



THE ROLE OF OCDM IN THE FORMULATION
AND IMPLEMENTATION OF
NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

Honorable Leo A. Hoegh

NOTICE

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Reviewed by: Colonel Thomas C. Keach, USAF

Date: 12 November 1959

INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

7 October 1959

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Reporter: Ralph W. Bennett

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GENERAL MUNDY: Yesterday we considered the role and the functions of our top-level security agency, the National Security Council. Today we turn to a member of that council, the Director of OCDM.

We are privileged and we are honored to have as our speaker Governor Leo Hoegh, who is the Director of OCDM, and who will talk to us on the role of his office in the formulation and the implementation of national security policy. You have been given our speaker's biography, and you know that he is a member of the Board of Advisers to the Industrial College--a very important group of gentlemen. I'd like to give you an additional piece of information, though.

Governor Hoegh has recognized the unique relationship that exists between his office and this College by assigning Mr. Charles Pulver as his representative and as a special assistant and adviser to the College in all matters pertaining to OCDM. This arrangement is one that we appreciate and it's one that I think has already paid dividends and will continue to do so. It's a very fine arrangement for both institutions.

Governor Hoegh, it's a privilege and a pleasure to welcome you back for your third talk and to present you to this year's class.

Gentlemen, Governor Hoegh.

GOVERNOR HOEGH: General Mundy, Gentlemen: I'm pleased to have this opportunity to discuss the subject which has been assigned me. I hope that when it's completed you will not come to the same conclusion that the manager of a major league team did who had tried out a minor league player on his baseball team in a drive to win the pennant. He called this young man in and started him out at right field. Before he went out to right field, the young man was informed that he should be relaxed and do the best that he could.

A ball was hit to the right field and he got his glove on it, but he missed the ball. An error--two bases. He came in from the field at the end of the first inning and the manager said: "You've got to be relaxed out there, young fellow. Take it easy."

So in the second inning he went out again. A ball came out between first and second and went right between the recruit's legs. Another two-base error.

He came back in at the end of the second inning and the manager said: "Sit down on that bench. That's where you play" and he said: "I'm going to show you how to play right field." So the manager went out to play right field.

A ball came out to him, a real high one. He adjusted his glasses, missed the ball in the sun, and the ball dropped back of him and inside the park for a home run.

The manager came back and went up to this young fellow sitting on the bench and said: "I'm sending you back to the minor league tonight." This young fellow responded, "But, sir, I wasn't playing out there. Why do you send me back?" "Well," he said, "you've got it so fouled up out there, nobody can play right field."

When I finish this talk, I hope I haven't got you that fouled up.

At one time civil defense responsibility was primarily that of the States and the local governments. The Federal Government had no authority to direct the States or the local governments. We were in a position of suggesting or asking or even pleading, but our lines of authority restricted constructive leadership.

Now, this was a serious weakness, a weakness that had to be overcome. We worked for the passage of legislation that would transform this organizational line into a Federal, State, and local government partnership. We achieved that goal with the passage of appropriate legislation in August, 1958. We now possess the responsibility for guiding, leading, and directing. The States and the local areas must assume the responsibility for implementing our plans with organized action. However, there still is a weakness, since the Congress failed to appropriate funds to implement this law. It has refused to match State and local personnel and administrative expense for civil defense functions.

I'd like to pause at this point to emphasize one of the problems, and the most important one, that arises in the consideration of policy formation. In many cases there is a decided imbalance between formulation and implementation of policy. This imbalance reflects my own conviction that without derogation of the importance of sound policy, it is in the implementation of policy that we find our greatest difficulty; and that it is to this goal that we must apply ourselves most assiduously.

This relationship between policy formulation and implementation is clear when you apply the policy to specific instances. For example, if attack should come to this country, it's the policy of our Federal Government that the decision as to whether people should evacuate or take shelter must be made at the local level. There are sound reasons for this policy. The local officials are the ones who understand and know the traffic problem and who understand and are thoroughly familiar with their own conditions and the capability of their people to comply with the decision made at the local level. The Federal Government could not make that decision. We can, however, assist the local areas with the development of nationwide communications warning systems, so that they have as much time as possible. But the final decision, the implementation of the policy, the choice between evacuation and shelter--this must be a local decision.

This is one reason we have worked so hard in OCDM to convince Congress that adequate appropriations to match funds from the States and localities for personnel and administration are vitally important. The mayor and the governor must have competent, well-trained staffs, that can adequately advise these commanders as to what decisions they should make.

We have not been successful as yet, as I mentioned; but I can assure you that we are determined, and we're redoubling our efforts in order to accomplish this objective.

You have heard as recently as yesterday how the National Security Council operates. I'm a member of that body. As a member of that Council I share with my fellow members the responsibility for the advice given to the President with respect to the national security policy recommendations that are advanced by the Council. The range of such recommendations is indeed awesome, and I feel deeply the responsibility that I share with respect to domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security.

