

## THE UNITED STATES POSITION IN THE WORLD TODAY

13 March 1959

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## NOTICE

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INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

Washington, D. C.

Mr. Frank R. Barnett, Director of Research of the Richardson Foundation, Inc., of New York City, was graduated from Indiana University in 1945. He is a former Wabash College professor and a World War II veteran who became a Russian interpreter for the 69th Infantry Division, the first American unit to meet the Red Army on the Elbe River in April 1945. Prior to the war he had been a student of geopolitics and Russian conversation, history, and culture at Syracuse University. After serving as a military government official in Berlin, he won a Rhodes Scholarship from Indiana and read philosophy, politics, and economics at Oxford University, receiving his degree in 1947. While in England, he had opportunities to revisit Berlin during the Russian blockade and the American airlift and participated in a summer seminar on political science at the University of Zurich. He interviewed exiles from the Communist Empire who crowded into London after the fall of Czechoslovakia and the purges of Poland, Hungary, and the other Iron Curtain nations. He is a director and former executive secretary of the American Friends of Russian Freedom, a private committee which gives food, clothing, language training, and useful work to anti-Communist Russian escapees. Subsequently, Mr. Barnett became associated with The Richardson Foundation, Inc., as Director of Research. He lectures widely on cold war topics to university, business, military, and foreign relations groups. Articles by him have appeared in "The Officer," "The Congressional Record," "The Russian Review," "Vital Speeches," and "The Military Engineer." This is his first lecture at the Industrial College.

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DR. REICHLEY: Having taught at Georgetown University, which is an all-male university, I have never gotten used to seeing women in the classroom. I am very happy to see them here.

General Mundy, Ladies and Gentlemen of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and Guests: Any occasion on which we have our ladies present is indeed a very special occasion. This truly is no exception.

In planning our program for this evening we realize that the wives have been contributing in a large measure to the success of this college by lending encouragement to their husbands. This encouragement has taken many forms. Since I can't go into all of them, I think the following may prove illustrative:

First, they get their husbands to school on time. Secondly, they patiently listen to their husbands' speech rehearsals. And, third, they lighten the burden of home duties to permit greater concentration on college studies.

In view of all this, we felt that it was only fair that we give the opportunity to participate in the more profitable and interesting, though serious, activities of the college to our ladies. For this reason we have scheduled one of our regular lectures this evening to make it possible for you to be here with us. In the question period which follows the lecture, we are going to give priority to the ladies, for we want you to feel that this evening is your evening at the college.

I wish also now to give a special welcome to all the other guests. We are particularly pleased to have you with us.

The subject of the address this evening is "The United States Position in the World Today." For an audience such as this, which is so well acquainted with the many facets of our national security problems, it is hardly necessary to explain how valuable it is to sit back now and then and receive a summation and an analysis of our present security position. Today we are faced with a possible catastrophic conflict between two tremendous power systems. The big problem is, the result could well be

the end of life as we know it. To analyze and emphasize the position of the United States today, we have been very fortunate to obtain as our guest speaker Mr. Frank Barnett.

Mr. Barnett is a Rhodes scholar, who has studied at Oxford University and the University of Zurich, and has been at Wabash College. He has served in World War II, and was a Russian interpreter with the first American Army unit that arrived on the Elbe and met with the Russians. He is a Director of the American Friends of Russian Freedom. He is Director of Research for the Richardson Foundation, and is intimately associated with the Institute for American Strategy. He is thoroughly conversant with the problems of foreign policy and national security facing not only the United States, but the free world. He is an author and has contributed numerous articles to such publications as "The Officer," "The Russian Review," "The Military Engineer," "Vital Speeches," and so on.

Ladies and gentlemen, it is indeed a pleasure to welcome Mr Frank Barnett.

MR. BARNETT: General Mundy, Distinguished Members of the Faculty, Ladies, and fellow students of strategy: I am going to try to do my level best to repay you for the honor and courtesy you have done me in inviting me here by trying to make the rest of your evening as uncomfortable as possible. I say that, first of all to the ladies, because you can be gratified, I think, that your husbands have the most important job in the world. But the real reason is fairly unpleasant, and that is that the Nation is really already at war. Indeed, the Nation has been at war now for four decades.

It is true that from our point of view this has largely been an unrecognized, underground, twilight, undefined, undeclared sort of war; but only results pay off, and the victories increasingly go to the enemy. Let me illustrate.

Forty years ago world communism was confined to a single rented room in Zurich, the brains of Lenin, the ambitions of a handful of outcasts. The total resources of the Communist world would not have endowed a single chair of, let's say, engineering at one of our great American universities. Today communism has seized two-fifths of the earth, a billion people; and, as we meet here this evening in this sanctuary, another third of mankind are being swept toward the whirlpools of Peiping and Moscow.

Nor is this any accident. Communism is not simply an idea. Communism is a power technique--a power technique invented, owned, organized, and exploited by professionally trained revolutionaries. The leaders of the Communist world are not businessmen. They are theoreticians, thugs, politicians, and conflict managers. And when workers are shot down in the back alleys of East Berlin or Poznan, or when freedom fighters are crushed to death in the streets of Budapest, or when, as today, 500 million human beings on the mainland of Communist China are being submerged in the insect slavery of the anthill state, we Americans need not trouble to send to ask for whom the bell tolls. The bell tolls for us. We are now target number one--the last meaningful obstacle to the Kremlin's persistent and oft-repeated intention of achieving dominion over this planet by the end of the century, if not sooner.

