

1958--YEAR OF SURVIVAL

14 March 1958

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Mr. Leo Cherne, Executive Director of the Research Institute of America, was born on 8 September 1912 in New York City. He is a graduate of New York University and the New York Law School, has served on the faculty of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, lectured at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces since 1939, and was a faculty member of the New School for Social Research from 1945 to 1952. He was awarded an honorary degree of Doctor of Laws from Parsons College, June 1951. Mr. Cherne participated in drafting the Army and Navy industrial mobilization plans for the last war, and worked closely with virtually every military and defense agency during that period. At the joint request of General Douglas MacArthur and the War Department, he went to Tokyo in April 1946 to prepare a program for the revision of the Japanese tax and fiscal structure. He is also well known to national radio and television audiences. He has covered every national political convention, starting in 1940, and frequently serves on panels. As Chairman of the International Rescue Committee, Mr. Cherne made several trips to Berlin in 1953 at the invitation of the late Mayor Ernst Reuter to review the problems of the escapees coming across the Iron Curtain. With other members of the Board of Directors of IRC, he is presently completing plans for several major projects to aid those who seek freedom from Soviet tyranny. His writings include: "Adjusting Your Business to War," 1939; "M-Day and what it Means to you," 1940; "Your Business Goes to War," 1943; and "The Rest of Your Life," 1945. His articles have appeared in Saturday Evening Post, Colliers, Look, The Saturday Review and The Atlantic Monthly.

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DR. REICHLEY: Ladies and Gentlemen of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and Guests: Any occasion on which we have our ladies present is indeed a very special occasion, and this is truly no exception.

In planning our program for this evening, we realized that the wives have contributed in a large measure to the success and content of this College by the encouragement they have given their husbands. This encouragement undoubtedly has taken many forms, which I am going to show you. I think these few points that I raise will probably be illustrative.

First, they get their husbands to school on time. Second, they patiently listen to their husbands' speech rehearsals. Third, they lighten the burden of home duties to permit greater concentration on college studies.

I am sure you have gathered by now that I am also a family man.

In view of all this we felt that it was only fair that the wives be given the opportunity to participate in an interesting, profitable, most serious part of our college activities. For this reason we have scheduled one of the regular lectures in the evening so that you may be here with us.

In the question period that follows the lecture, we are going to give top priority to questions from the ladies, because we want you to feel that this is your night at the College.

I wish also to give a special welcome to all the other guests. We are particularly pleased that you are able to be here with us this evening.

The subject of the address this evening is "1958--Year of Survival". For an audience such as this I don't believe it is necessary to explain how timely and vitally important the implications of this subject are. Today we are faced with a possible catastrophic conflict between two tremendous power systems.

To analyze and to emphasize the major facets of this global power struggle, we have been indeed fortunate to obtain a most outstanding guest speaker, Mr. Leo Cherne, who is the Executive Director of the Research Institute of America.

Mr. Cherne has been a member of our guest faculty for many years. I won't give the number, because we both remember the year he first came, and it might not be too appropriate. He is thoroughly conversant with the security problems that face not only our Nation but the entire free world. He is an author, has written many books, and has contributed to many magazines--for example, the New York Times Magazine and the Saturday Review of Literature--and these are purely examples.

I would like to read the note from this one--"30 Days that Shook World." The editor says, "This week's guest editorial is contributed by Leo Cherne, author and lecturer. He was one of the last men out of Hungary before the Soviet tanks moved in." Mr. Cherne has also been active in numerous ways to alleviate the problems of escapees from Soviet control. For example, he is the Chairman of the International Rescue Committee. He has always been in the forefront of the fight against tyranny and strives to maintain the dignity of man. Most recently he has returned from French Equatorial Africa, where he has had conversations with the renowned Dr. Albert Schweitzer.

Ladies and Gentlemen, it is indeed a pleasure to introduce to you Mr. Leo Cherne. Leo.

MR. CHERNE: Dr. Reichley, General Mundy, Admiral Clark, General Zitzman, Captain Kelly, Ladies and Gentlemen: Marlin Reichley, in a typical act of kindness to me, refrained from revealing that this happens to be the 20th anniversary of my first appearance before the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. He was very young at the time.

I must confess that the hesitation I feel tonight is far greater than any I have previously experienced. There is something in the special nature of this annual meeting which makes me feel an added responsibility. May I express a debt that flows from that sense of responsibility, stimulated by 20 years of contact with men who have devoted their energy during these years to teaching or studying at the Industrial College.

I have had the opportunity to speak in a number of educational institutions. But there is no organization, no school, no group of men in which I have consistently found a higher quality of thought, a deeper insight, and a more tenacious search for the only peace that has meaning, a peace

which rests upon safety, than here at the Industrial College. I have found no group of men so totally dedicated to the application of the most valuable instrument of defense we have, the mind, as the men I have met in the course of these 20 years at the Industrial College; and I am happy to have the occasion to say this, not only to the men, but to their wives.

