MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

19 September 1955

CONTENTS

Page

INTRODUCTION--Dr. M. S. Reichley, Director of Instruction, ICAF 1

SPEAKER--Mr. Henry A. DuFlon, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Personnel .. 1

GENERAL DISCUSSION 19

Publication No. L56-25

INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

Washington, D. C.

Mr. Henry DuFlon, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Personnel, a resident of New Canaan, Connecticut, received his education at Berkshire Preparatory School, Princeton University and Harvard University, School of Business Administration. He entered the Army as a private in 1941, was promoted through the ranks and graduated from Officers Candidate School in 1942. During 1944-46, Mr. DuFlon served in Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, Washington, D. C., as Chief of the Domestic Assignment Branch, Chief of the Liaison Personnel Branch, Assistant Adjutant General, Army Ground Forces, and was released from active duty as a major in 1946. Following his release from active duty, Mr. DuFlon became associated with the Bigelow-Sanford Carpet Company as Assistant Manpower Manager, 1946-48; and Assistant to the President of that firm, 1948-52, specializing in organizational planning, control, communications, public relations and foreign operations. During the period 1952-July 1953, Mr. DuFlon was a management consultant in the fields of organization and personnel. As such, he was engaged in projects in Europe and South America. Prior to his present assignment, Mr. DuFlon was Special Assistant to the President's Advisor on Personnel Management at the White House. In this capacity, he specialized in legislation and programs for overseas personnel, and many other phases of personnel practices in Government. He also worked with the Secretary of State's Public Committee on Personnel, as well as with other advisory groups on manpower and personnel problems. Mr. DuFlon was appointed to his present position on 1 February 1955. This is his first lecture at the Industrial College.

MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

19 September 1955

DR. REICHLEY: Secretary Berry, Admiral Deutermann, General Niblo, gentlemen: Our subject this morning is "Military Manpower Requirements."

In any study of manpower and its relationship to national security it is mandatory that you know, first, what are your requirements; and, second, what are your plans to do something about these requirements. It is a complicated subject, containing not only the military aspects, but also economic, social, political, and legislative facets.

To discuss this subject with us today we are privileged to hear a man well qualified in the manpower area. In addition to his experience in business, and as a member of the President's White House staff, I know personally that he is most interested in and dedicated to his present assignment as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Personnel.

In addition, he has already been of valuable service to the Industrial College when last spring he served as a member of our evaluation panel on our final problem.

It gives me a great deal of pleasure to welcome Mr. DuFlon to address this audience.

MR. DuFLON: I think there are two types of persons who address a group like this. First of all, there is the expert, who is fully qualified and is respected for those qualifications. Then there is the second type--and I include myself in that group--whom you might call the "impert"--one who has the impertinence to get up and go through this exercise in front of you. Those are not futile words, because I did not join the Department of Defense until February of this year. So when I get on the topic of military requirements--and I hope to stick more or less to the topic assigned--I hope you will bear with me.

I don't have to repeat the question any time this morning as to whether there is a doctor in the house. Fortunately, there are two of them--Dr. Frank Berry, who is the Assistant Secretary of Defense for

Health and Medical, who came over here to keep me honest; and Dr. Fitzpatrick, of your own advisory group, who is here to straighten me out on all questions relative to the manpower pool, selective service draft, and, I am sure, many other aspects.

Colonel George Roll is here with us. Colonel Roll is the Executive Officer of the Office of Manpower Requirements in the Department of Defense. He is not only going to handle all the hot, curved balls that come in the question period this morning, but also is going to conduct a seminar here later in the week on this and related topics. Colonel Roll previously was commanding officer of the Ninth Marines in the Far East, and he is pleading for reassignment already.

The title of the discussion today is "Military Manpower Requirements." I would like to start off by saying that in determining military strength, many factors operate to affect the availability of and the allocation of resources to the military, as you know. In addition to the military factors, there are political, economic, social, psychological, and other considerations which affect decisions as to the size of the Armed Forces.

It is true, of course, that military planners can and must figure requirements for certain eventualities in time of, let us say, cold war, limited war, and general war. But the manpower programs on which we work on a day-to-day basis are determined more by the size of the military budget than by any other single thing. Hence, I think I can say that the term "requirements" in that sense is a bit of a misnomer. What we are really doing primarily, is allocating within a budget that is allotted us.

Military manpower policy is based on the total amount of resources, both material and human, that the public and the Administration are willing to devote to security. Alterations in public mood are reflected in the actions of Congress with respect to the size of the military budget and the size of the Armed Forces. The amount of money available for the pay and maintenance of troops depends in turn not only on the total defense budget, but also on the apportionment of funds between manpower, materiel, and research and development. This is an oversimplification, of course.

Within the amount allocated for manpower a balance is necessary between forces in being, support of the Reserves, and use of civilians and military. Keeping these general comments in mind, let me describe our own functions in the Office of the Secretary of Defense by outlining the development of a given year's military manpower program.

The steps followed may be thought of really as a cycle. We go through certain procedures which are more or less repeated in succeeding fiscal years.

I should warn you that this cycle is not a very clear-cut thing. It is a complex and never-ending process. The military departments in the Office of the Secretary of Defense often work simultaneously on two or more steps of the process in the development of plans. The reason, of course, is obvious. A decision of national import, which may change the manpower requirements picture for the immediate future, can happen at any time or place in the operating or planning cycle. So we don't have any control as to when these factors go to work on what it is that we are planning, either immediately or for the future.