In the past, of course, we have enjoyed a geographical sanctuary. We have been sheltered by the ramparts of our great oceans and the shield of the British Empire. Those ramparts and that shield are no longer there. New York is as close to Moscow as Richmond was to Washington at the time of the Civil War, or Berlin to Paris at the beginning of World War II.

Hence the American text for today is really from the history of the Punic Wars. You recall that ancient Carthage, which also had luxury standards of living, refused to make minimum sacrifices to support Hannibal and did not survive. Across the Mediterranean an old Roman Senator named Cato was ending every speech in the Roman Senate with the words "Carthago delenda est," which, roughly translated into today's diplomatic jargon, means, "We'll bury you." But the Carthaginians, preoccupied with business as usual, couldn't bring themselves to believe that Cato really meant what he said. And, anyway, wasn't there that vast expanse of Mediterranean which protected them from all known Roman weapons systems? Except that the Romans were building a new type of trireme capable of crossing the Mediterranean with a certain degree of speed.

Similarly, Rome in her turn, entertained with bread and circuses, arrogant in her splendor, did not survive the onslaught of the Vandals and the Visigoths. The technical skill that built Roman roads and aqueducts, whose traces remain today, the admitted know-how of Roman administrators, the glory of her law, and the grandeur of her great amphitheaters--none of those tangible, physical, material assets saved an effete and overcivilized Rome once she had lost those intangible things called national will and national purpose.

Nor, may I point out, did Rome's gross national product protect her. The Vandals and the Visigoths had no gross national product whatsoever--only weapons, will power, leadership, and the initiative.

These rather dismal comments on Rome and Carthage can, of course, be repeated for many other proud civilizations which lie now on the scrap heaps of history. Many, many times in the past, nations with high standards of living have been pushed to the grave by peoples with low standards of dying; and there's no reason to suppose that history or providence will accord any special dispensation to the American Republic if our people are not prepared genuinely to sacrifice, as opposed to giving lip service to the term.

I started by saying that we are at war and that we have been at war for four decades. That is a proposition which I think is not generally accepted in our society. To support my case, I would like to spend just a moment in referring to an event which changed the lives and fortunes and futures of virtually everyone in this room, the Saturday afternoon before Pearl Harbor.

On 6 December 1941, this country did not know that it was at war. Indeed, Japanese diplomats were drinking tea in Washington, smiling, and suggesting that certain trade arrangements might redound to the benefit of American business and American diplomacy. But as America slept and Japanese diplomacy smiled, the carriers of Imperial Japan were already converging on Hawaii. The bombs had been loaded, the pilots briefed, the mission assigned, the die irrevocably cast for our people by a handful of war lords on the far side of the earth. We learned the hard way that a war starts, not at the moment of the dramatic surprise payoff attack; a war starts when an enemy agrees on his final plans and commits his forces irretrievably to conflict.

Now, again, I would suggest that our own good intentions and hopes for the best, or our refusal simply to accept enemy definitions, in no way alter the master plan of the Kremlin. American hopes for peace are quite irrelevant to the fact that the Kremlin has irrevocably committed its conflict managers to aggression. It is true this is a war with camouflaged weapons and very unorthodox rules, but it is nonetheless war. And today, of course, the odds are really far heavier against America than they were at the time of Pearl Harbor.

What if back in 1941 Japanese science had in some respects surpassed our own? What if Japanese fifth columns had penetrated some of the social, political, and educational institutions of every nation on the face of the earth, including some of those in the United States? What if Japan had already swallowed two-fifths of the earth and had dominated a billion people, whose slave labor could be coerced to the cause of further aggression? What if little Japan, back in 1941, had had vast natural resources, access to all the oil that her war machinery could possibly use, abundant water power, and no need to rely upon the import of foreign steel or coal? And, finally, what if back in 1941 Japanese submarines and bombers, armed with their own atomic weapons, had been stationed as close as Alaska, Mexico, Key West, Catalina, Bermuda, Nantucket? It's a rather frightening supposition; yet actually the nightmare equivalent of that hypothesis has come to pass in the last decade with the Soviet conquest of space, with the invention of the ICBM, with the Communist breaking of our monopoly of atomic and hydrogen weapons, with the manpower of China and the technical resources of Eastern Europe added to the Communist warmaking machine, and finally, with the Middle East, India, Southeast Asia, and Africa all on the agenda of Soviet nonmilitary warfare techniques.

In the past, America has, of course, always had the leisure to gradually recruit our manpower from the pursuits of peace for the pursuits of war when an emergency struck, and to gradually convert our consumer goods production line into the arsenal of democracy. That leisure will not be allowed us next time. Owing to science, the Atlantic Ocean is now just about as wide as the Rio Grande. The Pacific is no broader than Lake Michigan. The Gulf of Mexico may serve simply as a highway for Soviet submarines armed with nuclear missiles. And, of course, the waste lands of the North can be spanned in a few hours time. We Americans are quite literally face to face with the heirs of Genghis Khan, cheek by jowl with the Orient, cheek by jowl a type of aggressor whose lack of morality, whose cultural traditions, whose ethics we fail as a people to even comprehend.

Unfortunately for us, the 20th descendants of Genghis Khan are no longer a rude barbarian horde. We have learned to our cost they are disciplined in science, well armed with engineering. They are schooled in political and economic theory. They speak many languages. We know the Soviets are said to be graduating two and a half times as many engineers as we produce in American colleges. They are graduating perhaps 100 times as many linguists as we graduate. Thus for every American studying Hindu, for instance, there are perhaps 100 Russians studying Hindu--

the key to the precincts of India. In the realms of persuasion, propaganda, and public opinion struggle, the first requisite is that you speak the other chap's language.

