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PUBLIC INFLUENCE UPON NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

Dr. Abdul A. Said

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Reviewed by: Captain W. P. Schoeni, USN

Date: 23 October 1959

INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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12 October 1959

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COLONEL LACKAS: General Houseman, Gentlemen: In developing the unit on National Security Objectives and Requirements, the attempt was made to provide you with an insight as to the roles of the various elements that go into the formulation of national security policy and to see that those various roles were covered. Incidentally, one of these roles, that of the legislature, was covered in the Foundations Course. Since then you have had the National Security Council, OCDM, and the role of the Intelligence Community. The lecture following the one you will presently hear will concern itself with the role of the Department of Defense.

Our lecture this morning is concerned with the role of the public in the formulation of national security policy. In the selection of a speaker, there was some difficulty involved, and it was fortunate that the course in atomic physics was off Channel 4 that particular June morning, and I turned in CBS and listened to our speaker this morning presenting a telecast course on world politics. At that very moment he was talking about the subject which I was concerned with at that time and which he will speak to you about this morning.

It gives me a great deal of pleasure to present to this Class Dr. Abdul Said, Professor at the School of International Service at American University. Dr. Said.

DR. SAID: Thank you very much. Gentlemen: I am very delighted to be here with this distinguished audience. While I was finding my way through, I was told, "Do not be deceived by the way they are dressed. They are all militarists." So I hope I'll be deceived.

The subject for this morning is one which has not been clearly formulated either in my mind or in the minds of those of us who are concerned with the various forces which play and exert pressure on the formulation of foreign policy and national security.

Many years ago, when the American Armies occupied Morocco, a young American captain, perhaps from the City of New York, was passing through the City of Casa Blanca, and every morning and afternoon he used to meet with four natives, about 19 or 20 years old, young looking, and apparently very strong; but they were very idle; they never did anything. Day in and day out he constantly saw them beneath the shade of a tree. One day he couldn't take it any more and, with an American-Arab accent, he came up in front of them and said, "Why don't you do something for a living?" The spokesman of the natives said, "What do you mean, a living?" The American said, "Why don't you work?" The native said, "Why should we work?" "Well," said the American, "to make money." The native asked, "Why should we make money?" The captain said, "To be able to travel, and then, maybe when you are 60 or 65 years old, you will be able to retire." Said the

native, "My friend, we have retired at the age of 20."

This applies to our topic this morning. I have retired even before trying to investigate my topic any further. In trying to analyze international politics--and my field is strictly in that of the philosophy of international politics--I am not an expert in any region nor am I an expert on any particular topic. I might be referred to as a generalist in international politics.

In order to locate the specific impact of the various elements and forces, one has to go back a step beyond the current events and discern the nature of the national state system, because, unless one understands the nature of the national state system, it may be completely impossible to locate and analyze the function of national security.

The state is definitely a very unfortunate form of political organization. I say unfortunate, but it is nevertheless very essential. And in life oftentimes many things which are very unfortunate become very essential. Because it has proved to be essential, man has insisted on the continuation of this organization which I referred to as the national state system. The national state system was created as a result of two basic motivations or two basic forces. One of them is to permit individuals to cooperate successfully, to support them, and to assist them in that cooperation toward achieving objectives and aims which they cherish and hold in common; yet, on the other hand, to also assist them in their competition; in a sense to see to it that, while they are competing, they are competing in

such a fashion as will not ultimately result in mutual destruction.

Accordingly, cooperation in the pursuit of common objectives, and competition in the pursuit of divergent ones, accounts for the establishment of the national state system, and once that national state system was established in order to justify its existence and in order to continue its livelihood, the state itself found it necessary to perform certain functions. There are definitely many functions. They could all be summed up. One could say that the basic function of the state is to safeguard and promote the interests and the survival of that particular state.

Of course, if states do not live they are out of business, and no state is willing to run out of business by permitting another state to occupy its territory. Accordingly, this element of survival becomes a very essential one, and throughout history, modern and ancient, it has been proven that political independence alone is not enough to insure that individuals pursue successfully their happiness and achieve successfully their potentialities. Throughout history it has become evident that political, cultural, and economic independence alone does not suffice for nations to pursue the happiness of their individuals. Throughout modern history it has been evident that, in order to successfully pursue individual happiness as they see fit and to fulfill the individual potentialities, oftentimes assistance has been needed, and this assistance

oftentimes comes from the "haves" to the "have nots." Those who do not have attempt to secure or procure that assistance from those who have.

