


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## MOBILIZING OUR MANPOWER

Lieutenant General C. S. Dargatzis, USAF (Ret.)

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INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

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**MOBILIZING OUR MANPOWER**

**21 September 1955**

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**Reporter: R. W. Bennett.**

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**INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES**

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21 September 1955

**GENERAL CALHOUN:** Our speaker today will discuss the subject "Mobilizing Our Manpower," as viewed from the Office of Defense Mobilization. In addition, he will touch on the problem of maintaining the relatively high force levels inherent in our current force structure.

General Dargusch has had long experience in mobilization at the Federal level, extending from 1938 to the present time. He has recently been active in the preparation of the legislation which resulted in the Reserve Forces Act, recently passed by the Congress.

We are honored to have you here, General Dargusch, and to present you to the class.

**GENERAL DARGUSCH:** I am glad to have the opportunity of being here today. I should say in preface that I am about one month old on this job that I have now, and have just barely learned to find my way around the building in which I am located. Fortunately, I am not in the Pentagon, because I don't think I could ever find my way around that building. I suppose that is an old joke; but, as far as I am concerned, it would be true.

I see out in front here my old friend Colonel Fitzpatrick, whom I know through association in Selective Service in the training of manpower during the years that I spent with General Hershey. I recall that when

I was going to Sheridan in 1936, he was giving me my first exposure to the manpower field. Colonel Fitzpatrick was one of those who were active in the World War I draft; and in turn were working with the Joint Army and Navy Selective Service Committee. I know well Colonel Fitzpatrick's great contribution to the whole manpower field.

I got into this business of manpower more or less accidentally. My primary work had been in the field of public finance; and I was asked, because of that, I assume, to take a look at Selective Service. I didn't know what it was, but it did intrigue me, as being in the nature of a resources problem. Having gone from so-called resources to tax commissioner in my state, I was fairly well acquainted with the difficulties that accompany resource problems of one type or another.

I didn't realize that manpower in all of its aspects had proved to be more difficult than taxation, because I thought in 1933 that there was nothing more difficult than that. I saw the State of Ohio printing her own money, something which most people have forgotten. Every once in a while I remind people in Ohio that we actually did print Ohio State money and paid our bills with our own currency.

But enough of that background. I came here in 1940 and stayed until 1947. During that time I was with General Hershey in Selective Service. From 1950 to the present time I have been working around the Office of Defense Mobilization in manpower matters which were more of a general nature than those that I had anything to do with in

Selective Service, although if you look upon Selective Service in World War II, I think, in the proper relationship, you will understand that it was in many respects our manpower agency. It got to be that perhaps by accident more or less, but it nevertheless was in a sense the manpower agency.

ODM has certain responsibilities, as you know, which it inherited from the old ODM, from the National Security Resources Board, the Defense Production Administration, and other agencies of the Federal Government, the Munitions Board, for example. In the manpower field its functions, as I have seen them, have been coordinating the planning in the area of manpower in the Federal Government. That is the way I have looked upon my particular assignment.

I think we might go back just for a moment and take a look at the World War II Selective Service operation, because, as I said, it did represent, at least from the standpoint of compulsion, the only direct thing that we had in the Federal Government.

We registered under that act many millions of men. I think the total was 50 million, although many of those were not subject to military service. Since the last registration occurred under the act, in December, 1941, we have not only been getting them through the element of compulsion and allocating to direct labor, but to a certain extent through the instrument of deferment as well as selecting people for induction.

I think the important thing to understand about Selective Service of that time and now as well, is that it is a two-sided process. In other words, the selective process has to do with the selection of men for deferment as well as the selection of men for induction.

Much of our problem in 1940 was minimized by the fact that we had large-scale unemployment. I believe the figure was 8 million. We had also a dependency deferment in the early days of that emergency, which took most of the problem off of our boards, in that we tended to find among those we deferred for dependency the persons in turn that we would have to consider on occupational grounds for deferment because of their skills. But when the war was well under way, the problem of occupational deferment became a really acute problem with Selective Service.

You have been told many times, I suppose, that the Armed Forces took in a total of over 15 million. Of that number I think we provided something like 10; and, with apologies to the Navy and the other services that were recruiting during the early part of the war, we chased most of the other 5. And sometimes it was only when we were in thoroughly hot pursuit of these men that they volunteered and entered the Armed Forces.

We had 5,443 local boards, scattered all over the United States and in the various territories. Those people did the job of selecting men for deferment or induction.

The thing that I think is most significant about this whole

business of 1940 to 1947 in the Selective Service system is that, as I go back to 1936, we never visualized that there would be such a thing as a draft in so-called non-war time. I don't know what type of war we are in. It certainly is not peace. Some people say it is not war. So it is non-war time. I suppose that is the proper term. I am sure Colonel Fitzpatrick will check me on that proposition-- that we never visualized in those days that there would such an instrument as Selective Service in a period other than war.

But we have either advanced or gone backward or something in the time that has lapsed, because now even Congress has recognized that we use Selective Service as an instrument for securing manpower, and, again, as an instrument in this fashion, as I said before, for helping the armed services in their voluntary recruitment program. I think General Hershhey always uses the analogy that the Selective Service System served as the beaters for the hunters, driving the game in so that the recruiters can get there.