As a matter of fact, I would be happy if I could continue in a similar vein. After a pleasant dinner, and especially on an occasion which should be particularly pleasant, it is with hesitation that I approach the subject I have been asked to talk about, because there is nothing pleasant in it. And yet I can discharge my responsibility only by honesty as I see it--by pulling no punches and by perhaps, as expeditiously as possible, conveying the bad news--because it is bad news.

I believe that the American century came to an end in October 1956 and that from that time on America has no longer lived as the single unchallenged power on earth. I believe that, when the history of this period is written, that particular chapter will be written in the language of avoidable tragedy. An opportunity presented itself, perhaps our last clear opportunity. Had it been used as courageously or as wisely as it might have been, I believe that the whole face of the earth might have been changed. Let me first present it in the most oversimplified terms--had we moved in Suez with the lethargy we applied to Hungary, and had we moved in relation to Hungary with the speed we applied to Suez, I should not tonight be discussing "1958--Year of Survival."

Unfortunately, the Soviet Union has made extraordinary use of the year and one-half which has passed since its great crisis. Unfortunately, we now find ourselves in a crisis which includes the elements of a developing recession, coming very awkwardly, as it does, at a moment when our international footing is less sure than it was before, at a moment when our leadership is in a greater difficulty than it was in other critical periods in American history, and at a moment when the executive power of the still most powerful, but no longer unchallenged, Nation in the world is in acute trouble.

It is one of the great tragedies of free people, and I suspect that perhaps it is a little more true of us than of some of the other democratic societies, that it is difficult for us to face and to grapple successfully with two problems at the same time. And, unhappily, the two problems are pushing us in wholly incompatible directions. We shall likely do things, because we feel one of the problems more acutely, more immediately, which may hurt us seriously in relation to the problem which is genuinely the more serious, the more consequential.

When the first of the sputniks burst into our consciousness, we had a sudden realization of something that the men who are students in the Industrial College have known for a long time. As a Nation, we had assumed we were supreme, unchallenged, beyond the possibility of being equalled by scientists or technicians or manufacturing capacity, or energy, or brains anywhere else. We might have conceded that some other nation could equal us in manpower--but not in brains. We might be challenged effectively by armies--but not by talent. We had long, rather foolishly, believed that a totalitarian society does not produce first-rate men. On the contrary, a totalitarian society has within itself, if it uses them, the instruments to more quickly develop the capacities of its first-rate men. A totalitarian society knows precisely what it wants and what it needs, it knows precisely the numbers, and it is willing to pay the price for what it wants. It is not divided in the endless struggle among conflicting values which can bedevil democratic systems. It doesn't debate in an open market place the value of a scientist versus a swept-wing auto. It doesn't debate in a market place the importance of a university versus the 37th new mammoth hotel in Miami. It doesn't debate in the free market place of ideas the relative importance of a teacher and a politician, let alone a skilled worker. It has the power to apply its resources with tenacity and skill to produce what it requires. This we have now learned.

Then, when the second of the space satellites was launched by the Soviet Union, those who were perceptive enough learned a great deal more. We learned that we had been not merely outmaneuvered, but that we had been seriously outdistanced. And because of this we concluded that much indeed has to be done here if that distance is to be shortened and finally reversed. A free people rarely move with great energy except in crisis. This was a crisis, and the American people understood it as such. But then another crisis developed--recession--and, as the figures of the unemployed grew, as the still lingering fear, which is our heritage from the 1930's, sank roots, we rather rapidly lost sight of the sputniks and of the Soviet Union and of the job that had to be done, and we began, with a pretty simple single-mindedness, to debate the methods of beating the recession.

What is the difficulty? As an economist, I must say that the fastest way of countering a softening economy is the enactment of sizable tax cuts. As one who is concerned with equaling and exceeding the Soviet Union, I must say that tax cuts may prove to be the single most damaging step that we as a Nation can take.

Congress does not normally change the tax law annually, and, when it does, it is only with great difficulty that a tax cut is reversed. Any

\$5 billion tax cut enacted this year would almost certainly apply next year. That would mean \$5 billion less revenue to the Government. And that would be in the year, according to both the Gaither Committee Report and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund Report, when our Federal Budget should already have climbed to at least \$47 billion. Instead we would be fighting almost irresistible pressure to pare a \$41 billion budget to meet the growing deficit. Here is the disaster implicit in pursuing one objective designed to meet the immediate, urgent domestic need.

I don't deprecate the need to counter recession, but I worry about methods which may really cripple the other needs of our embattled society. Society accommodates itself in extraordinary ways to its own desires and decisions. And now we have already begun to persuade ourselves that the problem is not so great, that it is possible to negotiate with the Soviet Union. We have already begun to persuade ourselves that something will come out of a Summit Meeting.

