

ORIENTATION ON MOBILIZATION PROBLEM
Annex to Mobilization Unit Curriculum Book

17 February 1956

CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
SPEAKER--Colonel James E. Walsh, USA, Chief, Mobilization Branch, ICAF.....	1
GENERAL DISCUSSION.....	19

Publication No. L56-101

INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

Washington, D. C.

ORIENTATION ON MOBILIZATION PROBLEM

17 February 1956

COLONEL WALSH: General Hollis, General Calhoun, and Gentlemen: As you gathered from the weekly schedule, I am going to talk to you about the Mobilization Unit. This unit doesn't start until two to three months from now--the first of May--and it will continue until graduation day. Somebody was telling me outside the lecture hall that I have some unforeseen competition this morning in that the interest of the Navy students has been diverted by receipt of orders.

You have all received a copy of the problem directive for the Mobilization Unit, which you have been asked to read. In the Mobilization Unit we try to summarize the course as a whole by assigning a problem of broad scope. I imagine those of you who have read the directive have gotten that impression.

The first question that might occur to you is why I orient you on the Mobilization Unit now, since you are used to branch chiefs talking about their units the first day you work on the unit concerned. There are two reasons. One is that with a problem of such broad scope, we want you to be able to turn it over in your minds, to get used to it. The second reason is that previous classes have suggested that the mobilization problem be given out early.

We were on the horns of a dilemma in that regard, because we didn't want to divert your attention from other course units and the work that you are doing currently on term papers. There have been comments by the students about the undesirability of two courses running concurrently. So we had to compromise. Colonel Cass Conner, who runs the Economic Potential Branch, and I have discussed the committee work that you are going to do in that unit in March and April. We agreed that it can lead naturally into the committee work you are going to do on mobilization planning in the final unit of the course. So we have issued the Mobilization Problem Directive to you, and you will have the opportunity of thinking about it while Economic Potential is going on.

I would like to begin by discussing with you the mission of the Mobilization Unit.

CHART 1

MISSION

- | | |
|----------------------|---|
| I College | To study... Economic Mobilization |
| II Mobilization Unit | a. To study... Economic Mobilization through analysis of current mobilization... plans. |
| | b. To synthesize the year's study. |

Note that I set up here a capsule definition of the year's work-- "To study economic mobilization." As you know, yesterday we listened to four student OP's. I made a mental note as I listened that three of them mentioned the phrase "economic mobilization" as they opened their talks. It seems to me that there is in the class a general understanding that those two words "economic mobilization" are a short definition of the year's work.

I draw your attention to the fact that the Mobilization Unit's mission is phrased in the same terms-- "To study economic mobilization," with an accent, however, on current conditions.

Since the Mobilization Unit is the final unit of the course, it gives you an opportunity to fill in the gaps in the year's work; to relate to each other the individual subjects--manpower, economic stabilization, requirements, procurement, production, et cetera. They have to be integrated into the one overall subject of mobilization. That is what is implied in the second part of this unit's mission-- "To synthesize the year's work."

Now, each of you must necessarily do that for yourself. Nobody can tie together what you know about economic mobilization and put it in proper perspective but you yourselves.

But, since we have this mission of synthesizing the year's work in the Mobilization Unit, I am going to try to express to you the way I tie the course together. Perhaps I can help you to relate the courses you have taken to each other; or I may suggest to you certain gaps in the instruction you have received. Possibly such a review may stimulate

some of you to an individual effort to fill out your knowledge of economic mobilization in some special area where you feel that a gap in your knowlege exists.

An overall look at the full course at this time--looking backward at what you've had, and forward at the little that remains--should give you an appreciation of the continuity of the course. From my viewpoint I hope it will help you better to understand what we are asking you to do in the final study, which I shall discuss in the second half of my talk.

CHART 2

COURSE UNITS

- I Orientation
- II Manpower
- III Economic Stabilization
- IV Natural Resources
- V Requirements
- VI Production
- VII Procurement
- VIII Economic Potential
- IX Mobilization

Last August and September we had three weeks of Orientation, Unit I. We surveyed the historical development of economic mobilization and United States experience with it. We presented a ten-day Economic Refresher Course to broaden your grasp of basic economic principles--so you'd become familiar with their usefulness in analyzing trends in the national economy. We glanced briefly at the American political and economic system today, and at our national security organization evolved since the last war.