Our role in policy formulation is not limited to the deliberations of the National Security Council. In the nonmilitary defense field, virtually every phase of Government is caught up in the implementation of policy; and the know-how of all fields of government must be tapped in the process of its formulation.

An excellent example of the way this works is to be found in the development and the promulgation of the National Plan for Civil Defense and Defense Mobilization. The broad framework of policy is developed by the National Security Council and approved by the President, and within these guidelines it was necessary to work out refinements and clarifications to guide the various departments and agencies of the Federal, State, and local governments in their implementation of the policy.

Now, in addition to spelling out the responsibilities of the Federal, State, and local governments, this national plan stresses the preattack preparations for the continuity of government at all levels, the indispensability of fallout shelters as the best single nonmilitary defense measure for the protection of the greatest number of our people, and the mobilization and management of the national resources in the event of a nuclear attack.

Let me stress that this is a national plan, not an OCDM plan, not a Federal one, but a plan concerning all government--Federal, State, and local--and all people. It's a plan by them as well as for them. All of the Federal agencies and the State and local governments through their respective organizations participate in the development and the perfection of this national plan. Each had a voice. Decisions had to be made, and those decisions were made in line with the capabilities of the local, State, and Federal governments to function.

The title says that the plan is for civil defense and defense mobilization--a somewhat awkward phrase, but a deliberate one. It leaves no doubt about the subject. Yet one should not infer from this that it is composed of two separate and distinct halves bound together in a common cover. The difference between civil defense and defense mobilization is not so clear-cut. If it were, there would have been little reason to merge ODM and FCDA, or, for that matter, to have a single national plan.

The glossary to the plan contains both terms. Civil defense is defined as "activities and measures designed or undertaken to minimize the effects upon the civilian population which would be caused by an attack upon the United States or by a natural disaster, to deal with the immediate emergency conditions which would be created by such attack or disaster, and to effectuate emergency repairs to, or the emergency restoration of, vital utilities and facilities destroyed or damaged by any such attack or disaster." Defense mobilization is "the employment of government and the national economy for meeting essential civilian and military requirements."

We say in the preface: "While other documents concerning civil defense and defense mobilization will be issued as necessary, each will be subordinate to and compatible with the National Plan." This last point is of particular significance, for it indicates, as I said earlier, that this is a basic plan, the foundation for further planning.

Before leaving the plan, I would like to point out one more very significant feature, that of economic controls. In a war of attrition, these would become increasingly necessary. In an all-out attack they could be immediately essential. These would be far-ranging and much greater than anything in our World War II experience. Above all, they must be automatic, that is, determined ahead of time for prompt execution in emergency and must be workable under emergency conditions.

The plan anticipates this when it provides that the Federal Government will continuously assess the ability of the national economy to meet all requirements for essential resources; will develop programs for emergency control of the economy; and will prescribe the emergency roles and responsibilities of State and local governments, private industries, and individuals.

Although the national plan anticipates extraordinary circumstances and measures, including extraordinary Government controls, let me again stress this fundamental point: One of the purposes of the plan is to help assure the preservation of our form of government. The plan would be counter to that purpose if it required implementation by means contrary to that form of government. I hope I have made it clear that the plan and its annexes are intended to be applied only within that principle.

What I have said thus far may have given you a better understanding not only of the content of the national plan, but also of its significance. A full appreciation of this, however, can come only from a reading, a thorough, careful, line-for-line and between-lines reading and studying of the plan. I urge all of you to do this. If you have, I would suggest that you read it again. It's like the scenery along a highway. Each time you traverse it, you see something new. But keep one eye on the road, on where the plan is pointed. Keep its objective in mind and you will better realize its usefulness.

In the development and issuance of the national plan we have an example of the formulation of national security policy by the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization in collaboration with a great many departments and agencies of government, including State and local government, with the Cabinet serving as the final mechanism for clearance and recommendation prior to the approval and the promulgation of the policy by the President of the United States. And, as you know, the national plan was promulgated by the President in October, 1958.

It is, of course, belaboring the obvious to state that many policies are shaped entirely within OCDM--those that are properly described as implementing policies. This is true in the case of any important program development.

So much for the policy-formulation role of OCDM. What are the important functions of policy implementation? Without attempting to cover the waterfront, let me list a few of the programs we are conducting in the field of what we know as civil defense.

1. We have developed a fine national warning system capable of flashing an attack warning to almost 300 key points in every State in a fraction of a minute--12 seconds, to be exact. These points would relay the word to every citizen. By 1 July 1960, there will be 376 points that will receive this early warning.

2. We maintain a good communications network. Radio backup to regions will be completed by 1 July 1960, and to the States by 1 January 1962.

3. The Federal Government created the Conalrad radio system, designed to give official emergency information and direction without giving enemy navigational aids.