However, I am not sure that this is bad. I went into a little store about a year ago to get an educational toy for my oldest girl. The clerk came out with something that was replete with gimmicks and gadgets. I looked at it for a minute and said: "This is a very fine toy, but don't you think it is a little complicated for a seven-year-old girl?" The clerk said: "Oh no. This is what we call an educational toy. It teaches the child to adjust to the facts of life. No matter how she tries to put the thing together, it won't work." That is the position we are in, in military requirements planning. We don't even listen to people who tell us about the imperfection of our techniques.

The actions to be accomplished in developing a manpower program are as follows: Step one is the formulation and publication of guidelines for manpower programs. The Secretary of Defense and the Assistant Secretary for Manpower and Personnel issue these. They are the basis for the services' manpower programs. They go out in the form of two different types of documents. To some extent the guidance is exact, and to some extent it is flexible. The preparation of these guidelines starts roughly eighteen months before the start of the fiscal year in which the manpower program is to be executed.

The principal sources of information in preparing these guidelines are the National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, other assistant secretaries of defense, service recommendations, Congress, and so on.

To take those up more or less in order, the National Security Council offers guidance on military requirements which is very broad

in scope; but is of major impact. I suppose the largest single determinant they make is the size of the defense budget that the economy can stand. Granted, this is not what Congress thinks; but it is nonetheless the tying together of the best thoughts in that area within the executive branch. Here, truly you are tying in all factors--political, social, economic, and psychological, and perhaps other areas in the Department of Defense that we don't consider.

An example of National Security Council guidance might be the decision to utilize indigenous personnel to the maximum possible. That decision is an economic one basically, on the assumption that this will be a much cheaper method to carry out a mission the size of that which we have been assigned. It could be a political one--to keep the money that is paid to these indigenous personnel flowing into the coffers of our allies.

There are many other aspects, as you know. While you save money in not sending dependents overseas, you also save by reducing the size of the evacuation problem. You perhaps raise a morale problem. But, nonetheless, the Council will make a policy guidance statement, and that is where we start.

Another example of National Security Council guidance would be the relative share of each military service, which leads to the treatment of the manpower pool. That gets into the whole matter of equity and is the procedure which we follow based on the assumption that everyone will serve, through selective service, universal service, and the other procedures which stem from it.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff in turn offer, of course, primarily military advice. In a recent article they tried to stress the importance of the fact that military advice is not all they offer, because eventually they are constantly being dragged into the other determinations.

For purposes of military requirements planning, the Joint Chiefs recommended the major combat forces. In the Army this means divisions, antiaircraft battalions, regiments, and combat teams. In the Navy it means combat ships and air groups. In the Air Force it is air wings. In the Marines it is divisions and air wings. These major combat forces are to a large degree the basis on which the total force structure is built. They largely determine our overall manpower requirements.

At that point let me say that perhaps this is a good item that should be studied by the Industrial College. That is, the sufficiency of predicating your whole military requirements planning on the keystone of the major combat forces, can, I think, be debated back and forth.

Next we come to the guidance provided by the Secretary of Defense. I won't labor that. In the course of a year, of course, there are many written and oral decisions that affect current and future programs.

An example of that might be the decision on ROTC. You remember, at the outbreak of Korea there was fear that some students who were deferred for that reason--for ROTC--were in effect getting deferment from service. So there followed a Secretary of Defense decision that all ROTC graduates would serve roughly what they would have served had they been drafted. The effect was that they went into the Armed Forces whether the Armed Forces needed then or not. Such a decision obviously has a lot of bearing on the military manpower requirements picture, and is typical of the type of situation where, once a decision is made, you have to review all your plans and see how it affects them.

In the other assistant secretary of defense areas, we have worked constantly, of course, in the matter of housing and reserve facilities with the Assistant Secretary for Property and Installations; on pay and costs with the Comptroller; on the employment of scientists with Research and Development; and on health and the relative ratio of doctors and dentists, for example, with Health and Medical. Here is where things that relate to people and money are coordinated and tied to the schedule.

At this point in these listings of the steps that we take, my talk may get a little too paragraphed. I assure you I won't keep on forever doing this. It reminds me of the fellow who was giving an inspirational lecture at a reunion. He was talking about the virtues of Yale, and he said: "Y is for youth, A for ability, L for loyalty, and E for enterprise." As he was making his point on each of those letters, some fellow in the back of the room said: "Thank goodness he didn't go to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology."

The Bureau of the Budget is another source of guidance, and probably one that has greater emotional impact than any other. I happen to be one who does not feel that comptrollers are undisciplined members of the Government. However, there are certain arbitrary decisions that they make which affect our military requirements planning.

The Comptrollers have had for some time an unwritten law that no more than 50 percent of enlisted personnel can be in the upper pay group. That obviously is a dollar control unrelated to any personnel needs. And while we may go over there and battle for our program, that rule exists and has not been licked. I am not saying that it should be. It at least has an influence on our guidelines.

Then we get recommendations from the services. These are so continuous that I don't claim any uniqueness for them. The informal liaison which goes on while the guidelines are being prepared is usually enough to give us the service viewpoints. In the innumerable manpower and personnel problems that confront the secretaries of the services, getting the decisions and the solutions is no different from getting policy decisions from any other source in the Government that has to be counted in.

Congress, finally, provides guidelines in the sense of laws enacted and even in the reports of committees. Granted that reports of committees aren't going to be followed unless they are feasible and acceptable, and that we may not always be in agreement with them, we certainly must be responsive to committee reports.

I have been drawn very much into that in the last few weeks in that by the process of bumping in reverse, or whatever you want to call it, I find myself extending felicitations of assurance for the Department of Defense in inquiries on the Hill. The point was made there that the public mood would be brought into play in committee hearings, and so we had better pay very careful attention to the recommendations of committees and utilize them before legislation was introduced. I think in this particular case they were overstating a little, the job that we should do. Obviously we will oppose any legislation that we do not think is acceptable, whether or not it is in a committee report; but continually I find that congressional committees expect some sort of reaction to their reports, whether or not they end up in law.

