MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS

27 September 1956

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Honorable Carter L. Burgess, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Personnel and Reserve) was born in Roanoke, Virginia, 31 December 1916. He was graduated from the Virginia Military Institute in 1939 with an A. B. degree. Prior to World War II, he worked in private industry. During World War II, he rose in rank from Army 2nd lieutenant to colonel serving in various capacities, including Aide-de-Camp to Chief of Staff of European Forces; Assistant Secretary of General Staff, AFHQ (North Africa), Secretary of the General Staff, SHEAF, and Administrative Secretary at the Casablanca Conference in 1943. From 1945 to 1946, he was Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State in charge of administration. While in that position, he was Deputy Executive Secretary of the International Secretariat at the United Nations Conference at San Francisco in 1945. From 1946 to 1947 Mr. Burgess went back to private industry with Trans-World Airlines in Washington, and from 1947 to 1953, with General Aniline and Film Corporation in New York. In 1953, he became assistant to the President of the University of South Carolina, during which time he served as Consultant to the President on White House Staff Organization and on Cabinet and Staff Organization, as well as several other governmental committees. Mr. Burgess is a member of the Board of Governors, the American Red Cross, and a member of the Board of Directors, United Services Organizations Inc. He has been awarded the Legion of Merit, French and Belgian Legion d'Honneur, and Croix de Guerre, and British Order of the British Empire. He was appointed to his present position in September 1954.

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GENERAL HOLLIS: Admiral Wooldridge, Gentlemen of the joint colleges: All of this audience, I am sure, understands fully how essential it is to have adequate personnel to support the military effort.

Because of the scale and complexity of our present forces, the problem of providing such an adequate supply of military personnel has become a major preoccupation of the Department of Defense. The cost of pay and direct support of active-duty military personnel alone for the fiscal year 1957 exceeded 10 billions of dollars. It therefore behooves our Government to get the optimum return on every one of these dollars.

To discuss this important topic of Military Manpower Requirements this morning, we have been fortunate in securing the Honorable Carter L. Burgess, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Personnel, and Reserve. He has had military experience of much stature. He is and has been a leader in drafting policies and legislation looking toward the most effective recruitment, employment, and retention of uniformed personnel.

It is a great privilege and honor to present to this audience this morning Secretary Burgess.

SECRETARY BURGESS: General Hollis, Admiral Wooldridge, Members of the Faculty, and Gentlemen of the joint colleges: I hope some day in Washington life that they will find a way to have a college of advanced learning for either potential or present Assistant Secretaries of the Government, because I think in that technique there could be much gained in government. Perhaps some of you folks might come over and talk to them and show them the best ways to get things done in this rather complicated atmosphere.

I am happy to be here with you and to be before such an experienced and professional audience.

Military and civilian alike, your presence at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces and at the National War College marks you as

an outstanding and select group. You are here to take advantage of a unique opportunity. You are here to prepare for greatly increased responsibility.

Let me assure you that much depends upon your preparation, and upon the insight into the many strengths of America which you gain through your special studies here. Much depends upon the quality of the leadership which you will be expected to provide. And much depends upon the adaptability, the flexibility of your thinking in an age grown vastly complex and unbelievably swift in its transitions.

Again, it is a great pleasure to be here on this occasion.

General Hollis has asked that I speak to you briefly on the subject of "Military Manpower Requirements," with specific reference to what is being done through legislative and administrative action to meet these requirements. This I am more than happy to undertake.

Today's manpower program and all related elements of America's total defense picture add up to the greatest strength we have ever maintained in times short of a shooting war. For this day in our history, and to meet the imperatives which we most certainly face, it is a program based upon a commonsense appraisal of what the American Nation needs for its security.

I might also note in passing that our manpower programs must be operated so as to be able to respond to the "short war" strategy or the "long war" strategy, with the knowledge that to be realistically prepared to ward off or deter sudden surprise attack doesn't mean that we should ignore and be unprepared for the other concept. To do so might well invite and activate the second concept as a result of a decision to be unprepared and unready for it.

Additionally, as our weapons and methods change, our thinking today manpower-wise must be as dynamic for tomorrow's needs as the research and development that is going into tomorrow's material weapons.

Our program is based upon a determined and continuous effort to look ahead for better answers to our problems, to more imaginative and productive use of our resources, and to improved ways of uniting manpower and technology in a resilient defense structure.

Basic to every other consideration is the continuing realization that without a sound, ready, and up-to-date defense program we would be taking dangerous risks with our security as a free nation and the free world as we know it today.

Confronted by this fact, the Administration in 1953 launched an intensive review of our national military strengths. From the President and the National Security Council to the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this review involved a searching effort to determine precisely what we required for defense in the light of the Korean experience and the future dangers.

In January of 1953, President Eisenhower summarized these findings in terms of the following four basic assumptions. I quote:

> "First, the threat to our security is a continuing and many-sided one, involving no single critical 'danger date' and no single form of enemy action to which we could soundly gear all our defense preparations.
>
> "Second, true security for the United States must be founded on a strong and expanding economy readily convertible to the tasks of war.
>
> "Third, because scientific progress exerts a constantly increasing influence upon the character and conduct of war . . . we should base our security upon military formations which make maximum use of science and technology in order to minimize numbers in men.
>
> "Fourth, due to the destructiveness of modern weapons and the increasing efficiency of long-range bombing aircraft, the United States has reason, for the first time in its history, to be deeply concerned over the serious effects which a sudden attack could conceivably inflict upon our country."

Additionally the President urged an active awareness of the increased importance which Reserves must play in any coherent program of military defense. He called attention to the fact that:

> "To maintain order and organization under the conditions that would prevail in attacked areas of our country

would of itself constitute a major challenge. Improved reserve programs would help greatly--in fact, might prove the decisive margin in these as in other major tasks."

From realistic considerations of this nature, preceded by the two-year study already mentioned, has come the present manpower and materiel program for a capable military establishment.