4. We maintain emergency and medical stockpiles, containing, for example, over 1,900 emergency hospitals of 200 beds each, these hospitals including all the way from bandages up to x-ray machines. These are well dispersed throughout the country and are ready and available should there be an emergency.

5. We prepared the national plan, about which I spoke, to which every State and community survival plan is keyed. It fixes the responsibility of every government at every level.

6. We are creating by trained operators and distributing instruments a nationwide capability for detecting and measuring the deadly radiation from fallout. Today there are 1,006 monitoring stations operated by Federal agencies and over 14,000 by State and local governments. Funds are made available by Congress, and Congress here again is dragging its feet. This will be expanded to 150,000 fixed monitoring stations spread throughout the country. These monitoring stations will be manned by State and local government personnel, not specifically for this assignment, but with the secondary mission of taking over and rendering this service should there be a nuclear attack. Our objective to have this completed is 1 July 1963.

7. We are providing the guidance and example for the construction of shelters. The Federal Government is incorporating fallout protection in all of its new buildings. Prototype shelters are being constructed throughout the Nation. These prototype shelters include facilities within existing and newly constructed hospitals, within existing and newly constructed high schools, and within homes, within the highway programs, and within industrial plants. All types of shelters are being constructed with the \$2.5 million that was appropriated by Congress this year, in order to give examples to people, industry, and government.

8. We are working with the States in developing continuity-of-government programs designed to insure the operation of government following an attack.

9. Emergency action plans have been completed now in 47 States, 240 metropolitan areas, and over 2,100 local communities, all of which are being geared to the national plan. More are, however, being completed each week.

10. We have published an excellent booklet on home shelters, so that the people may be fully informed on how to create good protection from radioactive fallout. People can procure a copy from their local or State civil defense office or from our own office. The cost of this type of shelter and protection varies from \$150 to \$1,500.

11. We are doing our best to inform the American people of the threat, the effects of nuclear weapons, and how to protect yourself from it.

I appreciate this opportunity to visit with you today, because I am going to urge that when you return to your stations and to your communities, you be a leader to inform people of the threat, the effects of nuclear weapons, and what they should do to protect themselves from it. This is a tremendous task and probably one of our most difficult.

I recall when I served in the military forces it was difficult for me even as a platoon leader to get the message across to 45 men. I am trying now to get it to 180 million Americans, and I don't have them quite as well disciplined as I did this platoon.

Now, these are just a few things that we're doing. We will continue, of course, our best effort to make civil defense strong, to make it effective.

In the field of defense mobilization, we are having to reorient much of our national thinking. In World War I, World War II, and the Korean War, our mobilization base was geared exclusively to the production, distribution, and use of implements of war. Materials, manpower, production, transportation--these were the predominant concerns that pre-occupied us.

Furthermore, we had time in each case to untangle the initial snarls, time to organize our effort. In the event of general nuclear war, it seems crystal clear to me that we shall have no such time; that the initial and possibly the decisive period of such a war will be fought with what we have on hand. Therefore, of course, it's most significant that the plans we have available now be effective.

We are concerned also with the contingencies other than a general war. The cold war in which we are now engaged in our Nation's response to local aggression must also be served by our mobilization base. Until recently our national policy has had a built-in assumption of a period of six months for purposes of mobilization. This is no longer true, as I stated. And both military and nonmilitary mobilization base planning must take into account the possibility that an attack will come or may come with complete surprise.

Until recently, it was assumed that preparations for general war would be more than adequate as preparations to meet local aggression. This is not now the case, and the requirements of each must be separately studied as a basis for planning.

Until recently, there was no requirement that military planning for general war take account of probable nuclear damage. This too has been changed. Many estimates of military requirements in the event of general war are being reviewed and revised.

Unless you have been recently digging into your library on this specific point, I daresay that most of you will be surprised at the breadth of the current official definition of the mobilization base. The definition that has now been in effect for approximately two years states:

"For planning purposes the mobilization base is defined as the total of all resources available, or which can be made available, to meet foreseeable wartime needs. Such resources include the manpower and material resources and services required for the support of the essential military, civilian, and survival activities, as well as the elements affecting the state of readiness such as, but not limited to, the following: manning levels, state of training, modernization of equipment, mobilization of material reserves and facilities, the continuity of government, civil defense plans and preparedness measures, psychological preparedness

of people, international agreements, planning with industry, dispersion, standby legislation, and controls."

Here is no mere mobilization of men, money, and material. Here is a challenge to prepare the country both internally and externally to win any kind of conflict that may be thrust upon us. It is a challenge to be ready at all times in materials, skills, organization, foreign alliances, and attitudes.