But this whole business of manpower policy has always struck me as being something like the situation in which the fellow found himself when he went to a psychiatrist. We all deal with this whole problem of what we are going to do at the moment on the basis of expediency. I said exactly this at the College to the students. We had never had a manpower policy, at least, not up to now. I hope that we can have a manpower policy which will deal with all the segments of our manpower operation, one which we

will be willing to go ahead with. I told the students out there, and I will repeat it to you, although since I first heard this story and told it, it has come on a record which is played by the disc jockeys; so it may be old to some of you who listen to those things. The story goes something like this:

A fellow came in to see a psychiatrist and said he wanted to see him about his brother. The psychiatrist says, "What is the trouble?" The fellow says, "He thinks he is a hen." The psychiatrist says, "He does? How long has he felt that way?" The guy says, "Seven years." The psychiatrist said, "Why didn't you come to me before?" The fellow said, "Oh, we needed the eggs." That was a dandy story, as I said before, until the record people got hold of it.

That is about the way we deal with this whole manpower problem. And that is not a truly ludicrous illustration. I have seen a lot of that in my twenty years experience in this field.

To go on from World War II, I will talk a little more today perhaps on this business of selective service.

I think, as we first got into that operation, it didn't occur to us too directly that we had this dual function--that there was a corollary responsibility here to select on the one hand for deferment, and a corollary responsibility to select for induction. I think that idea is becoming more fixed today, more recognized perhaps, although in this interim of 1953 to 1955 we have had a philosophy of a kind in selective service which you might call universal military service.

I don't think that is a reflection of the law itself so much as it is a reflection of political expediency. In other words, when you have in the local boards a disturbance about the deferment problem, a very definite one, you solve that disturbance by saying to the people that complain about this element of deferment: "This is not in any sense an invention of ours. It is a postponement to permit a man to get training. When he is through with that particular phase of his training, we are going to induct him into the Army. So it is just a postponement for four or five years of a man we are going to get anyway." All during the years in this whole Selective Service operation all the time it was a dual function--to select for deferment or induction as the case may be--occupational deferments primarily.

Now, the Selective Service Act was passed on March 21, 1947. It was not re-enacted until June 24, 1948. There were no calls under the act of any consequence until the Korean War, or police action, as some people call it, in 1950. Since that time the act has been in operation constantly, and I understand that a call has now been made for the Navy, for the first time since World War II.

I think that will bring us down in a very rough way to where we are today.

There is no pattern by which we can plan in the ODM, or no pattern by which the Federal Government can be guided, in this whole problem of where we go for the future. Many of the things we can do are manifested in Public Law 305, which was just passed

by the Congress and signed by the President, which provides, among other things, for the enlistment of under-18 1/2-year-old men, to the top limit of 250,000 per annum. Those men are to enlist for a period of eight years. They are to be trained for six months, and then will revert to the Ready Reserve.

There is another provision in that legislation of equal or even greater interest perhaps. That one provides for the enlistment of critical skills. These are people who have critical skills--no reference to age--who are employed at a critical defense-supporting activity or a research activity affecting the national defense. That program will shortly go into effect. The numbers involved will not be large; but it does for the first time in our history perhaps mark an attempt on the part of Congress to recognize that there is a program for the allocation and utilization of so-called critical skills. I am sure that is a problem that has bothered every one of you, and it has been a very disturbing problem to us.

You may remember that some years ago the Committee made a report to the National Security Resources Board and at that time recommended that there be established at the Washington level a committee which would pass upon the qualifications of all people of high attainments--scientists and engineers primarily. That board would certify to the Selective Service the deferment of those individuals or the non-deferment as the case might be. Selective Service was to be bound by that determination.

Fortunately, nothing ever came of that recommendation.

There have been similar proposals in Congress. One was in the form of the Hinshaw Bill, which would have established primarily the same sort of procedure--to require the Armed Forces to turn loose within ninety days all men who had such attainments--to discharge them, separate them. There was quite a lot of support of that bill before the various committee hearings. Nothing came of that. The provision in Public Law 305 which permits the enlistment of critical skills was in effect a compromise that came from the Hinshaw type of legislation.

Now, a word about this business of Washington boards, because I think it is inherent in this whole business of manpower and manpower administration.

I believe that the local board is the answer to the whole problem of manpower procurement, whether it be military or civilian. I think so, based upon my experience. It is something that the public trusts. It is something that the public understands.

I don't say this because either of us had any connection with Selective Service. But during the period 1946 to 1947 it is significant that in the Federal Government the only agency which had no great difficulty in the handling of its job was Selective Service. We can take OPA in contrast, which was also doing somewhat the same kind of job. In other words, it was dealing with the citizen at the local level. The difference between OPA and

Selective Service, manifestly, was that OPA was a Washington operation and Selective Service never was a Washington operation.

I remember when the chief of the Planning Section of OPA came over to our office--this was about 1942--during one of their changes in administration in that office, and he asked me point blank the question why I believed Selective Service had succeeded while OPA had failed. And I told him--of course I don't want to be quoted on this now, but I understand you don't quote anybody anyway. I happen to be a lawyer in civil life--and I asked this guy: How many lawyers have you got. He said, I've got about two thousand. I said, You have answered your own question. I have twenty and I don't let them do anything.

