

UNITED STATES READINESS FOR WAR

27 April 1959

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NOTICE

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Publication No. L59-139

INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

Washington, D. C.

Honorable Dean Rusk, President, Rockefeller Foundation, was born in Cherokee County, Georgia on 9 February 1909. He received his A. B. degree from Davidson College, his B. S. and M. S. degrees from Oxford University (Rhodes Scholar), LL. D. (honorary) Mills College and LL. D. (honorary) Davidson. From 1934-40 he was associate professor and dean of faculty at Davidson College. In 1940 he joined the U. S. Army as a captain and was separated as a colonel in 1946. He entered Government service in the Department of State in 1946 as associate chief, International Security Affairs. During 1946-47 he was special assistant to the Secretary of War. He returned to the Department of State in 1947 and served as Assistant Secretary of State; Deputy Under Secretary of State; and Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. In 1952 he assumed his present position. In 1933 he received the Cecil Peace Prize. He is a member of the American Political Association and the American Society of International Law. This is his second lecture at the Industrial College.

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ADMIRAL CLARK: Gentlemen: Today we embark on the final unit of the year's course of instruction. The lecture that we are to hear is the keynote lecture of the unit. The title, "United States Readiness for War," is appropriate because, in the final analysis, that is our real concern here at the College.

For the benefit of the many visitors who are here today, I would like to interject this point, that, habitually throughout the year, we have used the term "war" in its broadest sense, to include cold war as well as limited or general war. Perhaps our speaker will do the same this morning.

Our studies, which are culminating in this final unit, have been pointed toward developing an awareness of the problems which we face today as well as an appreciation of the further problems which we would face in case of a hot war.

Our speaker is eminently qualified to give this keynote lecture and to help us with an appraisal of our readiness. He is the Honorable Dean Rusk, the President of the Rockefeller Foundation, a former member of the State Department, where his distinguished career included service as an Assistant Secretary, as a Deputy Under Secretary, and as the head of the Mission to Japan with the rank of Ambassador.

Mr. Ambassador, it is a great pleasure to welcome you back to this platform and to introduce you to this year's class of the Industrial College. Mr. Rusk.

MR. RUSK: Admiral Clark and Gentlemen: I appreciate very much this invitation to come back to the Industrial College to talk at the beginning of this course. Actually, on the plane coming down this morning I began to wonder whether I was wise in accepting the invitation, not because we were being bumped around, as I understand some of you were coming back from California yesterday, but because I began to think back over some of the briefings and discussion groups in which I have participated in the last two years.

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I have been concerned about the gap between what seems to me to be rather obvious and dull views of my own and some pretty fancy thinking which one bumps into at some of these current discussions. One sits down to hear some rational analysis and is told that we should have had an all-out war in such and such a year but the United States was too stupid to understand its situation, or that we should have had an all-out war in such and such another year but fortunately the Russians were too dumb to appreciate their situation. One gets into a games theory discussion and is told that in a given circumstance it might be the right move for us to guide, escort, and protect an enemy hydrogen bomber to come and strike one of our cities, and that it would spoil the game if you alerted the people of that city as to the move that was being made. Either some of this discussion is out of contact with the world that I know or the world has passed me by, and I am not sure that I am able to keep up.

Similarly, in the last two years, I have received at the Rockefeller Foundation more than one distinguished scientist in the physical or biological fields who wanted to get some financial support for various types of explorations of nuclear testing, cold-war moves, negotiations with opposite numbers on the Russian side who would sit down with them as private citizens to see whether they could come up with some good ideas. When I inquired of these fine scientists about their familiarity with the background of the way in which we got to where we are, their understanding of what the issues seem to be and their thoughts about what questions are suitable for discussion with their Russian opposite numbers, I have invariably had to say to them that we could not provide any support. When they asked why, I have said that because we cannot make grants to Mr. John Foster Dulles to investigate genetics and we cannot make grants to Senator Fulbright to conduct experimentation in nuclear physics; that it is not our business to subsidize naivety. They go away quite offended, feeling that the Rockefeller Foundation is looking only to the past and is not interested in the future.

Now, I am not suggesting that amateurs stay out of these questions, else I would not be here myself. But I would suggest that there is a crucial difference between a conclusion and a decision, that difference being responsibility, that a decision must take into account as many of the factors that bear upon a problem as one can imagine and identify, and that the man who participates in a decision must be prepared to take the full consequence of that decision without falling back upon the comforting excuse, "Sorry; I was wrong."

If some of you are away ahead of me today, perhaps my only role is to give you an example of one of your problems, which is the normal citizen who has not quite kept up with some of the recent talk.

When I was in the State Department in about 1951, the Red Chinese were just beginning to move into Tibet. There was an arrangement with the Dalai Lama by which he was to leave Tibet and establish an anti-Communist Bhuddist headquarters in some other country, such as Thailand. But at the appointed time and place he did not show up, and we didn't know what had happened. Some weeks later a runner came across the mountains with the story. At the last moment apparently the Dalai Lama had decided to consult the gods, so he wrote on two little pieces of rice paper, "Leave Lhasa," "Stay in Lhasa." He rolled each one of those in a little wad of dough, put them out on the edge of a prayer wheel, spun the prayer wheel in the presence of the court, and the first lump of dough which fell off contained the answer. The answer was to stay in Lhasa.

When we got that message we were very much amused. And then we began to think back over the decisions of, say, a decade, and we were not entirely sure that we were batting better than 50 percent.

