

## CURRENT NATIONAL STRATEGIC CONCEPTS

9 September 1959

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## NOTICE

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INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

Washington, D. C.

Colonel William R. Kintner, USA, Plans Division, Office of Assistant Chief of Staff for Military Operations (working on a special project with the Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania) was born in Pennsylvania on 21 April 1915. He graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1940, and in 1949 received his Ph.D. from Georgetown University. In 1940 on graduation from the Military Academy he served with the Coast Artillery Corps and in 1946 he transferred to the Infantry. He graduated from the Command and General Staff School in 1945 and was a member of the faculty of the Command and General Staff College, 1948-50. During World War II he served in Europe and in 1953 he was on duty in Korea. He subsequently served as Chief of Plans, Plans Branch, United Nations Command, Military Armistice Commission; International Branch, Plans Division, Army General Staff, and later in the Office of the Secretary of Defense as Planning Board Assistant to the National Security Council and in 1955 was a member of the Office of Special Assistant to the President. He was assigned as Senior Military Advisor to Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University, 1956; and in 1957 was sent to Europe as Special Assistant to the Commanding General, United States Army Headquarters in France and returned to his present assignment in September 1958. He is the author of numerous publications, among them: "The Front is Everywhere," "Forging a New Sword," "Atomic Weapons in Land Combat" with Colonel George C. Reinhardt, and "Protracted Conflict" with Dr. Robert Strausz-Hupe, et. al. He is a frequent contributor to military journals. This is his first lecture at the Industrial College.

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MR. PULVER: General Houseman, Gentlemen: So far in our study of modern warfare and strategic concepts, we have reviewed some of the more traditional global power pattern theories and we have also considered Sino-Soviet strategic concepts.

Today we will look forward to a discussion and analysis of Current National Strategic Concepts of the United States. Our speaker for today, as you may have noted from his biography, is not only a well-known author and scholar on this subject but is also an Army officer who has served with distinction in a variety of increasingly important planning assignments. These include the Planning Board Assistant to the National Security Council and a member of the Office of Special Assistant to the President. He is currently assigned to the Plans Division, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Military Operations, and is working on a special project with the Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania.

I would also like to call your attention to our speaker's latest book, "Protracted Conflict," which is coauthored with Dr. Strausz-Hupe, James Doherty, and Alvin Cottrell. It is a most challenging study of Communist strategy. I might add that it is available both in the Book Store and in the library.

It is a pleasure and a privilege to introduce Colonel William R. Kintner, United States Army, Colonel Kintner.

COLONEL KINTNER: General Houseman, Members of the Faculty, and Students of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces: It is a real pleasure to be with you today. I was mentioning to General Houseman that I am not quite sure that I'm altogether here, because I just got back at 7:00 o'clock yesterday morning from a six-week trip to Africa. I still might have one foot in the bush, literally speaking. So forgive me if I revert to tribalism or any other custom I have run into down there.

The subject of today, of course, is one which I have to tackle with all humility, because, in the first place, if one has an overall concept of national strategic concepts, I have not yet run into it. I do not

believe that, except in very general terms, our own Government has developed one to date. But I plan in the course of the morning to do the following:

1. To state our general objectives;
2. To indicate the type of world in which these objectives are attempted to be realized;
3. To state in very broad terms what the existing basic national policy appears to be;
4. To give a short critique of that policy; and then,
5. To very briefly point out the problems of developing a strategic concept with reference to the place I have just been, namely, Africa.

The goals of our national policy which always must be the first element in determining a concept, of course, are very well stated in the Constitution. The very Preamble states that we must get together to provide for the common defense. And that is still the basic aim of all security policies. Now, in existing policy statements we read such things as preserving and enhancing United States security, particularly in the face of the Soviet scheme to acquire world domination. Other ways of stating this are, "to preserve our liberties, to expand our opportunities at home and abroad, to seek peace and security, and to pioneer in the development of a new and more constructive world."

To achieve these goals we have listed in our basic policy the following: "to prevent general war, to deter or defeat limited aggression, to assure economic growth both internally and externally, to destroy or neutralize the Communist apparatus, and to accelerate peaceful evolutionary changes within the Sino-Soviet bloc."

This strategy runs directly in the face of a very serious problem, namely, that we are, for better or for worse, a status-quo power, and we are facing the revolutionary thrust of a power determined to destroy the status quo. We are encountering throughout the world what has been described as a systemic revolution. This revolution essentially is characterized by the breakdown of an existing international order and long-term conflicts and struggles which take place before a new international order can be established. I believe some of you were

given a chance to take a look at an article in Orbis which describes this and the parallel, of the breakdown of the Greek city-state system with the creation of the universal Roman Empire, the breakdown of the empire into feudalism, the shift from feudalism into the national state system.

At the present time we are probably witnessing the breakdown of the existing national state system as it existed in 1914. There are many indices which point this out. There is the collapse of the great power system, the rise of virulent nationalism, the establishment of worldwide communications, both personal and mass communications, the great population pressure, the breakdown of old cultures, and the beginning of establishing a universal world culture.

Now, this process, which I believe we are in the middle of, is not going to be a peaceful one. It has not been one thus far. There have been two World Wars, there have been probably a series of 50 or 100 fairly significant wars, plus all sorts of internal coups d'etats, revolutions, and challenges to whatever authority may exist in a given area. In other words, we are in a period where conflict is endemic. This has always been the process of major political change, and the change of the world from one order to a new one, I believe is going to be characterized by greater, rather than less, conflict in the future, until the human race finally settles down with some new standard of normality.