This is where the role of foreign policy becomes important. What is foreign policy? It is merely that machinery through which a nation conducts its business with the other nations of the world. In a way, foreign policy becomes a way of living, because foreign policy consists of human interactions. The men who conduct foreign policies are not derived from the national zoo; they are not camels, they are not lions, even though they may behave like lions; they are human beings. Foreign policy is a human process. It is a process of human interactions, and accordingly it has the earmarks of irrationalities. Oftentimes we may criticize the actions of Mr. Herter, Mr. Acheson, or Mr. Dulles, but please always remember that those three gentlemen, and many other gentlemen concerned in the formulation of either foreign policy or defense, have to act. All of you are in the service, and you are acquainted with deadlines. Mr. Herter could not tomorrow morning awake and tell the American public, "Gentlemen, there is no foreign policy this morning. Go to sleep."

A minister of foreign affairs is very similar to a newspaper man. When you read newspapers, oftentimes you will read big headlines-- KOREA ATTACKED! KASSEM ASSASSINATED!--but, whenever no significant event has occurred, a kiss by Marilyn Monroe to another

gentleman occupies the headlines. A very insignificant detail becomes very important. The same applies to foreign policies. A statesman cannot come and say there is no foreign policy. That is his business. Through foreign policy he has to justify his living.

Foreign policies are designed primarily to promote the national goals of a state or a nation. All of us are acquainted with national goals. They are merely those aims and objectives which a people believe to be desirable. A national goal is a future state of affairs which a nation feels most desirable for the fulfillment of its happiness, aspirations, and potentialities. Yet, in order to be capable to further and promote national goals, every nation on earth has found it necessary for its foreign policy to perform certain specific functions. From the nature of those national goals, the functions of foreign policy emerge.

One of the basic functions is the preservation of the territorial integrity of the state. A second, equally important, function would be to defend the independence of that state. One may add many other functions, but these two--to preserve the territorial integrity of the state and to defend the political independence of the state--are the functions which every state must perform in order to promote its national goals and in order to defend the existence of its particular state.

With this, now, we try to attack our main topic for this morning. How do we tie up, then, the functions of foreign policy with defense and public? One could sum up the functions of foreign policies as follows:

The functions of the foreign policies of any nation are to defend the interests and survival of that particular nation. This is the basic prerequisite of the functions of any foreign policy--to protect or defend in survival the existence of that particular state. Throughout history it has been apparent that, when we speak of the function of a foreign policy, when we speak of defending in survival the existence of that foreign policy, the more powerful a state feels, the more secure it believes it is, meaning, the more powerful we are--and this applies to every state--the more secure we feel we are at that moment.

This is where the element of national security and foreign policy interact. Beginning with this moment, they interact at every step of the road in the field of international politics. Officers, military men, in a way, beginning with this moment, perform double functions. They perform two shifts. They are two-toned diplomats, because nations cannot rely on the good intentions of other nations, and a dilemma develops here. Once you feel you cannot rely on the good intentions of the other nations, you have two alternatives to face. If you expect war you have to prepare yourself to establish conditions favorable to a preventive war. If you don't expect war you invite aggression.

Which one of the two alternatives are we to follow? Should we constantly expect war, we should then constantly try to establish conditions favorable to a preventive war. Should we not expect war, and should we then rely on the good intentions of either our friends or our

competitors, then again we are inviting aggression.

But this is not the whole story. It was suggested, or pointed out, that the function of foreign policy is to protect the interests in survival of a nation. Now we come to the second point. What do we mean by interests? This is a term which we encounter many times in the field of diplomacy--national interests. It has been given many definitions by many authorities and many politicians. Actually, the concept of the national interest is the central focus of reference in the field of international politics; because every foreign policy is conducted with reference to the national interests, and every national interest is conceived with reference to power. This claim could be refuted by some authorities, as they have very well done. But the two elements constantly tie in together--interest and power.

This gives rise to the question: What is the substance of national interests, or what are the elements which make up the national interests of a nation? One could assume, perhaps falsely or perhaps correctly, that the national interest contains two basic elements--and I underline the term, basic. The first force or element is survival. See, we are constantly going back and trying to emphasize and reemphasize the element of survival or security. The first element is survival. Yet the second element which makes up national interests, which is equally important to survival, is survival in a certain fashion which a nation deems to be desirable--not only survival. Survival alone does not suffice

to make up or to create a national interest, but survival in a fashion which we believe to be desirable does.