I referred above to the implementation of certain policies governing nonmilitary defense. I should like to report briefly an additional program for which OCDM is responsible. The Federal Government maintains in the national stockpile supplies of 75 strategic and critical materials meeting stockpile specifications, valued at nearly \$6 billion. Supplemental stockpile and inventory supplies are valued at more than \$1.3 billion. While original procurement was undertaken with a view to meeting the needs of war production only, we are now currently undertaking a study of the critical requirements of recovery and reconstruction, which is just as important.

In cooperation with Defense and with AEC, a series of supply requirements studies have been conducted. The studies now under way include efforts to assess our capability to rehabilitate and reconstruct the economy after an attack, and a study of the possible use of Latin American resources in the survival and recovery period.

Together with responsible Federal agencies, we are well advanced in planning for emergency resource management, for food distribution, for manpower mobilization, for economic stabilization, for emergency assignment of communication facilities, for transportation, and jointly with Defense for wartime censorship.

Through assignment of responsibilities to the several agencies of Government and their recruitment of executive reservists to supplement agency personnel, provision for implementation of these plans is now being advanced. Plans for fuel and energy and for the production materials are now nearing completion. By the end of the current calendar year I expect to have all 40 annexes to our national plan completed and in the hands of the Federal, State, and local officials. If slightly more than a year seems like a long time for the development of these annexes, let me emphasize that they have had the same painstaking clearance and participation on the part of interested officials and groups as the plan itself.

You might be interested in this. For example, we delegate the Department of Labor to develop our manpower annex. However, they are instructed to work with the Selective Service, the Department of Defense, and the Civil Service Commission. We work with them. They work out then what they feel is a good, sound, national manpower plan. And then we clean it up within our respective agencies, and finally sit down again and say, "This is it."

And then we send it out to all the Federal agencies of the Government--Defense Department, State, Commerce--all of them--and also the State and local governments. We get comments back in a stack that high. Then we go through them to find out if there are some good recommendations and suggestions. And I want to point out that in many instances there are some real good ones. And when they are, in our opinion, sound, we adopt them; and then revise and rewrite the annex. And if it makes a great change in it, then we disseminate it again to all the Federal agencies and the State and local governments, and to all of our advisory committees. Generally then we get a concurrence. We finally get the four agencies that are directly concerned in and we work up what we think is the final draft. And then we send it out and say, "If we don't have any objections within two weeks, it's approved." It's a nice procedure. They can't react in two weeks.

However, that annex, and all 40 annexes, when they are completed, are not complete things. As in any plan, they must be constantly reviewed and analyzed, and must be constantly updated.

Now, in its implementing role the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization is perhaps analogous to a quarterback on a football team. Occasionally the quarterback carries the ball himself, but more often he passes it to one of his teammates for the execution of a well-rehearsed play. We

are engaged in frequent rehearsal with agencies of the Federal Government to which functions have been delegated, in order to assure effective functioning in time of crises; and in most instances we pass the ball to the other agencies. But when we pass it, we do not pass our overall responsibility to the President. We still must have that responsibility and retain it.

I should like to make one more point, however, before the question period. In any policy and program designed for implementation by all the people of the country, as is the case with that important segment of the civil defense program involving individual and family self-protection, the action elements must be developed and stated in simple terms. You in the military understand that. I understood it, because we had a lot of foul balls in my platoon that couldn't understand it unless it were simple. We prepared--and we are repeating it over and over again--the five fundamentals that every citizen must know and take action upon.

I never leave an audience without leaving these five fundamentals. I want every American to know them and take action upon them. Then they can say they had civil defense preparedness.

One is that they should know the warning signals and what they mean. There are just two of them. They're uniform throughout the Nation as a result of the national plan. A steady blast of three to five minutes means "Take action as directed by your local government." You should

know this local plan. If you do not, turn on your A. M. radio to 640 or 1240, Conalrad, for official direction. Now, a wailing tone--that's the second one--or short blasts for three minutes means, "Take cover immediately in the best available shelter." That's all. And yet when you poll the American people on these two simple signals, 30 percent of them come up with the right answer--only 30.

Second, know your community plan for emergency action. If you are in a target city, you will be asked to either move out or take the best available shelter. You in the military would have to know this. You certainly have a plan in your respective stations. If you don't, you're certainly derelict in your duty. But I know you do.

The decision, again, is a local one. If you are in a target city, you will be asked to either move out or take the best available shelter. The local authority makes the decision. If you are not in a target city, there's only one action and that's to take cover.

Now, three, you ought to know how to protect yourself from radioactive fallout. You should construct a fallout shelter, stock it with a two weeks' supply of food and water, a battery radio, a first-aid kit, and other essential items for survival. Designs and plans are being disseminated throughout the country. My own shelter cost \$212. It's the soundest investment I've ever made, because it's going to afford protection for my greatest possession--my family--\$212.

Fourth, first aid and home emergency preparedness. I don't need to tell you in the military that. All of you know first aid. This is essential for everyday living, as you know; but it's crucial in the case of a nuclear attack. Nobody is there to administer medical aid. You're on your own.