In this type of revolutionary situation, the Communists have advanced because they have a revolutionary theory. They are not wed to the status quo, to the existing order. Their policy is to destroy that order. Their revolutionary theory does not correspond exactly to the situation as it is actually unwinding, but it is a better approximation of the trends of development than a sort of nostalgic desire to return to a normalcy which will never return.

The Communists have made their success by dint of their own hard efforts as well as by the mistakes of the West. They have also done it by following what we have described in this book as a strategy of protracted conflicts, a strategy whereby a weaker power over time gradually displaces the positions and strengths of a stronger power. This doctrine is the doctrine of irreconcilable conflicts between classes and between nations, between the capitalist system and the "peaceful" social democratic states. The conflict is an organic whole. For the

Communists there is only one war, the war to the finish, the war which Khrushchev describes, and ends his statement by saying, "We will bury you."

In this conflict the Communist leaders are taught to think in much broader terms than is the average citizen of the West. They review the whole situation constantly. A continent is a salient to be turned. An industrial system is an object of constant attack very much like an enemy logistical system in times of war is an objective of attack for a military commander. As the military commander attacks with psychological warfare the troops in the battleline, they attack the opposing cultural system in peacetime.

Some of the principles they use in executing this conflict strategy are the principles of distraction, namely, to distract the enemy from the most vulnerable point and to lure him into battlefields that are the most attractive to you. For example, they have sought constantly to distract us from Eastern Europe, which is their Achilles' heel, and to turn our attention to the areas, say, in Southeast Asia, where we work against greater psychological handicaps than we would in Europe. They irregularize the conflict constantly by utilization of indirect and irregular methods, by using proxies and satellites, fronts, and neutrals. They press continuously but they do not provoke a retaliation until they are ready to accept it.

Examples of this are legion--Berlin, Quemoy, Laos, at the present time, Syria, Iraq, et cetera. They mislead and misinform. The rule there is to deceive the enemy as to your true strength, leading him to overestimate it at times and to underestimate it at other times. They try to be strong locally, regardless of their general situation at all times, and they try to capitalize both from strength and from weakness. For example, during the Hungarian crisis, the general line put out in the West was "Do not intervene, because, if you do, you will be facing the cornered bear, and he will strike back with all his fury." Other times they use the threat of their great strength, such as Khrushchev's beloved missile strategy, to intimidate the West by giving an impression of overwhelming power.

They constantly try to deceive the enemy as to their methods, by varying the method constantly, by tactical innovation, by abandoning techniques once they become known. They also pursue the tactic of the inverted golden rule, namely, to prevent others from doing unto them what they do to others. For example, they like to constantly

build up their own strength while working against opposing strengths. They deny, by use of the Bamboo and Iron Curtains, such things as fronts, Communist parties, propaganda, and all kinds of techniques like those, internally, while demanding the right to participate fully in the discussions in the Western World by the use of these very devices. They have established by this method what we have described as the war-zone peace-zone concept. The peace zone is the area controlled by the "peoples' democracies"; the war zone is the area controlled by the West.

The cold war has always been fought in the war zone, namely, in Western territory, or Western-influenced territory--never in their own.

Finally, they seek to avoid and prevent a direct all-out decisive encounter until, by a variety of means, they have achieved such preponderance that the decisive blow can be struck safely, or even better, that it need not be struck at all. Anyone who has been following recent Soviet strategic doctrine will realize the great emphasis they are now putting on the preempted strike, the central war thesis, as it has been described by Herman Kahn at Rand; and under certain situations it is conceivable that, for a variety of reasons, if they reached a position of military superiority and if the West reached an even worse state of psychological malaise, they may wish to follow this particular strategy.

By pursuit of all these methods they have eventually succeeded in shifting the world power balance into a position which at least begins to be equal and, from certain points of view, I believe they think, begins to favor them.

Now, we are in a period of extraordinary danger for one basic and fundamental reason, and that is that few of us recognize the seriousness of the adverse trends working against us. The Communists have before them a few essential, different strategies which unfortunately are complementary. They have the strategy of the protracted conflict, the strategy of creeping aggression. They have also the strategy of seeking all-out technological dominance. Both these strategies reenforce each other. For example, if, by gaining further territory through creeping expansion, they are able to improve their position, through tracking stations, through access to materials, and so forth, they can improve their technological position. Vice versa, if they achieve a technological success, such as the Sputnik, they can improve their position in

trying to advance by creeping expansion, through presenting to the world the fact that they are in the forefront of scientific technological advance..

There are basically three interpretations you can give to the Communist effort, with respect to the type of policy we might pursue. There is first the hope that for some reason or other the Soviet system will change internally through peaceful evolution, that the leopard will change its spots. This, of course, cannot be dismissed arbitrarily, because there is no system which is static. All systems change eventually. The question is, however: Will the change take place in time to do us any good? It was no consolation, for example, to the Carthaginians that the Roman Empire itself came to very serious disorder 200 years after they had been defeated. Likewise, it would be no consolation to us if the Soviet system should eventually become more mellow in the Western image after we are dead and gone.

