

CHINESE AND RUSSIAN STRATEGIC CONCEPTS

8 September 1959

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Publication No. L60-17

INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

Washington, D. C.

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8 September 1959

COLONEL SMITH: General Houseman, Fellow Students: Over 2,000 years ago the Chinese philosopher Sun Tsu wrote a book. His book was entitled "The Art of War." Incidentally, this book is the oldest military treatise that we know of. In it, Sun Tsu made the following observation: "If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the results of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat."

Today the struggle is too costly and the stakes are too high to run the risk of winning a scant 50 percent of our battles. We must insure a far higher percentage of wins if we are to insure the continued enjoyment of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. It is therefore imperative that we have a clear-cut understanding, first, of Communist goals; and, second, of the strategic means which they intend to use in furtherance of their objectives.

I am convinced that every thinking American is currently fully aware that international communism has set its sights upon global domination. But I am not at all sure that we as Americans are cognizant of the strategic principles which have been evolved by the Red rulers of Russia and China.

There are at least three reasons for the murkiness which I think beclouds our vision. First of all, Americans are in many respects provincially minded; and we tend to ignore cultural patterns which are foreign to our own. Secondly, I believe that Americans naively interpret the human race in terms of our own image; and we view the actions of others through American eyes, in terms of what we would consider to be a normal response. And, finally, we are just naturally congenital optimists. We are convinced that right inevitably triumphs over wrong, and that Prince Charming will marry the beautiful princess and they will live happily ever after. We believe that the seeds of the destruction of communism are in the system today, and that those seeds will work in our favor.

Now, these are three major obstacles or stumbling blocks which hinder us from discharging the full measure of our responsibility for

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world leadership. Unless we can objectively face the challenge of things as they are, our civilization will go the way and join the ranks of such sad ghosts of history as Assyria, Babylonia, Greece, and Rome. Each of these civilizations, in turn, failed miserably to see the major challenge of the world of its day.

I am sure that the recent lecture by Dr. Penniman, given you last Wednesday, is still fresh in your minds. In it, you will recall that he described communism as basically a belief system, with political dogmas just as rigid as those found in any of the most demanding religions. He said that a strong adherence to historical inevitability and the conviction that eventual victory permeated the thinking and the leadership and the party elites in Russia and China. And he also mentioned the fact that in the two systems people are only ciphers in the Communist power equation.

With a view toward expanding some of the points made by Dr. Penniman, I think that we should consider several other factors which broadly characterize basic Communist thinking. First, the Communist philosophy is both militant and military. From the earliest invitation to the workers of the world to cast off their chains because they had nothing else to lose, communism has underscored the fact that party militancy can give a jog to the processes of history. Struggle and conflict are implicit obligations to those who march under the banners of Karl Marx. A continual revolution is, according to them, occurring daily; and it will not end until the achievement of one world is accomplished under Communist dictatorship. That the system is military can easily be seen by the many prolific references to, and the use of military terms, in their literature--such words as "front," "reserve forces," "phalanx," "shock troops" and allusions to writers in the Soviet system as "warriors of the pen."

Now, underlying the whole Communist thinking is an awareness of continuing struggle. Von Clausewitz, in spite of Stalin's denial, has made a significant impression on Communist thinking, particularly in Russia. Von Clausewitz' statement that war is a continuation of politics by other means has been given a new meaning by Communist leaders, who see politics as a continuation of war. Accordingly, Communists do not recognize distinct periods of war separated by periods of peace; but they view world events as one unending struggle. Thus, to orthodox Communists any separate identification of war and peace is only a fictitious belief found in the diseased minds of the capitalist bourgeois. True Communists identify every stage of living

with conflict and are dedicated to exploit every situation to its maximum potential.

Now, as a corollary of this belief, Communists everywhere subscribe to the principle that the advancement of party interest, eventually culminating in global victory, justifies the adoption of any tactic. No Communist suffers from social or moral inhibitions. An adherence to Marquis of Queensberry rules or to any moralistic code is decried by Communists as a weakness characterizing the bourgeois intelligentsia.

Next, world communism today has an organizational apparatus which reaches into even the most remote portions of the globe. The organizations are diversified in terms of activities to include espionage, sabotage, political subversion, fronts, promotional groups, and a myriad of other special missions. Elaborate communication nets link all these field organizations to Moscow and to Peking. You will note that I have included Peking because I am convinced that today Peking has its own independent apparatus and operational teams in the field.

Communists, while adhering to the discipline of the party, and wholeheartedly agreed on the inevitability of the final victory, are realistic. They are fully aware that you can't consistently bat 1,000, and are only anxious to win most of the time. Lenin expressed this attitude quite well when he said, to paraphrase his words: "We should be content to advance two steps forward and one step to the rear if necessary." This illustrates the dominant principle in Communist philosophy of the ebb and the flow. The advances are forward during the period of flow; in times of ebb one step backward is taken if necessary. This Communist waltz has frequently characterized much of Soviet diplomacy and strategy in the years which have passed.

Now, gentlemen, I am convinced that both Russian and Chinese strategic concepts should be studied in the light of their historical and cultural setting. I know that most speakers prefer to merely categorize the tenets of communism in terms of strategic principles. I shall give you strategic principles this morning, but I feel it is necessary for us to understand not only the bare bones of the system, but the cultures and the life blood by which these systems live. And although I must admit that I am tempted as a historian to discuss this subject at length and in great detail, I will restrain my natural instincts and only touch lightly on the historical and cultural background of Communist strategic thinking, with some general observations on the subject.

There are many people who feel that communism today is a sterile philosophy in terms of the teachings of Karl Marx and in Leninism and Stalinism and now Máoism. I do not share this belief. There are those who think that the Communists, because of their system, are divorced from the cultural settings both of their own country and the rest of the world. Someone has stated that the Communists are men without a navel, who just grew up like Topsy and have nothing in terms of allegiance to their past culture and history. However, I believe that the Russian Communist reacts in many instances like a Russian, and the same may be said of the Chinese.

