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STATE CIVIL DEFENSE

2 March 1956

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Brigadier General John J. Maginnis, Director, Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency, was born in Lawrence, Massachusetts, 3 October 1895. Following his graduation from the University of Massachusetts, he became an instructor there, in the Department of Economics, 1920-23. He did graduate work at the Sorbonne, Paris, France, and at Boston University. Since that time, he has been a businessman in Worcester, Massachusetts, spending over thirty years in the fuel and equipment business. He is Vice President of the Claflin-Sumner Company in Worcester. General Maginnis served in both World Wars. During those years he rose from a lieutenant to colonel, Infantry. He commanded the first Civil Affairs Detachment to land in Normandy with the 101st Air Borne Division, and Civil Affairs and Military Government detachments in France, Belgium, and Germany, where, in Berlin he directed military government operations of the Kommandatura, quadripartite governing body for Berlin. From 1949 to 1954, he organized and commanded the 357th Military Government Area Headquarters Reserve Unit at the Boston Army Base. His activities include business, community, social and military affairs and organizations. He was appointed Director, Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency early in 1954, and is Vice President of the National Association of State and Territorial Civil Defense Directors. He was commissioned a Brigadier General in the Massachusetts Organized Militia on 12 September 1955. General Maginnis holds the Legion of Merit, Bronze Star and Commendation Ribbon and decorations of France and Belgium. This is his first lecture at the Industrial College.

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ADMIRAL DEUTERMANN: Good morning. This morning we will have one of our general lectures on State Civil Defense, and any of you who have been reading the papers and have listened to the conferences and recent reports of this subject know that it is a pretty hot one. I have several retired friends who have gone into the field of civil defense and I know the Civil Defense Administrator in Montgomery County out here. He said it is a very interesting job. You are never wanting for ideas. If you are, the audience is not. He says he has to go out two or three nights a week and that gets a little bit tiresome. After all, he said, it reminded him of the story dealing with some cannibals. Two of these boys were walking in the jungles of Africa and one of them said, "I'm very worried about my son because of late he just won't eat anybody." The other cannibal said, "I wouldn't worry about that. There are times when I'm fed up on people myself."

Our speaker today is Brigadier General John J. Maginnis. You have his biography. He is a graduate of the University of Massachusetts, did graduate work at Boston University, and at the Sorbonne. He is a veteran of both World Wars. In the last one he went in with the 101st Air Borne Division and commanded the Civil Affairs Detachment and the Civil Affairs and Military Government detachments in France, Belgium and Germany. With that background, I think he would be able to recognize disaster or trouble when he sees it.

Our scope this morning will be "State Civil Defense" as it relates to the national picture, the regional picture, and the community picture. He has been asked about his experience in recent disasters and in current planning and future planning. You have read in the paper the discussions as to whether Civil Defense should come under the Department of Defense or remain civil, and we have asked him to talk on that, too.

It is a great pleasure to introduce to you General John J. Maginnis.

GENERAL MAGINNIS: General Hollis, Admiral Deutermann, Gentlemen: I have 45 minutes this morning to discuss some aspects of the Civil Defense program for the State of Massachusetts and how it relates to other echelons of Civil Defense.

I would like to preface my remarks to you by giving quick consideration to the legal basis for Civil Defense because it is a very important factor in the whole picture.

Civil Defense came into permanent being in 1950 through the enactment of Public Law 920. In enacting it, the Congress made the following declaration of policy:

> "It is the policy and intent of Congress to provide a plan of civil defense for the protection of life and property in the United States from attack. It is further declared to be the policy and intent of Congress that this responsibility for civil defense shall be vested primarily in the several States and their political subdivisions. The Federal Government shall provide necessary coordination and guidance; shall be responsible for the operations of the Federal Civil Defense Administration as set forth in this Act, and shall provide necessary assistance as hereinafter authorized."

In 1953 the Federal Civil Defense functions were further expanded by Executive order to include the responsibility for administering the Federal Disaster Act of 1950, which had to do with coordinating the activities of the departments and agencies of the National Government in rendering relief in natural disasters, and administering Federal grants made available to the States and local governments in major disasters.

In Massachusetts, we operate the State Civil Agency under Chapter 639, Act of 1950. In defining Civil Defense this Act says:

> "Civil Defense shall mean the preparation for and the carrying out of all emergency functions, other than functions for which military forces other than the National Guard are primarily responsible, for the purpose of minimizing and repairing injury and damage resulting from disasters caused by attack, sabotage or other hostile action, or by fire, flood, earthquake or other natural causes."

You will note from these statements that the State, and its political subdivisions has been made primarily responsible for the operation of Civil Defense. In the light of present-day conditions, it is now a quite widely accepted belief of those who are close to the Civil Defense problem that the intergovernmental responsibilities for Civil Defense are presently inappropriately defined and assigned. The view now held is that the States have a responsibility which by the realities of the

problem, they cannot effectively discharge. They have no significant degree of real policy formulation and technical leadership. The consequence is that they have been unwilling to bear the heavy financial burden involved.

There is much evidence that changes in the concept of Federal Civil Defense with regard to its relation to the states and subdivisions are imminent. Several groups such as the Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, the 1955 Re-study of Project East River, the Senate Armed Services Committee on Civil Defense, and Government under Law in Time of Crisis (Harvard Law School) agree in principle that effective Civil Defense will not result until basic changes are accomplished. During this session of Congress another Senate Committee, the Military Operations Sub-Committee, is actively investigating this problem. This Committee (Holifield Committee) has indicated that its hearing will be exhaustive, that it will probe all phases of the subject, and that it will submit legislation to the Congress which will provide for the establishment of an effective Civil Defense in the Nation.