Before this year is out, we are going to persuade ourselves that armament on the scale of the rather moderate recommendations made by both the Gaither and the Rockefeller Reports is not really needed. We will once again find ourselves on that merry-go-round of hope and frustration and disillusion. And we haven't got the time any more for false starts or erroneous directions. The essence of the emergency is that all of the actions required to do the job must be begun this year, if, by 1960, the distance between the Soviet Union and ourselves is not to be unmanageable. I am afraid that distance is now increasing at an even more rapid rate.

Our Gross National Product is declining. The Soviet Union's Gross National Product, during the most recent reported 3-month period, has gone up 11 percent. Our rate of increase in Gross National Product has been averaging 2.5 percent a year. The Soviet Union's Gross National Product has been averaging an increase of 10 percent a year. There is very small comfort in remembering how much more steel, aluminum, power, coal, and oil we have--and we do have every one of these. They are small comfort, because we use so much of them for purposes that bear little on security. The Soviet Union uses very little of its resources for purposes that are not imperative for security.

The evidence of the softening, the decay which threatens to envelop us, is acutely disturbing. The growing clamor for disengagement is a new, attractive formula. Its adherents say that, if you just keep the two giants apart by a distance of safe territory, the chance of difficulty is less. On the contrary, in my judgment, one of the reasons that we have

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managed thus far to struggle with the Soviet Union since 1945 without war is that we were together, close, and face to face along a great portion of that boundary. Disengagement does not diminish the danger of war. Disengagement does something else. It deludes the peace-minded into thinking that in fact they are safe. Every aspect of Soviet strategy is designed to achieve one effect--to persuade the peace-minded people of the Western nations that in fact they are safe.

Additional evidence of the softening I speak of is the opposition to American bases which is growing throughout the world. I regret to say that before the year's end there will be a very substantial chorus in Great Britain against our use of our most vital stationary aircraft carrier. Accidents so frequently play such a disproportionate role in human affairs. Two events, one accidental and the other really quite silly, will reverberate for months--the atom bomb that fell on American soil and the nuclear blast in a tunnel that was not accurately reported by the Atomic Energy Commission. These two spread like wildfire and do their part for the Soviet Union.

In this year of difficulty we will find greater perils, because this may well be the year in which Aneurin Bevan will emerge as the administrator of foreign policy in Great Britain. As no one knows better than Winston Churchill, Bevan is a man of extraordinary skill and tenacity and stubbornness and parochial Welsh fury, largely directed at the United States. It is now virtually certain that the Labor Party will win the next election in Great Britain and that, when it does, Aneurin Bevan will be the Foreign Secretary. Aneurin Bevan's approach to his role as Foreign Secretary will be designed to accomplish one end--British neutrality--disengagement, not from the Soviet Union, but disengagement from the United States.

This year, no matter what is said here in Washington, something else will almost certainly happen. Sometimes I wonder who is saying what here in Washington. I have heard the most eloquent statements made by both the Secretary of State and the President against the meeting of the Summit, but they might as well be talking into the wind, because they are going to meet at the Summit unless the Soviet Union decides otherwise. I don't know quite why they are going to meet, but what I do know is that, when they do, the American people will relax, as they did in 1955, as they did when Chamberlin brought a tattered umbrella back to London in 1939. Peace again will have been achieved in our

time, for two months, or six, or nine, and we will have found an additional reason to relax and admire next year's car model, especially since we are not buying this year's.

And in this year of relaxation, of softening, the Washington Post, one of the country's most powerful and, in many respects, excellent newspapers, printed on its first page--not in its Letters to the Editor column, but on the first page--a letter from the Vietnamese girl who raised some 14, as I recall, acid questions about American policy. What a bright little Vietnamese girl she was! What an extraordinary piece of scholarship, to have so effectively picked the 14 questions which the Soviet Union is asking through the uninformed world. And what an act of irresponsibility, to give this the prominence of first-page coverage. It can't be repaired even if the Washington Post spends the next four weeks, as it has the last two Sundays, printing answers to the Vietnamese girl.

And in this year of softening there were those who, for a moment, were shattered by Budapest--the fellow traveling groups, a number of them in the arts. Budapest rattled them. Budapest even rattled numbers of wholly committed Communists. I have to underline that distinction. When Communists get rattled, they generally stay rattled. When a fellow traveler gets rattled, it is frequently momentary. This group is back in full force. Approximately 25 percent of the plays on Broadway are either written by or produced by members of that fraternity. We have found new darlings: Britain's angry young men, whose proudest member is John Osborne, the author of "Look back in Anger," and a new vehicle that Lawrence Olivier dignifies with his presence, "The Entertainer." They have a very simple theme. The theme of both is to persuade Western free society that it is broken down, second rate, cheap, tawdry, and dead. And how we clamor to the box office, to be abused by the new generation of defeated, guilty precursors of national suicide.