I had the very definite conviction that the lawyers should write what the administrator wanted, and not what the lawyers wanted. And I asked our legal staff, who were always in disagreement with me, for a good way to let it be known that I thought that law was a staff function and not an executive function. That is where we differed.

But it is true that in this whole business of manpower procurement, dealing with people as you are, you have to have something that people can understand, that they can see. It is a simple proposition to post on the local board's bulletin board a man's enlistment classification. Anybody in the town could walk down there, look at that list, and find out the status of any individual with the board. There was no secrecy to the operation, except to the extent that the file contained confidential

material. It had to be then, because there were many things in those files, including letters from wives who wanted their husbands inducted-- and we had a great many customers of that type in our business-- information which probably would not have been too well received on a public basis.

I think the important thing about this whole proposition of Selective Service was the local board and the idea of letting the people of the community make the decision as to whether a guy is going to go or stay home. And I think that would be equally true when we get into an operation that we have never actually utilized in this country up to this time. I am speaking about the problem of national service, as distinguished from selective service.

National service, as you all know, is simply a device by which we extend to all of our population, within prescribed age limits, both male and female, the obligation to serve the nation. I think there is a great deal of disagreement on that question, as to whether we ought to go that far, or whether we ought to stay to the civilian labor force:

"We expect you to do on a voluntary basis those things which will make most effective the mobilization of the nation."

up

I think that question will finally turn in the event of another emergency, since, as I said before, we have no basis for planning for another emergency of World War II or greater dimensions. We simply don't know what kind of war it would be. We know some of the ramifications of the extent of it, the catastrophic nature of it; but we don't

know just what we would be faced with.

It could be a situation where we would have no time. It could possibly be, although I doubt it, a situation where we would have some time. I think one thing we lose sight of perhaps always in this country--some of my friends say this to me--we lose sight of the fact that we might not have any time, as we did in World War I and World War II, in which to do this essential job of mobilization.

I think, assuming that we were attacked, and in the form in which we might expect--a nuclear assault of some kind--it is obvious that we would have to extend compulsion in all of its aspects to our entire population. We should go about that job through some agency patterned along the Selective Service type. In other words, registration ought to be a local matter. It would have to be, of necessity. Handling the classification of people ought to be a matter for local boards.

I don't know of any better system than that. In the first place, it doesn't cost so much, for the very simple reason that the work has been done locally and done by volunteers--citizens of the community. But the most significant fact, as I pointed out before, is that the people can see the operation. They know what it is. They know the people who are doing it, and they will trust them.

Of course, Selective Service was fortunate, as hardly any other agency, I suppose would be fortunate to an equal degree, in having the greatest FBI that ever lived or existed. By "FBI"--and

I don't mean this disrespectfully--I mean the mothers of the United States of America, who watch the actions of every local board, and who very promptly report any irregularities in the operation. We spent an endless amount of time just running down complaints that we received from mothers and other people concerning the treatment of specific registrants. So we do have this highly localized operation, with this very protective element of a national FBI, whether it is a military mobilization or an over-all mobilization.

Now, what we will do in ODM, and what we are doing, is to suggest plans which would cover the Korean type of operation, that is, a mobilization of 3,500,000 up to, say, 5,000,000; or a full mobilization, involving approximately 12 or 13 million men. The first, I would assume, would always be the "guns or butter" or the "butter or guns" type of operation. When you get into the 12 or 13 million type of mobilization, of course, you depart very directly from the normal and shift to guns from the so-called "guns or butter" concept, although I think it is correct to say that in World War II, the war being what it was, the American people were not deprived of very many things as a result of that mobilization. That, however, was a direct result of the kind of war we fought, and I am assuming here a direct assault made upon the United States.

We were talking the other day in the staff about what share the civilian population would have of the goods in the event of mobilization of 12 or 13 million men. There was a great debate about rock

bottom, basic requirements, and that sort of thing. It struck me as rather strange, because I believe that in a country such as ours, where you have the public to deal with, which some other nations do not have in the same measure or degree, you may do whatever the public wants you to do. I think General Hershey said that very well when he said that a statesman is a man who is out in front of the people just far enough but not too far. And I think that spells pretty well what you can do about this business of mobilization.

In other words, you can't take things away from the people just to take them away. You take from the people in the event of total mobilization what you can justify taking away. You don't take gasoline away from them to make them realize that there is a war going on. You take it away from them because you must take it away.

Some people like to say that we will have no compulsion in time of total mobilization. But then, when you examine them on that question, they will say: "Well, they would ration gasoline, they would ration food, they would ration quarters, they would ration clothing, and all the necessities of life." Of course, those things come pretty close to compulsion. If you examine them, it is rather hard to distinguish finally between a so-called direct compulsion in which you assign a man to a job, and indirect compulsion that you attach to all these things having to do with the elements you have to have to live. In other words, if you don't have anything to eat, if you don't have any clothes, you don't have any place to live, you are under just about as much

direct compulsion as you are under any kind of compulsion. You can't go away from your job, so you stay there.

