

SOME MOBILIZATION PLANNING PROBLEMS  
WORTHY OF SPECIAL EMPHASIS

17 May 1956

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Publication No. L56-133

INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

Washington, D. C.

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COLONEL WALSH: General Calhoun, Guests, and Gentlemen: This morning, in the second half of that doubleheader, we return to consider the mobilization problems that still face the United States.

When we discussed this subject with Mr. Tupper, we discussed the fact that Dr. Flemming and people from the Office of Defense Mobilization, and Mr. George, Chairman of the Mobilization Advisory Committee, have talked to you, and Mr. Tupper asked what would be left for him.

In a broad and deep subject such as mobilization planning, we felt that another point of view would be valuable and you would be interested in hearing problems worthy of emphasis discussed.

Mr. Tupper is qualified to do this for us. He has spent a lot of time in Government and knows the Government agencies. In World War II he worked in the Office of Production Management and in the Defense Production Administration. Currently he is in business as the local manager of the Washington office of the American Can Company.

Mr. George, when he was here, referred to the fact that Mr. Tupper is a member of the Mobilization Advisory Committee, of which Mr. George is Chairman. He promised us that Mr. Tupper would have some provocative remarks to make about these special problems worthy of emphasis in the current mobilization studies.

With the detachment of the businessman, but with the experience of one who has had a great deal of mobilization and Government training and knowledge of what we are doing now, by virtue of his membership in the committee which advises Dr. Flemming, I look forward with pleasure to Mr. Tupper's remarks at this time.

I should like to present Mr. Ernest A. Tupper to this year's class of the Industrial College. Mr. Tupper.

MR. TUPPER: General Calhoun, Colonel Walsh, Members of the College, and Guests: I think I probably ought not to start off my lecture the way I am going to do. I am going to have to start by preferring charges.

I was asked about four or five months ago if I would give this lecture. At that time I proposed the names of six, eight, or ten people who were far better qualified to give the lecture than I am. I sort of went to sleep and assumed arrangements were taken care of. Two months ago I was approached again, when I had very little to do, and in a weak moment I accepted.

After I accepted, I think that somebody must have approached my boss and said, "let's fix this fellow but good and give him something to do." Since then I have been pretty busy.

Moreover, as Colonel Walsh indicated, they lined up three or four other people to talk about everything I might talk about, and, finally, to cap the climax, they looked around to get the most able speaker, the most facile mind in Washington, Leon Keyserling, and put him on ahead of me. I am really in a spot.

This series of events, plus the fact that I have looked through the material that was sent to me, has influenced the nature of my talk.

In selecting the subject of my lecture, and in trying to decide upon the best way to handle it, I have been influenced by several of these considerations, also by:

1. Your instruction by the President "that no existing organization or policy is sacrosanct."
2. At least three people who have preceded me have talked about the work of ODM and presumably have covered what ODM is doing--and doing well--rather fully.
3. The printed materials available for your study undoubtedly deal mainly with work in progress and therefore represent, for the most part, areas of work where partial or complete solutions of problems have been achieved.

With this in mind it has seemed to me I might make more of a contribution to your study if I avoided referring to many of the mobilization planning functions which are being handled so adequately.

It seemed to me the most useful thing to do would be to concentrate on one or two problems which might escape your attention, the kinds of problems on which you might be expected to find difficulty in reaching agreement and the kinds of problems which we all have difficulty in trying to think through--mainly because none of us has had previous experience with them.

So that you may be able to follow my presentation a bit more easily I will summarize the major problems and points I intend to make and to discuss:

1. We need a sound foundation, to provide sound facts, as a basis for sound analysis, to reach sound decisions, in peacetime, and in wartime.
2. We are not now developing the facts, nor the analyses, needed now, to take actions which would lessen the problems created by an atomic attack.
3. If an atomic attack is launched we will have, in the crucial first few months of the postattack period, little, if any, basis for making sound economic mobilization decisions which reflect the overall national interest.
4. Under present arrangements, if an attack comes, the vital decisions in the first few weeks will be made by the wrong organization, and by untrained and inexperienced people.

#### Concept of ODM's Functions

I shall start out by giving you my concept of ODM's functions. As I see it ODM has two broad areas of responsibility.

The first is to establish policies and initiate actions which will help maintain and increase the ability of the United States to win a major war--the kinds of things which should help to discourage aggression. For example:

1. Stockpiling of critical materials.
2. Stimulating a balanced industrial expansion.
3. Encouraging, and, to the extent possible, putting into operation measures which will insure the survival of sufficient industrial facilities--following an atomic attack--to win either a short or a long war.

The second is to anticipate the kinds of problems which would arise in a Korean-type war, a full-scale conventional-type war, and an atomic war--and to develop solutions. This function breaks down into three parts:

1. Initiate such actions as are practicable in advance of war to solve or lessen these problems. For example: war gaming; bomb damage assessment (including provision for collection of statistics on a regional basis); resource-requirement analyses under different sets of assumptions; development of an executive reserve; and determination of the broad outlines of a wartime organization and inter-agency relationships.
2. Develop plans, under different sets of assumptions, for the actions to be taken in the first ninety days of war. For example: Government relocation; chains of command; the presidential proclamations and orders which would be issued; the nature and extent of stabilization efforts; delegations of responsibility; manpower policy; and the like.
3. Formulate the plans, programs, and procedures designed to insure that, if war comes, the Nation's resources would be directed promptly and effectively to their most effective war use.

#### The Major Assumption for Economic Mobilization Planning Purposes

As I understand it, the purpose of your study is to identify the essential parts and phases of an adequate mobilization planning program. I assume you intend to appraise the strengths and weaknesses in our current mobilization planning efforts. To do this it seems to me you need to start with something akin to the familiar "resource requirements balance sheet" approach--and you need to break your analysis down into three parts--our efforts to meet the three different kinds of possible wars.