The next interpretation is the so-called conversion theory, which is fairly popular in certain circles in the West, namely, that the Soviet Union, because of its problems of the size and immensity of its industrial program, is tending to become more and more like us. It has had to decentralize its industrial system and it has had to give greater benefits to its industrial bureaucrats. In the process it has changed from a highly centralized system to a decentralized system, where decisions have to be made on a rational basis by the operators rather than on a political basis. The converse is that our system, having started out as a rather free-wheeling society, because of the demands of modern technology and because of the demands of the huge defense budget, has to become more and more centralized. Eventually the two systems will meet somewhere in the middle, and therefore it would be a crime to louse it up by having a war and by preventing this natural evolution to take place on both sides, so that they could live peacefully together.

Finally, there is another theory that we are in a consistently hostile relationship with the Soviet Union, and in all prudence I believe that this is the only thesis that we can, for the time being, accept, because there is no fundamental evidence that they have changed their basic views on society, their basic views on what the human being is, and their basic methods of operation against us. This can be illustrated in many ways. I am sure you are all familiar with many concrete instances which would support this thesis.

Under these conditions we seem to be caught in somewhat of a bind, because the Western World is still determined, somehow or other, to find a modus vivendi, a method of relaxing the tensions with the Soviet Union. I noticed when I went on this trip to Africa that the British are particularly concerned about relaxing tensions at the present time. I came back yesterday and read the "Washington Post," and read that one of the great benefits to be achieved from the visit of our distinguished visitor, Mr. Khrushchev, in the next week or so, will be the possibility of relaxing tensions.

Where do the tensions come from? The very term, "relaxing tensions" is Communist in origin, and the tensions, for the most part, are either of Communist manufacture or they are of Communist magnification. Under these reasons I do not see that we can gain much from this particular desire, however laudable it might appear.

I would like to quote very briefly from the 21st verse of the 55th Psalm, with reference to our distinguished visitor: "The words of his mouth were smoother than butter, but war was in his heart."

We are at the present time confronting a series of negotiations with the Soviet Union. It appears to be the trend now. I don't have anything against negotiations in general; I think they should be held occasionally. But the fundamental question is: Are we clear in our own minds as to our goals and aims? What do we particularly hope to achieve? Are we as clear in our own minds as to our goals and aims as our opponents are? This I doubt very much, because the Communists state very frankly that negotiations only record a concrete relationship of forces. At the present time they think that the relationship of forces is working in their favor; therefore any negotiation and any negotiated settlement of any kind at the present time would be, by their own doctrine, thrown away as soon as the concrete situation became more favorable.

Now, how is the United States meeting this challenge? Broadly speaking, we are still following a course of containment. We are trying to contain the Soviet Union from further expansion--territorial, psychological, and so forth--and we are also trying to develop the free world as a more cohesive, homogeneous union. We are trying to carry on strategic containment through the SAC forces of the Air Force and through retaliatory forces of the Navy, while maintaining at the same time effective local forces which will permit us to defend our allies against territorial aggression around the Soviet periphery.

I am stating now what are the official statements of policy. I will later on discuss how closely we may be achieving these stated aims. We are pursuing a policy of coordinated combinations of arms and actions. We do this through two mechanisms, primarily--the National Security Council, which presumably develops the cohesive, coherent statement of U.S. aims and policies, and the Operations Coordinating Board, which presumably works out the details of specific plans whereby these broad objectives are to be realized.

In the areas of the world where our missions operate, we have the country-team concept, where the American Ambassador acts as the major-domo of the State Department, the USIA, the CIA, the military missions, the military attachés, the information people, and the ICA people. And in many cases, depending on the personality of the Ambassador, this concept has worked very very well.

These have all been organizational changes induced upon us by the conflict. In other words, the NSC began in 1947 when it was recognized that the old world order was not going to be the same. The OCB is an offshoot of the Psychological Strategy Board, which was formed in 1951, and the OCB was formed in 1954.

The means that we have adopted, broadly, to carry out this combination of our arms strategy is to maintain military strength to meet limited or general war, to pursue internal policies which will encourage economic growth, to provide leadership for the free world, and to now engage in peaceful competition with the U.S.S.R.

I should mention that there has been an evolution in our national policies over the last 10 years. In 1950, when NSC 68 first came out, the thought of peaceful competition with the U.S.S.R. was an anathema; we were going to move in and destroy the Communist apparatus. Nine years later we are going to engage in peaceful competition.

Let's go into more detail on what our policies are. Politically, we are to keep our alliances from deteriorating; we are to maintain our associations with the allied nations as an end in themselves as well as an element in our collective security; and we are to endeavor to create conditions for acceptable change within the Sino-Soviet bloc.

We have area policies which attempt to carry out these very broad statements. In North America we have a very intimate working relationship with Canada to defend the security of the North American base.

This is probably our most successful working relationship. Our next most successful is in Europe with the NATO Pact. We regard it as the most critical area of all areas in the world, because, if the industrial potential of Europe were lost to our side and transferred to the other, the existing ratio industrially, which now favors the West, three to one, would immediately be equated between the United States and Western Eurasia. There we are attempting to develop a capacity for local aggression without resort to all-out war, as well as to reinforce this capability by our SAC forces.