The Communists have learned how to use art, trade, literature, sport, cultural exchange, ballet, even religion as weapons systems. They have perverted virtually every form of human activity to the cause of conflict. Above all, they are superbly trained in what they themselves call "warfare by words" and "conquest by communication."

Now, because of these things, the front today, as Colonel William Kintner said in a well-known book, is everywhere; and every citizen is on the front. Strategy is no longer confined to war games or the plans of a general staff. Strategy now relates to the battle for public opinion, to the quality of citizenship training in our public schools, to excellence in the industrial research laboratory, to the reputation and performance of American business, both here at home and abroad, where our economic system is judged by others. Strategy relates to the salaries and dignities which we either give to or withhold from teachers, civil servants, and career officers. Strategy is certainly related to this intangible thing called national will, which undergirds all the more material aspects of national defense.

In our type of society most of these intangibles--the climate of public opinion, the quality of citizenship training in our schools, the reputation of business, and so on--are the responsibility of private citizens, not of Government. Hence strategy has now become everybody's business.

In talking about "intangibles" I do not for one moment suggest we do not have to give a fearful priority to winning all the contests of science, technology and military power with the Soviet Union. If the Soviets break through the "thought barriers" of technological research ahead of us, they will be likely to blackmail us into "peaceful coalition" in the world Soviet state. Certainly we have to take into account the terrible challenge of Soviet military, nuclear, and technological power.

But these are subjects which Americans, by and large, understand. Science, technology, industrial organization, military power--these are things Americans comprehend. I have almost every confidence that, once the problem of survival is fairly placed on the agenda of our great private institutions, trade associations, and professional societies, Americans will be prepared to make the sacrifices necessary in these areas. Hence I wish to speak tonight about something that is alien to the American mind,

something unorthodox and quite apart from our cultural pattern. This is what might be called nonmilitary conflict, psycho-social combat, political and psychological warfare, propaganda, the exploitation of the behavioral sciences to manipulate opinion and behavior all over the world.

May I call this, for the purposes of the lecture this evening, "fourth dimensional warfare"? I am not talking now about space warfare, but I am talking about warfare in the mind, in the hopes and aspirations, opinions, beliefs, and convictions of the human being.

May I say parenthetically something about third dimensional warfare which I think is important. The classical dimensions of human conflict are, of course, land, sea, and air. Now, once man occupied the third dimension of human conflict--the air--the ground rules for the first two dimensions--land and sea--were changed radically. Infantry generals and battleship admirals had to become airpower minded, because it was now possible to encircle or outflank the hardware based on the land or on the seas in a new dimension.

Soviet advances in the technology of fourth dimensional warfare are revolutionizing the ground rules for the first three dimensions, in the same way that air power changed the rules for the first two dimensions. One example: In many parts of the world today we are in serious danger of losing our great military bases. No Soviet paratrooper need land on those bases to sabotage them. No Soviet bombers need blast them. Those bases are being taken apart, dismantled and destroyed by politics, propaganda, psychological warfare, conspiracy, subversion, and the other various and assorted types of Soviet fun and games, operating through indigenous Communist parties, fellow travelers, and coalition groups which are willing to cooperate with the Communists. Thus fourth dimensional warfare can in a sense interdict the battlefields of the first three dimensions and dismantle the hardware of the first three dimensions. And I think that this is something that by and large Americans are not yet on to.

The Nazis were good at this. The Nazis, you recall, did very well initially with what they called the strategy of terror and the technique of the big lie. But the Soviets have improved even upon Nazi technology. In an age of mass media and instantaneous intercontinental communication, (where an opinion sounded in Moscow yesterday reverberates through New Delhi, London, Paris, New York, and Washington in the space of 24 hours, sending shock waves into all of the chancellories of the world as

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it moves), political and psychological warfare has been elevated to the status of a primary weapons system, with the military hardware held in reserve.

But whereas the Russians are using political and psychosocial combat as a primary weapons system, American psychological warfare is still very much in its infancy. It is about where Billy Mitchel's air force was 35 years ago. If you can imagine that today the exclusive mission of SAC were only to perform reconnaissance for battalion artillery, you can conceive of the way in which we are using American political warfare against people who have elevated nonmilitary combat to the status of a primary weapons system.

If one troubles to read Soviet military journals or Cominform publications, he comes quickly to the conclusion that the Soviets hope, under the umbrella of nuclear blackmail, to advance across the face of the earth by subversion, coups d'etat, political penetration, economic warfare, and the other arts and sciences of the fourth dimension.

Now, the point that I think needs making is this: For 35 years of the 41 years in which communism has been on the face of the earth, the western powers were unmistakably ahead of the Communists in all of the constituents of orthodox power--military strength, air atomic power, industrial organization, science, technology, natural resources, fiscal know-how, managerial skills, et cetera, et cetera. In spite of our supremacy in all of those orthodox constituents of power, the Communists did in fact play their deuces and trays very skillfully and win pots by their irregular and unorthodox techniques.

Now that we are approaching a period of relative parity, where their nuclear and missile capability tends to inhibit our ability or willingness to use the orthodox constituents of power, it is virtually certain that their fourth dimensional techniques will become even more effective, not less effective. If they could do this when we had supremacy, how much more likely are they to continue successful nonmilitary combat now that they are approaching parity in hardware?