In case of a new Korean-type war our economic resources are unquestionably adequate to provide as much support for the military as the military may call for. The problem is largely a question of the nature and extent of stabilization and production control measures which will be required in that particular kind of situation. Inasmuch as we have extensive knowledge and experienced personnel in these two planning areas, ODM is, in my judgment, prepared to cope--in terms of economic mobilization--with any war of this type which might be initiated.

In case of a full-scale conventional-type war, we are again, I believe, as fully prepared on the economic front to meet whatever situation may arise as could be expected. There are, of course, many details to be worked out, but there always will be, regardless of the state of our planning, and therefore these don't bother me. My conclusion is based on the following considerations:

1. The Nation's economic resources are being utilized close to their full capacity. A national emergency would insure that maximum utilization would be quickly achieved.

2. The resources we need from abroad are being accumulated. Our stockpile policy calls for building up reserves adequate to meet requirements over a five-year period. A substantial number of goals have been reached. In instances where the accumulation is behind schedule efforts are being made to provide additional sources of supply. More rapid accumulation--at the expense of current production--probably is, in most instances, not feasible.

3. The methods and procedures used in dealing with mobilization problems in World War II and the Korean conflict have been reviewed, and plans for improvement are, in most instances, completed.

4. There is still available a large reserve of experienced personnel which could be called in on short notice to man mobilization agencies.

5. The WOC program, particularly in BDSA, is developing new talent. The executive reserve program also has great possibilities.

6. Time would be available to build up mobilization organizations and to train additional people.

Thus you will see that I feel that in case of a Korean-type war, or even a full-scale conventional-type war, our mobilization planning resources probably equal our requirements.

Not so, however, in the case of nuclear war. Here we have relatively little experience to go on, and we are having great difficulty in coming to grips with the problems. The problems we face are new and fantastically large and complicated. Most of the planning job still lies ahead of us.

Perhaps all that is said regarding the decreasing likelihood of nuclear war is true. Nevertheless, we can't count on it. The planners must prepare for the least likely prospect. It is difficult to conceive, if war breaks out, how the use of nuclear weapons can be avoided indefinitely, especially after it becomes clear that the situation is going badly for one side or the other.

Accordingly, I am strongly convinced that most of our emphasis in our economic mobilization planning should be in anticipation of the possibility of nuclear war. That is why the several problems I shall discuss will deal with that particular planning area.

#### A Note of Caution

Before I go further with my lecture I should like to have you get some kind of a "feel" for the importance or lack of importance you should attach to what I shall say.

I want to point out that my lecture is intended primarily to raise some questions in your mind, and not to give you specific answers and definite conclusions. To the extent I give conclusions, or seem to do so, it is only for the purpose of stimulating discussion in the period following this lecture. In connection with some of the things I should like to discuss I have rather strong convictions. In other cases I merely have questions and doubts.

I want to observe that I have relatively little time available to try to follow what is going on in the area of mobilization planning. Accordingly, I find it impossible to keep up to date on developments. I am therefore sure that projects have been initiated, and developments have occurred, which I know little or nothing about. Accordingly it is presumptuous of me to try to identify problems which may be worthy of more attention than they are now getting--and more so to discuss them. Nevertheless, that is what I propose to do. So please keep in mind that such judgments as I may make are not so informed, and therefore probably not so good, as others which are being presented to you.

Finally--it will be very difficult to avoid giving the impression of considerable direct and indirect criticism of ODM. I therefore wish to make it very clear--just as clear as it is possible to make it--that no criticism is intended--that I have the greatest admiration and respect for the Director of ODM and many people on his staff--respect

for their ability and their judgment and their performance. I think that everything considered ODM is doing an outstandingly fine job.

### Some Handicaps Faced by ODM

This brings me to my first question. Considering the fact that we are spending 36,000,000,000 dollars a year for defense, considering the fact that everything we read and hear continually seems to indicate that a full-scale war could break out overnight, I have to ask myself "Are we spending as much money as we need to spend for mobilization planning?"

It seems very clear to me the answer is no--not anywhere near so much as we should.

If there were no danger of atomic attack, we undoubtedly could get along nicely with the funds now available for mobilization planning. However, considering the loss of life which would accompany an atomic attack, the huge number of people who would be injured, the terrific destruction of industrial facilities, and the fact that the outcome of the war probably would be determined by the extent to which and rapidity with which we could reestablish industrial production, it appears to me to be the sheerest kind of folly not to devote more thought, more effort, and more manpower to the economic mobilization problem. I hope some of the thoughts I will present during this lecture will help to convince you that this is so.

Incidentally, I heard a point made at the War College a year or two ago which was very impressive. One of their study groups observed we were spending, annually, more for maintenance of the Washington Zoo, or the Smithsonian Institute--I've forgotten which--than we spend annually for planning economic mobilization.

A moment ago I said "everything considered, ODM is doing an outstandingly fine job." The words "everything considered" were carefully chosen. I appreciate, and I hope you do also, that it is rarely possible to conceive of, let alone find, an ideal situation in which to do a job. Perhaps, everything considered, the situation, though far from ideal, is as close to ideal as can be attained. Personally I think not so, so I will illustrate a few of the things that worry me.

The ODM staff is relatively small. I see a number of problems which I believe are important, which I think are receiving too little

attention, and where I think the progress toward finding answers is too slow. Some of these I will refer to later on. I do not see any areas in which too much emphasis is placed or where I think effort is being wasted. Therefore, it seems to me that given more manpower--the right kind--we could be much better prepared to deal with the problems which would arise in nuclear war than we otherwise will be.

ODM has very few line operating responsibilities. Its major emphasis is in the policymaking area. Its line operating responsibilities have for the most part been delegated to other agencies of Government. Some of these agencies have been provided with appropriations for mobilization planning activities, but most of them have not. Naturally, as might be expected, performance is spotty and often inadequate.