This calls for:

1. Strong Active and Reserve Forces.

2. Strong alliances with other free nations.

3. A strong and solvent national economy and industrial complex.

4. The finest in advanced weapons and systems of delivery from an intensified research and development effort.

5. Maximum effective utilization of manpower, military and civilian.

6. Development, to the greatest extent necessary, of stable career forces made possible by a positive program of pay and benefits to attract and retain quality officers and enlisted men.

This is a program kept under constant review, constant study. Right at this time, the requirements and strategy parts of it are again being given prolonged consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a view to determining its validity for the years 1958 through 1960.

The reasonably level force of 2,850,000 which it was determined should be maintained for the indefinite future was to be reached at the end of fiscal year 1956. We have met that goal.

Certainly the level-force concept does not preclude--but instead encourages--close and careful attention to trends in weaponry, improvements in mobility, and the products of management efficiency.

It also does not, and I wish to emphasize the point, rule out the application of any and all positive measures and sensible actions which would work to give us a greater streamlined strength and organizational tautness.

Level force doesn't mean a set, absolute, and rigidly final structure. It means strong forces, somewhat below what we would require to handle a mobilization situation, and kept flexible. It means that, where further personnel reductions can be achieved through no accompanying loss of real strength, we should effectively work toward that end. Such changes are not posed to curb the potential of our true career element, or the quality this element represents.

Directly related to our military strengths are the civilian employees of the Department of Defense, and, as of 31 July of this year, they amounted to 1,185,000 direct-hire individuals and some 290,000 indigenous personnel in foreign countries.

All together, therefore, the manpower program in the active defense establishment totals slightly more than 4 million. And it needs to be emphasized that this is a program in which our civilian force is considered a unity with the military in terms of overall supervision, programming, and planning.

To this active establishment, we must add our Reserve forces. These total about 2.5 million not on active duty, a portion of which are very much in the picture, and participation is going on to this day, going on weekly. I will speak more of the Reserve later, but wish that you would note that the total military and civilian strengths under Department of Defense control and general supervision is about 7.5 million individuals, without counting the dependent strength.

Additionally, Defense's payroll and benefit payments to all of its personnel represent over 16 billion dollars of the entire armed services budget of 36 billion dollars, and this 16-billion-dollar figure is exclusive of appropriations for housing.

I know of no business, no industry, no other organization that has a 45 percent ratio of payroll to total budget. Our problem is not to characterize this amount as "peanuts" as some have done, but rather to determine how we can make this amount of money achieve a better personnel result with attendant improvement on quality of force.

In addition to persons directly connected with the Department of Defense, it is also necessary to be reminded of the following in the picture we are developing this morning:

1. Personnel of the various defense industries and the multitude of subcontractors.

2. Personnel in the programs of military assistance, stockpiling, Atomic Energy Commission.

3. Personnel engaged in scientific research directly beneficial to defense.

Taken together, the personnel and skills program represented by all these components adds up to our total manpower contribution to the defense of the free world.

Before taking a closer look at this program, I'd like to note some of the basic principles which govern Defense thinking today with respect to manpower.

First, we recognize that we cannot maintain on a standing basis all the forces we would require for a full mobilization. To attempt to do so would probably wreck our economy and injure our social structure as well.

Second, in the case of the manpower we do maintain on an active footing, we need to achieve a maximum of utility--getting the right man in the right job at the right time and with the right pay.

Third, we need to continue a policy which makes use of civilian personnel to the greatest extent possible for administrative and support-type jobs.

Fourth, we need to utilize to the greatest extent possible the available means to augment our strength offered by industry, rather than attempting needless duplication in the Armed Forces. Such a policy, of course, needs to be consistent and within the limits of our requirements for maintaining an adequate and strong rotation base in this country and the spread of abilities we require in defense if we had to expand rapidly.

Lastly, we need to remember the technical manpower needs of industry, while doing our best to conserve and retain our own supply. In short, there has to be mutual understanding of the requirements of each.

With these principles in mind, and returning to the figure of 2.8 million for the long haul, let's look at our recent experience in terms of numbers and categories of personnel.

The problem is one of turnover, replacement, and retention of essential leadership and skilled technical elements in the military structure.

Before Korea, when we were maintaining roughly a 1.5 million force, the reenlistment rate stood at 55 percent, adequate to maintain the then existing force levels. After the war, however, the rate dropped swiftly, and, as the large group who had volunteered reached the end of their term, it fell as low as 24 percent, because those men had entered to fight a war in Korea with no intention at all of making the military their career. This figure was clearly inadequate, and has been, to maintain forces of double the pre-Korea level with the requisite balance of trained, seasoned, and skilled personnel.

I hardly need to remind this group that to maintain a 55 percent rate for military in active force is a far easier job than to try to get half of them ready with a force twice that size.

This drop in the reenlistment rate has involved huge costs in terms of replacement, training, and movement into and within the military establishment. It has meant that an inadequate portion of our total military forces has been in fact effective and combat ready.

And I need hardly elaborate to this audience that gross numbers alone convey only part, and a small part, of the total picture.

Literally hundreds of separate skills are required, calling for specialized training and progressive on-the-job experience. In many technical specialties, particularly in the critical electronics field, fully two years of service experience is required to reach a journeyman's level of skill. Additional experience and advanced training are required to qualify as a fully seasoned technician or supervisor.

In relation to these large requirements for highly trained specialists, our qualitative manpower resources have been far from adequate. First, it is an unfortunate fact that a substantial portion of our enlisted personnel do not have the basic aptitudes required to acquire these exacting technical skills, or to make the grade as effective combat leaders.

Thus, of our total new enlisted input during the past several years, through enlistment and induction, nearly 30 percent has consisted of personnel in Mental Group IV--the lowest of four broad mental categories. Experience has indicated that only a limited proportion of these individuals can qualify as skilled specialists or as effective combat leaders.

Secondly, as a result of the high personnel turnover during the past several years, the overall experience level of our forces has declined. Only about one-third of our present enlisted force consists of career personnel who have continued on active duty beyond an initial term of service, as contrasted with about 45 percent before Korea. However, the situation is constantly improving, as we will show you.

Our deficit of experienced personnel is greatest, moreover, in those skills, such as electronics, where the need for long training and high caliber personnel is also the greatest.