To try to answer my own question, I'm going to ask this audience to play with me for the space of seven or eight minutes a war game or, if you like, a game of imagination. Will you pretend that American science has invented time travel as well as space travel and that we have here, in this lecture hall, a pilot model of the celebrated time machine invented by the British novelist H. G. Wells? Many of you read that book as boys and girls.

Let's pretend for a moment that the time machine is hooked to this speaker's stand, that by pushing a button we can all be precipitated forward into, let us say, 1973. I say "1973" by design, for 1973 is a date which often appears in Cominform journals. It is their target date by which they hope to complete what they call the socialist encirclement of the last bastion of capitalism.

Well, if you will indulge this little fantasy of mine, I'm going to push the button. It is another March evening. The place is still Washington. It is the same lecture hall. But this is not a gathering of the faculty and students of the Industrial College. Rather, this is called the "Emergency Conference on Terms for an Honorable Peace."

Nineteen seventy-three is a black hour for the American Republic. There is widespread unemployment. A labor government is in power. Many key industries have been nationalized. There is bitter class struggle, increasingly exploited by a growing Communist Party of America.

Business has been stultified by a critical shortage of raw materials, while American foreign trade has been strangled in a web of Sino-Soviet intrigue and economic warfare. The ever-expanding Communist bloc has engineered ironclad trade monopolies in the handful of Latin American states not yet completely absorbed in the vast Marxian commonwealth of nations, which now embraces four-fifths of the land surface of the earth and stokes its further ambitions with the oil of the Middle East and the riches of what once was Indonesia.

To the Russian and Chinese masses, communism has added the manpower of India and much of Africa. Americans can neither buy from nor sell to more than 2 billion people.

The men and women who take part in this emergency peace conference of 1973 have in their eyes the look of the accident victim who numbly intones, "But it can't happen to me." Yet it has happened. And it continues to happen as the chess masters of Russia methodically coordinate and advance their deceptive bishops and treacherous pawns toward what now seems to be the inevitable checkmate.

The story is told simply. In the decade from 1945 to 1955 a complacent America lost her matchless supremacy in science and military strength. In the 14 years that separate 1959 from 1973, American power had declined almost as rapidly as British power evaporated in the 81 years that stretch from Disraeli, who bought Suez, to Eden, who lost it.

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Kipling's "Recessional" now applies to our America of 1973--"Far called,  
our Navy melts away," "On dune and headland sinks the fire."

It is true that the American Navy, with the scorpion sting of its under-seas flotilla, still gives pause to the men in Moscow so far as all-out war is concerned. But on distant dunes and headlands, where once the deterrent force of SAC pointed toward Moscow, there stand today gleaming Russian missiles aimed at Pittsburgh, Dallas, and Detroit. With blackmail and persuasion the Communists have negotiated the withdrawal of American military power from all the Communist rimlands. The argument was always the same: that disengagement of American military power would reduce tension.

Then with a brief peace charade or summit conference as a screen for clandestine operations, the Communists induced that nation dissolving its American alliances to gratefully accept the gift of Russian foreign aid, of Russian machine tools which required Russian spare parts, Russian engineers, Russian economic advisers, and Russian military experts to engineer the final coup d'etat.

In those 14 years the Communists also liquidated American business overseas. That job was done with some subtlety. While one industry was being nationalized and another taxed out of existence, the Communists contrived to keep British, American, and German businessmen divided on every specific issue by stimulating among those whose business was not immediately affected great expectations for more trade. Thus, while the Communists seized the tin and rubber, they stepped up their import of toys and their export of perfume. Soviet puppets confiscated the oil field on the one hand, but with the other encouraged the belief that the Afro-Eurasian heartland could eventually absorb an almost limitless outpouring of goods from western factories. Somehow the actual business never quite developed; but the promises, the earnest trade missions, the touring diplomats the jovial reiteration of good will, all worked their hypnotic effect.

By 1970 Russia had applied massive propaganda so skillfully to all the world's media that the West was virtually out of touch with reality. The democratic peoples responded to false hopes for peace and dire threats of war with the same pathetic predictability of dumb creatures in a Pavlovian laboratory, which in a sense they were. As illusion turned to despair, only to be followed by another Soviet-induced illusion, the peoples of the West were run dry of their moral stamina, their self-respect, and their courage to live.

It is true that, as the great structure of free world alliances began, nation by nation, to crumble under the pressures of Soviet blandishments and nuclear blackmail, the American people learned to live with the word "sacrifice." But it was largely a word. The sacrifice was always too little, too haphazard, and at least one continent too late. While the West was fashioning NATO to defend Europe, the Communists consolidated their power in China and pushed their tentacles down the islands of the Indies toward the thinly held waste lands of northern Australia. By the time Asia was put on the American agenda, the Soviets had leapfrogged into the Middle East. Then, while America was preoccupied with its spreading stain in Syria, Egypt, and Iraq, Communist cadres swarmed into the precincts of India and every corner of Africa. By the time Washington thought seriously about Africa south of the Sahara, Communist trade missions and agents had saturated the Latin American and Caribbean doorsteps.

Oh, there was sacrifice when, after the wonder of the Sputnik had worn thin, the Soviets put gun platforms in outer space to hover over New York and San Francisco as a constant reminder to timid civilians in those vulnerable cities that they were only 30 seconds from the thermo-nuclear front. But the sacrifice was never of sufficient magnitude. It was never adequately sustained. It was never geared to any structure of priority. For, in spite of the evidence, the American people, like the Carthaginians, couldn't bring themselves to believe that the enemy meant what he said.

