

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS IN THE ATOMIC AGE

4 September 1957

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COLONEL BILBO: General Hollis and Gentlemen: The motto of the Industrial College "Defense and Industry Inseparable," might well be interpreted to read "Civilian Military Inseparable." After all is said and done, the soldier soon becomes a civilian and the civilian often becomes a soldier.

One would think that with this interchangeability of status, the relationships would be easy to understand. But such is not the case. Conflicts have existed since the first civilian donned a uniform. As our Government has grown and developed, as we have progressed from the musket to the atomic era, these relationships have become more and more complex.

We are indeed fortunate to have with us this morning Dr. Samuel P. Huntington, Assistant Professor of Government at Harvard University. Dr. Huntington has proved that he is eminently qualified to discuss the relationships of the civilian and military through his book The Soldier and the State.

Dr. Huntington, it is a pleasure to present you to this year's class.

DR. HUNTINGTON: Thank you very much, Colonel Bilbo.

General Hollis, General Armstrong, Gentlemen: I should like to begin my lecture on civil-military relations this morning by expressing my utter, deep-seated, and perhaps even violent antipathy to the very phrase. I start this way not to be cute, but to highlight the ambiguity of the concept and the multitude of things which it may cover.

The chief deficiency of the phrase is that it suggests a continuous gradation from a definite and fixed firmly civilian pole on the one hand to an equally definite and fixed and very remote military pole on the other. It implies that the relations between the military and civilian are like labor-management relations, or Soviet-American relations, where two concrete organized groups with real conflicting interests parry and bargain with each other. It thus suggests a basic dichotomy and opposition between the civilian and the military viewpoints.

This is a suggestion which generally has been advanced by both antimilitarists, who wish to prove how very different you military are from the rest of us, and even by very promilitary writers, such as General DeGaulle, for instance, in his book Le Fil de L'Epee, where in effect he argues that the military and civilian are two halves of any society and that consequently the military viewpoint and the military role should equally balance all the rest of society.

This suggestion of an opposition between the military and civilian viewpoint, is, however, I think, a very erroneous one. There may be such a thing as a definite military interest and outlook. Indeed, in my book I argue not only that the military mind exists, but the even more radical position that it ought to exist. Even here, however, in terms of practical politics, important differences exist; and, as you well know, the SAC mind can hardly be equated with the infantry mind, much less the carrier task force mind.

Setting aside these military differences, however, the concept of a basic opposition between military and civilian really breaks down, because, of course, there is no distinct common interest among civilians. The word "civilian" means simply "nonmilitary." It denotes--I have to say this even though I'm a civilian--a negative, not a positive quality. And the multiplicity of conflicting interests and outlooks among civilian groups means that frequently greater conflicts will exist between any two civilian groups than between any one of them and the military. The United States Steel Corporation sells steel to General Motors; and it must also sell steel to the United States Navy. And while there may be various differences in these two relationships, I fail to see how the latter is so entirely different that it has to be classified under a separate heading of "civil-military relations."

The impression conveyed by the phrase "civil-military relations" is, I think, particularly erroneous with respect to the United States. The role of the military in this country has evolved through three distinct phases, and in none of these did this classic opposition exist.

The first phase, which I would call the prenatal phase in our civil-military relations, can be said, I think, to have lasted from the Revolution until the Civil War. This may seem like a long period of gestation, but for a variety of reasons military institutions and interests suffered a delayed birth in this country. The preeminent characteristic of civil-military relations before 1860 was that there were no, or at least very few, truly military institutions or purely military individuals. The military type as such had not been distinguished from other social types.

This may be seen in the careers of individuals, where military activities were very frequently only one aspect of an individual's career, or possibly a brief interlude in one's career; but they were not an entire career in themselves. The division of labor in which the military functions had been separated out simply had not gone that far. There was no real military career service. Almost half of the graduates of West Point during this period got out of the Army and pursued very successful careers in civilian life. It was a period in which West Pointers frequently became railroad presidents, in which politicians became generals, and in which generals very, very frequently became Presidents. Indeed, during the first 58 years of West Point, between 1802 and 1860, the Army had 37 generals. Twenty-three of those were appointed directly from civilian life, and 11 others had entered the service at the grade of captain or higher. A similar pattern prevailed in the Navy.

In addition, the functions of the military services during this period could not be clearly segregated into military and civilian components. West Point, was, of course, the only engineering school in the country down until 1835, and one of its major contributions was to inspire and aid in the establishment of other engineering schools. The Army Engineers first developed their important civil functions during these years. They built roads, bridges, and canals, made surveys, and indeed aided in the construction of such important links as the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, the Erie Railroad, the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, and many other such projects. The Army and the Navy both played an important role in supporting science and in undertaking expeditions to various parts of the world in order to increase scientific knowledge.