And then we spent one week in a course called Executive Development. Here we tried to develop your appreciation of the other fellow's point of view. We tried to sharpen your appreciation of management, in the sense of getting along with, or managing, other people.

With this background, we entered upon the course proper. In a series of seven course units, the various branches of the College faculty attempted:

First, to point out to you the problems involved in their particular aspect of the general subject area of economic mobilization; and

Second, to develop some of the historical procedures and policies developed, especially in World War II and Korea, to solve those problems; and

Third, to indicate the gaps in our United States planning and experience--for, in many respects, there are some perpetually unsolved problems--and there are other new problems introduced by technological progress; e. g., nuclear warfare--so we may be better able to handle the security and mobilization problems of the future.

The first such unit was Manpower, Unit II. Here you examined our manpower needs versus our resources; and some special attention was given to the United States' shortage of engineers, especially as compared to the comparable situation in the U. S. S. R. You got a look behind the phrase "manpower shortage," and you got an understanding of the procedures that have been tried out to get the most effective use of existing manpower. You explored some associated problems--education, labor disputes, the bearing on manpower productivity of such factors as wages, hours, training, and working conditions. You examined the question of manpower controls, including the hot political question of national service, and of how far the people will permit themselves to be controlled. When the calendar ran out on the Manpower Course, I feel sure you were convinced that it was a subject of central importance in economic mobilization.

Concurrently with Manpower, you studied another basic segment of the overall picture-puzzle of mobilization--economic stabilization. With visiting lecturers and in student discussion groups you went over some United States historical experience in this area. You gained an appreciation of the controls needed to minimize the disruption to the economy when too much money chases too few goods. You learned that

the solution to such problems as inflation, hoarding, and shortages of labor and materials lies somehow in the application of Government controls applied in five sensitive areas; viz: prices, wages, profits, credit, and consumption. But you finished your studies in this unit knowing that contradictory views prevail regarding the time for application, and the extent of coverage, of these controls. You were given some ideas, also, about the possibly increased complexities of such problems if the economy of the United States were to be disrupted by future nuclear damage.

In Natural Resources, Unit IV, you turned to a consideration of our national position in the area of another of the five M's--materials. You saw that the richest country in the world, the United States, although not a "have-not" Nation, does classify herself as a "want-more" Nation. You noted that raw material consumption is constantly increasing; that many important materials have to be imported; that domestic output of other materials is insufficient for our peacetime needs--let alone our wartime needs; and that many imported materials come from areas where wartime trade would be difficult or impossible.

Also in November, and extending over the Christmas holidays into January, you investigated the relationship of mobilization to military strategic and logistic planning. You examined the procedures in use, at different levels in the DOD, for determining and coordinating military requirements. You discovered what an almost superhuman task it is to compile a balanced bill of materials for national security, and I presume that consequently you became convinced of the need for short-cuts. You learned that a rapid and practical method of translating a strategic concept into reasonably accurate estimates of needs for men, materials, and machines; and balancing them with the needs of the civilian economy; is to a great degree an unsolved problem. Possibly this is naturally a problem which needs to be worked out again and again--with never a constant solution. You learned that this problem is one on which a major portion of the planning effort of the Office of Defense Mobilization, as well as military logistic planning, is focused.

That brings us to the present time, when you are studying two basic aspects of the mobilization picture. Procurement and Production to my mind go together like Damon and Pythias, or love and marriage. Procurement is concerned with the organization, policies, and procedures in accordance with which the military services acquire from the basic civilian economy the goods needed to support our Armed Forces in preparation for or in war.

Conversely, Production focuses attention on the capabilities and limitations of United States industry to satisfy that procurement demand, to supply the balanced military-civilian requirements you investigated in the Requirements Course. Your study of industrial production will be supplemented by visits to some six or eight plants on our spring field trip. You will see various types of factories in operation, and have a chance to discuss with management their problems and views regarding defense production. The opinions you hear may cause you to reassess your own views. The trip serves as a valuable visual-aid adjunct to the college lectures by industrialists, who, of course, cannot bring their factories to the platform.

From mid-March to mid-April you will study Economic Potential, Unit VIII. This course is intended to provide an understanding of the economic factors which influence logistic and strategic planning, and which form the bases of national power. I hope you will also get an appreciation of the relative economic strengths and weaknesses of those world areas which have particular significance in today's international situation. This study will supplement many of the lectures in this area which you have heard jointly with the National War College. The committee work which you will be doing in the Economic Potential Unit will weigh and compare Communist vs free-world economic capabilities. It will provide a valuable background for your committee work in the Mobilization Unit.