Of course, we tried in a very minor way this business of direct compulsion in Selective Service approximately at the end of the war, in 1945, I think it was, in the spring, when we said that we would remove the occupational deferment of any man who left his job. Now, that is in its nature, I suppose, a negative kind of approach to the problem. We were saying, "You stay there or else." We first said it in the case of the strikers in the Philadelphia transit strike-- "You get back on the job or you are in I-A." I don't know whether those compulsions finally are any lesser in effect than those which result from assigning an individual to a job. I suppose it is a matter of definition and debate rather than of fact.

But I believe that in a future emergency the question of whether we would go to compulsion across the board will turn upon the nature of the conflict; and that, if we had a war like World War II, we might expect to have an operation of the same type. If, on the other hand, we had a catastrophic type of situation, with a major assault on the United States, then I think we might very well expect compulsion across the board, applied to all individuals within the age limits of registration.

In connection with the manning of the Federal Government, I might say one word. We are engaged in a rather interesting experiment now. This experiment is authorized by an amendment to the

Defense Production Act in 1955. That is the establishment of a so-called executive reserve. It has to do with a civilian reserve, as distinguished from a military reserve. Under this program various departments of the Federal Government will select and train small numbers of reservists, drawn from civil life, who are to man the agencies of the Federal Government in the event of a total mobilization.

There is an experiment that has been going on, for example, in ODM now for a small nucleus of about fifty men, who have been drawn from all phases of American civil life, to man ODM in the event of a major emergency under the authorization of the Defense Production Act of 1955. That program will now be extended to the other agencies of the Federal Government. We will be copying there perhaps what was done in Selective Service and in the military before the war in expanding the procurement and training programs of the Federal Government in the field of civilian manpower for the purpose of manning those agencies in the event of a war.

I think that is all I have, General. I will be glad to answer questions.

MR. POLUNOFF: Gentlemen, General Dargusch is now ready for your questions.

QUESTION: General, you mentioned that you are setting up machinery to draft skilled personnel. Are you going to draft them for the services, or will it be for allocation to private industry?

**GENERAL DARGUSCH:** I perhaps didn't make that clear. What we are trying to do now is to set up an executive order providing for the enlistment of persons who have critical skills and who are engaged in critical defense-supporting industries or research affecting national defense. That is the language of the act, Public Law 305.

Those people will enlist in a service for eight years, will be trained for six months, and at the end of that time will revert to the Ready Reserve, where they will remain unless they are screened to the standby.

There are no large numbers involved there. It is simply an alternate program under Public Law 305. At the present time--and the same thing was true during World War II--there are no calls on Selective Service for individuals or on an occupational basis except in the case of doctors and dentists. You do have specialized skills covered under Public Law 779, which provides for the registration of doctors and dentists and people in other health-supporting activities; and we have had calls, as you know, from time to time in that area. But that is wholly a specialized situation. There is no program for the drafting of critical skills at the present time.

This 305 law came as the result of the Hinchaw-type agitation for special treatment for scientists, engineers, and other special skills. It is a compromise with the whole problem of requiring everyone to serve, by introducing a shorter element of training.

**QUESTION:** General, I believe they discovered toward the

close of World War II that the labor supply was much more available than was anticipated. Could you foresee in the event of nuclear warfare that you might have a problem of diverting some huge blocks of surplus labor supply from one geographical area to another?

**GENERAL DARGUSCH:** I think inherently this is a tremendous problem. I remember when we talked about moving some of the surplus labor supply in New York City and making them go out to the West Coast to man the aircraft plants, we found that what we had maybe was there, but the people weren't. We just couldn't move them.

You talk about nuclear warfare. That would just complicate the problem of what to do with people. I think it is one of those things that probably you get into before you know what is coming. But it would most certainly complicate the problem.

**QUESTION:** I know it is a bit early to predict all the things you are going to do as we implement this Public Law 305, but one thing it provides is that all the services will perform a thorough screening, a continuous screening, to insure that we don't retain critical skills that we don't require and to screen out some of those individuals who will not be available when the time comes when we need them. But all the services, I think, are short of many of these same critical skills that civilian industry is short of today, and in the event of war will be more critically short. Now, you mentioned in your talk that it has been your policy that the local boards will determine whether or not these individuals shall be available for military

service.

**GENERAL DARGUSCH:** That is in the case a man is in the standby reserve.

**QUESTION:** Yes. That is right. However, if the local boards make this determination, how can we be sure that some of these military requirements are met, or how can we be sure that there will be an equitable distribution of these critical specialists between the military and civilian requirements?

**GENERAL DARGUSCH:** I suppose that takes us to the next problem--and I am going to talk about that--that in the event of total mobilization we would have in existence a War Resources Administration--that seems to be the current name for such an organization--which would undertake this whole problem of allocation of manpower, and certainly within the total allocation, the allocation of skills, because it is not conceivable to me that we would have skills in the total numbers that we would need for all purposes. I can't believe that that would be so.

A good illustration of that, I suppose, is doctors. They are the best illustration of that problem. We know that the armed services would have to have 80,000 or 85,000 doctors. As I remember it, that was the World War II figure--something in that neighborhood. We would have to provide those. Then the question would come up as to what areas you are going to get these people from.

There are some areas I could cite where you can't possibly take a doctor without doing serious damage to the civilian populace. I am

thinking now of Noble County, Ohio, which is about 75 miles south of the city of Columbus. The last time I was there, they had four doctors in this county to serve about 30,000 people. You would take a long look at that before you would take a doctor away from Noble County.