Somehow the American people, who way back in the 1930's had not troubled to read Hitler's "Mein Kampf," or to take seriously the Nazi strategy of terror, still managed in the 1960's to ignore the strategy of Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, and Mao Tse-tung. Now, in 1973, after last year's debacle, it is probably too late.

Ever since 1962, on the wings of transoceanic television, Communist leaders have regularly invaded American living rooms to warn our people we might suffer 100 million casualties in any future war. The fear this threat has engendered, together with widespread confusion sown by covert Communist sympathizers, has immobilized United States military power at every crucial showdown. The money had been spent, the troops trained, the weapons were ready, but the will had been sapped.

Last year, in May of 1972, when it seemed certain that American naval units and United States paratroop divisions might be rushed to the defense of the last free outpost in Asia, the Soviet Defense Minister wrote bluntly to all western capitals. His message, you recall, was brief and brutal, and I quote:

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"My associates, the marshals of the combat space forces, have asked me to remind the people that mistakes can occur easily in the internal affairs of an infantry division? Capitalist warmongers should not delude the Asian republic, who can say if such small firecrackers may a dynamite explosion. Mothers and wives in America should think of themselves that let Wall Street and the Pentagon start what is being fraudulently advertised as a limited war. The scientists and soldiers of Red China and Red Russia may take it upon the dish we serve before they let Wall Street and the Pentagon start what is being fraudulently advertised as a limited war. Soviet Defense Minister. "

That message, reinforced by pitiless pressure from Communist peace fronts in all the democracies, brought on the resignation of the British Prime Minister and the indirect dismissal of the American Secretary of State. World public opinion, carefully manipulated by the Soviet hidden persuaders, hailed another victory for peace. The last of the free nations in Asia was blotted out, while Americans watched even more helplessly from the side lines than when 17 years before they had witnessed the murder of Hungary.

Now, ladies and gentlemen, so much for the time machine. We are, of course, still in 1959, and I am sure that many of you will regard this whimsy as a private nightmare that could not possibly come true for America. And yet, as we meet here this evening, literally tens of thousands of trained, professional Communist cadres, schooled in the arts of political warfare, county chairmen, intelligentsia and even the cabinet officers of all the Afro-Asian lands. They are winning elections in India; they are stepping up their economic penetration of Southeast Asia; they are prepared apparently to use assassination as well as blackmail in overthrowing Middle Eastern states, while overhead a piece of Russian hardware orbits the sun just to remind us that a nation which only a dozen years ago we contemptuously dismissed as the "oxcart economy" has very real nuclear and missile capability.

To me certain conclusions are inescapable. One is that, unless this country breaks through the barriers of convention and tradition and emerges itself into the fourth dimension of warfare, we are likely to be taken a step by step backward into the thermonuclear corner, where we have only the choice to surrender or cremate the earth. The Soviets

have developed a whole gamut of nonmilitary weapons systems, as well as a whole family of military weapons systems; and they can play from A through Z, whereas we are usually forced into the dread alternative of backing down and doing nothing, or going all-out with some thermonuclear holocaust. We must develop nonmilitary warfare capability, at the same time of course, maintaining equality or supremacy in the dimensions of orthodox military power.

There is no easy solution. Certainly people who suggest that propaganda and political warfare are a substitute for military power are, I think, speaking errant nonsense. We must have the absolute shield of military and scientific strength. From behind that shield we could wield with great effectiveness, in my view, an American psychological warfare sword. But the sword without the shield would, of course, be useless.

And, too, it seems to me that we have got to have inside Government some new apparatus that can wield nonmilitary combat capabilities with as much sophistication as our admirals and generals are capable of wielding military power if hot war is thrust upon us.

Finally it is necessary, in order to achieve these goals, that leadership groups outside of Government be prepared to provide whatever public opinion and budgetary support are necessary.

Well, how should the task be started? Certainly any speaker is terribly presumptuous to throw out ideas in the forum of this great college. But I think it incumbent upon a speaker who paints a horror story of the future to at least suggest one or two ways that there may be of getting out of the terrible dilemma of "surrender or cremate the earth."

The first thing I would like to call to your attention is a bill which is currently before Congress--H. R. 3880, introduced by Congressman Herlong of Florida and Congressman Judd of Minnesota. It is a bill to create what really amounts to a West Point of political warfare, the sort of thing that General David Sarnoff, chairman of RCA, called for in his celebrated memorandum to the President of April, 1955.

I'd like to make it very clear that, in my view, this is not in any way competition to our great war colleges. This is, if you like, a Fort Benning of political warfare. It is not a National War College or an Industrial College or a Naval War College, or whatever. This is a school for tacticians--from the Department of State, from Central Intelligence, the young

officers who will serve as military attaches, and hopefully some elements from the civilian sector--representatives of American business overseas, selected journalists perhaps, and/or even members of private welfare agencies which operate all over the world--a West Point of political warfare.

The purpose? To produce trained, professional American cadres capable of competing on the squares of the cold war chessboard, just as our professionals who graduate from West Point, Annapolis, and the Air Academy are prepared to compete on the squares of the hot war chessboard if it should come to that.

Behind the Iron Curtain today there are more than 100 schools, academies, and institutes of political warfare, in which Communists from all over the world, including Latin American, are trained in propaganda, sabotage, subversion, political warfare, and revolutionary parliamentarianism as systematically as Americans are trained in engineering, business administration, brain surgery, and electronics.

