think, clearly should rest with civilians, because a specialist in small details or large deals is more amenable to the general population, which is perfectly all right. In our theory, now, we get into the question of whether or not the military are capable of exercising managing control. I think that is where we are most deeply wounded.

COMMENT: I hate to belabor the point, Louie, about this distrust of the military. I am inclined to think it is more a technical matter of recent origin. I have talked to several people in the Middle

West in the last several years. The point of concern is simply something that originated with President Truman in 1950 when he took the country into war without, in the eyes of many people, proper authority. A military officer today can order an atomic-weapon strike on some nation and say, "Oops, I am sorry. It was a mistake." I am simply reciting what I have heard people say. That's the reason I think the civilians are concerned about the authority that one or a small group of officers have today, or at least what they think these officers have today.

COMMENT: When they first put up the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Forrestal was in a way for it, and in a way against it. One of the things he said was he wanted it kept a small organization, with a total number of personnel, including himself, of around 350. It is political boondoggling, or was it really necessary to expand it to such tremendous proportions?

DR. HUNTER: Does anyone want to comment on that?

COMMENT: Along with what you say about the overburdening of this OSD, the last I read was that the number of persons would be 2,500 people, and they were relieved about setting that limit. It seems to me that, in the defense of all the assistant secretaries, we have made a lot of civilians in effect tacticians; and the thing that we should question--I think the Congress should question it--is the question of control that is now being put into OSD. We might as well wipe out the Chiefs of Staff, because we have too many agencies to go through to sell a tactical necessity.

DR. HUNTER: A basic problem here if the symbol of the logistical pyramid roughly represents the situation, is, I suppose, the problem of where you are going to draw the line. It is an integrated mechanism, this national war machine. Where, at what point or level do you draw the line between military and civilian?

COMMENT: Louis, it has been my recent experience in this business that this tremendous overhead proposition we are getting into in the Department of Defense has penalized us tremendously in trying to get a job done. What I refer to is, I came from a procurement shop that had a big ceiling on the number of people we could have. There is a real law that you can't get an extra body or a pair of hands; but day in and day out requests for information generated by this tremendous staff just precludes our trying to do our mission. It would

be good if some of these Hoover Commissions on things like that would examine that facet. Even their people came in and tied me up for a whole morning. I think that part of it should be closely examined by someone.

QUESTION: The National Security Council has a lot of a high-power order of people on it. Would you tell us something of the secretariat of that council?

DR. HUNTER: I would not attempt it for I have only a general familiarity with the NSC.

CAPTAIN MOTT: We should get a lecture on that from the National War College, if we follow the same plan as last year.

DR. HUNTER: Do we have anybody here who would be glad to take that one on?

COLONEL WIRAK: I won't take it on, Louie, but Jim Lay's lecture is downstairs in the classified section of our library or in the National War College library, and it goes into that subject in great detail.

COMMENT: I am a civilian. I would like to say something. I won't defend the OSD setup. However, I think that the military could gain something from self-analysis. A lot of things that are brought up could be managed by the military itself. People look and see hostilities on every side. Although we have Joint Chiefs of Staff, we haven't had a joint strategic plan since the end of World War II. So that is an example of the cooperation among the three services.

COMMENT: I am a civilian, too. I understand that a civilian is a citizen of a State. This background is all about the organization bills that fell; not the one that passed. I think it is significant here, because of S-84 and the other one, 1226, and the various other ones of 1946. President Eisenhower and a number of other people worked on the original ones, because they constituted measures of establishing a military unified career staff and a coordinated general staff concept for the Armed Forces. The compromise bill that was finally put through, I think, was the Eberhardt--orEberstadt--compromise bill, which was the one which called for a small centralized control under the civilian secretariat. It would prohibit appointing just exactly what is a strong centralized control or differently uniformed civilians.

QUESTION: Louie, I wonder if you would comment on the Defense Production Act of 1950? That had certain organization in it that modified the 1949 Act after the Korean business.

DR. HUNTER: I am not sure what you have in mind--would you tell us more about it?

STUDENT: I am curious in my own mind. I am not sure.

DR. HUNTER: I am sorry but I can't help you.

COMMENT: I might be able to contribute a little to it. The Defense Production Act of 1950 gave the President the authority to set up certain organization and carry out the purpose of the act. For instance, he gave to the Secretary of Commerce the authority to regulate or issue certain orders with respect to transportation. As a result of that, the Secretary of Commerce established the Defense Air Transportation Administration and set up what he calls the National Shipping Authority. Also, an Executive order gave to one of the ICC Commissioners certain control over some land transportation and he in turn, the Commissioner, set up a Defense Transport Administration.

In Interior they established the Petroleum Administration for Defense. There might have been some others. I am not sure about the Business and Defense Supply Organization in Commerce, but the act itself gave the President certain emergency powers, and he in turn authorized the Director of ODM to do certain things, and those in turn were redelegated to these executive agencies at the time.

In that way we got a host of semimobilization agencies. DTA went out of existence June 30, but the functions are still in the hands of Commissioner Clarke, and he has set up within the ICC what he calls a Mobilization Planning Organization. PAD went out of existence a few months ago. There could have been others that came out as a result of the act.

DR. HUNTER: Mobilization functions, you will find, as well as mobilization planning, increasingly have been placed in the existing structure of the old-line agencies.

CAPTAIN MOTT: I think we have run out of time. I would say, Louie, you have certainly sparked a lot of questions. I think myself we have talked up a very interesting discussion. I don't think it is necessary for anybody to apologize about where he comes from. This is one great big school. We are all here for the purpose of learning. We want to thank also those who contributed to the discussion. Thank you, Louie.

DR. HUNTER: Thank you.

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