

THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF STRATEGY AND LOGISTICS

19 December 1956

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INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

Washington, D. C.

Rear Admiral H. E. Eccles, USN (Ret), was born in Bayside, New York on 31 December 1898. He was graduated from the U. S. Naval Academy and commissioned Ensign in June 1922. He became a qualified submarine officer in 1925 and received postgraduate instruction in Diesel engineering at the Postgraduate School, Annapolis, Maryland, and Columbia University, 1928-1930. He commanded the destroyer John D. Edwards from October 1940 until March 1942 and participated in the naval actions against the Japanese in Badung Strait and the battle of the Java Sea. From May 1942 until June 1943 he was on duty in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Following instruction at the Naval War College, he reported for duty on the staff of the Commander, Service Force, Pacific Fleet, in December 1943, as officer in charge of the Advanced Base Section of the Pacific Fleet Service Force. In December 1945 he was ordered to the Army and Navy Staff College, Washington, D. C., as a member of the Joint Operations Review Board; and the following July he assumed command of the USS Washington. In January 1947, Rear Admiral Eccles was ordered to duty on the staff of the Naval War College at Newport, where he served as Head, Logistics Department until 1951. His last year of active duty was as Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics for Commander Allied Forces Southern Europe. Since his retirement in June 1952, he has been a consultant to the George Washington University Logistics Research Project.

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GENERAL HOLLIS: There is a legend about a woman who was driving her small Fiat car down the road and something went wrong with the engine and it stopped. She got out and lifted the hood and what she saw put her in a state of consternation. She finally managed to flag down an oncoming automobile, which proved to be an identical one, also driven by a woman. The woman who was in trouble was almost hysterical. She said, "I've lost my engine." The other woman said, "It's fortunate that you stopped me, because I happen to have a spare one in the trunk."

Our speaker this morning has made almost a religion for ten years of trying to combat that sort of sloppy logistic thinking. He is engaged, as you read in his biography, on a research project for George Washington University, and is also presently conducting instruction to a group of foreign naval officers in the Naval War College representing 23 friendly nations. With the language problem which he has there he tells me that he has learned to communicate very simply. So I am sure that he will be quite competent to communicate with the class.

ADMIRAL ECCLES: General Hollis, gentlemen of the Industrial College: It is always a pleasure to me to talk about the fascinating subject of logistics in relation to modern war. It is a particular pleasure to talk to a group of men who have had some experience in getting beneath the surface of this subject of logistics and have some understanding of what the facts of life are. So frequently you have to start with an exposition of some of the basic facts of life, because many people have gone through life completely unaware of them.

Now, due to the industrial revolution, logistics today is the dominant feature of war. It's not a question of whether we like it that way, or whether it should be that way. It just is; that's the way things are.

I personally do not think that it should be the dominant feature of war thinking. I think the fact that it has become almost completely dominant is due to a faulty point of view, an inadequate understanding, and a superficial thinking concerning an entire complex of political, economic, psychological, and spiritual factors, which factors cannot be controlled.

This superficial thinking, in my opinion, has resulted in the growth of a rigid bureaucracy. I believe that today this bureaucracy, this Government-military bureaucracy, shows much evidence of having become malignant. This malignancy in turn forces many senior officers who should spend most of their time in thinking deeply on strategy to devote an excessive amount of their time and intellectual attention, which is equally important, if not more important, to administrative matters.

I will present today certain personal opinions. You know, one of the nice things about being retired is that if your personal opinions don't happen to coincide with the official thinking, you don't have to worry a bit about it. I am going to express some ideas, not with the hope that you will agree with my ideas--God forbid that you do that just because I happened to stand up here and say something--but that you will think about these matters and that you will formulate your own ideas.

Now, the first thing about it is, What is the point of view that we should take in considering this extraordinary accumulation of material facts, political arguments, conflicts, and things of that sort that in total make up the problem of military thinking, military decision, military action?

Chart 1, page 3. --Well, I suggest that we look at it from the perspective of command. I suggest that the perspective of command is that point of view which knows the nature and relationships of the technical problems of the command, which recognizes how they affect its capabilities, and which understands the amount of time and effort required to solve these problems.

What are we dealing with? We are dealing with war. What is war? Too many times, I think, people have thought of war in terms of a game. Now, I will admit that there is much evidence to believe that the events in Chicago on Sunday afternoon, when the Chicago Bears and the Detroit Lions went to war, justify that thinking. But why kid ourselves about what war is today?

Actually, we are not dealing with war any more. We are dealing with a spectrum of human conflict. And, in passing, if any of you gentlemen can put together a reasonably representative picture of the spectrum of human conflict that can be put on one slide, I would be receptive to your suggestion. But let's look at this thing.