Gentlemen, you are all acquainted with this. You go home and the wife comes and says, "Well, I don't have anything to wear any more." What she really means is not that she does not have anything to put on, because I am sure if you consult her wardrobe you will find many dresses and many coats, but she does not have anything fashionable to wear. And this applies to national interests. It is not survival--it is not wearing a dress any more--but rather wearing a certain dress which is fashionable, a certain dress which is acceptable, a certain dress which is attractive.

This explains the foreign policies of the Soviet Union, the foreign policies of Nazi Germany and of Fascist Italy in the past. And oftentimes we wonder, why is it that these nations conducted those foreign policies. The second element of national interests becomes equally important as the first one. It is completely nonsensical, irrational, to go and convince those people that the second element is not important, as it is completely nonsensical to convince your wife--well, you may be able to do it--that the new fashion isn't good any more; but you are the greatest diplomat if you could do that. If you could convince your wife that she looks ugly in a mink coat, then you have achieved the apex of diplomacy. I wonder how many persons could ever achieve that.

This is where the second element becomes important, and this is

where the public enters into the picture. We tried to show how national security enters into it. The first element brings in national security, the element of survival. This is where national security enters into the picture. The second element brings in the public. Yet, while we are saying this, besides the two elements it has to be borne in mind that the concept of survival came about because of the constancy of the threat to which every nation throughout history has been exposed, and this permanency of the threat to which every nation has been continuously exposed has been outbased by the ability of the human mind to transform the concept of survival into ideology. Because he is constantly threatened by external forces, his mind, his imagination, succeeded in converting that concept of survival into ideological considerations. This is where the human mind has achieved a great success.

Now, with this we come to the next topic: What has been or what is the role of the public? This is a topic which is very close to my heart. I will try to attack it from various points, as I do in the seminars--not really in lecture form. I try to point out the various angles. Two years ago a great debate developed in the United States centering around the following theme: Should foreign policy and domestic politics be divorced? Should domestic politics be completely divorced from foreign policy? I would like to comment briefly on this point. In a way I conceive of the state as a household. I conceive of the husband as the minister of external affairs of that household. He is the man who carries out the

functions of survival and the functions of survival in a certain fashion. He is the man who has to make a living. He is the man who has to face the outside world. He is the foreign policy of the household. On the other hand, the wife is the person in charge of internal artilleries-- we have dictatorships. She is the person in charge of the internal affairs of the house. She is the domestic policy.

Gentlemen, the more the wife becomes nagging in that household, the more difficult would it become for the husband to conduct a successful foreign policy--meaning, to conduct himself, he will go to the office not in the most cheerful mood. He may not receive his promotions; he may not be very friendly with his associates. Yet, on the other hand, the more demanding a man becomes within the household, the more difficult would it become for the wife to conduct the affairs of that household.

So the question is not really one of divorcing one element from the other, because, in divorce you can have divorce, and that will result in the termination of that association. You cannot say should we or should we not divorce foreign policy from domestic policy. That is completely beside the point; that is completely irrelevant, because, throughout modern history it has appeared that the foreign policies of any great power--and the United States of America is a great power, even though it has taken us about 47 years to find out that we are a great power--but this is natural; when a person becomes a millionaire it takes him a while to learn the good taverns in town, the good dresses, et cetera, so we

should not criticize the United States- ~~but the~~ ^{the} foreign policies of any nation must need a double standard--this is inevitable--the standards of international politics and the standard of domestic politics. The greater the standards of one becomes remote from the other, the more difficult would it be for that nation to pursue a rational foreign policy. In order to reconcile the two standards, a people must accept reality, and in order to accept reality a people must also understand their history, and a people could only understand their history on the basis of their own experiences.

Going back to the two issues, then, when you divorce one from the other you have completely assassinated the household. Yet, when the husband imposes his will upon the wife and the children day in and day out, she may go to Alabama or Nevada. Who knows? And vice versa; it may occur in the other situation.

This is where the great debate arises as to how and what should be the role of the public in the formulation of national security policy. And let's use the term, national security, because foreign policy becomes converted into national security.

I would like to refer to the present Administration in the United States of America. Personally, I am neither a Democrat nor a Republican, and I will try to comment on the present Administration as objectively as possible. The present Administration, similar to many other administrations, correctly believes that foreign policy must be responsible

to the public. That is true. There is no argument against that. The foreign policy of a liberal democratic nation must always be responsible to the will of the people of that nation. However, the present Administration commits a grave error in the fashion it attempts to bring about this response. It assumes correctly that it must be responsible, yet, when you analyze the manner and the fashion in which it tries to bring about this response, this is where the error is committed. And, unfortunately, this is where the error has been committed in many recent decades in American foreign policy. The present Administration believes that public opinion is the arbiter, the ultimate umpire, the ultimate arbiter of foreign policy. Again here we have no argument against the present Administration.