We have a great respect for professionals in this country--in law and medicine and business and commerce and military science; but we have thus far, in my view, failed utterly to produce any sufficient numbers of men who are trained in nonmilitary warfare.

I think this bill merits the attention of every policymaker or future policymaker in Washington. Undoubtedly there are parts that should be modified and amended; but at least, it seems to me, the direction is right.

Secondly, it would seem to me that we need now, not after a hot war starts, but now, a Board of Economic Warfare, or whatever you call it--some machinery capable of waging economic war--not necessarily machinery to expand trade possibilities, but to wage economic warfare. We created in World War II, after the war started, a Board of Economic Warfare; but surely the time to wage propaganda, political, and economic war is before you have been forced to trial by firepower. It seems to me that in order to mobilize the very dynamic resources of the private sector in this country concerned with business and economics, we need some sort of Board of Economic Warfare. Conceivably this is a counterpart to the British Board of Trade, which, as you know, has traditionally given British commerce, industry, and banking a much greater leverage on the world scene than the American private sector has had.

I think that the ideas thrown out by General Gruenther and by Field Marshall Montgomery sometime ago, pertaining to the need for perhaps a NATO political-psychological general staff, should be carefully canvassed and given serious study. So far as I can see, that has not yet been done. These excellent suggestions have not yet received the serious attention they deserve.

Finally, I am wondering if we do not need more attention to a career service, a special career service for officers who specialize in the intelligence, propaganda, psychological warfare, community relations, and public relations functions? These are highly developed arts today, given all the new work that is coming out in the field of the behavioral sciences.

It is my humble opinion as an outside observer that, in America, an officer who stays too long in intelligence or propaganda or psy-war begins to feel that he is on the shelf and that he must get back to troops and hardware in order to make a go of his career. In Britain and in certain other countries which have used the nonmilitary warfare and intelligence functions successfully for a century or more, it is possible for an officer to make a complete career of the intelligence, psy-war, of propaganda function. It seems to me this idea should be seriously canvassed.

And finally, in conclusion, let me say in all sincerity--and here I am not in any way trying to flatter you--that I think the activities of this great College should, if anything, be expanded. Recognizing that this would require more support from the taxpayers, of which I am one, I would be very happy to pay additional taxes to support expanded activities for this College. To me the holding of your regional conferences, which generate a resolute and sophisticated climate of opinion at the grass roots, is one of the primary contributions to national defense.

And would that some day this Industrial College could also be teaching elite groups in other nations the sciences of geopolitics, defense management, logistics and even elements of countering Soviet fourth dimensional warfare. I think that the passing of the technical, philosophical and conceptual skills which you have here to foreign military elites would be a most

substantial contribution to stability in many parts of the world in which democracy, as we know it, in the next two or three decades is really not feasible and where the only choice is between communism or some fairly enlightened person, such as Attaturk in Turkey, who can prepare the way for a genuine democracy.

I think also that the private sector has much to contribute. Giving away money in America is now about the 11th largest industry. There are 7,000 private foundations in America, with assets of nearly \$8 billion. The American business system is so incredibly productive that, last year the American corporations gave more than \$500 million to worthy projects, quite apart from foundations.

Now, where did most of this money go? It went to community welfare, to medical research, and to other extremely worthy causes. It went, in effect, to improving upon the American skyscraper, to putting another cocktail lounge on the 44th floor of this big skyscraper; and only a tiny, infinitesimal amount went to paying insurance premium against earthquakes that could destroy the entire skyscraper.

I have nothing against helping Boy Scouts and wayward girls, I assure you; and I think we should continue to make generous contributions to solving such problems. But I think American philanthropy and the American business system have got to come to the place where they shift some substantial percentage of their largess from community welfare to national survival--to setting up defense studies groups in our universities to making the study of strategy and geopolitics and military science respectable. In many universities, of course, you have only to say "the military mind" and immediately you have carried your point against introducing a new course. We have certain academic tribal taboos that need to be broken down. The study of strategy and survival should be introduced into our public school system, et cetera, et cetera.

Now, I have sounded a little bit pessimistic, I am sure; but I am not really. On the other hand, I don't want to give you the impression I am not deadly serious about 1973. If there is no change, if the pattern remains the same, if the enemy continues to choose the time, the place, and the weapons, and to have all the flexibility of nonmilitary combat,

while we have very little, if any at all, then I think 1973 is going to come out the way it was produced in my nightmare.

But the reason I am hopeful is that we have not yet started to fight. We have not really put the question on the agenda. We do not really have in every Government department and agency some outstanding, irascible, "controversial figure" who constitutes himself a committee of one to say on every occasion and on every proposal, "But what does this have to do with national survival?"

Clemenceau, the great French leader in World War I, when harassed with hundreds of irrelevant details, used to say, "I wage war," and everything else was irrelevant. If the time comes when at least some of our policymakers take the attitude "I wage survival," and we establish priorities in Government, there is every reason to believe that the trend toward 1973 can be reversed. And when American private foundations, colleges and our great overseas corporations (which have vast assets in areas now threatened by the Communist conspiracy, and which have highly skilled executives who could be trained to work in community relations programs in Indonesia, as they already do in Detroit) take the same attitude, there is every reason to believe that the nightmare can be turned around.

Finally, of course, there are very real tensions, intrigues, suspicions, and fears behind the Iron Curtain. I would think that fourth dimensional warfare may really be a 100 times more dangerous to Moscow and Peiping than it is to Washington and London, provided we use it!

