WELCOMING ADDRESS

22 August 1958

GENERAL MUNDY: Admiral Clark, General Zitzman, Members of the Staff and Faculty, and Gentlemen of the Class of 1959: On behalf of the Industrial College I extend you a very cordial welcome--a welcome to this course which I am sure you will look upon later as one of the highlights in your professional career, whether you be a military or civil servant.

Your selection to come to this academic environment as a student, free from all administrative responsibilities and duties, is recognition of your capabilities and professional promise. Your assignment here is one that imposes a very substantial cost upon the taxpayer--a cost that is measured not only in terms of your salary while you are a student and the cost of maintaining this college, but also the cost involved in the loss of your services from one year of important operational duties.

Attendance at the ICAF is thus a privilege and a responsibility as well--a responsibility of taking maximum advantage of the extraordinary opportunity provided you here. This is an opportunity that enables you to enhance your capabilities for further service to your country.

As for the civilian members of the class, having worked with, along side of, and for civilians for many years of my own career, I can assure you of the military that the civilian students contribute a great deal to the course. It has been my experience that the civil service members of the Government team are intelligent, hard working men: and that devotion to duty, love of national traditions, fighting spirit, and a fierce jealousy for everything that our country stands for are not exclusive attributes of those of us in uniform.

On the other hand, one of the ancillary advantages of the course to the civilian members of the class will be the opportunity to study at close range that fabled monster, the "military mind." I think you will find that it's not as narrow, unreasoning, or musclebound as you may have been led to believe. I think you will find it a mind given to consideration of pertinent factors, analysis, and decision.

Here at the College you will find maximum freedom to grow in knowledge, wisdom, and professional competence--a freedom not only from the

pressures of normal operating duties, but from the pressures found in most schools to meet conventional standards of performance as tested in examinations and reported in grades. To a very large degree you are on your own. How you make use of this freedom, how you measure up to the confidence placed in you by your services and agencies, will be largely a matter for you to face with your own conscience. You are mature and responsible men--and you're going to be treated as such while you are here as students. This is your opportunity, but at the same time it is your challenge.

The College program is designed to provide you with an understanding of the economic and industrial aspects of national and international security. It is concerned with developing an appreciation of the interrelationships and the interdependence of the military, logistical, political, administrative, scientific, and social factors pertaining to national and international affairs. The term "national security," as I use it here, refers to national security under all conditions--in time of uneasy peace and cold war, as well as armed hostilities and hot war.

It has been said that we teach here the nonmilitary aspects of national security and that these nonmilitary aspects, as war has evolved, have become more and more important to the whole. I think this fact becomes increasingly clear to military people today.

Now, while our curriculum will be familiar to some of you, it will be almost an entirely new experience for most of you. For some it will mean a period of frustration, bewilderment, and exasperation before you become accustomed to it. Let me explain briefly why this is so.

Most of you came here from operational or staff assignments which were essentially operational in nature. There you have had concrete problems to deal with--problems that demanded solutions and answers reasonably free from qualifications. There such solutions and answers were usually possible. But here it is often the case that you will be dealing with situations which are not amenable to this sort of treatment. They will contain more intangibles than tangibles, more variables than constants. You will study in fields where the abstract is more common than the concrete.

Some of you may encounter difficulty in trying to live with problems of this nature. Their vagueness and ambiguity may discourage you. However, keep in mind that this state of affairs is inherent in some of the problems with which you will be working. Much of our course falls in the area

of the social or behavioral sciences; and these sciences, as you know, do not lend themselves to the precise methods of the physical sciences with which most of us are familiar.

Now, this is contrary to the heritage of most military people. We are impatient with anything less than completed and certain solutions. We like to plunge into a problem, tear it apart, arrive at a solution, and then move on to something else. We are not conditioned to the notion of having to live over long periods of time with major problems that have only partial or incomplete answers. The extent to which this is done at high levels of Government and on the international level may come as something of a surprise to you. Then, again, it may not.

What can you reasonably expect to accomplish in these 10 months of freedom and opportunity? Let me suggest some things to you.

First, you have the opportunity to widen your outlook and horizons and to gain the kind of perspective rarely possible under the pressure of daily duties.

Second, you have the opportunity to escape from the preconceptions, the prejudices, and the viewpoints associated with the necessarily limited scope of virtually all operating jobs.

Third, you have the opportunity to advance in knowledge and understanding of many great and complex problems which face this country and the world today; and to see these problems, not in the context of the needs and interests of a particular service or agency, but of the Government and the Nation as a whole.

To sum up: Here you will have the opportunity to broaden your intellectual horizons, escape from the limitations of professional prejudices and interests, and gain in understanding of many difficult and complex problems facing this country today and in the years ahead.

I'll put this a little differently. The advantages of being here derive first from the joint nature of the College--four military departments and many departments of the Government are represented here. You are approximately in the same age group and have had approximately the same service experience. In your association here together you will unconsciously use each other as a yardstick to measure your individual progress in relation to the group. You will also gain an insight and an understanding of the other services and departments which you would not gain

otherwise. It's been said that the future of the desired degree of service integration will rest largely upon the graduates of the joint institutions.