In this short survey of the course I have tried to show that the units of the year's work can be integrated in your minds into one package. I think of requirements, procurement, and production, from the point of view of process, as the guts of this subject of mobilization. One can also break mobilization down another way, into subject areas--the M's of manpower, materials, money et cetera. But you are taking the course as students, and I am not. You know better than I what you have done and are doing, and how you are fitting it together in your minds. My remarks are intended to give you the perspective of an observer--one who was a student two years ago. As I stand off and see this forest, without being overwhelmed by the number of trees, I see an overall logical relationship in the units of the course. And I have tried to share it with you!

But let us turn our attention to this year's Mobilization Problem. I propose to discuss the background of this directive, to explore some aspects of the problem, to explain the administration organization of the class during this unit, and to go over the committee requirements.

In preparing this directive, one of our major objectives was to make this problem as close to the real problem facing the United States as we could. Nevertheless, we wanted to keep the problem at as low a classification as possible. So we did not use classified intelligence or planning documents in its preparation. It was based on information available in the press and on an unclassified basis from Government publications. After preparation, the directive was referred to official governmental agencies, to be certain that it contained no errors of fact, and that it was realistic.

We have made this directive unclassified. You are authorized to go as high in classification as you want. But I urge you also to keep the reports to as low a level of classification as you can. We are planning on inviting to our presentations only guests who will be cleared for secret. That is because classified material can come up in the question period. I urge that the lower the classification, the wider the distribution you can have on your reports, and the more useful they can be. So from the standpoint of usefulness of the reports, a low classification is suggested.

But I would like to turn your attention to the mission, which is:

"To appraise critically and to develop recommended revisions to United States planning for economic mobilization, to meet the demands of the estimated situation facing the United States for the next five years."

As benchmarks for this mission, we have provided certain assumptions, which correspond to the current situation, in our opinion. As you have noted from the directive, the security situation facing the United States for the next five years is being estimated by this year's National War College class. A selected committee estimate resulting from the NWC student exercise will be made available to each of our ICAF committees in April as further background for your mobilization planning.

The planning which you are to appraise, criticize, and amend is for a certain time period--for the next five years. We are not asking you to plan for mobilization for the indefinite future, but under current conditions and for a limited period.

CHART 3

CONDITIONS OF PROBLEM

1. Plan for next five (5) years.
2. Power struggle continues.
3. Soviet military capabilities:
 - a. Peripheral war.
 - b. General war.
 - c. Nuclear attack on United States.
4. Mobilization conditions.
 - a. With (
 - or (massive destruction in United States.
 - b. Without(

We have almost given you "carte blanche" to solve the problem, which we think President Eisenhower, the National Security Council, and the Office of Defense Mobilization are faced with in today's world. When President Eisenhower was your age, he probably hadn't had as much experience in this area as you have had. But he is faced with this problem. If you feel inadequate, think of the job that faces him. I think there are men in the class who are just as intelligent as he is. So I don't think this problem is too big for you.

Your student committees simulate a Presidential Advisory Commission. We think that such a commission might have on it men of the stature of Bernard Baruch, Herbert Hoover, George Kennan, General Marshall, et al. This would be a really high-powered group! And we feel that this commission would be asked to give its frankest opinion and advice. When the directive says that no organization or policy should be sacrosanct, we really want to wipe the slate clean insofar as commitments to preconceived courses of action are concerned.

However, you are, of course, limited by commonsense and the facts of present-day reality. You have only 165 million Americans

and about 400 billion dollars economy to work with. Also you have patriotic Americans like Treasury Secretary Humphrey and Defense Secretary Wilson and President Eisenhower to convince. In my opinion, such men will not "buy" preventive war; nor will they sacrifice United States economic strength for military power beyond what they think our economy can stand.

And you have to solve this problem in the light of the existence of a Republican and a Democratic party and a presidential election every four years!

Furthermore, you have allies like France, and the United Kingdom, and Canada, whose friendship you want to keep. You have commitments to NATO and SEATO, and to the Organization of American States. These treaties and alliances help this country, but they also limit its freedom of action. You must consider not only United States' desires and interests, but United States' interests in the light of our position in the world community of nations.