Congress has had a lot to say on a variety of subjects--the maximum number of personnel in operating forces, civilians in place of military to the maximum amount, the problem of dual staffing, attaché work, unification, etc. Certainly the many trips that Congressmen take abroad get them into increasing areas of military concern because of the geographical spread of our forces.

We have been talking about guidelines sent out by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Let us talk now about the next step, which is program preparation by each service.

Preparation follows receipt of the guidelines in July of the fiscal year. The services prepare their programs over the summer months. Remember, the forces in the Joint Chiefs of Staff plan were only on the major force level, using major combat forces. It is now the function of each service to arrive at the quantities and types of a multitude of units, involving area support, training, pipelines, etc. Up to this time in the cycle these have not received consideration at a higher level.

Service programs take into account such things as training bases, operating locations, shipping rates, supplies of all kinds, and raw manpower versus trained manpower. They contain everything that is considered necessary to carry out the assigned tasks of the services. The services do not, of course, wait for us to send them our guidelines. This major planning in every service is a continuing function. However, from the standpoint of meeting the final deadline on the budget, it is at this point that their continual planning gears into our program development.

The services submit their programs to the Office of the Secretary of Defense in the early fall. I state that in very general terms, because this wrestling match goes on all through the year. The data are submitted on a prescribed format.

Now, step three is the program review in the Office of the Secretary of Defense on receipt of the service programs. These programs are given a thorough analysis. The major points to be determined are compliance with the guidelines, adherence to end-strength, beginning-strength, feasibility--that type of thing. Feasibility is one of the major inquiries, and differs all the way from talking about an annual program, to formulating a mobilization plan.

For example, a mobilization plan might call for an estimate on the number of women in uniform that could be used by each service. One of the recent studies indicated that a million and a half women would be required by the services in the event of a full mobilization. We will take a look at that figure as it comes in, realizing that in the last war, World War II, we had roughly a quarter of a million women in the services. The estimates of the experts indicate that we could get in maybe half a million this time. So what is the feasibility of writing into your mobilization plan a million and a half?

Well, maybe the good feature of that coming up for a feasibility test is that if it is truly an expressed requirement desire, it may be that something can be done about it between now and when such a need exists.

However, to get back to our annual review of the program based on the fiscal year rather than mobilization planning, talking of the feasibility test, it is at that point that we ask such questions as: "Will the reenlistment rate there predicted be achieved?"

Now, a lot of this type of questioning results from an analysis of former budget requests and the actual results. Reenlistment rates are normally overestimated. There could be a variety of reasons for that. One reason certainly historically has been that you can get more money in the budget that way. You are dealing with a bonus situation and you usually come up with an overestimated enlistment rate.

If you don't exceed the reenlistment rate that is predicted, you probably have to drain people from the operating forces to build up the training establishment. So you have a relationship there in the composition of forces that might have a bearing. There might be perhaps eight different considerations all wrapped up in the prediction of the enlistment or reenlistment rate.

Another thing to consider will be the qualifications for the promotion of people, the estimated number of promotions, and the money needed therefor. It is true that you could have a limit on promotions, let us say, based on dollars received. But if you are going to let an economic issue enter into your personnel planning, perhaps you had better review your plan not only from the standpoint of dollars required, but also from the standpoint of the qualifications of the personnel that the services could get if they were able to go ahead and had the money.

Another analysis point in the Office of the Secretary of Defense is the identification of any excess strength. I won't get into that. That is largely a unit type review of utilization.

Then we have the whole question of the most desirable distribution of personnel. That involves such problems as, What comparisons are valid? How can you compare the Navy and the Air Force and not come up with an oranges-and-apples situation?

There are a couple of approaches that are used. If it were not for the fact that you are dealing here with a tremendous number of people, and so you are expected to use a broad tool, you could say that this is a little too broad to be of specific use. But one approach is roughly this: You can compare each service with itself on a time basis. What did it previously have in areas isolated for attention?

The second major approach is to study the relative composition of forces. That is, you study the numbers of personnel in operating forces or combat-type forces versus support, training, transients, prisoners, and patients.

The next step is to send the recommendation from the Manpower and Personnel shop to the Secretary of Defense. When it is approved, it becomes the basis for the defense budget relative to manpower.

When approved by the Secretary of Defense, it goes back to the services and enters the Comptroller's processing schedule. Here too is where emotion enters in.

We are sometimes on the emotional end of this. I was talking to Assistant Secretary McNeil the other day, and I told him we were coming over there to conduct a discussion of military manpower requirements. He said: "If you oppose anything, I will be glad to join you." So he rather enjoys the role he plays, I guess.

After it leaves the Department of Defense, the Budget Bureau conducts a review. Of course manpower is reviewed along with all the other elements of the military program. Here is where the Comptroller's staff, OSD, and the services work very closely with the Bureau of the Budget staff.

When complete, the military budget, of course, becomes part of the executive branch or national budget, and the President presents it to the Congress.

The next step is action by the Congress. Manpower and the other elements are reviewed by the appropriation committees. All the elements are so interwoven in this review that a change in any one pretty much changes the others. Normally the appropriation committees will have accomplished their work by the end of June. Mind you, we are now at the beginning of the fiscal year for which we are doing all this planning. In fact, we may be into it.

We now go into the postappropriation or postbudget review on the basis of the funds actually made available to us. The services submit revised programs, which they now call the operating programs. These incorporate the changes made necessary by changes in policy since the original submission, whatever the source, and changes necessitated by action in the Bureau of the Budget and the Congress.