THE PERSPECTIVE OF COMMAND

**THE PERSPECTIVE OF COMMAND IS THAT POINT
OF VIEW WHICH KNOWS THE NATURE AND
RELATIONSHIPS OF THE TECHNICAL PROBLEMS
OF THE COMMAND; WHICH RECOGNIZES HOW THEY
AFFECT ITS CAPABILITIES; AND WHICH UNDERSTANDS
THE AMOUNT OF TIME AND EFFORT REQUIRED TO
SOLVE THESE PROBLEMS.**

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Chart 2, page 5.-- We are not dealing with formal wars any more, although we may have to deal with formal wars. We are dealing with an entire spectrum of human conflict, which starts over here with what I choose to call that impossibly romantic thought of sweetness and light; peaceful international competition. We move from there to economic competition plus tariffs; trade quotas; currency restrictions and devaluations; political concessions for trade privileges; the dumping of surplus; political sabotage, propaganda, and boycotts; subversive infiltration, arrests, and deportation; seizures of ships and cargoes, blockades, border incidents, border violations and reprisals, material sabotage; riots and revolution fomented from outside; seizure of territory, partial mobilization; air and naval bombardment, full mobilization; submarine sinkings, expansion of the scope, the conflict, and the area; expansion of the objectives from limited objectives to unlimited objectives; and finally the use of thermonuclear weapons, gas and bacteriological warfare as the ultimate limit of human conflict.

For a while this conflict is controllable. Somehow or other, it becomes uncontrollable, and there is an overlap. We say we are at peace. When we get along in here, the peace is only technical, and it overlaps with what we call a cold war. And that's overlapped with what we call a hot war. It has no limitations here, and up here it has no limits. So we call it an unlimited total war. And all the way through we have economic war, starting about here, going from absolute peace to relative peace, increasing tension, limited war, to unlimited war.

I think it is important to recognize that as the tension increases, more weapons and tools of conflict are used. In each case, as these additional weapons come into play, the use of the older weapons continues. Thus, there is a cumulative involvement which eventually gets out of control.

Well, what does that mean? Through the perspective of command it suggests that in today's conflict the military commander has the obligation to understand this situation, and to take effective military action as directed by higher authority at any time and in any area of this spectrum of human conflict. Not only must he be able to take effective military action, but he also has the obligation to understand this well enough to know where he is in the spectrum when he takes that action. That's an important point.

Well, I think that establishes a basis for thinking about what war is today. But what is the structure of war? Now that we have given

a broad definition of human conflict, a broad description of human conflict, what is the structure of this thing we call war, because we still have to deal with it?

Chart 3, page 7. --If you think of war in terms of a group of general factors that are all interrelated--political, economic, geographic, military, psychological, scientific, and technological; and you can put your own in there anywhere you want as long as you recognize that these factors are all interrelated--and if you would understand war, you have to understand the interrelation and the nature of these factors, and that we as military commanders are interested primarily in dealing with the military factors. We have to understand the military factors and their relationships. I submit that when we understand these general factors in our civilization, we can come up with a group of five interrelated military factors.

If we think in terms of the military factors of war--strategy, logistics, tactics, intelligence, and communications--and recognize that these military factors, are based on the general factors, come out of the general factors, and that these military factors are all related, I think we have established a structure of war in relation to a structure of conflict. We can then see that command has the obligation to understand these relationships, to bring them together into a decision-making process, into operation, into analysis. If we do that, I think we have gotten somewhere.

Now, remember that we have extraordinary elements of power that command must deal with now. I am thinking in terms of national command in the person of the President of the United States, with his military leaders and his subordinates. They must deal with elements of power. I am not going to go into that in this talk, except to say, Don't forget the other elements of power.

Let me give a little better sense of relationship among these military factors.

Let me give, not definitions, because these things are indefinable from the standpoint of fixed definitions, but broad, related descriptions.

CHART 3

THE STRUCTURE OF WAR




Chart 4, page 9. --I submit, gentlemen, that this chart shows a coherent structure of war from the point of view of command, the perspective of command. I submit that strategy determines the objectives and the broad methods for their attainment; that logistics provides the means to create and to support combat forces and weapons; that tactics determines the specific employment of forces and weapons in order to attain the objectives of strategy; that intelligence sheds light on the situation for the commander; and that communications transmits information and command decisions. I think we have an overall structure there which is coherent from the point of view of command.

Putting it another way on these three, going back to Colonel Thorpe, strategy and tactics provide the scheme for conduct of military operations; logistics provides the means therefor. We are dealing with simple terms, with coherent terms, with related terms. But just how do these things relate to each other?

Chart 5, page 10. --I suggest, gentlemen, that this is a coherent picture of the relationship; that strategy, logistics, and tactics comprise three discs; that no two war situations ever find these discs in precisely the same situation; that they will move apart and to the point of tangency, but never beyond that; and that sometimes they will coalesce into a single disc in which the elements of strategy, tactics, and logistics are so closely intertwined that no commander cares to or can separate them out; that command must be thinking simultaneously in terms of strategy, logistics, and tactics.

It is in this central area where command does its real thinking. He is assisted by specialists in foreign policy, in national policy, who assist him in some of the basis for the strategy that he as a military commander must evolve. He is assisted by technical specialists in these areas of logistics. His own knowledge must be supplemented by more specialized knowledge. In tactics he is assisted by those officers who specialize in the tactical employment of forces and weapons. But high command must see these things in their relationship and keep his thinking central, with intelligence shedding light and communications transmitting the information to him on which to base his decisions.