In the face of these serious personnel shortages, and in the light of our overall experience, what have the Administration, the Congress, and the Armed Forces themselves been doing about it?

In January of 1955, in a special military message to the Congress, President Eisenhower directly related the personnel problem to the Nation's military defense needs, and to the fundamental concept of a stable, long-range and sustained security program.

> A far-reaching and greatly improved Ready Reserve program was brought forward, and in modified form took effect in August as the Reserve Forces Act of 1955.
>
> Extension of the draft authority was requested and approved to 1959.
>
> A Career Incentive Act, following up the Reenlistment Bonus action of 1954, was proposed and approved, which gave percentage increases at key stages of an individual's service career, and which included such forward-looking items as sensible dislocation and military per diem allowances.

This latter effort, passed by highly responsible bipartisan action of the first session of the 84th Congress, had immediate positive effects

in improving the reenlistment and retention rate. It was followed in the 1956 session by a greatly expanded Career Incentive Program which went forward to further improvement in the status of the military careerist and his family and--I might add--because of the same highly responsible bipartisan action.

The net effect of these legislative actions, in combination with vigorous service reenlistment programs, has been a very encouraging upturn in our reenlistment rates.

The overall rate for personnel completing enlistment tours rose from a low of around 20 percent in the second half of fiscal year 1954 to over 40 percent in this past fiscal year. The increase was particularly dramatic in the case of Career Regulars, men who had already reenlisted at least once before, amounting to a rise from about 40 percent to 90 percent.

Keeping these results in mind, I should like to consider our overall action program, starting with the Reserve Forces Act of 1955.

The Reserve Forces Act applies to the manpower requirements picture as:

1. A means of helping stabilize the Active Forces at planned and programmed levels.

2. A great new source of manpower utilization and training.

3. A positive method of conserving the Nation's supply of critical skills.

4. A broad and enlightened avenue for the encouragement of volunteer service in both the Active and Reserve Forces with the availability of over 30 choices of service to fit any young American's life plan.

This program increased the statutory size of the Ready Reserve to 2.9 million, and gave the President authority to call up to one million of these reserves, without the sanction of Congress, in an emergency. It provided realistic methods of screening and selective recall of direct benefit to American industry, reducing the likelihood of disruption at a time of mobilization, and giving management a far more predictable work force pattern in such event. It allows certain

skilled individuals over age 18-1/2 to take the special six-month training program and, following that, to achieve Standby Reserve status from which they may be recalled only by action of the Selective Service System.

Over 1,000 critically skilled young men in defense-supporting industries or research have already been selected for the six-month critical skill program; they therefore will be withdrawn from their essential jobs for only six months instead of two years or more. The number is growing, applications are mounting, and, with more understanding and cooperation on the part of industry, it will continue to grow and to serve this Nation better.

The screening program is much more extensive because it relates to mobilization rather than to present conditions. As I mentioned earlier, our reserve force now numbers 3-1/2 million. The wisdom and benefit of screening the Ready Reserve is simply this: We do not want people with critical skills in the Ready Reserve who, because they are excess to our requirements, can make a better contribution in the defense-supporting economy. Korea taught us this lesson.

I am not going to go into details at this point, but I recommend these programs for your very careful study. They are based on the sound idea of a sensible balance between military and defense-supporting civilian requirements. I know that the principle of balance, and proper phasing between military and defense-supporting requirements, is a major doctrine of this institution, and quite properly so.

The six-month program for men below age 18-1/2 has not received the necessary response. From this, some individuals deduce that the program itself is deficient and unproductive. I do not share this view.

In the first place we have gained around 40,000 new trainees through this avenue, and these represent troops we would not have at all in the absence of the program.

They represent something else as well, and that is a manpower supply which is being properly trained, with the emphasis upon quality and performance instead of quantity and unknown capacity.

Furthermore, in contrast to the old formula, the function of this program is to bring men into the military structure at the right ages and grades for the job responsibilities they will face.

We have not, by any means, given up on the six-month program. We still believe it will show greater dividends as the young men in it today spread the word of its many advantages. We intend to continue our own efforts to build this program into a stable source of manpower strength in support of the Active Forces.

But to do so is plainly going to require a far greater response than we have thus far achieved. It is not beyond the realm of the possible that a decision will have to be made requesting the Congress to grant at least a standby draft authority in this connection.

I might just mention at this point that I have some other ideas which apply to this subject, and which we might consider in the discussion period. Basically, they involve the questions of:

1. How do you build a Reserve?

2. How do you use a Reserve?

3. Why do you need a Reserve if you favor or gear up to a "short war" concept?

4. How can industry and education make better use of this program?

And now, moving to a consideration of the draft and the military manpower pool:

Roughly speaking, for the next few years we will require an annual intake of about 700,000 men to replace those whose enlisted term or period of induction has expired and who are returning to civilian life. Last year, of our intake of approximately 680,000, we found it necessary to request the Selective Service to provide about 140,000 of the total, divided between the Army and the Navy.

This leads, of course, to recognition of the draft as essential to the maintenance of our strengths and as a readiness mechanism available for need in the event we were forced to go to a full mobilization. In this connection, let me stress, the 4,000 local draft boards throughout America constitute a most valuable resource, manned by experienced and educated citizens capable of swift action.

The primary policy of the Department of Defense will continue to be to encourage volunteer enlistments to fill our strength quotas. However, it is plainly the course of realism and commonsense at this time for the people of the United States to continue the draft authority and the insurance which it provides us against aggression.

Today, at a time of greatest prosperity and peak levels of national employment, when our allies in Europe need our strong example, and when we are doing our best to build a strong Ready Reserve system, it would be ill advised and foolhardy to fail to recognize this basic fact.

Nor should we forget that the existence of the draft serves as a considerable stimulus to volunteer enlistments--encouraging thousands of young men each year to enlist in the Armed Forces, on the basis of their time and their objective.

Our continued reliance on the draft imposes a responsibility on the Government to assure that the military service obligation is shared as fairly as possible by young men of military service age. This brings us to the related question of the size and composition of the manpower pool.