Here is where a lot of the plans that were originally put into the program are taken out. I was talking to a fellow from the British embassy, one of the military attaches, the other day; and he said he has a box to go along with the "In" box and the "Out" box and the "Hold" box, that he calls the "OBE box." It means "overtaken by events." There is an awful lot of OBE material taken out of the original program at this point.

The operating program, as each service has now revised it on the basis of what the Congress has given it in the way of money, is now reviewed again by Manpower and Personnel in the Secretary of Defense's Office; and then sent on to the Secretary of Defense.

Finally it is approved and returned to the services for implementation. Of course, whether or not the services at this point recognize what they were after basically is questionable.

This company I used to be with had a vice president for sales, Sumner Robinson. One of the regional sales managers asked him one day if he would mind writing a personal letter to one of the old salesmen, who had been with the company for years, who had once been a producer and was still above average in producing, but whose expense accounts were getting pretty much out of hand. So Robbie sat down and penned a letter pointing out that, while the fellow's performance had been fine, it would be necessary for him to get his expense accounts a little more into line with everyone else's, or some sort of disciplinary action would be taken. Robbie came in to work about a week later and found on top of his desk the letter he had written to this fellow, with a little note on top of it reading: "Dear Robbie, look what some SOB sent me and signed your name to." If you find anyone who says he is not responsible for what is in the program now, believe him, because he is not.

The only remaining steps in the development of the program cycle are, of course, the followup and the continuing audit and the submission of reports that occur on a continuing basis.

In the past the constant changes that have typified program development have been reflections of the uncertainty of the executive branch decisions and legislative support of military plans. Earlier I suggested that military manpower policy is determined by the size of the budget more than any other single factor. The size of the military budget in turn is determined by the national mood as evidenced through congressional action.

The American public historically has indicated an unwillingness to support large military forces in times of peace or hopes for peace. This has led to extreme swings in the size of the military budget; and here are the payoffs from the standpoint of continuous requirements planning.

I think the perfect example of that is the Selective Service Act of 1940. As you may remember, that act called for twelve months of service, and then any individual who was drafted under that act could be released from service. It was touch and go in the summer of 1941 whether or not an amendment to that act would be passed that would permit the military to retain people who had come through the draft. I don't remember specifically, but I think the thing passed by one vote.

Another example of the "all-or-nothing" approach was the overwhelming insistence of the American public after VJ-Day to demobilize the forces. A few years' statistics on military strength in selected periods will show these extreme swings. I will just give you the totals here instead of the breakdown on the Army, Navy, and so on.

The average strength in 1915 was 173,000. The World War I peak was 4,265,000. The average strength in 1935 was 244,000. The World War II peak was 12,178,000. June, 1950, pre-Korea, 1,458,000; June, 1951, one year after Korea, 3,186,000; June, 1953, roughly 3,500,000.

After Korea, with a known enemy, of somewhat known strength and intent, the prospects of greater stability in requirements planning were better than they had been before. Requirements planning was based on different assumptions, of course--of cold war, limited war, and general war--and time-phased by the use of a date of maximum danger concept. This was an improvement policy-wise, but it had drawbacks. The dates of maximum danger changes as conditions change.

Speaking, as I am, to the Industrial College group, I am sure that you can think of many other disadvantages of the date of maximum danger concept. One lies in the fact that you have to get the materiel ready by a given date; and after you have gotten everything ready by that date, obsolescence sets in immediately, whether or not you have even started to use it. Your industrial base in turn is geared to turning out materiel at a given rate from some stockpile. But we had better not get into an area where I have no knowledge.

I think, other than the drawback in the date of maximum danger concept, and how it changes with the frequency of revisions of that danger date, another one is that the planning did not relate closely enough to the public mood and hence lacked congressional support.

Now, I have heard the argument: "Well, we are not trying to please the Congress. We are not trying to be responsive to their mood. We are trying to give what we consider to be the military requirements." It is like the mother who was listening to her little boy say his prayers in a low voice at the bed one night. She said: "I can't hear you. Speak up." The little fellow said, "I wasn't talking to you." I think it is true that we are not talking to the Congress, that we are not trying to please the Congress; we are merely writing military requirements. But, as I touched on before here, the size of the military budget is finally determined as a congressional decision, which is based exactly on that congressional mood.

Greater coordination of all the factors involved in requirements planning has finally been achieved through the National Security Council and through congressional acceptance of the concept of a level of force. If we can hold, as intended, a level of force concept, the year-to-year job of requirements planning, of course, will be greatly facilitated. And because it is so important to us, I would like to say a few words about the level of force concept and some of its implications relative to stability of force, for if the level of force concept results in greater stability of force--and it should--our requirements problems will be still fewer.

The level of force concept, as you know, calls for a foce level of 2,850,000 troops at the end of the fiscal year 1956. The President, Admiral Radford, Mr. Wilson, and others have called this level the strength that we must maintain for a decade in the foreseeable future. It may be for ten years, or it may be fifty years. Those are excerpts from statements.

We first reach the level of force on 30 June 1956. It is based on a plan, of course, to supply a reasonable force to fill immediate military needs, supportable within a sound economy, and backed up by a truly ready Reserve of 2,900,000.

I think of importance to the executive branch is the fact that this concept also has the prior approval of Congress. When you look at these other programs, where, as I have pointed out, the plans were related to what we needed and not to what Congress was going to give us, you can see that any agreement on a level of force that Congress will subscribe to is obviously going to bring great stability into military planning.

The level of force concept really assumes a proper balance of the four services within the overall strength. And that breaks down this way: Army 1,025,000, Navy 657,000, Marine Corps 193,000, and Air Force 975,000.

