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SELECTIVE SERVICE IN MANPOWER MOBILIZATION

30 September 1955

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Publication No. L56-34

INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

Washington, D. C.

Major General Lewis B. Hershey, USA, (Ret), Director of the Selective Service System, was born in Steuben County, Indiana, 12 September 1893. He received the following degrees from Tri-State College, Angola, Indiana; B.S., 1912; Ph.D, and A.B., 1914. He holds the honorary degree of LL.D. from Ohio State University, Tri-State College, Oglethorpe University, Allbright College, LaFayette University, and Columbia University. He has also attended Indiana University, 1917, and the University of Hawaii, 1935-36 and is a graduate of the Field Artillery School, 1923; the Command and General Staff School, 1933, and the Army War College, 1934. He was commissioned first lieutenant in the Regular Army in 1916 from the Indiana National Guard and advanced through the grades to lieutenant colonel in 1940. In recognition of his work in preparing plans for the Selective Service System, he was promoted to brigadier general in October 1940. He became Deputy Director of the Selective Service System, 1 October 1940, and Director, 31 July 1941. He was awarded the DSM by the Army, Navy, and American Legion for outstanding service as Director of Selective Service during the war. He was promoted to major general on 28 April 1942. On 31 December 1946, he was retired but recalled to active duty on the following day, 1 January 1947. He has been Director of the Selective Service System since its reactivation on 24 June 1947.

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GENERAL HOLLIS: Gentlemen: In this era of a semimobilized economy which we have today, one of the very important and significant elements of our military preparedness is the Selective Service System.

Our speaker this morning is a distinguished officer who for many years has made a reputation for the smoothness, the efficacy, and the impartiality of the administration of that system, which in other hands could have been a very crucial and controversial aspect of our preparedness to administer.

Our speaker this morning is an old friend of the College and has talked to us here 12 times, and I am sure you have before you an extremely interesting, provocative, and informative hour.

It gives me great pleasure to introduce to you Major General Lewis B. Hershey.

GENERAL HERSHEY: General Hollis, My Fellow Officers: I would like to expand just a little on what the Commandant has said of the fact that I have been here many times. First, one is always proud, regardless of the reason or the necessity, or the accident, that permits him to appear at least twice in the same place. My connection with this institution has been longer and more consistent than with any other institution with which I have been either temporarily or otherwise connected. I am very proud of the fact, and I believe it is true, that, since 1938, whenever there were classes here, I have had the very great honor of appearing before you. It is one of the things I get a great deal of satisfaction out of, and as one gets along, as you will find in 15, 20, or 30 years, the number of things you have very much satisfaction out of are fewer.

I do want to say that it is always an honor for an aging person to have an opportunity to do the thing that the great Spanish explorer attempted unsuccessfully in Florida to do; that is, to find the Fountain of Youth. To a very large degree I think we must find our Fountain of Youth in meeting tomorrow and in having a few brief moments to spend with tomorrow. I state that this morning is the time I have the

privilege of spending with tomorrow, because I can really say you are some of the prized hopes of tomorrow, and the most anyone could ask if he were trying to influence the future would be to talk with the people who are going to make it.

I should like to say also that I think this institution and the graduates of it have a very peculiar duty and responsibility in the future. It is not a new problem. This problem has been on earth as long as there has been an earth. It is: How do you use intelligently your manpower for survival? Now, one of the things that have always made it very difficult is to try to find ways and means to encourage somebody to go out and run the risk of disappearing individually in order that collectively all may live. It was true in the jungle; it was true in the village out in the woods; and it is still true.

Now, unfortunately, the fellow in the jungle did not have as many reasons for not going when he was able, as we find. Generally his reasons had something to do with age, physical condition, mental condition, and other processes, but he had less reason to refrain from putting himself between the enemy and his village than we have at the present time.

One of our problems is more and more excellent reasons, or excellent sounding reasons, why a man can make so much greater a contribution at some distance from the enemy.

Now, you gentlemen, in a very peculiar way, come, most of you, from an area in which you have realized the necessity, as society has recognized it, of making it appear that the thing to do is to go out and save society. Sometimes, if you analyze society logically, you could not do it, because society would not probably analyze to a place that it would appear to be worth saving; but we have gone on the assumption that it is.

You gentlemen have, most of you, had a lifetime, up to now, of knowing how necessary it was to keep encouraging people to get out between the village, the country, the Nation, and the enemy; but, on the other hand, we are going through a great mechanized stage, and technocracy is in the land, and therefore somebody has to do that, too.

Now, don't misunderstand me. Of course, that is the reason for it. But sometimes reasons that are reasons at some times to Americans are just excuses at other times. One of the things that the

generations that follow us are going to have to do, somehow or other, is to individually see that we not only have all the things done that we must do to produce the weapons and the things that we are going to use to survive with, but that we won't at the same time make it so attractive to provide those weapons that we all want to provide but nobody wants to use; because they are worthless unless they are used.

In the business I am in, I am prejudiced, of course, because I see a great many people--a very, very small proportion of the total, but a very, very large proportion of my total, and of course my reactions stem from what I see, and not from the statistics--who believe they can make much greater contributions some other way than by serving in the Armed Forces; and the stories many times are very logical indeed. So our problem is going to be in this manpower planning and manpower execution: How do you do both?

I think you are a bridge. I think you have opportunities beyond the average in the Armed Forces, let alone in the civilian life, to know the need of both, because your experience in the past has been the necessity of finding people who would use the weapons.

You are planning and thinking on what you are going to do to try to get individuals, groups of individuals, competent individuals, who will make these weapons; and somehow or other we have got to be able to get the necessary numbers of people making them, destroying the urge that society always has had for both "the carrot and the stick." Society not only has rewarded Service and given the veterans a great many things, but it has also made laws, which are somewhere between "the carrot and the stick," and we have, at least, tried to "encourage" people to go into the Armed Forces.