So it does become, it seems to me, a matter for local administration. What you are going to see is that the military is going to say: "We have to have so many people." Then, as a result of your allocation, you work back and do that local job of determining where we can get those individuals with the least embarrassment or trouble to the local communities or the states or the nation.

I don't think there is any other approach to it than that, because you will have to go ordinarily to the cities. You will get the bulk of them from the cities.

QUESTION: I have two questions. The first is, How is the local board selected in the township?

GENERAL DARGUSCH: It all depends on where you are from.

QUESTION: Just take a little town out in any given state. Who selects them? The local townspeople?

GENERAL DARGUSCH: I can give you the Ohio experience. To select the local boards in Ohio we set up a committee consisting of the common pleas judge--that is the trial judge in Ohio--the probate judge--who is what the name implies, the judge of probate--and a newspaper editor. That was our committee in Ohio in each county.

Handwritten text, possibly a signature or name, oriented vertically.

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Those three individuals selected names and sent them to the governor. He in turn transmitted them to the Director of Selective Service, who appointed them in the name of the President.

Now, I will say that invariably the selections were made on a nonpartisan basis. They represented, on the whole, outstanding people in the community. They represented also people that you could not have hired with any pay that you could give them. There were exceptions to that, but there weren't enough exceptions to it to jeopardize the operation.

So in most every state you had some kind of citizen group to make nominations to the governor, which were in turn sent to the Director of Selective Service.

**QUESTION:** That is what I am getting at--whether those local boards which were selected really had the backing of the population of the town.

**GENERAL DARGUSCH:** Generally, yes.

**QUESTION:** They weren't chosen from the "blue bloods"?

**GENERAL DARGUSCH:** Normally not "blue bloods," no.

There were no requirements that the members of the local boards be anything except of non-military age and citizens. In other words, they didn't have to be from industry or labor. On the appeals board we had representatives from industry, agriculture, labor, a doctor, and a lawyer, as I remember the breakdown of those boards.

**QUESTION:** Would it be possible to have actually within the

community a list of so many tool and die makers, and have the board select this man and say, "You are going to the Army" and another man and say, "You, Bill Jones, you stay here. We need you here. You are just as important here as you would be in the Army." I am not talking about engineers and scientists, which seems to be what all these motions are about, but about this other shortage of prime labor.

**GENERAL DARGUSCH:** This other shortage, frankly, could be very acute on occasion.

**QUESTION:** Is that selection board you are talking about going to select the civilians just as they select the military?

**GENERAL DARGUSCH:** I think it would have that effect. As I said, in the exercise of that one responsibility of deferment, they select a man to stay on the job. They do it that way instead of selecting him to go. They select him to stay by assigning him to a job. It is a negative kind of thing. You defer him from military service to serve in a critical job.

**QUESTION:** Are you doing that today, or only in time of full mobilization

**GENERAL DARGUSCH:** They will have to expand that. We have, I think, 16,000 people deferred to industry because they are deemed essential. We have a larger number deferred to agriculture.

We have a new agency in this whole picture, and in closing I probably should have touched on it. I will just say a word on it now,

since you have raised the question.

We always say that each of these selective service local boards is like a jury. That is truly what it is. It is a group of citizens drawn from the community, and they are representative of the community. I am speaking now about engineers and scientists or even the critical mechanical skills. So we have them set up now, and they have been in operation on sort of a pilot basis.

We could really call them study committees on science and engineering and specialized skills. They are to run across the board and deal with all skills, not just professional skills, so-called. Under this enlistment program I spoke of, of critical skills, we are including mechanics as well as professional people. All the files will be referred to these study committees. These study committees will do that job of identification. That has been the greatest problem in this whole selective service operation--determining when a man has a skill.

I am always using the very simple illustration of the doctors. When people ask the question, "How do you identify an individual who says he is a doctor?" I think the best illustration is that you know him because he has two pieces of paper--a diploma from a recognized university--that word "recognized" is important--and a certificate from the state to practice medicine. If you find that he has those, you have a doctor. That is all you need to know. When you get to these other fields, scientists or engineers, those people don't have

by any public authority that established skill. They may have a college diploma, but they don't have a license to practice. You have a very difficult problem in identification.

So we are training these study committees, which in the event of a major mobilization will be broken up on a panel basis all over the state, to identify for the local boards whether, 1, the man is, we will say, a scientist; 2, as to his competence; and, 3, whether he is employed in an important activity.

QUESTION: I want to ask you as an element of planning whether there has been any consideration given to national registration in advance of an emergency as to discovering and maintaining in ODM or elsewhere a list of available skills in these areas.

GENERAL DARGUSCH: We have constantly studied that problem. We have a roster, as you probably know, but that deals with professional skills and not with mechanical. I doubt whether there would be a nation-wide registration short of what appears to be a very general emergency.

QUESTION: How are the quotas passed down to your local boards? For instance, take your county in Ohio. What procedure prevents that county being assessed to provide one doctor instead of taking that doctor from a city where he could be better spared?