I think we could start arguing those totals right now. Take, for example, the Marine Corps, 193,000. As of now, the Marine Corps has been given authority to keep their personnel strength at the present level, although if you use the entire amount in the congressional appropriation, it would mean an increase in the Marine Corps. This, needless to say, has been debated. Here we are aiming at the end of June for a level of force; and in this instance, for example, the numbers involved are being argued already.

In the Navy last week, in talking about the Navy draft, the matters of desirable Navy strength, the level of force concept, and whether the Navy should allow itself to fall below that strength in order to remain a volunteer service, came up for a great deal of discussion. So even within the military there is a lot of pulling and tugging as to whether or not you can as a practical matter keep the level of force concept and whether you want to.

The President stated that any further material reductions are dependent upon an improvement in the world situation. Secretary Wilson has said: "Nor do I see any need for any important increases short of war." So certainly we would appear to be now at a level of force.

The level of force concept is a departure, of course, from this previous mobilization plan assumption of a date of greatest danger.

It recognizes theoretically the reduction in reaction time which modern weapons in a possible future war might bring into the picture. This too is a very controversial area.

If the level of force is considerably above what might be called that necessary in peace, I think myself that one of the big confusions that we get into in arguing various aspects of military requirements is the mistaken thought that our current level of military strength is really a peace level. For example, I heard discussion in the Navy draft debate that the Navy had never gone to the draft in times of peace and deploring the fact that they are doing it now. Well, is this peace in the historical sense? I don't think it is. If, for example, your planning is based on peace, and we say that we now have a partial mobilization, then we have all the way between Korea and what we have now, which numerically in the Armed Forces is not very great.

I think the level of force concept recognizes the responsibility of World leadership which goes with the group security pacts which we have negotiated since World War II, in which really the U. S. is probably the only common denominator.

It aims at stability of force, which the President has stressed by saying that lack of reasonable stability of force is the most wasteful and expensive practice in military activity.

I realize I am getting fairly close to my allotted time here. But let me, if I may, continue on stability of force for a moment.

Stability of force is something that we get into in various aspects. It has multiple meanings--stability of the total force, stability of the people within the force, and stability of the people at geographic locations. Then there are all the areas of stability of organization.

Taking the first one, stability of the total force, this pretty much underlies the level of force concept. It is an attempt to avoid the peaks and valleys and the feasts and famines of previous years. I think it is significant that in no two previous years have we ever had the same military budget.

As to stability of the people who compose that force, I think we all recognize that the turnover of enlisted and officer personnel is too high. The reenlistment rates have been going down, historically; I don't mean within the last few months. For example, the Department

of Defense total all-service reenlistment rate of eligibles in the fiscal year 1955 was 26.9 percent. The reenlistment rate of eligibles the year before was 23.7 percent. Now, those correspond to the average reenlistment rate in 1951-53 of 54.6 percent, and in 1950 of 59.3 percent.

Stability of the people who compose the force, of course, is also all tied up with career incentives and career incentive legislation. I don't intend to get into that today, except to mention two of the efforts last year--the reenlistment bonus and the Career Incentive Act.

In the coming session of Congress a few of the items will be medical care for dependents, survivor benefits, equalization, and housing--they have already passed that--and medical and dental officer career incentives. We hope that we can eventually get along without the doctor draft. Also there is regular officer augmentation. The term "augmentation" is a little confusing. It is a term selected as a word that does not conflict with "integration" and its meanings.

As you may know, in the Navy and the Marine Corps roughly 50 percent of the total officers on duty are regular officers. Specifically, it is 48 percent in the Navy and 46 percent in the Marine Corps. In the Army it is only 26 percent, and in the Air Force a little under 17 percent.

If we are talking about stability of people who compose the force, we have, for example, in the Air Force more that 80 percent of the officers who are not on the career ladder. In that sense, obviously, they are contributing to the instability potential of that force.

There is a bill going up which will authorize the transfer of Reservists into the Regular Establishment in the Air Force and Army.

Then from the standpoint of stability of the people who comprise the force, you get into the whole area of enlistment versus the draft, and the time period in which you have a man to do a job with. The Air Force, of course, offers only a four-year enlistment. The Navy until last week was in the same position. The Navy didn't cut to three years, because they felt that if they started a competition between their three-year enlistments and their four-year enlistments, they would never get back to four. They had had many studies that indicated that the true payoff on enlisted personnel and petty officers is in the fourth year and the end of the third year. They went to Selective Service as a temporary solution of their problem.

The Marine Corps accepts three-year enlistments. But it has set recruiting quotas at its recruiting stations of 75 percent four-year enlistments and 25 percent three-year. So they have an administrative control over that.

The Army is required by law to accept three-year enlistments, but they play that down pretty much. As a result they have gotten quite a response in their three-year enlistments. They got 87 thousand three-year enlistments in fiscal year 1954, for example, as against only 1,700 in the previous year.

There is a great deal of material indicating how efficient the long-term volunteer is as against the trainee that you can get through the draft. Obviously there is a lot of cost in training travel at the lower-skill level. There are many things involved that I don't think we have to go into. But we have quite a struggle here in stability of force to maintain a force of the size of roughly three million--2,850,000--and keep our voluntary enlistment for the period that we think it should be because we get the best men that way.

From stability of the people within this force you get into the matter of quality and qualitative distribution. Certainly you are going to have quite a lot of turnover where you have mental grade fours, because in general the military will not reenlist mental grade fours. That can be a debatable point.

The question of quality enters into not only reenlistment, but also into enlistment. I would like to get into that a little later if we have time, because up to now we have been discussing our requirements based only on numbers of people. That certainly is an answer to program development based on numbers of dollars and not on quality but from our standpoint it is very much a matter of concern, and certainly it is in the services.