It can also be argued that our Constitution fundamentally did not contemplate any drastic distinction between what was military and what was civilian. The clause in the Constitution, just to cite one example, which makes the President Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, is frequently held up as evidence of the devotion of the framers of the Constitution to the idea of civilian control. But it is even more evidence of the devotion of the framers of the Constitution to the idea that the military and political talents were inseparable. The framers expected individuals elected as Presidents to be capable not only of functioning as Chief Executive and as Chief Diplomat, but also to carry out military activities. The Constitutional Convention very carefully rejected a proposal by Alexander Hamilton that the President be denied the right to command the Armed Forces in the field. The reason for doing this, of course, was that they expected the President under certain conditions to go out and command the Armed Forces in the field.

During this prenatal period, consequently, I think it could be stated, with only some oversimplification, that no civil-military relations existed, because there was no clear distinction between what was civilian and what was military.

In the next phase in American civil-military relations, which I would call the monastic phase, a clear distinction did develop. But again it is hard to say that civil-military relations really existed, because the military were very separate from the rest of the country. In his history of the United States Army, Colonel Ganoz states that in the 1870's the Army was "unseen, unknown, and unpopular."

This is not quite true. In fact, during this period the Army was probably less unpopular than it was in the previous period. In the previous period before the Civil War there was a curious gap between the attitude and the behavior of the American people with respect to their Armed Forces. They warned of the danger of military despots, but then elected many generals Presidents. They constantly warned of the evils of a standing army, but then pressed upon the Army all sorts of civil functions. In contrast, after the Civil War the military were not hated so much as simply ignored. The Army was out on the plains fighting Indians, and after the turn of the century a large proportion was on overseas garrison. Throughout these years the Navy was largely at sea, and hence also "unseen and unknown."

As a result, the military emerged as a separate group and an institution, but they lived in solitude and had fairly little contact with other groups in the population. As one officer said, looking back on this period in the pre-World War I years, "The military lived apart in their tiny secluded garrisons much after the manner of military monks, and they rarely came into contact with the mass of our citizens."

Another officer, writing in 1912 declared: "The United States Army is an alien army--alien in its practically complete separation from the lives of the people from which it is drawn."

During this period the military generally performed less in the way of civil functions and made fewer contributions to civilian activities than they did during the previous period. During these years the military also withdrew from any active role in politics.

The monastic phase came to an end with World War II. The beginnings of the end, of course, go back to World War I; but the real

termination of this phase was in World War II. It is quite obvious that the current phase of civil-military relations is very different from the previous two. The military, it might be said, have emerged from their monasteries, but they have not returned to the womb.

Many efforts have been made to describe this revolution in civil-military relations. I might mention here two of them which I disagree with very vigorously. One, advanced by Professor Lasswell of Yale, is the garrison state theory--the idea that as the result of the increasing needs of national security during the recent years, the military are emerging as the dominant group in society. The second theory is one which is contained in a book published last year by Professor C. Wright Mills of Columbia, called The Power Elite, in which he describes the military as the copartners with big businessmen in the emerging new dominant class in American society.

It seems to me that both these interpretations of the revolution in civil-military relations go wrong someplace. I think they go wrong fundamentally not perhaps because they misunderstand the nature of the military so much--although I think they do that too--but because they misunderstand the nature of American society.

Fundamentally American society is pluralistic. Power is never concentrated, or at least never concentrated in any one spot for very long. Consequently, theories of American politics and society which argue that one class or one group is becoming dominant are never true for long.

I think what the garrison state theory and the power elite theory fail to appreciate is the fact that American politics is basically a politics of interest groups. I think that this perhaps is the dominant characteristic of civil-military relations in the current phase.

This might be described as the atomic phase, not simply because it is connected with the development of atomic energy, but because in some respects civil-military relations resemble the actions of electrons inside an atom. A large number of groups, one of which is military, continuously interact with each other in a constantly shifting, extremely complex, dynamic pattern of relationships. It seems to me that in this period the military have really emerged as a political force in American society, but as a political force not unlike many other political forces in American society. Perhaps a good word to describe

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the world of civil-military relations today is that of William James when he spoke of a "pluralistic multiverse."

The important point here is that the relations of the military as a group with other groups are not fundamentally different from the relationships which exist among the civilian groups in society. Among the dozens of relationships which exist between the military and other groups I would like to select out five for special consideration. I will very briefly discuss military relations with executive officials, with Congress, with diplomats in the State Department, with business, and with scientists.

The relations of the military with any one of these five groups, however, are dependent upon a whole complex pattern of interrelationships among the other groups. Military relations with Congress are frequently dependent upon the relationships of these other groups with Congress. One of the real problems in terms of military relations with the State Department has been the weak character of State Department relations with Congress. Consequently it seems to me that it is very difficult to draw any sharp distinctions or consider any one of these problems in the abstract and alone. The relations of the military with civilian groups are only one of a tremendously complex series of interrelationships among all significant interest groups.