Note that we have assumed that the currently bipolarized world stays that way for the next five years, in that current alliances and attitudes are assumed to be substantially unchanged for the period of your planning. This assumption is made to help you. If you plan to recommend action to alter that situation in our (U. S.) favor, please feel free to do so. We realize that change in international alignments is possible. Why, it is only eleven years since that United States and Russia were allies! Merely be realistic and justify your variation from the current international pattern.

I do want to mention one aspect of this continuing power struggle which some people think contains real danger for the United States. That is the historic tendency of the United States to demobilize rapidly when war seems remote. A peace offensive by the U. S. S. R. could cause real problems for our mobilization planning for the long haul. Relaxation of international tension might conceivably cause us to again dangerously reduce our Armed Forces, and handicap our readiness to mobilize. This is a problem area which is not too pressing now, but one which conceivably could be a problem; and it should not be overlooked in your consideration of this problem.

Probably any one of you is as competent to foretell the nature of future war as I am. We could estimate Soviet military capabilities and come up with various points of view. We have three such possibilities in the problem directive and on chart 3--the types of war against

which we might have to mobilize in the future. I will not spend much time in discussing the pros and cons of that subject.

Since the directive is concerned with mobilization planning for future war, inevitably its preparation developed differences of opinion as to the nature of future war, especially with reference to the effect thereon of the development of nuclear weapons. In that connection, you received some valuable background for this problem in the two days you spent being briefed on recent nuclear developments by the team from Sandia. You have an impression of the vast destruction which can be accomplished by nuclear bombardment.

You will note from the footnote reference on page 2 of the problem directive that we will provide a short appendix on nuclear damage, and that we refer to some student reports from previous years. These references will be available to you to provide some feel for the possible effect on the United States economy of massive nuclear attack.

One facet of the task you are charged with is that of planning for mobilization in light of possible nuclear destruction. The number of casualties in the country could be 15 million or 20 million or more; the damage to our economy (or segments of it) might run 25 to 40 percent of capacity. We think it is sufficient to know that the range of casualties can be in the tens of millions, and that entire cities can be wiped out, and that some 30 or 40 percent of, say, the steel industry could conceivably be eliminated by one surprise attack. In light of damage possibilities of that order of magnitude, and a premise that Soviet ability to stage such attacks is growing, you are being asked: What mobilization planning adjustments are necessary? We are asking you to plan to meet the demands of the situation facing the United States for the next five years; and a mobilization planning directive could not conceivably ignore this most dangerous threat of nuclear attack on the United States.

On the other hand, it was and is also important not to be so obsessed with the "big bang," so mesmerized with the horrors of massive nuclear damage, as to fail to prepare for the lesser, and possibly more probable, future emergencies of new Koreas. Or possibly the equalization of nuclear destructive capability on both sides of the cold war could forestall either side from dropping the first nuclear bomb; and we would have to mobilize for more and more intense war, with the threat but not the actuality of nuclear destruction. In other words, military and mobilization planners must reckon with the possibility of nuclear stalemate.

In any event, we have given you a two-pronged problem. There is the historical condition under which we have mobilized--a strong and uninjured economy here in the United States. Then on the other side is the drastically different condition where the economy might have to be mobilized under conditions of massive damage from nuclear attack. So that we want to look at it under these two conditions--with or without nuclear attack on the United States economy.

I would like to say to you in this connection that you should not be carried away with the one condition as against the other condition. They have to be somewhat in balance. No one of us can see the nature of a future war. Our plans must be flexible and must be adaptable.

It is not just I or the College that says that. Let me quote from the Commander-in-Chief. President Eisenhower said in January, 1955:

"We must stay alert to the fact that undue reliance on one weapon or preparation for one kind of warfare simply invites an enemy to resort to another. We must, therefore, keep in our Armed Forces balance and flexibility"

And now, let's turn our attention to specifically what we want back from you. We want a written committee report in four parts.

CHART 4

REQUIREMENTS OF PROBLEM

- I Précis.
- II Analyze mobilization problems--
 - a. Under nuclear attack on United States.
 - b. Without nuclear attack on United States.
- III Critique current planning, with special reference to above problems.
- IV Recommend mobilization planning actions to meet needs of next five years.