I don't think it is necessary for me to tell you how much I believe in planning. I have had some very unusual but very satisfying experiences in planning. I have had experiences that, unfortunately, many people do not have. I have had the privilege of seeing and participating in planning, and of being allowed afterwards to participate in its operation. It is quite satisfying to be able to take a plan in which you had some part, at least some knowledge of it, and then participate in the operation of it. So many times, by the time you get the plan made, you go somewhere else, and somebody else comes along, and of course it's easier to write a new plan than to understand the old one, so they just do it again. There's some advantage to that. You don't get in the rut that probably we get into. The organization I represent

is probably in a lot of ways in a rut. Some of us have been with it probably long enough to know all about it, long enough to have lost most of the things that we could be contributing to it by freshness. But bureaucrats are hard to root out. They get intrenched. Sometimes it is an individual; sometimes merely a position. Sometimes you create a position for a good reason and keep it because, well, it might make surplus people.

So I am very strong for planning. I think what we were able to do in the Selective Service System during World War II was based very largely on the fact that it was well planned. I saw many agencies in the Government that came in with inadequate planning, or no planning at all, and tried to get going, and I used to feel very sympathetic toward them; I used to pity them, because they were floundering around, when they were too busy to think, or be trying to make up their minds what they ought to do.

One of the advantages of planning is that you may think when you are not hurried. You know from your experience in operations that you are not hurried in your planning here, as you are hurried in operations. Now is a good time to think. When the plans have to be operated, you won't have time to think. So you will do well to remember that, and, if you have anything to offer in planning, offer it now.

I had a friend who took high school rather rapidly, had some college, and then went out to teach. I saw another friend and I asked, "How is he getting along with his teaching?" My friend said, "Not so well. He went through school so fast he didn't have time to think, and since that time he has not had anything to think about." One of the things we do have right now is time to think.

I had many experiences during World War II; yet, strange as it may seem, the situation nearly always was one that we had talked about around the planning table. When it occurred it might have been the easy way, the lazy way, for us to use the solution for it that had evolved at times when we had more time than we had then, but it worked.

Of course there's tragedy in good planning. Many times when you get yourself worked into the problem, still later on when you come to operate it, you can see an emergency coming, and nobody will pay the slightest attention to you. When you are crying "wolf," and you can see the thing really coming on you, no one will believe it is coming.

There was a man one time who was appointed to a rather high job in the Government, in about 1941 or 1942. I went over to talk to him about manpower. He said, "If we have any difficulties about it, I will be glad to get in touch with you." He was remembering only that people were waiting outside the gates for jobs during the late thirties. They were still waiting, some in 1940 and 1941; but they were not there in 1943!

The difficulty was, that we cruised on to the emergency without doing much about it. Then, when we got there, we were like my school-teaching friend, who didn't have anything to think about. Of course, now, money is all important and time is somewhat less; but in an emergency money is nothing when time is everything.

Now, on this manpower planning, I don't pretend to know the answer to it. I don't believe that necessarily is the obligation of the Selective Service System. We are a very small part of it. We are implementers. We normally sail after somebody finally gives us even the compass bearing. So our problem then is to try to move generally on the compass bearing. If we varied from it, there was an island in the way, and while we had a bearing to work with, no one told us we had to run aground with it necessarily.

It is not a very good check, and I don't suppose we ought to pick on the Navy, but, in the days when I knew the Navy, before World War II, people who ran ships ashore got into difficulty. In fact, that helped promotion boards a great deal. If the promotion board had to select somebody out, they knew where they could get started. We used to say when the war came on we would have to get somebody to run the ships. Some of them had to be run onto the beach, but you have people in the Navy who have been in too long to run ships on shore. If you have to run ships on shore, you had better start with somebody who hasn't had that kind of training all his life which teaches him not to run aground.

That has nothing to do with it. That didn't remind me of a story. Normally when a speaker is "reminded of a story," he has practiced it the night before. I can assure you I didn't in this case.

There are three questions that are quite simple in any sort of planning. They are obviously simple for manpower. The first question is: What have you got? The second is: What do you need? The third, of course, merely a matter of detail. That is: How do you move your supply to your requirement?

Quite often some of the planning that I used to do before the war never got that far. We got charts drawn, starting with the precedent that somewhere down the line, if we got an organization chart drawn, we thought we had a plan. I have generally found that legislation sometimes is difficult, but, even if you get it, you haven't got much anyway and, if the organization doesn't have some relation to the function, you haven't got much when you have an organization.

So part of the problem of answering the three questions of What have you got in the way of manpower? What do you need? and, How are you going to move it? is--let's see: The first problem gets complicated, and of course anyone nowadays who doesn't make things complicated just isn't smart. If you were to take most things and keep them perfectly simple, nobody could do them. And, further, why would you need an administrator?

The whole age of specialization is built on the fact that you try to take something simple and make it hard to understand even by yourself and, if you can make it that way, obviously, other people will have trouble understanding it. In these days when we don't understand something that a fellow is telling us, instead of thinking he is stupid, like we did on the farm back home, we think he is profound.

Therefore, we have to make this question of What have we? complicated. It is slightly complicated. Now, when you start out talking about what you have in manpower, you have to use some measurement. How are you going to count the men, when you haven't even agreed on what a man is? Does he have to be male? Obviously; probably not. Does he have to be old, or young, or middle aged? Does he have flat feet? Do those flat feet prevent him from being a man? Do they add to him? How about the flatheaded boys? How do you find them out?

All these things get into this question of manpower. So we have 160 or 180 million, or 170 million, or what not. It makes very little sense, if you don't know 160 million <u>of what</u>. Thirty-four million or so are under 14 years of age. They are probably the most precious asset we have, because they are growing into something. Even your own age group, virile as it is, is growing <u>out</u> of something.

And yet, who would say that the 34, 35, and 36 year-olds and this ever increasing group that is under 14 years constitutes much of an asset at the present time to win a war? Some of you probably are still young enough to be in the babysitting business. Sometimes when you

are babysitting, you can't kid yourself into feeling that the object of your attention is much of an asset at the moment.

So, therefore, you have to drop that 34 million at that end and take 20 million more up--well, between your age and mine, shall we say? Now, that 20 million--what is that worth? Well, it depends on what you want. If you want advice--invaluable. They have more advice than they have ever been able to use successfully. Not only that; if you ask them, or if you do not, for that matter, they will be glad to give you the benefit of their advice on all the things that they have never been able to do anything about. But, when it comes to survival, that's another problem.