Let us now look at the situation that faces us in Massachusetts. I think there can be no question in anyone's mind that war is a real possibility. Certainly the aims with their resulting actions of the Soviet Union, since World War II, have made this evident. We know that the Soviet Union has the capability of striking any target in the United States. We know that they have the planes, and we know that they have the weapons--and by weapons, I mean nuclear weapons in the megaton range. We also know that as the months go by they are in a better and better position to carry out such a mission. We know, too, that Massachusetts is vulnerable because of its geographical location and concentration of important industrial and military installations. So the threat is there, and we are trying to prepare ourselves against it. We also know that war will be all-out, and that what we have to meet the initial onslaught with, when it comes, may pretty well determine the degree of success that we will have in overcoming it.

Should a sudden attack occur, we do not have a firm idea as to how much warning time we will have before the bombs actually fall, and the probability is that we will never have a guaranteed time. From all the information that has been made available to us, it appears at this time, that we can count on about two hours of warning time. While the establishment of early warning lines and other radar defenses that we now have do give greater insurance against surprise

warning time greatly, for much of this
out by the increased speed of new planes.
we might well expect four to six hours of
with Soviet jet bombers coming into the picture more
month--bombers like our new B-52's-- it is doubtful
have more than two hours of warning time from the time
planes were first detected until they were over our cities in
Massachusetts. All our planning assumptions are based on this figure.

In Massachusetts we have three critical target areas, as designated by the Federal Civil Defense Administration. These cities are Boston, Worcester, and Springfield. I would like to point out also that we have a small section of the State which lies close to Providence, Rhode Island, and which is included in the Providence target area. Also, although the actual target area of Hartford, Connecticut, does not impinge on the Springfield area, the close proximity of these two cities does give rise to some problems. So we have a situation then of three fairly sizable urban areas that are relatively close together, and two others close to the State line. We have about five million people in Massachusetts, and about three million of them live in these critical target areas. So, therefore, we are faced with the problem of doing something about approximately three-fifths of our population.

In the past, Civil Defense has been almost entirely a post-attack organization. By that I mean that Civil Defense has been organized to go into action after the disaster. In other words, it was a sort of "pick up the pieces" organization. It is evident from the facts now facing us that, unless something is done before the disaster takes place, there are not going to be too many pieces to pick up. Today we are thinking of Civil Defense in terms of a pre-disaster organization. It is a far greater operation as well as a post-disaster organization. It is a far greater people from injury and death, the bigger job we will have to do after the attack is over in taking care of them. It has, therefore, become an undertaking that requires a vastly expanded organization and operation, and has in fact, become a highly important part of our total defense organization.

How are we, then, to meet this threat? How must the Commonwealth of Massachusetts organize itself and how must its Civil Defense be set up in order for us to be prepared for a war-borne disaster? First of all, I might point out that Massachusetts, in the Federal organization, is in Region 1. This comprises the six New England

States, New York, and New Jersey, and coincides with the 1st Army Command. Headquarters for Region 1 is located within our State at Harvard, Massachusetts.

Civil Defense organizations in the various states are placed in different positions in the state organization. Some are in the Military Department under the Adjutant General, some are in the Department of Public Safety, some are in a separate agency under the control of a commission, and some are a separate agency directly under the Governor. In Massachusetts, the Civil Defense Agency is in the Executive Branch, responsible directly to the Governor.

The first job that was undertaken by me when I came in two years ago as Massachusetts Civil Defense Director was to institute a reorganization of the Agency on the basis of new requirements brought about by the increased size and deliverability of nuclear weapons, and the corresponding threat to our population. The organization had to be brought into line with the realities of our present situation. This was accomplished by setting up the organization with which we are now operating as shown on our Organization Chart.

We are organized somewhat along the military pattern with a staff and with services. In fact, this organization is not too different from one that we had in military government during World War II with, of course, the exception of the governmental section which we needed in that, but do not in Civil Defense. We have, under the Director, a Deputy Director, six staff positions, seventeen service positions, and twenty-two field positions--a total of forty-seven positions in all.

(Chart 1--Organization)

Here is the Organization Chart which shows the different positions in the Agency. Now this chart does not carry down the full length. The services are not shown on there but I will tell you what they are because they are very similar, I think, to the services that you are familiar with. You will note the Governor at the top--and this is very important--the Director directly under him. There is no one between the Director of Civil Defense and the Governor. Then there is the Deputy Director, and our staff line here is a normal staff line almost, with the exception of a legal officer, whom we have in here. We have planning broken down. We have Operations and Planning both, and under the operations officer comes the whole matter of evacuation policy. Underneath those, we have the services.

In this top echelon there is the Governor's Advisory Committee, which advises the Governor and the Director; a Defense Council made up of the different chiefs of the principal public safety services in the State; and then a group of Technical Advisers, whose job it is to advise the Director and Service Heads on specific technical matters. Also there is a box there which shows liaison with the military and Federal Civil Defense. Here are the staff positions--Planning, Public Information, Operations, Legal, Supply and Administration--and then below are the different Services. There is the Medical service, Radiac, Rescue, Transportation, Water, Engineering, Fire, Police, Communications, Welfare, Facilities, Utilities, Manpower, Education, Religious Activities, Women's Activities, and the Warden Service. Some of these Services are supplied by the Agency itself, and others are supplied by different departments of the State. Under the statute, Civil Defense must call upon any resources which the State possesses in order to complete its organization. Therefore, we have Services like the Engineering Service, which is a responsibility of the Department of Public Works; the Police Service of the State Police; the Medical Service of the Department of Health; etc. This means that these different departments must supply and pay a staff person or persons who will head up the work in his particular specialty. In other services for which there is no counterpart in the State organization, such as Rescue Service, Transportation, Women's Activities, Warden Service, etc., the Agency must itself supply the specialist to fill these positions. Also shown on this chart is the Ground Observer Corps, which is under the control of Civil Defense administratively, but the United States Air Force has the responsibility for its operations. And then also are shown on the chart here the area and technical organizations which I mentioned a moment ago throughout the state. I think those will show up on the map over there in a moment.