In analyzing these relationships one can consider any given relation in terms of the viewpoint of the two groups involved, whether there is a natural coincidence of interest and outlook between the two groups, and also in terms of the relative power or influence of the two groups. There may well be a greater difference, for example, between a scientist and a Senator than between a Senator and a military officer.

Also, of course, so far as power is concerned, before the current period of civil-military relations, the contacts which the military group had with other organizations were very largely limited in terms of any sustained contacts to governmental institutions--the Executive and the Congress. Here the military were necessarily subordinate; and consequently we speak of civilian control, meaning, of course, not civilian control, but, rather, governmental control. I think one of the difficulties in the present period perhaps is the carrying over of the concept of civilian control and the broadening of it to include all other civilian groups in addition to the political decision-making bodies in the Government.

It is not the function of the business community, or of the scientific community, nor even, I would argue, of the State Department, to exercise civilian control. In order to describe the relationships of the military with the other groups, we have to develop some new concepts and possibly some new phraseology to describe these new relationships.

Let me turn first very briefly to military-Executive relations. By "Executive" I mean the President and the political appointees in the service departments.

Quite obviously, harmony of interest and outlook between the military and civilian viewpoints is more important here than in any other relationship. It is just exactly here, however, that new issues are perhaps coming up to plague civil-military relations in a way in which they have not existed before. Very frequently in previous years in our history, the conflicts between the military officers in high positions in the service departments and civilian executive officials were very largely the result of faulty administration. Now it seems to me there has been a marked change. We have straightened out the administrative arrangements, and the controversies which take place now are ones involving fairly clear issues of policy.

Let me simply illustrate this by citing two cases, one old and one new.

In 1855 Jefferson Davis was Secretary of War, and Winfield Scott was the Commanding General of the Army. An issue came up which very quickly went beyond the fairly low boiling point of both these men. In the correspondence which developed between them, Davis on 25 July 1855, wrote to the Commanding General of the Army, "I leave unnoticed the exhibition of peevish temper in your reply to my last letter." Scott was not going to be outdone in this way and he replied to the Secretary of War that he would reject all communications of the Secretary, "whether designed as private and scurrilous or public missives of arrogance and superciliousness." Davis in turn wrote the Commanding General of the Army denouncing "the gratuitous and monstrous calumnies" he had suffered from Scott and going on to say: "Your petulance, characteristic egotism, and recklessness of accusation have imposed on me the task of unveiling some of your deformities" Your military "fame has been clouded by groveling vices" and your "career marked by querulousness, insubordination, greed of lucre, and want of truth." At which point the Commanding General wrote back to the Secretary: "Your new

letter is a new example of chicanery. My silence under the new provocation has been the result, first, of pity, and next, forgetfulness. Compassion is always due to an enraged imbecile who lays about him in blows which hurt only himself or who at the worst seeks to stifle his opponent by dint of naughty words."

Now, what was the issue which provoked this fairly vitriolic correspondence between the Commanding General and the Secretary? Was it a major issue of policy? Was it some fundamental difference with respect to strategy? Hardly. The immediate issue which gave rise to this was that Scott, as the Commanding General of the Army, had given leave to a Colonel Hitchcock while his regiment was out in the West; and Secretary of War Davis claimed that this violated War Department regulations and claimed that the Commanding General had no power to grant this leave.

Here we have an insignificant matter of detail giving rise to controversy, although one should not discount the personalities of the two men involved. But this was merely the high point in a whole series of controversies between commanding generals and secretaries of war throughout the 19th century simply because the organizational relationships were such that it was almost impossible for the individuals in these positions to work together harmoniously. They had overlapping, duplicating functions. They were coequal. Each reported directly to the President. The net result was that they were always fighting with each other. This type of conflict was finally removed, of course, with the General Staff Act of 1903.

Most of the controversies between military and civilian executive officials throughout our history have been largely rooted in these organizational matters. Now, however, it seems to me that very grave policy matters will become more and more important. The quite obvious disagreement between General Ridgway, when he was Chief of Staff of the Army, and Secretary Wilson involved a basic disagreement over values and priorities, with the Secretary thinking in terms of one set of policy requirements and the Chief of Staff of the Army thinking in terms of another. And I think it is this type of issue which will play a larger and larger role in the relationships between the military and the civilian executive officials.

There may be still a few points of dubious organizational arrangements. This position of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has

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not been fully clarified. It is conceivable, I suppose, that under some conditions the relationship between the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense could approximate that between the Commanding General and the Secretary of War, but I doubt that this would ever emerge into a major problem. Another possible issue is the relationship between the service secretaries and the service chiefs of staff in our enlarged Defense Establishment. Both obviously are being down-graded in importance, but the secretaries are being down-graded faster than the chiefs of staff; and this may possibly pose some problems.