Part I.--A précis or summary. This should contain a brief exposition of the major ideas and recommendations of the committee report. Each key idea or recommendation should be referenced (by paragraph or other means) to the supporting data and argument in the body of the report. This section is intended to make the report useful to the busy reader, who may read it for an operational purpose. This is a condensed version of what the committee submits. It goes without saying that this section of the report should be written last, and based on Parts II, III, and IV.

Part II is the first major section of the report. It contemplates an analysis of the stresses and strains in the social and economic fabric of the United States, under a mobilization to meet the assumed Soviet military capabilities. The nature of the mobilization task and its problems can be quite different under the two conditions to which we want specific attention; i. e., whether the United States suffers massive damage from nuclear bombing or not. In any event, the student committee must explore the meaning for mobilization planning of the possibility that further mobilization might have to survive, or go forward, under Soviet nuclear attack. The committee should weigh the problems which it feels this possibility poses for mobilization planning. These problems may vary from simple matters such as how food supply is to be restored and how to dispose of the dead, to complex questions involving rehabilitation of industrial production.

We have suggested certain important issues or problem areas in footnote 3 to the problem directive. You should explore them under conditions of nuclear attack. May I advise you strongly, however, that we are not trying to solve the problem of nuclear damage to the economy. It is sufficient for us to know that entire cities can be wiped out by one bomb.

We have advice from experts that nuclear weapon size and capability for area destruction is important for mobilization planning mainly to establish the possibility and general scope of massive, widespread, sudden damage. Previous student committees have tended to spend altogether too much effort in speculating on the possible size and extent of damage from specific nuclear attack patterns. There really is a hypnotic fascination about the subject. I think, from my own experience as a student, that such behavior is an effort to escape from the really difficult task of planning for how to cope with such a possibility.

Conversely, the committee should develop the problems posed for future mobilization by the need to be able to meet new peripheral wars, or a general war without nuclear bombing. The Government agencies responsible for developing mobilization plans must prepare for all eventualities rather than solely for all-out nuclear war. Under conditions of nonnuclear war, we may have problems such as: How do we handle a new Korea? How do we handle more than one Korea at a time; e. g., if peripheral war breaks out in the Middle East and in the Far East concurrently? How do we keep our alliances firm? How do we coordinate our mobilization planning with the mobilization planning of our allies, especially since we have been the motivating factor in setting up such alliances as NATO? An overall problem is, how do we coordinate readiness for one condition with readiness for the other condition?

Whereas Part II requires you to develop the requirements of the present world situation on United States mobilization planners, Part III requires that you present briefly your appraisal of the mobilization planning measures which have been developed to meet those requirements. We want the important matters to be singled out for attention. As was referred to earlier, committees are to concern themselves with the larger issues appropriate for consideration by a presidential commission.

We realize that even after some six months or so attendance here, there are many mobilization planning activities of the Government on which you feel that you are not completely informed, or at least not up to date. Therefore, the committee's first responsibility is to research the mobilization area and become thoroughly conversant with current planning, as a basis for constructive suggestions for change. As is the universal custom in graduate education, the graduate student must himself do a major share of that work. We will set aside certain material on special shelves in the library to aid you. Also we are inviting representatives of the major departments of Government to meet with you in panel discussions of their mobilization activities. We hope that these devices will bring you a sufficiently clear appreciation of what has been done to allow for constructive recommendations.

Last year, representatives of the Government planning agencies who came here to the student presentations at the end of the year said that the students were far too easy on them, that they didn't pick out enough faults or lacks in the actual preparatory planning for mobilization.

You should not commit yourselves to investigating the minutiae of current planning. I would say from my experience with student activities in this area in the past two years that committees have tended generally to rely too much on investigating the details of what agencies were doing. Committee representatives have tended to submit long unoriginal descriptions of their investigations of Federal agency activity. Such material has parroted back to interested agencies the same ideas which are current in those same agencies. This has been of value as a familiarization process, but without the advantage of stimulating original thought.

To counteract this tendency, we are suggesting this year that such material can be presented in outline form in appendices to committee reports. Certainly we want you to know enough about the current mobilization situation to make really constructive suggestions for amendments. But we want you to so apportion your time and effort as to concentrate on the constructive aspect of your assigned task. If 50 to 60 percent of the assigned unit time has passed, I would suggest that the time is past to be investigating the factual situation. You should by then be thinking about what should be done differently or in addition to current mobilization planning.

