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ADMINISTRATION IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Mr. Roger Jones

NOTICE

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Reviewed by: Colonel Tom W. Sills, USA

Date: 9 September 1959

INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES
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CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
INTRODUCTION--Major General Evan M. Houseman, USA, Deputy Commandant, ICAF.....	1
SPEAKER-----Mr. Roger Jones, Chairman, U. S. Civil Service Commission.....	2
GENERAL DISCUSSION.....	29

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Reporter: Grace R. O'Toole

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31 August 1959

GENERAL HOUSEMAN: General Mundy, Gentlemen: We are starting off on a beautiful Monday morning with the beginning of our second week of academic instruction. I hope you are all nice and sharp.

Today the lecture is Administration in the Federal Government. As you will remember, last Wednesday we had a lecture on the subject of the Federal Government and the American Political System. That lecture and the discussion periods involved with it were more or less concerned with the textbook solution to the problem.

Today it is likely that we will receive information which will enable us to have a more practical understanding of actually how things are done and how work is accomplished within the Federal Government System.

Our speaker this morning, Mr. Roger Jones, is eminently qualified by experience and by background to give us some enlightenment on our subject today. In 1933 he first entered into the governmental service. He then became a member of the Central Statistical Board and later went to work with the Bureau of the Budget. After World War II he again joined the Bureau of the Budget, and as of last September he became Deputy Director of that bureau.

This February President Eisenhower saw fit to take more advantage of Mr. Jones's talents by appointing him as Chairman of the United States Civil Service Commission.

This is the fifth time Mr. Jones has been with us here at the Industrial College.

Mr. Jones, we are happy to have you with us today on this platform and I now introduce you to the Class of 1960. Mr. Jones.

MR. JONES: Gentlemen of the 1960 Class: It is very much of a pleasure and privilege to be back here. When I made my third appearance some years ago, my youngest son said that nobody deserved more than three strikes and that I probably would very definitely fan out and that I might as well get over the idea about being a public speaker. I have long since gotten over the idea about being a public speaker, but I have had an awful lot of fun in these appearances before the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. It has been a pleasure and a privilege to be with you.

I have tried a few tricks that I know in terms of my method of presentation. Last year in fact I tried to get along on the basis of talking first from notes and then going into a little ad libbing on some subjects and got myself into difficulties both with the clock and in terms of my own thoughts.

So this morning, with your indulgence, I am going back to what I

think is perhaps the best method for this kind of presentation, a formal text; and then, since I am going to be able to stay with you, we can take on the informal discussion a little bit later on perhaps more productively than if I attempted to read your minds and my own and talked all at the same time.

Administration in the Federal Government is a peculiar kind of topic, and you can do almost anything with it. That is why I have had so much fun here in past years. This morning I am going to try to take a different approach to it, and, if you find it unacceptable, all I can ask you to do is to wait and take me on a little bit later. So, with that, General Mundy, if I may, I will pitch into the middle of this thing.

Too often in recent years administration has been referred to as a science. The assertion has carried with it an assumption that administration is susceptible of scientific accuracy, and has reached the point of scientific maturity which requires that it be governed by fixed, unchanging rules. The thesis also asserts that in proper application administrative science will have no basic differences of method or result. I want, this morning, to advance an opposite point of view. I do not dispute the fact that science has served administration well in our day. In my judgment, however, administration is still an art and will remain an art. I think this view of administration is implicit in the word itself.

Administration, as you know, comes from two Latin words: ad-"in the direction of, or toward", and ministrare--"to serve." Service, in

any connotation, has never been governed by absolute abstractions or scientific rules which are equally applicable in all circumstances. Neither does administration have the concern of science with ends, or ultimate reasons. It has, on the contrary, always maintained the closest identity with means of getting the job done, and thus has followed the dictionary definition of an art as "the systematic application of knowledge or skill in effecting a desired result."

So much for semantics. If I may illustrate my own view by the oversimplification of stark contrast, I ask you to consider four examples in administrative history. Administration as practiced in ancient Rome, in the France of Louis XIV, in the Soviet Union, and in the United States presents vastly different concepts of service. They are more than differences in the structure and powers of government or the aptitudes of men to learn how to govern. And only in recent times has science entered into any of the concepts.

In the Roman republic, administration was a highly personal art, successful or the reverse, to the extent that the administrator was able to guess the popular will--hence the literal construction of the word. Administration was in the direction of serving, and it was not adorned with any of the scientific method. In the era of Louis XIV's belief that "L'état, c'est moi," administration was a cold, impersonal exploration of every means to enhance and solidify the power of the monarch. It was the crafty application of a political philosophy, and there was nothing

at all of science in it then. In the Soviet Union, administration, as such, should have no place at all, if the Marxist-Lenin ideal means anything. Every man will know his duty and do it. The state will "administer" itself. The excesses of administrative zeal shown by some Soviet officials may be artful in a strange and warped way, but they certainly are not governed by scientific rules. This dilemma presents just another evidence that communism still has a long way to go to iron out some of its most bitter and discouraging inconsistencies.