If I seem critical today about certain aspects of our national decision-making, it is criticism with compassion and it is certainly without partisanship. I suspect that neither Democrat nor Republican will approve of some of the things I will say, and in any event one who was born a Democrat would not wish to be partisan on foreign policy discussions while that capable and gallant man, John Foster Dulles, is going through this particular period of his life. If I exhibit personal prejudice, it will be the prejudice of experience in the State Department rather than in the Pentagon, in each of which I have spent about the same amount of time during and since World War II.

My principal anxiety today is that propositions which seem so obvious to me are clearly not at all obvious to a great many other people, including many in positions of high responsibility. And so I have to find out why I am so wrong or whether there is anything which I can say or do about that gap, as a citizen, which would make any difference.

For example, it seems to me obvious that our present military power and doctrine are not suitable for use as an instrument of foreign policy. We are geared more and more for an eventuality calling for maximum violence and we are lagging behind in the flexibility of force

which we need in support of policy. As a matter of fact, we are even lagging behind--I gather, as I am not Top-secret briefed on this at the moment--on the techniques for applying maximum violence. Basing our policy upon a rather limited strategic concept, we are not even taking the steps necessary to make good on that concept and seem to be turning aside from "conventional" forces, in many circles a bad word, and are losing the flexibility which any foreign office would need if there is to be any connection between national power and national policy.

Our strategic doctrine, I suspect--and I am sure that I will be corrected on this in the discussion period--seems to rest more and more heavily upon damaging someone else rather than upon protecting the United States. I would have supposed it was obvious that we would prefer a land war in Europe rather than a hydrogen war over the population centers of the United States if an enemy, through fear of incineration, would afford us that choice. But the forces are not available for using the type of force called for by a great variety of situations with which we shall be confronted.

To me, the most important role of the conventional forces, other than to apply the necessary force where the enemy does not, himself, elect to expand the war into an all-out war, is (before the fighting starts) to provide token forces as a register of our determination and intention and to provide sufficient force to require the other fellow to decide whether this world goes up in a holocaust. Those forces are not now in sufficient number to provide the token forces which I suspect the State Department would like to have.

There is a standing argument, of course--on which one can have respect for both sides--between the diplomats and the Military Establishment on the role of token forces. The soldiers, sailors, and airmen are a little nervous about sending boys to do men's jobs, a little nervous about having a force insufficient to meet its probable military mission, but from the point of view of diplomacy, the mission of a token force is not necessarily that of fighting, although it may be called upon to fight in a most desperate situation. The mission of a token force is to alert the other side that that force must be bowled over and that the power and determination of the United States will stand behind it.

Looking back over the years during which I was in Government, I suspect that one of the most grievous mistakes we made was to pull the last regimental combat team out of Korea. Some of you will remember

those circumstances. We had an insufficiency of force to make a significant impression upon our commitments. From the military point of view it was necessary to regroup, consolidate, fill in some gaps in the ranks, and, from the military point of view it seemed wise to get our troops out of Korea. The State Department had another view of the matter, and succeeded in delaying the removal of that regimental combat team for at least a year. But it is my own considered opinion that, had we not removed that last regimental combat team from Korea, the Soviet Union would not have unleashed the North Koreans about a year later.

There is a story about Mr. Vishinsky which, if you have not heard you should hear, because it represents a situation which to me is very important. I don't think the story is apocryphal. It did come second or third hand, however. About 10 days before he died, in New York, he was having dinner sitting next to a top American businessman. This American asked him the question which most Americans apparently ask most Russians when they sit next to them at dinner. He said, "Mr. Vishinsky, you know that the American people are not going to attack the Soviet Union. Why do you appear to be nervous and afraid?" Mr. Vishinsky said, "Well, we don't know whether we can rely upon you people in matters of that sort. Look at Korea. You did everything you could to tell us that you were not interested in Korea, and then when the North Koreans went in there you put your Army in there." He said, "We can't trust you fellows."

This is the story of the token force. Somehow the force has to be present at points of commitment in order to make clear to the other fellow just what our position is going to be. Our military position increasingly forces us to the narrow and fatal choice between surrender and a war of annihilation. We have put ourselves in a position where we, ourselves, are likely to initiate the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons.

I suppose that I am, on this point particularly, old-fashioned because it seems to me that the initiation of the use of atomic or hydrogen weapons of whatever caliber or scale is crossing a threshold which has the gravest possible implications for us all. And it is one of the roles of diplomacy to insure that that not become necessary. It is also one of the roles of diplomacy to be sure that in the process we do not surrender vital interests. There again the conventional forces have their important part.

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One hears that we must be prepared to initiate the use of atomic weapons because otherwise we could not deal with massed Soviet armies on the European Continent. What we are saying is that 460 million people in NATO are unwilling to provide the conventional force with which to meet the conventional forces of the Soviet Union with 200 million people. If you say, "Ah, but they have 100 million satellites in addition," I would not know whether to add or to subtract that number from the Soviet total. If you pull China into the balance, then there are vast peoples around the world who almost certainly would be with us in a clear case of aggression involving the necessity of war.