Now, if you will note, Russia, which is a part of the European continent, has never been a part of the European community. From earliest times Russia was culturally divorced from the stimulus of the great Renaissance movement which so profoundly influenced Western Europe. Russia did not have an Age of Chivalry and did not share the common cultural experiences which are intrinsic to our background. She was physically on the European Continent, but she was culturally not a part of it. Russia did not have an Iron Curtain until Churchill gave it the designation a few years ago in Missouri, but all during Russian history you have had a sense of apartness as far as the Russian people were concerned.

This mysticism, this blanket of mystery, which separated Russia culturally and almost physically from the rest of Europe was recognized by writers from Western Europe frequently and although Russia has never been conquered by any of her European neighbors, she has frequently been humiliated and has suffered defeats by the Swedes, by the French, and by her neighbors living beyond the steppes. Furthermore, Russia did, for a period of 250 years, experience the domination of the cruel Tarter clans. There is much today in Russian culture which is reminiscent of the Asiatics, both linguistically and, I believe, in some of the thought processes which characterize Russians of today. Napoleon was not an anthropologist, but he once made the observation, "If you scratch a Russian, you will find a Tartar."

Russia during her early history developed a period of feudalism which did not end until 1861. The Russian population accepted the concept of slavery and there was a willingness to follow the leader, whether it was a tsar or the nobles of that period.

Russians developed certain attitudes toward life, characterized by strong feelings of cruelty, which may, in part, derive from living

on the lonely Russian steppes and enduring the long lonely cold winters. Russia has in her literature and in her music an element of pathos, an air of mysticism, and a sense of beauty. Russia is therefore culturally in her history, a nation of contradictions.

I don't believe that the current strategy, which is our main interest today, can properly be understood or appreciated without at least a backward glance over our shoulders at the stages of early Communist strategy, which started with Lenin, moved on to Stalin, and now is in the hands of Khrushchev.

Lenin, when the Russian Revolution was a fait accompli, was filled with the exuberance of a Russian revolutionary who wished that the revolutionary experience of Russia could be shared and enjoyed by Russia's neighbors. His enthusiasm caused him in the first flush of victory to express the feeling that Russia should give help to revolutions outside of Russia's borders. Germany was stimulated toward a revolution in 1923 which was abortive in its results. Russia also tried to incite revolution in Poland which, too, was doomed to failure. But this first period which saw the strategy of revolution being carried outward from Mother Russia ended with Lenin's death in 1924.

And under Stalin you had a complete reversal of strategy. Stalin felt that the true role of Mother Russia was not to carry revolution outside of her borders, but to consolidate the strength of the only country which had founded a socialist base in the world, namely, the conservation of the strength and the building up of the power of the Soviet Union itself. While Stalin was sympathetic to the starting of revolutions outside of Russia, he felt that Russia needed several decades to build up its strength and to develop an army which would give effective defense to the Soviet Union.

I might reemphasize a point in parentheses that I made earlier, namely that the Russian Communist theory is both militant and military. It is very significant that Stalin and Mao in China today are both imbued with the idea that statescraft strategy and military strategy are one and the same in terms of identification.

Stalin, during all of World War II kept on his night table the three volumes published by Boris Shaposhnikov, "The Russian Army." This work is a weak dilution of Clausewitz' writings but it pretends to be a valid Russian expression of new ideas in the field of military theory and strategy. The Communists belabor the point that, in the bourgeois

world, there is a dichotomy between strategy in the political field and strategy in the military field. Professional Communists do not feel that this separation and identification is justifiable.

Stalin, particularly during the early years of his regime, did everything possible to avoid involvement of the Soviet Union in outside wars--"adventuristic conflicts," as he called them. In fact, in 1925 he made a statement which I think is quite significant of his strategy. Incidentally, this statement of his was not found until 1947, when it was discovered in a review of some archival material. Stalin said in 1925: "If war should break, we shall have to come out; but if we do, we must be the last to come out, and we should come out to throw the decisive weight on the scales, the weight that should tilt the scales in our favor."

This attitude of the use of military forces by Stalin was very typical of his strategy. Actually Stalin would, if it had not been for the premature German attack on Russia, have waited longer before entering World War II than he did, because it was the Russian strategic concept which, quoting an old Chinese proverb says: "If you are attacked by two tigers, get them fighting among themselves. Once the tigers have torn themselves apart and weakened themselves, then a man can cope with two tigers if necessary."

One of the most characteristic features of the Soviet strategic system is an intensive evaluation of enemy potentialities, and his capabilities as compared to Soviet strengths and weaknesses. Every diplomatic move on the part of Soviet statesmen is carefully weighed in terms of its appropriateness in time and space.

There is one aspect of Russian strategy which I think is tremendously interesting and is still in keeping with the character of the Soviet people. It's the strategy of area analysis--looking at an area in terms of its total resources--its strengths, its weaknesses, its vulnerabilities. Now, I feel that many times we, in our military intelligence appraisals and possibly in the approach which the State Department uses, have a tendency to adopt the country-by-country approach. The Soviets have, and possibly because of the influence exerted by German geopoliticians (of whom Dr. Clem spoke during the last hour) developed an attitude of looking at an entire region and assessing its overall strengths and its weaknesses and its values. This is very much the way that an experienced chess player goes about winning a game of chess against an amateur. The professional looks at the entire board and moves his

pieces in conjunction with pieces on the other side of the board and eventually brings about a checkmate much to the embarrassment of his amateur opponent, who has been playing the game, as I do, piece by piece and move by move.