GENERAL DARGUSCH: We use the same kind of device that I spoke of with respect to these citizen committees. During World War II we had the Procurement and Assignment Service on doctors

and dentists. Now we have the Health Resources Committee, so called, who sit with panels in areas. The doctors themselves determine what doctors can be spared. They certify to the local board that this man is available and this individual is not. Then the local board in its own discretion will finally determine whether a certain doctor ought to go, although they normally will follow the recommendation of the advisory committee. We do the same thing with the reserves, as you probably know.

**QUESTION:** That committee from ODM passes upon controversial questions across the board, not only doctors but also scientists?

**GENERAL DARGUSCH:** No. It is only the healing arts in that instance. However, we have this other committee that I spoke of, the state advisory committee, which deals with scientists, engineers, and specialist skills. They are just <sup>coming</sup> into the picture. They have been dealing with deferment problems up to this time, which have been minor, as you can see, being the deferment of 18,000 people out of a reservoir of 18 million or something like that.

**QUESTION:** On this local board proposition, I don't think the people in my home town saw any honey and candy in the operations of the board. The primary argument, the big thing they complained about most, was the workings within the board. They seemed to have a tendency to take the boy who was a truck driver and make him go first, and let the boy who said, "Yes, I am going to the university next fall" stay at home.

**GENERAL DARGUSCH:** Was that World War II?

**QUESTION:** Yes, sir. "I am going to the university next fall."

Hell, he may never have gone to the university. He just said that. But the poor truck driver had to go right off the bat. They worked on the lower ones first. It didn't have any relationship to dependency either. This boy who was going to the university had a bunch of citrus groves. I won't name the state. This truck driver was hauling the citrus. Is there anything being done to correct that?

**GENERAL DARGUSCH:** We have tried many devices, as you always will from the administrative standpoint. We have this local board auditor system. It will be their job to go to the state headquarters and review the files of the local boards, to see that that type of thing does not occur.

I suppose a fair statement would be that in the early days of World War II, from the start of the emergency in the fall of 1940 and going through Pearl Harbor into the spring of 1942, we tended to meet our selective service calls by drafting the unemployed, which probably didn't make them too happy. But that was a natural result of the economic situation.

I think on the whole I would answer your question just by saying that we have no general problem of that type. I remember that the governor of one state--I won't name the state, since you didn't name the state--wrote in to us and wanted to know why we were drafting farmers--I knew what he was thinking about--and what was his authority

as governor of the state. I wrote back to him for General Hershey and said his authority as governor of the state was to administer the Selective Service law in accordance with the act and the regulations promulgated by the President; that if he wasn't satisfied with what we were doing, we would probably curtail all farmer deferments in his state, because they were producing no essential commodities whatsoever.

**QUESTION:** What are your views relative to the merits of continuing the volunteer system in time of war?

**GENERAL DARGUBCH:** Well, I don't about about this "relative" business. I would say that there were no merits whatsoever in continuing the volunteer system in time of total emergency. You produce a great deal of imbalance in the handling of your manpower. I am talking about those who are liable as a matter of age for military service.

I think a very natural result--and I don't blame the services for doing it. I would do the same thing if I were an employer, and I think you have to think of the armed services as an employer--the natural tendency of the services is to get as many of the best people as they can get. The tendency is to hoard. Industry does it and the military does it.

I would say that if they wanted to use their manpower to the greatest advantage, and to allocate it properly, they would not indulge in a voluntary program within the age limits to which the draft applies. Under that perhaps it is O. K., although we tend again to distort the picture. If you let a kid enlist at 17 when you are going to get him at 18,

you distort it. Certainly the over-age, if you are not going to take them by any compulsory process, there is probably no reason not to maintain a voluntary program on the ones you wouldn't get otherwise. But from my experience I would say that it would seem to have a tendency to produce an imbalance which we could not afford.

QUESTION: We are told that our greatest potential source of increased labor supply is in the area of women. Is the draft to be applied to women, and are there any special arrangements that are necessary under the planning now?

GENERAL DARGUSCH: I presume that if we went to this one-base national service, it would naturally apply to women of certain ages. You would exempt from that, I suppose, housewives who had young children, as we usually talk about doing. You would not go down below 18 or 18 years of age for liability. You would have to make some provision on assignment. You would try to assign them, I suppose, to their homes where that was possible.

On the other hand, it is entirely possible that <sup>in</sup> a system of national service you would assign people away from home as you do in the military. But again that would be a matter for application of the local boards, which I think normally would act wisely on this problem--not always so, but normally so. But most certainly, if we are going to a national service, you would have to apply it to women as well as men.

QUESTION: What provisions have been made or are being

contemplated for mobilization in the event of a surprise nuclear attack of a severe nature?

**GENERAL DARGUSCH:** Well, we are worrying about that one. The only question is whether we will have anyone left to mobilize. There are two possibilities. Either you have nothing, or you have a period of survival. I would judge that in that second instance you would have to do what I said. You would have to mobilize the entire nation. And we are thinking along those lines.

We are not very far advanced, frankly, in that problem, because I am not sure that anyone yet knows the whole scope of the problem. But from what I have seen, the problem would be extremely difficult. But, assuming that we could survive under those circumstances, visualizing something like the New England flood as a comparison, you would certainly have to take all sorts of emergency measures. I suppose there would be a complete regimentation of our people in that event.