Nor need we be depressed that there do not seem to be many people who care. History is always made by minority groups, such as the group meeting here--the students and faculty of this great Industrial College. Communism was carried all the way from the gutter to world empire

by a tiny handful. The American Revolution itself was made by less than 100 men, counting the committees on correspondence, which wrote to each other from Boston, New York, and Philadelphia generating the climate of opinion that made a change in policy possible. Indeed, for a time the whole fate of this Republic was carried in the will and heart of just one lonely man, walking the winter lines of Valley Forge, persuading his ragged countrymen not to quit and go home.

Now, if just a handful, literally a handful, 3 percent out of this Nation of 170 million, the alumni of the Industrial College's national resources seminars--if that 3 percent will dedicate themselves to the extension of the American revolution, as the missionaries and conquistadores of the Communist church militant have dedicated themselves to the further extension of tyranny, then the 20th century of course is not going by default to Genghis Khan. Instead, it is going to be kept open to continue experiments in liberty and opportunity for all people by a nation which traces its heritage, not to Ivan the Terrible or the ghettos of central Asia, or Tamerlaine, but rather, to Galilee and Athens and Rome and the Renaissance and Magna Charta and to that tiny, tiny handful who back in 1776 really did pledge their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred honor.

DR. REICHLY: Any questions from the ladies?

QUESTION: I would like to know if we don't have a U. S. Information Agency that could take care of this drastic policy that you think is so important.

MR. BARNETT: That's a very good question. USIA is, I think doing a reasonably good job in some areas, a commendable job in others, and, as with all human institutions, not so good in certain others. But USIA is terribly limited by its charter, its mission, its budgets, and the training of its personnel.

As you know, the budget for USIA hovers, I believe, about the level of \$120 million a year, give or take a few million dollars. Soviet non-military warfare is budgeted at about the level of \$4.5 billion a year. This includes not only their vast informational program, but a lot of machinery and bits and pieces that we don't even have--subsidies to Communist Parties all over the world, buying up of the press in many parts of the world, salaries and expense accounts of more than a quarter of a million

trained graduates of their various Institutes of Political Warfare. In other words, Moscow money goes to precinct politicians who are operating in various parts of the world. It goes toward expenses for running these institutes and to subsidies for literature which is flooding all of Asia, at way below cost for the books and pamphlets.

Moreover, I would suggest this--and I recognize that I may be wrong: In my view USIA tends more to be what I would call an informational agency rather than a political warfare apparatus. Now, don't misunderstand me. I think there is good reason to have bona fide informational activities, but one should not delude himself that public relations is political warfare. These are two quite different things. Public relations seek to persuade the mind. Political warfare seeks to disorient the soul itself. Public relations assumes that a person will act rationally to advance his own best intentions. Political warfare seeks to substitute mythology and the will of the state or whatever for the good of the individual. One is persuasion and one is soul surgery.

Now, curiously enough, we Americans distinguish very clearly on the domestic scene between different gradations of what might be called our own internal, nonmilitary conflicts. We do have some. We have public relations men. We have lobbyists. We have precinct leaders. We have pressure groups. We have lawyers to represent corporations in, let's say, antitrust suits. All of these people are doing quite different jobs. And the Communists, of course, have an even wider spectrum than that.

Let me put it another way, if I may. I do not think that the United States Information Agency is spending much energy in systematically researching what are the key issues that would divide, irritate and confuse, disorient, and destroy Soviet and Chinese power elites. I think that they are putting out, by and large, straight, good information. But I want some American apparatus to treat the Soviets the way Republicans and Democrats treat each other during a presidential campaign. That gets closer to political warfare, because there you have Republican strategists trying to plan issues that will divide southern conservative Democrats from northern liberals, and you have Democratic strategists trying to raise issues that will create civil war between Taft Republicans and Eisenhower Republicans. This is done, and it's financed at a very nice rate. Speaking as an outsider, I might say that another species of domestic political warfare, so I am told, is what, say, the Air Force Association and Navy League may do at budget time.

We put a lot of energy into internal political warfare. Again, whether one approves or disapproves, I think this is fairly professional. It's professional, because specific targets and objectives are set, the terrain of political power is carefully analyzed. You decide what key Congressmen have to be changed. You don't just scatter your shot against Congress as a whole. You decide what key Congressmen on what key committees need to be persuaded--then you figure out what people back in Denver or Dallas need to be persuaded in order to pressure those Congressmen. Dossiers are prepared on five by eight cards. This thing is done professionally. We are not doing that, in my view, against Genghis Khan. We have not practiced the same fun and games against the external enemy that we are prepared to tolerate against each other in the achieving of our own domestic business and political goals here at home.

QUESTION: I noticed that you seem to have a lot of respect for the British modus operandi in this kind of warfare. In view of that, how do you explain the treatment that Prime Minister Macmillan received in Moscow?

MR. BARNETT: Well, I think, as I said somewhere in the speech, or should have said and want to say again, I would never argue that non-military warfare techniques, including intelligence, black operations, subversion, and propaganda, can ever really be effectively waged except in a framework of tremendous power in the orthodox areas of real military power, tremendous industrial strength, and so on. It seems to me that Mr. Macmillan is explained, as are many other British actions, not by the fact that British intelligence operations have disintegrated, but that Britain has fallen to a status of a second-rate power in military and industrial and financial strength.

I think the fair question would be what would happen if a Churchill were President of the United States and if British intelligence officers were operating this way. I think then we might see a very interesting species of fun and games, because, although I would agree with you that I don't think Mr. Macmillan scored any victories in Moscow; I think that has to do less with British fun and games capability and more with the fact that four or five hydrogen bombs could probably sink the island of Britain, that their balance of payments is unfavorable, and so forth. I mean, all the orthodox constituents of power have declined in Britain.