Let's turn back the pages of history for just 39 years. Gentlemen, on the 8th of September, 1920, a conference was held in Baku, on the Caspian Sea. Attending that conference were 1,200 delegates from all of the principal countries of Asia, and with representatives of tribes living in remote areas. The purpose of the conference, which lasted a week, was to indoctrinate the advance cadres of Asiatics who it was hoped, would go back to their countries and carry the message, the gospel of Karl Marx with them.

At the opening session, Zinoviev, one of the early leaders of the Comintern, addressed these 1,200 Asian and said: "Gentlemen, the Communist Revolution will not have achieved its goal until the 800 million people in Asia rise up in flames and throw off the chains of their colonial masters."

In 1922 the Soviet Union established in Moscow a school, which was first called "University of the Toiling Masses of the World." And to this school came selected men and women from Asia. The sixth graduating class in 1928 numbered among its alumni such famous names as Lance Sharkey, from Australia; Earl Browder, of the United States; Nozaki, from Japan; Thorez from France, to mention just a few. Later graduates, of whom Ho Chi-Minh is a notable example, were to achieve notoriety as leaders of anti-Colonial revolutions with Communist sponsorship.

The Communists have a goal which they recognize clearly and a conviction that time is on their side. Leo Cherne, in talking to this group last year, made what I think is a rather significant statement. He said: "The Communist timetable is from now until eventual victory, and we are living within the time cycle of our budget year, fiscal year."

The work which was started at the Baku Convention of 1920, was a recognition on the part of Russian strategists that some of the adventurism which Lenin had advocated in Europe was going stale; and that the Communist cause could be advanced best by breaking the hold which European nations had on dependencies which they owned or controlled in the Far East.

In 1923 Stalin made the point that the road to Paris lies thru Peking and Calcutta. Lenin himself felt that the Far East was a key to the eventual breaking of the back of Western powers, because Communist strategy has always felt that Western capitalism drew raw materials and resources from the Far East, which gave it, according to Communist ideas, a very inflated value in terms of strength. If the Far East could be wrenched away from the control of the Western World, the Russians felt that this would be a very, very important thing to do.

Now, what are some of the Communist theories in regard to the present strategies which they hold today? There are many people who believe that Khrushchev has opened up a new phase of Communist strategy. I think possibly that they are right in terms of the special stress which Khrushchev is giving to certain traditional aspects of Communist strategy. There is no doubt, I am sure, in your minds, and none in mine that the Communist goal is still the same; that they have their eye on that ball, which, of course, is ultimate global domination.

When Khrushchev came to power, he denounced Stalin, partly to erase in the minds of Russian youth and certain of the satellites the old fear and hatred of some of the more terroristic practices which Stalin had been identified with. It's very significant too that Mao Tse-tung did not join in this wholesale denunciation of Stalin. I have often wondered about it. I feel that Mao Tse-tung himself believed that it would be dangerous and really heretical to damn a fellow dictator even though Mao and Stalin were never close friends, because psychologically, if the image of the godhead is attacked, then all dictators are insecure. I feel that this explains, at least partially, why Mao was unable to repudiate Stalin. I also think that perhaps Mao wanted to demonstrate to the Russians that he was not a puppet of Russian diplomacy and strategy, and that he would take his own sweet time in singing the tune which Moscow was playing under Khrushchev's direction, which was condemnation of the old leader Stalin.

Soviet strategy up until recent months has been characterized, I think, by an attitude of alternate roughness and sweetness and light. I think that the Russian attitude in recent years has been something like this: They tend to speak roughly and gruffly until someone carries a bigger stick than they like to contemplate. Then they tend to change their tune to sweet reasonableness.

I believe that the Russians have, in recent years, particularly under Khrushchev, stressed more and more the desire to use the strategic

tactic of negotiation. Actually, I made a check and I found that for the years from 1932 to 1950 the United States and Russia (before Khrushchev came on the scene) had held some 3,400 meetings on questions of various types; had expended 106 million words of official text in these negotiations. Negotiations are something which the Russians use as a strategy; and one of the things which the Russians, really, I think, enjoy is wearing American negotiators down. We keep telling them, if not in words, at least by implication, that "time is money so let's get on with it." I think the Russians in their strategy of negotiation have played upon our natural impatience and have deliberately dragged negotiations on interminably.

We, on our part are inclined to feel that perhaps at the end of the rainbow, when negotiations are finally completed, we might have a concession from the Russians. But the Russians do not really intend to make concessions. They just enjoy negotiating.

One of the most famous statements which Stalin loved to make was as follows: (I frequently think of it whenever the subject of negotiation with the Communists is broached) "Sincere diplomacy is no more possible than dry water or wooden iron." This, I think, very tersely explains Stalin's and the Russian view toward the purposes of sincere, constructive negotiations.

Now, what are some of the major aspects of current Soviet strategy, at least as I see them? First of all, I think that the Soviets today are flying more white doves of peace than ever before. They are posing in the world of today as the champion of peace and trying to give the impression to the rest of the world that the United States is the champion war monger, with her NATO alliance supporting her. They, the Communists, are posing as the champions of peace and throughout the uncommitted parts of the world they are soft peddling the gospel of Marx and Lenin and dialectical materialism.

I was in North Africa a few years ago, and in the country of Libya, where Colonel Tanberg was, for many years, the Grand Mufti, the head Moslem in the country, was entertained by the third secretary of the Soviet Embassy; and for an hour and a half this Russian explained to this Moslem leader that Russia had never been against religion; that all such statements were the crass accusations of the diabolical war-mongering imperialists. The Russian diplomat showed picture after picture, gloss prints blown up to a very large scale, of mosques in the Soviet Union, with Moslems in attendance at worship; and the whole

attitude was that Russia is the friend of the Moslem, Russia is the friend of the oppressed people, the Russians are the friends of nationalism everywhere; that the Russians will give volunteers, because the Russian people are friendly, and they're interested as champions of peace in defending the cause of free men everywhere.