Behind all this I believe that an understanding of strategy is most important. This, then, becomes the foundation. And I think Dr. Herbert Rosinski in some of the papers that he has written has given as clear a concept of what strategy really is as any writer who has ever written on

CHART 4

- STRATEGY** — DETERMINES THE OBJECTIVES AND BROAD METHODS FOR ATTAINMENT.
- LOGISTICS** — PROVIDES THE MEANS TO CREATE AND TO SUPPORT COMBAT FORCES AND WEAPONS.
- TACTICS** — DETERMINES THE SPECIFIC EMPLOYMENT OF FORCES AND WEAPONS TO ATTAIN OBJECTIVES OF STRATEGY.
- INTELLIGENCE** — SHEDS LIGHT ON THE SITUATION.
- COMMUNICATIONS** — TRANSMITS INFORMATION AND DECISIONS.

CHART 5

THE STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP OF THE MILITARY FACTORS IN WAR



IN ALL WAR SITUATIONS, THE ACTIONS AND DECISIONS OF COMMAND, WHATEVER THE LEVEL, ARE BASED UPON A BLEND OF STRATEGICAL, LOGISTICAL AND TACTICAL CONSIDERATION.

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the subject. I have abstracted in an oversimplified manner a few thoughts from Dr. Rosinski (Chart 6, page 12), in which he says that strategy is the comprehensive direction of power: tactics is its immediate direction. Since strategy must take into account the multitude of possible counteractions, it becomes a means of control. And this element of control is the essence of strategy. Strategy, in other words, is comprehensive control.

Chart 7, page 13. --Let's pass on to another part of this same source, and that is that strategy must be selective in order to achieve economy. Therefore comprehensive control requires concentration on those minimum key actions or positions from which the entire field can be controlled; and this concept of control applies equally to offense and defense.

Tactics is the immediate action beyond which comprehensive control of the entire field is not involved.

Now, I had to think for one year about this two-page paper that Dr. Rosinski wrote a year ago before I was able to attempt to expand it. I am not going to go into that expansion today. I just assure you that this basic thought has a tremendous amount of meat and muscle in it. It's worth very concentrated thinking and mediation on the part of all military commanders.

Well, with strategy as a continuous and comprehensive control of the elements of power, let's take a look at logistics. I think that logistics has to be seen in two lights, and that this fact gives us a useful clue as to how to look at logistics. The Munitions Board about 1948 or 1949 put out a study for the Secretary of Defense (Chart 8, page 14), and in that they said that the logistics process is at one and the same time the military element in the Nation's economy and the economic element in its military operations.

Well, that makes a lot of sense to me. It has its roots in the basic economy and it has as its objective the sustained effectiveness of the combat forces. Thus logistics becomes the bridge between the national economy and the effective tactical operation of the combat forces.

Let's take another look. I suggest, gentlemen, that the practical military application of strategic concepts takes the form of specific tactical operations to establish the control necessary to attain the objectives, preceded by the economic-logistic effort to prepare and to support the forces employed.

CHART 6

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THOUGHTS ON STRATEGY AND TACTICS FROM ROSINSKI.

STRATEGY IS THE COMPREHENSIVE DIRECTION OF POWER; TACTICS
IS ITS IMMEDIATE DIRECTION.

SINCE STRATEGY MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE MULTITUDE
POSSIBLE COUNTER ACTIONS, IT BECOMES A MEANS OF CONTROL

THIS ELEMENT OF CONTROL IS THE ESSENCE OF STRATEGY

CHART 7

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STRATEGY MUST BE SELECTIVE IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE ECONOMY. THEREFORE COMPREHENSIVE CONTROL REQUIRES CONCENTRATION ON MINIMUM KEY ACTIONS OR POSITIONS FROM WHICH ENTIRE FIELD CAN BE CONTROLLED.

THE CONCEPT OF CONTROL APPLIES EQUALLY TO OFFENSE AND DEFENSE.

TACTICS IS THE IMMEDIATE ACTION BEYOND WHICH COMPREHENSIVE CONTROL OF THE ENTIRE FIELD IS NOT INVOLVED.

CHART 8

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THE LOGISTIC PROCESS IS AT ONE AND THE SAME
TIME, THE MILITARY ELEMENT IN THE NATIONS
ECONOMY AND THE ECONOMIC ELEMENT IN ITS
MILITARY OPERATIONS -

FROM A MUNITIONS BOARD STUDY

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Well, what are the economic sources of strategy? Economic factors influence the objectives of strategy. These economic factors are interlocked and regenerative. The development of trade routes and markets in order to get sources of materials and distribution of products is an essential element in the relationship between economics and strategy. The desire to attain or to maintain a higher standard of living is a very important element of this.

The problem of how to deal with the excess population becomes a problem which influences strategy.

Economic warfare springs from economic competition; and as it increases in intensity, it may combine with social-political competition to produce violence. The enemy's economy becomes a target for destruction or interdiction. His logistic system, which bridges his economy and his combat forces, becomes an immediate target.