Parts II and III are the two sides of one coin; two methods of approach to an improved mobilization policy. Together they are intended to explore the pros and cons of the various mobilization situations and planning actions. They should develop argument and reasoning leading to certain conclusions. The recommendations which follow therefrom are to be expressed as a consistent package in Part IV.

Part IV, then, is the meat of the committee report. It is the place where a reader can turn to see the expression of a recommended course of action for the United States for the next five years. Of course, it is not separable from Parts II and III, and coverage and emphasis in the parts of the problem will inevitably vary from committee to committee.

It is not desired that the report be repetitive, and that the same ideas and material be duplicated.

In a staff study of this sort the approach and treatment should not be expected to be the same in different committees. However, a reader should be able to look in the table of contents, to examine the organization of the report, and then expect to find recommendations

in the indicated place. The faculty expects the report to be organized somewhat along the lines suggested in this talk, and required by the problem directive scope of Parts II, III, and IV.

I presume that I could go on talking about different aspects of this problem "ad nauseam"--about economic and political feasibility, about coordination with the nations whom we have persuaded to become our allies, and other matters.

But now I want to explain our administrative plan for handling this problem.

Generally speaking, the word "course" does not accurately suggest or describe the work you will be doing in Unit IX. It will not follow the pattern of previous course units. There are about eight lectures, and seven panel seminars. These are designed--

First, to introduce the study and provide background material;

Second, to further acquaint you with the current status of mobilization planning;

Third, to present some critical appraisals from viewpoints other than those of the responsible United States mobilization planners, as a spur to your own critical appraisal and suggestion.

There will be no fragmentation of the class with a view to later cross-indoctrination.

Your major effort, requiring the bulk of your time, will be to meet in committee sessions, for research and evaluation, for imaginative thought and discussion, for the purpose expressed in the problem mission.

Eight committees will be formed, of about seventeen students each. Each committee will work out its own solution to the problem. Each committee will submit a written report. Each committee will make a fifty-minute oral presentation of the essential features of its report to the faculty, who will select one or more of the committee reports for presentation to the whole class and faculty. The selected presentation will be repeated before the National War College class and faculty. At each of these presentations distinguished guests from the military forces and from Government agencies charged with actual operational responsibilities in the planning areas concerned will be present.

To indicate the caliber of guests, last year's audience included such names as Secretaries Quarles and McNeil; Generals Palmer and Dahlquist of the Army; Admirals Royar, Good, and Combs of the Navy; Generals Washbourne and Anderson of the Air Force, General Shepherd of the Marines; and a liberal number of Government officials from the Office of Defense Mobilization and other civilian mobilization agencies. These VIP's are extremely interested in the ideas that you advance, in what you think about mobilization problems and their solution.

You see that your reports will have an opportunity of affecting the decisions of men with considerable responsibility in this mobilization area.

As I have suggested, you will select your own committee leadership. The eight committees have been formed by assigning roughly the same number of Army, Navy, Marine, Air Force, and civilian students to each. Shortly before the spring field trip, committees will meet with their faculty monitors and select their chairmen from their membership by majority vote. It will then be the chairman's responsibility to further organize the committee, and direct its operations. A spokesman, editor, and vice-chairman will probably be needed. These may either be appointed or elected, as the committee or its chairman desires.

A designated member of the faculty will be available to each committee. His job is to help and advise, not to guide, the committee. The committee and its chairman are given the task and the responsibility. All members of the faculty are available for consultation, as and if committees desire such help.

Stenographic assistance will be available to committees through faculty advisers, to assist in preparing oral presentations and to type final drafts of committee reports.

Right here I may as well try to dispose of the annual question, How long should the report be?

Past reports have run 150 pages or more. We have included some suggestions as to length and relative emphasis in our problem directive. We would be pleased with less lengthy reports than previous classes have averaged. The 15,500 words we have mentioned in the directive would run some 60 pages. But please do not take this estimate as a standard. My reason for mentioning it is that the question is always

raised. The thing to do is to build into your report what you think is responsive to the directive, edit out duplication, and let its length be governed by that procedure.

Another question that comes up annually is, What was the scope of the final study for previous classes?

For the past two years we have studied the problem of mobilization under nuclear attack on the United States. The committee solutions reproduced, Student Reports SR55-22, SR55-27, SR54-22, SR54-26, SR54-28, SR54-32, M55-70A, M54-90, in the ICAF library, may be consulted for background concerning possible damage from nuclear attack, which, as you know, is one of our two mobilization conditions this year. Of course, committee reports are also available from earlier classes.