ODM was formed by the consolidation of several Government agencies, with fairly substantial staffs. Getting it down to its current size necessitated using RIF procedures. This procedure, as you know, is not one designed to insure that the most able people, people with the most valuable experience, are retained. Thus, while ODM has many very competent people on its staff it is, nevertheless, handicapped with some who owe their present positions to length of service, rather than to their exceptional qualifications.

The organizational location of ODM--reporting directly to the President--is ideal in one respect. It gives ODM the prestige so absolutely essential to doing a job. On the other hand, its location at the White House level is used as a justification for delegating some important operating responsibilities to other Government agencies. This results in the individuals responsible for determining mobilization policies being pretty well separated by the entire governmental organization from the industries and activities they will be called upon to mobilize in the event of an emergency. Owing to an absence of direct communication, this sometimes tends to create problems rather than to resolve them.

#### The Problem of Making Decisions Following an Atomic Attack

Most of us tend to think of our military strength in terms of superior organization, superior weapons, and superior industrial resources needed to feed the military machine.

The importance of these factors cannot, of course, be overemphasized. But there is one additional factor which we tend to overlook, and which is equally important, if not more important, and that is the strength provided by having a superior basis for decision making.

One of the reasons why our economic system is so strong is that we have developed a constant flow and an abundant supply of statistics, facts, and information which are readily available to business and Government for the purpose of decision making.

This fact-finding system of ours enables business to eliminate much of the guesswork from its planning, its financing, its production, and its marketing, and thus to do an extremely fine job. Evaluating the facts and the potentials of our economic system, from month to month and year to year, continually points up vast new opportunities for sound growth, for increasing efficiency, for cutting costs, and for eliminating waste, and thus provides a basis for capitalizing on these opportunities.

It was the superiority of our fact-finding machinery and our ability to integrate and analyze facts in World War II which enabled us to lay out programs for supplying vast quantities of goods to the military services and to achieve our production goals with maximum speed and minimum waste.

You need only to think back to the startling, stimulating, and what at first seemed to be fantastic, announcement early in World War II of the President's goal of 50,000 planes a year, to get the sense of what I mean. To most people this goal seemed far beyond the realm of possibility. But to the economic analysts it wasn't-- and they were right.

I am firmly convinced that the superiority of our information collecting system, and the inferiority of the system of our enemies, played an important part in giving our military services that margin of superiority in supplies which enabled them to win World War II.

We still have the same fact-finding system available to us for peacetime use, and it is greatly improved. However, it should be pointed out, and strongly emphasized, that currently the system is receiving relatively little use in planning against the possibility of atomic attack.

More important, the way things stand now, a correspondingly good system will not be available to us in the postattack period. In fact I can't see, as of now, promise of having any kind of a system for decision making in the first months of a postattack period.

I, therefore, want to discuss this problem--and it's an exceedingly important one--in two parts: the preattack period and the post-attack period.

In his testimony before the Military Operations Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations on 10 April 1956, Dr. Flemming said in part, "We do not have adequate requirement information for a situation involving an attack on this country; nor do we have adequate information relative to the resources that would still be available to us following such an attack."

So far as I know we not only do not have adequate information--we do not have any information. And without estimates of what we would need to recover from an attack, and what resources would be available to meet these requirements, it is impossible to plan in the preattack period to lessen the problems which would be created by an attack.

To illustrate the problem, let me give you several examples.

Assuming a particular attack pattern, what industrial resources would we have available after the attack to carry on the war?

In June 1955 during "Operation Alert" efforts were made to assess the various kinds of damage resulting from the simulated attack. Fairly decent figures were developed with respect to the probable number of people killed and injured. Reasonably good estimates were also developed of the amount of destruction to various classifications of industrial facilities. But we were unable to come up with estimates of what and how much our industrial system could actually produce following an atomic attack.

The figures which were developed were extremely misleading. My recollection is that the figures showed losses in facilities ranging from about 5 percent to 20 percent in a broad range of industries.

However, to operate almost any plant in any industry requires a continuing flow of materials, supplies, and equipment from other

industries. In an attack, an assembling plant could escape damage, the plants of its major subcontractors could escape damage, and yet it might prove impossible to produce a single end product because of the damage to plants of sub-subcontractors.

My own guess is that, had it been possible during Operation Alert 1955 to analyze industrial damage in terms of interplant and interindustry relationships, taking into account power and transportation, we would have found we had lost our capacity to produce 90 percent, 95 percent, and even 100 percent of most end products for a number of weeks and perhaps months.

It might be useful if I were to spell out the resource side of the problem in some detail. Let us take the question of food. After an attack what would be our resources for supplying food?

The fallout from a nuclear attack would, I assume, if it came during the crop season, substantially reduce the crops available for processing and ultimate consumption. It would destroy at least part of our livestock. Some of our stocks of foodstuffs in warehouses, wholesale and retail distribution channels, restaurants, plant cafeterias, drugstores, schools, clubs and homes, would be destroyed. Some part of our facilities for producing containers used in the preservation of food would be destroyed. Some part of our food processing industry would be destroyed. Facilities for transporting food to canneries, tins to can-manufacturing companies, cans to packing plants, and food to population centers would be destroyed. In this kind of a situation, what would be our resources for supplying food in the first week, the first month, and the first year of the postattack period?

Looking at the other side of the balance sheet--what would our requirements be? We know our total population and can estimate how much it would be reduced as the result of an attack. We need to develop some kinds of concepts of minimum dietary requirements in a postattack period. We need to develop estimates of the minimum requirements of our allies which we would be called upon to supply. With these elements we could estimate postattack requirements for food.