For present purposes, the "military manpower pool" refers to the estimated number of young men, 18-1/2 years or over, available for military service under the present draft law, and who meet minimum physical, mental, and moral standards of fitness.

The age of liability for induction under the present law extends to the 26th birthday, except for the men who have been previously deferred. For the latter group it extends to age 35.

This "pool" is, of course, not stagnant. It is continually changing in composition as young men enter it by reaching age 18-1/2 or by discontinuation of deferments, while others leave it, normally upon enlistment or induction into military service.

One of the key objectives of national manpower policy in recent years has been to maintain this manpower pool within certain desirable limits. If this manpower pool were permitted to drop below a minimum acceptable level (roughly about 1/2 million) it would impair the ability of the Selective Service System to meet draft calls, and would, at the same time, dry up the main source of voluntary enlistments. I see no possibility of the arrival of this phenomenon. Our concerns are in

the other direction. On the other hand, an increase in the size of the manpower pool above a certain optimum level creates a new set of problems. The age at induction tends to rise to an unacceptable and undesirable range. Moreover, if the pool increases beyond a certain level, a condition could develop under which some qualified men may escape any military service or training.

Right now the military manpower pool is estimated at slightly over one million. Although this is somewhat larger than required for Selective Service operations, it is still well within a manageable range.

However, our projections indicate that the inflows into the pool in each of the next few years will exceed projected requirements based upon currently programmed strengths, by over 200,000 annually. At this rate of increase, a situation could develop where the average age of induction for some men would rise by several years, while others escaped liability completely.

These projections are, of course, by no means certainties. They hinge upon a whole series of related assumptions on strengths, enlistments, reenlistments, deferments, and related factors.

However, if these trends should develop, a variety of approaches are available to stabilize the manpower pool.

These could include, among others, intensified programs of enlistment into the six-month training program, selective early release programs for personnel with minimum qualifications, and policies to limit regular enlistment to personnel who also meet minimum standards of a career force, using short-term inductees for the less skilled jobs.

Taking all these factors into consideration, however, it becomes readily apparent that the draft authority needs to be continued. It is unquestionably a basic insurance policy for peace.

And now let me add this: The draft over the long haul may well not provide a grandmother's version of equity, but it does provide an impersonal climate of vulnerability. Our program requires no one to wait for the draft, and any young man who wishes to relieve his anxiety or uncertainty can do so by signing up for one of his many options. I can't, and I don't think the country should, relieve him of his responsibility to serve, or his ultimate vulnerability to be sent greetings to serve.

Now I mentioned some questions I'd like to hear discussion on with respect to the Reserve, and I'll add two or three on the draft:

1. To what degree will the size of our Active Forces decline without it?

2. How would we get the initial input of qualified officers?

3. Would any service be able to obligate men in significant numbers for the longer enlistments needed in our more complicated skills areas?

These, it seems to me, are some questions that get pretty close to the heart of the matter.

The objective of our Career Incentive Program of legislative and administrative action has been to attack the personnel problem through concrete measures to improve conditions of military service and the status and quality of the military individual and his family.

Here we have made notable progress. In addition to the already cited gains of 1955, we saw the following constructive measures placed on the books in 1956:

1. A vastly improved Survivors' Benefits Act providing increased indemnity compensation for service-connected deaths, Social Security coverage for the entire Armed Forces, and continuation of the six-months lump-sum death gratuity with payments up to 3 thousand dollars.

2. A bill increasing the regular officer augmentation of the Army from 26 percent to 50 percent, from 17 percent to 50 percent for the Air Force, and making permanent the Navy's existing augmentation authority.

3. Special career incentives for medical and dental officers, to increase and encourage better medical care for personnel and dependents, a benefit in terms of many people.

4. Authority on a permanent basis for all Armed Forces personnel to retire in the highest grade held.

5. A dependent medical care law greatly extending hospital and treatment facilities for service families through contracts with civilian

hospitals and physicians. This will insure adequate medical care for the 40 percent of service dependents to whom such care has not been available.

I cannot, in listing that creative legislation, fail to mention that in your midst here this morning is a member of the Navy who had as much to do with the passage of this complex legislation as anyone in Washington. I refer to Captain David Martineau.

These are positive actions in support of stable forces. Problems still remain, however, in the retention of qualified technicians and leadership personnel completing initial tours of duty.

In critical skills, such as electronics maintenance, the first-term reenlistment rates have averaged about 50 percent less than the rate for all personnel completing tours of duty. However, even in these areas we have had some very definite improvements.

For example, the first-term reenlistment rates for electronics technicians rose from an extremely low average of 7 percent in fiscal year 1955 to 15 percent in the first three quarters of Fiscal Year 1956. The rate for radar and other electronic-equipment operators rose from 12 percent to 17 percent. The rate for aircraft and engine mechanics went up from 13 percent to nearly 25 percent. For all personnel completing initial terms of enlistment, the rates have risen from 16 percent to 23 percent over this same period.

We still haven't the proper number or correct mix of personnel, but we are making progress, of a kind you don't read much about in the papers these days.

All of these actions are designed to further the buildup of stable career forces. In the meantime, however, the point must not be overlooked that not all turnover should be measured in terms of losses. There is a positive aspect to it as well.

Defense has provided skills to young men who never dreamed of being electronic experts or communications specialists and has trained them in the practical and operational use of the tools of the game. Industry speaks highly of their ability and ready adaptability.

This turnover of our militarily trained personnel enhances the overall-skill level of the working force in the country and in terms of our

Ready Reserve it spreads high quality military training throughout the population. We will always need this reserve strength, Main Street by Main Street, reinforcing all our other strengths--ready, if needed, in time of disaster or invasion.

What we have achieved thus far in legislation must be supplemented through vigorous and varied administrative action and aggressive leadership. We recognize that our chances for further legislation in the next Congress will be greatly enhanced by our own ability to show results from the constructive opportunities available to us within existing law. In other words, count and know your blessings, and be a leader in a positive atmosphere. That's the way our business brethern do it.

Accordingly, we have made considerable progress in our efforts to reduce family separations and to set reasonable limits on overseas tours of individuals unaccompanied by dependents, as well as setting a minimum time in the United States for enlisted personnel between overseas duty assignments.