Stability of the people at specific geographical points is another concern that we hope the level of force concept will do something about. As you know, in favorable areas it is hoped to be three years. Climate, living conditions, and facilities for dependents operate to shorten these tours in some locations. The objective, of course, is to make improvements in the conditions that now shorten such tours. Schooling must be associated with additional duty too. There are problems such as declassifying Hawaii as overseas duty, and increasing the tour of duty from two to three years, with savings in personnel.

However, we are getting here into an area that I am sure we will all hear a lot more about, due to the Hoover recommendations. I am sitting on a group, for example, in the Department of Defense that is trying to get up the Defense response to the special personnel problems in the Department of Defense report. As you know, Secretary Wilson has designated Mr. Charles Coolidge as his special assistant to implement those Hoover recommendations that are acceptable. We are having many meetings on the long-term program; and we are going through the recommendations to try to come up with some solutions that will be to the benefit of the national defense effort.

I know certainly that in the technical area support the emphasis is pretty largely on keeping a man who knows a difficult technical job on the job longer than he has been kept on it in the past, because of the rotation policy or for other reasons. There may be something in that. The rotation base is certainly a big element in trying to figure out what to do. However, I think one element that has been overlooked perhaps a little bit is the fact that, generalizing now, you go on a job. You spend a good part of your first year perhaps learning the job. Then maybe the second year you contribute whatever originality you have to offer to whatever the function is. Then from there on you are sort of administering your own program.

I have often thought--and I am giving you a purely personal opinion--that one big advantage of military assignments and the frequency with which you rotate is the fact that you do bring a battery of new ideas to every job to which you are assigned. The tendency of the Hoover recommendations, congressional criticisms, and recommendations from other sources is entirely the other way.

The rotation base is fundamental, of course, to the stability of the people in specific geographical areas. The objective, I take it from reading enough of these studies and listening to enough people talk, is to have ideally two billets in the United States for every one billet overseas. The current employment of people outside the United States is: Army 42 percent, Navy 63 percent--that includes afloat and mobile as well as personnel on shore bases--Marine Corps 21 percent, and Air Force 29 percent. The Army and Navy have the most unfavorable rotation base, of course. Maybe that is one of the reasons for the Navy's low reenlistment experience.

We have to consider with this stability of people at specific points, of course, the impact of the civilian personnel policy, which is really considerable, starting with not only Congress but the Hoover Commission and other groups, for the substitution of military by civilians

wherever possible; and what we call in requirements the effect of "double whamming," of which you may be better aware than I. That is where you substitute a civilian for a man in uniform. Then someone gets alarmed over the effect of our increased use of civilians on the civilian economy. So we get a dollar cut in that, giving us unintentionally a double whamming.

Then there is the impact of the indigenous personnel policy, in which it has been decided as a policy that they will be used to the greatest extent possible.

Stability of force in rotation also gets into abuses in the transfer process. General and flag officers seem to have the greatest rate of change. Some of this is concerned, of course, with retirement--rotation out of a job into retirement.

The permanent change of station funds are a continuing target of the Comptroller, the Bureau of the Budget, and Congress. Every time we go up to argue an appropriation, or even some incidental aspect of a bill on military requirements, we can be pretty sure that we will run into something on the attaché problem and the permanent change of station funds.

The magnitude of the problem on transfers can be indicated by saying that about 9 percent of our personnel are actually in a transient, patient, or prisoner status all the time. That 9 percent is taken from Marine Corps figures. Other services have gotten it down to 1-1/2 percent, but that is largely an accounting device. Actually the people are moving, whether you pick them up on the books or not, in that they are in the pipeline and supported by large funds for a tremendous number of people.

We also have the stability on organization that we hope is coming from the level of force concept. There one example, I suppose, that is being watched with interest is the Army gyroscope operations. There will be another aspect of stability of organization, of course, concerning, not units, but such a thing as the Department of Defense and its staffing and the services and their staffing at the top level.

Stability in expenditures is something that the Comptroller always wants to throw in. I think we should let him. Certainly the more we open and close and reopen stations and posts, and the more we hire and fire and rehire personnel, the more we let contracts and change them shortly thereafter at an expense, and so on, the less stability of organizational expenditures we will have.

I don't want to continue beyond this point. I see that in following my meandering notes I have gotten beyond the period in which I was supposed to speak. I was going to get a little bit more into quality in my discussion, but perhaps we can get into that in the discussion period.

COLONEL BARRETT: Gentlemen, Mr. DuFlon is ready for your questions.

QUESTION: Is it a fact, sir, that the Navy has to go out and draft fifty thousand men because the Bureau of the Budget and the planners say that we have to have that many men whether we want them or not? As far as I know, the Navy has never had to draft personnel; and now all of a sudden we are told that we have to do it. Now, why?

MR. DuFLON: You don't mean the Navy has never done that in time of war?

QUESTION: I don't think we did.

MR. DuFLON: Yes, you did. So the first point I would make is that I am not sure that we are really in time of peace now, which is the point I made a little earlier.

I sat through all the levels of discussion, I think, on the Navy draft; and the decision was opposed by no one. It was a decision arrived at by the military in the Navy, and supported above. It was based on the belief that the force level that had been assigned the Navy was a sound one, and that if you let the numbers of people fall below the strength that was expected, you would be taking an unwarranted risk in the effectiveness of the Navy to meet its share of the total defense.