Until we can put together a picture of our postattack requirements for food, and the resources which would be available for meeting them, it is impossible to determine what, if any, steps need to be taken in

the preattack period. Some people believe an atomic attack would not create any insolvable food problems. Others, as evidenced by a bill introduced in this session of Congress to provide 500,000,000 dollars for a series of dispersed food depots, believe atomic attack would bring a serious food problem.

But, either way, what we are doing, or not doing, at the moment, is based on guessing--not planning. Fortunately, in this particular instance--food--steps are, I believe, being taken to provide a balance sheet for decision-making purposes. Unfortunately there are hundreds of similar balance sheets which are needed if we are going to plan seriously, and intelligently, against the possibility of an atomic attack.

These balance sheets--some of them at least--would, in my opinion, be much more valuable for defense purposes than some of the protection we are now buying at the cost of millions and millions of dollars.

As you know, a great deal of thought has been given to the problem of minimizing the effects of an atomic attack by plant dispersal and plant protection. No one as yet has been able to figure out any very satisfactory way of achieving a reasonable degree of safety in this respect, at an economically feasible cost.

However, with appropriate analyses, which would disclose our major weaknesses, some relatively low-cost solutions might be found. For example, analyses would undoubtedly disclose many situations where, following an attack, it would take 12, 18, or 24 months to get back into production--not because every single piece of machinery and equipment required that long to produce, but rather because one percent, two percent, or five percent of the equipment has long production cycles. If this equipment with long production cycles were available after an attack, it is possible that the period required to get back into production might be cut in half--to six, nine, or twelve months.

With an analysis, and a finding of this kind, it might become obvious that certain pieces of long lead-time equipment should be produced now for stockpile, and stored at dispersed locations.

Such an analysis opens up another possibility. Industry, because of technological advances, is rapidly obsoleting machinery and equipment. Perhaps the most valuable use for some of this obsoleted machinery and equipment would be to stockpile it against the possibility of an atomic attack at a dispersed location.

This discussion will, I hope, suggest to you the vital importance of doing much more extensive work than is now going on to provide a statistical basis for preattack planning purposes.

So far I have been discussing preattack informational requirements. We shall turn now to the postattack informational problem.

In this connection there are several things to keep in mind. The first is that we are dependent on a highly centralized fact-collecting system. The foundation of our fact-collecting system is here in Washington, in the Department of Commerce, the Department of Labor, the Treasury Department, and the other agencies of the Government.

However, as most of you know, to provide for central decision making in World War II, and thus to direct the distribution of resources to their most essential war use, it became necessary to supplement the normal flow of statistical information with a huge collection of additional facts at daily, weekly, monthly, and quarterly intervals.

If World War III comes, it will, again, be necessary to have central control of resources, central decision making, and therefore a centralization of the information required for decision making and control purposes. While there is a common understanding of this need, the thought given to the means of handling this problem, in a postattack situation, has been slight--and efforts being made to solve the problem are feeble ones.

So far as I know the only effort being made toward solving this problem is in the area of bomb damage assessment. I must confess I'm not sufficiently up to date on the work and planning in this area to give you a picture which will permit you to evaluate progress. However, I can suggest some avenues worthy of investigation.

Information--the latest information--regarding facilities for the production of power, for transportation and for communication, and for the production of materials, components and end products--should be maintained at dispersed locations. This is to guard against the probability that an attack would result in the destruction of records housed in Washington.

A system should be devised--and this is what I believe is now being developed--to provide for reporting to a central headquarters

the extent of damage by product classifications, industries, and locations in the event of an atomic attack.

By relating attack damage to the preattack resources, broad measures of the postattack potentials of the system become available, and thus provide some basis for broad and general policies.

However, it should be recognized that, because of the probable extensive damage to transportation and communication facilities, it would be many weeks and possibly many months before a flow of information to a central headquarters could be established for anything more than very broad decision-making purposes.

Meanwhile decisions will have to be made, and they will--in fact--be made in individual communities, in the various states, and in the various regions. In many instances these communities, states, and regions may be virtually isolated for considerable periods of time. The question is, what information do they have--as of today--and what will they have tomorrow, to provide them with a basis for making decisions in the broad national interest. The answer is, I believe, little, if anything.

The first thing that needs to be done is to develop, as quickly as possible, through ODM, some broad general guidelines for the use of communities, states, and regions; guidelines which will insure some chance that efforts to reestablish production following an attack conform to some pattern which is in the general national interest. And I want to point out that this pattern can only be determined, in a wholly adequate manner, by the preattack resource-requirement balance sheet approach previously suggested.

The next step would be to see that these guidelines were made available to the responsible authorities in the various communities, states, and regions.

The third step would be to study the problem of how best to set up--for postattack use--decentralized information-collecting machinery, utilizing Federal, state, and local government agencies.

The final step would be, of course, to educate local agencies regarding the kinds of information which they would be called upon--in an attack situation--to collect, integrate, and analyze, and the techniques for doing so.

In summary of this particular point, I wish to observe that good decisions have to be based on good facts. We are not now putting together and analyzing the facts needed to understand and evaluate the problems which would be created by an atomic attack. We are therefore limited in the efforts we can make, in advance of an attack, to lessen these problems.

Moreover, no provision is being made now for getting the facts which will be necessary for decision making at local, state, and regional levels in the first weeks and months following an attack. And such provisions as are being made for getting the facts for central decision making at the national level are, at the moment, very modest.

Considering Present Arrangements, how Decisions will--in Fact--  
be Made

This discussion of the problem of providing facts for decision-making purposes leads me into a second problem which also bothers me greatly. That problem is the question of who, actually, in fact, is going to make the decisions at the regional, state, and local levels in the first weeks and months of the postattack period. I want to make a distinction between what we think we plan to do and what will actually happen, unless we modify our plans.