However, the present Administration believes--and this is where the second error is committed--that public opinion pre-exists foreign policy. Of course this is the greatest debate of our time. Does public opinion pre-exist a certain foreign policy or does it not? There are many excellent comments on this topic. Walter Lippman in his early days wrote an excellent and brilliant book about it, entitled "Public Opinion." Many books are constantly written about the topic. About 50 percent of our authorities and philosophers and statesmen believe that public opinion pre-exists foreign policy.

Yet, personally, I cannot conceive of how one could reasonably state that public opinion pre-exists foreign policy. If one states that

public opinion pre-exists foreign policy, then one is really stating that a certain rule of law pre-exists the actions by which it is to be judged. To me this is completely inconceivable. How could one say that a certain regulation pre-exists the action by which this regulation is to be judged upon or by. This, I think, is where the error lies. Whenever our Secretary of State addresses the American public, at least, ever since 1947, or perhaps 1946, he has been concerned merely with discerning the reaction of the public. There is nothing wrong with that. But, what has been the extent of our leadership in trying to achieve two functions? First, to try to understand the reaction of the public, but, second, to try to make that public understand your foreign policy, despite the fact that it may be completely inconsistent with the various stereotypes which that public may hold.

Let's face it, gentlemen--every great power must bluff in the field of foreign policy. There is a certain amount of bluff which is completely necessary, as there is a certain amount of bluff in the household. You cannot merely tell your wife in the morning that she does not look as beautiful without her makeup as she does with her makeup. A certain amount of bluff is inevitable in trying to conduct a foreign policy, especially when it comes to a great power.

But, in order to be able to bluff successfully--and I am not using the term, bluff, in any vicious fashion--you must bluff within the same framework of a consistent foreign policy. You must bluff within the

framework of a foreign policy understandable to the public. This has been the problem. Actually, I do not believe that our Government has successfully bluffed our public. A number of professors do believe that. A number of statesmen do believe that the American Government is the greatest bluffer on earth when it comes to public opinion. I do not believe we are such great bluffers of our public opinion, because, any bluff in the field of internal politics reflecting foreign policies would have to be within the framework of a constant foreign policy. In the case of Hungary, in the case of Egypt, in the case of Lebanon, in the case of Korea, many of those tactics in order to secure and defend national security were correct, but the fashion or the manner with which those tactics were carried out could stand some improvement.

We must conceive of public opinion, then, as something which is not static. It is something which is dynamic. It is something which is in constant motion. It is something which needs constant shaping and reshaping. It is something which the leaders of a state must, in a certain fashion, not exactly create but shape because they are the persons who shape the foreign policy of that state. And, because they are the persons who shape the foreign policy of that state, they also must be responsible for the reshaping of the reaction to that foreign policy, not in the sense of imposing that foreign policy upon the people but in the sense of making that foreign policy understood by the people and to the people.

Now, you may say: But, why should we bluff? I have answered the question in some cases: Well, either we believe in our foreign policy or we do not believe in our foreign policy. Either we believe in Mr. Eisenhower, or we do not believe in Mr. Eisenhower. Either we believe in Mr. Herter or we do not believe in Mr. Herter. Either we believe in our Congress or we do not believe in it. Once you say that you assume you believe in that Congress, that you believe in that leadership which you have elected, then, on the other hand, it is also assumed that that leadership must, to a certain extent, be acquainted with the realities in the international scene.

Another point must be added here, and this applies to us in the United States of America. It has applied to the United Kingdom in the past and it applies to the United Kingdom today. It applies to all those nations possessed of a liberal democratic system. It is this: The foreign policies of any democratic nation--and when I say democratic I imply a liberal democracy, as opposed to the so-called "people's democracy," et cetera, et cetera--are inevitably a compromise. Our foreign policy has been, remains to be, and perhaps will always remain to be, as long as we have a government similar to what Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Jefferson did desire, and has to be, a compromise between two elements--the rational requirements of a sound foreign policy, and the irrational preferences of public opinion. There is no way about or around this. It has to be a compromise between the rational requirements of a

foreign policy, and the emotional preferences of the public. The preferences of the public are emotional. And it will not help us to try to do away with this compromise.