I am not sure whether I am answering your question. Let us put it this way: There were various things that could be done. For example, there was great concern lest going to the draft should have an adverse morale effect. You are going to get another answer more authoritative than mine. There was quite a lot of concern about the adverse morale effect of going to the draft in the Navy. How much would you lose in esprit de corps by the fact that you could no longer say you were a volunteer service? To what degree would going to the draft lessen your ability to get four-year enlistments, because if a

man wants the Navy and can get it for two years, why go to four? May the Navy be not improving its recruiting, but going in the opposite direction? There were other arguments of this sort.

Now, on this point that you made--that it was the first time the Navy had gone to the draft in time of peace; that it always has been a volunteer serivce--I think there is some question as to whether or not we are in peace in the historical sense. I think there is some question as to how volunteer the service is in its current form. You may have read the Saturday Evening Post article written by an ex-Navy man, in which the term "shotgun volunteers" is used for the large number of Navy volunteers received at the time of Korea, who went into the Navy certainly on a volunteer basis, but at that time as against the possibility of being drafted into the Army.

It really comes down to this: Suppose you guess wrong on what some elements in the Navy would like to do and say: "It is true that the enlistments and reenlistments are not what they should be. Let's put it on a projection basis of 50 thousand for the whole. Can't we do something to kind of redouble our recruiting efforts? Can't we do something to tide us over?"

Well, a lot of study was given to that, and the thought was, it might work; but if it didn't work, you would pyramid your problem, plus the fact that you would in the interim be below the strength level that the plans were drawn up to meet. So it was a military decision that you couldn't afford to risk getting below your assigned strength.

QUESTION: Were those plans so important?

MR. DuFLON: They were passed and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council, and I don't know who can argue with them.

I think Dr. Fitzpatrick would like to say something on that.

DR. EDWARD A. FITZPATRICK, Member, Board of Advisors, ICAF: Yes. I would like to say that in World War II the virtue of the Navy in its being a purely volunteer force was acquired by means of a substitute. What they did was, they enlisted a whole lot of personnel back particularly before the war and in the early states of the war and told them they were going to leave them where they were--in college. And they left them there way beyond the authorized strength, but ultimately they had to go to the draft anyway.

QUESTION: Mr. DuFlon, my question has to do with the stability of the level of force. I wonder just what effect the Conference at the Summit, the Geneva Conference, and the recent business that Marshal Zhukov gave out this morning on liquidating the Russian bases will have on future manpower planning.

MR. DuFLON: We have to consider that, needless to say. The President, of course, in his public statements says that only an improvement in the international situation would bring about a revision of the force levels we are now agreed upon to maintain. Whether or not these reductions in satellite forces are window dressing or whether they are sincere efforts I don't think anybody in our group, for example, knows. And I suspect that nobody really knows except the Russians.

I think that if they should prove to be sincere efforts, if somehow, let us say, the inspection plan should go through and you could determine that these are not accounting figures, that they are actually reductions of force--and even here you get into the matter of trained reserves--I think probably over a period that situation would affect that level of force concept. I don't think myself that this decision would probably come through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I think it would be more of a congressional reaction and budget control right there.

QUESTION: In general it is understood that the Joint Chiefs of Staff in evolving their Joint Strategic Plan are not basing it on one plan for all the services in a future conflict, but are basing it on separate plans for the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Do you want to comment on whether it is necessary to plan manpower on this basis?

MR. DuFLON: Well, no. We have lots of differing opinions in our group. But our job is to follow through on the plan which is represented by the major combat forces that the Joint Chiefs of Staff give us. In other words, let us say we have this basic debate as to whether the war is going to last ninety days, and if you don't win it in ninety days, you are out of it, which, to make an extreme statement, would tend toward the Air Force's view, versus the Army's, which feels that there has never been a war like that yet and never will be, and even if there were, our problem is not a general war, but partial wars, limited wars, and that that is what we must be prepared for--all that arguing goes on outside of our realm, and we work only on the single plan given us by the Joint Chiefs.

To answer your question, we don't have various plans of our own based on different assumptions. I think, from our review of the

situation, there are a number of things that we could do on that more than we are doing now perhaps. For example, the base of our whole planning program development structure is this major force determination by the Joint Chiefs. I am not sure that it could not be something else, using that, of course, but far more comprehensive. For example, as you know, the total cost of defense to the Government personnel-wise is in a package for supporting civilian-military personnel; and from that you have to support the military, 2,850,000 and 1,700,000 civilians, plus the indigenous.

Now, nowhere in the National Security Council or the Joint Chiefs of Staff are there formulated any guidelines on the levels for employment of civilians. So we are the first agency that inquires into the appropriateness, the adequacy, and so on of civilian staffing as it relates to the military. I am not sure that we do that very well, but at least we are aware of the fact that a problem exists, and we are trying to develop techniques to do more about it. But it is only in that civilian-to-military situation that we use our own guidance.

QUESTION: In connection with the Regular Establishment versus the Reserve, there are in the lower ranks a relatively small number of officers who find the service attractive, and this is pyramiding our troubles. The Career Incentive Act has had some success. Beyond that, would you comment on its effectiveness; or, if it is not as effective as you want, what you are going to do as the next step to correct this on a long-haul basis?

MR. DuFLON: To get a pyramid of the proper shape so you don't have humps and so on?

QUESTION: Yes.

MR. DuFLON: We hope that the Augmentation Bill, granted our Navy is already in the position of about 50 percent regular career strength, plus the fact that the Augmentation Bill probably is not going to involve enough numbers to affect the Navy and affect that pyramiding situation that you speak of, will have the effect, in the other services at least, of ironing out some of these World War II career humps that have developed.