In his presentation to the Military Operations Subcommittee on 10 April 1956, which I referred to previously, Dr. Flemming outlined the functions of FCDA and ODM, in an attack situation. I want to discuss these functions and will therefore quote his testimony.

"The FCDA would be responsible for taking the lead in all civil defense, relief, and rehabilitation matters.

(a) "The administrator would direct all efforts in providing and distributing emergency food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and cash allowances; maintaining order, sanitary safeguards, fire protection, countermeasures against the hazards of special weapons or unconventional warfare; essential clearance of debris, and restoration of public facilities and utilities basic to the resumption of commerce and industry; and the establishment of programs that would result in the distribution of goods required to meet essential consumer requirements.

(b) "The Federal Civil Defense Administration would make claim on the Office of Defense Mobilization for its resource requirements.

"The Office of Defense Mobilization would be responsible for logistical support.

(a) "The Director would mobilize resources and direct the production required to meet military requirements as submitted by the Department of Defense, essential civilian requirements as submitted by the Federal Civil Defense Administration, nonmilitary requirements for foreign areas as submitted by the Department of State; would direct economic stabilization programs; and, in order to accomplish the objectives set forth above, would direct Federal programs for allocation of resources including the adjudication of conflicting claims for manpower, production, energy, fuel, transportation, telecommunications, housing, food, and health services."

Before getting into an examination of the question of who will really--in fact--make the decisions in the first weeks of the post-attack period, I want to give you several assumptions and several facts, so that you can decide how far you want to go along with my thinking.

Assumption 1. --Most of the results of the planning for the post-attack period, such as they are, are still in Washington. Some, and perhaps all, of the results of the work to date are at the Executive Office Relocation Center. But little, if any, of the thinking and planning has reached the hands of people around the country who would have to make decisions if we were attacked today.

Assumption 2. --If the country were to be attacked, Washington would be a prime target. Relatively few of the people who have been doing the planning would reach their relocation centers and such plans as have not been sent to relocation centers would be destroyed.

Fact 1. --The organizational concept of ODM calls for regional coordinators. Their job will be to act as Directors of War Resources in their regions until communication can be established and directions issued by the Central Headquarters. After that they will serve as Deputies to the Director of War Resources. Only two or three of these Directors have been appointed. As yet they probably have relatively little information regarding the details of how they would operate in an atomic war.

Fact 2. --If an attack comes, this vacuum in decision making will have to be filled. Considering the nature of the responsibilities

assigned to FCDA and the fact that FCDA has a nationwide organization established, it appears likely that FCDA will move in to fill this vacuum.

If these assumptions and facts are reasonably correct, I think it proper to ask ourselves whether or not we can afford to live with the dismal prospect which faces us.

Examining the functions of FCDA, we find that organization has a number of responsibilities about which there could be no question--making emergency provision for the civilian population, fighting fires, and cleaning up debris, for example. Beyond this, however, I run into serious difficulty in agreeing with the policy-forming functions which appear to have been assigned to FCDA.

As I read one of the functions, it says, substantially, "The Administrator of FCDA would direct all efforts involving the restoration of public facilities and utilities basic to the resumption of commerce and industry."

I don't know what this means to you, nor to the Administrator, but I can tell you what it means to me. It means the Administrator has the power to decide what commerce and industry is to be resumed for any and all purposes. If he has the power to decide what communication, transportation, and power facilities are to be restored, he must first decide what particular plants he wants to get back into production. Before that he must decide what particular requirements are most essential. Thus, as I see it, he must decide the overall direction of the war effort in the first few months.

And of course we must bear in mind that the Administrator delegates his responsibilities down the line to the point where they end up in the hands of a large group of volunteers, untrained in dealing with economic mobilization problems.

In anticipation of the possibility that the FCDA may sometime have to exercise its wartime responsibilities, Congress has provided this organization with requisitioning authority. This is the most powerful tool which can be devised for controlling and directing the use of resources. It is the power to seize a resource owned by one person, and used for one purpose, and to make it available to another person, for another purpose. Thus the Administrator can determine production patterns, not only by making resources available for certain purposes, but also in taking them away from other purposes.

If, for example, in an emergency, he should decide that a particular motor, available in an undamaged inventory, should be used to pump water, he simultaneously makes a whole series of other decisions, such as the following: The motor will not be used to power a military end item. It will not be used to power a machine in a guided missile plant. It will not be used to power a machine tool in a machine-tool plant, which could be used to produce more machine tools, which in turn would produce more pieces of production machinery.

Even assuming that ODM has time before a war breaks out to complete its postattack planning work, and that it perfects and trains a wholly adequate field organization to direct the use of all resources, so long as FCDA has the power to requisition without being subject to concurrence and/or approval by ODM, a most serious and basic problem will continue to exist.

You should keep in mind, in this connection, that FCDA's primary job is to provide for the civilian population. It is human nature to expect that they will wish to do that job as well as possible. Bear in mind that a broad and long-range view of the national interest, in an emergency, might, at some places, and at some times, call for an entirely different approach. For example, it is conceivable to me that, in certain circumstances, if we had a death list of 15 to 20 million people, and as many more on the injured list, we might find it in the overall national interest to abandon some communities and some people. I can't quite visualize officials whose prime responsibility is to provide for people ever being able to face up to that kind of a decision.

I am endeavoring again to emphasize the importance of trying to anticipate the need for providing a sound basis for decision making in the postattack period.

Even with well thought out plans for attaining a series of overall national objectives, with an excellent organization for carrying them out in being, and adequate facilities for collecting and integrating facts on a local, state, or regional basis, the problem would still be impossibly difficult.

If you followed the description of the functions of ODM which I read to you, you noted among other things that part of ODM's job is to mobilize resources and direct production required to meet military, civilian, industrial, and foreign requirements. It should be

clear to you that, as of now, it would be impossible for ODM to carry out this function in the first few weeks or first few months following an attack.