That brings us, then, to the United States. There is little dispute that this Republic was founded on the twin concepts of service and representation, so far as the role of government is concerned. (Of the purposes of government I shall speak in a moment.) To that extent we are closer to the Romans in our concept of administration, but we have institutionalized the art, and we have stripped it of the calculating despotism which led Rome from republic to empire, and which was equally a reason for leading France from empire to republic. We have, in the process, made administration a much more flexible art by training our administrators, thus giving over the assumption that enough of them will, by God's grace, appear when needed. We have also discovered how some scientific laws and much scientific methodology can be applied with good result to administration of government affairs. We have made administration a basic part of "social science." To give examples, we have greatly improved administration by adopting scientific methodology

for testing aptitudes of people to perform certain tasks. Similarly, we have made administration more effective by using scientific mechanization, by finding that applied psychology has uses beyond the laboratory, by developing and using administrative statistics, and by applying the statistical method of analysis to many problems of management. But I stress again: Science has been used exclusively to improve means.

Whatever mistakes we may have made along the way, we have adhered always to the belief that our institutions are a means to an end. Hence the management of them can be no more than that. We have also insisted that, for all its concern and success in clarifying natural laws, science and the scientific method have shortcomings when dealing with things of the spirit and with national ideals. Both science and the scientific method have had a prominent place in the American way of administration, and they have remained matters which require the artful combination of ability to do with ability to persuade, all stirred together with an array of constitutional checks and balances with which administration has had to live, and under which it has thrived greatly.

Cornell's great historian, the late Carl Becker, summed up this aspect of America as a nation in one of his lectures on "Freedom and Responsibility in the American Way of Life." If any of you were privileged to know Carl Becker, you will instantly recognize his favorite device of recounting successes of the past by pointing to needs of the

future. I quote.

"When all is said, what is needed for the solution of the difficult national and international problems that confront us, and therefore for the preservation of our institutions and of the liberties they were created to secure, is more intelligence, more integrity, and a heightened sense of responsibility. We need more intelligence--the knowledge required for understanding the situation and for dealing with it effectively. We need more integrity--less dishonesty and less of the feeling that, in private and in public life, our conscience is clear if we keep, with whatever slick maneuvering, within the letter of the law. But what we need most of all is a heightened sense of individual and collective responsibility--less insistence on negative rights and the unrestrained pursuit of individual self-interest, and a more united and resolute determination to concern ourselves with the public good and to make the sacrifices that are necessary for it.

"That is only to say that the preservation of our freedom depends less upon the precise nature of our constitutions and laws than it does upon the character of the people. . ."

When one says that preservation of freedom depends upon the character of the people, he is posing a challenge to successful administration that is very great.

Throughout our history we have moved, sometimes slowly and blindly, sometimes with great leaps taken in the power and light of

inspiration, toward the improvement of democratic institutions. We have been spurred on by belief that they needed improvement both as a means of governing and as a protection for the basic purpose of our Government just referred to--preservation of freedom of the individual and advancement of the public welfare. Considering the vagaries of human nature and the imperfections of any form of social organization, it is nothing short of miraculous that we stand where we do today, the undisputed leader of the free world, the most powerful advocate of representative democracy the world has ever seen. And we have got there because we believe as we do; because we have backed our beliefs with military, economic, and social efforts which are almost beyond understanding. We have also demonstrated greater success in administration than critics of our national policies would have us believe. In short, we have made democracy work by good management as well as by high and steadfast ideals.

Force of arms and constant pounding from the forging hammers of social and economic growth have moved things along, on the whole, much faster than we have learned how to manage them. At every step of the way there has been absolute necessity for improvement in administration, and we all know the truth of the old adage that necessity is the mother of invention. In our national development, administrative advance had to come in order that we might control our own creations. Even the most tolerant of democratic republics could stand just so much

inefficiency, waste, and disorder.

In his most recent novel, "The Young Titan," Van Wyck Brooks points out how the first real joint effort of the colonies--the successful expedition against Louisburg in 1745--was an exciting prophecy of the great power that was to come. At the same time his accurate descriptions of the errors in planning and executing the expedition make it evident that even elemental military or political or business administration was almost totally absent. We lucked it through, as we have so many other "first times" in our history. Fortunately, we have had sense enough not to turn our backs on luck as a teacher or to fail to recognize advances in administrative techniques whenever they have been discovered and applied. Ironically, when an administrative genius has appeared on the scene, his miracles have been so quickly accepted that he, himself, has often been forgotten--Col. Herman Haupt and his handling of rail transport in the Civil War, for example, or Harold Smith and the reorganization of the Federal Government before and during World War II.

Two additional major facts about our progress to maturity in administration stand out in relief. First, lessons learned from failure have been important in advancing administrative techniques. This may betoken an empiricism that is scientifically unacceptable, but it also epitomizes the constancy of change in the American way of life and our dogged refusal to be licked. This lesson is aptly illustrated by the promptness with which we recognized in 1942 that the war effort must be handled

by special war agencies--not by assignment of war functions to old-line agencies already burdened with adjusting their programs to wartime conditions.

Second, improvements in administration, including such things as mechanization, decentralization of authority, and quick recognition of Federal responsibility for regulation (radio, TV, and pipelines, for example) have added immeasurably to our capacity to make the most of the two major contributors to social and economic growth. These have been, and still are, in my judgment, rapid industrial development and even more rapid development of means of communication and movement. True, this very speed now makes it vastly more difficult to govern than it was 200 years ago, but at the same time skillful use of new administrative techniques has kept the difficulty under reasonable control.