I don't know whether this subject is properly defined for everyone to get into. But all the services have a disproportionate number of people who have been in about the same period of time, dating back to

the World War II service. So often, when you want to break somebody into your Regular Service, you find that it merely adds to the number of people who are all about the same rank or would be going out of the service on retirement at the same time; or some other problem comes up which merely complicates it. All that the Career Incentive Act would do would be to make the service, whatever service you are talking about, a more desirable career; but it is a question whether or not those people would afflict you further by adding to your bulge problem.

I don't know whether I am responsive at all to your question.

QUESTION: I am wondering whether the Career Incentive Act paywise has done enough to attract young people to actually request transfer to one of the regular services. I know the Navy has in the past not been able to attract them.

MR. DuFLON: I think it is a little too early to tell. I have seen arguments on both sides on that. You see, we have such a high level of prosperity and so many immediate alternatives of employment in a career outside the military that I am not sure any career incentive act by itself could immediately show a trend which would be a desirable one from the career service standpoint.

Do you want to take a crack at that, Colonel Roll?

COLONEL GEORGE A. ROLL, OSD, M&P: From the standpoint of the Navy, they have essentially the number of junior regular officers that they need. From the standpoint of the Air Force and Army, they don't have authorization in terms of finite numbers for additional regular officers. They need additional legal authority to get them out of their deficiency in regular officers.

Then, as far as the legislative results are concerned, another program on the survivor benefit business will eliminate the inequities that exist now in favor of the reserve officer, whose dependents and survivors get far more benefits than regular officers' dependents. That is an additional part of next year's legislative program which is aimed at correcting some of these deficiencies.

So, totaling them together, we think we will be able definitely to get all of the junior regular officers that are needed.

QUESTION: What is the Department of Defense's attitude with regard to universal military training, which would seem to solve so many of our problems?

MR. DuFLON: I would say that General Hershey, who is going to be part of your program, has stood for the draft by all the services, for two reasons: Maybe I am not thinking of enough reasons. One is the fact that it is involved in equity, both to the service and to the individual. Secondly, it would cut out an awful lot of costly recruiting and repeated recruiting on the part of the services.

I think that the services' position, and the Department of Defense's position, our position, has always been that matters of equity, simple procurement, and so on must be balanced against the economy and efficiency of getting the job done. We were talking earlier here about high levels and proficiency on long-term enlisted men versus drafted. I don't think that at the force level that we are talking about now we would ever think of universal military training as being the answer to our problem.

Certainly the military commanders are very conscious of the fact that they are expected to do normally a bigger job with fewer people and less money. But if they come up and say, for example, to you: "Look at all the mental grade fours you gave me," you can argue that they should have some mental grade fours perhaps. But the other argument is that it prevents them from getting the job done.

I think if you went to some elements of central procurement, universal training would certainly decrease the cost in one way. And on the equity situation it would perhaps be a little more explainable. But I think it is going to have to be a balance between the two.

QUESTION: My question has to do with quality. At the present time the services in their procurement of enlisted men are shackled by a requirement of taking people on a qualitative distribution basis. In other words, they get a very small percentage in the higher mental categories, such as category 1, and a fairly large percentage, about 27 percent in Category 4. As a result, all the services in building up their combat forces and so forth are asking the individual not only to do more, but to be more capable. The men are asked to stay there longer and give out more. And yet there is this requirement on the grade fours. Would you care to comment on whether or not the Department of Defense is taking any action to either break this bottleneck or to amend the requirement?

MR. DuFLON: I am right now in the middle of a problem of the same type--trying to avoid that. In fact, I am getting a memo today from the Air Force inquiring on that very question. We are working on that all right.

The problem is roughly this: I will tell you this for the benefit of those who have not been in this fight very much. If you picture a great big pie divided into three big sectors, you can call one of those sectors perhaps "efficiency and economy"--giving the taxpayer the most for his money and so on. That is the argument that any military commander is going to make of course--that he cannot give the taxpayer what he should have for his money if you give him a knucklehead; why must he bear this, particularly in times when the mission is being increased? and so on. That is a very logical argument.

The next sector involves the scientific management--if you want to call it that--argument. There you have people like Dr. Eli Ginzberg on the conservation of human resources, who I believe is a lecturer here, and the President, who, when he was president of Columbia, started a ten-year project on the conservation of human resources.

That is, the idea is that America has a natural resource in its manpower; that if you start skimming the cream off the top of the bottle, particularly in peacetime, you are going to be in a bad way. Not only are you stockpiling those not in the service, at grade 4, or whatever level you are talking about; but also the services themselves are not getting experience in having to utilize the type of men they will get come full mobilization. The President feels strongly along this line, and he has set up a whole project based on his dissatisfaction with the World War II rejection statistics. This program has been under way for over five years.

The other third of this pie you could call the political checks. By that I mean that when you start drafting the brighter fellows or permit their enlistment to the exclusion of the dumber fellows, you have left in the community, for the community to live with, the fellow who is a little less apt and acceptable in all ways, industrial or otherwise. It can get to be a political issue, because the matter of equity to the individual enters into it. For example, when you hit a guy with the draft, and you are taking him in because he is bright, and his obligation there is based on his brilliance, whereas the other follow you let go simply because he doesn't meet your mental standards, it can be argued that it is not equity.

Now, just to summarize here, I think there remain these disagreements with Congress, which are real. Then there is the conservation of natural resources. There are the political checks. You don't get into this area very quickly and out of it very quickly. So, no

matter what we do on qualitative distribution to bring about relief from the current situation--and I am inclined to think we are going to bring relief--we have a justification job to do with all these other groups, starting with Congress.

COLONEL BARRETT: Our time has run out, although there are other questions. On behalf of the Commandant and the College, I wish to thank you for your presentation this morning.

MR. DuFLON: Thank you very much.

(28 Mar 1956--250)B/ljt

B59888