The Russians also, I believe, have as one of their major strategic gambits today the use of economic warfare, both in actual observance, operation, and in propaganda tone.

Russia believes that she will in a few years equal the industrial production of the United States. In March of 1957 Khrushchev stated: "The growth of our industrial and agricultural production is the battering ram with which we shall smash the capitalist system." Then in July of last year, talking in Czechoslovakia, Khrushchev made this statement: "With regard to industrial production we are now the second country in the world, having left behind us highly developed capitalist countries. The United States of America alone remains, but she won't get away. We will catch up with her."

Now, gentlemen, that is a propaganda statement, and strategies are not won entirely with the use of propaganda statements. There must be substance to make the propaganda statements come true. Leo Cherne, while addressing this school last May in a speech entitled "Countering the Soviet Challenge," quoted Mr. Allan Dulles in a speech which he made in April of last year: "During the past seven years, through 1958, Soviet industry has grown at the rate of 9.5 percent yearly. And, said Mr. Dulles, "this 9.5 percent figure is our own deflation of Soviet data. Our own growth," he stated, "during the last seven years, through 1957, has been 3.6 percent, only slightly over 2 percent if 1957 is dropped from the tabulation."

Mr. Cherne went on to state that if (and his institute had calculated these figures, and I hold no brief for them) Soviet production drops to 8 percent instead of 9.5 percent, and ours, which has been around 2.5 percent, jumps to 4 percent annually, then Soviet production will be more than 66 percent of ours in 1970, and will be 90 percent of ours before 1980. These figures were worked out by Mr. Cherne's research organization.

He also went on to say that if their figure remains at 9.5 percent a year production increase and our figure jumps to a straight 4 percent, here is what he figures will happen: In 1971 Soviet production will begin

to catch up with us. In 1972 it will have significantly overtaken ours. And by 1980 our production in the United States will be 63 percent of the then Soviet industry. I mention this as a rather sobering and challenging point, one which you gentlemen will examine in the course of your studies during this year. The economic drive of the Soviet Union today is not propaganda; it is realistic. This economic drive in the Soviet Union today has spilled out over its borders. Economic warfare by trade is already showing up in many parts of the world. In their lend-lease and mutual aid programs in India and Southeast Asia the Soviet Union and the Red Chinese are making a big campaign today.

They are diabolically clever in the way in which they administer their aid programs. About a year ago the Soviet Union supplied a steel plant to India and they send over a nonentity to run it. They sent over the Deputy Director of their Ministry of Communications, a man who had prestige in the eyes of the Indians. Russian economic warfare in terms of the exports of her goods as well as her ideas is part of Soviet strategy.

The Soviets have a policy of indirect attack. I'd like to point out a rather interesting feature, I think. If you disagree with my thesis, at least it's interesting to look at. In 1954 the Indo-Chinese War ended. In 1954 the Soviets began to look at the entire area for what it might have to offer in terms of further development and conquest.

India, they probably felt, could be discounted, because of Indian neutralism. India represented no threat at the time to the Soviet Union or to Red China. So a flanking type of attack against the Middle East and North Africa was initiated. You will recall the establishment of the Nasser regime followed by the Syrian crisis. You all remember the establishment recently of the United Arab Republic. The Soviet Union launched a massive campaign of subversion, of propaganda, of political infiltration, using every means of psychological and social threat and pressure. This was an attempt on the part of the Soviet Union to extend their strategy from the Far East through the Middle East.

The Soviet Union does not have any love particularly for the Arabs or the African peoples. But the Soviet Union realizes that a strategy of economic industrial denial can be tremendously effective in crippling Western Europe and its industries. If you look at a map you will note that Western Europe is nothing more or less than a peninsular extension of the Afro-Asian continent, of which Europe is a part. And

the great industrial complexes in Western Europe cannot run long without the oil and the other resources which are derived from the Middle East and from Africa.

This flanking strategy of the Soviet Union which was apparent after the first Indo-Chinese conquest was concluded in 1954, is an interesting strategy. It's the indirect approach of strategy which I think could be, and they feel will be, effective.

The Soviets have always believed in their strategy of hitting at the weakest link. There is where they get their two steps forward in the flow of their strategy. They analyze these weak links through a very intensive system of social science research in Moscow. I would not be surprised, though I've never gotten the proof of this absolutely, that the Russians have in Moscow today a research institute quite similar to Dr. Haushofer's school for geopolitics which he once had in Munich.

Communists believe in a shiftiness of strategic attack, flexibility of time, space, operational techniques and propaganda themes. This not only gives them the advantage of the initiative and throws the opposition on the defensive, but by this shiftiness and the compounding of types of attack the Soviets are tending to confuse their enemies in terms of multiple tactics which tend to becloud the true strategic objective which lies behind the multiple tactics being employed.

This ability to shift, to employ psychological and economic warfare, political warfare, subversion, and infiltration, singly or in terms of combination, has been well described by Colonel Kintner (who will talk to you) as "the orchestration of conflict."

I would like to move on now to Chinese strategic concepts. I realize I have not exhausted by any means the subject of Soviet concepts, but I hope that I've given you some appreciation of the field. I think it was Bob Berman who asked me if I wasn't going to speak Chinese during the lecture. I said "No, but I could tell a Chinese joke." I won't, but think I will cite a proverb which I believe is important to us in our consideration this morning. "He who doesn't climb a high mountain can never fully understand the beauties of the plains." In other words, by climbing laboriously up a mountain, you gain perspective which can be helpful in evaluating problems.

I think that the understanding of Chinese diplomacy requires a lot of hard work, which means climbing a mountain; but I believe that if

you look at Chinese diplomacy in perspective, you can see much better what they are trying to do.