In the first place, there is only a limited amount of advice that the man needs who is out insuring survival against the enemy. Or maybe when he is given too much he has not even time to listen to you. Then, he has either to be respectful to a senior officer or win the war. So therefore we have 50-some million that we are in doubt about. When you start dropping back even maybe from the 45 age, which used to be the end of ablebodiness, according to some colonial laws, and our own laws from time to time--when you begin to drop back from there, you begin to get into different shades of usefulness. They are useful for some things, anyway, but not so useful for the Armed Forces. We have felt in our business that something could be accomplished with the recognition of a simple thing; that is, a division of men about like this:

We believe with others of our associates that this Nation has been saved by the boys in their late teens and early twenties. There are some other people who have been around at times. Probably some of them have been assets. Some have been debatable assets and some have not even been debatable. There are too many times, undoubtedly, when the Armed Forces had enough old men around. They could have spared two or three of them, and been much the stronger for the sparing.

We have taken men from somewhere around 17 and 18 and up to 25, and there are arguments about how soon we can use the lower end. Some of the reasons given are actual and some are political. Somewhere in that group are the people that have to carry the brunt of survival. Therefore, we think that those under 26 years of age should be used to the maximum, because, if you don't use them to the maximum, you have to go and find somebody, somewhere else, and where are you going?

Since this is a complicated age and you people are selected for brightness, I will jump to the other end of the bracket, rather than being logical, because most of us are more zoological than logical.

Take the individuals above 35--those are people to be used to fight only if we have to fight on our own ground. Everybody then has to fight and does. But you take those above 35 and leave out the professionals and semiprofessionals and take those in the regular forces, those who are key people--I repeat, key people--in the reserve forces--all the rest over 35 should be planned on as being available always for the maintenance of our national life, for the production of the food we have to eat and for the manufacture, generally, of the things that we have to have in order to throw them at the enemy or use them to keep surplus property running for ten years or so after the close of the war.

I used to think in the deferment business that we not only deferred enough people to build what we needed here but also we had to capture all the islands to have places to leave things. I deferred, or helped defer, enough people for the building of new ships, when we just didn't have room to anchor all the ones we deferred people to build. That is merely my view.

But, be that as it may, we believe that intelligent manpower planning would say to industry, to agriculture, and to others, outside of the professions, whether they be in the professional or semiprofessional class, "You may plan on keeping your people who are 35 and above, unless we are attacked on the home ground," and then it doesn't make too much difference about your planning anyway; because you might not have to have many people to run a factory that was destroyed.

Somebody told me in World War II when I came away out East as far as Baltimore, "Once there was somebody digging around in the ruins in London and he dug out an old girl. He said to her, 'Where's your husband? Is he down there deeper?' She said, 'No, the coward is in the Army.'" It could well be that the safest place, if we are attacked at home, would be with the Armed Forces; but, barring that, I believe that we can go somewhere in manpower planning if we have assurance in our productive area that the people above 35 are not going to be used for the forces.

Now, I have left the ages 26 to 35. What about them? In my book, they are a swing shift. In my book they are the people who, after we have exhausted--I repeat, exhausted--the manpower potentials of those

under 26--and that is not going to be easy, because there are a lot of people who don't want to exhaust the use of those people for the Armed Forces--will be used. I think the ones between 26 and 35 constitute the swing shift. I think they are the people that you begin to use after you exhaust the people who are under 26. I think you have another factor in that those are the people who are implemented as a result of the provision of the Reserve Act. You may find above 26 some of the individuals who are in the standby reserve, and perhaps a few in the ready reserve and, to the extent they are there, they will either be subject to call immediately, if they are in the ready reserve, or be subject to selective call as soon as the Armed Forces have need for the standby reserves. The standby reserve means somewhat the criteria that we have set up for the ages of 26 to 35, because we believe we ought to use everybody below 26 and we believe you should start rigid selection at 26, always to be sure no one went over the obstacles between 25 and 26. We believe that when you are selecting above 26, beginning with the age of 26, they should be taken selectively, and you should take the youngest first; so that, if we get about everybody, you won't take the 34 year-olds before the 33 and the 32 year-olds, etc.

That depends on how fast you mobilize. You always plan to mobilize much faster than you do. It would seem to me to be late in the first year, or maybe well into the second year, before you would be in the 26-and-above ages. So therefore it seems to me that industry, agriculture, and other people have some right to believe that initially they have maximum use of the people above 26 years of age.

There are exceptions to all these things, but, in general, one of the things that was bad in World War II was this hide-and-seek game. In the first place, the planners before World War II had thought that 21 to 31 were the initial ages that we would start putting in the Armed Forces. Congress thought a little differently. In fact, Congress had two ideas. One House believed we should take from 18 to 45; the other one thought we should take from 21 to 31. They compromised at 21 to 35. The compromise of 21 to 35 was quite easy at that time. The Armed Forces were enlisting people anywhere up to the age of 35. Congress just cut off compulsion at the place where the Armed Forces had cut off voluntary enlistments initially.

However, when Pearl Harbor came, everybody got very excited. We went back to age 45, which had been what the legislative people had thought was the top age of physical fitness. That was pretty well

established in State laws and in national law. They didn't go down to 18, because you have always got a sensitive political situation on the younger people; so they went as far as the early twenties. What happened? First: There were several million above 38. We got a few of them in the Armed Forces--not too many. There are several reasons why you don't get them. You defer people because they are doing something worthwhile. You have some with skills, and some with brains, and some with other things, in the upper age groups. Not only that, but, if you defer them for dependency, dependents are more likely among older people. If they get too old, they begin to be dependent upon their children. I happen to be in that state at the present time; some of you are approaching it.

So, by the very nature of things we don't take in so many people above 35 or 38, because, first of all, they do have dependents; second, they have skills, or they have publicity agents or something to prove that they are worth something; lastly, as the age rises they are rejected by physical examinations. We don't find many fit for service. There were some 300,000, 400,000 or 500,000.