One great problem which military officers are always having to face is, of course, that of their relations with Congress. Congress adds a complicating factor to civil-military relations in the United States which is generally absent from other countries. Traditionally our military have disliked Congress, because Congress has posed a threat to the integrity of the chain of command. Most military officers would like to have a clear hierarchy of authority, and Congress has been a threat to that hierarchy.

It is perhaps here that one most clearly sees the fact that civil-military relations do not exist alone, but are dependent on the relations of the groups involved to other groups. Congress, quite obviously, has almost always considered its relations to the military second to its relations to the Executive. If the Congress is hostile to the Executive, which by and large is normally the case, and if the military supports the Executive, Congress, of course, views the military as emasculated puppets suborned to serve the unworthy ends of a despotic bureaucracy. If, on the other hand, the military oppose the Executive, they become dedicated public servants placing conscience above politics and public interest above personal gain. And if they should be fired by the Executive for supporting Congress, they occupy for at least a moment in the hearts of the Congressmen the elevated status of martyrs.

One of the important points here perhaps is that the military can build effective support in Congress, but that they can do it only by sacrificing that of the Executive over any long period of time. In certain cases this may well be a good thing. The Presidents stay in office at the most four or eight years, the Secretary of Defense two or three, but committee chairman in Congress may be there for a decade or two. Longevity in office means power, and quite obviously military organizations frequently find it worth while to play their cards on the side of Congress rather than upon the side of the Executive.

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The Navy, for instance, during the first half of this century did this fairly consistently in terms of building up effective congressional support in the Naval Affairs Committee in Congress. Thereby naval officers, for instance, put through the act creating the Chief of Naval Operations in 1915 over the vigorous opposition of Secretary Daniels, and thereby they also secured various other legislation expanding the size of the Navy. In 1940, for instance, Congressman Vinson, then Chairman of the Naval Affairs Committee, put through an act expanding the size of the Navy, although the President, FDR, wanted him to go slow. Indeed, Vinson created an additional embarrassment for the admirals at that point by giving them even more than they wanted to have and more than they knew what to do with.

This sort of relationship, of course, poses difficulties with the respect to the relations of the military men involved to the Executive; but it is, and I think will have to be, a continuing aspect of American civil-military relations.

Quite obviously, military relations with Congress and the Executive antedate the most recent period of civil-military relations. However, I think it is not unfair to say that military relations with diplomats, with businessmen, and with scientists are basically a product of this most recent period. And nowhere, of course, in the early years was the gap more obvious than in the lack of relations between the State Department and the military.

This was not something which was desired by the military. In the 1890's and down until World War II the military were in effect the ardent suitor attempting to end the unnatural separation of force and policy, while the State Department was the bashful maid constantly repelling their advances. Throughout this period military organizations and writers, people like Admiral Mahan, Admiral Fiske, and others, urged some sort of National Security Council, such as we now have; and the State Department always turned thumbs down.

In fact, on the first of May, 1919, the then Acting Secretary of the Navy, Franklin Roosevelt, wrote to the Secretary of State urging the need for relating foreign policy and military force and urging the establishment of a joint Army-Navy-State Department staff. But his letter did not get to the Secretary of State. It was missent to the Division of Latin-American Affairs in the State Department. Then after waiting there for a few months, it was quietly interred in the general records of the State Department. Some 30 years later, in 1949, it was discovered

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by a colleague of mine from Harvard. He found it unanswered, unread, and apparently unopened. Such was the interest of the State Department in civil-military cooperation during this period.

In recent years the State Department has had to pay the price for this lack of interest. Because the State Department refused to consider the problems of force, the military in World War II and after had to come in and consider the problems of policy. And whereas the American traditions of civilian control prevented officers from becoming Senators or even secretaries, it did not prevent them from becoming diplomats.

The problem in military-diplomatic relations is that, although there tends to be a fairly general similarity of viewpoint between the military and the State Department--a certain natural kinship, exists, I believe, between a professional soldier and a professional diplomat--nonetheless the vast disparity in power and influence which has existed between these two agencies has made relations between them rather difficult. Compared to the military, the diplomats in the State Department have, of course, been very weak. The State Department is traditionally disliked by Congress. You would have very great difficulty finding any evidence of the State Department going behind the President to build up effective support in Congress, such as the Navy and other military units have done at various times in our history. Congress has an inherent and inbred dislike for the State Department, one which, I think, is grounded in the nature of the two institutions. This, plus the restrictions and difficulties suffered by the diplomatic service as compared with the military service, has tended to make this aspect of civil-military relations very touchy.

Fourthly, there are the relations between the military and the business community. Here too, it seems to me, a great gap has existed until the recent period. Except during our brief periods of war, throughout our history business generally has been very unwilling to get mixed up in military affairs. American business has not been eager for defense contracts. In both our World Wars, business by and large was reluctant to convert to wartime production before we got into the war, because of the natural fear a businessman has of losing his position in his regular peacetime market. As a result, this close alliance and relationship which now exists between the military and business are something very new. In fact, they are in many respects the most striking innovation of the new phase of civil-military relations.