Chinese strategy is in many instances similar to its partner in the Soviet Union. All fears or hopes that Mao might become another Tito were dispelled when Mao wrote his essay "Lean to One Side." Mao expressed the opinion that it is impossible for a person or a country to be neutral. A neutral is a eunuch in the expression of Mao Tse-tung; and a country must lean to one side. And he stated early in the early days of his career that "China is oriented to the Soviet Union. We march one step behind the great socialist USSR."

China has never regarded herself in the role of a satellite. She has been and is a junior partner in the Sino-Soviet entente.

The Chinese have three targets, which have been given them by a combination of joint Sino-Soviet strategy. One target, of course, is Southeast Asia, another is Japan, and the third, believe it or not, is Latin America.

As far as Southeast Asia is concerned, there are some 12 million Chinese, or people of Chinese blood, living in that area. Red China has wooed these people with great avidity. She has given them a task to do. The task is to form, as the Chinese strategy has expressed it, an outer circle in Southeast Asia working for the good and the future aggrandizement of the Chinese motherland. Many of these 12 million Chinese in Southeast Asia have no love for Mao Tse-tung and his bloody regime, but every Chinese in Southeast Asia is traditionally Chinese; and he cannot help but feel, wherever he may live--in Malaya or whatever part of Southeast Asia--a certain feeling of, shall we say, a secret pride in at least the announced industrial accomplishments of China, the motherland. And when these Chinese troops were fighting ours in the bloody battle of Korea, I have spoken to Chinese in Southeast Asia who said to me: "God help me, sir, I am anti-Communist; but every time Chinese soldiers defeated the Americans, I could not help but feel a sense of pride." There is a common bond of racialism in Southeast Asia which Mao Tse-tung has been able to play on with propaganda and with telling effect.

Mao has told through the Foreign Minister, Chou En-lai, who visited Nehru in 1954, that there are five principles of coexistence which the Chinese will respect in terms of their present and future relations with Southeast Asia. These special principles for Southeast Asia are, first,

respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; second, mutual nonaggression; third, mutual noninterference in each other's affairs; fourth, equality and reciprocal benefits; and, fifth, peaceful coexistence. Now, these five principles sound awfully repetitive to me, and I'm sure that Nehru is beginning to feel that they are somewhat phony--respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty.

However, there is an aspect of Communist strategy which is very difficult for us to appreciate fully. A statement made today, a promise made today may be broken today or tomorrow, and the Soviets with complete straightness of face can brazen the situation out.

Look at this invasion of India's boundaries in this area (indicating on map). What does it mean in terms of peaceful coexistence? The Chinese strategists in Peking charged India with aggression after their troops had marched across and fired on Indian patrols and border guards. Actually, the rattling of a saber is part of Chinese strategy today. The friendly announcement of the five principles of peaceful coexistence combined with a show of strength, whenever a show of strength might psychologically be deemed useful, illustrates Red Chinese strategic thinking of the moment.

Now, the Chinese have a ground force numbering 2.5 million troops. In addition, they have a militia which probably numbers 50 million in their home guard. They could push that figure up as high as they wanted to, depending only on the availability of military equipment. The Chinese have a military force here which has the capability to overrun Southeast Asia, in my opinion, with impunity. At least militarily speaking, China has as a predominance of military force. She is pointing at Southeast Asia with the old idea of the iron hand in the velvet glove--constantly probing for strengths and weakness using techniques marked by threat and condescension.

China is, in her border incidents, practicing nibbling aggression. It's a relatively safe type of aggression, where you move in just far enough not to provoke war and have a way out in case the outside powers become too upset over your attitude.

China has placed heavy emphasis on economic propaganda although she has recently had to trim her sails considerably in modifying the claims made for the 1958 industrial achievement and agricultural production in Red China. General Cabel in talking recently to an American

Legion group in Minneapolis, stated that Red Chinese strategy is to boast of scientific, economic, and military strength in such a way as to make it appear that they have tomorrow's capability today. This is quite an art and is quite typical of Chinese strategy--to boast of achievements today which you won't have until tomorrow or until perhaps a much longer period.

China has in Southeast Asia, and in the areas around her borders, about a million and a half square miles of territory which she once owned and could, and will, I think, try to take back some day. She at one time had a more or less tenuous claim to all of Southeast Asia; and when the time is ripe, when China is strong enough, and the world situation warrants it, I believe then and only then, will the Communists move in and take over this area. They do not have to take it in a military way. They already infiltrated it with their advance agents, through guerrilla actions, sabotage, subversion, assistance from neighboring states. It is Laos today--and the pattern for the future aimed at is making the area rotten and vulnerable to attack from the North.

One Communist writer stated that the attack of boring from within, which is a Chinese strategy in this area, is coming under the military shield that the United States is applying through its MAAG missions and Tito alliances in this area. It is concentrating on hitting the man at the grassroots level and winning his allegiance and brainwashing him to support communism. And Mao Tse-tung has repeatedly pointed out, that the United States power in this area, is nothing but a "paper tiger," and is not something to be feared.

China is confident that she will penetrate Southeast Asia. And China is confident that someday Japan will be forced to join the Communist camp. Japan has often been called the United Kingdom of the Pacific, industrially strong, the Japanese are weak in raw resources and today about 40 percent of her trade is with Southeast Asia. Red China is sure that Japan needs China economically more than China needs Japan. And all of the propaganda today directed against Japan is urging her to give up her alliance with American "imperialists and war mongers" and come home; to rejoin fellow Asiatics with whom she is culturally identified. Unless they comply, the Japanese are told almost daily that they will become the "orphans of Asia."

Stalin in 1922 states that it was necessary for the industrial complex of Japan to be joined to that of China, and that the industrial complex of Japan would give a great boost and be of much benefit to the advancement of Communist strategy in the world for global domination.