Well, I remember very well one of the very high officers of the military testifying over on the Hill. We were at that time engaged in trying to get the 18 year-olds, and the Congress was rather slow. They were afraid of the women's vote and the parents' vote, and a lot of other things. So they were having quite a time. We had to use every card we had in the deck. We were finally driven to the place where we had to tell them the people over 38 weren't so hot. Of, course, they were about as hot as they had ever been. The only thing was, if they had let these individuals, who were 38, behave like they were 38, they probably would have done pretty well--if they had not tried to train them like monkeys to swing on ropes across the chasm and to crawl through barrels. The boys had gotten a little slow on their feet. Of course, if they had kept in shape like you people, mind you, they would have done better!

So this very high officer had a very startling thing to disclose. By putting the people who were 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, and 43 through what an 18 year-old thrives on, he had discovered two people, one of whom had a hernia and the other guy who had a heart attack.

So he finally kidded Congress into going to the 18 year-olds and doing away with the people from 38 to 45. So therefore we stopped taking people above 38. But we are logical guys. We promptly let

go all the guys above 38 because we were not taking any more. We had only spent 15 or 20 thousand dollars apiece on them. Not only that--we had taken them out of society because they were not doing anything in society particularly worthwhile. So we discharged them and started taking people we had deferred heretofore because they were necessary for society. A very intelligent approach to it.

Then, due to the fact that we made a little mistake in addition, along in 1945 we suddenly found ourselves one time with 300,000 more people in the Armed Forces than we thought we had. It was just a natural mistake. When you are dealing in big numbers, after all, what's 300,000? You wouldn't call a fellow a liar for 300,000, would you? Doesn't a three look like an eight, anyway? Well, I don't know. I didn't add it up.

One morning I found myself confronted with a request for what would happen if they told us to stop inducting. Some of you are old enough to remember that. During the month of February 1945 we had a great apparent shortage of manpower throughout the world. We were running induction stations at night, and we jumped 1-A from about one million to two million. The Chairman of the War Manpower Commission and the Director of the Selective Service System had a letter from the President on the 26th or 27th of February, in which he said the shortage of men was appalling. He didn't use the word "appalling." It was better English than that. I think it was written in G-1. He said we had to reduce the number of deferments in agriculture and industry. We certainly reduced them. During the month of March we had two million people in 1-A. The 4th of March we were asked whether we could stop inducting people because we were over strength. Of course we weren't over strength in February, because we hadn't taken anybody in in February.

It's like this fellow who pushes a button and sometimes tells them the wrong thing because they didn't ask him the right one. Anyway, we were over strength, and we retreated to not taking people over 26. We hardly dared say we would not take anybody we could get. So the war had gotten to the place where only young men could participate, which I think was a rather intelligent thing, a thing we might have arrived at several years before. It was now 1945. In 1940 we had taken them up to 45; then back to 38; then we went back to 26; later we went up to 29; then up to 33 again.

I realize you can't be entirely stable in trying to fight a war that was awfully different from any war we had ever had. If you use all the boys below 26 first, and, when you need more, take them, selectively, from 26 up, I think we will come nearer stabilization; we will come nearer to having the public understand that this is about what is going to happen, by making some plans, rather than have them never know what is going to happen from day to day.

I am probably a little oversensitive about this. I was flattered beyond anything I could hope for if anybody thought I was the guy who was changing the age groups. As a matter of fact, all I was doing was trying to find men. Congress and a few other people were changing the age groups. Congress is not a single person, and the Director of the Selective Service is. Collectively you can't be completely a damn fool, but individually you can always be accused of it. So therefore I have lived through a rather extensive experience of being blamed for not being able to make up my mind what kind of manpower we wanted and when we wanted it.

We have felt we would do much better in manpower planning if we planned to utilize to the extreme those under 26, and then, selectively, take the ones above 26 when you run out of people under 26.

We believe the new Reserve Bill, if implemented, will go a long ways toward establishing and maintaining that principle. We too feel that it is a forward step in manpower planning. Now, this is not, so far as I know, accepted by any large segment of the Government in toto, or necessarily by parts of it in anything but toto. We did convince Civil Defense that they would be wise if they followed about that pattern; that is, that they got their key people over 35, and, if they took anybody under 35, they took them knowing they had them on a loan. We have discouraged at every turn any talk about deferring people to run Civil Defense, or something like that, below 35 years of age.

Now, when you are talking about skill, by and large, it fits into the pattern very well. There are people with skill under 26; there's no question about that; but there are more above 26. When you talk about farming, it is true that there has been a very severe disintegration of 40-year-old farmers in this country, especially if they have 18- to 20-year-old sons. You would be surprised to know to what extent farmers of 40 have aged now and think they can't even run a tractor, much less walk, especially if they have sons 18 to 22 years of age. They might recover some if we were badly enough attacked. The attack

has to be bad enough to make the farmer believe his son might save us, and if he doesn't, he will have to go, too. Then he will start farming, and no question about that. I grew up on a farm. I know how the farmers feel about it.

I do think we will have more stability if we can make industry and agriculture and other fields understand that they ought to make their plans to meet mobilization; hence, to get ready for mobilization, and not to plan on keeping people under 26.

You do run right into one group; it is a head-on collision. I don't know how you can avoid the collision. I don't know how to avoid it. That is training; that is the school world; because the school world does feel that it has vested interests in the people when they are young. They figure they can't feed them the baloney they do when they get too old. They believe older people just wouldn't take it. I say this in all sincerity and in all kindness. I happen to have majored in education. That is in the family. As far as that goes, I am a trustee of an engineering school. Some people don't think it is as good a school as some others. That's controversial. I won't debate it at this time.

But the fact remains that the thing our educational system collides with, and I don't know why, is: It is the young men who normally have to save the Nation; and it is the young men who go to school. Of course they could perhaps get education, too, if the war is short enough. We are going to have lots of veteran students afterwards, and they can make up for the loss when we took them out. But just the same, the big pressure group--I say it in all kindness--is education. They object to placing the whole responsibility of the more active survival activities on the group under 26 years of age.

How to solve that, I don't know. I have regretted that we have somehow or other failed in this country to make our educational institutions and our educators understand that they are a part of it. I think we are going much farther than we did before World War II; but we have much farther to go. The educational people in this country are a pretty rare resource for many things we may want to do for survival. Many of these people are going to build things we already have, because we haven't made arrangements to be able to use, by modifying them, the things we already have.