And in this period we have pacificism back in full passionate flower. A rather foolish philosophy that I thought had been quite firmly buried in the middle 1930's is with us again. Clarence Pickett, Bertrand Russell, Norman Cousins, and a host of other well meaning people, are concerned lest we destroy the world. The only curious thing about them is that they never seem to direct the really pertinent questions at the nation which threatens the world as it destroyed Budapest.

One of the devastating handicaps against which we work is that when we do something, we are criticized. When the Soviet Union does the

same thing, we are still criticized. An American atomic blast which tragically showers several fishermen sends reverberations throughout the world, and there are demonstrations in Japan. But three blasts in two days in Siberia showering the air over all of Japan is so much more readily assimilated. It is very odd.

America builds two steel mills in India. The Soviet Union is in the process now of completing one. If you were in India you would be persuaded that the Soviet Union is rebuilding the Indian steel industry.

The little Vietnamese girl, in one of her questions asked, "Are not the Soviet Union satellites and 150 atomic-powered submarines a mortification to you?" She asked this of us Americans. My reply would have been, "Yes, indeed, they are a terrible mortification." But here's the curious thing: If we had sent that satellite up first, or if we had 150 atomic-powered submarines, we would be criticized for aggressive intent. The Soviet Union is not.

Here, I am afraid, some note must be made of our extraordinary inability to cope with this. Actually, it is really not all inability. We do try. If Congress passes the appropriations, there will even be \$113 million this year for our overseas information program. That's \$8 million more than last year. That's giving it the good old college try. The Soviet Union is spending in excess of \$2 billion on overseas propaganda. Sputnik has made no difference to us, I suppose, except, to be honest, that additional \$8 million would not have been added to the budget. In fact, I am not sure it is, yet.

What are our dangers? I am not concerned here with remote dangers. I am concerned with dangers on which action must be taken, or at least begun, this year. First of all, the Soviet Union is beginning a genuinely massive economic offensive. Although it has been gaining strength each year, it is still inferior to us in economic strength at the moment. But it is now beginning a genuinely massive economic offensive. What are we doing? The leading figures of both parties appeared one day on the same platform at a meeting in Washington to push for a program which every one of them knew was a fraction of the program required.

The second danger is a terrifying one. We, literally, this year face the danger of NATO developing a fatal crack. I doubt that there are many Americans who know that it has been held together with chewing gum since last December, and that the heroic action of an ill man is what helped save it then--the appearance of President Eisenhower. But NATO was not restored; it was merely saved.

We face a greater danger this year. NATO rests on French soil. There is not a living Frenchman who knows where France will be before the end of this year, because France will not be where she is now when the year is out. She may well take one of three courses before the end of 1958:

a. A Communist coup, which I think is unlikely, but no longer improbable.

b. A popular front, led by Mitterand or Mendez-France, and neither will do much good any more. Their day has passed.

c. A rightwing, led by the Army, or by a political figure of whom some of you have never heard perhaps, Jacques Soustelle.

The year 1958 may see the end of the Fourth Republic of France. And France is the heart of NATO. France cannot find its exit from Algeria and is dying there--and so are we. The world rarely provides us with pleasant or simple alternatives, and Algeria provides none of them. I am afraid we are going to lose either way.

American effort will be designed to save Tunisia and Morocco. If I am not mistaken, detailed plans have already been made to accomplish that in the event of total eruption in Algeria or the loss of Algeria.

In this year we are likely to see the growth of Communist strength in additional critical nations. A rebellion flares in Indonesia. It will lose; and, with the loss of that revolution in Indonesia, the strength of the Communist Party will be that much greater. And Indonesia is indispensable to the future safety of Asia.

In this year we will begin to see the growth of German neutralism, for some fairly substantial reasons. The American recession is beginning to hurt Europe and, as the American recession deepens--and I am afraid it still will--the injury to Europe this time will be rather painfully felt, as it was in 1949. And the nations which have thrived in their relationship to us, will, as they suffer, look elsewhere for trade. The Soviet Union has sharpened its appeal of trade to Western Europe within the last 24 months. I am afraid China has a great deal to offer Japan, and I am afraid Central Europe and the Soviet Union have a great deal to offer Germany, in addition to the mechanical rabbit which the Germans can never catch but will chase until they die or win--reunification. It is impossible to be German and not seek it. It is impossible that there will be a permanently divided Germany. This

is the mechanical rabbit the Soviet Union periodically displays and then takes away, displays again and then takes away. And, of course, there is only one nation which can bring about this reunification--the Soviet Union.

I know that Adenauer does not want reunification. I am sure he would never be heard saying so, but I suspect that Adenauer wants reunification of Germany about as much as the Soviet Union wants recognition of Communist China by the West. But the German people want it, and the political movements of Germany want it, and Adenauer is an old man.