I think I would perhaps not be so disturbed as I am with this situation if I could see some communication going on between the people in ODM who are doing the thinking and planning and the people in FCDA who I am convinced will, under present arrangements, be the operators if an attack is launched.

The primary cause of the problem, of course, goes deeper than interagency relationships. But unless and until the laws, regulations, orders, and delegations are straightened out, the least that needs to be done is to develop a basis for communication and cooperation.

The Immediate Need for Developing Guidelines for Field Operations  
and a Temporary Organization to Follow Them

If we are agreed that an atomic attack would bring tremendous destruction, that we have made little if any provision for decision making in an attack situation, that we have made little if any progress toward setting up an adequate organization to make the most effective use of the limited resources which would be available after an attack, and if we can also agree that the prospects are not bright for doing what needs to be done soon, the question is: Are there any stopgaps which can be used to improve the existing situation? I think there are.

We have, scattered throughout the United States, a very large number of able people who work for and report to various Federal agencies with headquarters in Washington. These agencies include, among others, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Labor, the Treasury Department, and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. It should be possible, within a relatively short time, to establish a tentative and temporary organization with specific individuals committed to taking over specific key responsibilities, in the event of an emergency.

An office should be established in the ODM to work out the temporary organizational structure, to work with the various departments of Government in order to secure the designation of specific individuals to fill key positions in an emergency situation, to inform them of their functions and their relationships to other emergency field representatives, and, finally, to keep them continuously up to date on the plans which are being developed for handling an attack situation.

In the absence of making provision for some such stopgap organization as this, with at least a broad overall plan of operation in the event of an attack, and some fairly specific guidelines for handling a series of problems which will arise and can be foreseen, I feel we are in an extremely vulnerable position. The result could be that we might find it impossible to recover from an attack because of the tremendous loss of time involved in reestablishing production, and the waste of resources which would result.

In the absence of guidelines available in different parts of the country, and of some kind of an organization established to put them into effect, it seems possible, if not probable that, a few weeks after an attack, one region of the country may be devoting its entire effort to trying to maintain the civilian population with considerably higher standards of living than are necessary. Another region of the country may be devoting much of its efforts to trying to reestablish production in a variety of industries which can make no very significant contribution to winning the war. Still another region may be directing its efforts toward producing military end products for which the military no longer has any use, or toward producing components which cannot be used for 18 months, 24 months, or longer. In many instances efforts will undoubtedly go forward to clear up the debris and restore facilities in communities which perhaps should be abandoned.

Needless to say without prior guidance we can anticipate, in the various regions of the country, that about as many different programs will be initiated for handling reconstruction, production, allocation, requisitioning, stabilization and rationing problems as there are regions and regional administrators.

Also, needless to say, to the extent that our efforts to recover from the attack in the first weeks of the war result in a variety of conflicting programs, using a variety of tools and directed toward a variety of objectives, a tremendous amount of extremely valuable time will be lost and the problem of eventually unscrambling the resulting mess may prove insolvable.

I appreciate, of course, that trying to lay out, in advance, the kinds of actions which should be taken on an almost infinite number of problems, all related directly or indirectly to one another, is in itself an insolvable problem. But it seems to me a start could be made in this direction, and, as time goes on, we should find it possible to extend and refine our initial decisions.

Let me illustrate, very briefly, what I mean. It seems to me it could be agreed that if a city were completely destroyed, the chances are, there would be no good purpose served in starting to clear away the debris and reconstructing part of the city in the first few weeks following an attack. We could probably agree there would be no point in doing so if 90 percent of the city were destroyed. As we dropped down from 90 to 80 to 70 and lower percentages of destruction, an area of disagreement would develop and grow. However, through discussion and study we ought to be able to arrive at some general principles which would serve as a guide, until central decision making could be established, with respect to those particular situations in which no effort would be made, initially, to remove debris and commence reconstruction.

Similarly, with some rough concepts of minimum civilian, military, and industrial requirements, we should be able to agree on at least a small group of products which would not be needed in a post-attack economy, production of which could be promptly discontinued. For example, we should be able to agree that we could get along without toothpicks, flowerpots, tablecloths, draperies, lawnmowers, hair-waving machines, and even many much more essential products in the first few months of the postattack period. Through study and discussion, this list could be continuously extended and refined. Obviously, the repair and reconstruction of plants in the nonessential and less essential categories could be delayed well beyond the point where central decision making could take over. This would save manpower, material, and transportation and would furnish a rough guide to sources of machinery and equipment for use in the repair and reconstruction of more essential production.

Likewise, we should be able to anticipate a variety of products where an attack situation would call for producing, at least during the first few weeks of the postattack period; the maximum quantities the undamaged plants could get out in a 24-hour-day, 7-day-week, operation. Basic shapes and forms of mill products, common industrial components, food products, and simple building materials are examples. These products could perhaps be divided into three or four urgency ratings to indicate the types to be favored when shortages of manpower, materials, transportation, or power, at a particular location, made it impossible to favor all. Such a list, regardless of how rough it might be, would be an extremely valuable guide in a postattack emergency.

Examples of the possibilities of doing constructive work in the development of guidelines for the use of communities, states, and regions, even in the absence of analyses of resources and requirements covering the postattack period, could be extended almost indefinitely. And, of course, to the extent it becomes possible to develop postattack estimated balance sheets of resources and requirements, the value of such guidelines could be enhanced tremendously.

To summarize this point--we have no organization, no guidelines, and few plans to deal with a postattack situation on a regional basis. We do have organizations and personnel which could be used as stop-gaps. A small expenditure of funds to set up a temporary organization and to develop guidelines would pay tremendous dividends in the event of an attack. People should be assigned to this job as promptly as possible.