Actually, our public has not been confronted with this choice. Our public has not been asked to help decide whether we are willing to provide the conventional forces with which to meet Russian conventional forces rather than limit our choice to that between an all-out hydrogen or atomic war on one side and surrender on the other. I think we have greatly underestimated both the intelligence and the wisdom of our public by not getting that question out on the table for discussion. There seems to be some nervousness about presenting our problems to the public because we fear the answers would cost a good deal of money. We haven't really heard from the public any systematic effort to prevent our spending money on things that have to be done. Some of you may have seen this morning a letter in the "Washington Post," which I picked up on the way over here. It was signed by about 25 members of the Economics Faculty of the University of California. If you have not seen it, by all means have a look at it. The letter is on the subject of "How Much Can We Spend?" and it points out that we could spend a considerably larger amount on our national defense without cutting into the comfortable consumer levels which we have achieved in the last few years, let alone what we might have to do at the cost of giving up some of our luxury and comfort.

I am concerned that our present stance erodes the confidence of our friends and the credibility of our enemies, leaving as our principal protection the suspicion on the part of our enemies that we may be just a little bit insane and must, therefore, be handled with some care. There is a serious problem in Europe at the present time, as some of you know, because there is a steady undermining of their confidence that the United States would in fact risk serious war for the protection of Western Europe. The more our friends in Europe become skeptical about that, the more the Russians will become skeptical about it. We then move into a highly dangerous situation. That is, we allow our enemy to gamble that we would do less than in fact we would do, which is opening the door to a major war.

Now, I will not take your time and presume to say things to you which you know a great deal more about than I, but it seems to me rather clear that we should make whatever effort is required and is technically possible to keep abreast and, if possible, ahead in modern weapon technology, that we should equip ourselves with conventional forces capable of protecting vital interests in the absence of hydrogen warfare, and that we should invest now in a greater degree of industrial preparedness for crash production of military material.

Some of you were probably on the receiving end in this Korean business, and you were wondering why such a shy policy--as some of you in the field may have looked at it sitting where you were--prevented us from being ready to expand the war into Manchuria and to send fleets up and down the China coast, and so forth. Now that you are here in the Industrial College you might have some information available to you which at least was a very important part of that policy decision at that time.

Take a look at our then monthly jet production, for example. You could count them on one hand. When the Second Infantry Division lost its artillery in North Korea, we had to take the divisional artillery away from a National Guard division in active training on the west coast in order to replace it. There were no planes, we were advised by the military in those days, on our carriers which were capable of meeting in fair contest the Migs which were and could have been easily stationed along the China coast. In other words, the safe haven which we had in Japan was fairly important to us because we did not have the military material in being nor the immediate military productive capacity which would give policy any reasonable alternatives when questions such as expanding the war came up.

Surely some investment in a higher state of readiness in military production in the present state of the world would be a good investment. Surely also we need to do something more serious about civilian defense. There is a danger that civil defense is becoming a joke. It is difficult to get communities to take it seriously, and the tangible steps which are being taken appear to be unconvincing.

Let me say in passing that I am not now referring to that kind of civilian defense program which is designed as a domestic psychological warfare program to convince the American people that they might as well relax, that everything is going to be all right even if we have a hydrogen war. I am talking about a civilian defense program aimed

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specifically at reducing casualties in the case of massive bombing and fallout, in an effort to retrieve as much as we can for the postbombing period, for the recovery, and for the continuance of the war.

When I hear an American top general say that the war will be over in two days and a Russian marshall say that the next war is going to be won by the foot soldier, I have an uneasy feeling that the Russian marshall may be more in touch with the determination of human beings and that we had better think about the long range as well as the short range.

All this involves a sharp increase of expenditures by several billions a year. As to public acceptance--we haven't asked the public. When the Rockefeller Brothers Fund Panel--(these panels have no connection with the Rockefeller Foundation, although I was on the panels)--on Defense circulated its report calling for sharply increased expenditures on national defense, they got no significant fan mail from around the country saying, "You are spending wildly; you are irresponsible from the point of view of economics; the country can't afford it." That part of it was received with a good deal of calm. What has been more disturbing has been indications that people have been distressed that more motion has not been taken in these directions.

It is entirely possible that we are not likely to improve our policy unless we give more attention to the way we make it and the ways in which we carry it out. I am not at all sure that our policy is going to improve solely through the invention of ideas, because the processes by which we reach policy are extremely complicated and deal with incredibly complicated situations moving at a pace which literally take one's breath away.

We need to give very serious attention to the way in which we make policy. I suggest we do not do it by accepting as a rule of public administration that "everyone affected by a decision must participate in making it." The committee structure which perhaps naturally arose during World War II has been greatly expanded in the postwar period so that the gauntlet through which an idea has to run before it becomes a policy is long and deadly. The infant mortality rate of an idea in the mind of an associate division chief in the Department of State or a lieutenant colonel on the General Staff is very high indeed. You all know men--perhaps you, yourselves, are among them--who had a good idea, but found that the problem of translating it into policy proved so tedious and so complicated that it hardly seemed worth raising.

The United States, as the leader of a great coalition, must learn to think with its allies in the process of this complicated decision-making of our own. We are frequently scolded for lack of consultation. One of the reasons is that, by the time we get our own position set, on the basis of which we can talk to our friends abroad, we have gone through such an elaborate procedure for getting our position that it has become frozen; there is little need to discuss the position because it is subject to so little change. Even if our friends come up with good ideas--as they do from time to time--we find that the problem of changing it seems again hardly worth the effort.