An additional danger confronts us. After a brief flurry of preoccupation in the United States with the suddenly discovered concept that perhaps we ought to be prepared for limited war, we have dropped our interest in the vital concept in about the same way and with the same childlike inability to concentrate that made us pick up and grow tired of the Coué theory in the 1920's. It is almost as though limited war capability was a fad we could afford to play with and then drop. To the extent that we do not revive it or do nothing adequate to prepare America for the possibility of a limited war, as well as the willingness of risking one, precisely to that extent is American power disarmed; because no one knows better than the Soviet Union that the United States will not knowingly involve itself in a major holocaust.

We stand, consequently, as a world power without either the will or the capacity to exercise that power in meaningful areas which might entail moderate risk. All of the increased preoccupation with atomic weapons and the hydrogen bomb and fallout, all of these, will increase, as inescapably they do, the will of decent people to avoid the risk of any war--especially since the only war we could fight would be total. It is, after all, such a very small step between the wish to be at peace and the willingness to be at peace at almost all costs. The year 1958 is the year in which we really have to make up our minds. Do we want peace beyond anything, or do we insist on peace with freedom? Do we have a price which we will not pay for peace? This is the dilemma. These are the difficulties.

This is the year in which it was urgent, according to most modest recommendations, to add \$3 billion to our defense budget, and then \$6 billion next year, and then \$9 billion the year after, as we build up to a budget of \$65 billion. Which way are we moving? How close are we to the target? Who, in fact, any longer mentions the Gaither Committee or the Rockefeller Brothers Fund Report or these unpleasantnesses?

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Nor is anyone likely to, while there is 11 percent unemployed in Detroit, and while Auto Lite is in trouble in Toledo, and while much of New Jersey is beginning to really feel the pinch, and while each day brings new numbers who have exhausted their unemployment insurance tax.

We are reacting quite normally, as free people in a free society. But, in a free society in which free people react normally, people are also normally incapable of defending themselves. In times of crisis it is urgent and inescapable that free people act abnormally, with discipline and purpose and strength, and with a resolution to face things that are tough.

For example, there are other ways of fighting recession. There are other ways of fighting it which can contribute at the same time to national military security. They are not as fast; they are not as certain; but they can aid both our economy and our national posture. But a free people must decide that they are willing to pay the price of lost time in the fight against recession for gained time in the fight for survival against the Soviet Union.

There is nothing I wish more than that I could conclude these remarks by saying to you that I see some evidence that this is beginning to be visible in the United States. In 20 years I have probably never delivered a talk as totally pessimistic as the one I am now concluding. I must honestly say to you that the greatest hope I have for survival against the Soviet Union is internal difficulty within the Soviet Union, rather than national strength and resolution in the United States. If all of America knew what is known in this room, if all of America had the sense of purpose and direction that is present in this room or if there were an American leadership telling America what is known in this room, I think we would do well indeed. We are always too late, and usually start with too little. But a start must be made, and none of any consequence has been made thus far.

I have spoken of assets--the asset of Soviet difficulty. Let me just briefly touch on it. It is important to recognize that the Soviet Union probably has problems even greater than ours. Sputnik dazzled the countryside, but Russians can't wear it or eat it, and the demands from the Russian consumers grow larger with each passing month. Khrushchev was Time Magazine's cover boy of the year for 1957. He will be lucky to be around at the end of 1959. If, like Khrushchev, you have friends like Mikoyan and Suslov, you don't need enemies.

The Soviet Union holds captive many of the most courageous, knowledgeable, embittered peoples of the entire world. When will they erupt again? I think I know when--when they have reason to believe that the United States learned something from the last eruption and will do something different than it did in October 1956.

We frequently think of ourselves as disliked by the entire world. We are not liked in many places, and in some places there are some good reasons why that should be.

But, before we are too sorry for ourselves or too critical of ourselves let's not forget the central fact. We may not be liked in some places, but the Soviet Union is hated by more people alive in the world than any other country in the whole history of civilization. The Soviet Union is hated wherever the Soviet Union is the government, whether it be Peiping or Riga, whether it be Poland, Berlin, or Budapest, or whether it be Moscow, Leningrad, or Kieve.

These are some of the difficulties the Soviet Union faces. There are others. I state this in closing, not to give you false courage, but to give you at least a deserved portion of solace. I wish I could say that we are using these handicaps of the Soviet Union as effectively as we might.

Before the year 1958 is over, the year that I have called the year of survival there may well be another test of where the United States stands in relation to a captive people, and it may be that once again we will have an opportunity to do what we failed to do in 1956--to play a part in shaping the future of the world.

