



## INTERDEPENDENCE OF STRATEGY AND LOGISTICS

Rear Admiral H. E. Eccles, USN (Ret.)

### NOTICE

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Reviewed by: Captain W. P. Schoeni, USN

Date: 23 October 1959

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ADMIRAL PATRICK: General Houseman, Gentlemen: Our speaker this morning is an old friend of the College. He is a widely recognized authority on logistics and its relation to strategy. You will find in our Library several authoritative textbooks that he has written on this subject. His latest is "Logistics in the National Defense."

His subject today is the Interdependence of Strategy and Logistics.

It gives me great pleasure to introduce Rear Admiral Henry E. Eccles. Admiral Eccles.

ADMIRAL ECCLES: General Houseman, Admiral Patrick, Gentlemen of the Industrial College: It is always a pleasure to come here and talk about my favorite topic, and I have tried this year to introduce some new ideas into a talk which I have tightened up in recent years.

There are two concepts that I am bringing into my talk today that I have not discussed in the past. One of those concepts is the source of flexibility, the other the implications of the new Department of Defense concepts of weapon systems. I don't think we have devoted enough attention to flexibility. The weapon system concept is relatively new and includes many wide variations of thought.

But, trying to talk about the relationships of strategy and logistics

is a test of organization of a talk, because the two are so tied together that you have to be very precise and very careful in identifying the various relationships that exist. Now, out of the welter of conflicting strategic opinions, the United States has finally abandoned the concept of sole or chief reliance on massive retaliation and there is general agreement on the need for strategic flexibility.

The questions arise: What is flexibility? What are its sources? How can it be obtained? I believe that flexibility can be understood only if we examine the basic concepts of human conflict, concepts of strategy and of logistics, and of weapons and of weapon systems. Both the study and the conduct of war involve a blend of the logical and the nonlogical. That's a very important point to bear in mind. War involves-- the conduct of war, the study of war, involves understanding of the logical and the nonlogical.

The exercise of high command requires the understanding of theory and of practice, both. Correct major decisions come only when objectives are undisturbed and analyzed, when the basic facts are known, and when sound logic, based on theory, is tempered by the understanding based on study and on practical experience. The combination of theory and practice will produce sound concepts, and these in turn are the basis for the exercise of intuitive skills and intuitive judgment that are required in high command.

It is in this intuitive reaction of the mind to the problem that so much

appears that we call it frequently nonlogical, and it is nonlogical simply because the process by which the man reaches a decision cannot be put down in strict sequential terms as it can be in the strict logic of a mathematical or a programing formula.

I will stress today the logical elements of the problem of strategy and logistics and I will give some concepts which I think are fundamental, and I will try to tie these together in a pattern. As preparation for this approach, you have been given a pamphlet which gives you some of the ideas that will occur in my talk, and I hope that, in the course of your thoughts about war and preparation, this pamphlet will be of continued use to you.

In considering these questions, my perspective is always the perspective of command, because, if we don't look at these things from the perspective of command, we will find ourselves lost in a mass of technological detail, detail that is necessary but does not necessarily give you understanding of the problem as a whole.

#### SLIDE 1

My conception of the perspective of command is as shown, the perspective of command being that point of view which knows the nature and the relationship of the technical problems of command, which recognizes how they affect its capabilities, and which understands the amount of time and effort required to solve these problems.

#### SLIDE 2

The basic thing on which our thinking is established is an understanding of the nature of human conflict. We are no longer dealing

with war in the sense that it is a former contest with a beginning, an end, a set of rules, and a decision. We are dealing with the entire spectrum of human conflict.

### SLIDE 3

I will not dwell too much on this spectrum of conflict in this talk because the decision lies in the pamphlet, but I do want to point out that there is overlap in this spectrum which is more truly a continuum than a spectrum, because a spectrum does not apply for overlap so much as a continuum does. But a basic thing is that, at some point which cannot be determined in advance, your actions move from controllable to uncontrollable, from relatively predictable to completely unpredictable.

There is another element of this thing that is of vital importance, and that is that, as international tension increases, more weapons and tools of conflict are used, and in each case, as these additional weapons come into play, the use of the older weapons continues. Thus, you can have a cumulative involvement which may eventually get out of control. This word "control" is a very important point, and I'll come back to that later. But, if we establish our thinking on an understanding of the nature of human conflict, we have a good beginning.