I'll just mention four points in passing, points that need particular attention in this matter of policy-making. I cannot see that there is any alternative to strong and vigorous executive leadership on the job in Washington. I say this with respect and with sympathy for men who are ill. I am talking now about the needs of the Nation. I am also talking with great skepticism and reservation about the growing tendency toward Summit diplomacy, drawing our President and our Secretary of State off into the field of negotiation, away from their main responsibilities in the national capital. The President and the Secretary of State have the most complicated constitutional system to run which exists in the modern world. They must run that system on the basis of consent, largely through the building of coalitions behind each major policy, coalitions which vary in composition and are constantly in motion. Coalitions behind a defense program, for example, might be quite different from one behind a foreign aid program, and that again quite different from one behind another major aspect of our foreign policy, such as in the Middle East.

These coalitions are steadily shifting, losing support at one edge, hopefully gaining support at another. If we think of the President as an executive sitting at a desk striking off decisions we miss the point; think rather of the president as a sheep dog, whose job it is to round up enough people headed in the same general direction for a sufficiently long period of time to make it possible for us to follow something called a policy. That is more the role of a leader in a tumultuous, scattered, and vigorous democracy such as we have.

The Secretary of State has four main problems--his relations with the President, his relations with Congress, his relations with his own department, and his relations with the public. Even before he takes off on a plane to negotiate with a foreigner, these are the four motors that ought to be in good tune before he sets out. And yet all four are

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time-consuming. If the President or the Secretary of State is at his post, building coalitions, consulting with leadership, and instructing and informing the public, then our representatives abroad may be able to pursue policies with greater imagination, greater vigor, and more daring than if the President, himself, were the negotiator. When the President goes abroad and sits at a table, he must worry about what he can make good on when he gets home. There is the lesson of Woodrow Wilson. If he were at home, building policy, instructing his representatives, there is reason to believe that he would be carrying out his role in negotiation the more effectively.

From the point of view of the technique of diplomacy itself there is grave question about whether principals should be in direct confrontation with each other. As a citizen I am nervous about Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Eisenhower sitting across the table from each other. On the one side Mr. Khrushchev, a highly emotional individual, willing to talk and speak for effect and in these days in a mood of great confidence; on the other side the President, with a hot temper and a weak heart. What happens at the end of a long day of negotiation? These are two men who can start a hydrogen war, the two men sitting on top of these things. What happens at the end of a long day if Mr. Khrushchev says, "Mr. President, why don't you give up? Why don't you concede this point? You know we are going to bury you. We have already told you that"--and the President gives the answer from Bastogne, "Nuts!"? Where do they go from there, these human beings, with human frailties? Lawyers have discovered that you do not confront your clients directly with each other when there is a case to be settled between them. The intermediary plays a vital role and there are great disadvantages in the direct confrontation of the principals in a negotiation.

Then we need, I think, to work more vigorously on bipartisanship. One of our problems now is that bipartisanship tends to be temporary, fragile, and rather formal, because the temptation is always present for the party in opposition to seize upon an opportunity to attack, whether to one side of the position or to the other. If the party in power acts vigorously and spends the money required, the opposition party will talk about balanced budgets. If the Administration acts timidly or cautiously, the opposition party can come out and talk in the other direction. Surely we do need in our party structure some more sense of party responsibility. We need to get policy issues discussed more in our national committees. There needs to be some sense of party responsibility in standing in a general position and keeping to that

position and foregoing the temptations of petty sniping for electoral purposes.

Surely it is not too much to expect of two great parties in a democracy that they try to work out a reasoned and sensible and long-range basis of foreign policy and not leave it to chance and accident as to what the public discussion will be about at any particular time.

I won't take time to do more than mention executive-legislative relationships. There are those at the top of our executive branch and there are those at the top of our Congress who are deeply concerned about whether the Government of the United States is properly organized to conduct the public business and foreign affairs for the next 25 years. Much of their concern turns upon executive-legislative relationships, a concern about which they tend to be despairing because they realize that they are dealing with constitutional prerogatives of the most deeply rooted sort and that the people who hold those prerogatives are reluctant to pass them along to their successors with those prerogatives impaired. But, nevertheless, we should be able to do better than to call upon the Secretary of State personally to testify in four separate hearings to get a single piece of important legislation and its corresponding appropriations through the Congress, hearings which require at least a day of preparation ahead of time, hearings which expect him to make the same speech in four different ways in order to preserve the feelings of the respective committees, and hearings at which he is not permitted, unless health intervenes, to send a substitute.

Surely we can do something about annual appropriations. Is there any particular reason why each Congress, now elected for two years, could not at least budget for the normal operations of our principal departments on a two-year basis, and thereby save some of the nervous energy and time--and indeed money--which are now involved in this long annual process of appropriating funds, where most of us can predict with reasonable certainty the range in which those funds will be forthcoming.

I have already mentioned party discipline. It has an importance in the legislative relationship, of course. It may be that we need to consider more seriously the election of our Congresses for a four-year period, electing the entire House of Representatives at the time we elect the President, in order to give a little more steadiness to the House of Representatives and give them a chance to think more soberly and seriously about the merits of the issues with which they are besieged right through the year.

There are two questions I would like to raise with you, gentlemen, about the two possible institutions which we might need to supplement, to assist, to stimulate, and sometimes to put the brakes on some of the action in the political field. You are familiar with the National Academy of Sciences, which was originated by President Lincoln to provide the Government advice on scientific matters. During World War I it was decided that the Academy, as it was then constituted, was not adequate to the task and that it should have an operating arm, which came to be known as the National Research Council. Then, in World War II, both those were found to be not entirely adequate, and various other scientific and development boards were created.