(Area-Sector Map)

Now the Areas and Sectors. The State is subdivided into four Areas and 20 Sectors. Two Sectors are city Sectors, Boston and Worcester. Therefore, we actually have 18 Sectors in the State. Each one of these Sectors is manned by a Director and that Director is a paid employee of Civil Defense. He isn't a volunteer.

You will notice that green spots here are the Fourth Area Headquarters and the brown are the Sector Headquarters. So that means that we have a command organization in the State of 22 people outside the Headquarters. I would like to have you note also the location of those Headquarters. We have not a single Headquarters in the State

that is within a target area. They are all outside the target areas. If you don't think that takes a little thinking to find places for them, you have another guess coming. It's a hard thing to find centers outside the center of population for the kind of think we have.

The Areas and Sectors are staffed with volunteer staffs, which approximate that of the State Headquarters. In this organization, the Area Headquarters becomes a very important entity and is a major command post in the field.

You will note that this system does not rely upon a county organization, nor follow county lines except in a few instances, and in this respect differs from many other states. In Massachusetts, the county is not a very strong subdivision of the State, for its activities revolve to a large extent around the court system. The State has direct control over the cities and towns without the intervening authority of the county. Also, we wanted to organize a web system of defense around our target areas, especially Boston, and this by its nature cuts across county lines. It was necessary, therefore, to devise the special subdivisions of the State for Civil Defense purposes which you see here on our Area-Sector plan.

I have here our Organization Plan, which has just been completed and which states and defines the functions and responsibilities of our organization, together with the annexes for each Service.

The Federal Civil Defense Administration has its headquarters in Battle Creek, Michigan, and operates through its regional offices--in our case Region 1. This is our immediate and chief contact with FCDA. Federal has no control, as such, over the organization or operations of the states. It does have an indirect control, through the money that it makes available in the "Matching Funds" programs in that certain standards must be established and maintained by the State before it is eligible for such funds. In short, the only control that it has is through the Federal funds made available to the State, and the State does not have to utilize such funds unless it wants to. This relationship, which results from the statutes, is now receiving new consideration, as I indicated earlier, for it is at once evident that under this system the operations of Civil Defense in the states vary greatly, depending upon the emphasis or lack of it which a particular state puts on it. Our channels to Federal Civil Defense and all Federal agencies and establishments is through Region 1, and conversely all Civil Defense contacts

from the Federal level to cities and towns or installations in the State is through the State Civil Defense Agency.

So much for organization. Let us look now at how we operate. We are fortunate in Massachusetts to have Civil Defense set up in the State organization in the way that it is. I referred earlier to the fact that the Director is responsible directly to the Governor with no intervening authority or department head. He is directly under the Chief of State and has direct responsibility to him.

The Civil Defense Agency is a coordinating agency of public and private resources and, because of its position of independence under the Governor, it is in an ideal position to accomplish such coordination. Compliance among State agencies has been accomplished through the issuance of appropriate orders by the Governor. We had a practical application of how Civil Defense works in the State during the August 1955 floods, by the issuance of a proclamation by the Governor, declaring a state of emergency and directing the Director to "take all steps and do all such things as I personally might do if present by virtue of Chapter 639 (Civil Defense Act) to combat such emergency and the effects thereof." This placed the Director in complete and unquestioned control of the State and municipal machinery during the period of the emergency and placed the responsibility for dealing with it squarely on his shoulders.

Our operations fall into several areas of activity. First of all, there are our out-of-state activities. These have to do with the Federal Government or national organizations and are handled primarily through the Federal Civil Defense Administration. Beside this we have direct operational contacts with other states through formal mutual aid compacts. Massachusetts has twenty mutual aid compacts with other states. These compacts, in my estimation, have no great value, for they appear to be operationally unsound, especially under present circumstances. In Region 1, during the national exercises which take place annually in June, by common consent, all states of the Region agreed to make requests for, or offers of, assistance from other states through the Regional Office rather than going directly to other states. It simply means that in a disaster of great consequence, say one affecting many states, there must be a clearing house for requests for, or dispersals of, resources from national or other state sources to an individual state.

(Chart 2--Responsibilities and Relationships of State Agency)

The second area in which we operate is within the State organization itself. Ours is the responsibility to coordinate the organizing of the State and all its departments and agencies to meet any disaster. We must evaluate and define the full resources of the State in order to utilize them for an emergency. One of our biggest jobs was to make other agencies of the Commonwealth realize that Civil Defense is not the sole job of the Civil Defense Agency but that each department of the State has the inherent responsibility for its organization for Civil Defense purposes. The Massachusetts Civil Defense Agency has, of course, the responsibility for supervising and coordinating such activities.

This chart shows the relationships and responsibilities of the State agencies for Civil Defense as set forth by Executive and Administrative orders. Now the State Director has a staff officer assigned to him by those agencies required to do it--and they are required to do it. That staff officer is operationally responsible to the Director of Civil Defense although he is still paid and taken care of administratively by his own department. Coming down here, this is a line to the agency head and to the Civil Defense Officer. Every agency in the State today has a Civil Defense Officer--these some 50-odd agencies. That Civil Defense Officer has the responsibility for Civil Defense matters in his own department or agency. Now those responsibilities, as you can see, follow these two general categories.

In brief, every agency in the State has departmental responsibilities, such as the protection of its own resources; the determination of essential functions and resources--that is those that must go on regardless of what the emergency is; the determination of resources available to Civil Defense; establishment of alternate headquarters; and emergency succession of its officials.

In other words, they are required and we now have reports every two months showing what progress they are making in determining what resources they have and what resources are necessary, that they must count on for Civil Defense purposes. They are now in the process of moving their headquarters and in the process of determining what records to take, things of that kind that they must protect. The service responsibility is over here in another box, such as the assignment of personnel to Civil Defense staffs at either State, Area, or Sector level; organization and training of available resources of their own group

for Civil Defense functions; and for the actual performance of any assigned duties that we may give them in time of disaster.