We have in NATO a clause for economic and political cooperation which thus far has not been too well implemented. We have also the fact that our major NATO allies have great interests outside the NATO area, and up to the present time we have not been successful in coordinating our approaches with these allies to areas outside the immediate province of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

In the Middle East we have followed several policies. We first developed the so-called Northern Tier concept, whereby we would associate ourselves, directly or indirectly, with Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and Iraq--that was the Northern Tier--and work to harmonize relations in the Southern Tier, namely, Egypt, Saudi-Arabia, and so forth. That concept has sort of gone by the board. For one thing, the Baghdad Pact, which we were not directly associated with but with which we were very deeply involved, was very badly punctured by the coup d'etat in Iraq which took away the capital of the Baghdad Pact area, as well as many of its plans, in 1957. We now find Iraq very much on the critical list in the Middle East. After the Suez crisis we enunciated the Eisenhower Doctrine, which was applied several times, in Jordan, in the early part of 1957, and in the intervention in Lebanon in 1958. In the Middle East at the present time we are treading on still very dangerous water. However Egypt may have been learning a few lessons, and there is a tendency to revert to a more genuine neutralism than Mr. Nasser has been following in the past several years.

In Southeast Asia we run into our weakest link around the periphery of the Sino-Soviet bloc. We have developed an organization called SEATO, the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization, which was formed in Manila in 1954 as an aftermath to the rather disastrous settlement of the Indo-China conflict in Geneva in July of that year. There, however, we have no commitment of forces. We have a commitment to "discuss in the event of aggression. There is nothing in the way of forces directly earmarked there by any of the member parties. It

does, however, provide us a basis for intervention in case it should be necessary. We may find it very necessary in the near future in Laos. But that area is characterized by two factors: (1) It is the weakest in our total structure; (2) it looks like it is the most logical target for Communist Chinese expansion in the next several years.

In Latin America we have the treaty organization known as the Organization of American States, which does provide a very good machinery for handling cases of direct aggression, and does provide a procedure whereby we might consult, in cases of indirect aggression or subversion. However, we appear to have a situation on our doorstep in Cuba for which the procedures of the Organization of American States have not thus far been too well adapted.

Now, as to Africa, the last remaining territorial area, we are still partially in the dark as to American policy. I will discuss some of the limits of this policy later on.

Let's now get down to some of the specifics on the military and economic side. We recognize finally that research and development is a very critical factor of the technological race between us and the Soviet Union. I might add parenthetically, however, that our side does not believe that it is in a race officially, even though we are in a race which our very survival depends upon.

We are encouraging, according to our policy, dynamic research and development, the tapping of all resources, and mutual collaboration with our allies. We have made tremendous advances in the R&D field, and certainly I think that any fair evaluation will show that the race is at least "comme ci comme ca" at the present time. Whether it could be better or not is something I will discuss later.

Militarily our policy is to maintain sufficient strength, flexibility, and mobility and to rely, for the most part, on nuclear weapons, but not to place sole reliance upon them. With regard to nuclear weapons we treat them as if they were conventional forces from a military point of view. Because of this reliance we have sought to achieve a flexible nuclear stockpile. We have both the big and dirty and the clean and small weapons, and we presumably are prepared to use them in all types of situations.

We are attempting to carry on a program of educating our allies as to the importance of and the characteristics of nuclear weapons.

You know that we have not been too successful in this particular area, but it is a very important element of our whole strategy. With our flexible forces we have sought to achieve the maximum cold war contribution of our Armed Forces to our general cold war position, and we have also sought to strengthen the collective defense.

We continue to provide military support to American allies. This desire was reinforced greatly by the report of the Draper committee which stated that military assistance should be with us for a long time to come and that a greater area of investment should be put into this field.

By our policy we have ruled out preventive war, though, parenthetically, this has not been ruled out by the Soviet Union. We have sought to overcome some of our difficulties by other means--through an active pursuit of arms control, arms regulation, arms detent, or whatever you want to call it, and by maintaining at the same time ready forces for retaliation.

At the same time we have sought to develop a strong, healthy free world economy. Here we have run into considerable difficulties because the very nature of the Western World is a generally free competitive economic system. The members often wrangle among themselves and in the process have left openings for the monolithic economic system of the Soviet Union to move in and disrupt it. We have not yet come to the end of Soviet excursions economically into the Western World.

We also, in the light of our humanitarian tradition, have sought to meet the basic needs and aspirations of peoples everywhere, and by so doing to provide a constructive alternative to communism.

Now, what I have just given you is essentially a boil-down of our basic national security policy. I would now like to suggest some critical looks at certain elements of this policy from the point of view of our organization, our military program, our economic assistance program, the information program, which attempts to create the image of the United States elsewhere, and the technological race.

The first thing I'd like to mention is that most of the specific goals and measures stated in our basic national security policy are very sound--in fact they are incontestable. If you were given the job of

drafting the policy you would probably come up with much the same thing. But we do suffer, I believe, from a psychological way of looking at our problem, namely, because of the success we have always enjoyed, the idea that you can always get what you want if you really make an effort, that solutions are somehow found for very difficult problems, and that every story has a happy ending--the lack of the tragic, in other words. I think these factors make it difficult for us to implement a policy of the type I have described in a world so much opposed to our particular standards and goals.

Our own policy statements do admit some difficulties that we run into. I'd like to list some of them, taken directly from these statements.

First, not all the world is as happy about our nuclear weapons policy as we are officially. There is an uncertainty, in the first place, whether the United States will ever use them.

Secondly, we face weakness and political instability in many areas where we are attempting to accomplish our goals.

Finally, the American people do not know the extent of the crisis.