I was on a board one time in the War Department. We had a feeling there would be no controversy on a thing like that in 1936, but I was

cast in the role of being the "devil's advocate." It seemed to me that whatever progress was made, the first thing you had to do was to buy off everybody, because you already had vested interests. That is a compromising thing to say; but it is a rather practical one.

I believe the more of the educators we educate, the better, so that they can integrate and know that what they are going to have to do in mobilization is something they at least think is important; and I think we will overcome one of the biggest difficulties we had in the war. One of the things that is very discouraging is for a guy who has been something on the campus to find the war has changed things so that he is nothing anywhere. He knows too much to be quiet. Unless we have integrated him, he doesn't know enough about operations, and he is an unfortunate guy to have around.

That is one of the reasons why I like to work with a man who is dumb, much more than I like to work with a fellow whose attitude is wrong but who is smart. The dumb man can do only a certain amount of damage. The bright man whose attitude is wrong can do a great deal of damage.

Therefore we have the problem in this country of integrating the educational program so that it becomes part of defense and it knows something about what it is going to do when you have a problem. You have a problem with the school educators. They like to draw things on boards. They like certain subjects. For example, there is the place where Latin is taught at times because you have a guy who teaches it, and somebody is going to have to take it. In the Service, of course, we would not do it that way--you would not do that in a service school--we at least have the advantage of getting people transferred a bit more often than they sometimes are in the educational world.

The educational world has great resources, if we make it at all times a willing part, so that we can somehow or other get the institutions and personnel connected with the institutions doing something affirmative. Then we won't have them worrying because they have no students. As soon as you leave them without anything to do, obviously they will want students. Campuses don't look well without some students on them.

In saying this I am not becoming in favor of the two projects that we initiated during the war, ASTP and V-12, because I think you have

to do some thinking about the ASTP and the V-12. They were better though, undoubtedly, than what we did in World War I, but somehow or other I was not in a good position in the fall of 1943 to go into a little place like Montpelier, Vermont where in a school up on the hill we had 400 or 500 of the best looking men you could find up there, and we had those boys come down and parade in the streets upon the occasion where we shipped away 37-year-old fathers with four and five kids. The public didn't understand exactly how we were using our manpower, especially when the guy came home in around six weeks after we found he couldn't swing across chasms or crawl through barrels, or do some of the other things demanded of him. They had to excuse him. Somehow you must not only use your manpower intelligently, but you have to keep the public sold that you are intelligent, and that there are not too many extra things going on which give the public doubt.

Now, I realize there are difficulties, even if you know what to do, in trying to get your plans so they are operative under any sort of circumstances. We are at the present time suffering in our agency with a surplus. I never expected to suffer from that disease. We have about 17 million people that are registered. Some of them were 25 years--almost 26--in 1948, so they are getting on. But there are about 17 million of them. Seven million of them are over 26, or under 18-1/2. The latter are only about 500,000. That leaves you 10 million. Of the 10 million, 4 million who are under 26 have been in the service, are part of the service, or have been in the service and are out of the service. That leaves you 6 million. Two million of that 6 million at the present time are in 1-A. That is more than we had in 1-A most of the time during the war. That is too much cash to carry. But we are operating at the present time with a law that was made for universal application or to fight the Korean War, which is over--at least temporarily over. It was certainly a real struggle, and we used that setup to fight that war, but we have not carried out universality. Hence we have around 2 million 1-A.

Of course you could make easy deferments. The next time you need men, you are going to make it hard again. It is not easy to switch back and forth on the concept of what constitutes 2-A, 2-C, or something.

The thing that bothers me as much as anything is that in the manpower field there are one or two million 4-F's, (mentally or physically rejected) most of them under 26 years of age. It doesn't seem possible

that you could find 2 million people that the Armed Forces would not take under 26 years of age. If you didn't think we could do it--we have.

On the other hand I do want to say that one thing most of you, unless you are unlike other classes, have labored under is the delusion that the Selective Service System has anything to do with acceptability. It doesn't. The Armed Forces fix the standards and apply them. We do reject some few people. The local boards reject them as agents of the Department of Defense, especially a man with a couple of legs off. It seems queer to the public to use money to send a fellow up for physical examination when you don't, even in this technical age, have to be a doctor to see that there is going to be some reason for his being rejected. We try to avoid such cases, but that is all we do about accepting or rejecting them.

I am disturbed because 750,000 of this 2 million have been rejected for no other than the so-called mental reasons. I don't mean emotional. I mean they are confronted by a paper and a pencil. Those who have looked at the paper afterward said it wasn't good enough.

Now we find that we have a few people who know too much to get into the Armed Forces. They know how to answer what is on the paper so that it is not good. I suspect most of them don't know how.

I can't make any case now of compelling the Armed Forces to take that 750,000 when we have 2 million others that are presumably better--or at least they have not been examined, and we don't know that they are that bad--but they are available. This is not the time to try to reduce physical standards, I realize.

But I do say to you as planners of manpower that you have created an unfortunate club of the least capable who have been sorted out, and then, when an emergency comes, when you have the least time to spare, you are going to get them. Two out of five--that is about their occurrence rate--there is about a 40 percent rejection. Sometime you are going to have to take all of them from that group, because they are going to have to be used in all-out mobilization. You have already sorted out the other guys that are to go with them in their occurrence rate.

Now, what to do about that? I don't pretend to know, because now is not the time to reduce standards, because, why eat stale fish when you don't know whether you can eat the good ones or not? That's exactly

the proposition you have. With 2 million people, unless we push up the reserve program and absorb and train more men, there's going to be some doubt about whether or not we are going to lose men, because Congress will get to thinking that we have a surplus. When they think of it hard enough, they will correct that. The thing we are afraid of is that they will correct age 20 or 21, or something, or up the limit, rather than leave it where it is now. That would really hurt. We would rather leave it at 26, instead of the much discussed extended liability that goes with a deferred man until he is 35. Personally I was frightened to see Congress start following that course, for two reasons: (1) I don't know where they would stop. (2) It is a show of weakness, whether it is weakness or not. Somebody might say if we moved back to 26 we would have removed the liability from 9 million people, which would be true in theory, but as a matter of fact, we were really bothering about 17,000 who had extended liability. We had to get anything we could out of it.