Now, it seems to me that we may very well need something like a National Academy of Public Affairs, an academy which would have in it as much of the stored wisdom of the country as we can get, an academy which might provide a forum out of which some things could be said which would be listened to. When you get outside of the political arena these days, it is extremely difficult to find a forum which will get respectful and interested attention on the part of the general public. You know the effort to get various advisory groups together. You know that the universities are doing all sorts of research and publishing studies. You know that various organizations, such as CED, the Chamber of Commerce, and others, are studying various questions and putting out points of view on them. But it is very difficult to think of any body, any group, which could say some things about the executive-legislative relationship, for example, which would make the slightest difference in the executive branch or on Capitol Hill.

My hunch is that Mr. Herbert Hoover, Mr. Harry Truman, Mr. Tom Dewey, and Mr. Adlai Stevenson--to take four who would obviously be in such an academy--are capable of sitting down with one another and thinking seriously about national problems on a nonpartisan basis, and of giving the country some occasional advice on the rare, but deeply fundamental, issues.

Perhaps a subsidiary agency of an Academy (or perhaps located somewhere else) might be something which could be thought of as an "As If" Planning Board. When one sits down in an operation like the Rockefeller Brothers Fund Studies or in some of the discussion activities within the Government, or in private groups outside, one of the things you run into is that we are a nation which is confronted with national tasks but are not really organized to act as a nation. Our constitutional system has fragmented responsibility, deliberately, and I

suppose there is no need for us to think seriously about changing it, because it isn't going to be changed in major respects at the present time. But, nevertheless, it is hard to find anyone who is systematically trying to find an answer to the question: How are we doing these days? It is hard to find someone who will take a good look at the state of the Nation in the general sense and not in the narrow, limited sense in which it is usually conceived in the President's State of the Nation Address.

But, how are we doing? How are we doing in education, in science, in production, in housing, in consumption, and in population growth and all the other big questions which go into the shape of things to come? I would not myself give this agency any operation role. I call it an "As If" planning agency simply because it seems to me that the assessment itself would be useful, interesting, and important. At one stage during some studies in which I was recently involved, I was interested in that some businessmen present said, "Look. We don't expect and don't believe in a planned society, but we do need some general guidelines about the directions in which we ought to move in the national interest. Every few days we are making decisions in the industrial field which to us are marginal. They could go either way. It doesn't make any particular difference to us which way we do it and we don't know enough to be sure that we are doing it exactly right when the issues are closely balanced. If there were some general guidelines, about the directions in which we ought to be moving in the national interest, we could support those ideas by taking them into account in our specific decisions." My guess is that the same thing would be true if we think of such things as school boards in local communities and housing and things of that sort.

We need somehow to know a little bit more about how we are getting along in the main. At the present time it is not easy for us to get that kind of information.

I understand that two of your sections are going to be interested in the cold war. Perhaps I could comment just briefly on that under the general notion of preparation for action to prevent war, or how one comes to win it in the political sense. Surely one of the purposes of policy, where we are confronted with a regime and a power like the USSR, is to try to create a world situation in which it is the USSR against the rest. This was the theme, the hope and the effort in the first several years of the United Nations, where, on vote after vote after vote, you would find that the USSR bloc was all alone in its minority.

It seems to me that there is much to be said for trying to build a sense of solidarity among the rest which will serve to put brakes upon the ambitions and appetites of the Soviet Union. In case of trouble this would be of real importance to us. Those of you who have been in American uniforms in the midst of a sea of non-Western people, as have those of us who were in the CBI theater, for example, can understand the connection between military power and the attitude of the people among whom you are working. The attitude of these people, in whatever part of the world, is one of the important elements in our military posture.

We start with some important advantages. At the risk of seeming optimistic and sentimental, I suspect that the United States today is in touch with the aspirations of common people all over the world in a way in which no great power has ever been before. I think it is possibly because what is written in the preamble and Articles I and II of the charter of the United Nations does rather accurately reflect the long-range hunches and intentions of the American people. It is also because we have drawn into this country men from all parts of the earth and have had to find the common elements of our cooperation. It is because we have been less ideological and more practical in our approach to public problems; and, when you wander around the world and discover that you can't find people who would rather be hungry than fed or sick than healthy, and find that most people are like apes and that they don't want to be pushed around too much, and that most people are interested in family and some reasonable expectation of what is going to happen tomorrow, then you suspect that this 2,500-year discourse which has been going on in the West about the political consequences of the nature of man has something in it, and that in the process people along the way have gotten in touch with some pretty fundamental stuff, the stuff of human nature.

There is a kinship waiting for the West if we can handle it with skill and tact and vigor--and candor as well.

I just mention in passing that I do believe that we are not sufficiently skillful in talking about our relations with some of these people in the non-West in terms of genuine reciprocity. And I am not now talking about quid pro quo for a given amount of aid. If you talk to Indian friends you find them concerned about what India thinks about the United States and you find them looking at the common interests which both countries have in the well-being of a democratic India. If you should run across

an Indian who would be willing to talk about the United States attitude toward India or to talk about India's stake in the United States, he would be a very rare person indeed.

Relationship is, by definition, reciprocal. The United States is in a position to be friendly to those who want to be friendly, indifferent to those who want to be indifferent, and hostile to those who want to lift their hands against us. Perhaps we should sit down more systematically with some of our friends, and indeed our enemies, to try to discuss at length the general notion of common interests and to try to identify where they might lie.