Fifth, learn how to use Conalrad, 640 and 1240. The radio industry has helped us by putting those little signs down there on 640 and 1240, because it's there that you'll get your official instructions and information.

Detailed information pertaining to these five points is available. We say this: By preparing now you will never have to ask the question, What shall I do should there be a nuclear attack? If every American would know and take action on the five fundamentals, then this Nation is assured that it cannot be destroyed. Then this Nation has another strong deterrent to war.

Thank you.

MR. MUNCY: Governor Hoegh is ready for your questions.

QUESTION: First of all I would like to say that I admire you for taking over this job in the first place. You indicated a great deal of sincerity and real down-to-earth concern about the need for getting on with the building of shelters and places to hide from nuclear attack. But the average American, it seems to me, is not convinced that this attack is

imminent; and he is not going to take this kind of measure, of spending \$200 or whatever it is to build a shelter unless he is convinced that it is imminent. My question is, What is being done to educate the American public of the imminence of this attack? And how can you educate them that there is an imminent attack when most of them would rather believe that Mr. Khrushchev was over here on a friendly visit, and so on?

GOVERNOR HOEGH: Of course you've hit a real problem. You really hit it. That's one reason I'm glad I'm here, because maybe you can give me the answer. But let me tell you what we're trying to do.

But first, before I come to the answer to that question, I don't think the people are complacent, because they are more than willing to pay their taxes today for military defense. No question about it. In this last session of the Congress you didn't hear any Congressmen speak up that we should cut the military budget 50 percent. If the public had demanded it, they would have. So they have a really keen sense insofar as the need for protection is concerned. They have that.

We haven't been able to get the message across to them that they have to do something about protecting themselves. They have the impression that maybe the military can do all of the protecting. That's been our past experience in World War I and World War II. We never worried about protecting ourselves on this continent. That's what makes it difficult.

We had a little experience in 1942, in February, I think it was, out on the West Coast, when everybody got trigger happy and was shooting up at the moon. That was a good thing, because it incited people a little and they put their heads down and took this thing maybe a little more seriously even after December 7th.

Now, what are we doing to try to impress the people? One is that we say that military defense is necessary. You have to have three points. You have to have a strong military defense, you have to have a hard-hitting retaliatory force, and you have to have an effective civil defense.

Civil defense depends upon governments, and most of all, upon people. We urge people to make a contribution toward the total security of this country by having a capability of protecting themselves. It's a difficult assignment.

You would be surprised how many people are taking some action. For instance, when they had this false alert in Chicago. And again let me point out very clearly, I don't control that siren in Chicago. The mayor does. But I had a stack of telegrams that high irrespective, which is all right. But the mayor had that responsibility. That siren was blown at an ungodly hour--10:30 at night--and they had never heard it at night, you know--just daytime.

I'm working over the reactions to that alert now. I was surprised how many people went to shelter, really did. And actually they were

blowing the shelter siren, I don't know whether by accident, luck, or what. But I was pleased with that result. Don't let that go outside, because I'll be condemned because I'm pleased with anything like that.

Now, let me get off of that. I'm getting in a tangent. Specifically, what are we doing?

One, we have in 3,500 high schools throughout the country--and we're going into 7,500 more this year--a course on detection, measurement, and reporting of radioactive fallout, by instruments. They go into the science classes. This last year we reached a million young Americans in the science classes of our high schools. They found out the threat, the effects of nuclear weapons, and what they had to do to protect themselves from it. That was the secondary mission. The primary mission was to teach them to detect, monitor, and report fallout. That will have some real, tangible results in about three years. Kids take messages like that back home. They discuss it.

Another thing we are doing, we are starting an adult education program with HEW. We are now in four States with adult education classes covering these same things. We hope Congress will give us the funds to go into 20 more States this coming fiscal year.

Next, of course, we do it with all mass media, trying to get the message across. I think probably one of the best salesmen we have is Dave Garroway on "Today."

Another way we're trying to do it is right with this audience. You are leaders. We're trying to do it with governors, mayors, county officials--leaders.

There are others, but I think I've taken enough time on it. But it's a real problem.

QUESTION: What is the possibility of extending the building program, for example, FHA loans, to include shelter construction?

GOVERNOR HOEGH: The State of New York is the leader in that. Governor Rockefeller about two months ago had a committee study it, and they came up with a specific recommendation that legislation should be passed to require every citizen to build fallout shelter in new construction, and within a period of 10 years to modify existing structures to provide it. That's the first State in this nation to lead off.

There are seven countries that have that type of legislation--Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, West Germany, the Netherlands, and Turkey. The West Germans are just getting it into gear, and they're really going to put this thing across.

Now, our policy today, our national policy, does not go that far. FHA can give you a loan to modify an existing house to provide fallout shelter. It cannot give you a loan to build a new home with fallout shelter incorporated, which is ridiculous, but which I think will be corrected.