I urge strongly that, as the time for the Mobilization Unit draws close, you read previous years' solutions. They will be a big help, particularly to the chairman and committee spokesman. They suggest previous student committee organization and approach to similar problems of making constructive criticism of, and contribution to, United States mobilization planning.

The six-week period devoted to this problem may seem like a considerable time, but let me caution you that experience has taught that it is all too short. In that period there are twenty-eight academic days. There will be a series of lectures and other presentation of material which will, along with attendance at a few National War College lectures, use up some 30 percent or so of that time.

It is important that the committee chairman carefully organize his committee work. With some seventeen committee workers, I assume that there will be eighteen days of useful work for each member, at a six-hour day each. On this basis, some $17 \times 18 \times 6$, or 1,800-odd, man-hours of work are available for producing a committee report. This seems like a reasonable amount of effort available, but I risk laboring the point by urging that you be prepared to make all of it count. We shall include some guidance on this matter in the curriculum book, which will be issued to you late in April, before the unit begins.

And now may I suggest that the College feels that each of you can get some practical advantage from this problem which will be helpful

on your future assignments. Many of you will go to jobs where you will be handling some aspect of economic mobilization. The fact that you have just gone through the study and reasoning called for by this problem will give you quite a head start. You will leave here with fresh ideas as to what the classic mobilization problems are, and what the best methods are for solving them. You will also have a good understanding of what the responsible Government agencies have accomplished, and what corrective or additional actions are needed.

Many of you will tend to regard this problem as academic. On the contrary, we feel that this final study is the real national security problem which faces the Nation's leadership under present world conditions. This problem directive has been commented upon by all the branches of the resident faculty. I believe that it is truly a problem prepared by the faculty as a whole. Furthermore, it has been referred to the Joint Staff for comment. The planning officials of the Office of Defense Mobilization have met with us to discuss it. The suggestions of the above and those of other individuals in the services have contributed to its development. In the form in which it is presented to you it represents a need and a request for a real contribution to United States planning.

You and I know that there are many unsolved problems in the mobilization picture. May I recall to your minds the fact that you were told last August that at the end of the academic year you would be afforded an opportunity to feed into United States planning your constructive ideas about mobilization. As a matter of fact, the Mobilization Unit justifies your attendance here. You can now give us your ideas on how the United States should mobilize. If there were no problems left to be solved, there would be little need for officers of your seniority to be pursuing your present studies for a ten-months' course.

It is a matter of record that meritorious ideas advanced by the student classes here at the ICAF are eagerly received by the responsible Government agencies. When selected student solutions are presented to distinguished visitors on 7 and 8 June, you will have a chance to participate in what amounts to a planning session, which can affect the future of United States security and mobilization policy.

Now one final thought. You are all aware of the talent that this student body possesses. The College feels that the focussing of that ability upon an important national problem of the challenging nature of this one cannot but produce some fresh ideas. This exercise can be

more than the solution of a school problem. You are no longer being passively exposed to what others think. In May you take the initiative. This problem becomes your opportunity! We look forward to the possibility of real accomplishment. I hope that you also look forward to this challenging problem. Thank you!

QUESTION: It appears to me that the most important consideration in this whole business is missing. That is, What is this mobilization plan going to support? We have no strategic concept of the United States war plans for this period. Would you care to comment on that?

COLONEL WALSH: This is a question I had not anticipated. I think that for what is known as mobilization planning in the Air Force or the other services, knowledge of war plans is necessary. But for civilian mobilization agencies I don't think that a strategic war plan in complete detail is necessary, and the student committees are not going to work out the details of a future mobilization. We are going to make recommendations as to how it should be done. This is my individual opinion, of course.

Under the terms of the problem, President Eisenhower has asked you (you are a senior statesman like Bernard Baruch) to help him in deciding what should be done for mobilization readiness. Must you know the details of military planning? As a matter of fact, I don't believe our strategic plans are given to the Office of Defense Mobilization by the Joint Staff; i. e., detailed military plans for the type of war we are going to fight. Requirements for the men and materiel estimated to be necessary for the prosecution of a future war should be and are given to the ODM, as you know for your requirements studies.