Now, in addition to this lack of understanding of the crisis, we have not approached our problem of dealing with the Communists as an organic whole, as they have approached their strategy of handling us. It is this circumstance which explains the whole series of Western reverses, which, had they taken place in a recognized campaign, would have been of such magnitude that the American people would realize the catastrophic decline in their fortunes. You merely have to take a look at the Western, American position in 1945, plot it on an order of battle map, compare our situation then and now, and, if it were a recognized war, which I believe it is, you would see that we have not done very well.

Secondly, on the question of organization there is before the Congress at the present time an effort, headed by Senator Jackson of Washington, to examine our machinery for the formulation of national security policy. He is asking these questions: What is the present structure? What is it supposed to accomplish? What is it doing? What are its grave shortcomings? What is the cause of these shortcomings? What improvements should be made?

As to this point I'd like to point out that it is my opinion that the organizational competence of the Communists, particularly in international conflict relationships, is probably their greatest strength, and probably our greatest weakness. They are experts in conflict management. We can illustrate, I think, by saying that in this country the people who are responsible for conflict, in the recognized sense of the word, namely the military services, are about third man on the totem pole. In the Soviet Union the very top directorate, the presidium, the politboro, or what have you, are masters of conflict, and have been trained ever since they entered the movement to wage psychological, economic, military, and violent warfare against all opponents. So that the leadership group on the one hand finds conflict congenial to them, and the leadership group on the other hand seeks accommodation and seeks to avoid conflict. Having this general state of mind, the Soviets have organized their government for the conduct of conflict, and we have organized our Government, properly, from a different point of view.

Their policy, because it does follow a theoretical analysis of the world, has a greater consistency than ours, which is a derivative of composite points of view. In other words, the members of departments who participate in policy formulation in NSC often meet as sovereign ambassadors of their respective departments and work out a series of compromise decisions; so that we finally get a statement of policy which is so general that no one can oppose it, but which can be interpreted and implemented by each department as it sees fit.

There is no directing concept to anticipate and cope with foreseeable crises. I think, for example, that anyone who was dealing with the problem of the Middle East back in 1951, 1952, and 1953 was fairly well certain that things were going to reach some sort of a climax within a reasonable number of years. And yet, there, as in many other areas, we did not react until the crisis was upon us. We run into the lead-time problem in dealing with foreign crises just like we do in weapons. You have to be ready to handle them, you have to have the means to handle them on hand, if you are going to cope with them accurately.

Few of our personnel are trained to think across the board. I mentioned earlier that our policy calls for a combination of all arms and actions, and yet, if you are going to carry on a national strategy, you must have people who can feel at home and think in military,

political, economic, and psychological terms. Otherwise you will run into the disadvantages of trying to coordinate any military operation where you just, say, know the Air Force point of view, or the Army point of view, and you are not trained to think across the board on both of them.

We also lack an integrated picture of the whole net situation. There is no place in our Government at the present time where you can sit down and see, in a concise, highly organized fashion, the total composite picture of our position and deployments in every sphere in contrast to the Communist position. This makes it very difficult for us to manage a conflict of this sort because, no matter how much a single human mind may be briefed on all this, the conflict is so immense and has so many varied angles to it that, unless you have a systematic way of handling it, I doubt very much if you can reduce it to its simplicity, which you must do to master it. I do not know, but I presume, that in the presidium they must have a mechanism which presents the picture in this type of fashion.

We have next the problem of the selection of leaders. Our leaders in this country on the political side are not selected because they are masters of conflict but because generally they are masters of finding solutions by compromise; whereas the opposition leaders are masters of climbing their way up through a very bitter and tough jungle, and when they get to the top they are willing to use all the techniques they learned in their rise to achieve their aims.

Let's leave the organizational problem for a moment and come to the military problem. Basically we have two problems: First, how to prevent general war by maintaining our nuclear retaliatory capability; and, second, how to prevent local aggression. On the first factor we are running into a critical area; namely, the Soviets are developing, in the strategic sense, a counter-force capability, while we are still primarily relying on a counter-area capability. In other words, they are developing missiles of the type which should be aimed to knock out our entire retaliatory capability--if they succeed in doing it--whereas our retaliation has a much greater difficulty in knocking out their striking force, and for this reason is still generally aimed at their population and industrial centers.

Here we run into a very difficult problem, because, if we have to, from a policy point of view, contemplate a war involving, say, 10 million casualties--which is a relatively small figure for an all-out

thermonuclear war--we must ask from a policy point of view, what is the goal of such a war? Presumably you use military forces to defend your society. If you defeat or destroy a good portion of your society in the process, what is the aim? What concrete issues are going to be worth this price? If there aren't any concrete issues, you find yourselves running into a prescription for inaction; and the more the Soviets achieve their counter-force capability, the more difficult it will be for us to finally use this force in specific instances.

Now, the Soviets can exploit our strategic doctrine--or I would say our strategic capability is more the case. We would like to have a counter-force strategy also, but we don't have it at the present time. They can exploit our strategic doctrine in the first place by producing threats. They can question the capability of our doctrine, in other words, by maneuvering in Berlin, at the risk of accepting a nuclear retaliation. They can say that they are not afraid of our using it and that they think we are pursuing a paper rather than a real policy. Therefore, in order to convince them, we must shoot the works literally. That's what we should do if we really mean business. On the other hand, every time we get into a crisis, we generally counsel firmness, patience, calmness, and avoid any show that we are provocative. This immediately undercuts the very policy we are dependent on to keep the Communists in line.