I feel particularly good about the work we have done with the State Agencies. I think we are getting the State itself organized in a very effective manner. I felt right along that we were in no position to tell communities what they should do when the State itself hadn't done anything. But happily now we are a long way down the road to having the State completely organized for Civil Defense purposes.

I would like to make an aside here--which is a personal opinion--concerning Federal Civil Defense Administration and the Federal agencies. They have the same problem, somewhat, although they don't have the direct authority that we have. Under a delegation of authority order, various Federal agencies have received directives to proceed with Civil Defense planning in their fields. My observation is that no coordinating action, or at least not much, has accompanied them, with the inevitable result that there has been much independent action, crossed lines of authority, and in general much confusion and indirection. We get more or less of that and we throw it back to Federal Civil Defense.

We are now in the process of evaluating our State resources, as I have just told you. Every agency in the State now has a Civil Defense Officer who has assigned duties in this respect. Before too long we will be in a position to know pretty much what State resources we are going to be able to call upon in a great emergency. These different agencies of the State are now in the process of determining where alternate headquarters are going to be; what records they must duplicate; where they are going to store dispersed material. I am particularly pleased with the way this phase of the work has developed in our State. Civil Defense is not very popular work and there is a certain amount of natural foot dragging by departments on any "in addition to regular duties" sort of thing. I must say, however, that the cooperation has been of the highest and we are well on our way to having, for the first time, a real summation of the Commonwealth's public resources. I might say that this would not have been so readily possible without the complete support and direction of Governor Herter, who has taken a strong hand in the Civil Defense program.

Probably our most important area of activity is with the subdivisions of the State--the fourteen counties and 351 cities and towns. As indicated earlier, we have set up our field organization in order

to be able to discharge our duties to the local organizations more effectively. Through our Areas and Sectors we are able to give the local directors more individual attention and support than formerly. This organization is already beginning to prove itself. You must realize that a great majority of these communities have volunteer Civil Defense directors who carry on these activities in addition to their regular daily work. They cannot, therefore, be informed on all of the things which they should know about their Civil Defense duties. The help and assistance which the Sector Directors are able to give them has already raised the morale and efficiency of many local organizations. Best of all, it gives us a direct contact with and, in an emergency, control over, local Civil Defense. We have a clean and direct command channel for operations.

Another area of activity has to do with semi-public organizations, such as railroads, public utilities, and similar groups, and with private organizations and institutions. You noticed, for example, on our organization chart that we had a section called "Facilities Protection." It is the purpose of this service to assist commercial and manufacturing establishments to prepare their personnel, their plants and their equipment against disaster and for coordination of their efforts with the State Civil Defense plan. This Facilities Protection group, as well as Manpower, in certain respects, gets over pretty close to the activities of the Office of Defense Mobilization, for it, in fact, has to do with certain aspects of the continuity of business and the distribution of labor in an emergency. It is evident that some of these areas of responsibility will have to be more clearly defined than is now the case.

And finally, we have another general area of activity, and that is with the public at large. This field has to do principally with public information and public relations. It has to do with the dissemination of information of a Civil Defense nature to the general public. It is at once one of our most important activities and one of our most difficult. Lack of public interest is constantly being talked about as a large factor in the ineffectiveness of Civil Defense as a whole. Certainly some of this springs from the uncertain program that Civil Defense has offered in the past. I believe, however, that the threat is now great enough and our program to meet it well defined enough, for the so-called public apathy to be effectively attacked and I hope dissipated.

To carry on these operations we have been very badly handicapped insofar as headquarters are concerned. Our administrative office, where our daily work is carried on, is in one location, a warehouse in the the National Guard Depot at Natick, and our Control Center for emergency operation is in the State Police School at Framingham. Not a good arrangement to say the least. This, however, will in due course, be rectified through the construction of a new administration and control center. The Legislature has appropriated, and plans are now going forward, for the building of an underground structure to house both the administration and control center that will cost approximately one million five hundred thousand dollars. None like it now exists in Civil Defense and when it is completed it should be the finest in the country. We now make it a hard and fast rule that administration and controls centers of State, Area, and Sector must be in the same location.

Now let us look at our problem. As I have stated earlier, we find ourselves in Massachusetts in the following situation: Five million people, three critical target city areas, three million people in these target cities, two hours of warning time. A pretty grim situation. It would not be so bad if we had or could build adequate shelters for these people, but the destructive power of megaton weapons is so devastating that there is no serious thought being given to such a questionable program. If we want to save our people, we have one choice and one choice only--that's to get them out of our target cities. The best chance that the individual has for saving his life is by putting as much distance as possible between himself and ground zero. We are, therefore, attempting to substitute distance for shelter. In Civil Defense this principle is known as Evacuation.

(Chart 3--Target Area Casualty Chart)

To emphasize the seriousness of this situation, I would like to have you note this chart, which will indicate the damage that would result if hydrogen weapons were dropped on these target areas. These figures that you see here represent the population of these cities probably at the time of greatest density--which is about noon; then what would happen to these cities if weapons of the size we are working on were dropped on them.

I would like to say a word about the weapons. There are a lot of questions about the size of weapons these days. Colonel Spring came back last night and he had a little different set of megaton weapons

that have been worked out by Federal Civil Defense and the Department of the Army. I don't think I need to point this out in detail. I think you can see and read the chart from here. You can see the tragic total--1,600,000 people within a limit of 5.7 miles. We are going to get 1,200,000 killed; 240,000 injured; 160,000 saved. Well, you can't argue with figures like that. You can't argue with them. The percentages are roughly the same for all of these. I would like to point at Springfield here. This is a little thinner because it takes in Westover, the SAC Air Base, and we get a thinner spread of population there than in either Worcester or Boston.