As I indicated earlier, we have institutionalized our Government. Here again our action grew out of necessity. The vast expansion of Federal functions since 1929 permitted no other course. Just as rapidly as we have made decisions to do collectively, through the Federal Government, things which we used to do for ourselves (if we did them at all) we have had to forge new administrative tools to insure that the resulting effort was impartial and continuous in application, equitable in result, and quickly responsive to demonstrated need for change. Three illustrations will suffice: The concept of social security was made administratively feasible through the institution of old-age and survivors

insurance. Protection against the hazards of an uncertain employment market was made possible by the State-Federal device of unemployment compensation. Administrative formulas have been needed, and have been found, to insure success of any one of the Federal grant-in-aid programs (in fact in all of them)--whether it be large like that for constructing an interstate highway system or very small like that for the training of licensed practical nurses. Each program, once embarked on, has had to work. The public, and their representatives in Congress, and the special program constituency all have demanded that it work. If it has faltered at all, the blame immediately has been placed on poor administration. Even massive error in proper estimation of need has been overlooked as a cause of failure, as, for example, in continuing our farm price support program unchanged after World War II. Faulty administration has continually caught the criticism and has been assigned most of the blame for the surpluses that plague us. This kind of silly, but persistent, self-delusion has never yielded to the 'most brilliant administration. Perhaps that leaves us something to work at in the future. But it is no act of chance that administrators have pursued the goal of more effective administration with zeal and have hoped that it would turn out to be the common solvent for every governmental problem.

Of course I do not write down good administration. It has grown into a position of major importance in handling Federal affairs. As I

have already indicated, it can, and frequently does, work miracles of a minor sort, and it is a key to control of our complex, institutional Government. But its lasting success can be assured only when it is an adjunct of effective leadership, a sound plan of action, and the inspiration for a new try when failure overwhelms. None of these is the handmaiden of science in the pure sense; yet all of them become more artistic when making full use of scientific methods appropriate to the circumstances.

At this point I should acknowledge that I have attempted to paint with a broad and somewhat philosophical brush. I have tried to indicate why administration has grown and become ever more important in the Federal Government. If I have failed to leave a clear impression of what the background is, perhaps I can clear things up in the discussion sessions. The demands of time now require that I become more specific for the remainder of the lecture period. I have three more assigned subjects to discuss: Administration in relation to national security preparedness; administrative and management problems in relation to the enlarged tasks and responsibility of the Federal Government, which I have touched upon in the background discussion; and current and emerging problems and future trends in administration.

My discussion of what administration has and has not done in the field of national security preparedness also will be philosophical rather than historical, chiefly because I believe you already know the chronological

history of the National Security Act better than I do. For equally obvious reasons I shall leave out of the picture the tactical administration of troops, and planes, and ships, and missiles in the field and at home.

Some of the claims as to what would result, administratively, from enactment of the National Security Act seem a little ridiculous when viewed with the hindsight of 12 years. In the light of those original claims, one might have thought that intentions, words, and legislative history would assure self-execution and immediate success of all that the Act intended to accomplish. Of course, no such thing happened, as the tragic death of Secretary Forrestal proclaimed.

Unification of defense effort, to say nothing of its management, was not, is not, and will never be something which can be accomplished by decree, or by tidy and logical administration. National security is not just men in uniform and weapons. It concerns ideals and things of the spirit. It also encompasses missions that cannot always be consistent, and, more important, it cannot, in a democracy, always be given priority over everything else. The whole history of America's development of democratic institutions and our passionate and often blood-soaked defense of them and of the dignity and importance of the individual deny any possibility of defense concepts which are overriding and purely military, important though military power is in the whole. That, gentlemen, is why you are here.

Nevertheless, the importance of military-preparedness administration would not have been recognized without the Act. Until passage of the National Security Act we had tended to compartmentalize military administration and to define it pretty much in terms of estimates of the situation, tactical defense plans, and not very effectively coordinated logistics support, which was often almost tragically unrelated to the practical possibilities of our economy. The years since 1946 have brought into our whole concept of national security preparedness a requirement for bold, effective, and devoted administration, with the civilian-military team working together on every aspect of the problem, and with the services practicing unification wherever possible. We have come to recognize that the best equipped armed forces in the world, the most brilliant strategy, and the most successful tactical deployment and use of those forces would avail little if administration broke down. And that administration has cut across every aspect of our national life and economy, and almost every program of the Federal Government from agronomy to zoological research. It could do nothing else when it was responsible for spending more than 50 percent of our national budget.

Almost inevitably, any consideration of this subject leads to some intellectual throat-clearing of the variety we always describe with the cynical question, "Which comes first, the chicken or the egg?" Actually, for our purposes I don't believe it makes much difference. It is as true to say that one cannot administer without a plan as it is to say that one

cannot plan unless he has faith that the plan can and will be carried out successfully. Administration is needed whatever the sequence.

Perhaps the greatest handicap that both defense planners and defense administrators have had in the complex and rapidly changing world of the 20th century has been the undeniable need to act in order to meet not only the expected but the unforeseen and the unforeseeable. This need shows no signs of disappearing. It has been highlighted across the whole area of preparedness: Witness Sputnik, which some did expect; Suez, which was unforeseen; and the Korean War, which I stoutly maintain was unforeseeable. It is exactly in situations like these that good administration comes into its own as an art, and, increasingly, with the aid of science. Its presence assures that instinctive action has some chance of success and that a more considered plan and execution of plan will be promptly forthcoming. Its absence can only mean chaos and dismayed inefficiency.