I started with my expression of debt to you. I started by paying tribute to the quality of thought which has always been characteristic of the Industrial College. May I close by expressing an additional conviction. One of the unique attributes of the Industrial College is that the men who are part of it and students within it scatter to many places and assume many responsibilities at the conclusion of this arduous period. I suspect, consequently, that in this room tonight there is assembled more leverage that will be applied on future policy than can perhaps be assembled in any comparable audience anywhere in Washington.

If there is any excuse for my pessimism it is that if it results in stimulating one additional bit of energy, an iota of greater courage,

or one risk worth taking that might otherwise have been defaulted, my debt to you will be greater than it has ever been in the past. Thank you.

DR. REICHLEY: Ladies and Gentlemen, we are now ready for the questions.

MR. CHERNE: I don't mind some cheerful questions.

DR. REICHLEY: We would like to hear questions from the ladies, first.

QUESTION: It is a long time since I have been in school. I would like to know why you think Dr. Adenauer is opposed to the reunification of Germany.

MR. CHERNE: I will try to answer it partially with an analogy. I think he is a wise enough statesman and student of government to know that it is the division of Germany which has contributed as much as anything else to the extraordinary fiber, especially the vitality of freedom in Western Germany. I think he knows--as a matter of fact, I am quite sure he knows--that the reunification of Germany of necessity would be a reunification based on compromises, compromises which will tear at some of the elements of present German vitality and principles. Reunification of Germany will tend very strongly to make of Germany another force, a third force; and it is urgent to Adenauer that Germany be identified with Western Europe, and especially with the United States. For him, the reunification of Germany means difficulty on each of these levels and compromise with the Soviet Union, because obviously, reunification will not come about without paying some price for the great benefit. The analogy I would use is the same as this. There were a number of us--and I know one of the ladies in the audience expressed this to me just a short while ago--who were very grateful for sputnik, because sputnik, with all the unhappy news it brought us, was also a very, very great boon--a sense of reality. In the same way, and in a very much more tragic sense, the United States as a nation had a great deal to be grateful for in a tragic occurrence, the beginning of the war in Korea; because until then we had disarmed; until then we really knew nothing of the face of the Soviet Union. As a result of the tragic price of Korea we, as a people, learned the nature of the enemy we face.

The difficulty is that we don't remember these things long enough, and the difficulty with sputnik is that we forgot what we knew so vividly just 90 days ago.

So, to return to Adenauer, I know that he is concerned that, in the very real attraction that reunification has to virtually every German family, much that has been learned and gained since 1945 in Germany's hard march back toward freedom may be lost.

QUESTION: Why do you consider France the heart of NATO?

MR. CHERNE: Well, for several reasons. First of all, because the NATO nerve center is physically located in France. Secondly, because strategically France is the heartland. Power might ultimately rest in Germany, but France is the heartland at present. These are the two basic reasons. It is very difficult to conceive of a NATO with a France in the midst that was either in anarchy or possessed by a neutralist passion. It would mean at the very minimum the moving physically of those functions of NATO which are more concentrated in France than in any other Western European country.

QUESTION: Do you know where the next uprising against the Soviet Union will take place?

MR. CHERNE: I think that the next uprising against the Soviet Union will take place in Poland. Poland is in the midst of an experiment that can't succeed. It is torn between two irreconcilable poles. That's an unintentional play on the word. Gomulka did indeed, as a Communist, attempt to exercise the maximum national sovereignty within the framework of Soviet foreign policy. He has found his economic problems unmanageable. He has found independence difficult. And the help he has received from the West has also been very modest--as a matter of fact, not only modest, but given at a very considerable gamble to us. There are many reasons that should have led us to hesitate; though I would have gambled more than we did.

The result is that the dissatisfactions of the Polish people grow. Now policy is entering a new phase. Gomulka is tightening the screws. Yesterday's freedom is now beginning to disappear. Repression is again showing its face. In my judgment, the Pole and the Russian are irreconcilable. In my opinion, Poland, whatever its politics, cannot long live at peace with the Soviet Union.

Consequently, a revolution such as the Hungarian Revolution, which was born in Poland, which was born at Poznan several months earlier, is likely again to occur in Poland as the next place.

The second most likely place would be East Germany, though there the real repression is the presence of the heavy Soviet armament on German soil.

The least likely place, I regret to say, for some years to come now, will be Hungary.

QUESTION: Had you been in a position of power in 1956, what would you have done with the Hungarian Revolution, from our standpoint?

MR. CHERNE: I would have done several things. First of all, I used the figure of speech with literal meaning before when I said we should have moved with the same kind of urgency and even with the identical steps that were taken in the case of Suez. The first thing I would have done would have been to hustle U. N. Chief Hammerskjold to Budapest. That was urgent. The Hungarian people were not waiting for American troops. The Hungarian people were waiting for the U. N. The Hungarian people had the illusion that the U. N. had an emergency police force, which of course it did not have. But it sure built one fast for Suez. The U. N. could have built a police force for Budapest very quickly.