In the six years during which I was in the State Department, I don't recall a single instance--there may have been some--in which any foreign ambassador in Washington and an officer of the Department of State, or an American ambassador abroad and an official of the foreign government sat down for a systematic, desultory, relaxed attempt to box the compass of common interests as a background for the discussion of specific differences.

On the execution of policy, I won't take your time now to go into detail. Let me just indicate what I have in mind. In the execution of our policy we have tended to overlook the fact that big things are made up of a lot of little things and that there are a great many small ways in which we can improve the way in which we carry out policy, no one of which would mean very much, but taken together the entire basket might make a substantial improvement.

If we can only move toward a task-force of administration abroad, under which we would give people a mission and the resources and then cut them free to get the job done, this would greatly improve our effectiveness. During World War II, when it was important for us to conserve all of our resources as much as possible, we gave our theater commanders resources with which they could get everything they needed from hand grenades to drapes for officers' messes. In peacetime, when we can afford to accept some risk and some waste, we seem more concerned to prevent the commission of crime. We seem to treat even our great universities as potential thieves.

In these university contracts, instead of a 20-page contract and a 30-page annex, there is no reason why we could not put them on a grant basis--write them a one- or two-page letter and say, "We have agreed with you that here is a job. Here is the money. God bless you. Get

the job done." If you don't do it well, don't make another contract. But if they do do it well, leave them alone to get it done. These universities are handling trust funds which have to be handled on at least as high a standard of responsibility as are public funds, and, over the last half-century our Foundation has found that you can trust them.

Our cultural attach'es abroad need a sharp stepping-up in status and function. In some places they are the second and third junior officer in our information program. Here this great rich and diverse 10th-amendment American culture, which is not really the business of the Federal Government, is suborned abroad as a tool of propaganda. We have cultural attach'es who, only through courtesy, could be called cultured individuals. One of my friends in Asia said, "It doesn't bother us that your cultural attach'e doesn't understand our language, history, and tradition, but it does upset us when his jaw drops open if we want to talk about Walt Whitman."

If we have cultural attach'es who are on the ambassador's personal staff, ranking with the military attach'e, and recruited, to get the kind of men the intelligent people of the receiving country will enjoy having to dinner and spending an evening with, we will be a long way ahead.

I can't touch upon American schools abroad, and I mentioned the language business. Time is running out. These are simply fitting examples of the general notion that there are a great many little ways in which we can improve the execution of policy. I say this in full knowledge of the fact that almost anything I could name was a problem when I and some others were in Washington, and we left many of these problems to our successors to solve.

In conclusion, let me make what might well be considered the most unacceptable remark of all, because it is almost incredibly optimistic. In all of our anxiety these days, we are, of course, very much pre-occupied with the possibility of the major holocaust, the major war. But, on the other hand, I suspect that we are living in what might properly be called the agony of the near miss. After World War I, and again after World War II, we came awfully close to having it made, with some kind of system which had a fair chance of settling international disputes by means short of a major war. It would be too simplified to say that the responsibility after World War I was largely that of the United States for not joining in the League of Nations. That was a part of it, but was not the whole story. I suspect that a very heavy

part of the responsibility after World War II rests with the United States because of the sweeping and precipitous demobilization into which we sank just after the end of the war.

It seems to me that we have been doing little else since 1945 beyond trying to catch up on the consequences of that demobilization. At a time when we might have given the United Nations a fair chance to work itself out, with a fair chance, on wholly realistic grounds, that the Soviet Union might have rearranged some of its thoughts on foreign policy, by our very weakness we put intolerable temptations in front of them and the dismal story unfolded.

And yet, if we did not suspect that there is some possibility, some practical hope, of working this thing out, my guess is that we would not be so anxious. That is, we would learn to snarl and bare our teeth, we would adjust our philosophy to the kind of life which Thomas Hobbs called "nasty, brutish, and short." But we are not doing it. I suspect that the base of the causes of war is shrinking somewhat. For example, you could not easily find any responsible discussion in any country of importance these days about seizing somebody else's territory for the purpose of getting the raw materials and the foodstuffs required to support its own population. The "have-not" kind of argument seems to be on the back burner. There is no significant irredentism at the present time as a major cause of war.

The real issue of war is the conduct of the Soviet Union and its attitude toward the community of nations. This one rogue-country stands between the human race and arrangements that could open the way to peace. And there is our problem.

My guess is that we will best meet it, not by concentrating wholly upon it but by working as steadily as we can from a position of strength which we have not yet achieved with those who are willing to work with us in all parts of the world, by which we can bring about a situation of the USSR versus the rest. And then I think we shall have the kind of peace that we will be willing to abide.

Thank you, gentlemen.

COLONEL SMYSER: Mr. Rusk is ready for your questions.

QUESTION: Since Red China occupies the mainland, do you have any comment as to the value of recognition of Red China as an existing

government and inviting her into the family of nations to sit across the table and give us some facts?

MR. RUSK: This could take us quite a while. Let me just summarize my own view to this extent. Personally I would not put any importance on the issue of recognition, the bilateral arrangement between Washington and Peiping. That is something you can think about or postpone in your own good time. They have no claims on recognition. That's something you can do or not. The more important problem is membership in the U. N. On that one, it seems to me that we ought to think a great deal about what people out in Asia think about that problem. This is much more mixed up now than it was about three or four years ago.