Experience with the National Security Act also has led the way in reversing some administrative trends in agency and program management which grew up in the staff-dominated years of the depression. Two developments, I believe, are worthy of specific mention. First, in defense matters we recognize more and more that highly impersonal control of such matters as budgets, production schedules, and personnel will not work in such a way that preparedness is a verity rather than a hope. Controls must be integrated to the greatest extent possible with

planning and command responsibilities. This has had important repercussions far beyond the confines of the Pentagon.

Any budget must, of course, reflect a plan of action geared to policy decisions. The defense budget must mean phasing of production schedules with dollars. They must be kept in phase by administrative decisions taken by management itself--not just by decisions of staff advisers or even by those who make the contracts. And some of the decisions must be taken in far places and in departments and agencies which know nothing of military matters but do have responsibility for major segments of national policy and well-being. Similarly, there is no such thing as an automatic data computing judgment of men and women through whom defense preparedness must be attained. When the National Security Act was under consideration, the opposite was hoped for and was even forecast by some who thought history, tradition, uniforms, training, and the need for working to keep the civilian-military team operating would give way to the precepts of a statute. Personnel and budget management, they thought, could become a wholly scientific and detached exercise in unification. This did not turn out to be the case, and I must admit that some of the evidence to prove the fact borders as closely on insubordination as even our flexible democracy can stomach. At times the issue was more than disagreement between men of good will. I believe that those times are behind us, in the main, because we have learned once again that the machinery of the Act is

properly concerned with means, not with ends.

Because of the force of its words, I should like to quote from George F. Kennan's summation of the case against highly impersonal personnel controls. It is set forth in his stimulating article, "America's Administrative Response to Its World Problems." I have taken some liberties with this quotation in the sense that I have cut out some bits and pieces that did not seem pertinent. He says:

"There is no such thing as an abstract, objective evaluation of a human being, independent of the personality of the one who judges. The only definition of a man's worth that has reality is the image as seen by another man, and that image is a reflection of--and a reflection on--both of them.

". . .one cannot realistically depart from the human personality in its most intimate sense as the basis of selection and promotion and handling, generally, of personnel. To attempt to make this departure is to operate in a world of unrealities, dealing not with men themselves but with distorted shadows of them at the price of inefficient, wasteful use of their talents and sacrifice of that particular enthusiasm and devotion that come from the assurance that one's official fate is likely to be a reasonably faithful reflection of the quality of one's effort.

". . .It is also true that no personnel system can be properly operated, even in a moderately large organization, without some centralized system of record-keeping and without the invocation of some general

criteria designed to guard against the aberrations of the biased, unjust, or erratic superior. One cannot leave men exclusively to the mercy of the man they happen to work for at any given moment.

"But what is involved here is the question of the weight to be given to the various components of a personnel decision. It is my contention that the preponderant voice should always be that of a superior who knows the man personally, who has first-hand knowledge of his performance in his work, and who is interested in him as a human being--not that of remote, unseen individuals devoid of experience in the substantive aspects of the work of the man they are judging and protected by their anonymity from the real responsibility that resides in the shaping of the fate of individual employees of the government. So long as the latter system prevails, the premium for the individual employee will continue to lie not in boldness, not in individuality, not in imagination, but rather in the cultivation of that nice mixture of noncontroversialness and colorless semicompetence that corresponds most aptly to the various banal distinctions of which, alone, the business machine is capable."

With changes in a few figures of speech, a parallel indictment could be drawn of mechanistic budget controls, or any of the other kinds of staff functions. The importance of this type of analogy for American administration is the fact that we have rejected it, and to this extent we do not stand four-square/^{and}typical of the administrative effort of some of the other great countries. They have tended to become/^{too}scientific

in their administration.

The second development I wish to mention is more dramatic. The demands of national security preparedness have reversed administrative collectivism, which some thought the National Security Act had decreed. We now accept the sounder, and older, doctrine of individual authority and responsibility. The National Security Council has never been, and will never be, more than what the National Security Act says it is--an advisory body to the President. It cannot administer our defense program. Its character will not be changed by requiring it to meet at regular intervals or by adding statutory members, illusions which numerous persons at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue (not including Presidents Truman and Eisenhower) have found attractive from time to time.

Likewise, in defense policy execution the Secretary of Defense has got to be boss. No strategic directive and no committee ever bossed anything. I do not deny that some of the great figures of World War II and some scholars have tried to give another impression. The Secretary of Defense will receive directives from above and he will give orders to those below, but in either event they must be administered. He cannot leave interpretation and execution of those directives and orders to the clarity of their own language or to the diffuse responsibility of committees. Similarly, he cannot assume that the service secretaries need nothing but the direction or guidance of an order from him to bring about balance in our defense effort.

The National Security Act has fully demonstrated that its effective administration requires delegation outward and downward of authority to act, and that authority must be concentrated, not diffused. It goes without saying that where there is a delegation of authority to act there must also be a two-way willingness to assume responsibility for the delegation and for the resulting action. We have come a long way back from the precipice of assumption that logical organization and tidy management at the top will automatically produce a properly functioning machine. The need for leadership does not stop in the front office, and coordination, no matter how good, is no substitute for initiative, clear lines of authority, and a hardheaded willingness to hold action agencies and officers accountable for their success or failure, while at the same time accepting personal responsibility for delegations made to them.