The issue which arises is not to kill the compromise but rather to convert this compromise into a much more reasonable and a much more workable foreign policy. That leadership which formulates foreign policy has also to influence, in a democracy, in a liberal fashion, that public opinion. It can influence that public opinion only if it has a consistent foreign policy. It can have a consistent foreign policy only if it has a precise concept of its national goals. And it can have a precise concept of its national goals if it can develop a stronger common denominator internally—which brings us to the concept of the various pressure groups in the United States.

A certain authority in the field of diplomacy has stated in a book that Americans cannot pursue a uniform concept of a national interest. He said, "America can never have a unified national interest, because America is a Nation composed of many aliens bringing with them various cultural heritages, bringing with them various experiences." This is not a Communist. He is a great American philosopher. He says America is a Nation of diversities. This, he claims, accounts for the fact that oftentimes we do not know exactly what it is that we are trying to further in international politics. Some of us believe that Mr. Herter should act as a bishop and that he should behave in such a fashion as a bishop

does in running the Church, that his basic function is to spread love throughout humanity. Others claim that he is not a bishop, and I claim that, if he wants to be a bishop, that will be fine; let him be a bishop. But he is the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United States.

I do not believe the view that, because we have different cultures, we cannot have a unified national interest. I do believe this is not the reason. In the field of international politics and national security, domestic politics could exert pressure through the following methods: One is the various vested socio-economic groups within the Nation; another one is domestic politics itself; and still another one consists of various regional and other organizations.

In this Nation at present, socio-economic groups, or economic groups in particular, do exert a great pressure on the conduct of our foreign policy. The issue, then, is: How are we to establish an equilibrium between the socio-economic groups, political parties, and other regional or national organizations throughout the United States? There are many answers to it. One is more interest. One thing that is most fascinating about the United States--I have been here altogether nine years, but for the last seven years I have been residing here constantly--is the outstanding development in the United States in the last seven years. It has not been the Chevrolet Corvair; it has not been Mickey Mouse movies; nor has it been some great highways. It is the fact that Americans in the last seven years, not only mentally but spiritually,

have become and have adjusted themselves to the fact that they are the greatest power on earth. More than ever before you find this in the United States of America. Actually, you became the greatest power on earth beginning with the latter days of the 19th or the 20th century. It took us many years to adjust ourselves to this fact.

Yet there is another great achievement about us. You know, we entered the First World War, the Second World War, and the Korean War not really to help democracies against totalitarian regimes, as much as we may like to claim we did--this is a part of diplomacy by hoax--but rather to reaffirm the secure and detached position which we have inherited from our Founding Fathers. But, since the Korean War, we have been dealing with other nations not only to secure the detached secure position which we did inherit from our Founding Fathers but to play the role of a guardian. Until the Korean War we were interested really only in defending ourselves, no more no less. Even though we gave foreign aid, and even though we did this and that, we were merely concerned with securing our own position. After that we have realized something more has developed, and we are accepting it, assuming the leadership.

This is why the period since 1953 has been a period of many difficulties in American foreign policy, because, when a young person assumes many responsibilities for many years to come, he will feel burdened and

encumbered with those responsibilities, and, in that moment of feeling the burden, he may sway around. He may not walk very consistently; he may not act very rationally. But, again, it is very delightful to observe that that period is gradually passing away.

I will conclude with a statement, with a comment, which interests me very much, and I believe you will be interested in it, too. The concept of war as it applies to what we have been discussing has been described and many books have come out about war and about the impact of nuclear weapons upon war. Gentlemen, throughout history, nations have had three choices in their conduct of foreign policy. One choice was to deny their importance to other nations and to deny the importance of other nations to them--meaning neutrality. Another choice throughout history has ^{been} to impose their will upon other nations by force--that means war. And the third alternative has been to compromise or to negotiate with other nations.

With the beginnings of history and until about the year 1947, these three alternatives were operative in international politics. Beginning with 1947, or perhaps beginning with 1945 or 1944, the emergence of new instrumentalities of power did play and still plays an important role. In the past, until 1947, nations could have pursued any one of those three alternatives without any great risk--meaning that, throughout history there has been a rationality and equality only between those three alternatives. Any one of those three alternatives, any choice,

was based on a rational calculation, on a rational equality, in the sense that nations have calculated in the past that, "Well, we may go to war, but war will not bring about complete destruction, anyway. We may lose, and, if we lose, then we will wait another 20 years and we will wage a second war." So there was some rationality in the sense that losses were equal to risks and risks were equal to gains. What I am trying to say is really this: Until 1947 any one of those three alternatives, particularly war, was conceived as a means and as an instrument for self-survival. This has really been true in history. This may sound irrational, but war was looked upon as a means of survival. Throughout history war has been conceived as that honorable alternative when a person or a nation found itself in a psychological dead-end street. When a nation found itself in a psychological dead-end street, the only honorable alternative of retreat was war--meaning self-survival.