We have been working on this evacuation problem for about a year and, while we have something to show for our efforts, we have not nearly enough. It is not necessary, I think, to indicate to you that an operation which attempts to move three million people to safety under the most unfavorable circumstances and then provide for them for an indefinite period in inadequate surroundings, presents a problem of staggering proportions. If successful evacuation can be accomplished in our American cities, we are going to be faced with the biggest logistics problem that the world has ever known.

Here briefly is where we now stand in Massachusetts with regard to our evacuation plan.

(Chart 4--Zone Designation and Evacuation Routes)

The State has been divided into three types of zones--Evacuation, Neutral, and Reception Zones. The size and extent of the zones to be evacuated was arrived at through a determination of the probable size of the weapon which would be used on it to accomplish the greatest necessary destruction. These figures were concurred in by Federal Civil Defense and the First Army.

I indicated the size of these weapons just a moment ago: For Boston, a 30-megaton bomb; for Worcester, a 5-megaton bomb; and for Springfield, a 10-megaton bomb. If you are wondering why Springfield has a larger weapon estimated for it than, say, Worcester, which is actually a larger city, the reason for it is that Springfield has Westover Air Base, a SAC Base, in close proximity to it, and that is why the value-rating of this target has been raised. You will note that these areas are not circular, but conform to community lines in almost all cases. We found that it was more practicable to follow town boundaries than an outer destruction ring, especially since the two are substantially the same.

Persons in these evacuation zones will leave by way of evacuation or escape routes. Such routes, marked with special evacuation signs, will permit only one-way traffic--outward bound with no cross traffic. Although all possible means of transportation will be used, the private automobile is the basic method utilized for the movement of our population. Our plans do not call for any so-called walkouts, as such, but only for persons to walk to assembly points where they may be picked up by vehicles. The movement of these people on evacuation routes will be out away from the city through neutral zones into reception zones. No pre-assignment of evacuees to definite reception areas has yet been attempted, with one exception. We have one evacuation plan set up in Massachusetts--the Air Force has already set it up for Westover, with an assigned area and an assigned grouping.

You will notice an area in grey around the evacuation centers themselves. These are called neutral areas, and are either a ring of towns that abut or are adjacent to the town of the evacuation areas or other urban areas, such as Lowell and Pittsfield, that are secondary targets. The principal reason for a neutral area is to provide a sort of a field of operation for the Civil Defense forces to combat the results of the disaster far enough away from ground zero. Persons who live in this zone do not move, but stay in place, unless, of course, they desire to leave. Evacuees will pass through it to reception areas beyond. Unlike the old "duck and cover" plan where seeking shelter was mandatory, there is no compulsion on the part of anyone to evacuate is he does not want to.

You will notice the rest of the State is in other colors--green here, yellow here. Those areas are all reception areas. We have put them in color to show you the close proximity there is between Boston and Worcester and Worcester and Springfield. That is where our great problem is going to lie. We haven't very much room in which to operate. These are the areas in which evacuees will be held, housed, clothed, fed until their further distribution can be accomplished or until they can be returned to their homes.

The reception areas in Massachusetts are not great enough to take care of the population, and consequently individuals will have to be moved into nearby states, principally New Hampshire and Maine. At the same time, Massachusetts will have to receive evacuees from Rhode Island. There is a possibility that some may have to be received from Connecticut and also around the Pittsfield area from New York State. General Huebner was asking me not long ago when I was going to give him some space in Massachusetts. This area around Albany will have to have space in western Massachusetts.

In order to initiate planning on the local levels, a series of State directives called "Evacuation Memoranda" were issued--an outline of Massachusetts Civil Defense evacuation policy. This was more or less the blueprint of the whole operation. Others pertaining to specific services, such as the police, fire, and so forth, outline to some extent the activities of defense services in this matter of evacuation in Massachusetts.

On Tuesday, February 28, the Governor issued Executive Order No. 31, which is the so-called Evacuation Order. This officially prescribes evacuation of critical target areas as the official policy of the Commonwealth and in general sets forth the principles and methods under which this policy will be carried out. By today, every family in Massachusetts should have in its possession an instruction card giving them information as to the zone it occupies, what the attack warning signals are, and other necessary facts. How effective this would be today would depend upon how well the local community has developed its individual plan. In any event, incomplete though our plans are, we have now crossed the line from the old take-cover policy to that of evacuation. If an enemy attack should come today, we would attempt evacuation.

We have one other factor in this matter, and that is the Federal Survival Plan. This Survival Plan is a project which is underwritten by the Federal Civil Defense Administration. Its purpose is to make studies of various kinds that will allow a proper evacuation plan to be set up for a critical target area. In some cases, the Survival Project involves more than one state, for example, the Greater New York area where three states are involved. In the case of Massachusetts, where we have three target areas, the Federal Government, rather than indicate each target area separately, has allowed us to make a plan for the whole State, since our target cities are so close together that, for all practical purposes, they constitute a single integrated operation. We feel in Massachusetts that we are as far along as probably any state in our evacuation planning. However, since some of our planning has been on a "best estimate" basis, we know that revisions will unquestionably be necessary.

The Survival Plan will, we hope, give us the basic and definite facts and figures upon which we can base our final conclusions. This study will be developed by an organization outside of the Agency. It may be set up through the organizing of a special task force to accomplish this work, or it also may be carried out by subletting parts or the whole of the Survival Plan to different organizations who are

competent in this field, and again it may be a combination of both of these methods. We have not yet decided in Massachusetts exactly how we will handle this or how far we can go with it, but it appears now that we will of necessity sublet a good part of the areas of investigation that are required by the plan.

I think the Survival Plan comes at a particularly good time for us, because we still have policy decisions that we absolutely cannot make until we have more specific facts and information on some of the factors involved in the plan. I feel certain that this is going to give us the firmest possible foundation upon which to build our final evacuation plan. The Survival Plan also requires that field exercises be run to prove out the plan and this will be most welcome for as yet Massachusetts has held no such test.

I am running fairly close on time. I will say a brief word on natural disasters and perhaps develop it in the question period.