Now, actually the term, war, I think, is a little out of date. If we think in terms of conflict rather than of war, we will have the same problem of the use of the military weapon and the problem of command. But war is a convenient term, so let's look at the structure of war.

#### SLIDE 4

It consists of a group of basic factors--political, economic, geographic, military, psychological, scientific, and technological. All of these factors are interrelated. If we expand the military factors, I think it is logical to say that they consist of strategy, logistics, tactics, intelligence, and communications. All of these factors are interrelated. They all blend, and the military factors are based on the general factors. What do I mean by these abstract terms, strategy, logics, et cetera?

#### SLIDE 5

I suggest that strategy is that which determines the objectives and the broad methods for obtaining them. Logistics provides the means for creating the support combat forces and weapons. Tactics determines the specific employment of forces and weapons to attain the objectives of strategy. Intelligence sheds light on the situation. Communications transmits information and the decisions of command. These are very simple, broad, descriptions, rather than strict definitions, because we are dealing with abstract terms that are not acceptable to precise, permanent, and strict definition.

Well, in our terminology let's remember that the facts of war and the relation that exists between the various facets of war will remain the same regardless of the terminology that is used to describe them. Secondly, in the mind of command, strategic, logistical, and tactical considerations must be blended and each must be given the weight warranted

by the circumstances of the situation. In this blending, a sound concept of strategy is the foundation for all high military thinking.

That brings me back to my pamphlet, because, in my experience I have never seen as clear and valuable a discussion of strategy as that two pages in the pamphlet entitled "New Thoughts on Strategy," which was written some four years ago by Dr. Herbert Rosinski. I think that that concept of strategy as control is fundamental to an understanding of the problems of national defense, national security, and military organization today, strategy being the comprehensive direction of power for the purpose of exercising the control necessary to attain objectives.

I suggest that these two pages are worth many hours of your thought--strategy and conflict, the relationship, strategy being the comprehensive direction of power to establish control of situations and areas in order to attain objectives, and tactics the immediate--not comprehensive--the immediate, application of power. That is to say it is the specific employment of weapons and forces to attain the control, the objectives established by strategy.

The nature of modern conflict, covering as it does the entire spectrum of pressures, violence, and destruction, demands great political and military flexibility, if we are to gain and exercise the control demanded by strategy, and this need for flexibility is further increased by the fact that the nuclear, electronic phase of the industrial revolution makes it mandatory that we employ weapons with restraint in order that

we may keep destruction within tolerable limits.

I may say that in a somewhat different way. Strategic needs and purposes determine the weapons that should be used. Weapons should not determine the strategy. Nothing can be more fatal than to use a weapon simply because you have it, regardless of its influence on the objectives. Obviously, though, weapons, because of factors of availability as related to capabilities and limitations, will influence strategy, but they must never dictate strategy. That's a very important point.

We see, therefore, the concept of control rather than the concept of destruction provides the essence of sound strategic thinking.

Now, let me go a little bit further on that concept of strategy as control. Let's be specific.

#### SLIDE 5

If you are thinking in strategic terms, you ask yourself: What is there to control? For what purpose? In order to achieve control, to what degree must I achieve control? How long do I need to maintain that control to obtain my objectives? How in general will I exercise that control? If power appropriate to the kind and degree of strategic control required is to be employed, flexibility in weapons and in combat forces is essential. But, before we go into the discussion of the sources and foundations of flexibility, let us first look at logistics and economics as they are related to strategy--a brief word on the nature of logistics and of logistics planning.

## SLIDE 6

This is the simplest description of logistics and its relationship to strategy that I know of. Strategy and tactics provide the scheme for the conduct of military operations. Logistics provides the means. What are the means, in simple terms?

## SLIDE 7

Logistics consists of the determination of requirements, of procurement, of distribution. Every logistics problem entails these basic elements, and every logistics problem entails organization, planning, execution, and supervision. It doesn't make any difference whether you are a squad leader or G-4 on the Joint Chiefs of Staff or what your position is. In thinking of logistics you are thinking of those terms--requirements, procurement, distribution, organization, planning, execution, and supervision. And the means of war we are providing are essentially men, materials, facilities, and services. In each case you have requirements, procurement, and distribution, and in each case you have organization, planning, execution, and supervision.

Now, this business of logistics, then, goes deeper and further than these very simple formulations, because logistics has got to be seen in two lights.