Next, you've been provided 10 months of time free from any pressure. The significance of this may not strike you at first, but sooner or later it will. You finished college and started working; busy circumstances have bound you closely to your job and the party line. This was somewhat like wearing blinders. Here you're going to find it a little difficult at first not to wear these blinders and it will take you a while to become a student. But the time that's afforded you here will let you do that and your thinking will become far less parochial--your horizons will undoubtedly be broadened by this academic opportunity.

And, lastly, there is the content of the curriculum itself. It's a well-thought-out curriculum, in our opinion. A lot of hard work has gone into it.

So those are the advantages that you have of being here. I'll touch a little bit more on the curriculum later.

Now, why an Industrial College of the Armed Forces? Here is a question which doubtless many of you have raised with yourselves. Why is such an institution supported within the defense establishment? Why do major civilian agencies likewise give aid and approval by sending selected representatives as students and by sending many others to participate as panel members and lecturers at the College?

We get at a good part of the answer by considering still another question: What was the basis of the allied superiority in World War II and more recently in the Korean War? Was it the personal bravery, the fighting spirit, the ability and leadership of our Armed Forces? Well, certainly it was, to a degree at least. If our Armed Forces had not performed as they did, the outcome would have been very different. But we did not win because we possessed these things and our enemies did not.

The factors that clearly put us head and shoulders above our enemies were the global concepts of the Combined Staffs--the world outlook; the relative priorities assigned to widespread combat areas; the mature, far-seeing wisdom of our planners that rose above narrow, parochial viewpoints; our capacity for organizing and managing vast combines of men, materials, and skills; and the ability to mobilize all these things in support not only of our own Armed Forces, but in support of those of our

allies. In the opinion of our allies and ultimately even in the opinion of our enemies, American managerial aptitude and production and technical advancement gave our military forces a superiority which the opposing combinations of nations could not match.

Unfortunately, however, some of our wartime achievements, particularly in production, technical advancement, and mobilization, have lost much of their relative superiority in terms of the challenge which faces us now and in the years ahead. Although American productivity has moved on to higher and higher levels during the past few years, we no longer enjoy the same margin of superiority. Therefore we must do something to redress this imbalance and reverse this trend. And here is a challenge worthy of the best minds of Western civilization.

Now, how do we assess this condition? What do you think we should or could do about it today and in the years ahead?

In 1945 or up until the Soviets exploded their first nuclear device, our problem was a relatively simple one. Traditional methods could be used for traditional situations. But since, with our country open to sudden all-out thermonuclear attack, our old plans have become suspect. Drastic rethinking and revision are in order, and way overdue.

But what new plans can we make? What can we afford? And what can we expect to achieve politically?

The situation is changing radically. If atomic war comes, there will be no appreciable time to mobilize our resources to defend ourselves or to counterattack. We'll have to use the forces that we have in being. Even if atomic war does not come, the United States can no longer rest secure on its past position of productive, technical, and scientific superiority.

This is so because a new hostile giant, Russia, has already appeared, and another, China, is stirring. We'll have to ask ourselves: Where will they be in 20 years? Where will they be in 40 years? Where will we be?

The economy and the technical proficiency of the Soviet Union have been expanding and developing at a phenomenal rate during the same period since the war that we've been expanding. The question to which some Soviet and other economic experts now direct their attention is no longer as to whether the Soviet Union can match or surpass our productive and technical achievements, but when it will do so.

In the coming years, then, our relative strength vis-a-vis our potential enemy may depend less and less on our technical and productive superiority and more and more on our wisdom in understanding the essential nature of the threat: in understanding our own imperfections and how to correct or surmount them; on our genius for organizing ourselves, our allies, our friendly neutrals, and perhaps even some of our enemies into patterns of living that are acceptable and desirable to them; and on our prescience today in peering into this our troubled future. These attributes may be far more important than our technical and productive superiority or our ability to outmaneuver our enemies politically, economically, or psychologically.

This threat of improved Soviet technology and production, the stirrings of the Chinese giant, the emergence of the United States as the leader of the free world, and the increasing interdependence of the defense establishment and the American economy have created conditions and problems unprecedented in military history. Almost overnight the military services have found themselves engaged in economic, financial, sociological, technical, and scientific enterprises on a scale which was once beyond the wildest dreams of the most fanciful military planners. This nonmilitary or logistic aspect is at one and the same time the economic element of our military operations and the military element of our economy.

The curriculum at ICAF covers this range of subjects. It is unique in this respect. In my opinion there is no more important course offered in Government than the course offered you here. I say this whether you're the combat or logistical type. Certainly all the senior people over in the Pentagon in all of the departments need a working knowledge of the subjects that we cover here.

Now, I'd like to tell you that last spring I went down to the Secretary of Defense's Conference at Quantico. It was well attended by officers such as the President, the Vice President, the Cabinet, the Under Secretaries, Assistant Secretaries, and all the "brass" of the military. Although this was my first attendance at a conference of this particular type, I didn't feel at a loss, because every subject that was talked about, from the President on down, had been covered here in our curriculum. Now, if these subjects are that important to those people in that type of meeting, I think you can readily gather that they're important to you in your specialty whether you be civilian or military.