Economic capabilities limit the combat forces which can be created. Logistic capabilities limit the forces which can be employed.

Now, to get into the historical examples of the relationship between strategy and logistics, let me give you a very rough classification of the types of relationships. I am sure that with careful thought many of you can improve on this cataloging, but this will do for the purpose of this discussion.

Chart 9, page 16. -- We have the strategy of blockade in its relationship to the choking off of an entire national economic system, or a more selective approach in which a critical logistic target is selected for destruction or interdiction.

We have the relations between strategy and logistics in determining the scope and timing of strategical plans.

We have the relationship which determines the composition, balance, and deployment of forces, and the force buildup.

We have that relationship which influences the maintenance of a political position without waging war.

We have the relationship which governs strategic overseas base site selection and buildup--an extraordinarily complex problem.

CHART 9

SOME TYPES OF STRATEGIC-LOGISTIC RELATION

STRATEGY OF BLOCKADE.

NATIONAL ECONOMICS.
CRITICAL LOGISTIC TARGET.

SCOPE AND TIMING
OF STRATEGIC PLANS.

COMPOSITION BALANCE
AND DEPLOYMENT OF
FORCES, FORCE BUILD-UP.

MAINTENANCE OF POLITICAL
POSITION WITHOUT WAR.

STRATEGIC OVERSEAS BASE
SITE SELECTION AND BUILD-UP.

CRITICAL LOGISTIC ELEMENT.

And we have that relationship which results in there being a critical logistic element in the buildup of your own forces.

Let's take a few illustrations of this from history. The glorious first of June was a great victory for the British Navy. On the first of June, 1794, Lord Howe had his glorious victory over the French fleet under Villaret. The only trouble was that he missed his objective, because at that time France, in the throes of the French Revolution, was a critical area of starvation. A large, 128- or 200-ship food convoy had been assembled in Chesapeake Bay, and the French Government had instructed Villaret that that convoy was to get to France in spite of what happened to his fleet. The British admiral knew of the presence of this convoy, but he became bemused by the prospects of a tactical victory. So he achieved the tactical victory and lost the strategic victory. The result was that the French Revolution survived. That is really a very interesting example of the influence of a strategic blockade against a national economy. It is an interesting example of a strategic error in which the objective was missed.

Well, we go on to some of the more simple and obvious things that need no explanation. Look how our submarine campaign against Japan destroyed their oil transport and crippled their fleet and air force for lack of petroleum. It is an example of the strategy of blockade of petroleum, of a critical logistic target.

Take China in 1947. This is an extraordinary story that has never been told except in certain congressional hearings--how special sessions of the President, the Secretary of State, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the late part of that period authorized the emergency shipment of two shiploads of small arms and ammunition to the nationalist forces in Mukden. By that time the logistic system of the United States military departments had been broken down by a disorganized wrecking of our national defense system after World War II. Instead of live ammunition and working guns being delivered to Mukden, after a delay of three or four months, three LST's drifted into Saipan, picked up two LST loads off the junk pile, and delivered them to the Chinese nationalist forces, which saw these parts of broken machine guns, bad ammunition, and things of that kind and said: "What the hell's the use of fighting any more?" and within one week Mukden surrendered. It was a loss of political position without war and it illustrated the lack of a sound logistic procedure.

Well, our U. S. airlift in the Berlin blockade is known to everybody. It is perfectly simple--the maintenance of a political position without war.

Chart 10, pages 19, 20, 21. --Let's go on. The Cairo Conference in 1943 dealt with major strategic decisions and was directly the dissenting factor in the development of the scope and timing of strategic plans. The Cairo Conference reports probably weigh 25 to 40 pounds, but the decision was to delay the Normandy landing one month to allow time for our buildup. The Southern France operation angle was delayed two months, because of a critical logistic element--the availability of landing craft. The Aegean expedition was canceled, because of a critical logistic element--landing craft and oilers. The Moulme'n landing was canceled, because of a critical logistic element--landing craft and steel. Those are a few simple illustrations.

And I might point out this: That the results of that Cairo Conference took from five to six months of altercation subsequently to do some of the other elements that I have not listed, because of the inability of the military to come up with equally effective planning factors as to ocean shipping and requirements and for lift. The simple matter of logistic planning factors fouled up the whole works, because the British and the Americans could not agree on what the factors were.

Let's go on to some of the other illustrations. Every World War II Pacific amphibious landing was undertaken for the purpose of establishing an overseas base, and involved the site selection of bases. They illustrate a logistic buildup along the line of strategic advance. This resulted in a successful strategic drive toward the enemy homeland and the destruction of the enemy bases, his fleet, and his air force.

In the Normandy invasion the selection of the invasion site and the scheme of maneuver were probably the most perfect illustration in history of the necessity for the complete integration of strategic and logistic planning. Its result was to establish a firm base for the destruction of the German Army and the liberation of Europe, and it illustrates an integration of strategic-logistic-tactical planning, the composition of balance, and the deployment of combat and logistic forces.