As already stated Civil Defense in Massachusetts has responsibility for natural disasters. In this regard, during the past three years, we have had much to do in this field and have built up a considerable experience in natural disaster operation. We had the Worcester Tornado in 1953, the hurricanes of 1954, and the major flood of 1955. The extent of these disasters can be seen from the following figures:

The Worcester Tornado did a total damage of fifty-three million dollars. The State Legislature appropriated five million dollars, the Federal Government made a half million dollars available to the State, and the total cost has amounted to about two million dollars. The work of allotment and expending of funds and the handling of the entire transaction was the responsibility of the Civil Defense Agency. This meant, of course, that much of the regular work that we should have been doing in Civil Defense in that period had to be side-tracked in order that the work of handling the rehabilitation phase of the Tornado could be taken care of.

The next year we had the two hurricanes which cost a total damage of eighty-five million dollars in the Commonwealth. The Legislature appropriated twelve million dollars to offset the effects of this disaster. The Federal Government allotted two and one-half million dollars to the State for this disaster. We are just about to close up this work, and it appears that about twelve million dollars will be actually spent

on the disaster. There was a basic difference in administering between these two disasters as far as Civil Defense was concerned. For the 1954 Hurricane Disasters the Legislature set up the Hurricane Relief Board which took out of the Civil Defense Agency the responsibility for the financial and rehabilitation work following these disasters--a very wise move. The State Director was a member of this board, for all transactions had to be handled under the Civil Defense Act.

Again this year, we had another and still greater disaster--the floods of last August. The total loss attributed to the flood in Massachusetts was one hundred ten million dollars. The Legislature appropriated fifty-five million dollars to take care of some of this loss. In this situation, only an allotment of one million dollars was made by the Federal Government to the State for the reason that the United States Army Corps of Engineers were called in to assist in cleaning up the results of the flood. In general their work was restricted to streams, dams, stream clearance, although in some emergency cases they got into bridge building and road repair. The cost of their operations, which will amount to about seven and one-half million dollars, will be charged to the Federal Government's share of funds made available to the State in this disaster.

This was by far our largest natural disaster, and the fourth major natural disaster that Civil Defense had to combat in a little over two years. In my opinion, it was the best and most effective operation of any that we were engaged in from all standpoints. The mobilization and disposition of forces was speedy and reflects great credit on local organizations. Communications were better organized and more effective than in the past. Our lines of command and authority were effective. Civil Defense could do little about averting the physical damage of the flood, but the results of its operations in rescue and evacuation showed up clearly in the low loss of life in Massachusetts--only some twelve people lost their lives. The most pleasing thing to me about the whole operation was that we got a fast start on it; we stayed on top of the situation throughout; and we were constantly thinking ahead and anticipating actions to be taken. In short, we operated like a going concern.

In closing, I would like to refer very briefly to some of the problems that confront us. This is pretty much a new field that we are in. We are being called upon to perform an operation of military proportions with a volunteer organization and not a very well trained one at that.

This can only be offset by a more widespread realization of the necessity for grappling with the problem in official and private circles. Competent personnel are difficult to come by and considerable training and education is necessary before an individual is of much value. There is still too much thinking of Civil Defense as a political organization, although I am happy to say that this is not the case in Massachusetts.

We are in a sense creating and developing at the same time. The march of events is often too rapid for a cumbersome organization like ours to keep step with. We are only now at our Agency beginning to develop a professional corps, competent for the work of Civil Defense. Our best source of competent personnel has been those with military training and background, but this has the danger of acquiring a staff with too high an age level, one that might not be able to stand the strain of a severe operation.

The great problem which we live with day and night is: How much time have we in which to perfect our plans and develop our organization? Two years? Five years? That is the unanswerable question. It could be less rather than more. Certainly events of the last few months and even weeks tend, if anything, to confirm this. I feel a strong sense of urgency and am consequently making our plans on the basis that time may be shorter than we think--and in Civil Defense we have a fearsome amount of work that still remains to be done.

I have attempted to give you a hasty "once over" of Civil Defense in Massachusetts. There is much that I have not covered but I feel certain that your questions during the discussion period will greatly aid in further developing the subject.

QUESTION: Last year during "Operation Alert" the President declared martial law. What would you expect in Massachusetts the Army should do under martial law under those conditions?

GENERAL MAGINNIS: That is the question I asked the Army last June. This whole matter of martial law is receiving quite a lot of attention, as you know. I don't know whether you saw the Federal Civil Defense paper which came out last week. It's not worth the paper it's written on. I think when martial law is declared, we are out of it, unless you want to call me back to active duty. I don't see how they can set up such a proposition as martial law and still think that nothing is changed. I don't believe that is so.

QUESTION: I am interested in the theory of evacuation. How many people do you think you could evacuate in a large population area with a two-hour warning time? That's a lot of people to move by any means.

GENERAL MAGINNIS: It seems like a big proposition, doesn't it?

QUESTION: Yes, sir.

GENERAL MAGINNIS: Let us go back to the basis for this. If you don't get them out, you don't have any problem. Take it from there. You have to do what you can with it. If something happened today, I don't think we could save too many people, but I think with education, training, and exercises we can save a lot of people. There's no point in minimizing the problem. It's a problem that may never be solved very well, and I certainly am not of the belief that we are going to save everybody. A lot of people are going to die.

QUESTION: You mentioned the command line from your organization down to the counties and cities. I assume that Boston and Worcester have a Civil Defense Director for the city. Is he in your organization, is he independent, or what is the relationship?

GENERAL MAGINNIS: As soon as an emergency is declared, he is part of our organization. We have no county action. It's Area Sector, and City, and the line is direct and complete. We also have a great deal of authority other than in a time of emergency, according to the way the law is written.