Personally I would take the view that we should simply announce that we recognize that there are certain unrealities in the present situation, but that we see no point in giving up one unreality for another unreality. To us there are two essential realities from which we might be willing to start. One is that there are two countries involved in this issue, both of which have the attributes and the capacities to take membership in the United Nations. Certainly the National Government of China on Formosa is entitled to a seat in the United Nations. The second reality is that by no stretch of the imagination was the regime in Peiping the country which was selected in 1945 to be, in effect, a spokesman for Asia as a permanent member of the Security Council. I would say that it is time for a renegotiation of the question of permanent membership in the Security Council and that our attitude on that would be very heavily influenced by the consensus among the Asian countries. Then I would point out that there are certain charter and constitutional problems involved in settling this problem, and I would wind up by saying that, in view of the relations between Mainland China and the United States, it is not the responsibility of the United States to carry Peiping piggyback into the United Nations. If anyone is able to come up with a solution which is satisfactory and meets these two standards which seem to meet the general agreement of the United Nations, that's one thing. But, until someone does come up with an answer which is satisfactory, we prefer to stay with the status quo.

In other words, I would relax our attitude. My guess is that there would be no practical change in the situation, because, for parliamentary and other reasons, it would be extremely difficult to get any change in the present situation. But I would not send the United States delegation out with a club in its hands, beating everybody into an unwilling

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acceptance of the present situation when the responsibility ought to be on others to try to find a solution. My guess is they would not be able to do so for quite some time to come.

QUESTION: Mr. Rusk, with reference to your proposed public-affairs forum, what mechanism of action do you visualize here? Upon whose ears would the utterances of this group fall? By what mechanism would they be transmitted into national policy? Would these utterances overcome the coalition elements which you mentioned earlier in your talk?

MR. RUSK: It seems to me it would be a mistake to create some body which had any official responsibility. It would be a private agency which would not be directly involved in the decision-making processes and political responsibility. Secondly, it ought not to attempt to do too much. At the beginning, perhaps, it might be wise for it to start off simply by planning to have an annual dinner, in order that these 200 people who might eventually make up its membership--or 200 to 400--might gather to talk about the state of the Nation. But then it would be available, and its availability is what I am interested in. It would be available for consultation by government on a few far-reaching and fundamental questions, particularly those of a constitutional sort, where the wisdom of the country would be important to get, and also where the person in a political position would be more able to do what he would think was right, because there would be someone out in front of him preparing his constituency back home for one rather than another point of view.

Looking back over the last few years, I could mention three or four situations in which I think such a national academy could have spoken out with good effect. Surely the question of the way in which we got out of World War II and the issue of demobilization was a very important and critical one on which the leadership of the country should have done a better job than it did. The question of revision of the Constitution limiting the President to two terms, tending to deprive the President of strong political influence in his second term, was something that needed much more mature deliberation than it got. Surely there was something that could have been said during the McCarthy period, which cut deeply into this country and into our reputation abroad. These war colleges during that period were almost unique in being little islands of free speech on certain questions, because the country tended to be terrorized about talking about certain kinds of controversial questions,

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including this question of China that was just raised. A national academy could have spoken out to great effect in that situation. On the segregation question and the problem of Federal enforcement by military power and the responsibilities of the local communities and the States in relation to the Supreme Court, there is stabilizing advice which could come from a group of that sort who might be listened to with respect. And there is at the present time another great issue which the public has not been able to discuss in a responsible fashion. Can we afford the additional expenditure we need for national defense? This is something on which such an academy could speak out.

These are just a few issues. I would not, myself, see this group burdened with a lot of day-by-day questions, and certainly I would not expect them to get into a specific political problem such as Berlin or Indo-China, where political responsibility is the crucial element.

QUESTION: Mr. Rusk, these various deficiencies that you point out in our present organization all seem to be based on fundamental democratic foundations. As we move on toward, for instance, the stronger executive and less leadership by consent and less by partisanship, and longer appropriations, and a sharper focus between the legislative and the executive, we move away from the democratic process which is really a fact of life. Can you move away from this without going all the way? How far would you go?

MR. RUSK: I don't believe that I would agree, without a good deal more talking and listening, that a strong President is necessarily an undemocratic development. He is the only national officer, other than the Vice President, elected by all the people. His job is at hazard in every community in the country. Then, too, if you want to get away from machinery for a moment, the people of the United States are entitled to have their public affairs conducted in a responsible fashion. In that sense, it seems to me that, as the pace and complexity of events move and where the absence of action or the absence of decision is itself a major policy event, one can make a strong case for a high degree of executive leadership.

If that executive leadership starts off in undemocratic directions, there are all sorts of checks and balances under the existing Constitution and law; or simply by the stubbornness of the American people in not being pushed around if they are not really willing to be, or, indeed, by the element of violence that is in our society if you scratch the surface very deeply.

In other words, I think there are all sorts of built-in guarantees of a basic democratic process which still would leave room for a strong and vigorous executive.

QUESTION: Sir, it seems to me, in observations around the world, that one of the places where we are falling behind the worst is in the psychological and the ideological area. It seems to me also that USIA is not staffed, chartered, nor supported to do the sort of job that needs to be done. Have you any comments on what could be done about that?

MR. RUSK: In brief, it doesn't seem to me that we can improve our psychological position significantly merely by saying something else to people than we have been saying. It seems to me that our psychological position can be improved by doing a lot of the jobs we are trying to do a little better and by working toward more of a sense of reciprocity between some of these countries and ourselves.