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As far as South America is concerned, China today has sent a rather large delegation from the New China News Agency down to Cuba where they are publishing a Communist paper in Havana today. Also, the Chinese have in Uruguay a large delegation of Chinese commercial and political agents. A number of years ago, Ravines, writing from Mexico City, wrote a book called "The Yenan Way." At that time, the Chinese were given as one of their major targets the development and fomentation of revolution in Latin America. The book "The Yenan Way" came out in 1952. Everyone felt it was highly fictional. But again I'd like to refer to General Cabell's speech in Minneapolis, when in great detail he talked about the current trends of Chinese penetration in South America and the growing threat which our intelligence people see there, with China acting as the agent for the development of Communist strength, the advancement of Communist strategy, in Latin America.

Gentlemen, I have a feeling that if the strategists in Moscow and Peking could be induced to be with you this morning, they could brief you fully on their objectives and strategic goals and more specifically as to how they foresee the brave new world in 1980. In the few minutes remaining I'd like to sketch in broad relief what they probably have in mind.

China, as a partner in this world conspiracy, probably has Southeast Asia earmarked as her bailiwick. Eventually all this part of the world would become a part of the Chinese Peoples Republic. Red strategists feel that if Japan suffers consistent and continuing trade losses in Southeast Asia (where 40 percent of her trade now is) and finds that the rest of the world refuses to take low priced Japanese products then Japan, the Kishii Government is doomed. In consequence Japan will have to cast her lot in with the Peoples Republic of China for economic not political reasons.

India, by Red China's timetable for 1980, would also be Chinese. Nehru's neutralism, his indecisiveness, and the fact that the Pakistanis and Indians do not seem able to get together, should facilitate a Chinese conquest.

Communist leaders foresee the whole of Africa in 1980 being run by eight graduates of the Lenin Institute designated as economic commissars to administer the area. Under the direction of these Communist-trained nations, the rubber and mineral wealth of the Dark Continent will be exploited for Red consumption.

As far as Europe is concerned Red planners hope that the European Economic Union (which started so handsomely in 1959) will gradually become involved with the Soviet economic system and develop an indebtedness which will indicate that it is economically wiser for Western Europe to throw in her lot with the Communist states lying nearby. I might say, however, that Holland and Belgium might form a customs or trade union for mutual benefit, but most of their trade in 1980 would be with the Soviet bloc.

Let's look further at the world as the Soviets might review its history in the year 1985. Great Britain, because of blackmail by atomic weapons, felt that it would not be wise to be a strong member of NATO and broke off sometime about 1970; and is a neutral nation but is trading with everyone she can trade with.

Now, in this part of the world (indicating North America) we have Canada in 1980 to the north, and living in Ottawa the British royal family, because it's safer to live there than it would be in their own homeland. We have 50 States. Puerto Rico didn't join in 1961. We have only 50 States in the United States. And right here to the south of us we have the Peoples Republic of Mexico. This organization fell because primarily Toledano and his union bosses were able to bring about a political coup, labor unionism took over, and established a "Peoples Republic" there.

Now, the Russians realize that this breaking up of states in Central America was stupid and foolish, so you have a federation of states in Central America, each one being an administrative district.

Latin America, as a result of Communist penetration, and the fact that its development was not economically able to rise fast enough to meet the aspirations of what the common man in Latin America felt he should have experienced a series of revolutions. Most of them, in fact, all of them, as I recall, were Communist-inspired. But by 1980, there emerged a confederation of three satellites of the Soviet Union. Technically, the new states might be classed as neutralist but they believe in communism. Their missionary work was done by the Chinese and they adhere closely to Red policy dictated from Peking.

Gentlemen, you have Fortress America here in 1980, surrounded by Communist strategy, which has a timetable which is from now until victory. You may not agree with me, you may regard this as fantasy, but I say this: that this can be and will be a reality unless we as military

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planners, and those of you who are in civilian walks of life in our Government, can plan intelligently, can understand what are the true goals, the techniques, and the objectives of the Soviet Union. God grant that this picture that I painted in 1980 will be purely fiction.

COLONEL SILLS: Colonel Smith is ready for your questions.

QUESTION: Colonel, in your picture of the state of the world in 1980 you didn't give any consideration to the participation of the Chinese Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek. Would you give us your views on where they fit into the picture?

COLONEL SMITH: Actually this is a privileged audience. I feel that Chiang Kai-shek is an old man and that when he passes on, there will be profound changes--changes perhaps in Formosa, possibly changes in our foreign policy.

I wouldn't be surprised--don't quote me--that we would recognize Red China and give her diplomatic recognition in the next four or five years, if not sooner. And I think that the poor people in Formosa will have to "accommodate themselves," as the diplomatic term goes, to new situations. I think it's a vain hope that Red China is going to be overthrown by Nationalist troops storming across the beaches. I wish it might be true.

QUESTION: You didn't mention Australia in your picture of 1980.

COLONEL SMITH: Australia, of course, is so remote that she is living unto herself as best she can, living one isolated and precarious existence. The Commonwealth would be very badly disrupted by the Communist position.

QUESTION: Do you foresee in this world of the future a totally Moscow-dominated world, with China as a running mate? Or is this supposed to be a bunch of independent countries with their own brands of communism?

COLONEL SMITH: I think that's a very, very good question and I thank you for it.

I think that the Chinese Communists have a strong sense of pride and nationality in spite of the fact that they are now Communists. China has always absorbed her conquerors; but Mao and Chou are Chinese and they have interpreted communism with a Chinese content.

I can foresee a time when Red China will grow so strong, not only in population but industrially, 10, 15, or 20 years from now, that the Soviet Union might begin to feel awfully uncomfortable with this bed-fellow sitting so close to her on her boundaries; and that Red China might in time become the predominant power in the Communist enclave. Stefan Possony, who will talk to you in a couple of days, actually felt that Mao Tse-tung had all of the qualifications to be the world leader of communism following the death of Stalin, but I felt that possibly being a Chinese National would not make him an appropriate choice to head world communism.