The development of new instrumentalities of power, in the form of nuclear and perhaps other instrumentalities of the future, ^{has destroyed} /this rational equality. Beginning with 1947, gentlemen--and this is where national security becomes very important, this is why the American Armed Forces become very important--diplomacy has become an auxiliary of war. This is very interesting. This has been the greatest development in power politics, and this explains the dilemma which we have been facing. We inherited leadership to discover that the traditional

methods of diplomacy are not applicable, to discover that the rational equality between the three alternatives has been destroyed, to discover that we have become much more limited in our diplomatic methods and tactics, and to further discover that diplomacy has become an auxiliary of war.

This in a way explains the visit of Mr. Khrushchev to the United States. Both of us are fed up--we and the Soviets--with the fact that diplomacy is behaving merely as an auxiliary of war, but I think Mr. Khrushchev is more concerned with other things. When diplomacy becomes an auxiliary of war, the role of the Armed Forces becomes important. In a nation of totalitarian philosophy, the Armed Forces become a complete instrument of the government, and accordingly cannot play any significant role in the formulation of national defense, whereas in a nation such as the United States--you may not be able to accept this--the Armed Forces become a very significant instrument in this period of diplomacy being an auxiliary of war.

The Administration cannot play the Armed Forces as an instrument, but must conceive of the Armed Forces as a partner in this venture. The more international politics deteriorate, the more difficult will it be to reconcile between the fact of partnership in national defense, between government and armed forces.

At present we are observing indications that a compromise is developing. I would like merely to conclude by saying that in the future

what will decide the ultimate destiny is not really how strong we are, because now strength between us and the Soviets is not becoming so very important. The tangible elements of national power at present are decreasing in importance. Actually, what will decide the ultimate destiny is going to be the methods of exercising national power. There are many methods through which national power can be exercised, and I think that is going to decide the ultimate fate as to whether we will be able to defend and protect that which we believe in, whether we have the guts to do it. History has proven that we as Americans do not have the stomach for imperialism. We do not like it. It is repugnant to us. Mr. Dulles said he would go to the brink of war. The moment he arrived at the brink he looked down there, his stomach was upset, and he retreated. We simply do not have the stomach for imperialism.

As I was telling a friend of mine yesterday, this is the only nation on earth, throughout all recorded history, the only nation which has become the greatest power on earth without colonialism. I think this is something that we can be very proud of.

Thank you very much. I shall be very happy to answer any questions.

COLONEL LACKAS: Gentlemen, your questions.

QUESTION: Dr. Said, in your provocative and exhilarating address this morning, you made these statements: "Every great power must bluff in the field of foreign policy. To do this successfully, the bluff

must be done within the framework of a foreign policy understood by the public." Dr. Said, it seems to me that very few people in this great country of ours actually understand what constitutes our foreign policy. As a matter of fact, I doubt that very many students here in this auditorium understand it. Can you suggest, sir, what steps might be taken to enlighten our citizenry in the field of foreign policy?

DR. SAID: The foreign policy of a nation must be a reflection of what the leaders of that nation conceive to be the basic objects of their society. The original basic objects of our society are very simple-- that every person can pursue his happiness, that every person can have liberty, that every person can have security; and the fourth one, to me a very significant one--I consult the thinking of the Founding Fathers-- that every person must have the right of economic freedom. Those basic concepts are still applicable. Our objectives have not changed, and accordingly our foreign policy really should not change. However, what should happen is, having become the greatest power on earth, we must develop a greater and a larger concept of our objectives. When Vice President Nixon went to Latin America, in some cases he was not received in an honorable fashion. Immediately following that, what did we do in the United States? Professors and leaders and scholars and intellectuals, everybody, said: "Where have we committed the error in selling our idea to Latin America?" I stood up and said, "This is not the issue.