The cold war threat presents a challenge of special significance to an institution concerned with a study of the economics of national security.

The economic implications of the cold war are many and varied, and are perhaps the most basic of all to a conflict of this nature.

The existing bipolarity of the great powers in the political and military fields is, in a large sense, the result of a bipolarity in the fields of economics and economic philosophy. Economic sanctions and pressures have become important weapons in the East-West conflict, and are exercising a major influence in shaping the pattern of contemporary international politics. In fact, there are those who believe that these techniques--rather than military actions--could be decisive in the ultimate resolution of the basic differences existing between nations today. Therefore, a sizable portion of the program here at the College is devoted to a study of the economic and psychological aspects of the cold war.

To put it a little differently, Khrushchev has stated that they will win by an economic war; that they'll bury us; that they see no necessity for fighting; implying that the ICBM isn't our big danger. So, if we are successful in deterring the hot war, our big danger will be the economic war that they're going to wage, the danger that they will, in fact, win it and bury us in this manner. I'm not belittling the hot war aspect; nor am I belittling the deterrent capability that we've got to have. That's certainly a must. But this follower-on, this economic war, is just as dangerous to us.

A new national responsibility has fallen upon us. We can no more ignore its impact upon the whole scheme of things than we as a nation can ignore our present position of world leadership. Military isolationism from any vital aspect of our national life makes about as much sense today as would a return to the old prewar United States political isolationism from the rest of the world.

For the military and the civil service this has brought about a revolution in the educational foundations required of those who will rise to positions of high influence. In brief, the new requirements of national security demand of our senior members in the military and civil services a far broader understanding of the world we live in today and the world in which we'll be living tomorrow. The fact of the matter is that there are no longer any such things as purely military solutions, purely political solutions, or purely economic solutions to our problems. To think and act as if these are compartmented entities may be the gravest error that we could possibly make.

As senior officers and officials, any one of you may one day have much to do with shaping the policies of this nation, and with making decisions whose impact will be felt by millions of persons the world over. In the years to come, your official acts may affect and possibly preserve the political, economic, sociological, moral, and spiritual structure of our society, and perhaps other societies as well.

That is the eventuality against which the Government has selected you for this school. This is the goal for which you are being prepared--to be one of these leaders.

Our experience indicates that you will become fully aware of the real value to be obtained from the course at the Industrial College only after you have been out of the College for some time--perhaps several years later. This should not be cause for surprise when one comes to appreciate fully the breadth of scope and content of the course.

In offering a program of such broad character it is not our purpose here to prepare you for the performance of any specific or routine job in your next assignment, such as a procurement officer, for example. Rather, our purpose here is education. We propose to provide you with a broad background of knowledge in the affairs of national security and to cultivate the creative, the imaginative, and the analytical mind that qualifies one for progressively greater responsibilities. To put it another way, emphasis at the Industrial College is not on training--we are not a training school--but on broad education for the long run.

In evaluating student work here at the College, we do not give each student a grade in the ordinary sense of the term. Nor do we evaluate students against each other, or post a list periodically to indicate how each student stands in the class. The only official evaluation which we make of you as a student is one which consists of a word picture descriptive of such matters as attitude, cooperation, and judgment as they relate to your general participation in the class.

In other words, the evaluation concerns only those matters which can reasonably be evaluated in an academic institution. It is based primarily on a close personal relationship between the individual students and the members of the faculty. The faculty will arrive at an evaluation of your work at the end of each major unit of the course. Then at the end of the year an overall academic evaluation is submitted for each of you to your service or Federal agency.

I am sure all of you realize that if you put forth the necessary effort to get out of this course all that is possible, you will return to your several departments or services better equipped to turn in superior performances of duty. I think that you realize the importance of this to your service, to your country, and as a matter of fact, to mankind. But I daresay that, while you realize these things, you may also speculate as to just what effect this course is going to have on your as individuals. Or, to put it a little more bluntly, how is this course going to affect your chances for a promotion?

It is my experience, based on many years in the military, that there is no pat, sure-fire, royal road to flag rank in the Navy or general officer rank in the Army, Marine Corps, or Air Force, or supergrade in the civil service. The surest way to the top is through competence and nerit. It still lies in doing every job that you tackle just a little bit better than anyone else and in having the wherewithal and the will to produce superior results.

Because this curriculum here will vastly increase your ability to realize your own potential, it can mean selection to the highest level. But the mere fact that you have graduated from this college (or any other institution) will neither add to nor detract from your chances for promotion. It's what you do with your opportunity here and when you leave that's really, in the long run, going to determine what happens to you. You can rest assured that your selection to come here was a compliment to you. It means that you're doing well in your service at your stage of the game and that you're a very likely prospect. But I emphasize, the stamp "graduated" on your record is not enough in itself--it's what you do with what you get here after you leave that counts.

Now, in conclusion, I'd like to commend to you the resolution to put into this opportunity your very best. In this way, and only in this way, will you live up to your own highest ideals and the aspirations for yourself and for our country. You are the repositories of special confidence and trust on a national scale.

Thank you and, again, let me say "welcome."

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