But I think that China possesses tremendous aspirations. And, interestingly enough, have you ever heard of a nation in history that went clear to the bottom--as they often have, as I made mention in my talk--and then began to come in again on the rise? Communist China today is a country again coming into viability and making a bid for world power. This is a unique feature of history.

QUESTION: You mentioned in the first part of your talk about the institute or school that they had in Moscow during the twenties for all these up-and-coming Communist leaders throughout the world. And then in your vision of the world of 1980 you said that Africa would be administered by eight African-born administrators who had been trained in a school of that sort. Do you think there's anything we can do to train native-born African leaders in the democratic way of life to counter that sort of infiltration by the Communists?

COLONEL SMITH: I think there are a lot of things we can do. How sad it is that 30 years ago we didn't give an answer to your question. The Russians were starting their schools then. The products of their systems are now at work at the present time.

I've talked with thousands of students from the Far East over the years and they have told me that foreign students in this country work so hard for a diploma that they never learn about the American way of life, with the language barrier to begin with; and they get their diplomas and go back home and never realize what democracy, as we understand it, is all about. The Russians in their system have a slower pace of learning by propaganda, visiting students tour the Soviet Union and the Russian educational system has tended to orient their foreign students to adopt a dedicated understanding of Marxian tenets so that when they return home they are missionaries for communism.

Do you realize that there are hundreds and hundreds of MIT and Harvard graduates working now for Red China in scientific and governmental pursuits? For example, in the Panmunjon negotiations, my friend Jack Kinney sat across the table from two Red Chinese negotiators who were both graduates of Harvard. They got to like Jack pretty well, and Jack said: "You know, I felt uncomfortable. They felt sorry for me because in their minds I was nothing but a stooge of Wall Street, a slave of this capitalistic system. They thought I was a nice guy and wished they could emancipate my thinking."

QUESTION: Considering all the hysteria and progress in this country as the result of an economic depression or recession, do you really think that an aggressive nation like the United States, with its aggressive people, will sit by and let the Communists take over the world? It sounds fantastic to me to allow them to do it. Do you really think they could do that?

COLONEL SMITH: I don't know. I gave you a picture which I felt would challenge your thinking. I don't want to give the impression that this is my own thesis.

I do feel that the American people have a tendency to overlook some of the less spectacular developments of communism. Let me give you one example. On the traveling team of the Conference Branch, we have felt for years, in fact, have given out the word to the American public, that the Communists are backward particularly in food production and dairy cattle. We've had some very convincing figures. In the course of the last week I was telling a colleague of mine that we got a new revised list of figures and I said, "These must be Communist-inspired." They showed that Communist wheat production equalled ours and a little over; that their dairy products were just approaching our level. And I said, "These must be Communist-inspired." He said: "Oh, no. These figures come from the Department of Agriculture and are official figures." We have a tendency to overlook some of these seemingly little things that creep up on us until it is too late.

Now, if the Russians were to attack us with an atomic bomb, we would retaliate but fast and cut that Gordian knot of war. But suppose that Mr. Khrushchev doesn't want atomic bombs. Suppose he believes in this policy of economic strangulation and so on. It's creeping. It's insidious. That is what we have to worry about. We Americans can recognize spectacular dangers. We don't recognize little nibbling aggressions too much. This, I think is an American characteristic and a major weakness.

QUESTION: I am sure that throughout the history of the world there have been balances of power; and when one side gets a little too tough for the other side, they begin getting jealous of each other and the first thing you know they've got internal strife. When you get a Gargantuan amalgamation of nations such as you foresee, the problems of administering it and keeping down these rivalries will be on a scale that we have never known. Don't you foresee any internal trouble of any kind, any rivalries, any jealousies, any revolution from within, be it armed or political?

COLONEL SMITH: Yes. I think you have a very good point there. I think the Soviet Union periodically has these power contests. Khrushchev won the last one. Who wins next I don't know. There certainly are the seeds of unrest there.

I think that in China today we may be on the verge of a colossal type of disruption, with Mao Tse-tung now being somewhat discredited. This commune thing has hurt them, hurt them bad. They are talking now of looking for scapegoats--writers, adventurers, deviationists, et cetera. We have had two or three known outbreaks in this area of China. There is all the potential in the world.

But the question in my mind is, What would our policy be, or would we have a policy, other than we had in Hungary, should these things begin to gather speed? There is no possibility of unarmed peasants being powerful enough against machine guns and weapons of today to win. And therefore, you might ask the speakers who will appear later this year, what we should do to foment real trouble in the so-called "Peace Zone," which is the satellite world--instead of merely declaring peace weeks or weeks for sympathy with the underprivileged slave peoples of the world. We've got to get in there to assist. Otherwise these situations of unrest in my opinion, will just be tragic, and that's about all I can say.

QUESTION: Sir, we have heard a lot and read some in the last year or two of the failure of the Chinese to plan for the industrialization of China. That is, they have been unable to reach their goals in iron and steel production and in other areas. Do you feel that any further failure or falling back in the schedule of industrialization will alter this plan of conquest in the Western Hemisphere that you outlined, that is due to take place somewhere around 1975 or 1980?

COLONEL SMITH: I think you've got a very good point there. The 1958 figures were corrected the other day and show, instead of 11 or 12 million tons, only 8 million tons of usable steel.

When I was a boy in China, they couldn't even make electric light bulbs. Now they've got eight million tons of steel. In 1952 they only had a million and a half tons of steel. So I think they have eight million today. That's a reasonable figure.

When I was in Hong Kong with General Mundy, I was very interested in the agricultural figures of last year. The whole industrial base in China comes from what agriculture can produce. We questioned their 100 percent figure for 1958 production over 1957; and we estimated, based on fertilizer alone, that they had maybe 25 or 30 percent increase. The officially corrected figures now confirm our estimate.