### Other Problem Areas

There are a number of other areas of problems which I believe you would find it useful to explore. For example, there is the whole field of international relationships involving economic warfare, psychological warfare, aid to allies, assistance from allies, and also involving utilization, in an emergency, of the large staffs of people we have abroad. Relatively little work is going forward in these areas.

I perhaps might have covered some of these problems had I been willing to deal less intensively with the problems involved in decision making, in the postattack period.

But I assume I was invited here to give you my point of view. Accordingly, since I am so greatly impressed with the overwhelming importance of the decision-making problem, and with the extent of its ramifications, I was unwilling to dilute what I wanted to say about it, by bringing in other problems of lesser magnitude.

Thank you very much for your courteous attention.

COLONEL WALSH: Gentlemen, Mr. Tupper is ready for your questions.

QUESTION: Mr. Tupper, I notice that you were associated with the National Security Resources Board. It is my understanding that, when that organization was set up under the Security Act of 1947, it

had the basic responsibilities for nonmilitary defense, which encompasses most of the things you were talking about, and also had its Chairman sitting on the Security Council. I wonder if you would care to comment on whether that would be the proper approach to solving some of these problems that you mention, particularly the ones that ODM has no particular control over, in FCDA and other agencies concerned with nonmilitary defense preparations.

MR. TUPPER: Just to make sure I understand, do you mean there is no organization to do some of these things?

STUDENT: I mean restoring the Security Resources Board or forming another organization with those same responsibilities.

MR. TUPPER: I think I understand the question. I don't believe the answer is another organization. I think the trouble is perhaps in the law, or the regulations, or the orders, or the delegations of responsibilities.

I think that there is no question but that ODM could move to correct what I consider some defects in our mobilization planning now, but they have a limited amount of manpower. They are working on important projects and I don't know that they can do much more than they are doing. But the problem of ODM-FCDA relationships I think stems from the basic law, and I think the law has to be corrected before you remove the major difficulty.

I don't know that another organization would really make a contribution. It might only tend to foul the thing up more.

STUDENT: If I may continue the point I wanted to make is that there is no central direction of all these activities that are working on the same type of thing, and the feeling is that there should be someone to draw all these activities together and give them that direction.

MR. TUPPER: I feel that there is a place for central direction. The Director of ODM is the President's designate as the individual to do economic mobilization planning, and the things I am talking about are economic mobilization, and they can be handled in the Office of the Director of ODM, as far as the planning purposes are concerned.

There is one great problem, and that is that there is no communication between ODM and FCDA. I can't find anybody in ODM--

I am sure the Director sees Mr. Peterson frequently and talks with him. But when you get down to the areas where the staff is working, the people in ODM are not communicating with the people in FCDA, so their planning does not move over to the FCDA organization.

QUESTION: Mr. Tupper, you referred to a desire on your part to give ODM something in the way of more operational responsibilities. Can you elaborate on that?

MR. TUPPER: Well, I think probably I would like to see so many things in ODM that I can't enumerate them. I am satisfied with the BDSA arrangement. I think that that job is properly placed where it is. But take this foreign area where we are doing so little--I believe the questions of psychological warfare, economic warfare, aid to allies, and what we get back from allies presumably are functions that are delegated to somebody around town. I mean, people are aware that this is a problem, but I don't see anything going on there.

Now, if ODM took this on as an operating responsibility, then somebody would be tabbed to produce. I must say I don't want to try to give you conclusions or answers to questions. What I am trying to do is stimulate a line of thought, mainly on this immediate problem of decision making, and have you ask yourselves, "Are we going to be able to make decisions? Isn't that really the important thing, if we get into war, to make sure that experienced people, people with some general concepts of what is in the national interest, are available and that they are furnished with some tools for decision making?"

QUESTION: We are pretty well concluded, sir, that the answer to the ODM and FCDA situation is to put one under the other--ODM under FCDA or FCDA under ODM--that that is the only solution to the problem. What are your thoughts on that?

MR. TUPPER: I think you have a very smart group here. I agree with you. To be a little bit more specific, I don't believe you have the choice of putting FCDA under ODM or ODM under FCDA but that there is only one way to do it--that is, put FCDA under ODM.

QUESTION: Some of us in the old-line departments think this idea of delegation is a pretty good one, because, as long as ODM keeps out of operation, it keeps the old-line departments feuding and fussing with each other in the interim. I understand the problem is that delegations are made to you, but you don't get the personnel and the money to do the job.

MR. TUPPER: You are absolutely right. I am not suggesting that these delegations by and large are wrong. Did you say Labor Department?

STUDENT: Yes.

MR. TUPPER: You are in the Labor Department. You have field offices all over the country. You have probably the best people experienced in labor in your own organization here. I think that there is a tremendous job for you to do. But the thing I don't like is that we talk about manpower problems and labor problems and whatnot in a group in ODM, and I am sure they are working with people in the Labor Department, but that is where we stop. I don't believe there is a man in your department out in the field who has any concept of what he might be called upon to do come an emergency.

I also agree that you can't do work without money, unless you are willing to take people off things you think are important now and put them on things that may be important in the future.

One of the things I am trying to urge is that we look at the 15 or 25 million people that would be killed if we have an atomic attack and the 15 or 25 million people that would be injured, the heavy damage to our industrial facilities, and the fact that the military can't win the war after an attack if they don't get the supplies they need.

Therefore I say that we ought to now be planning on how we are going to make these important decisions in the field if an attack comes, and I just think we are not planning in that area. Your people in the field should have assignments to act if an emergency occurs.

QUESTION: What are your ideas on the overall security nature of the various plans in statistics? It is my understanding that, when BDSA prepares data books on construction supplies and building hardware for the complete industry and transfers them to the manufacturers, they make two copies, one for Washington and one for their security place to which they will retreat in time of emergency. It seems to me that that information should be disseminated now at the regional levels. Are there reasons why they can't release that stuff now?