We have sought through a variety of direct public relations efforts to increase respect for the military service and the people in it.

We have continued to improve the dependents' housing situation on and near military installations.

We have, in addition, set in motion a whole series of actions to improve individual conditions of service, officer and enlisted alike, ranging from stabilized assignments in a variety of activities to improvements in uniforms and training opportunities.

Of great importance, we have reexamined the entire question of qualitative distribution by mental groups throughout the Armed Forces, and as a result have revised our original quota system to permit services to obtain a greater percentage of enlistments in the higher groups so essential to the utilization and care and operation of modern technical equipment.

Here again I have some additional ideas on this problem area should qualitative distribution and its solution stimulate your interest in the discussion period.

I also would welcome a go-around on what we must do for ourselves before we again ask the Congress for more help.

Lastly, I want to mention the Department of Defense Committee on Professional and Technical Compensation, headed by Ralph Cordiner of General Electric. The job of this committee is to examine the entire personnel area, and from that examination to recommend measures to attract and retain the scientific, professional, technical, combat leadership, and management skills required by the Armed Forces.

A major problem, of course, will be to come up with some kind of workable formula which will provide a variable compensation for different skills, and which will relate with more directness to prevailing civilian compensation for the same skills. The solution to a problem as complex as this will obviously not be obtained easily.

I know that many of you are thinking, and rightly, that higher pay alone will never solve the problem of personnel retention in the Armed Forces. We recognize that fact and have taken it into account from the beginning of the committee's operation. Greater material reward will help close the gap between military and civilian rates of pay, but in the final analysis our appeal must still be to a career concept based upon loyalty and willingness to serve a meaningful cause under equal conditions of leadership.

The Cordiner Committee is faced with a sizable task but, from its efforts, I have every confidence that the final result is going to be at least a workable action program in the direction of our goals. It's just too early to predict the pattern of the Cordiner Committee's final recommendations, but I can assure you it is overlooking no bets in its travel, inspections, and studies to get the best answers obtainable.

And now, with all these various thoughts in mind, it seems to me that our discussion comes down to a few fundamentals:

1. We have to maintain a sizable military force of highly trained personnel, equip it with advanced weapons, and make certain it is ready to defend us in an hour of need.

2. We have to support our stabilized active forces with a realistic reserve program, giving us a dependable strength in depth, and permitting us to expand our military forces in a time of general mobilization to the magnitude it would require to fight a major war or control a disaster situation.

3. We need to be cognizant of the needs of our essential industry and the national economy, and we need, as a consequence, to adjust our military establishment accordingly.

4. We need to economize through efficiency on money and manpower, getting the maximum return on the investment of both.

5. We need to cut down on the flow in and out of the Armed Forces, striving to build forces built solidly on the career principle.

6. We need to perfect and retain our strengths for the long haul, hopeful of the day of lasting peace.

7. We need to be positive and ingenious in an atmosphere of inspiring leadership.

I sometimes think that what really lies at the base of our difficulties in attempting to give this conntry capable mliitary forces is the fact that we have never developed an adequate philosophy of military service. We have not been fully able to get our young people to recognize that military service in times such as these is every bit as essential as in times of war.

Here, if I may make the point, it seems to me that the responsibility lies not so much with the Department of Defense as with the mothers and fathers of America and with our educational systems, both elementary and secondary. Nor would I leave out the responsibility of the community, churches, and the leadership elements among our business and professional circles.

I have mentioned the six-month program in the Reserve Forces Act of 1955. Certainly we would not be encountering difficulties with this program if there were a clear and affirmative recognition on the part of the Nation as a whole that it constitutes an essential bulwark of our national security.

If all young men will recognize fully their responsibility to serve, this will be the most tangible demonstration of an all-out American move to be strong. This would mean that all our ages had combined in a common leadership with our youth, our taxes, our national inconvenience organized behind the purpose of freedom. I call it the "standing in line for peace effect" which no Russian could understand, and a total well of strength that no Geiger counter could measure.

There are still those, regrettably, who look upon patriotism as a sometime thing, and there are still those who fail to distinguish between the rights of the individual and the overriding needs of his Government. We have, in short, too high a percentage who prefer to think in terms of letting somebody else carry the load or that we can rely first on those who have carried the load in past conflicts.

Consequently, all our efforts to stimulate a greater volunteer response in the Armed Forces must be placed in this pertinent framework, and additionally we must be vigilant in our quest and actions toward making the Armed Forces a wanted career for more of our best people.

The services themselves need to work aggressively at the problem of getting and keeping the highest quality personnel. I for one would a thousand times prefer to see a "quality complex" throughout the Armed Forces than so much reverence for a "quota complex."

I think we are coming to understand that meeting the quota doesn't fill the bill if we must do it over and over and never quite achieve the requisite quality. We need to devote the fullest effort to the imaginative and efficient use of our manpower, offering increasingly attractive career opportunities to America's young men, and helping provide the real long-range stability which we are going to keep right on needing.

Gentlemen, I thank you for your courteous attention to my remarks this morning.

I am keenly aware of the fact that I have given what amounts to a broad-brush treatment to the subject in question, but I am hopeful that I have at least touched upon its major dimensions and its major considerations.

Yesterday I had a talk with one of our most eminent industrialists who had just returned from a three-day visit to his research laboratory. He said that he again observed and was reminded of the fact that many of our weapons systems and methods of defense will bear little resemblance to what will start to be available five years from now. He was talking about the research that will become reality.

This forward outlook offers real reason for your being here and experiencing this rare opportunity to consider and plan on an uninterrupted basis for what must be done about the changed defense world of tomorrow. It will, without doubt, be a world of many new dimensions.

And now, let's get to work on your questions, which I realize is the real grist for your mill and the exchange that will help me most. I hope to be of some assistance to you.

Thank you very much.

CAPTAIN LAUTRUP: The Secretary is ready for your questions.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, some countries have resolved that universal military training is a means of getting people into the Armed Forces, spreading the armed talent through the country. Would you care to comment on that as compared with the use of our system--the trained soldiers that will be required and all that sort of thing, if we adopt it?