In summary, administration of national security preparedness is not an impersonal thing which springs full-blown and effective from creation of the system, hatched, as it were, like an egg in an incubator. It must be worked at. It is an acquired skill, not an inherent virtue, and nowhere in government affairs has this been proven more dramatically. There has been one potentially discordant element, and it has slowed things down from time to time until we could be reassured that all was well. Our progress in administration has been geared throughout our history to the concept of making democratic institutions work better.

For the past 12 years, and to an extent never before even dreamed of, our defense effort could not be democratically organized. In every improvement of the National Security Act we have moved further in the direction of creating an organization capable of rapid and decisive action. This means automatically that we have moved in the direction of hierarchical organization and hierarchical discipline, with all of the threats and dangers inherent in putting instantaneous, technical efficiency ahead of everything else.

If taken literally, these developments would have suggested a rather terrifying administrative problem. They would have suggested that unification of the defense effort bade fair to create a threat to freedom, and to place in the hands of a few the means for a despotic and completely undemocratic exercise of vast power, including the power of atomic weapons.

Actually, I believe the problem is not as terrifying as it could have seemed at first glance, chiefly because we have accepted the thesis that I have tried to develop this morning--namely, that the administration of our national security preparedness program has been and will continue to be concerned with the means of creating and maintaining national security, not with how the power to achieve that end will be used.

I believe that our democracy is strong enough and sure enough of its own strength to continue to demand that all of its institutions remain merely instruments for the exercise of power which flows down from its

ultimate source, the people, through laws enacted by their elected representatives, and administered in the case of our national defense through the Commander-in-Chief. We know that he is the one elected representative of all the people. Further, in America we still speak of the "Armed Services," and that is a consoling and an accurate name.

Whenever we have had doubts we have dispelled them by conviction that the aggregate of individual exercise of statutory authority, whether vested in the civilian officers of the Department of Defense or in their peers in other departments who must share responsibility for defense preparedness, would be coordinated and controlled by responsible administration and constitutional restraints. The President, in whom all executive power is vested, could not demand or permit less. Of course, this has placed a staggering burden on the President and it demonstrates how rapidly national welfare demands the simultaneous exercise of all of the President's many roles--executive, chief magistrate, commander-in-chief, arbiter of foreign relations, political leader, and legislative leader. Despite all of our needs for what may appear to be undemocratic administration in the several parts of our defense establishment, the whole remains essentially democratic in result--the product of representative government and the processes of democratic consultation and popular deliberation. If we ever permit our Government to fail in this respect, or if the elected head of the people ever is false to his responsibility to them, our Constitution, our way of life, and our need for a coordinated

defense program will already have disappeared.

This discussion of administration in national security preparedness, and the general background which I attempted to draw at the beginning of the hour, have pointed fingers at both of the remaining topics assigned to me. At the same time, it has tossed facets of them about with little regard for their own logical and rounded development. For this I do not, at least at the moment, apologize. My purpose has been to illustrate the general nature of the administrative and management problem which we must face in relation to the major tasks and responsibilities of the Federal Government. To a lesser extent I have suggested, or left room for you to infer, what some of the current and emerging problems may be. We can discuss them informally in a few minutes. I have, however, said little or nothing about future trends in administration as I see them.

It seems inevitable to me that government will become more institutionalized because it has no choice except to become more complex. We may not want it that way, but world problems show no signs of abating in gravity or number; needs of a rapidly growing population at home will require more, not less, public activity; interdependence of men and their joint activities in our political, social, and economic life can only be enhanced by modern technology. In the face of what to me are inescapable conclusions, I see nothing in the administrative future which deserves more attention than the need for more and better trained administrators. Let me emphasize the words better trained. They must be better trained not only in the techniques of management of government

affairs but they must also be trained at successive steps throughout their careers in the ideals and basic values of representative democracy, and the history of democratic institutions. By no other means can we give our administrators of the future a sound basis for measuring their own success and for sitting in judgment on the doings and achievements of other forms of government. This requirement goes as much for political administrators as it does for career administrators, and I include all military officers in the career administrator group. We cannot afford to take belief in our institutions for granted any more than we can take for granted innate ability to administer them. Both must be taught and retaught. The day is long past when the American people can subscribe to Andrew Jackson's simple, but even then hardly accurate, pronouncement that the duties of all public officers "are so plain and simple that men of intelligence may readily qualify themselves for their performance."

Aside from providing more continuous and better training for administrators, we should also consider how we can better organize and conduct the highly specialized programs which grow from the complex scientific technology of our age. The Government must get and keep its share of scientists, but it cannot do so by artificial devices. Personally, I do not believe that the answer is to be found in such obvious gimmicks as a department of science or further separation of engineers, or doctors of medicine, or physicists from the normal processes of government

conducted in the normal way by people who, for the most part, will not be engineers, doctors of medicine, or physicists.

Basically, we need wider recognition that the scientist has different motivations and seeks different rewards from other people. He wants and needs a maximum of freedom and a minimum of policy dicta expressed in statute or organizational directives. His challenge is the unknown, and in that respect he is much like the pioneer in his drive to look and go beyond the next river or range of mountains. Like the pioneer, also, he may or may not want the company and support of others in his venture. This is hard on administrators, but they must recognize it and live with it. Administration should not be concerned with the what and the how of the scientist's activity but with being sure that the result is put to proper, prompt, and effective use. This is a new side to administration in our day and it poses some intensely interesting questions for future administrators.