In my opinion, we cannot expect an exact definition of the type of war or the forces that are to be involved. I don't think that the Joint Chiefs of Staff can visualize precisely what type of war it is that we have to plan to mobilize for. And even if we did plan on a specific basis, and concentrated our efforts on a particular plan, I think we could make a great mistake; the war might turn out to be a different type war. So I think we have to keep kind of a broad area of mobilization planning over which the planning is spread. We must be prepared to support wars of various types and scopes.

I would add one further point. The type of war that is expressed in the Joint Chiefs of Staff's program for planning, and the type of war worked on in the Office of Defense Mobilization are not exactly the same.

Generally the Joint Chiefs plan on two conditions. They plan on a military conflict such as Korea--short of general war. And they plan on general war, unspecified as to whether nuclear or nonnuclear. (That is the way I understand the Joint Chiefs operate, reflecting differences of service opinion as to the nature of future war.) In ODM they have a bracket of about five plans. I believe there are active plans for new peripheral wars like Korea, and for general mobilization without attack on the United States. And there are plans contemplating nuclear attack on this country.

That is not an exact answer to your question. I am sorry if I haven't answered it, but I have talked around it.

QUESTION: One of the things we are faced with is vague courses of action. It would help bring matters to a focus if each group could have something more tangible to work on in some of these items. Do you suppose the faculty might agree to use about four approaches and then assign an approach to this problem to perhaps two groups and let them dwell in that field and bring it down to something that we can visualize more, and then end up by having possibly four approaches to this? It might give us a picture of what would happen if we went off into each area.

COLONEL WALSH: I would be glad to comment.

To narrow my answer, may I say first that the College wants the problem to be about mobilization, as I suggested in discussing the unit mission. A similar question arose two years ago, when I was a student. As a result, last year there were two different approaches adopted in our mobilization problem; some student committees planned for a short war, and some for a long war.

The general consensus of opinion of those who read the student committee reports was that, despite the fact that some concentrated on a short nuclear war and others on a long war, the reports were not dissimilar. They tended to become absorbed into a general area of mobilization readiness for future war of various kinds.

Furthermore, this is the type of thing that leads to the questions that you should be asking each other in your committee meetings when you get to thinking about the problem of preparing for future war. The problem poses some conditions as a basis for thought about future mobilization. If you want to make specific assumptions which are reasonable and which you think will read well when Admiral Burke reads your report next year, we would certainly go along with such assumptions if you can get your other committee members to agree with them. What I want to say is that if you want to advise Admiral Burke so-and-so with reference to United States planning, go ahead. The problem opens the way for you to make suggestions as to United States readiness to mobilize for future war. My objective this morning is to discuss the problem with you and to alert you to the fact that it is coming, so that you can get used to it now and will be more ready to work with it at that time.

QUESTION: When do you expect the committee assignments to be made? Could they possibly be made before May, so we could plan the organization by that time?

COLONEL WALSH: Our plan is to have a meeting of student committees about a week before the field trip. We will have the students broken down into committees, balanced as to Army, Navy, Air Force, and civilian membership. The committees will meet and choose a chairman and whatever other officials the committee and its chairman decide are necessary. We will have that meeting when you get the curriculum book, which will be sometime around the middle of April. The curriculum book has not gone to press yet. Some details of organization, etc., which we want to put in the curriculum book, such as the names of lecturers and similar administrative matters, are not yet finalized. But they will be in time to have an organizational meeting of student committees two weeks or more before the Mobilization Unit begins on 1 May.

QUESTION: You said you were going to have certain lectures and seminars from people from departments and agencies. Will the students have any opportunity to go out on their own and contact the agencies here in this period?

COLONEL WALSH: Yes. In previous years they have. As a matter of fact, students who know people in the agencies have gone on their own. We will make arrangements for the students to group together if they want to go to an agency.

We hope this year that by bringing the major people who are knowledgeable in the planning field to this platform, you won't have to go on an individual basis. We are hoping we can bring the key knowledge to you here. But for any student who wants to visit a Government agency, it can be arranged.

GENERAL CALHOUN: I'd like to say just one word on that.

This subject has been under discussion by Jim and me and the faculty board for some little time. What Jim is trying to do is to make it simpler on you, to bring as many of these people here as he can.

We simply can't outguess you. You are going to find avenues that you are going to want to explore yourselves individually or as committees or as groups within committees. You will find time, I assure you, to do some individual and group research.

COLONEL WALSH: If you have any questions that you want to ask me individually, I will always be available.

Thank you.

(6 Mar 1955--250)B/feb