SECRETARY BURGESS: Well, as I understand UMT and the one that has been properly conceived around America--a general answer to your question is, I don't believe it fits these times for America. I think that UMT, as it was written on the books and testified to before the Congress around about the fifties, had as its concept that every young man would be brought into military service somewhere between ages 17 and 18-1/2, and after serving, say, six months, would then decide whether he wanted to make the military a career. Now, I think that would be playing some chances with our long-term enlisted programs, I think it would be a deterrent to our officer programs, and I think that it would not fit in with the concept of our growing need of technicians and longer periods for training personnel. I think it is a wrong sequence, forgetting about the work of first developing a career force in this country.

It is true that such a program might give you a better concept of equity, but I think that it is not one that we should undertake in these times. I think it would have been a step ahead, maybe, if we had undertaken it in the days between World War II and Korea, but I believe that our concept of problems of war has shifted so much, and we are now in such a tenuous situation, that to embark on this kind of manpower procurement and training would be injurious to the career concept.

With respect to the training facilities, I believe that you would build up a lot of training facilities to take care of initial loads that might be uneconomic and also detrimental to the much more serious types of facilities we need for what I call the career force.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, Public Law 364 is something less than satisfactory to the Department of Defense. Do you intend to go back to the next session of Congress and ask for an improvement in that law? If you do, what are the chances of success?

SECRETARY BURGESS: My answer to that question is that, as far as I can determine, the several States have done very little with what is offered in the law that you mention. My feeling about State defense forces, which I have related mainly to civil defense, is that your civil defense in this country, or your State defense in this country, is not going to be any better than what Main Street wants to make it. I think if we are going to have any kind of realistic civil defense in this country to centralize it at the Federal Government would be one of the biggest mistakes that we could make. To do its part, I think the Federal Government has to also provide thinking and planning, and, quite apart from this phenomenon of matching funds, which we have in this country, I think there is such a thing as matching effort. I hate to see all the unpopular manpower loss, the unpopular expenditures, and the unpopular direction be centralized right here in Washington.

I don't know what they are going to do about that law in the next session of Congress. It is being worked on right now. The only thing that is defective about that law is that it eliminated the prospect of the Government providing the surplus property and uniforms and general equipment to encourage State defense forces. But, on the other hand there was nothing to prevent the States' falling in behind the law as it was written, to prove that they in turn wanted such an authority.

I, for one, would like to see that move made before we make the other move.

QUESTION: With reference to our military manpower pool, in the past we have at times seriously curtailed this, partly in critical skills, through the application of relatively arbitrary physical standards. I saw this in operation in World War II--emphasis on teeth, vision, and hearing. Has anything been done to adjust this to a man's respective assignments, or is it intended that anything will be done?

SECRETARY BURGESS: That is one of the matters that are before the Cordiner Committee. Six or seven months ago we had an ROTC student in one of the finest technological schools in this country. I happen to know about this case personally. This young man was in his

senior year at this technological institute, and his eyesight turned up to be something less than it had been when they initially examined him when he went into the ROTC. In fact, I am not sure they gave him an eyesight examination when he went in his first year. Nevertheless, this young man stood high in his ROTC work and was the No. 2 man in this school in electronic engineering. Industry was lined up at the right to get him, but his eyesight made him unsatisfactory to the service. He wasn't the type that you might be able to use on the bridge of a destroyer or in the cockpit of a B-52, but he was plainly good enough to be the No. 2 electronic specialist in his school. But, no, he had to go in his fourth year at this particular school. My position on that young man is that that service not only destroyed a lot of his orientation and motivation to be a good soldier for his country, but I think they were being pennywise and pound-foolish about him. I said to the service when I talked to some of its members, "I'll bet you money that if we had a war tomorrow you would run out in the street and throw your arms around that young fellow and try to commission him a captain."

I think this is just as wrong as anything could be. It is one of the things that we are taking up, particularly in the career situation with respect to the Cordiner Committee. They are going to have some better policies on it. I do think the thing has been getting better, particularly in voluntary enlistment programs, both officer and enlisted man, as of recent date. It is not perfect yet.

I think it is one of the major weaknesses we have, that we will measure a man on his feet, to the degree of his flatfootedness, and not on the degree of his flatbrainness. I think there ought to be a difference there. I would rather see a little more measurement of the brainpower and a little bit less measurement of the footpower.

QUESTION: Relative to the reserve program, sir, I am under the impression that it is the policy to obtain approximately 50 percent of the officers for the three services to serve on active duty. I think we all recognize some of the undesirable aspects of having a split between our groups of officers within the services for reasons, among which is why we want to hold that percentage of the reserve so high.

SECRETARY BURGESS: Is part of your question--why don't we have more regular officers? Well, I think that that is a situation that we are trying to improve gradually, as you know. I don't know what your percentages were before World War II. I would imagine that they

were more or less on the basis of maybe 80 percent to 75 percent regular officers, and 20 percent members of the reserve--maybe higher than that. But this phenomenon of having almost a 3-million man force in being in these times is a new dimension in this country. For the Defense Department, the matter of making regular officers on a fairly large-scale basis is a problem in itself. Also, we just can't figure over a very sizeable period of time what our final strength is going to be.

Let us say that we had a tremendous improvement in situations next year. I think that there has to be a latitude there. I think we are narrowing the gap of that latitude on your personnel. That 50 percent at this particular time is a vast improvement over what they do need, not with respect to the Marines and the Navy who have almost 50 percent regulars now; but certainly, in the Army and the Air Force, I say, "Let's get the 50 percent and then make another measurement of the situation."

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, you spoke about Class 4 personnel, sir. Is there anything that we can do, or are doing, about improving distribution on a qualitative basis of personnel?

SECRETARY BURGESS: Well, we did make a move about six months ago. I don't know whether you remember it or not, but our enlisted programs were running on the same percentage distribution as the draft programs, and the qualitative 4's were running at a 27 percent slice of the 100 percent intake.