**QUESTION:** General, I recently spent some time on a research problem and had the opportunity of talking to a number of young men who are vitally concerned with your program. There were two areas of concern which these people were most interested in. One was the fact that they didn't like the uncertainty of never knowing when the axe over their head was going to fall. So they were naturally reluctant to go out and volunteer to avoid that uncertainty. The other was the fact that they always felt that there were people avoiding the draft by just holding off until they were past the age limit.

Both of those problems could be solved, it seems to me, by universal military training. It seemed to me that there was a good deal of public acceptance of the fact that universal military training would be a good thing. Is there any recognition of that in the circles that you operate in?

**GENERAL DARGUSCH:** I suppose in the circles in which I operate there is a general feeling that universal military training would be a good thing. I don't think there is any public acceptance of that, certainly not from the part of the country from which I come, because I have engaged in most serious warfare on that question, in debate with preachers, and so forth. I assure you that in the Middle West, if you were a Member of Congress and voted for universal military training, you would be in a bad position.

**QUESTION:** I agree, General, that a great many people are against it. However, I have more or less come to the conclusion myself that the people who are most vitally concerned would not only accept it, but would welcome it.

**GENERAL DARGUSCH:** I don't know what you mean by "the people who are most vitally concerned."

**QUESTION:** The people who would actually be subjected to military training.

**GENERAL DARGUSCH:** Mothers and fathers, no. They will have nothing to do with the program.

It seems to me it is about this way: The average age of the

inductee in selective service is twenty-two or maybe twenty-two and a half. So the chances are that if a man simply doesn't do anything, he won't be drafted until he is twenty-two or twenty-two and a half. The kids know that. All you have to do is to look at our experience in certain of the services during the Korean War. You had no trouble recruiting for the Air Force or the Navy during the Korean War, because the kids who were inducted into the Army knew exactly where they were going to go. As soon as the Korean War was over, the recruiting problem became tough, and it will remain so.

Now, I think there is uncertainty at the present time. It will continue. I don't know of any device by which you can introduce certainty into this draft question as long as the military situation stays uncertain. A kid gets six months training, and at the end of that period you can't give him any assurance of what is going to happen to him after he gets out and is put in the Ready Reserve, because if an emergency blew up, he would have to go.

I suppose one solution for this whole problem you just raised is to put Khrushchev, Bulganin, Zhukhov on <sup>the</sup> a boat with Peron. Another is to convince the American people that we are in for a hell of a lot of trouble, and that we need to maintain mobilization during this non-war time which will be adequate enough to keep the Russians off of our backs.

But I hear my friends say to me--I get the civilian viewpoint, not the military, you understand--"You had three years last time."

I say, "We won't have it again." They say, "You don't know."

I don't know what we can do to inculcate in our people this idea that sending all these kids away to UMT and to the Reserve is just like taxation, or something else you have to do, just like sending them to the public schools on a compulsory basis. But up to this time there has been no universality, and there is no promise of it. There can be no universality in selective service. I think we are now up to two million six or seven hundred thousand registered, including I-A, and with the calls in the relatively small amounts that we have had, those people can just stay home if they want to.

I would solve the thing tomorrow if I had anything to do with it simply by applying the thing on the basis, in the absence of UMT, of calling these kids up and putting them in the Armed Forces. But there isn't any way of doing that. I think this Public Law 305 is about all you can get out of Congress or the American people at the present time, that is, a voluntary program of enlistment for six months training. It is not what we want, but again it is a question of what you can get.

**QUESTION:** General, using the assumption that Operation Alert was a fair sample of what will happen in a nuclear attack, do you think the Government can avoid martial law in the event of such an emergency?

**GENERAL DARGUSCH:** We had to have martial law when we had the flood on the Ohio River. Operation Alert was something

**QUESTION:** Is there any stand or view against that differential?

**GENERAL DARGUSCH:** Well, I don't know as to that, except I would think, generally yes. I mean, under the whole situation, under the present circumstances.

If the Navy can get more by voluntary enlistment for four years instead of getting them for only two, that is a good deal. I think personally that this two-year period of service which the Selective Service Act provides now, is too short. It is not economical, and it doesn't permit the best use of the man. You don't have him long enough to use him properly.

Of course I realize that that viewpoint is not a very popular one at the moment. But it seems to me that when you get into total emergency, if you tend to differentiate between the so-called draft and the enlistment, you are simply creating problems for yourself. I don't like to see problems created, frankly. They bother me.

I don't like differentials in either pay or distinction. As a matter of fact, I would hope that sometime all of us would wear blue pants, a green coat, an Air Force cap, and a Marine cut of garment. I don't know when that is coming. I don't think it is imminent or anything like it. But I have heard a lot about unification and read a lot about it. It might be a good idea if we had a common uniform.

Those are personal views and nobody else's. My boss would throw me out if he heard me say that.

**QUESTION:** Has anything been done at the ODM about the current allocation of skilled personnel under various kinds of mobilization? I have in mind particularly the expansion of the medical service. In case of an atomic attack on the United States, the need for doctors would be overwhelming. It would be a great help to the armed services if they could know just what they could plan on having in such circumstances.

**GENERAL DARGUSCH:** I think that is fairly possible of ascertainment. We know what our medical supply is, not as well as grass. We know about what the Armed Forces would have to have, and I assume that we would approach this problem from this standpoint.