Consequently, because of our force capabilities, if we continue to pursue a strategy of nuclear retaliation, which is aimed in the fashion that ours has to be at the present time, we may find ourselves in a position where we cannot protect our alliance, and may find our general world position undermined. In other words, to be perhaps parochial at this particular moment, in Europe, if we were a little bit better equipped on the ground over there, perhaps the Berlin crisis would not be as acute as it is. On the other hand, I am not denying that we must, absolutely, maintain our position in the nuclear strategic field. For one thing, which I alluded to earlier, the Soviets can well contemplate gaining victory through a decisive all-out nuclear blow. Hence our counter strategy must be a deterrent which will discourage forever any Communist notion of launching such an attack. This must be the overarching framework in which the West must proceed.

However, we run into the problem that such a strategy on our part, if we have given the initiative to them, does not mean a parity of forces

but a significant superiority, since the advantage of the initiative rests heavily with the side that starts a nuclear war.

Let's get down to the question of local defenses. We have tried to do this primarily through collective security systems reinforced by military assistance and by the presence of American forces. We are capable of conducting local war in a few areas of the earth, primarily, Western Europe, Korea, and a few stations at odd points in between. We are attempting essentially to have our allies bear the brunt of the allied capability. We have achieved a good deal through our military assistance. We have at least on paper some 200 divisions of varying degrees of competence and capability. But at the present time it is doubtful whether many of these divisions would be able to fight unless we were able and willing to put a sizable American contingent alongside of them.

Even so, we are running into a problem of modernizing these forces. The forces in Europe are preatomic; they have not been brought up to the requirements of atomic warfare. The forces in the Far East, the Middle East, and elsewhere require a great investment if they are to be the sound military forces that we would like them to be.

So, in short, we have two problems. We need to really tighten up our striking force in the strategic field, and we have to, I believe, make considerable investment in our local capability if we are going to prevent recurrent crises of the type of Berlin and Laos.

Let's get to the technological race. Here I think we have to take into account the fact that the Communists are convinced Marxists; namely, they believe that the means of production finally determine the political organization. They believe that the Western World achieved its supremacy through its technological superiority, and I think very few could contest that. When Cortez landed in Mexico with 24 men back in about 1500, he had technological superiority of an overwhelming kind which permitted him to destroy the Aztec empire with hundreds of thousands of trained soldiers. Therefore, the Communists believe that, if they can achieve all-out technological superiority, they can displace the United States and substitute their system for our system.

They have a major advantage in this, namely, that they know everything that we are doing in the technical sense, in broad terms, and we know little of what they are doing. So, in any particular field of inquiry, they have access to Western knowledge, plus their own knowledge.

Now, the question no longer is a question of security measures to guard our secrets and to obtain their secrets. It is a question of multiplying your advance by having access to all the information that you can get. In this sense the Communists do have an advantage, the direct advantage of the Iron Curtain.

They also can have an advantage from following our program. Our program is quite well publicized, by the congressional debate, the budget hearings, and so forth. They can see what the gaps are, and they can take measures to exploit those gaps without informing us that they are going to do it.

They have the initiative, in a sense, technologically. They can come up with something whenever they wish without telling us about it, and then spring it on us at a later date when, for lead time reasons, it might take us several years to overcome it. On the other hand, knowing what our program is, they can plan their countermeasures almost concurrently with our adoption of a given program.

In addition, they are making a priority effort in this field. Their trained manpower pool, by 1970, according to all estimates, both official and authoritative unofficial, will exceed ours. That's engineers and competent scientists. Perhaps this has led to some very pessimistic predictions, including one by Mr. Teller, the man who invented the H-bomb, that by 1970 they will overtake us.

Now, in this field we can perhaps do more than we are doing. The Rockefeller Report on Military Security in 1957 stated the following:

"Systems of budgets, appropriations, and financial management are out of gear with the rapidly accelerating flow of military developments. The U.S. is rapidly losing its lead in the race for military technology."

We can cope with this, however, if we decide here and now to make a major increase in effort which involves dollars and personnel and an educational speed-up, which we are beginning to do in a somewhat lackadaisical way, and a new attitude toward military technology as a major national overhead. This technology is not only useful to the military but its byproducts are almost immediately available to the general development of our economic system. Take for example radar, the jet planes, the transistors, and other devices of that kind.

Assume now, however, that we have paid the price to have the military structure we need; we have made the investment to stay on top in the technological race; we have therefore paid the price to stay in the game. Then we can look into more constructive fields, economic, political, and cultural. We can follow a constructive economic policy. Now, we have done much in the area of economic assistance to the underdeveloped world. Whether we have done enough to actually help with the problem remains to be seen. We are faced with this revolution of rising expectations that I am sure you are going to hear about numerous times this year, the vast needs of people, some of whom are still in the Stone Age, who are trying to get up into, say, the 19th century. We have a terrific scope of demands. Every country I visited in Africa has its own dam it wants to build, its own bauxite works it wants to develop, and so forth. The capital outlay for this reaches stupendous funds.

Finally, we run into the problem that, in carrying out our economic program, we cannot really be economic determinists. I think sometimes our program has tended to be that way; namely, if you put in a little economic assistance, it makes the local boys happy, they stay politically stable, and they love you very much and stay on your side of the cold war. I personally think that there is much more to be added to an intelligent economic program than merely economic assistance.