Again, that's a process of implementation of policy, the formation of policy. We take it up in the Security Council. It gets batted around a little bit by Treasury and some others, sometimes even Defense. But eventually I think we will come up with a solution. We don't give up easily.

QUESTION: Governor, would you please relate the roles of the Business and Defense Services Administration and the Defense Materials Service to that of OCDM? There appears to me to be a similarity in the area of industrial mobilization planning.

GOVERNOR HOEGH: They have, through us, the delegated authority, they have the function, of the mobilization of resources. They can tabulate, for instance, where our resources are and what they are. And they, of course, are given that responsibility--Commerce, BDSA. It's our responsibility to coordinate it with the whole program. There is no chance of overlapping. It's a matter where they do it for us. We have staffs to work with them. But we have the responsibility of seeing that it's coordinated throughout the program.

QUESTION: Governor, this may sound like a political question. It is related to Captain Masterson's question. First, the Administration's party line seems to be that the Russians are doing O.K. in space, but that that has nothing too much to do with our relationship in the ICBM field. This seems to be the point of view that Dr. York took over the

radio this week. We have had speakers here who indicated the current Administration takes this view of these Russian accomplishments. Second, in terms of the national budget, one party calls the other "spenders," and the other party says, "We will spend less than you." Therefore it seems a little bit unfair to blame Congress, as you did, for not providing for civilian defense in this atmosphere. This picture is generated by the budget situation, the comforting words that we're in pretty good shape in missiles, and the hope that peace seems to be breaking out all over. Could you comment on this, please?

GOVERNOR HOEGH: First, with reference to space and ICBM's, I'm not an authority on either; but certainly I am conscious of the need for an effective retaliatory weapon. The ICBM is that. We could clobber Russia because of our, not ICBM's, not our intercontinental missiles, but of our other missiles. So I think they're right. There's no question in my mind.

Now, with reference to my picking on the Congress. That's a new one. They pick on me. I'll give you two examples.

I asked for \$12 million to implement this Federal, State, and local partnership arrangement--12 million bucks. What would I get in return for it if I had had the 12 million? I would have had five million State and local government employees rendering civil defense functions. Think of it. And all I wanted to do was to help the States and the local governments

finance adequate and competent staffs to advise them properly, direct them properly. Twelve million dollars.

If they don't give it to me some day, civil defense will be Federalized. And then instead of talking about \$12 million, we'll talk about half a billion dollars. How ridiculous can you get?

In normalcy, governments are to serve people. In case of a natural disaster, governments are to serve people. In the nuclear age, in case of a man-made disaster with nuclear weapons, the military can't do it. It couldn't serve the people. You haven't got enough. It will take governments.

That's just one example. I could bring in a couple more where they missed the boat.

QUESTION: In the policy for setting up stockpiles, both as to quantity and type of items that we are stockpiling, what is our policy now with respect to putting those items in the stockpile? Is it pointed toward a long, drawn-out war to serve our war industry, or is it pointed toward reconstituting our civilian requirements after an attack of this nature?

GOVERNOR HOEGH: Initially it was, of course, to meet the emergency requirements for a three-year period of emergency. That is, it was to meet civilian and military requirements for a three-year emergency period. I think initially it was five years, and then it was shifted to three. Now it's being revamped not only to do that but also to bring about recovery and rehabilitation after a nuclear attack.

Now, that takes quite a bit of IBM machine calculation. It's in the process. It's not completed yet. And that's why, you notice, we're not disposing of too many of these strategic materials. We may have to keep more aluminum on hand than what we would have to have for a three-year emergency period, in order to meet the requirements of recovery and rehabilitation after a nuclear attack.

QUESTION: Governor, there seems to be some reluctance on the part of certain individuals to accept the fact that OCDM has placed throughout the United States over 1,900 emergency hospitals. Perhaps you would care to tell us something about their location, the way they're stored, who would man them, and that sort of thing.

GOVERNOR HOEGH: We have exactly 1,932. The instruments and the equipment within these emergency hospitals would take care of up to approximately 500 persons each. Each one of the hospitals has 200 cots. But I think that in case of a real emergency, people can be treated quite well on the floor or on the ground, and cots should not therefore restrict the capacity of the hospital.

Next, these hospitals are put out to the States and to the local governments with priority in the vicinity of what we call critical target areas. Not all of them are committed that way. Others are in communities where there is no chance of it being a target except by it being a miss.

Next, personnel. Local doctors, helped in the training by HEW. Local doctors, nurses, and volunteers that go in and augment the capability of the local government will be or are trained and would operate the hospitals. And they are widely dispersed throughout the Nation.

You would be interested in knowing that in case of natural disasters, for instance, the fire in that schoolhouse in Chicago, they didn't have any of these massive, wide bandages. We had to break into one of our hospitals in order to get them.