On the Suez crisis, I am not going to say a word about that, except that I would like the question marks to be bigger. I am sure that with pencil and paper you can increase that inventory to ten pages in the matter of an hour or an hour and a half.

CHART 10

ILLUSTRATES

RESULT

EVENT

SCOPE AND TIMING
OF STRATEGIC PLANS.

MAJOR STRATEGIC
DECISIONS.

CAIRO CONFERENCE
1943.

ALLOW TIME FOR
BUILD-UP.

DELAY 1 MONTH.

SPECIFIC ITEMS.

CRITICAL LOGISTIC
ELEMENT, AVAILABILITY
OF LANDING CRAFT.

DELAY 2 MONTHS.

NORMANDY LANDING
1944.
SOUTHERN FRANCE
1944.

CRITICAL LOGISTIC
ELEMENT, LANDING
CRAFT OILERS.

CANCEL.

AGEAN EXPEDITION. 61

CRITICAL LOGISTIC
ELEMENT, LANDING
CRAFT AND STEEL.

CANCEL.

MOULMEIM LANDING.

CRITICAL LOGISTIC
ELEMENT, TRANS-
OCEAN SHIPPING.

DELAY 4 MONTHS.

PHILIPPINE
INVASION.

CHART 10 Cont'd)

EVENT	RESULT	ILLUSTRATES
ALL WW II PACIFIC AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS.	SUCCESSFUL STRATEGIC DRIVE TOWARD ENEMY HOMELAND AND DESTRUCTION OF ENEMY BASES, FLEET AND AIR FORCE.	OVERSEAS BASE SITE SELECTION AND LOGISTIC BUILD-UP ALONG LINE OF STRATEGIC ADVANCE.
NORMANDY INVASION, SELECTION OF INVASION SITE AND SCHEME OF MANEUVER.	ESTABLISHED FIRM BASE FOR DESTRUCTION OF GERMAN ARMY AND LIBERATION OF EUROPE.	INTEGRATION OF STRATEGIC-LOGISTIC-TACTICAL PLANNING. COMPOSITION-BALANCE AND DEPLOYMENT OF COMBAT AND LOGISTIC FORCES.

CHART 10 (Cont'd)

EVENT	RESULT	ILLUSTRATES
SUEZ CRISIS 1956	??	LACK OF INTEGRATED STRATEGIC-LOGISTIC PLAN. CRITICAL ECONOMIC-LOGISTIC ELEMENTS, OIL & TRANSPORTATION. LACK OF RAPID FORCE BUILD-UP. LACK OF SEA-AIR TROOP & CARGO LIFT.

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I think these illustrations are enough to show how the economic-logistic relationship determines the limits of strategy. I point out, furthermore, that economic factors can upset the political stability of a nation or of an alliance and can thereby force changes both in national policy, grand strategy, and in military strategy.

As an example of that, gentlemen, all we have to look at is the position, the policy, and the strategy of England as related to NATO and to Western Europe integration and Western Europe defense.

I will repeat this. Economic factors determine the upper limits of the forces which can be created; strategic-tactical-logistic factors determine the nature of the forces that you wish to create; and the logistic factors determine the balance of forces and ultimately determine the combat effectiveness of the forces which you create.

Now, from these broad statements, from these examples of actual relations, let's go back to a little bit of theory. Let's turn again to the theory of the integration of strategic and logistic planning.


Chart 11, page 23. --Here we have the fact that in all these areas the nature of the job varies considerably in accordance with the level of command. But always, gentlemen, the perspective of command is the thing that draws these factors into a coherent pattern. At this upper level most of the planning is very long-range. As you go down the level, your planning becomes almost entirely short-range down to this bottom part. You might say that this is strategic logistics in here overlapping what we might call tactical logistics in here. We have economic mobilization planning overlapping with operational planning, bound together by code planning. You have areas of interest, what you might call departments of interest--fleet or field interest.

Now, these are not rigid divisions. They are merely convenient approximations, in which there must always be great flexibility and considerable overlapping. But the level of the planning at which you are exercising command control will determine the nature of the planning that you are doing.

Chart 12, page 24. --There are two important elements in this nature of planning. There are two requirements for logistic planning factors. One is for what we might choose to call logistics planning. Now, this is where the integration of strategy and logistics and tactics

CHART 11

THE LEVELS OF PLANNING IN LOGISTICS*



* THESE ARE NOT RIGID DIVISIONS. THEY ARE MERELY CONVENIENT APPROXIMATIONS IN WHICH THERE ALWAYS MUST BE GREAT FLEXIBILITY AND CONSIDERABLE OVERLAP.

LOGISTICS PLANNING

THIS IS THE PROCESS WHEREBY LOGISTICAL FACTORS ARE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION IN THE FORMULATION OF STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL PLANS. VERY BROAD AND GENERAL PLANNING FACTORS MAY BE USED TO ELIMINATE STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL ABSURDITIES, TO DETERMINE CRITICAL ELEMENTS OF PROPOSED PLANS, AND TO DETERMINE THE GENERAL DISPOSITION OF LOGISTIC FORCES.