This has created all sorts of problems, because the relationship between these two groups is exceedingly complex. There is a certain similarity of outlook between the big businessman and the military officer, both concerned with administering tremendous organizations. Nonetheless there is in many respects a fairly distinct difference in interest: business generally wants lower expenditures; and in this day and age lower expenditures mean lower military expenditures. On the other hand, we now have the creation for the first time in the United States of a fairly permanent peacetime defense industry. And again, a most significant aspect of the relations between military and business is the relationship between this defense segment of American industry and the rest of American industry.

Turning to the fifth set of relationships, the relations between the military and science, as I pointed out, before the Civil War the military supported much scientific research in this country. This interest died down after the Civil War, but then in World War II, of course, the relationship between the two was re-created. Here, however, I think it is fair to say that it was the scientist who pursued the military, rather than the military going out and seeking the scientist. This simply reflected the fact that the military by and large in the end of the 1930's did not know very much about science and technology and were generally unaware of their potentialities; and consequently it was the scientist who took the initiative. As you know, many of the most important developments during World War II--the proximity fuze, the atomic bomb, and others--were originally suggested by scientists not connected with the Government who seized the initiative and turned to the Government with their proposals.

During World War II this scientific initiative was organized in the Office of Scientific Research and Development under the leadership of Vannevar Bush. Since World War II there has been a continuous search to try to find some sort of organizational mechanism which will result in harmonious working together of the military and science. So far I don't think the search has been too successful, because there is a very big gap which needs to be overcome here. While the military viewpoint is in many respects not too far removed from the State Department viewpoint, while there are many similarities in outlook between the military and business, it seems to me that the military mind and the scientific mind are really at fairly opposite ends. There is a fundamental difference in temperament and outlook here which has to be taken into consideration in developing an administrative mechanism.

The military mind emphasizes organization, discipline, hierarchy. It tends to enforce the acceptance of more traditional practices and procedures and equipment--the soldier has to have trust in his equipment, he has to rely on the judgment of his superiors--while the scientific mind is by nature more open, more self-contained, individualistic, and experimentive. The means of advancement in the two professions perhaps indicates the basic difference between them. In the military advancement is by seniority and by selection from above, which in general puts a high premium upon conformity to the objectives of the organization as a whole; whereas the scientist has to advance by his own individual activities and merit. With the military man too much specialization may lead to a dead end as far as advancement is concerned, whereas with the scientist specialization is his chief way of advancing.

The difference in outlook manifested itself in the postwar period in a whole series of classical controversies between the military and the scientists. The scientists came out of their laboratories. They developed effective political leaders in the persons of people like Conant, Vannevar Bush, and Oppenheimer. As a result, conflicts developed between the military and the scientist over the control of atomic energy, over the operation of the internal security program culminating in the Oppenheimer case, and over issues of strategy, with, as you know, the scientists by and large in the period between 1949 and 1954 pushing the development of an air defense system, whereas the military, at least in the Air Force, were much more concerned with the preservation and development of our offensive capabilities.

Perhaps the best one can say is that scientific-military relations are best when they are least. Quite obviously, they cannot be ended. One-half of the scientific effort of the country is performed on behalf of the Defense Department. But it has been possible to develop various administrative mechanisms for insulating one from the other.

As you know, perhaps the most useful of the devices which have been developed is the study project device, where the military hand over under contract to a group of scientists a problem, such as the problem of air defense (Project Charles), or the problem of civil defense (Project East River) and let the scientists work on it by themselves, developing their own ideas and, if possible, entirely new weapons systems in an effort to solve a single broad problem. Military-scientific relations are not beyond hope, but considerable administrative ingenuity is required to make them workable and beneficial.

In conclusion, the military have been participating in an extremely new, complex pattern of civil-military relations. They have been one group interacting with a large number of other groups in the complex processes of American politics. Perhaps the one outstanding characteristic of this development is the relative facility and skill with which the military man has moved into this new world. Certainly the military officer before 1940 was completely unprepared for the environment which he has faced since 1945. Yet he has done very well. The American military have produced very few Melville Goodwins at a loss in the complex civilian world.

Nonetheless, a real problem exists in that in this complex process of American politics the military man must learn to reconcile integrity with flexibility. In coming into contact with a wide variety of groups he will influence those groups and be influenced by them.

In working harmoniously with these other groups the military man must still maintain his basic military viewpoint. There is no reason why the military outlook should be identical with that of other groups, and the military man must learn not to compromise his basic cause.

All groups in this complex process have to learn to respect and appreciate each other's responsibilities and interests. Indeed, in some respects the complexity of these relationships may not only be a problem, but also a solution to a problem, because it may prevent the military man from falling prey to any one single interest. Continuous contact with a wide variety of interests may force him to maintain his own individuality.