QUESTION: In your recent experiences with natural disasters, have you been able to reach any conclusions as to permanent manpower in Civil Defense as to numbers who ought to be available? We have all these volunteers but who will be the strong central corps in time of full mobilization to hold it all together to a degree they could do work in the factory? I am thinking of the drain on the manpower pool.

GENERAL MAGINNIS: In a natural disaster you haven't much drain on the manpower pool because it is a very temporary thing. A natural disaster runs through two or three phases--the actual disaster itself, the mop-up part of it, and the rehabilitation. We are not very much interested in the third one. We have organizations like the American Red Cross that have responsibility for that sort of thing.

Therefore, people are not kept very long. We do have the problem of the individuals who belong to organizations like police and fire, and, of course, the National Guard has its problems arising from keeping people on duty who want to go back to work. If we have a war, these people probably wouldn't have any place to go to work.

QUESTION: What are the plans for your use or length of retention of the National Guard in Civil Defense work? Are you going to use them for any panic prevention?

GENERAL MAGINNIS: Is this natural disaster?

QUESTION: No, sir, war.

GENERAL MAGINNIS: That's another field that hasn't been developed. The Governors of the States do not know what National Guard jobs they are going to have, at least they have not been able to find out. I came down here with Governor Herter when he spoke before the armed services committee. That's one of the problems we had. They are setting up a State Cadre Guard which you can go into. Massachusetts hasn't done that. We are planning at the present time that we will not have the Guard available, although we disagree with that line of thinking. We believe both the Reserve Forces and the Guard, unless they have special commitments, will have nothing to do and can be used much better for the work of looking after the civil population than for anything else.

QUESTION: In that same connection, one of the speakers sometime ago suggested that the actual civilians in Civil Defense be commissioned upon an emergency, with police powers. I mean give them some kind of arm band or a pistol on their side, if necessary. What do you think of that idea?

GENERAL MAGINNIS: Police power is a very far-reaching power. We have the question continually with auxiliary police. My answer always as to whether they should have weapons and a uniform is that you can't do police work without them, but you can't give them out indiscriminately. They have to be trained in the use of weapons. You can't give out police power to a lot of individuals on a moment's notice.

QUESTION: I am interested in one of the questions that was asked just a minute ago and then I have one of my own. I would like to know what happens to the mayors of these towns in case of attack. Are they bypassed or do they become part of Civil Defense? And then my own question is, What action do you take to prevent looting and in the way of traffic direction in case of evacuation?

GENERAL MAGINNIS: In answer to your first question, the mayor, the city manager, and the chairman of the board of Selectmen have the responsibility. Any actions that I take, I am only taking for the Governor. I am acting for him. Actually, the mayor of the city has the power; the Civil Defense Director is acting for him. He would undoubtedly direct that the Civil Defense Director assume certain powers just as the Governor did last fall with me, but that is entirely up to him. If he doesn't want to do it, he doesn't have to.

In answer to your second question, we had a DAR meeting and an old lady asked if she would have time to go to the safe deposit box and get her jewelry before we evacuated. I don't think you will prevent looting if you have evacuation under war conditions. Our first job is to keep them moving and we are not going to be able to prevent looting.

QUESTION: In connection with your overall policy of evacuation, am I to understand that we should count out Massachusetts for any worth-while production after the first warning of war? Don't you suppose any brave men are going to stay back and man the essential industries in Massachusetts? Is everybody going to run?

GENERAL MAGINNIS: That's one thing that industry itself is facing--what personnel are they going to keep and how are they going to protect those that they are going to keep? That is a field that we have not given the leadership in that we should. I think we are weak in facilities protection. I think those are the types of problems industry will have to decide, not only in connection with other industries but inside the whole plant.

How much luck you would have keeping people in an industry after they knew Russian bombers were coming, I don't know. I have had a lot of people tell me--and this hasn't anything to do with industry--"You can't make me evacuate." And we say now we don't care whether they go or not. We are not trying to make anybody evacute. But I have a sneaking suspicion that those people will be the first ones out if they think something is going to happen.

QUESTION: I notice you have no lines running out to seaward. Have you counted out any possibility of evacuation by water?

GENERAL MAGINNIS: There hasn't been very much done on that. There is another question involved in that which hasn't been mentioned here and I am surprised it hasn't. I am glad it hasn't. That's the matter of fallout. Everything is downwind in Massachusetts from almost everything. I saw a chart in the last few days of a fallout pattern and you couldn't see the State of Massachusetts. It was covered.

One of the reasons they have kept away from water evacuation to a certain extent is that they know of the fallout situation in that area and they would like to keep people out of there if they can. But, frankly, there hasn't been very much done about getting them out by water.

QUESTION: I am wondering how you would handle a matter that involves interstate prerogatives, for instance communications and transportation, where if these things start falling, we are going to have to move people. With the authority you people have in directing these operations, I am wondering where coordination will be effected, where we might make a division and use facilities for some other action or some other military requirements we might need? How do you get around those?

GENERAL MAGINNIS: We haven't gotten around to that at the present moment. I indicated the powers of the State. It has the responsibility. The Federal Government does not have a definite responsibility. That is why we are having this discussion as to the propriety of Federal participation in the problem. In other words, with a little old atom bomb, we could take care of it in Massachusetts but not in Connecticut. You can see where it is aggravated for one state, but in our case state lines no longer exist as far as we are concerned. We have to know what they are doing in Providence. We have to know what they are doing in Connecticut. Not only that, but we have to all be doing the same thing. In other words, Massachusetts is one state in many in a whole area that is affected.

Since the military point has been made, I would like to say this: that we have not had much luck with the military in the matter of plans so we have gone ahead on our own basis. Now we are beginning to get some reaction from them. They have got to understand that they will not be able to handle these things the way they want to handle them.

They will not be able to move troops the way they want to move them. They are not going to have these roads for their use.