But, in addition to that, I would have used American participation, in a new way. I would have had American planes carrying food and medicines, identified just as vividly as possible with the American flag, fly into Budapest, with something of the same continuity that was true in Suez. There was a risk involved, of course. My judgment is that the risk was infinitesimal.

I think I know what happened in Hungary. The Soviet Union withdrew, and there were four days when they did not know whether they would return. These were the four golden days of possibility. They could not have returned if even a token presence from the U. N. and the West was present in Hungary, whether or not a single one of them carried a gun. They could not have moved the tank divisions that they did back into Budapest, a Budapest in which there was a Secretary General of the U. N., or U. N. personnel, or mercy missions associated with major Western governments--not just feeble little private organizations.

These are the things I would have had us do; but I would have done more than that. I would not have pretended to take action on the floor of the U. N., as we did, for some 60 days, without passing a resolution that meant anything. Incidentally, to this day we have never pressed for a U. N. resolution on Hungary that would hurt a fly.

QUESTION: What, if any, influence in the future will the new Arab Union, Egypt and Syria, have?

MR. CHERNE: I wish I knew the answer. I don't. I have seen a number of efforts within the last two weeks trying to figure out where they will move. Certain things seem reasonably clear. It seems reasonably clear that the combination of Syria and Egypt is economically unviable, as well as politically unstable.

That doesn't satisfy me, because I am still rather frightened by the reassurances we received in the early thirties. I remember when so many sound people were persuaded that Hitler could not make any trouble because he didn't have any gold. How could he possibly make war? Germany was on the edge of bankruptcy.

So the economic ineffectuality of Syria and Egypt does not give me very much promise for the future. As a matter of fact, insecurity or inadequacy is more often dangerous than it is safe.

However, one of the key things that no one of us knows is what the Soviet Union's real relationship will be with the new federation. There is an indication that it will be less than it was with the separate states previously. There is an indication that this is not in every respect a beneficial move for the Soviet Union.

Nowhere in the entire world do I regard political affairs as resembling a chess game so much as I do the Middle East affairs. Unfortunately, the Soviets are master chess players, and unfortunately there aren't many chess players on our side.

Beyond that, I would not know what to say. I keep waiting--or perhaps I should honestly say I keep hoping--for Nasser to wind up at Saudi Arabia's throat. I keep waiting for the kind of division that will break the heart of Pan-Arab nationalism, which at the moment is so useful to the Soviet Union. I may well be disappointed, but, in an area as fluid as that, and one in which my ignorance is as thoroughly seated, I should hesitate to say even this much.

QUESTION: Why did you neglect mentioning our Latin American neighbors? We are forgetting them.

MR. CHERNE: Well, I think the question is not only appropriate but the fact that I neglected them indicates a fairly common failing among us. We do take them for granted. The Soviet Union does not appear to

be immediately threatening us in that direction. We can often get away with mistakes in Latin America that would be terribly costly anywhere else.

I am interested in the second part of the question. I don't know whether it was intended this way, but you said, "we seem to be forgetting them." And you referred to our Latin American neighbors. I would like to state as frankly as I can that I think we have been forgetting our Latin American neighbors for a long time. We have not been forgetting their governments. I think we make a mistake in being so carefully attentive to their governments and so inattentive toward our neighbors. Venezuela is, unhappily, the last, but not by any means the unusual, illustration.

I do suspect that not too long from now we are going to have to-- for the same reason, because the Soviet Union will increasingly penetrate that area--pay attention to our Latin American neighbors.

It is true that I have neglected them in my remarks. I hope that I have repaid that neglect a little bit in remembering that there are people behind the facade of a handful of dictators.

QUESTION: Would you comment on why you think the Soviet Union really does not want the West to recognize Communist China?

MR. CHERNE: I think the reason is transparent. The only reason I hesitate to say that is because the tendency which flows from the answer is to persuade people that therefore we ought to immediately recognize Communist China. And that does not follow. I think that one of the unfortunate things we do is frequently decide what the Soviet Union does not like and decide that is what we should do; or decide that what they like is what we should refuse to do.

I think China is a good case in point. I think the Soviet Union has an excellent reason to hope that China is not recognized; and we have other equally good reasons not to accord recognition.

Now, to proceed with the Soviet reasons--there is no question at all about the fact that the Soviet Union has nothing to gain by any widening contact between any Communists, especially those that are in countries that are not directly under the Kremlin control, and western nations.

I think the Soviet Union has a great deal to gain from maximizing Chinese dependency on the Soviet Union. I think the Soviet Union has a great deal to gain psychologically by beating the drum constantly for Chinese recognition. And, incidentally, this is the cleverest of all the tactics. The United Nations three times came close to accepting Red China, under one formula or another within the U.N. Each time the moment seemed possible, the Soviet Union let loose a vast clatter--"Let China into the U. N." For what purpose? To make it impossible for us to do so, because the most difficult thing for the United States to accede to is anything the Soviet Union is loudly demanding.