Dropping liability for prime manpower is not the way you will do it to be productive of best results. It is not the way our allies, on the one hand, would think we are doing it; certainly, on the other hand, our potential enemies would not think so either.

So therefore it is dangerous to fiddle around with your resources, or with what people think your resources are. I find myself compelled to fight any reduction. Still, at the same time, obviously, the Armed Forces need to think about the young man going into the Reserve. If he goes in at 18, 19, or 20, he is a potential resource much longer than if he goes in at 30. We do a disfavor in giving 30 year-olds to the Armed Forces. They are already too old for the things they want them for.

We have taken some "illegal" corrective action. During the last three months, by and large, we have been tending to bring only single men, or at least those without children, the under 26 year-olds, into the Armed Forces. If we ever have recruiting that is going to work, it is going to be when we get the liability age small and the heat intense, because they don't enlist when they think the chances are going to be only one in twenty. We have to somehow drive them to believe that "If not tomorrow, the day after, I will be getting word." That guy is in a good recruiting area, but not the fellow who has been reading "U. S. News," where it says the chances are one in seventeen, or something like that.

In other words, when we stop taking men over 26, we lose only 17,000. The guy who reads it thinks in terms of nine years of men and what it will move closer to him. When he hears that we are not going to take fathers--or say he doesn't know that--when calls get to 15,000 or 20,000 or 30,000, he knows that his own turn is drawing closer. He feels it must be important. They are looking at me. Therefore we believe that in order to give the Armed Forces the men they can use best, we have to somehow or other get the heat and the pressure on the individuals within the group somewhere in the early twenties.

Now, if we are taking the men we are supposed to be taking, we are taking some around 22 and 23 years of age. Be careful of that age, because it is an average. It is an average arrived at by taking 70 or 80 percent of volunteers and inductees who are under 20 and adding a few older birds in the last six or eight months. They are in the late twenties--28 or 30.

You know the fellow who went into the swimming pool. He was a statistician. He knew the average dept was 2-1/2 feet. He couldn't swim. He didn't have to worry, at this depth. He got into the water where it was deeper than that. He drowned beyond the average. So therefore we have to be very careful about the average.

Now, it seems to me in this planning that we have to remember that our manpower resources are divided very sharply into age groups. We have to remember that the need we must feel, if we have it, is that we are dealing with a commodity that is not just the need of food or the measure of some of our mechanical and material things. Man has not been measured that accurately. So we are dealing with something that is never quite accurately defined in even our description of it. I have not dealt with the "how" that we are going to have to use and to change. I suppose probably I could do as many commanders have done and say that "how" is merely a matter of detail, which means it is about 99 percent of the problem, because, after all, you would rather have a bad plan well executed than a good plan messed up.

Now, the thing our organization is up against is that we have a surplus, which makes us vulnerable to Congress, who wants to reduce it. It makes us vulnerable also to people who want deferment. They say, "You have lots of people." That makes us build up a sort of perfect system that is not realistic.

We have time. We have a 10,000 call now and we are going to have 20,000 in November. So what? There have been times when we inducted 300,000 or 400,000 during the peak and 400,000 or 500,000 enlisted and they moved 780,000 in a month. What kind of job is it to move 10,000 or 12,000? You may think because you have time, because you have telephones, telegraphs, and everybody in the world helping you, you tend to get a type of perfection. Immediately when you move into large numbers, it tends to damn you from the beginning, because you are still trying to run it like what you thought was best, when as a matter of fact it was, from the planning standpoint, worse.

We are the only agency, may I say, in the Government, that has developed a philosophy for manpower procurement, built up a structure and gained a concurrence by everybody, and yet, today we do instead a lot of other things that won't work if we have an emergency.

MR. POLUHOFF: Gentlemen, General Hershey is ready for your questions.

QUESTION: Since the day may come when we know we have eaten all this so-called fresh fish, is there any positive planning or really definite thinking as to how you would change your rejection rate so that at least the Armed Forces might be able to eat a little more of this fish that is liable to be spoiled?

GENERAL HERSHEY: As they used to say on the radio, I am glad you asked that question. We have had a great many studies on how we would change it. One little matter of detail is; it is not our business. The Armed Forces are the ones to whom the Congress has been kind enough to say, and I think intelligently so, that "A man shall be inducted provided he is acceptable to the Armed Forces." Therefore, the problem is your problem, not mine; and I tend at the present time, although I have spent most of the last 15 years yelling--and just at the moment my face is a little red--to use anything, because we have so many other people. But I think the first thing we have to think about are the 750,000 mental rejectees. There are two or three reasons why.

One is, they passed everything except the mental test. I realize that if a man is dumb enough it is pretty hard to find a place for him, but the larger an organization is, the more places there are. Of course in the highly technical ones, they don't dare admit it; but I saw some college graduates doing some things in the war in some of these highly technical places that somebody else could have done a damn sight better.

In the first place, they couldn't do the first thing on the first day, because the Ph.D. didn't mind. They all got excited about having things like a head; but you can't keep a Ph.D. too interested too long merely in having the best head in the fleet. Some of these guys are on a level where you can get them keyed up so that they are proud to be a part of an organization which would also have the best heads in the fleet.

But I think we have to do more thinking about where we use some of these people. You can't rate them. You lose flexibility. You are not going to have people who can work everywhere. No question about it. But in this age of specialization, your smart boys are going to say you are lucky to have them work for you, but once you get them, they get mad if you let anybody else do the kind of work they want to do. You are going to have to find a place for them.

In the next war we get into, if we get into one, some people will have physical damage, but many of them are not damaged mentally, and I have always felt that there are places in supply installations, places in induction centers, places in other stations where you can use those individuals in a limited, but useful, way. If they have to go and jump over a creek and crawl through a barrel and have to do seven or eight other things that they have not been doing all their lives, you can't expect them to be able to do those things. But just the same they can intelligently do a great many things, and I think we ought to be planning now on how we are going to use them.

One other thing that nobody asked me to bring up is that one of the complications which arise where there are families with four kids, and I know how that is; I have four. If you let one of the kids get to thinking he eats ice cream until he is not hungry any more, and he can't eat anything else but ice cream until he has all the ice cream he wants, and the other kids can't get ice cream, you are going to have trouble selling them on eating spinach. One thing that may be tough presently, which is not the least improbable thing in this business, is, if you take in the service some of these lesser fit, some people who already have gotten "free of the spinach" will have to be told; "Damn your little hide; you are going to take it and like it."