I didn't say this when I was making my remarks, but I have always operated on the assumption that the Armed Forces must have the physically fit young men, to the exclusion of industry, agriculture, or any other civilian activity. Unless you can demonstrate that that man is more valuable in that civilian activity than he is in any military assignment, you would get him in view of his skill. In other words, I think there is a lien on the part of the military on the physically fit young men, because only physically fit young men will fit in with the needs of the Armed Services. We can staff civilian industry with over-age men, with women, with 4-F's, under-age people, that can't serve the nation otherwise.

I would say that likewise the military must have the minimum

number of doctors, certainly the amount needed by the military in its combat and non-combat operations. I don't think we will have any trouble with that problem. It is just a problem of allocation, and I think we would recognize that we had to meet the requirements of the military.

**QUESTION:** General, in view of the drafting of reservists, do you think there is sufficient enforcement power to enable the military to maintain a hard core of reservists? After a man serves his six months and comes out, what is to hold him in that reserve? He has to go back for sixty days?

**GENERAL DARGUSCH:** Forty-five days.

**QUESTION:** Suppose a chap goes in and spends forty-five days and then goes home. What happens after that? Would you go after him after the forty-five days and put him in I-A?

**GENERAL DARGUSCH:** He does go in I-A. He is a reservist, you see. The controls are military controls over him.

One of the greatest problems in this whole situation of building an adequate reserve is the problem of requiring people to participate. Up to the passage of Public Law 305 we had no participation. We had a law on the books. We said that all people had a reserve liability; but, outside of talking about it, they paid no attention to it. We will have to see, I think, whether this watered-down kind of thing that we have here now will work.

You remember, a bill was introduced, H. R. 2987, which provided that if a man did not perform after he had done training service,

you then call him in for the remainder of the two years. There is enough of an element there, I believe, that you would have compliance with the reserve obligations. Whether we will get that under the watered-down forty-five days I don't know. We will just have to wait and see.

**QUESTION:** Did Congress water it down?

**GENERAL DARGUSCH:** Oh, sure. Any time legislation is watered down, Congress is the one that does the watering.

**QUESTION:** In the concept of national service do you think the local boards can maintain their authority when it becomes necessary to move people between areas, to move special skills all over the country? It seems to me it will take some central direction to say where the people can be moved and when.

**GENERAL DARGUSCH:** It is going to take some central direction, certainly. I think that is true that it will operate that way. I have no quarrel with the philosophy of selective service, although at times I thought we didn't give enough direction. We can't expect the local boards to understand the complicated problems which reach them.

I remember one time--and this wasn't down in the citrus country, by the way--I wrote to a local board telling them that a certain guy was very essential to the Manhattan Engineering District. They wrote back and said they thought I knew what I was doing, but what was he doing there? So it struck me that I probably should say something about some of the experiments in radiation. So I wrote a letter to the local

board that this fellow was engaged in some very important experiments in the field of radiation. They wrote me and said: "Hell, those heat pump experiments can wait until after the war."

But, frankly, this operation of securing manpower has to be developed along the lines I indicated. You have to have people in Selective Service in time of national emergency who understand these problems, who can certify to the local board that this man is the kind of person that he is claimed to be, that actually he is doing something essential. That is where we have to call on your professional scientist and your mechanically skilled people, just as we do in the case of the doctor. We perhaps could do it through those committees I mentioned.

It is a matter of a jury in the community, like trying a case before a jury. If you have a problem of expert testimony, you get a guy on the stand, qualify him, and then ask him questions as long as from here to the moderator.

QUESTION: General, who sets up the requirements for classification into 4-F and so on?

GENERAL DARGUSCH: You fellows.

QUESTION: It seems to me there are an awful lot of places where you could use a lot of these fellows.

GENERAL DARGUSCH: I get a lot of mail from the Department of the Army about why we turned people down. I always have to write back and tell them, "Hell, you do it."

QUESTION: I had a man on my ship in the regular Navy before

the war who had a bum knee. He was a cripple.

**GENERAL DARGUSCH:** It is a matter of physical standards. We deal with manpower on that basis. There are many jobs in which people could be put who have limited physical qualifications--I don't know about mental, but certainly limited physical--if we would assign them on a personal basis or an individual basis. But as long as we are dealing with bodies--and people want to deal on that basis--we are going to have trouble with physical standards. It depends too on how serious the emergency is. If the next emergency is great enough, you will use a lot of those fellows.

**DR. FITZPATRICK:** There was a time when the recruiting service offices refused to consider anybody who was not fully qualified--no limits at all.

**GENERAL DARGUSCH:** You are from the Navy, I see. The answer we always got until recently was that you couldn't take a guy with glasses because when he was on the bridge and spray got on his glasses, he couldn't see. That may sound facetious, but we have that right now.

Of course, we always had cases of physical examiners who were to blame. I became interested in Fort Bragg, because everybody that went down there was rejected for hypertension. So I talked to our surgeon, and we moved that doctor out. The hypertension ceased. These things get very practical at times. We have a lot of psychiatrics at some places too.

MR. POLUHOFF: General Dargusch, you have given us a very interesting talk and a fine discussion. On behalf of the Commandant and the students and the College, thank you very much.

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