That had been set up, I think, back in 1950, administratively so there would be no criticism of what we were doing administratively over what was required legislatively. In other words, the draft is required to take 27 percent of those qualitative 4's. We took the position in my office that we didn't think we had to hire qualitative-4 men for 4 years. Rather than imposing the 27 percent rule, and also for the phenomenon of having to take the man who was first in line, and rather than being selective about the situation, we let the services in their voluntary programs reduce the 27 percent to 18 percent and have complete selectivity within that 18 percent.

That is beginning to have a better effect on the number of qualitative 4's that we have in the total service. Our administrative imposition of the qualitative-4 situation, of course, was to protect the service that had to use the draft at any given time.

This is my feeling--just to throw an idea out to this group as one that we might work on--I don't know why we enlist any qualitative 4's. I certainly am against enlisting qualitative 4's for 4 years. In the enlistment program, I don't think the 13,000 recruiters and the 4,000 automobiles that we have in this country in the recruiting service have to do much selling to the qualitative 4's. I think they come to us, rather than our going to them.

All we know about these people is what we find out about them on paper. So we sign them up for four years, and then, somewhere down the road, we go through a lot of techniques which I think are expensive and time consuming, and maybe unpleasant; but I personally don't know whether we hire any qualitative 4's on a voluntary basis. On the other hand, I am not for stockpiling such people in this country in times when they might be inclined to improve them somewhere.

So my idea would be to think about something like this: Why doesn't each service figure out what it needs, what its needs are for personnel who can perform a lot of our soft-skill tasks. I am thinking about drivers, vehicle drivers; I am thinking about grass cutters; I am thinking about kitchen personnel; I am thinking about people of that kind. We know generally how many of those types of folks we need. It would seem to me that each service might figure what that component of its intake is for each year, and let the draft provide those people. That would give you your qualitative distribution. That would keep you on the right side of the situation.

Now, for your long-term enlistment programs, your 3 and 4 year programs, let your recruiters work only on 1's, 2's, and 3's. Spend the whole effort there, and then, to the extent that those two columns don't meet your requirement, go back to the draft for the remaining part of the personnel that you need.

My thought about this thing would be that, after you draft the portion of the qualitative 4's that you would get in this particular method, you would not decide about whether you were going to give them a 4-year term in your service until after you had them with you for a while. In any event, you would not have them for more than two years, and, rather than hiring them on the basis of the paper answers, you would hire them on the basis of their functional performance for six months or eight months. In that way I think you would get a much better qualitative force. You would not be wasting your recruiters' time and

signing up people that are probably going to come to you anyway. I think you would get a much better mix of high-quality personnel.

For instance, the Navy knows the high quality of people it got in its 28,000 draft this year. One of its highest percentages of OCS candidates came through the draft. I think we need a set draft call in this country, and we need to stop some of this fluctuation. Let the fluctuation be up, not down. I think you would get a much better quality of 4's and you would have people on your payroll after a period of time, after which you can decide which ones of them you want to hire for the 4-year business.

That is an idea that I throw out to you. If you have any thoughts on it, I would certainly be glad to receive them from the thinking members who are spending their time on this particular subject. That is one we are working on.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, my question pertains to the Reserve Forces Act of 1955, and in particular to the lagging situation we have gotten ourselves into with respect to the six-month program. You indicated that a possible solution to this would be the inclusion of a draft revision as an amendment to the law. What is the position of the Department of Defense on this, and what other changes, by way of amendments to the present law, do you think would be presented to Congress in the next session?

SECRETARY BURGESS: Well, I would like to say this about what I said in my talk on that point--I hope that's the last thing we have to do; because, I tell you, this business of opening up manpower legislation is indeed a tricky one. Sometimes we come away with less than what we went up to get--or less than we had when we went up to get more--let me put it that way. I hope it is about the last six-month program.

I think the Army, which is suffering this particular lag, could do a great deal better job of organizing its reserve force in this country--the Federal Reserves. Let's take the National Guard--the Army National Guard has about 425,000 people in its force right now. When we started this program back last year, we had something less than 200,000 in the Army Federal Reserve.

I might tell you gentlemen, or anybody who has not spent time working on this, that this was a reserve of individuals who were going to see moving pictures that I saw as a second lieutenant back in 1938,

and they were sitting around, more or less doing individual operations, getting their pay, and then going to camp. Now, this is not completely true, but it is the general situation that I found existing in the Army's Federal Reserve Program back in 1954 and early 1955.

The Army now is building more and more toward a unit Reserve. The National Guard and its 425,000, or whatever they have--it's in that general neighborhood--today is a successfully organized Reserve operation. It has got the best balance of officers and enlisted men; it has got the best unit procurement and the best unit training.

People wonder why the guard is of this size? I think the guard has the best quantity and the best organization and a very wonderful potential. On the Federal Reserve side, I think we have the best quality potential but the poorest quantity and organization potential. My feeling about the Army's Reserve situation is this: I think that what we need today in this country is to try to translate the first-classness that I see down at Fort Benning and Fort Bragg and Fort Meade, and what-have-you, or an element of that class, into the Reserve of the Army, back at what I call the Main Street corner. There are many reasons why I would like to see that. The first is for the defense and security of the country, the attitude toward paying attention to the important elements. I would also like to see us be wise about the place where our public strength comes from. That is where our Congressmen and our Senators come from. That is where our support and the feeling for the defense forces come from. That is where our public relations start. They don't start down at Fort Benning. They start out in Peoria and out in Denver and out in Phoenix, Arizona. If you have uninspired units in those areas, that transmits itself back to the people who come here and work out some of our active-force problems.

So my thought about the Army's situation in this particular program is something like this: In the first place, I seem to remember that General Marshall, back before World War II, had a rule that any regular officer on active duty who wanted to become a general officer or to go to one of the senior colleges, should first have sought out and performed a successful tour with civilian components. I think that is one way to get some of our best people into this program. I also think it is just as wise to get that kind of experience as I think it is wise to get the kind of experience you are getting at this school.