The Soviet Union has everything to gain psychologically among the Chinese people by appearing to be its one advocate, or its major advocate, in the councils of the world. Incidentally, the Soviet Union is not very subtle about it. At the last Summit Conference, there were a number of Chinese there, members of the Chinese Government. Time and again they would find themselves in conversation with representatives of France, Great Britain, or the United States. Molotov had a very awkward habit. Whenever a conversation occurred between the Chinese and a member of a Western delegation, Molotov would literally physically push himself between them. "I will do the talking for you, my brother." He incidentally irritated the Chinese no end by this, but he did make it crystal clear that it is urgent for them to keep these conversations from occurring.

DR. REICHLEY: I think we ought to give one of our students a chance to ask a penetrating question.

QUESTION: I note with interest your pessimism with regard to the future of NATO. In an effort to alleviate your pessimism in this regard, I would like to make an observation. We have brought Captain Harry Harty home from NATO to this class to educate him, and today the Air Force published orders sending Colonel Baker and Colonel Whittaker to France. So perhaps there may be some hope for the future, after all.

In a less facetious vein, I would like to pose a question as to what your observations are in relation to the philosophies of Mr. Stassen in the Disarmament Subcommittee Meeting in London and the reactions which occurred in the Council of Nations of NATO.

MR. CHERNE: Let me just address myself to the first part of the last part of your question. I think my answer to this will in essence

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apply to the balance of it. I happen to have a low opinion of Governor Stassen's political acuity. I happen to think that he suffers especially from a persistent myopia where the Soviet Union is concerned. I happen to think it makes really no difference where he is or what he is doing; he will wind up with the same blind spot.

His position on disarmament talks happens to be the most recent of a series of positions in which he has, in one fashion or another, sought to initiate summit talks between Stassen and the Soviet Government. On one occasion, I believe the year was 1946, against the express interests of the United States Government, he traveled to the Soviet Union for that purpose. He has previously succeeded in embarrassing the United States Government by such communications and correspondence.

The nature of such foolish efforts is to give the Soviet leaders the opportunity to appear as reasonable, peace-seeking men. I don't want to do him an injustice. I believe that Governor Stassen honestly believes that this is in fact what they are. I don't want to do myself an injustice. I believe this is what the Russian people are. But this is not what the Soviet Government is. And Governor Stassen can't seem to get that through his head. Every time he talks disarmament I get the uneasy feeling of what psychologists call "deja vue"--that I have seen it before.

QUESTION: As a guest, sir, I want to acknowledge with great gratitude what I think is a great contribution to American public opinion. I have taken the liberty on a platform of characterizing Mr. Stassen as the perennial sophomore. I wonder if your memory is so fresh, sir, that you can recount quickly the pleasures that the Soviet took at the first Summit Conference, with which they are now in open violation as they try to reach the Summit again.

MR. CHERNE: I consider myself a reasonably informed man. One of the reasons I am opposed to Summit Meetings is because I have the conviction that many of my fellow Americans remember even less well than I do the promises that were made by the Soviet Union more than a year ago. And I honestly do not recall a single pledge they made; which to me illustrates how dangerous it is to induce ourselves that they are going to make some more pledges; because, neither will they live up to them nor will we even remember what it is they agree to do. What we will recall is what we agree to do; and this is what the Soviet Union wants.

I do recall what is to me the one most significant thing about that Summit Meeting. It was at the Summit Meeting that the United States effectively told the Soviet Union that they had nothing to fear from us in terms of initiating any war. Until then, I am persuaded, the Soviet Union was genuinely jittery as to whether we might at some time initiate war. We effectively told them and the entire world that we were totally committed to peace. This, in my judgment, is the single most dangerous thing any power, exercising power, can do in a world in which force is till the major determinant of policy.

DR. REICHLLEY: Ladies and Gentlemen, and Mr. Cherne, in closing these proceedings this evening I would like to mention three things: First, in addition to filling your minds, Mr. Cherne is quite a capable worker with his hands, and has built a remarkable reputation as a sculptor. He has a bust of Dr. Albert Schweitzer which is on display at the Smithsonian Institution here in Washington, and a bust of Abraham Lincoln which is in the Lincoln Museum. I have been in Washington so long that I forget the address. I am sure that these are most worthy of your attention.

The second thing is that when we adjourn from here the Commandant is happy to invite you to a little snack down in the rotunda. We hope that you will all participate in it and enjoy it.

Finally, Mr. Cherne, on behalf of the Commandant of the College and of all those gathered in this auditorium--I think the best way to express it is--thank you, very much.

(16 June 1958--4, 100)O/mms:en