PLANNING FOR LOGISTICS SUPPORT

THIS IS THE MORE DETAILED PROCESS WHEREBY THE OPERATIONAL DETAILS OF THE LOGISTICS SUPPORT REQUIRED TO CARRY OUT THE STRATEGIC PLAN ARE DETERMINED. THE TYPE OF PLANNING FACTORS USED IN LOGISTICS PLANNING MAY OR MAY NOT BE VALUABLE FOR THIS TYPE OF PLANNING, DEPENDING ON THE SITUATION.

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takes place. We call it the formal estimate of the situation. In the logistical staff study which is part of the estimate of the situation we find what we would call logistics planning. This is a bulkhead where logistical factors are taken into consideration in the formulation of strategic and tactical plans. Very broad and very general planning factors may be used in this process to eliminate strategic and tactical absurdities, to determine the critical elements of the proposed plans, and to determine the general disposition of logistic forces. And that is a process of decision.

But once having made the decision, you may want to employ an entirely different set of planning factors, much more detailed. You don't want the great aggregations that you have there. You come down to specific line items, because here planning for the logistic support is the development of your plan. It is the more detailed process whereby the operational details of the logistics support required to carry out the strategic plan are determined. The type of planning factors used in logistics planning may or may not be valuable for this type of planning, depending on the situation.

Chart 13, page 26.--Well, what's the basis for our plans? The basis for our plans is, one, the objective. What are you trying to do? That's the mission. Next, the forces involved. Next, the scheme of operations. Next, the intensity of the action that you expect. Next, the timing--the duration of the action. The scheme, the intensity. Command judgment.

In the free practical method of planning developed by the George Washington University research project, that element of good judgment factor, the commander's judgment factor, enters into official planning terminology for the first time in the history of military planning. But the most significant point, the perspective of command, the intensity of action, judgment in planning, you must always have.

From this you come up with time-phased logistic requirements both to create and to support the combat forces. What? How much? When? Where? You have to be specific.

Well, the commander needs help, particularly today needs lots of help. Primarily he has to know his job. He has to know these relationships. He has to know the importance of these factors. Where does

THE BASIS FOR PLANS

OBJECTIVE OR MISSION

THE FORCES INVOLVED

THE SCHEME

THE INTENSITY OF ACTION

THE TIMING

TIME PHASED LOGISTIC
 REQUIREMENTS BOTH TO
 CREATE AND TO SUPPORT
 THE COMBAT FORCES
 =
 WHAT ?
 i.e. - HOW MUCH ?
 WHEN ?
 WHERE ?

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he get his help? He gets it from his staff. Normally you have an Operations Section, and you have a Logistics Section, working in this integration.

Chart 14, page 28.--Operations states the forces and the proposed scheme. Logistics states the probable shortages. Operations and Logistics jointly suggest to the commander the modifications either in the scheme or in the logistic support which will permit him to accomplish his mission in spite of the shortages that appear.

Command evaluates and decides. And every time I hear somebody talking about logistics saying it isn't feasible, I shudder, because only rarely is the situation so simple and clear-cut that feasibility is obvious. By golly, our strategists and tacticians ought to have enough sense, and have enough knowledge of logistic factors, so that they don't propose to the logistic people that the scheme is so obviously infeasible that logistics can tell command what command can do.

Command evaluates and decides. The command evaluates and decides on the basis of admitting that he is going to have shortages and saying: "My mission is so important that I am willing to impose on my subordinates certain military risks, certain hazards, and certain hardships, which I recognize in advance, and count on their skill, their fighting spirit, and their morale to overcome these shortages." And that's a command decision, gentlemen. It's command leadership and it isn't logistics saying what's feasible. Don't ever let anybody kid you on that.

Well, what do we find today, gentlemen? There are certain trends. There is a trend throughout our entire Military Establishment to greater centralization of authority. There is a trend toward greater civilian control. There is a trend toward the increasing use of weapons systems.

Now, in all those areas we need to know a great deal more than we know. We are very ignorant about the degree to which centralization of authority in a large organization brings about efficiency. What's the cutoff point where overcentralization brings good results? We are ignorant. We don't know. We have got to study. We have got to have research.

STAFF RESPONSIBILITIES

OPERATIONS STATES FORCES AND SCHEME

LOGISTICS STATES PROBABLE SHORTAGES

**OPERATIONS AND LOGISTICS JOINTLY SUGGEST
MODIFICATIONS**

COMMAND EVALUATES AND DECIDES

UNCLASSIFIED

What is the nature, the spirit, and the degree of control which civilians should properly exercise in military affairs? We don't know. We are ignorant. We are guessing. That's a very important field.

What do we know about the implications of weapons systems and the increasing use of weapons systems in developing coordination of logistics? How is a theater commander, how is a fleet commander, going to coordinate the weapon systems, the logistics of these weapon systems that he is getting, because so many of them have their self-contained logistics and you are getting little principalities built up? We don't know enough about that. We need research.