The issue is: Where have we committed the error of not trying to understand the idea of Latin America?" You can hardly sell your idea before you understand their idea. What could be done about this? Definitely, there could be better media of communication. I personally have performed quasi roles--I have been teaching and I have been on television commenting on news. There is something which is more desirable and could be achieved in that field, the media of communication, more intelligent media. Second, there could be improvement in the field of education. Maybe it is high time in the United States--and this is always my approach in my classes--that we seek not only for the mere purpose of finding solutions to practical problems but seek knowledge for the sake of knowledge itself.

The two elements are very important, and I think that should be the cornerstone of our philosophy in education; that, first, we must find practical solutions to problems, but second, and equally important, we must seek knowledge for the sake of knowledge itself.

Three days ago I received a house guest who came from the Middle East. I went to the airport to drive him in. He is my guest now. His first comment, after driving through the city was: "Friend, I have visited all continents, but never in my life have I seen a country where the people have worked so hard to build it up." That was his first reaction to the United States. He said, "Here I see a great deal

of work that has been put into building this." So I think education is very important. It could be further developed, and I think education and better media of communication could help a lot.

QUESTION: Doctor, you used the term, bluff.

DR. SAID: I didn't mean it in any vicious way.

STUDENT: Would you explain it? I am a little in the dark on it.

DR. SAID: I will give you some examples of recent situations.

In the case of Lebanon, in the case of Hungary, and in some other recent cases, our newspapers did insist on receiving open stories on what was going on. The claim was very correct. They needed the story because the public wanted to know what was going on. They wanted to know what was behind the scenes. Mr. Eisenhower initiated the idea of cabinets by television. That was fine and dandy. There was nothing wrong with it. But that cabinet on TV almost looked like a Cabinet meeting, it almost did. But I know very well that in a cabinet meeting on television one could not discuss everything. Here was an element of secrecy. When I say "bluff" I mean/ ^{either} an element of secrecy or an element of presenting that policy in a fashion which could be understood by the public. Because we have not been willing to present it in a fashion which could be understood by the public, sometimes we have gone out and made statements explaining our foreign policy, statements which have been used by our adversaries against us, without waiting a while perhaps and trying to develop that policy within a

framework which could be understood by the people but on the other hand would not give out any great leakage of what our intentions are.

Personally I trust my Government and I would be the first one to revolt against it once it became totalitarian. As yet it is not totalitarian. As yet we do not have an oligarchy but what in a sense has a certain amount of secrecy.

Let me cite one simple example. When one decides to get married one does not go, before negotiations, and tell everyone else that he is getting married. First he negotiates with his girl friend. Then, should the negotiations prove to be successful, he presents his story. That is very significant. The same applies to diplomacy. Why should we go out and tell everybody what we are doing? The answer, to me, has been this: We have to tell the public; our newspapers must know. Take our satellites and our rockets. The Soviets have launched many rockets that have been complete failures. Of course our public knows about our failures and our successes. Maybe I am completely in error, but I question the importance of giving the people a policy, in order to make it understood, without having developed it in our minds, as the leaders, and presenting it in a fashion in which we should present it.

Sometimes we do it. We did it on Lebanon. We told everybody that we went to Lebanon at the request of the President of Lebanon. But I know very well that we went to Lebanon when Iraq had the coup d'etat,

two months, or maybe one month, following the request of the President of Lebanon. We would not have gone at all were it not for the developments in Iraq and Jordan which necessitated our going to the aid of Lebanon.

Maybe I did not make myself clear. This is what I had in mind.

QUESTION: Dr. Said, I refer to the Suez Canal crisis. Because of your familiarity with the Middle East, would you give us your views as to the correctness of the United States action in causing the French and the British to call off their operations in that situation?

DR. SAID: I made my views clear then in writing and orally. I believe, and this is my humble opinion--there are two things I know about my opinions on things in my field; one is that they are honest, and the second is that most of the times I am wrong--I do believe that Britain committed an error, Israel committed an error, and France committed an error in what they did--only an error. But I do believe we committed a grave error, and I think two errors would not make a positive truth, in the sense that our going to stop the three other powers from occupying Suez and Egypt was stimulated to some extent and motivated by some puritanical and pontifical inclinations on our part. But I do believe that that was a time when, if we waited two days--I happen to know--Nasser would have been out. He was about to give up. My personal opinion is that our entry was an error. Referring to it merely as an observer, I think it was an error and that now we are seeing the

error--not only now but beginning with 1958, actually. This is a good example of our leadership not being capable to mold public opinion so that in response to it it goes along with it. This is an example of our leadership not having developed something more concrete.