Next let's get to the information system. The conflict in its essence is a clash between two systems--the open society, the pluralistic society of the West, and the closed society of the Communist world. Our basic information effort should be to project the image of the open society behind the Iron Curtain. Are we making this effort? The content of our effort has changed radically over the last seven or eight years. Seven or eight years ago we believed in carrying on a rather virulent, hostile propaganda campaign against the Soviet system. That is completely soft-pedaled now. We are using the soft-sell approach. However, on the soft-sell you have to increase the volume, and I don't think we have increased the volume nearly enough to justify this technique being used. We have limited culture exchange programs, we have a very limited broadcasting program, in terms of the target we are trying to reach, and under these terms I doubt very much whether we are having as significant an impact on the minds and hearts of the people behind the Iron Curtain, let alone the Bamboo Curtain, as we might believe.

In the rest of the world we are trying to project a constructive image of the United States. Here we run into some very serious problems,

namely, the United States is the image of the things they oppose. In Latin America, for example, the Nationalists select as their number one target the United States, the perpetrator of economic imperialism. In the rest of the world we are tarred with the same brush as our European allies. No matter how we try to get out of it, we are put in the same package with them, and therefore we have very serious psychological handicaps to overcome if we carry through a constructive policy.

Now, very briefly I'd like to mention how we have to apply these very general principles that I have mentioned to the solution of the specific problem, Africa. Africa is an immense continent with tremendous sources of raw materials, tremendous unoccupied space, 11 million square miles, and 200 million people. With the world population pressure rising as it is, it might be very essential to keep this on our side of the fence. There are definite base possibilities for various types of conflicts, both general and limited.

Against these favorable factors we run into the development of the Pan-African movement which has some worldwide affiliations. The Pan-African movement was started primarily by a number of West Indians of African descent who got mixed up with the Communist movement. George Padmore is the leading exponent of this movement. He is now personal assistant to Mr. Nkrumah, who is the present Prime Minister of Ghana, and he is carrying out quite a propaganda factory there, not only for Africa itself, but to Africans throughout the world. If you look at the spread of Africans both in the United States and in Latin America and the West Indies, you will see that this could be a fairly explosive mixture over a time. Mixed in with this is a tendency toward class war, or race war is another way you might express the new philosophy of some of these countries--race war Marxism.

The countries over there are gradually moving toward independence. Two of them are independent already, namely, Ghana and French Guinea. Nigeria is slated for 1960. The French Association is likely to become independent within the next two years. The Congo is going to be given a good measure of independence by 1960, and probably full independence in a few years from then.

We run into the fact that these people, for the most part, are unprepared for independence--not that they don't have the capacity. I had a chance to talk to Nationalist leaders, government officials, in most of the countries that are independent there, and they have some outstanding

men. But the percentage of them is far lower than any other place on earth, for the simple reason that they haven't had the training and the background. So you run into the thing that the government affected is dependent on a very very small group. Because the group is so small, they have all tended to go down the authoritarian direction. Both Nkrumah in Ghana and Torre in Guinea are running one-party systems, with definite controls on the opposition.

There is the fact that most of these countries have no infrastructure to speak of, in terms of roads, harbors, electric systems to develop their own economies, and things they need. They all have a smoke-stack psychology. They want to see something produced there, even though economically it might be better, for the time being, at least, to have a more gradual economic development, so that they could turn more of the benefits to the immediate problems of schools, health programs, and things of that kind.

Into this environment we find that the Commies are beginning to move. They have come on the scene rather lately, but they are beginning their training program. They are taking a lot of the boys back behind the Iron Curtain. They are learning the languages, they are learning the anthropological background, and so forth. And they have certain advantages.

In the first place, most of the elite of the countries that I visited have a definite Marxist orientation. They were trained either in the London School of Economics in London or in the French Sorbonne in Paris. They were training a lot of them in the thirties when, if you weren't a Marxist you were certainly not very intellectually advanced in either London or Paris at that particular time.

There is a communal structure, a basic tribal structure, which is much closer to communism than it is to free enterprise. There is this penchant for state socialism in all these countries. There is the general recognition of the Marxist line in Africa which explains our difficulties. In other words, they say that, before the Europeans came there, things were really a paradise on earth. It was the European coming in creating the exploitation, and so forth, which led to their backwardness.

This is not true, in my opinion, but it is believed. In the East and Western parts of Africa there is the great conflict of approach. In West Africa there are very few white settlers, and I think independence will proceed much more smoothly there. In the Eastern part, particularly

in Kenya, and in Rhodesia, and in South Africa, there is a small white minority. It is very small in Kenya, larger in Rhodesia, and a fairly significant white population is in South Africa, and they are maintaining the last modern vestige, or the last modern hold, of the feudal system. The system there I think cannot last much longer, but the way it will be broken down could be by some constructive, peaceful way, or it could be by violence and destruction, which would be very disastrous to the West.

I think the approach being followed there on both sides is such that the more violent solution is likely to be possible. This is being, in a sense, fanned and encouraged by some of the propaganda that is developing in Ghana, for example. Ghana is developing four 100,000-watt radio stations, and is beaming two of them to the African French and to the English-speaking Africans. With Mr. Padmore running the machine, I am sure that the effort will be toward extremism rather than moderation in seeking a solution.