I do want to reemphasize that I think only those who have the capacity to fight an all-out war, if necessary--because it may come to that--can really afford to engage in this underground shin-kicking business.

QUESTION: Aren't we really talking about a decision as to policy in this matter more than we are talking about implementation? It would appear to me that if our Government were to decide that we're going to play this way and play for keeps, we have the will to do it now; that we're not as naked as you would have us appear. We have in the executive agencies of this Government, in my opinion, quite a bit in the way of capability for this type of conflict, should the decision be made to implement it.

MR. BARNETT: I would certainly agree with you that the policy decision is extremely important here. In other words, once you make a decision, let's say, that we really are at war in the nonmilitary field, and that, therefore, the rules of conventional diplomacy do not apply; and once you decide that instead of peaceful coexistence or containment, you really want to win a few more seats back, you really want to win some of the precincts, and want to displace some of their county chairmen, so to speak, yes, I would agree with this: that we have certainly in this country people who have passed through ONI and are now back out in the civilian sector, people who have passed through OSS and CIA, people who have simply been trained in the scuffling of the precincts of America. We have a lot of talent. I would agree with you that the policy decision, whether 60 or 70 percent of the thing I don't know, would be vastly important.

I still think, though, that you need some professional training. Even recognizing that we have many more talented people than are being utilized, I still think we need to do in the field of propaganda and political warfare what we've done with management. We need to set up case studies. The case study approach, I think, is to work out precisely, all the nonmilitary elements that go into a coup d'etat in Iran or whatever. I really think we could use the case study method in international political science.

But I certainly agree with you that the policy decision is the most important, because, as I try to understand American objectives, whatever those objectives are called, it seems to me that the real semantics is "hopeful coexistence;" and if you believe in hopeful coexistence, then you don't want to really run the risk of offending or provoking anybody.

QUESTION: We have been criticized a great deal about the crash basis which we use for many of our programs. If this policy decision was made to go ahead on the program you've been discussing, how much success do you think we would have on a crash basis?

MR. BARNETT: Well, I think that, like everything else, you would have to get into this for the long haul. Particularly where you make the decision to provide incentive to career officers who are going to specialize in this function, you would have to follow through on it over a period of decades. But I think there are some things that could be done fairly quickly, even on a crash basis, and which could be done by existing agencies of Government with no additional training and with no cadres and no special machinery once you decided you were going to try to take the initiative.

For example, take the question of persistence in propaganda. Propaganda depends for its effectiveness not only on the slogan, but on the persistence of the issue. To be only semifacetious, here again we understand this at home. In a sense, Republicans are still running against Franklin Roosevelt and Democrats are still running against Herbert Hoover's depression in certain parts of the country. In other words, you get an issue and you stick to it over a decade and you keep pounding it home.

In the international scene, whenever we have an issue such as genocide in Hungary or whatever, we seem only capable of sustaining that issue for two or three months, and then we cease and desist. Hence the world is still talking about Little Rock and it's forgotten about the 50,000 people murdered in Budapest. The world has forgotten completely about genocide in Latvia and Esthonia and Lithuania, about the boxcars moving eastward out of the Ukraine. It has forgotten presumably even about the 100,000 unwary flowers that had their stalks cut on the Chinese mainland only two years ago. American churchmen are now agitating to admit Red China into the U. N. while the blood is scarcely dry.

Part of that, I think, is our fault at the governmental level for not being persistent in our propaganda themes. If we made a decision tomorrow to get persistence, we should have the world talking about Soviet colonialism, about Russian carpet-bagging in central Asia, about Russian suppression of Moslem minorities in Kazakhstan. Communist atrocities should be on the world's agenda. There are many ways that we could seize the initiative without any new machinery and turn the propaganda weapon in the other direction.

It seems to me we are ignoring the elementary rule of high school debates, which is: Never debate the proposition as worded by your opponent until you have carefully scrutinized that proposition and perhaps amended the structure of the language of the proposition itself because the proposition may be so worded that the negative can never win.

Now, we always debate our opponent's proposition, which is something you never do in political warfare. We don't do it, again, at home. In a campaign, if a Republican raises an issue, the strategy of his Democratic opponent is to slide off of that as quickly as possible and raise another issue. If he does nothing but try and meet the Republican charge, he only gives further currency to that charge. He focuses public opinion on that one. So the elementary rule is, never debate the enemy's proposition. Start one of your own.

We've got so many things to take up with the Soviet Union. Neither they nor the Hungarian puppets have ever responded to the U. N.'s demand that this question of Hungary be considered by the United Nations. We've let it go back under the rug. No one brings out a White Paper on Hungary. No one brings out a White Paper on the 57 violations of the Korean truce by the Chinese Communists, who are, of course, moving in modern weapons and doing all kinds of other things. Instead of doing that, we keep debating their business of Berlin or Little Rock or "No, we didn't engage in germ warfare." We should, in my view, be setting the propositions for debate ourselves. And that could be done on a crash basis.

DR. REICHLLEY: Mr. Barnett, I know that you know that one of the most difficult speeches to make is to say "Thank you" to a man who has made you think; and that certainly is the situation here, I am sure, this evening. So I'm simply going to say on behalf of the Commandant and all those present, thank you for this wonderful presentation.

(11 May 1959--4, 150)B/msr/bn