MR. TUPPER: I can't comment specifically on as particular a question as how you handle all kinds of information. I mean, there are some things you have to hold very closely. For example, information on the work that the Industry Evaluation Board does on critical

facilities, obviously, you can't spread around, but I think the effort should be made to try to get out as much as possible. If, for example, you publish in the newspaper how you make the decisions in the field in the case of atomic attack, that is not going to do an enemy any good. It might do us a lot of good if the enemy knew we knew how to handle a situation of that sort. Are you a military officer?

STUDENT: No, sir.

MR. TUPPER: Let me give you an example in the military field. I have to say a little something for the industry here. The American Can Company is not competing for military business--at least it has not been competing. If the military wants some cans and puts out an invitation to bid on a few cans, a relatively small quantity, we are not interested in a small quantity of cans. We are not set up to produce them. We don't bid. Then, maybe three months or a year later requirements have grown. You are now discussing buying a big volume of cans, and we would like to bid, and I would assume that the services would like us to compete. But what happens?

The military has gone to the Congress and has asked for some appropriations; it has gotten its money; its requirements are set up; and, while the services don't know to the last can what they need for a particular year, they have a pretty good idea. But they don't put out an invitation to bid for the year's supply; they put out an invitation to bid on what they are going to need for the first quarter. They say this order has to be delivered by March or April, and you cannot possibly set up production facilities to produce that order in the time allowed. So you can't compete on that.

The thing I can't understand is, you can't get a bit of information out of the military on what may be behind that order. In other words, I think all across the board we hold this information close to our vests when we really don't need to do so.

Can you picture the American Can Company trying to get a steel company to increase tinsplate facilities? The steel company says, "We will be glad to consider this, but what do you need? What are you going to require?" We say, "We can tell you what we need in the first quarter, but we won't tell you anything more." Do you think we would get what we want?

COLONEL WALSH: You indicated in your remarks, Mr. Tupper, that some planning needed to be done in the international field. One

part of our problem is the possible integration of the mobilization planning to our allies. We know that Dr. Flemming is a member of an international committee, which he mentioned. Can you elaborate on what you had in mind?

MR. TUPPER: Well, I can't elaborate very much. I am aware of the fact, that, come a war, there is a lot of material around the world that we might like to have. Now, does anybody abroad know that we would like to buy up all of the strategic materials that we could get our hands on? Has anybody thought how we could provide the money to get our hands on such materials the first day or the second day after the war breaks out? Does anybody think of how we can get ships to go over there and take the materials out before somebody else gets his hands on them? Have we thought about the fact that we have thousands and thousands of people spread all over the world and how, in the event of an emergency, we could use those people to do certain things that would be of value to the United States? Have we thought about whether we are going to be able to get certain things to our friends abroad? Have we thought about how much we are going to lose if we are unable to give them those things? Are they going to fold up and go over to the other side? Have we thought of the people at home who will be badly in need of stuff and how we can prepare them for taking some of it away from them, or taking some of this small supply available to them and giving it to somebody abroad because by doing that we make our position stronger?

I think there are many problems in this area. It does not happen to be my field, but I do think it is an area worthy of study.

QUESTION: Going back again to the organization and delegation currently being made by ODM, it appears that that planning provides that the various agencies that are doing the detailed planning now as a result of these delegations will in large part be removed from their parent agency because of the war and put under OWR and operate directly then under OWR.

Previously people have told us about this. If we have asked a question as to why it is done this way, they have had a position to justify. I gather you don't have a position to justify. I am wondering if we can get your views on why it is done this way, instead of leaving the agencies intact.

MR. TUPPER: There may be a number of reasons for doing it; one being that you have in these agencies now a great deal of

competence, in Agriculture, in Mines, in Commerce, and so on. Now, if you want to have this function over in ODM, let's say, you have to get people; so you go to those agencies to get people, and you build up a large organization, the sole purpose of which is to be useful if war comes; to be useful to help discourage the possibility of war, first, and second, to be of use if war comes. I think the theory is that you begin to duplicate functions and therefore increase the cost of Government. I think that is one reason for the fear of not delegating functions to existing agencies. The second reason is the competence available in these agencies.

I must confess that I am not quite so well informed and have not the same concrete ideas about this organizational setup as some of my friends have. I know that some of my friends think the organizational setup is wrong. I don't think I can discuss this question with you and give you an adequate answer.

QUESTION: You mentioned your concern about the difficult problem of decision making in the field after the war. It looks, as a result of the delegation of authority to the various agencies in the Government, as if there is a really complicated problem arising out in the field because each one of these agencies is delegated authority and has set up its own regions. Public Health has its regions, Agriculture has its regions--FCDA, OWR, and whatnot. I wonder if you have considered that and if you have any ideas on making that problem simpler.

MR. TUPPER: I have thought of that problem a number of times. Of course you have your army groupings, too. It is certainly a terrific problem, to the extent that each of these agencies has a different set of responsibilities, and each has a different regional setup. But I think, as I have indicated, that, come an attack, we are going to be in an unholy mess, unless we start doing the thing implied in your question, that is, to agree upon a common regional setup for war planning purposes, and to induce all agencies to use the single setup. Therefore, for planning purposes, let's have delegations of authority for all the agencies on the same regional basis. Let's have a program for collecting information on the same regional basis. Let's decide who are going to be the key officials and let's give them the guidelines for operations in each of these areas.

COLONEL WALSH: The clock has run out on us gentlemen. I am sorry we have to cut the question period short. May I remind the class that we are going to have another seminar with the ODM representatives. Maybe they will answer some of your questions.

Mr. Tupper, I think you have demonstrated a much closer contact with the subject than you disavowed at the start of your lecture. You have given us a very interesting discussion and I appreciate your coming over here. Thank you very much.

(27 June 1956--450)O/feb)