For instance, we have emergency generators throughout the country, engineering equipment. Many times a storm will come along and knock out the local power and current. That was true up here in New York City. Fifty-four of our emergency generators were committed to permit surgery to go on. Some lives were saved. I could go on and point out that in many communities this past year our equipment has served the same role.

QUESTION: You have emphasized that you are giving a lot of training in our science classes in high schools on monitoring of fallout and the effects of nuclear weapons. What information do you have now with reference to the possibility of the use of BW and CW, inasmuch as the Russians have stated that they will use those agents in conjunction with the nuclear packages?

GOVERNOR HOEGH: That is covered, but very briefly, in this instruction. As a matter of fact, initially we gave that secondary emphasis. It gradually is coming up almost equal to radioactive fallout.

We are perfecting, with HEW again, this national plan on chemical and biological defense, and also in conjunction with the military. That capability is in the process of strengthening.

QUESTION: My question is similar to one that has been asked, but I'm still not quite clear in my own mind as to the real answer, I think it's generally agreed, and you briefly mentioned it in your talk--that in the event of another war we will not have time to mobilize our industry to build up to peak production; that we will have to fight with what we start with. Why are we spending millions of dollars to keep plants in standby condition, such as machine tools which are designed essentially for aircraft production, let's say, or such specialized production, keeping them in standby status? Why are we stockpiling these things when we could be spending this money to bring our force in being up to greater capacity?

GOVERNOR HOEGH: Just for the reason I gave, and that is that we must have the capability of recovery and rehabilitation. They will stand in good stead should there ever be a nuclear attack.

As a matter of fact, maybe we're not doing enough of it. Maybe we should be digging in some of these industries, like some of the European

countries are. West Germany is starting to do it. Norway, Sweden, and Denmark have been doing it for years. And that is being given consideration.

QUESTION: On the other side of the coin, I notice you have done a lot of inventorying of, I think it was, particularly construction materials, equipment, and so on. Following a nuclear attack I think we'll have mass confusion.

GOVERNOR HOEGH: So do I.

STUDENT: My question is, From a policy point of view what progress is being made in establishing procedures to allocate these resources to the more important jobs at hand?

GOVERNOR HOEGH: Well, based upon assumptions--and that means taking into consideration assumptions that we generate from different attack patterns, which are quite flexible--then we learn, of course, what essential resources remain, what we have left, based upon different attack patterns. Secondly, we have plans as to how these resources are to be committed, with priority for military and AEC and civilian recovery. I think it's being done.

Now, I recognize that you are going to lose communications for many of these. But you have throughout the country regional offices that are strengthened with people of know-how from industry. We call that the executive reserve program. These people know quite well the general

resources within that area and within that region, augmented by what we have in our files right there. So that they would have a survey and information as to the manpower and as to the resources available within the region. When we play these Operation Alerts, for instance, that comes into being; and that is our method of testing the plans that we have with reference to the mobilization of these resources.

QUESTION: Governor, how active are Mexico, South America, and Central America in our planning program?

GOVERNOR HOEGH: I made mention that we were now in the process of surveying their resources for our mutual use should there be a nuclear attack. That has just been under way a few months.

We depend a great deal on Canada, not depend, but at least we work very closely with them.

COMMENT: I would like to attempt to supplement a little bit your answer to the question on why we have these standby facilities if we must fight with what we have. We are planning for two possibilities--the possibility of general war and the possibility of limited war; and I would suggest that these standby facilities are largely important resources for a limited war.

GOVERNOR HOEGH: Yes. But also they can stand us in good stead for a general war.

Yes; I forgot to mention that there are three contingencies. One is extreme tension. Another one is limited war. Another one is nuclear war. And under the nuclear war you could have just a good war right here without it.

QUESTION: Can you tell us something about the Russian civil defense program as an indication of what their intentions might be?

GOVERNOR HOEGH: I am somewhat familiar with civil defense in Russia. I have never seen it, but from reports that we do read and examine, I know something about it.

They keep informing their people that they must have a capability of protecting themselves from air raids. They don't go as far as we do in informing people of the effects of nuclear weapons and what they must do to protect themselves from them. But in their protection from air raids they do cover the same subject matter generally as we do. But they are not honest with their people to tell them the actual effects of nuclear weapons.

They require all of their citizens to take 22 hours training each year in survival measures--civil defense. The hierarchy in Russia does have the information, and the shelters that they have are available for the hierarchy. I would say that the general mass of the people do not have shelters in Russia, but the hierarchy does.

QUESTION: I wonder if you would comment briefly on the reasons for the assigned responsibility to OCDM for coming to an agreement with the armed services committees of Congress on real estate matters beyond a certain amount of funds.

GOVERNOR HOEGH: I am not familiar with that.

MR. MUNCY: Are you referring to public indemnity, the Government taking over some indemnification for real estate damaged in an attack?