In the complexity of his present relationships, the military officer may well be forced to reconsider again what it is that makes him distinctly military, what indeed it is that he has that the others have not. And in so doing he may well come to a new and deeper appreciation of the unique contribution which he as a military man can make to the achievement of our national objectives.

COLONEL BILBO: Dr. Huntington is now ready for your questions.

QUESTION: Will you dwell at greater length on the military mind having traditionally different characteristics than the civilian and explain why you think so? That was incomprehensible to me and I was wondering if you would comment on it.

DR. HUNTINGTON: Well, I would say that the military mind arises out of the professional character of the services which the military perform. When I use the term "military mind" I do not, of course, use it in any invidious sense. I think there is a legal mind, possibly a business mind, and there is very certainly a professorial mind. These are natural outlooks which develop from the performance of particular activities.

It seems to me that the distinguishing characteristics of the military mind derive from the nature of the military activities concerned with the security of the nation; that it is the proper professional concern of the officer to put this first; and that his outlook will tend to be a fairly realistic one in terms of evaluating the relations between his country and other countries. If anything, he will be pessimistic with respect to his own capabilities. He will tend to be rather conservative, I think, in terms of his estimate of human nature and the possibilities of improvement and progress. While not desiring a war--in fact, in many cases I think you can argue that the military have been anything but bellicose--he always wants to be prepared for war. It seems to me that there is a whole set of attitudes which are connected with his professional concern, in which, to be sure, all military officers won't share, because every military officer is something else besides simply a military officer. But if you abstract it from the military profession and get a lowest common denominator of outlook which military officers share in common as military officers, it seems to me that you would come up with a set of values and attitudes which would be, as I say, conservative, realistic, possibly pessimistic in emphasizing the role of force in relations among states, and in general an attitude which would be associated with this particular complex of values and priorities.

QUESTION: You mentioned three phases of civil-military relations. Do you see any possibility of a fourth phase emerging--an international phase?

DR. HUNTINGTON: I don't see a fourth phase at the present time. It seems to me the nature of the current phase is very largely determined by the international position in which we find ourselves. I think that this will continue for an indefinite length of time.

When I say "the international position in which we find ourselves" I don't necessarily mean just the cold war. I think, if anything, perhaps we have a tendency still to think of our involvement in international

affairs since World War II as something out of the ordinary, and the word "cold war" sort of suggests that it is out of the ordinary; whereas actually it seems to me we have become a major participant in world politics and will probably continue to be so for the indefinite future, cold war or no cold war. I think that this will require the military to play a very active role in our entire process of Government. I think that they will continue to play an active role, just as business, labor, agriculture, and other groups also play an important role.

QUESTION: You stressed the recently improved and good relationship between the military and industry and yet you stressed the rather poor relationship between the military and science. I assume that "science" refers in the main to university activities as distinguished from industrial activities. Yet it would appear to me that within the military the scientific endeavor is more in the hands of civilian scientists who are on the Government payroll than in any other aspect of military operations perhaps. I am wondering, therefore, why the difference in thinking that the emerging scientist rather resents being told how he should spend the Government's money.

DR. HUNTINGTON: I think the relationships have been particularly difficult in those scientific activities which are carried on directly by the services. Two-thirds of the scientific research done for the military is done on a contract basis; and there, through the various devices which have been developed, I think the relationships are considerably better than where you have scientists working in a military organization.

Two or three years ago a subcommittee of the House Government Operations Committee, the Riehlman committee, made a very exhaustive study of this problem. They published a report, which I recommend very highly to you, in which they discussed the entire interrelationship between the military and science. They pointed out the severe strains which developed in a research organization.

For instance, the classic example of bad relationship, I guess, is the Air Force laboratory in Cambridge, where a whole series of strains developed. At first, the military officer who commanded this laboratory was able to get along very well with the scientists. But then a succession of later commanders were just unable to adjust to the peculiar scientific temperament. A very strained relationship developed between the chief scientific officer of the laboratory and the commanding officer; and eventually several of the scientists, including the chief scientific officer resigned. This development simply contributed to the difference in

outlook of the two professions. I think where scientific work has been most helpful and profitably carried on, it has been at arm's length.

QUESTION: I guess I misunderstood you. You were speaking about the military and scientists within the Department of Defense, weren't you?

DR. HUNTINGTON: Yes, sir. You have scientists either working for the Department of Defense or working in universities on contract with the military or in business corporations. I would say that very probably--at least this is what the Riehlman committee report strongly suggests--the relationships, just in terms of relationships at the operating level, have been worse in those establishments which are directly run by the military. There are many exceptions, of course. During the break General Armstrong told us about the very successful relations that he had with scientists when he was head of the Watertown Arsenal. It isn't necessarily difficult, but it tends to be difficult.

QUESTION: You referred to the military person reconciling integrity with flexibility. Just what do you mean?