Another problem with strong foreshadows of future difficulty is a redefinition (always an administrative job) of the respective roles of political and career executives. Very slowly we are learning that the traditional blacks and whites of partisan politics are often not sustainable in the complex life of our times. Nevertheless, a peculiar kind of lag in our political culture makes us believe that mere acceptance of political appointment in any Federal agency makes a man a politician in the primary sense of that word. We tend to forget that the political

executive of today much more often than not has had little to do with practical politics, and he is seldom a job seeker. He is primarily a businessman, or a professional man, or a scientist, or even a college professor. He has commitments to other ways of life; he serves his Government out of a sense of duty; and he does not want to stay so long that he loses contact with the work from which he came. He may advocate the principles and aims espoused by the party of which he is a member, or he may be relatively indifferent to them. But he is not a trained politician and this fact often gives him a bad time with trained politicians who resent both the label he wears and his lack of concern with partisan political matters. As the President's representative in an executive job, the political appointee must try to be the defender and developer of policies consistent with those of his President and of his party. Having done that, he often feels free to ask for his release in a year or slightly more.

This rapid turnover in political executives poses very real problems of continuity and administration. Not the least of them are the two most obvious: (1) no two men are alike, hence frequent changes in leadership create disruptions in leadership out of proportion to the ability of the two men involved in each change; (2) program management in day-to-day operations must be continuous, hence an acceptable means of providing continuity must be found in the career staff. This means that each political executive must either know how or must be quickly taught how to use

the people in his organization. The system must provide him with assurance that he can rely on the ability, the integrity, and the objectivity of the career staff under him. There is neither time nor room for long periods of suspicion, testing, and making do with temporary expedients. We must learn how to organize and run our programs so that any new political executive can be quickly acclimated and, so to speak, learn to hit the ground running.

This means that career people cannot be divorced completely from either policy formulation or policy execution. It means that we must find effective administrative means of separating the politics of party from the politics of policy. The more complex our Government and the more pervasive its programs, the more we will have to rely upon career executives to be the program managers and the staff advisers. This means that these career people cannot be devoid of program and policy commitments, but in the exercise of them they must be as flexible, as loyal, and as persevering under change in leadership as a military commander is. In short, we must carefully redefine the respective roles of both political and career officers in government, and we must train each to the fullest fulfillment of his assigned role. So far as the career administrator is concerned, this means administrative concern with the problems of career planning in the way in which you in the military have tackled it and we in the civilian have lagged. We need successive kinds of training to back up the planning. And most of all we need a civilian

staff college to prepare our most senior executives to do their jobs.

We need to learn more about and profit by the lessons which you have learned in the development of a staff-college system in the Armed Forces.

Finally, I should like to catalog just six more administrative improvements that hopefully the near future will bring. They are: (1) A new, rationalized, consistent, and flexible system of salary administration to replace the hodgepodge of over 200 salary laws now on the books; (2) an improved system of employer-employee relationships which will include a basis for evaluation of performance and potential in much greater scientific precision than now exists; (3) establishment of a system which will insure a regular and substantial annual intake of promising young people from college graduating classes, and with the agencies authorized to make firm commitments during the competitive recruiting period which falls in the four months prior to graduation; (4) further return of top executives into responsibility for and concern about the staff products designed to make their jobs easier, including budget, personnel management, records, management-improvement programs, accounting, and training; (5) authorization of funds for a longer period than one fiscal year, in order to give needed stability to numerous government programs in the administration of which efficiency and economy suffer from rapid changes in appropriations levels; (6) development of adequate means for periodic reexamination of national goals, with particular attention to the ever-growing power in our political system of interest groups of all kinds.

The art of administration has grown strong and certain of its strength under the American system of government. It has resisted efforts to turn it into a scientific monstrosity, devoid of feeling, impartial in the horizontal application of administrative norms, and ruthlessly destructive of the most important contribution to political philosophy of our system--belief in the dignity and worth of the individual. Our time as administrators has not yet ended. Let us be sure that we remain true to the heritage bequeathed to us.

Thank you, very much.

DR. KRESS: Gentlemen, our speaker is ready for your questions.

QUESTION: In your list of six items there at the end, where things can be done to improve the civil service, one of them was an improved and new method for rating personnel and establishing the record which would mean something. You also quoted Mr. Kennan in the study of administration, and he pointed out that the impression one person has of another is a reflection on both people. The present system, where almost everyone in the civil service gets an automatic "satisfactory," certainly doesn't show this. I would be interested in having a little more information on what is in the cards to improve the rating system.

MR. JONES: Well, sometimes you have to kind of tear things down, Captain, before you can improve them. You will note that what I said was that we should have an improved system of employer-employee relationships which will include a basis for evaluation of performance

and potential and much greater scientific precision than now exists.

What I personally have in mind--and I don't know how long it will take to get a lot of people to agree with me and perhaps get even the Congress to agree with me--is that I think that all the things that we now take for granted in the military side of our Government as being part of personnel management will have to be fitted into the civilian side of the picture, and that these are basically all parts of an employer-employee relationship system--labor relations, if you want to call it that, in the broader sense of the term. But we have tended to compartmentalize. Personnel management, we say, means simply those things that have to do with how you hire people, how you promote them, and how you fire them. We have left out of the picture very largely, until recent years, the important elements of incentives, awards, and discipline. We have this, to me, utterly useless system which defeats itself of saying that a man, at least a civilian, is rated under one of three adjective ratings--outstanding, in which event you have to sit down and justify your rating with an extended discussion of why he is outstanding; unsatisfactory, which almost automatically subjects him to certain sanctions, and which again must be backed up by your putting your judgment on the line in written terms; or satisfactory. Now, these were bad enough when they first came along, but they got even worse when the incentives-award system anticipated and, actually, in most agencies, did carry forward with a scheme under which, if you got an outstanding rating, you

automatically were eligible for and usually got a cash award of some sort, or a pat on the back, or a citation; and if you got an unsatisfactory rating, if you didn't get fired you ended up getting demoted. This has meant, of course, that you have applied the great common denominator of satisfactory. What does it mean? It means nothing. I have made out efficiency ratings of that sort, and so have some of the rest of you.