The net result of this is that you have a high conflict possibility in Africa. You are either going to have jerky development, punctuated by crises, which will lead to a sapping of Western strength, or chaos, due to slow development. You are going to have to acquire into these circumstances a Western position on the minority question there. You have the fact that, whereas the problem becomes most acute, Western interest and confidence cuts down. For example, with the announcement that the Belgian Congo was going to become free, the number of Belgians going to their Institute of Colonialism in Brussels was dropped practically to zero. And yet the Congo people need assistance now more than ever. Whether they are going to get it or not from the Western side remains to be seen.

Under these circumstances, a general orientation of Africa with the West will be difficult to maintain. The Communists will profit from any crises. In fact, their policy, I would say, would be, with little investment to exacerbate crises, whereas our policy should be a policy toward constructive evolution.

What can we do? I'll just throw out some choices of the type of thing you have to do and make up your minds to do on such an issue. We can continue interest but no direct involvement, which is essentially our current policy. Here we run smack up against the Padmore thesis that the United States stopped backing up the Western countries that are still in Africa colonialism would end tomorrow in Africa. Therefore,

our endeavor to carry water on both shoulders apparently is not doing us much good with our Western allies, who accuse us of pulling the rug out from under them, nor is it believed to be a very positive contribution to the African liberation movement on the part of the Africans.

We could adopt a policy of accelerating the transition. I think it is inevitable that we are going to have independent countries in Africa. We could say, "All right; let's do it now," and get the disturbance and the disaster over with as quickly as possible, and see what we have to deal with. There we run into the problem that we are dealing with a certainty now. In other words, we do have access to the territory, we do have a type of political stability there, whether it is enforced or otherwise. Whether the new African nations, after they become free, are going to be on our side or not remains to be seen.

Our major policy, of course, is to mitigate conflict during the transition. On the other hand the Communists have exactly the opposite policy, namely, to increase the conflict potentials during the transition. Under these circumstances another possible course might be for the U.S. and Europe to create a consortium under a type of African Monroe Doctrine to (1) bring about political independence as soon as possible, (2) to try to keep the Commies out of the continent, and (3) by really getting down to task on some of the fundamental issues confronting the continent, namely, the health, the schools, the education program, and so forth, help bring these people along into the modern world.

Now that last alternative, I need not tell you, is a very expensive proposition. On the other hand, we might adopt a policy of selective alliances. We have an alliance of a sort with Haile Selassie in Ethiopia which I think is going to be subjected to some very severe strains because of his recent visit to Moscow. We might develop one with Nigeria, which is going to be independent in 1960. It is a very important country, because it has 40 million population, one-fifth of the total population of Africa, and it has a good industrial potential, as well as a good general economic base. That might be a method of keeping our toe in the door.

I am just throwing these out. Frankly, as of this moment I have no solution for Africa, but I wanted to present the type of choices that you have to run into in developing one.

I am afraid I have run on a long time. I would like very briefly to wind this up by saying that, in developing a sound national strategy

concept, we must first of all see that they are comprehensive in order to deal with the variety of counteractions that could be put upon us. Under these circumstances, haphazard compromises between various concepts of action do not constitute a rational policy--and I am afraid we tend to do it in that fashion. We have not yet developed an effective military policy which harmonizes with a constructive policy for peace in this world. Our military policy I believe has too many loopholes to give the type of support which a sound political-economic policy requires.

In order to deal with the types of problems we run into, we must get rid of our short-term planning views. We must plan our conflict techniques, our positive policy, on the scale of decades, if we are going to do the problem justice. An individual conflict should not be viewed as an isolated phenomenon but as part of an organic campaign, and we should treat our approach to the world in some such manner.

I have no magic prescriptions to offer. I have only two points to make. First, I think in all fairness that we must as a nation make greater effort in dealing with this problem if we are going to be successful in creating the type of world environment in which the United States can thrive. Secondly, we must make greater intellectual effort in understanding the problem in order to cope with it. And this I leave squarely in your hands.

Thank you.

MR. PULVER: Colonel Kintner, on behalf of all of us here at the College, I thank you for a most comprehensive and succinct description and analysis of our current U.S. strategy.

COLONEL KINTNER: Thank you very much.

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**MODERN WARFARE: ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONFLICT**

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Mr. Harlan Cleveland, Dean, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University was born in New York City on 19 January 1918. He received his A. B. degree from Princeton and was a Rhodes Scholar, Oxford University, 1938-39. In 1939-40 he was a Carnegie Scholar serving at the National Institute of Public Affairs, Washington, D. C. He continued to serve in Government in the Washington area until 1944. During 1944-45 he served as Executive Director, Economic Section, Allied Control Commission, Rome. He was a member of the U. S. Delegation to the Third Session of the UNRRA Council, and served in various capacities with the UNRRA in Italy and China from 1945-48. From 1948-51 he was Director of the China Program and Deputy to Assistant Administrator for Program, Economic Cooperation Administration in Washington, D. C. During 1951-53 he served as Assistant Director for Europe, Mutual Security Agency, Washington, D. C. In 1953 he became executive editor and publisher of "The Reporter," and served in that position until he assumed his present duties in 1956. He is a member of the American Political Science Association and American Society for Public Administration. He received the U. S. Medal of Freedom for his work in Italy and has been decorated by the Italian and Chinese governments. This is his fourth lecture at the Industrial College.