The next thing I would like to see the Army do, maybe for each Army area in this country is, instead of taking the military district chief and making him the Army's principal man in that State for recruitment, ROTC, and Reserve activities, they would take away from that military district chief his Reserve activities and name the Federal Reserve commander in that State--the best Federal Reserve commander you have in that State--a man who is known in that State, who can stand up with the best of them on a know-how basis, and let him be the Army's Federal Reserve commander in that State; and put under him the senior Reserve officer that now reports to the military district chief, and let that senior Reserve officer be the Chief of Staff to this man on a full-time basis, in somewhat the same way that the Army operates that National Guard.

I go to those States a lot. I think the military district officer is a colonel; the adjutant general of the State is a major general. He is a citizen of that State. He knows the governor, the Selective Service, the industry, the churches, the education. He is a man of parts and knows the problems of moving around and building up the spirit of the 425,000 forces which the guard has today. The military district man is a stranger. A lot of them are at the end of their career. A lot of them have never served in the Reserve. People know they are passing through town. They are going to be there one year, two years, or what have you. I say to the Army, which has the biggest problem in this Reserve field, that its mission for this Reserve is at the Main Street corner. I don't know of any more important mission or of any more complex mission than to come out there and use the potential and resources that you have in that Army Federal Reserve, and let it build in the same successful way that the National Guard has built its program.

Another angle is, I would once in a while take my long-term recruiters off some of the programs for a month or two and let them work on a lagging problem like this.

The six-month program the Army has given these men in America is one of the biggest things I have seen. You talk to the young men first, and talk to them after six months, and notice their confidence and their ability. They made some fine officers in World War II with less than six months in some of our Officer Candidate Schools. What we need in this country is more confidence and more training. But take that man and his confidence out of the six-month program and send him back to an uninspired Reserve unit and you are going to have pandemonium up in Congress.

That's the gospel I preach everywhere I can go. I think if you just build up a better organization, you might have to take this Reserve commander I am speaking of and, instead of giving him 2 weeks and 48 drills a year, you might give him 2 weeks and 100 drills a year. To compensate for his extra time, let him run his insurance business, his coal yard, or whatever job he has; but use that man. Don't use a transient. This is a hometown job. I think if you could do some of these things that we could get further and further away from trying to get a draft on this six-month program.

That was a short question and a long answer.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, there is a proposed program in the Department of the Army to affiliate enlisted personnel with the specific branch in which they are, therefore giving that branch of the Department of the Army control over those men in their assignments. That proposed program has been turned down on several occasions. I would like to find out what is the high-level opposition to that program.

SECRETARY BURGESS: Well, that's one that has been kept from me. I haven't heard of that one before. I will have to go back and find out about it. That's the best answer I can give you. You come to see me Monday and I will have an answer for you. And I will see you, too!

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, a few months ago the newspaper reported that a cut of about 800,000 men in the Armed Forces is being considered. Is a cut of this magnitude now being considered?

SECRETARY BURGESS: Well, I'll tell you, as I have told everybody else, I haven't heard of the 800,000 cut. I haven't seen any paper with that figure on it. I have been quoted in the press as saying I don't think this figure is in the ball park, and I tell you I don't think it is in the ball park.

I think that what we have to do in our forward thinking is to think that there are lots of opportunities to effect efficiencies, and I hope that is the area in which we will continue to try to make our adjustments for some time to come. I think efficiencies are important. I think it is also important to recognize that, when we develop rocket battalions and atomic battalions, we require less manpower and more skill; that we will utilize the personnel where we can prove that we have weapon strength instead of manpower strength. I think the area of efficiency and

what I believe the President called streamlining are the two areas that are the most profitable to consider.

In my book neither one of those leads to an 800,000 cut.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, in a period in which we have steady inflation--and the monetary situation certainly is inflationary--has any thought been given to setting up a cost-of-living increase in military pay? If you take a colonel's pay today and that of 1939 you find that he is getting 4,000 dollars real wage. I imagine that currently we do get a little more than that--we have so much inertia in this pay system. I wonder if there has been any thought given to that.

SECRETARY BURGESS: Well, as I see our pay situation, back in 1954 we were on a crisis or a crash basis. We got the reenlistment bonus to try to stem what the end of the Korean War thrust upon us. That bill was gotten through. Then we came along in 1955, about the time I got here, and they presented me with the foundation work on what became the Career Incentive Act. My philosophy in that act, as you may recall, was not to do anything for either the officer or the enlisted man in his period of basic obligation, but to try to get him increases along the career pattern, specializing and catering to the man who could stay in, as I call the particular diagonal, giving him less below the diagonal and more above it; but treating him along what I call the career diagonal. We do the same thing with the hazardous-duty pay. We try to cater to the man who actually performs hazardous duty.

That act was successful. Captain Martineau and I were advised by some of the seasoned legislative experts around town. I won a 12-year-old bottle of Scotch betting that we would get this bill through. You are going to get a good increase in your 2-year term for the enlisted man and your 3-year term for the officer. We made a pretty able presentation on that, I think. The increases broke away from the tradition of giving everybody something. We can construe that as a step in the modern direction.

Then last year our effort was to try to see if we could not eliminate what I call the legislative inequity, the thing you can't do anything about even if you want to. That was to try to get survivor benefits on a par basis, an effort to try to get dependent medical care for people who could not get it because of separation of families--rotation and so forth--to try to get for the Army and the Air Force what the Navy

had on a promotion to retire at the highest grade held, also to get augmentation through for the Army and the Air Force equal to that of the Navy and the Marine Corps.

I can tell you that the Cordiner Committee is giving every effort and complete consideration to the cost-of-living factor. I can't tell you what the outcome will be. We have a wealth of material on it. It is being given consideration by a man that I am sure you know, who has had a great deal of experience in that technique.

May I just add one thought there? I think the thing that we found out in 1955 about the Career Incentive Act, the fact that you don't have to give something to everybody, leads us to believe that there are some other modern innovations that we can consider to start making a more sensible pay plan.

CAPTAIN LAUTRUP: Mr. Secretary, on behalf of both Colleges, I would like to thank you for a very excellent presentation and a forward look at our manpower problems.

SECRETARY BURGESS: Thank you, Captain. It has been a great experience for me.

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