What are you doing? You take a sheet of paper and go through it and write the word "satisfactory" and initial it just as fast as you can do it.

What I have in mind is this: that we will develop more specific information about the basic duties content of every job; that we will assign nouns to what that duties content is; and that we will then, in the process of discussion, in the process of proper supervision, in the process of training, and in the process of career planning, relate each individual, particularly those who are marked for major administrative jobs, as time goes on, against that kind of element; and that with our mechanical people--the clerical folk, stenographers, investigators, accounting clerks and folk of that sort, including card-punch operators and so on--we will get much more objective measurement of both quantity of performance and quality of performance than we now have.

Actually, except in those rare instances where you keep very close tabs on the individual, which has been done with very excellent results in some of our bureaus--I see, for example that the Director of the Census is with us this morning--his bureau has done some very remarkable work

in measuring not only the aptitude of individuals for highly specialized mechanical jobs, but to correlate productivity with quality--all of these things, if they are brought together under the overall tent of ^{the} labor-management relations type of program, I think will improve the situation very much. We have asked for the introduction of legislation to repeal this present efficiency rating law for civilians, and I hope we will get a substitute law.

QUESTION: The use of the industrial fund concept of management tool in administration appears to be growing. I wonder if you would comment on the use of it in the administration of national defense.

MR. JONES: I am afraid, Captain, that I am just, plain incompetent to do that. I've got some impressions about it, but so much has happened to the industrial fund concept since I have had any personal contact with it that I don't want to seem to evade the issue but I just don't think I am up to date enough so that I could give you a reasonable answer. I would say this: I think very considerable improvements have been made from the administrative point of view. The first concept of the industrial fund was the very thing that I have been inveighing against here this morning--horizontal application of a system without regard to whether it works in certain situations. I think many of the rough edges have been abraded off. That's what I have been told by my accounting friends. If I may duck being more specific than that, I will do so, because I am just not well enough advised.

QUESTION: Sir, you mentioned the need for funds to be appropriated for more than one year at a time. I notice that the Draper Committee has made exactly that same recommendation to the President--the five-year plan. Do you think, sir, that Congress will ever go along with that sort of thing that you are talking about?

MR. JONES: When you put in the word "ever," that gives me an out. Yes, I think it will in time, but I think we are going to have to sneak up on it, so to speak, by getting the multiple-year appropriation first for certain kinds of things where there isn't a great deal of change in program level regardless of what happens, where your expenditures are more or less mandatory. Then I think, next, you are going to have to move into the administrative appropriations area; and finally, I think, we are going to come in time to a capacity to define programs aims and ends in such a way that, with Congressional review of reports of stewardship, given in a heck of a lot greater detail than we now give them, and probably actually reviewed in hearings of the Appropriations Committee, you will be able to stick to the main line.

Now I realize this skirts on something which just gives me the administrative horrors, namely the possibility of the Executive Branch proposing what amounts to a legislative veto--a Constitution issue about which I probably feel as strongly as anybody in this town, because, as you know, for better than nine years, I sat as Assistant Director for Legislative Reference of the Budget Bureau, and had to develop every known reflex

that a man could develop to protect the Executive Branch and the President from legislative veto of one sort or another. You in the military have got to live with these more than anybody else, and I hope we will get rid of all of them in time.

But, nevertheless, be that as it may, I do think that we are going to have to find a tidier method of handling appropriations than we now have. And members of the Appropriations Committee very definitely agree on this, although they also very definitely say, "Well, when we are sure that collectively we all agree, we'll move." We've got some impediments to it. There is the Constitutional barrier, of course, to appropriations for the Army. We've got around that in the past by the device of giving contract authority. And I am not talking just about preparing programs for a new type of, say, a third phase of missile, or something of the sort, that you've obviously got to look out ahead 5 or 6 years for. I am talking about the normal kinds of things that we do where the whole darn thing is so delicately interwoven with a good many other things that it just comes apart at the seams if, at the end of 12 months, all of a sudden, you pull the props, or even 10 percent of the program, out from under it because of an appropriation difficulty.

Now, gentlemen, I say this a little critically, but I say it to you as also representatives of the Executive Branch. We've got to find means for getting better understanding by the Members of Congress for what these programs are. I am a great believer in our democratic system of

checks and balances, and I am not at all sure that we have done all that we should to improve our means of communication with the Congress in such a way that they know what our aims and purposes are, that they know not only what our program goals are but how we are going to get there, because this is a two-way street. We've got to get Congressional confidence as we move along. I think we can get it if we are responsible. We have had too much of the almost arbitrary and whimsical kind of cut-off of appropriations because somebody got himself into a row with a given member of Congress who was an important figure either on the substantive or the appropriations committee. And the men who have been responsible for that at the other end of the Avenue from time to time have been the first ones to admit that the system should be better so that they wouldn't feel that they had been put on the spot and had to flare back at us this way.