They have had a terrible setback in trying to reach too far too fast and too furiously; and for the next year you are going to find somewhat of a recession in Red China's foreign policy and their adventurism. But I am convinced that by and large over the long run China is going to industrialize, with or without Russian help. Right now she's getting Russian help. And this industrial development of China will be the makings of making China a third-rate or second-rate or fourth-rate, or at least a world power of some consequence in the next 20 years.

QUESTION: An old friend of mine about 10 years ago--who I regret to say is now psychopathic in my way of saying--said that this country started going downhill when it ran out of Indians to fight. I laughed at the time and thought he was off his rocker; but, looking back now, it seems, when you see what the Communists have done and what we haven't done, that there's an awful lot of truth to this. Is there any opportunity for us to find some more Indians to fight to put an aggressive front in the world? Even expanding the point four program might perhaps have been the beginning, but something like that might be the only reasonable counterblow that would draw our people's attention and get them interested.

COLONEL SMITH: I think you've got a good point there, that the American people rise to a challenge and they do it magnificently. But if the Russians don't give us an overt act or a spectacular challenge, if they creep up on us, we tend, in my opinion, to be somewhat sleepy. It's dangerous. Given some challenge, Indians to fight or something,

and we're really there. We're the world's best people to answer a fire alarm. But if the fire alarm doesn't ring, we tend to sleep in the station.

QUESTION: Do you feel that the Chinese can become strong industrially and technologically with their present language? and if they must change, would they have a tendency to break down their nationalism?

COLONEL SMITH: I believe they can become strong with their present language. One of the most interesting developments, I think, in the last three or four years has been the adoption of a phoneticized alphabet to spell out the sounds, the phonetization of Chinese words. Last year the Red China schools on the mainland adopted textbooks using this phonetic script in the first grade. This has done a great deal to help them linguistically and get away from the old outmoded character system.

Chinese have in recent years won Nobel prizes in science. The old concept that the Chinese are not scientifically inclined because of their language is, I believe, now an exploded shibboleth, like the theory of Japanese pilots that we thought couldn't fly because they wore thick glasses. China has every indication of making scientific advances and achievements, and we have been fertilizing for so many years in this country.

QUESTION: Colonel, do you feel that there is any possibility of a banana war or cocoanut war or oil war getting out of hand to change the course of that thing that you speak of?

COLONEL SMITH: Yes, sir. I certainly do. And I think that the Russians, notably Khrushchev, is more worried about that perhaps than his partner Mao.

Khrushchev, in my opinion, is very much afraid of an atomic war, trading punches. I think that Mao is less afraid. In fact, Mao has made many statements that for wars, big, little, or medium sized, he could care less. "The atomic bomb is nothing but an American paper tiger." He brags that "An A-bomb against the Chinese people might take 300 million, but they would still have 350 million left. China," according to Mao, "is one country that could withstand an atomic war, and we would run out of people before we defeated China," and so on.

The Russians are more cautious. The Chinese tend to be adventurous, and this probably gives Khrushchev many a sleepless night. Firing at Quemoy when they should or shouldn't, marching across territories with or without Moscow's permission. These little things are the seeds which could germinate into a war, which from the Russian point of view, again, I think would be unfortunate.

Now, that type of war, if a limited war got out of hand, might be one of the worst things from the Russian point of view that could ever happen, because they would prefer peaceful penetration, the nibbling aggression, to the overt act.

QUESTION: You mentioned the likelihood that Red China would be recognized by the United States in the next three or four years. What do you visualize as the key circumstances in the situation that might bring about a change of this kind?

COLONEL SMITH: I don't really have any good answer for that. I am looking at the way we used to feel about the Russians and then according them recognition in 1933. Ultimately we said: "Well, they're a de facto government and we'll recognize them."

I have a feeling that some major party may make a few campaign speeches on the subject once the pains of the Korean conflict have been forgotten, because we do have those scars in our social system and feelings of deep-seated dislike for the Reds. But as time goes on, these scars and wounds will heal.

I think there are many people in this country who feel, honestly-- I don't say that I do--that from an intelligence point of view we would be better off in Red China, both for official military intelligence and for industrial intelligence on how well they're really doing. And yet, should Chiang Kai-shek pass on, this could perhaps be the seeds for accommodation, because we're too committed to Chiang Kai-shek's regime now to make a sudden change. But this might provide it--the demise of Chiang Kai-shek.

QUESTION: Would providing the market for Japan's output for her factories have any bearing on the recognition of Red China?

COLONEL SMITH: It could possibly. I will say categorically--and this is my present opinion--that if Japan can't solve in the next 10 years her economic problems in terms of markets, she is going to have to

make some kind of political accommodations or starve. And Red China is putting every propaganda tool at work here.

By the way, the Japanese Communist Party is getting directions not from Moscow, but primarily from Peking. The penetration here is Chinese rather than Russian. She is in an economic straitjacket. Somebody has got to find markets for her somewhere or she's going to be out of business. That part of my world picture I feel very sure of.

QUESTION: Colonel, you have mentioned all these problems that we have worldwide. I'm sure you must have some plan of action that you'd like to recommend to these people when you go on the road. Would you like to tell us about it now?

COLONEL SMITH: I appreciate your question very much. When we're on the road we are really able to talk as freely as I have talked to you this morning. I'd like to recommend this--and I mean this seriously, not because this is the last question--and I'd like to chat with you over a cup of coffee on it. I'd like to recommend to the class that you ask Colonel Kintner this question when he comes to talk to you tomorrow and see what kind of action he would present, if he doesn't cover the question in his talk. Kintner and Strausz-Hupé and Frank Barnett and Senator Jackson and a number of people feel that we need a plan; and many of them have plans of action, if they could only get them approved. I would be glad to talk to you personally and would, in fact, enjoy it.

Thank you very much.

(10 December 1959--4, 400) B/bn:msr