QUESTION: Doctor, I inferred from your comment that there must also be compromise between foreign policy and domestic policy, and also that in our ultrapluralistic society the public opinion factor is a shifting one; it is dynamic. Yet our foreign policy, if you look at it and analyze it very carefully, is containment on the one hand and deterrence on the other. Now, isn't it about time that we give the lady of the house--I don't mean the wife, but I am using your analogy--a chance to give this dynamic posture a more positive basis for taking over the lead?

DR. SAID: That is a very good question. This came up in Hungary. Under the present Administration we initiated this so-called policy of liberation, vis-a-vis the policy of containment initiated by Mr. Truman in the previous Administration. Yet, to me, as an observer--and I repeat that most of the time I am wrong--our new policy is no different from the previous one. We may call it liberation but it is containment in a disguise. To me this is an indication of something very important. When a minister of foreign affairs acts--let us remember this--whether he acts stupidly or wisely, whether he executes his foreign policy brilliantly or unbrilliantly, he has to act.

Second, liberation can be successful only if we are able to take the risks. Ever since 1953 it has been evident that on some occasions we have not been willing to take the risks. Accordingly, the time has come--you mentioned it correctly--when, in exercising the methods of power, actually what is happening is that, having become the greatest power on earth, there is a great necessity for us, I think, to adjust ourselves. I don't mind saying this: When I first went on television to conduct a course on international politics, almost everyone and his brother told me--I heard it from leaders and from others--that Americans are stupid, that you have to lower your level to their own level of intelligence. This I was told by almost everybody in CBS and in the university. And I discovered--it was really no discovery, because I have been in these United States for nine years--that the American public is not stupid, that the American public is extremely receptive, that the American public is extremely compromising when it comes to receptivity, and that the American public is not so unreceptive as we think it is. Accordingly, the American public is now fit for some kind of direction which is more consistent.

You know that in our history and in the history of every nation we find great men. What is a great man? After all, a great man is not born great. A great man is he who responds to the needs of society. A leader must always respond to the needs of his people.

So, having become the greatest power on earth, I think we are

adjusting ourselves beautifully. This is witnessed by the visit of Khrushchev and by many other indications. But I think we could keep going on in assisting and supporting the public in adjusting itself even more rapidly. Because, let's face it, the day may come when we may discover, after all, what the Soviets are trying to, which is merely to outpace us in military power. They declare they want to outlaw nuclear weapons, knowing that nuclear weapons are a deterrent. They feel that by 1970 or 1975 they will be stronger than we are and they will wage some kind of war, either conventional or some other type--maybe not even a war, if they are able to surpass us. And I think the time has come for public leadership to establish a compromise based more on the basis of giving in to the public and helping the public to adjust itself more rapidly.

QUESTION: This might be a quick one. You said that you noticed a difference in the military groups--I presume you meant the Soviet type groups vis-a-vis ours. You said the Soviet groups were a tool to their government, and I think you also said that in this country we are a partnership with our Government. I don't see very clearly what that leads to. In fact, to some extent I am slightly in disagreement, but I would like to hear what you said. Will you explain why you said that and what it leads to?

DR. SAID: When the military becomes a tool or an instrument of

a government, the military then will not be in a position to express reasonably its role in the formulation of foreign policy. The Hitler and Mussolini episodes were excellent examples of a foreign policy conducted by diplomats merely on the basis of either intuition or diplomatic strategy and tactics, without giving adequate allowance to military consultation or military participation; because any foreign policy is really as strong as that organization which backs it up. This is why the military performs a dual function. It is a diplomat on two shifts.

On the other hand, in a nation such as the United States--and I grant you that our military on some occasions has not been given that honorable participation in policy formulation, but--I think the trend has been going toward a more respectable and honorable cooperation and more respectable consultation between the two.

What does it lead us to? I think it leads us to a more reasonable foreign policy, to a more consistent foreign policy, a foreign policy based not only on sheer imagination and sheer desires of politicians but a reasonable one in the sense that it is supported adequately, in the sense that we are not overdrawn on our bank accounts. To me that is very significant. Any nation, throughout history, which has overdrawn on its bank account has faced bankruptcy. I think as long as there is some kind of partnership we can easily avoid that.

I see your point. I see what you have in mind. I sympathize with

you, because I haven't got the answer.

COLONEL LACKAS: Dr. Said, on behalf of the Commandant and the students of this College, I want to thank you for coming down here and sharing with us your insight, your learning, and your experience. I thank you for a most invigorating morning.

DR. SAID: I really enjoyed it very much.