There's a trend toward the mechanization of logistic systems. That brings great efficiency in peacetime. We don't know how that will operate in war. We don't know to what degree we should centralize or decentralize by reason of the atomic and thermonuclear threats. We need war games to work some of these things out. In order to work out these war games we need better logistic planning factors and better techniques that will give us an analysis of these things, or at least give us an understanding of them.

There is a trend toward the improvement of supply systems. The Navy, the Army, and the Air Force are all using greater mechanization and greater understanding of supply to improve their supply systems. In that improvement of supply systems that is taking place there is one important element, and that is that the effectiveness of these improvements is almost wholly dependent on two things: first, logistic discipline, a command function; and, secondly, the assurance on the part of the tactical commander that he can get critical items by reason of the fact that he has a fast transportation system that is operating under his control in the distribution of these items.

So there is a contradiction because of our great genius for centralizing transportation to a degree where the commander is very soon going to lose all authority over his intratheater transportation, which is the key to the logistic system. There is a contradiction in terms today, gentlemen. We need to know more about it.

But the logistics of a thermonuclear war is a recuperation or really merely an application of the methods, the techniques, of advanced base development which the United States Armed Forces developed in the combat zone in World War II. How many people like to sit down and study the advanced base development under combat conditions? Do you?

The logistics of thermonuclear warfare also require decentralized logistic support in order to sustain thermonuclear retaliation.

What about the logistics of a widespread conventional war? We will need conventional logistics to provide and sustain the combat forces and sustain the greatest combat effectiveness. And at the same time we must exercise economy of resources and have a standby capability to fight a thermonuclear war.

The logistics of cold war means economy of force. It means logistic readiness for conventional war, and logistic readiness for thermonuclear war. It means a healthy economy for the long-range economic-political struggle.

This all adds up to a study of principles, to an understanding of cause and effect. It adds up to strategic-logistic integration in decision and in the process of decision, in decision and combat effectiveness in conflict.

At the highest levels of command our commanders are concerned with the economic-logistic influences and with their limitations on strategic decisions. As level of command descends, these limitations and influences shift to the purely logistic and tend to limit and influence the immediate employment of specific combat forces.

The mind of civilian command is concerned primarily with the economic influences and limitations. The mind of military command is primarily concerned with the operational logistic influences and limitations. Both civilian heads and military commanders must be aware of these influences and limitations; and they must understand these shifting relationships which are required to exercise control in modern conflict.

Thus, they must understand the nature of conflict, the elements of power, the position of strategy as continuous comprehensive control, the position of the process, the art, the science of logistics as the bridge between the national economic base and the combat employment of the effective combat forces.

They must understand these relationships when it comes to the selection of the elements of power, so that they can best utilize them in this shifting conflict. They must understand the need for adjusting power and power elements as the conflict shifts.

Finally, gentlemen, we all need to know a great deal more about the nature of the organization which is most suitable to the responsible control and employment of combat forces.

Thank you.

MR. HENKEL: Admiral Eccles is ready for questions.

QUESTION: I am very much interested in your feeling about the extent to which the Office of the Secretary of Defense has centralized transportation, particularly air transportation. Do you feel that this has gone too far; that it should be oriented more toward war than toward peace?

ADMIRAL ECCLES: I certainly think that a Department of Defense should be oriented more to war than to peace. The best way to orient a Department of Defense to peace is to abolish the damn thing.

I don't know what the results of this transportation deal are going to be. I do know that if we are to make wise decisions in the organization of our transportation, those people who make those decisions must have an understanding of the perspective of command in the employment of combat forces in human conflict; and they must think out in their minds the criteria on which the action of the Department of Defense should be based. I submit that if the budget is to be the only criterion for those judgments of the Department, we ought to abolish the Department of Defense and go back to the basis of submitting requirements. It is that simple. The budget is a very important factor in planning in the Department of Defense, but God forbid that it be the only factor.

QUESTION: I wonder if you would comment just briefly on the viewpoint that Soviet Russia is taking in the same areas of activity, especially in command and strategy.

ADMIRAL ECCLES: I have not seen any intelligence summaries or surveys of the attitude on command in the Soviet armed forces. I don't know. I suggest that perhaps a little book called "The Red Army" may give you that.

I think the Russians have been smarter than we have, in that they have had a better recognition of the nature of human conflict. I think Marx and Lenin put them straight on that a long time ago. However, I don't think they are any smarter administratively than we are. Sometimes

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I think that wouldn't be very difficult to be. But I really think they have some very severe administrative deficiencies, and I think we probably would find that they have overlooked certain very important elements in this question of logistic control. But that is merely a suspicion. It is not knowledge on my part.

QUESTION: I wonder if you would comment on the economic warfare implications in the global strategy now being pursued by the Soviet Union.

ADMIRAL ECCLES: No. I am not inclined to do that. I would have to go into it very extensively, and I haven't done that. All of us are aware that it is a very important factor in their operations, but I can't tell just where to go to find historical citations to back that up.

QUESTION: You have brought up the point that there is a trend toward civilian control. I was thinking in terms of the fact that military thinking and civilian thinking in many cases is not compatible. My question is this: For example, civilian thinking most of the time is generally in terms of economics, while military thinking is, of course, in terms of survival, or of effectively sustaining ourselves. I know that in our industries here in this country we are not pursuing vigorously enough a program of dispersion, because of the economic implications. I would like for you to comment on just what you would propose to break down this thinking on the part of the civilian control.