The first reaction came from Westover, the Air Force. They have a definite route and a definite location. They are actually going to put hospital supplies in there. They have the big problem that all military establishments have, that is how they are going to get their people out. That's the question General LeMay brought up: "How am I going to get my people out?" At Westover they are going to try to pick people up by helicopter if they can't get them out any other way. There has been some planning on that basis.

QUESTION: Undoubtedly you have some ideas regarding the revamping of the Federal Civil Defense program. I wonder if you would be willing to mention some of those?

GENERAL MAGINNIS: Yes. There have been two suggestions made. There are two bills before the Congress. One is to put Civil Defense under the Department of Defense; the other is to set up a separate department. That has not yet been determined.

The Federal Civil Defense tome that came out last week took some of the functions of the Office of Defense Mobilization and took the selective Service System and put them under one department, with the head of the department a member of the Cabinet.

First of all, I don't believe it belongs in the Department of Defense at all. I think everybody in Defense agrees with me on that. I am not sure it belongs as a separate department with Cabinet status. We have made a suggestion in our State to the Holifield Committee that a similar plan be followed to the one we have in Massachusetts on the Federal level; that we put it in the Office of the President because we can't see why or how you can coordinate a lot of equals, and that is what they are trying to do. One department can't very well coordinate another. It has to come out of the top drawer. I think we can't lose sight of the fact that in all the work we are doing, all we are doing and thinking about comes down to one thing: What is going to happen when the bell rings? No matter what we have been doing in Civil Defense, when the bell rings, the civil resources of this country are not going to be handled by a department. They are going to be handled by the President of the United States and right out of his Office. We haven't had any backers on that yet, but that is how we feel about it.

QUESTION: When I look at this answer, it appears to me that when you are under attack evacuation is the one thing that is just going to throw everything into turmoil. It would appear to me with two-hours notice the best thing you could do with the civilian population would be to get them to their homes where they can take up the safeguarding of their shelters, draw water, go below, get off the highway, clear everything. I think the safest point to be is ground zero which the Russian is aiming at.

Another factor is that this property is in jeopardy. Your family is at home with radios where you can control them. The next factor is you might run people right into the place where the bomb will hit. It appears to me the worst thing you could do is to throw everything to the devil. The fact is that is what we should do on the battlefield, if this is the right thing, if we are going to be hit by an atomic bomb, everybody take out.

GENERAL MAGINNIS: We have answers to that. I am just of the basic opinion that it is better not to be where that ground zero is. That chart there, I think, speaks for itself. You can't argue with those figures. I don't think you could go home, get water in the bath tub, and listen to the radio. Therefore, that is the basis. We just simply have got to get as many people away from that danger as we can. You have pointed out one of our troubles, that is people don't understand the destructive power of that atomic bomb.

QUESTION: If I honestly accepted that viewpoint, I think the American people will lose their will to fight. When we come up to the point where we have to make a decision and we have to determine whether we are going to have to meet an international political situation with force, I don't think we will get the backing of the American people. If we believe that we should take that action, that will be the result. It appears to me we may lose the will to fight.

GENERAL MAGINNIS: I would just like to say this: I have said nothing about strategic evacuation today. But where we may have a situation in which we may know a few days ahead that something is in the wind and people can start getting out, I would be willing to bet that, if we get into such a situation as that, people will get out of town. In other words, if they have a chance to sit down and think it over, I still think they would get out of town.

QUESTION: Following your suggestion of placing authority in the Executive Office, would you go along with the idea of the Federated State, with the Governor, and from there it would go to the municipality, and channel on down?

GENERAL MAGINNIS: I think you are going to have to have control of all Civil Defense organizations. I think the State now has the responsibility for it, but I think under the new setup you are going to find Federal authority is going to supersede State authority, just as it does in the military. I don't see how else you can handle this thing.

QUESTION: I have two questions: First, what are you planning to do in case a submarine guided missile sets off Boston or Providence? Second, will you evacuate all those people? If you do, where will you put them? How are you going to billet them?

GENERAL MAGINNIS: Those are two good questions. I am surprised the question of guided missiles hasn't come up before this. We can only do one thing at a time. Maybe they have guided missiles and they are off our shores now. We don't know. But we have to take one step at a time, so we are going to try to get the people out. We also don't know how much time we are going to have. It is very possible that an imbalance in air power may result in a few years before we get guided missiles that can do us any real harm. This cannot wait on that today. We have simply got to be prepared to do what we can do and do that.

I can't in good conscience say, "What's the use of doing this now because something may happen in two or three years?" I have to do something. This may happen before two or three years.

I don't think that answers your question. I did point out that we are not an organization that is highly integrated as the military is. We can't adapt ourselves to all of these things. We have to do what we can as fast as we can. We have to do the best we can.

I mentioned that we have this Survival Plan. I think we are signing the contract this coming week with the Federal Government on that. The Survival Plan, I think, will run into two or three hundred thousand dollars to the State of Massachusetts, more or less. That plan is the one that brings up the final answer on these things. They are talking about two and one-half people to one, or we can put

two thousand five hundred people into a town of one thousand people. Those are the best figures we have. We have made surveys, and we have more figures than that. This Survival Plan is going to give us the information as to where these people are going to be billeted in Massachusetts, in New Hampshire, and in Maine. We must have the answer because we have to tell Colonel Mapes down in Maine how many people he can expect; we have to tell Admiral Brinkman in New Hampshire how many people he can expect.

The ultimate of the thinking as far as evacuation is concerned would be predesignation. We hope that we are going to be able to arrive at a time when we can predesignate destinations. We will say to the city of Malden, "You are going to be in Haverhill, or you are going to be in New Hampshire, or you are going to be in Maine." We do hope that we are going to be able to tell the individual where he is going to go, how he is going to get there, where he is going to be billeted. As I say, that is the ultimate. I don't know how soon we will arrive at that, if ever. I think if we do, we will have brought to a successful conclusion a very difficult operation.

MR. MASERICK: General Maginnis, on behalf of the Industrial College, we thank you for a very fine lecture and a very stimulating question period.

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