Until that time comes we will never solve the use of the less fit, because you will never do it by making one of the little boys carry all the wood and the rest of the people eat the ice cream. Of course I am prejudiced, obviously. I came early. I came in a time when things had to be. I live as I see, I guess.

QUESTION: General, what is your personal opinion of the value of a true universal military training program?

GENERAL HERSHEY: Well, I have been for universal military training since 1908. I don't know what you mean by "true." I don't know what you mean by "true universal military training." I am all keyed up about trying to get universal military training passed by Congress. On two separate occasions Congress defined it, but that confused them, because they didn't know what it was, anyway. I am not trying to be facetious, but what we are up against is the fact that everybody ought to serve, I think, except, they will not unless we need them. There are some pacifists who don't want anybody to serve anywhere. You can forget them. We haven't been denied military legislation because of the opposition of people who are pacifists. Our trouble is our own people--people who said, "Yes, but."

Now, I have come to the conclusion that to talk about universality as a philosophy is not the way to get it--to say that we must have universal military training because everybody ought to do it, or to say we have to have universal military training because it is good for them and everybody ought to have it, because it is good for America. If you should write it you might tear it right up, or vice versa. I don't think we can sell it. I think we are on the right trail there. There's some difference of opinion. I believe you have to say, "You must have this number of people working full time; we have to have this many people working part time who will be ready to work full time immediately--the Ready Reserve. We have to have this number of people already trained who can come back and lend a hand." When you have these people at the start, it ought to be enough. You don't keep a guy until he vegetates from old age in the several years before you have universal military training. I don't care what you call it then. That happens to be my approach.

I believe Congress will buy necessity. I don't believe they will buy theory. I don't believe they will buy philosophy. The philosophy that everybody ought to serve I don't believe you can sell them. The fact that you need the guy may get through to lots of them up there if they are scared. If they are scared enough, you can sell them. If they are not, you just have to wait until they get more scared.

QUESTION: General, I was particularly interested in your remarks on education. Do you have any idea, sir, as to how, in accordance with the words of Mr. Royal, we should overhaul the educational system, perhaps contracting in certain areas and expanding in others, to catch the right number of people?

GENERAL HERSHEY: Well, I generally get in trouble in most anybody's field, and I think there are people undoubtedly in college that hadn't ought to be there. There were even when I was there. I proved it. But I am not convinced that, in our kind of Government, we can do some of the things that perhaps people do in other kinds of government.

I get my skin abstracted frequently from the scientific field because we are not in as good a shape as Russia is. They are both the witness and the judge. But that is what they say. I am not going to quarrel about that. I do quarrel about my being completely at fault. We have deferred about everybody in the last five years and have been skinned very hard by people who are outside of education for deferring them. I do not see how in our type of Government you can be too restrictive on who goes to school, even if you do it in the guise of making it tough.

Yet, frankly, I don't know where we are going. If we get everybody going to college, what little they could have done before they came to the military is not the appropriate thing. Therefore, when they get out of college they are fitted for nothing. I realize the danger there. I also realize the danger in that we have prostituted our high schools by allowing people to take most anything and graduate. When they come to try to make engineers out of them they find they are no damn good, because they don't know how to add. And there are two or three other processes an engineer has to go through in addition to addition. If they can't even add you are not going to produce engineers. Until we start in the grades making people take things that are tough, I don't think you are going to make scientists.

How long it is going to take to do it, I don't know. The people we are talking about don't ask nearly as much about the student's preferences as we do. Frankly, I would like to say, when the boys go to college, what the colleges that take the boys ought to do. I am not sure about that. I don't happen to believe all education is in the college, and I certainly don't believe that all that is in the college is education; but I do agree with that theory. On the other hand, I don't see how you are going to do it. I don't see how you are going to deny people, if they have enough money, or if they will work to go to college, at least for a while. Undoubtedly you can draw them out. I believe there's going to be a demand for things and legislators will not be appropriating money to State schools because somebody had one of their sons or nephews tossed out.

It is not an essential proposition. We can understand the advantage of it if perhaps the world is going to be saved by people who get through college. That is what I am not sure about, although I like to say I went through college. I have to, or nobody would suspect it.

QUESTION: It is my understanding that the initial reaction to this voluntary training and ready reserve, or standby reserve, has been very poor. Is that going to correct itself, or is there any medicine in mind to make it well?

GENERAL HERSHEY: I want to thank you very sincerely for the flattery of even thinking I know the answer to it. But this is not my business. Probably primarily we have a great interest in it, and we have some purpose for it. Most people who come in my office come to tell me how to run my office. I think I know more about my business than they do. I have to defend my boys. I know my boys, given time, can settle up things. They have not done so well, though.

I happen to be one of those who favor unreservedly this present reserve bill. It probably will benefit us. It is not one I would have written. I would not ever expect to get a bill I did write. I think it is very forward looking, and I think it has a great deal to recommend in it. I don't know too much about why they are not getting recruits. Maybe the things I am going to say are unfair. If they are, they won't make any difference, because you gentlemen know, and you will pay no attention to them.

I happen to have been in the Guard years and years ago. I got elected. I don't suppose I would have gotten in if they had done more searching and things. I was an enlisted man in the old Guard and I was an officer in the Guard. Probably times have changed, but when we were running the company we didn't get recruits by people putting notices in the paper, and we didn't get recruits from the efforts of our instructors. We didn't get recruits through a law. We went out in the highways and the byways and got people interested in, not the National Guard, but Company B of the Third Indiana Infantry.

Personally, I don't believe you will build a ready reserve until you build it geographically. I don't think a kid is going to enlist in the Reserve. I think he will enlist in B Company or Squadron A or some other thing. And I personally believe that in getting recruits you may have to get a company and get a captain in it and some lieutenants, and some people who figure they damn well had better get some men or

they are not going to be captain in it too long. Maybe they are doing all these things. I don't happen to know. I have been out most of the last three months going around the country. I have only one eye, and I see only half of what other people see. I am one-sighted. That makes distorted vision.