ADMIRAL ECCLES: In the first place, I believe that the basic principle of civilian control of the Armed Forces is the only principle that makes sense for the United States. I think it is an extremely difficult and important problem to define--to reach a better understanding of the nature of the control that they exercise and the degree of control that they should exercise in various areas. But that they should have the ultimate control is unquestionable. I am merely pleading for better and more understanding of that subject, and I plead against leaping to conclusions either on the part of the military or on the part of civilians in that area.

Secondly, the whole relationship of military value to economic value is an extremely important subject. It is as difficult a subject as you can choose to tackle. Military worth deals with so many intangibles. Economic value deals with profit and loss.

Now, our old friend, Captain Hunt has in the last week put together in his mind certain formulations relating to that subject. I have tried to formulate some ideas on that subject, and I am not happy with what I have done. I think that he has taken a big step forward in the last ten days, and I am going to be very interested to see what follows from the study, and I urge all of you to think of the military value versus the economic value. Their relationship to this subject is a very tough subject.

QUESTION: From the transportation standpoint the Army supports the Air Force to a great degree in the battle zone. One of our mistakes in World War II was the decentralization of transportation. Do you propose from the Army's standpoint to keep on doing that, to skip the intervening chains of command and deal with transportation on a decentralized basis? May I have your comment on that?

ADMIRAL ECCLES: The Army is best suited to determine the nature of the transportation organization which would support the Army in the combat zone. You run into the basic conflict which runs through all military command problems, and that is that there is an essential conflict throughout the war between the requirement for functional command control as opposed to a regional command and control. There is much to be said for functional command. There is much to be said for regional command.

In my opinion each part should be considered by itself in relation to the others. The basic statement that I made was that you must resort to the blackboard to show two command organizations--one carrying out what you believe, and the other carrying out what the other fellow believes, and make your comparison on the function of command decision. And, of course, you should try in making direct decisions and things of that sort to make this comparison on the length of time it takes for need to be translated into requirements and for them to be translated into a flow in the supply system, to be converted into transportation requirements, following up with the elements of traffic management and carrier operation which enter into the picture.

It is a laborious task. I think the flow chart of communications and decisions is the time lag in each system, together with the flow chart for the information that is necessary to be in the hands of the man who makes the decision. You then can establish a framework for better thinking along that line. But I will not get into that area.

QUESTION: There seems to be a tendency to violate what we might term the principle of self-sufficiency in that in so much of our planning of operations within the Government there seems to be a lot of reliance placed upon another arm or unit to do something or furnish some service. Would you comment on this trend, that appears to be increasing? Is there any particular value to it, and what are the demerits of it?

ADMIRAL ECCLES: I am not familiar with the manner in which this trend is developing in the various areas. I think we must learn to live with a situation of that sort--that we cannot have in any command complete self-sufficiency any more. We can have certain degrees of self-sufficiency in various areas.

I will make one generalization which may apply to your particular point, and that is this: There is no way to make an organization so perfect that you can eliminate the need for a mutual understanding of common objectives among the various commanders within that organization, where you eliminate the need for good faith, where you eliminate the need for professional competence and dedication; and, finally, where you can eliminate the need for freedom of informal contact and informal exchange of ideas beyond and outside rigid command channels.

If you force people to work exclusively within command channels, you are asking for trouble. But if you can train the people in command channels to supplement their formal command channels with good informal relations with their commanders, if you have good faith, if you have professional competence, and if you have a clear understanding of common objectives, you have concentrated on the real elements of organization that are important; and many other organizational deficiencies can be overcome by those things. Theoretical perfection of organizational structure can never be substituted for those things.

QUESTION: In going through the unified command organization I find that they have provided various unified commands for the conduct of all the various theaters throughout the world. In view of the present concern over a nuclear attack on this country, which may occur separately or simultaneously with conventional warfare throughout the world, you may notice that the unified command structure for the United States has many strategic and logistic implications. We have a separate Army and Air Force, but no unified command in the United States. Will you comment on the necessity for such command?

ADMIRAL ECCLES: Consideration of that subject is necessary. I don't know what conclusion to reach on it. I would say that in your study of the subject you will run across a detailed example in the inherent conflict between functional control and regional control.

I would suggest that the only way, and the best way, to learn more about that subject is by realistic war games. I would suggest that if you take your war game for the defense of the United States, you will find that that naturally divides into certain regional thinking and functional thinking.

Now, the amount of detail involved is beyond the capacity of any one war game to encompass. But you can take one segment of this big war game and concentrate on the development of that one segment. Next year you can expand another segment. In five or ten years of continued war games, with selective analysis of special segments, you will learn enough about the thing to make some good decisions. That is not a good answer, but that is what I believe in.

MR. HENKEL: Admiral, you have given us a great deal of food for thought. On behalf of the college I thank you not only for presenting your talk here, but for giving it in such an interesting fashion.