For example, this perhaps sounds rather silly, but I would be tempted to see us appoint a Deputy Director of ICA in charge of receiving assistance, and try to stimulate a country like India, or Burma, or Indonesia, or some of these other countries, to consider what contributions they can make to the enrichment of American life and culture. At the present time they do practically nothing, and there is a lot they could do. They could send us teachers of their languages, literature, and history for our colleges and universities. They could send us books for our libraries. They could make places in their own countries for Americans to come to study, with local costs taken care of by local currency resources. They could send us specimens for our zoos, for that matter. I think we register our interest in them in terms of trying to support them and give them something. Why don't we turn that around a little bit and elicit their interest in us because they are trying to make a contribution to American life and culture.

There are various things. But my guess is that we are not likely to increase substantially the propaganda effect merely by what we are saying or the amount that we are saying. Fortunately on this, every once in a while the Russians come brilliantly to our rescue--the Russians or the Chinese. I am quite sure that you could not have bought the impact of the Tibetan business for a billion dollars worth of propaganda.

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QUESTION: Sir, with regard to your statement concerning the dangers of summit meetings among heads of state, I am under the impression that the President would agree with you and that he has submitted under very strong international pressures. What in your opinion, could he have done to continue to resist these pressures?

MR. RUSK: My guess is that more could be done in explaining to our friends abroad why, quite apart from the techniques of diplomacy, it is constitutionally unwise for the President and the Secretary of State to become our principal negotiators. We may have to move in and simply set the style, simply say that fun is fun but we just cannot run our country effectively if we let our President and Secretary of State become traveling negotiators, and expect other people to adjust their views and their practices to ours.

There is a difficult question here, because, as you know, Mr. Khrushchev's attitude is at least in part conditioned by the fact that a foreign minister in the Soviet system is in effect an office boy. He is not a member of the Politburo; he is not a senior officer of government. Negotiations at the foreign minister level are of no particular consequence to Mr. Khrushchev. But, does that mean automatically that we should leave Mr. Khrushchev in a position to haul the President of the United States out by the ears and bring him into a meeting somewhere any time he wants to talk to him?

We've got to find a better answer than we've come up with so far. Incidentally, I am doing some work on this particular point and will be lecturing on it in the fall. So I could get rather heavily involved at a moment's notice on this one. I had better stop right here.

QUESTION: Sir, many of us feel uneasy that there is no sound national policy in certain areas, yet we are not certain because of the possible existence of classified policy papers on the subject. Would it be possible, in your opinion, for the National Security Council or like bodies to articulate national policy in an unclassified manner that would be satisfying to American citizens and yet be something more than platitudes that we hear on human dignity and freedom, but that will not lay open our cards on matters that we have agreed on in our negotiations with foreigners?

MR. RUSK: I may be quite wrong, and I may be underestimating the importance of the most highly classified information these days. Up until two or three years ago, I would have hazarded a guess that the

classified material by and large was far less in quantity and scope than most people supposed and that in any event it was almost never decisive in its bearing upon a policy issue. We are not very good at keeping secrets. But if you want this great country of ours to move, you've got to put a lot of this information out or people won't move. My guess is that, although there is a fret in the Congress or in the press from time to time about secrecy, the citizen has available to him an awful lot of information, if he can get at it and dig for it, and that the highly classified material is very seldom important.

If the President and the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and others, get to a point where they really do think that some of this material is decisive, then they've got a special problem of explanation to the public, and I don't quite know how you deal with that one.

QUESTION: I would like to pursue the colonel's question a little further. I notice that an alternative to the summit confrontations, as you suggested, is that all this sort of work could be done by intermediaries. Certainly some of the impetus within the United States for such meetings has been caused by the inability of our intermediaries to produce in a desired fashion. Therefore, are you suggesting new intermediaries, new techniques, or both?

MR. RUSK: Well, I think you've got a very fair question. I would start by trying to tot up a little box score, beginning with about, say, the beginning of World War II, to see how it looks in retrospect as between the negotiations carried out by principals and negotiations carried out through diplomacy.

I think you would find some rather striking failures, as well as a few successes, at the pinnacle and at the summit, and you would find some pretty constructive work going on through the processes of ordinary diplomacy--the Austrian business, the Trieste affair, and a number of issues between ourselves and the Soviet Union, where quiet diplomacy succeeded in bringing about fairly useful results.

I don't think it is necessary to go all the way to insulate these people from each other particularly at the foreign minister level. There is a growing habit for foreign ministers to come to the General Assembly of the United Nations for the first three weeks or so every year. I think there were about 45 of them there the last time. There is no particular reason why, if there is a habitual attendance of foreign ministers at the

General Assembly in the fall of each year, they could not then see each other a great deal, get off into any groupings they want--NATO, SEATO, ANZUS, the Baghdad Pact group, or the Arab League, or whatever it might be. There is an opportunity there to get to know each other without getting involved in the details of long-drawn-out negotiation.

My concern, sir, is simply that the jobs which the President and the Secretary of State already have are major constitutional responsibilities in leading this country into the formulation of policy and carrying through with it. Those jobs are already so enormous that we should not divert them from those jobs for negotiation.

If you had an Under Secretary of State who in every respect was qualified to be Secretary of State, then this would not be so much of an issue. But, as I look back over the postwar period, our batting average has been only 50 percent. We can't afford that sort of a batting average.

COLONEL SMYSER: Mr. Rusk, we certainly appreciate your visit here this morning and thank you for giving us your views about the serious problems we face and stimulating our serious thinking about those problems.

MR. RUSK: Thank you, Colonel.

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