QUESTION: General, each war seems to produce more deferments. In World War I and World War II one of the principal deferment causes was men with dependents; and in the Korean War we came up with a new one--first, educational deferments, of course, and then deferment for--not a dependent father, but for a prospective dependent father. Is that going to be a continued innovation?

GENERAL HERSHEY: Well, I think the answer is yes; except that it is continuous and has been. In the first place, we did have educational deferments during World War II. In World War I we didn't have too many. In the first place, World War I didn't get enough people so that they could defer many, because they didn't take them. Mostly everybody was deferred; not because they were deferred, but because they were not taken. There are two reasons why you defer: (1) because you defer; (2) because you don't get to them.

In World War I we deferred medical students and divinity students. In World War II we started in 1940 and 1941 deferring everybody who was in school until the end of the year. Congress did that. Then the next thing we did was to begin to pick out engineering, medical, dental, veterinarian, physicist, and this and that, and this health thing. You ought to have seen that last group. We made up a list, showed it to somebody, and, if it had any preferences in it, we went along with them.

A while ago I tried to tell about ASTP and V-12. What was offhand there was that disadvantage over the deferment--that it not only was not being run by the guys that were running the deferments, but that it was reduced to your people getting into our people and starting running a little hell of your own--so that ASTP and V-12 were nothing but military deferments. You did it because we would not defer enough people to keep the campuses up to what they wanted. They put pressure on Defense because of the Army. So they took a whack at it.

I don't know how many were not fit--400,000 or 500,000. We never got above 200,000 in the Korean War, of course, because, number 1, in the Korean War we didn't take too many, anyway.

Back to the "father" business--we started out in World War II by deferring anybody who was married. Then we got a little short of men; so we made them have a child, and most of them did. They have been most cooperative. However, by 1943 we began to pinch students, so that about all you had left were the engineers and scientists. Eventually, in 1944, everybody went. One of the student bodies thought we would have had some let up, but we took everything, except the medics and the vets were never taken. The final year the war got tough and fathers were taken. The Senate tried to pass a bill providing we could not take fathers. It ended in another compromise that we couldn't take fathers if we could get anybody else.

That is where we had to prove to each local board that there was need of taking fathers, before they would take them. Congress is very sensitive over the question of fatherhood. I don't know all the reasons why. That may change in World War III if we have it.

Congress never got to the place where the 25-year-old single scientist should be let go rather than the 21-year-old father who can't read or write--but the thing he works at he is successful in.

QUESTION: General, can you give us your views on the use of voluntary forces in a full emergency situation?

GENERAL HERSHEY: I suppose you mean volunteering to get into the service.

STUDENT: Yes.

GENERAL HERSHEY: We don't have it. In the first place, I never sold any of this and I don't expect to sell it today. I personally believe in the semimobilization, or whatever it is. If we are going to attempt to use everybody, I think we ought to do our recruiting of career men within, rather than without. I can hear a lot of you who have been on recruiting say "ha, ha." You figure you won't get them, and if you get them, after you have them a while, they may not re-enlist. You have to sell; you can't compel.

Therefore I have always believed in that in the present situation we are in, especially. In the Korean War, the forces had to take people out of the pool. I don't think a man ought to be permitted to enlist until he has proved he is worth having as a professional. I am a little touchy on that. I am getting to be an old man. I think one of

the reasons we are in trouble is that some of our recruiting officers oversold some of the men we have been sending to Japan and I don't think that's a thing we should be proud of. I don't believe every guy who walks in and says "I want to enlist," even if he thinks he has facilities to make him come up to specifications, should get in. I don't believe we ought to take him. I think permanent forces should be something you have to select. You can be a two-year man--that's an obligation--but to join you have to be something.

When I see people enlisting scared kids who are rejected as 4-F's, because they are getting the hell kicked out of them for not making quotas, or because the recruiter knew somebody was going to have to take what he didn't want, I don't know what to think. Procurement should be put on a different basis than that. I would hate to tell you the number of 4-F's I have the names of who were recruited after being rejected for induction. They managed one way or another to get them in because they had to have them.

I believe personally that in time of peace you can make it tough to become a part of the permanent forces of the United States. Obviously, if I believe that, I don't want a chaos that is inevitable when you run two systems at the time that you are trying to beat the enemy.

During the first two or three years of World War II, there were men in many States of the Union in uniform. Paternal high school officials were trying to keep the kids from enlisting when they were going to have to serve anyway. There were people in most every State of the Union trying to get people to enlist who had to serve in their part of it anyway drawing more money than it cost to run the Selective Service System in that particular State. I could name State after State.

It didn't help me to pay a girl 2,500 dollars or so a year and to have a number 1 person, whether he was a master sergeant of the Army or a chief petty officer of the Navy out there competing with this girl getting 2,500 dollars. The public wanted to know why the hell he didn't go and fight. Maybe he didn't know there was a war on. Getting the kid in high school was inevitable. So there was nothing to sell him. He knew he was going. He didn't know which one of the services he was going to.

I happen to believe that the services should vie among themselves and be proud of their particular part of the service. When they turn out to face the civilians, they should turn out as one. If outside

somebody said, "What about that stinker over in that suit?" they should say, "They are all great people. They wear Uncle Sam's clothes." That doesn't matter now.

I happen to have dissension in the family. I have a fellow in my family who belongs to the Marines, and they are not even in the Navy. But just the same I don't go around and publicly denounce the Marines, and I don't want to catch him going around denouncing the Army. He has told me things about the Army I don't like. Maybe they were so. I don't know. But that is all right. He and I can fight about which is the best, but when we turn our faces out, both are good; because the Congress of the United States said that both are necessary and that both are honorable. That goes for the Reserves, too.

The less we hear about the permanent forces talking about people escaping into the Reserves, the sooner we will have a sellout service. If everybody follows his own nose by serving in the way Congress has said he could serve, it is not given to any one of us to say that it is not honorable. So the sooner we have that, the sooner we will have something we will all be proud of.

So I will fight the Navy any time, but not when civilians are present.

MR. POLUHOFF: General Hershey, in your very unique and special way, you have again given us the benefits of your experience. On behalf of the Commandant and the College, thank you very much, sir.

(19 Mar 1956--250)O/sgh

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