DR. HUNTINGTON: Well, that in these various relationships which the military will have with civilian groups, on the one hand, they have to be flexible enough to get along with these civilians, to understand what makes them tick, just as the civilian has to have some sort of appreciation of the military. But also it seems to me that the military have to maintain their own basic outlook and their sense of responsibility to their own job and function.

I might take the most obvious example. As you well know, it's a tendency of military officers who work very closely with electronics and aviation companies very frequently to succumb to the very natural temptation that these companies dangle in front of their eyes and resign from the service and go into private industry. This I think is unfortunate for the military services.

This is perhaps the most crass and open form in which this problem can manifest itself, but it seems to me that it exists in several other ways. The military may be forced to make compromises and adjustments which may well be undesirable. You have to be accommodating, but you can only accommodate so far.

QUESTION: You mentioned the emergence of the military as a political force. I am curious to know whether you meant that the military has influence in, let us say, national politics or as a tool to be used by the Chief Executive or the State Department in enforcing national policy.

DR. HUNTINGTON: I was thinking of the military in politics in the domestic sense of the word, not in terms of the use of military force to enforce the will of the United States overseas or to maintain our national interests overseas. I was thinking of the military as a terribly important institution which has become involved in the policy-making process. And by "politics" I do not mean party politics. I mean the politics by which decisions get made in the National Government. In this sense the Department of the Interior and the Department of Agriculture, all the major units in the executive branch, necessarily have to be in politics and have to develop relationships with constituents and with Congress.

In this type of decision-making process I don't think anybody can exercise any definitive and final control over the military. Obviously the executive will probably have a preeminent influence. But there will be this entire complex pattern of relationships in which the military will be at times able to balance one group off against the other, just as other groups are trying to balance them off against somebody else. It's just the normal way in which government operates in the United States.

QUESTION: That leads to this question: Is that type of influence really expressed in the military or is it expressed in the civilian leaders of the military?

DR. HUNTINGTON: By "civilian leaders of the military" you mean the civilian leadership of the Department of Defense?

STUDENT: Yes, sir.

DR. HUNTINGTON: To a certain extent it is expressed there. To a certain extent it isn't. Just as the military are influenced by civilian groups, the civilian leaders are influenced by the military. As you know, some secretaries of service departments become very ardent advocates of their services. Others do not. You can have a whole variety of relationships existing there.

But the civilian leaders, it seems to me, in the Defense Department represent the fairly temporary political and social interests of the

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administration in power. They change with administrations and within administrations, whereas it seems to me that the interest of the military is something much more permanent and continuing. It is expressed by the higher military leaders, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and elsewhere.

Of course, these military interests are divided among themselves, and that adds to the complexity of the relations which exist. Of course, the normal pattern nowadays is to have secretaries and civilian leadership in one service, together with the military leadership of that service, lined up in a dispute against the civilian and military leadership of the other service. This would just tend to reemphasize the point that the distinction between civilian and military, so far as this type of interest--group politics--is concerned, is not terribly important.

QUESTION: Would you comment further on the relationships between the military and the diplomats, with particular reference to how we can improve our relationships with the diplomats?

DR. HUNTINGTON: I am just speaking as an outside observer now, never having been either in the State Department or in the Defense Department. I think that there has been an improvement in the relationship.

The main difficulty, I think, stems from the tremendous prestige which the military had in the period immediately after World War II and the very little prestige which the State Department and the diplomatic service had, culminating with the attacks of Senator McCarthy on the diplomatic service and the various other activities which were connected with this. From the low of 1953-1954, I think the diplomatic service has been gradually regaining its integrity and its esteem.

I would say that perhaps, so far as forming a pattern for the relationships between the two is concerned, a study might well be made of the British practices in this regard. I know the line of authority in the field between British diplomatic officers and the local military commanders is very carefully drawn; and that by and large they have cooperated fairly well.

So far as relations at the seat of Government are concerned, I think this depends to a very large extent, of course, upon the nature of the administration. The executive officials, both in the Department of Defense and in the State Department, are the brokers between the professional diplomats and the professional soldiers. If you have a

situation such as existed, as you recall, under the leadership of Louis Johnson in the Department of Defense, where an iron curtain went down between the State Department and the Defense Department, quite obviously there isn't much that can be done about it except get a new Secretary of Defense.

So I would say that there exists what I think is a fairly natural harmony of viewpoints between the two; although the military, I think, will always have to exercise considerable restraint in dealing with the diplomatic service. The diplomatic service in the State Department necessarily tends to have an inferiority complex in dealing with the military; the impression I have gained from talking with a State Department officer is that they always have to fight uphill in any battle with the Defense Department. This may be wrong and there may be some State Department people here who will want to argue against that.

QUESTION: To me a political group in our society implies a certain self-contained sector to accomplish its own ends. How do you account for the fact that the military have not been able to attain their end in such an extremely important thing as pay? Does the military have its own pressure group to accomplish such things as pay?