QUESTION: Yes, sir. I saw that in the assigned responsibilities in some paper.

GOVERNOR HOEGH: You said it was limited to real estate?

STUDENT: Yes, sir. Real estate or largely facilities, and I wondered whether it was premobilization or very possibly it was speaking of aftermobilization real estate.

GOVERNOR HOEGH: Well, we have the authority to condemn real estate for the security of the Nation. Certainly we're not going to condemn any military real estate, but we probably would some civil real estate.

We have a general agreement with the Department of Defense on matters like that, and also the role of the military. But I really don't follow your other. I might be in the dark, but I don't think I am.

It might be one of those Drew Pearson articles. I learn a lot of things there. Sometimes he's on the stick, but generally he's 160 degrees off, maybe 359.

QUESTION: You made the point that in a future war we probably wouldn't have the time to unravel the snarls in priorities and allocations and orders and so on. I understand that you have this machinery or are in the process of setting it up, so it would be available on call when needed. There would be two questions, sir. One, is this pretty well done, or in process? Secondly, are the people in industry familiar with this, so that when a new regulation is proposed, the company would understand it? Or would there be an educational problem involved?

GOVERNOR HOEGH: First I'd say that we know where we want to go. I'd say we're not there, very candidly. But I'd say this: that we are going to be closer to the goal each day; and as these annexes are consummated and completed, it does give us than a definite objective and how we're going to reach it. And the agencies have assumed their responsibilities in the development of them and in the implementation of them and putting them into action.

Now, the second part of your question was what, again?

STUDENT: Do the people in industry know--

GOVERNOR HOEGH: Yes. Through the executive reserve program we have been able to keep them quite well indoctrinated currently. But,

of course, they have to have the completed document before they could be fully effective. But we work very closely with them. When I say "executive reserve program" I am talking about executives--presidents, managers of industries of all types.

QUESTION: You mentioned as one of your five fundamental points a two weeks' food supply. Could you comment about our food problem in the event of a nuclear attack, what our program is?

GOVERNOR HOEGH: Well, generally speaking, we start with this premise: It's going to be difficult to serve people the first two weeks, because of the fallout hazard. It's going to be difficult to get to them. Therefore individual families must be capable of sustaining themselves for two weeks.

The local government should be able to respond within a two week period; and so should the State government generally speaking. So we are counting on the individual citizens, the State, and the local governments to take care of these people the first 30 days, with the full realization that the Federal Government must come in as soon as it can with its strategically stocked foodstuffs, for the support of the people.

For instance, we have bins and bins of wheat and corn. It's not surplus. It's a good strategic stockpile of essential resources. You would think I was making a political speech, but that's the way I look at it. We've got enough bins of wheat and corn that we can take care of

the people for a pretty good period of time. There will not be a shortage of food. We're not going to eat these chocolate bars that they gave us during World War II. We're going to have something a little more palatable--corn and wheat with water.

QUESTION: Philip Wylie wrote a book a couple of years ago which purports to give a program for tomorrow in which he tried to envision an attack upon the United States in which some 25 cities were devastated. He described one which had a real civil defense program and another which did not. But in this book he advances another thought which I think is very pertinent--that in all the other hundreds of cities which managed to survive this attack the people certainly realize that a city is a very unhealthy place to be in in case of a nuclear attack and they all rush out into the countryside and there was not enough of them to go back into the target area. It seems to me this will probably actually happen in a nuclear attack. I wonder if you people have given any thought on how you are going to get people to go back in and work in the factories in the target areas that may not have been hit the first time.

GOVERNOR HOEGH: First of all, I want to give the people credit for being smart. If I lived in a target city and I got out once and I knew that these bombs were coming over, I wouldn't go back either until I knew the enemy was out of bombs.

Now, when the enemy has dissipated its bombs, no longer are we going to be hit. I'm not worrying about that. I don't think we're going to be hit more than once. I give the defense a lot of credit. I am one of your greatest backers to the Congress, to people, and my own agency. I want you to have all the funds you need. I don't want two attacks. I just want one.

Now, after that's hit, I think that when people know the radiation has been reduced sufficiently, they will go back in. I'm sure of that. There will be many areas where they can't go back in for five years. That's very true. About 3 percent of the area of the United States would have to be abandoned for from one to five years. We will know that. We're not going to let them in there.

MR. MUNCY: Governor Hoegh, we are indeed very pleased with the manner in which you answered our questions with frankness this morning. You have convinced us that you are a man with many helpful ideas on how to work out our problems.

There is one further thing I'd like to say. We will pledge ourselves to keep in confidence the statement you made regarding the use of air raid sirens in Chicago when Chicago won that game. But what we want to know, are you a White Sox fan?

GOVERNOR HOEGH: I am very happy to answer that question. After this three to one, I became a Dodger fan.