I didn't mean to make a speech, but you got me started on something I am deeply interested in.

QUESTION: Mr. Jones, could you give us an idea of the feasibility of establishing permanent secretariats or under secretariats in our government system, for the purpose of continuity at the top level?

MR. JONES: Yes, I can. This is a two-edge sword, too. Supposedly, we have now permanent assistant secretaries at the administrative level. We have them in most of the departments. The device has worked out pretty well, but it was certainly subjected to all kinds of suspicion and

even hostility at the change of administrations in 1953. I don't think, myself, that we should look to the British system of permanent under secretariats, because I think they grow out of a different system of governing. Remember, under the parliamentary system, the ministers are, all of them, members of the then sitting government. They are all representatives of the elected branch of the government, the legislative branch. This puts them in a very different situation in terms of continuity from anything that we have in our system, where, all other factors being equal, it can be assumed that when a President picks his Cabinet that Cabinet should expect to stick around for the four years for which he was elected. A parliamentary government can fall at any time on a vote of confidence. Our Government doesn't. Therefore, you have a greater need, perhaps, for that kind of continuity in a parliamentary system. But I would say this: that, as our programs become more complex--and you will recall that I believe very honestly that they are going to--we are going to have something at the top of every department which is as completely objective in its approach to the problem as it can possibly be and which has the function of supplying, for every new political executive, as sterile and antiseptic and objective an evaluation of what he has got to do as you can get. Now, I don't know what you are going to call this thing. Maybe it will be a secretariat; maybe it will have some of the aspects of a permanent under secretaryship. I don't know. But we are going to have to have something of the sort, because we just can't afford

to go on the basis of having everything appear to grind to a halt every time we get a change at the top.

That is not a very complete answer, but momentarily it will have to do.

QUESTION: Mr. Jones, a previous speaker explained to us about interest groups and pressure groups and their relations with the Congress. I wonder if you could tell us something about the effectiveness of these groups on the administrators and the executives.

MR. JONES: We don't know enough about it yet, except in some isolated instances, to be entirely sure. Whether Operations Research, as a new and developing tool of management, is going to give us this, I am not sure, Captain, but I do know this: that these interest groups are a part of the mature democracy that we have developed in this country, and, in the Executive Branch, we have become almost too callous to their existence, and, in my judgment, almost too willing to pass the buck to the Congress by saying, "This is your problem, Legislative Branch; you make national policy; we are not going to talk to these guys."

Now, at two ends of a very broad spectrum, let me illustrate. When I was in the Bureau of the Budget, responsible for legislative programs, I almost never had a national interest group wanting to come in and tell their story to the Bureau of the Budget. They wanted to wait until they got before Congress. In contradistinction, at the other end of the spectrum, the small, really special pleader interest group

was forever in the world wanting to come in. Now, how would I distinguish between the two? In the same way that we do on any other basis. The National Association of Manufacturers per se didn't particularly want to come to the Budget Bureau, but the Chamber of Commerce of some place in Pennsylvania or a Connecticut manufacturers association did want to come in and put in a special pleader for some part of legislation that would particularly affect Pennsylvania or would particularly affect Connecticut.

You can lose your perspective pretty quickly if you let this happen, and you can't ever be quite sure just how far they, being a part of a larger organization, represent the views of the large organization. That's one kind of problem.

The second kind of problem grows out of the growing so-called professionalism, which I think is a misnomer, of many of these groups. They proclaim a vast objectivity about things which in the very nature of their charters and in the very nature of the source of the salaries of the people who are doing the work can't be objective. They've got to be pleading for special consideration for their particular interest.

These interests I think the Executive Branch is going to have to learn more about. We are going to have to do a vastly more competent job of reading what kind of testimony is given to the Congress. In time I think we are going to certainly not have joint hearings but I believe we are going to do what increasingly the Federal agencies do now when

matters of concern to them on the administrative front are being presented for changes in legislation or for new legislation--we are going to have to have people sitting at the hearings to know what these points of view are.

The only suggestion I would make that we do in advance of that is that we take the initiative in the Executive Branch to make contact with these people and find out what it is that's bothering them, what kinds of things they want, what things they are entitled to, why they think the way they do, whom they represent, how important it is, what the other side of the coin is.

Now, on the business front, increasingly the Government, operating through the very admirable device of the Business Advisory Council of the Department of Commerce, is beginning to do this. The Budget Bureau has an outside advisory group on Federal questionnaires. We in the Civil Service Commission increasingly are keeping track of the thinking in the insurance world on things like health insurance and life insurance, and so on. More of this needs to be done, and I think it will be done.

You can do this without becoming the advocate of any particular point of view, I believe, remembering always that there are some people who, by statute, are required to take a given point of view. The Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of Agriculture, and, to a lesser extent, the Secretary of the Interior all have a very definite

program constituency and a very definite set of statutes which require that they take very closely into account the views of the broad-interest groups in their fields. But the rest of us can be a little bit more objective about it.

I am running beyond the time, Dr. Kress. You guys tripped the trigger of my tongue, and I don't watch the clock too closely. I am sorry.

DR. KRESS: Thank you very much, Mr. Jones. You have given us a very interesting combination of the philosophy of administration and its practical aspects. On behalf of the faculty and the students, thank you for a very fine discussion.