DR. HUNTINGTON: The more removed the immediate objectives of a particular group appear to be from the national objectives, the more difficult it is for that group to sell its objectives to other groups, including particularly the Congress of the United States and the Budget Bureau. I would say that the military have been much more successful with issues of what you might call national policy or national strategy than they have with issues such as military pay.

In this regard the relationship of having a suitable scale of military pay in order to keep officers in the service and attract able men into the service is somewhat more remote and much harder for the Congressman, of course, to justify to his constituents than voting for more B-52's for the Air Force. Consequently this is something where I think probably the military will tend to be weaker than in the broader issues more directly related to war strength, national strategy, and that sort of thing.

I don't have any suggestions as to how to handle the problem of pay.

QUESTION: I am from the State Department. You will recall that during World War II the Chief Executive assumed the powers and responsibilities of the Secretary of State. That was true just prior to

World War II, it certainly was true during World War II, and it has been since. Do you want to comment on that as an answer to this low state of the art of diplomacy?

DR. HUNTINGTON: I would agree with everything you said about World War II, including even the low state of the art of diplomacy. But I don't think what you describe has been true since World War II. I think that both in the second Truman administration and in the current administration the President has relied very heavily upon the advice of the Secretary of State.

I think it's fair to say that in the Truman administration the advice of the Secretary of State by and large represented the advice of the State Department. Whether that is true in the current administration I don't know. I have a feeling that there may now be perhaps more of a gap between the Secretary and the Department in many respects than there was previously.

But I don't think that during the past eight years the Chief Executive has really taken over the functions of the Secretary of State, although Roosevelt, of course, did so during World War II. In part this was the result of Roosevelt's own personality and his confidence in his own capabilities as a diplomat. And also, of course, it was in part the result of the man who was Secretary of State during World War II.

I said in my lecture that the State Department had great difficulty dealing with Congress independent of the Chief Executive. I stick by that, but Cordell Hull as Secretary of State had such strong support in Congress that Roosevelt couldn't get rid of him. Roosevelt, as you know, appointed Sumner Wells Under Secretary of State and to a very large extent in the late 1930's and the early 1940's conducted most of his business with the State Department through the Under Secretary, until Cordell Hull would get all roused up and go storming to the White House and threaten to resign. Roosevelt knew that he couldn't permit the Secretary of State to resign, because it would cause too much of a clash on Capitol Hill. So he pacified the old man and would then go back to dealing with Sumner Wells again. A few months later Cordell Hull would again come storming in and the whole process would be repeated. But that, I think, was fairly unusual in the relations between a Secretary of State and the President.

COMMENT: My observation has been that there are scientific groups both inside and outside the Government where close cooperation

exists between the scientists and the military. One of them that I know of is the Naval Experimental Laboratory at White Oak, where they had a technical director and a commander who were equal in responsibility on the organization chart, with offices side by side; and they maintained very successful relations for a number of years.

DR. HUNTINGTON: That is very true. I think the Navy possibly, although I recognize the danger of generalizing, has had greater luck with its in-service scientists than the other two services. Certainly in some cases, such as the one you suggested, there has been a very satisfactory relationship. Whether this depends primarily on the particular individuals who happen to hold these offices, or whether it is the result of continuing administrative arrangements, I think it is difficult to say.

When I say "interrelations" I don't mean that they shouldn't talk to each other. I simply mean that to achieve the results which both want, it is frequently desirable to have a certain measure of separation and to develop devices by which one can do its work on behalf of the other without the frictions that frequently develop when you have very close contact between groups.

In a sense you can almost say that the relationships between the military and science are somewhat comparable to the relationships between the military and the civilian executive officials of the Government. In the relationships between the civilian executive officials and the military, it's the civilians, of course, who lay down the broad policies and make the basic decisions. They are supposed to respect the military advice, but the military are in a more instrumental role. The civilians, of course, state the needs more or less of national policy; and the military, of course, advise them as to the capabilities which exist for carrying out those policies. Then, if necessary, the military implement the policies in the military sphere.

In a sense you could almost say that the reverse relationship exists between the military and the scientists. That is, the military have certain needs with respect to weapons systems, certain problems, and the scientists exist to develop the capabilities for solving those problems. Just as the relationship between the political officials and the military depends upon a respect for the autonomy of the military, yet with certain responsiveness of the military to the political control, I would say that the relationship between the scientist and the military depends upon a

certain autonomy for the scientist, and yet a responsiveness of the scientist to the military needs and military problems.

COLONEL BILBO: Dr. Huntington, you have demonstrated that a "long hair" may have a crew cut. On behalf of the Commandant and the students, I wish to thank you for a very sparkling and informative and stimulating lecture. Thank you, sir.

(10 Oct 1957--4, 150)B/sgh:jj