## SLIDE 8

The logistics process is at one and the same time the military elements in the Nation's economy and the economic elements in its military

operations. In other words, logistics is the bridge between the economy of the Nation and the tactical operations of its combat forces. That concept of logistics, the bridge, takes up three pages of your pamphlet. I will not go further into it, but I will say this, that it is essential that we always keep in mind the purpose of logistics effort, the objective of logistics effort. There is only one objective, and that is the sustained combat effectiveness of the combat forces. In our malignant bureaucracy of Washington--and I use the term advisedly--malignant and bureaucracy--that essential purpose and objective of logistics is frequently lost sight of by men in high position. The greatest extravagance that a nation can indulge in is to create large combat forces which cannot be effectively employed.

That brings us to a basic principle in this relationship. Economic capabilities limit the combat forces which can be created. Logistic capabilities limit the combat forces which can be employed. So remember what extravagance can mean in terms of overconcentration on the economic aspects of the situation with neglect of the logistics aspects.

#### SLIDE 9

Now, I want that to sink in, because it is a vital concept that extends throughout the whole relationship to strategy. Let's look at this relationship in another term. We talked about the strategic concept. We talked about how logistics and economics enter into the picture. Let's express it simply.

## SLIDE 10

The practical application of a strategic concept takes the form of specific tactical operations to establish the control necessary to attain objectives, preceded by the economic logistic effort to create, to prepare, and to support the forces employed. Now, a word about strategy--frequently the strategist has a very high opinion of his abilities and a rather less high opinion of the abilities of the logisticians who are associated with him.

Today it is the usual thing in the United States for men in high positions to compliment themselves on the fact that they are pragmatic, that they are practical people. Now, if a strategist is going to be a practical man, he must understand this basic principle; and a logistics action must precede the tactical operations. Unless a strategic concept bears this in mind and includes adequate consideration of these two latter points, it is merely the day dreaming of an impractical theorist. So, there is a very distinct relationship between strategy and logistics.

Now, all this work, this planning, this thinking, has to be integrated, and I want to try to provide a logical sequence of thought for that integration. I suggest that we start again with strategy as control.

## SLIDE 11

What to control? For what purpose? In order to achieve it. To what degree? For how long? In general, how? That is the basic start. Well, you translate it into the plans.

## SLIDE 12

You can put this in somewhat different terms--the objective, the mission, the forces involved, the scheme of operations, the intensity of the action, and the timing of the action. That is the practical basis for the plan, because from that you can get time phased logistic requirements both to create and to support the combat forces. What? How much? When? Where? There is nothing more practical in the world than that what? how much? when? and where? Not all planning is at the same levels, and planning changes its nature as the levels change. It changes its nature as you move from what is known in official terms as the estimate of the situation to the development of the plan.

## SLIDE 13

You have two kinds of planning related to logistics. I will ask you to read this distinction between logistic planning and planning for logistic support.

Now, we need planning factors with broad aggregations that will provide the integrated planning at the top level for the logistics portion of the commander's estimate of the situation. Once the decision is reached, and if these planning factors are good, the material is available for a good decision. Once that decision is reached, the subordinate commanders have this immensely detailed job of planning for the detailed logistic support of the decision that was reached in this process--the estimate of the situation to the development of the plan: 1. Broad

aggregations. 2. More details. In some cases the planning factors are useful in both cases, but only rarely.

There is another point that is important to us in this overall relationship, and that is the question of the economic factors as they influence the objectives of strategy. These economic factors are regenerated and are interlocked.

#### SLIDE 14

You gentlemen have all studied enough about these subjects to recognize that you have certain basic influences of economics: Raw materials; trade routes, standard of living, population; industrialization reaction and economic competition on social-political situation, producing violence--we find that all over the world today--and economic factors upsetting the political stability of a nation and forcing changes in both policy and strategy. One of the important examples of that, of course, is England's abandonment of its effective naval forces. The tremendous change in the military capabilities of Great Britain which has taken place in the last 10 years is due to economic factors, and that has influenced the entire political situation in Europe and the military situation.

#### SLIDE 15

Now, there are some more direct military influences of economic factors, and they are the destruction or interdiction of an enemy's economy and the protection of one's own economy, and coming back again to the enemy, economic factors which limit the creation of your

combat forces and our logistic factors which limit the employment of combat forces.

How about the direct strategic-logistic relationships as exemplified in the history of the past?

#### SLIDE 16

Certain very general types of strategic logistic relationships exist. The scope and timing of strategic plans is dependent upon logistic factors-- the composition, balance, and deployment of forces and force buildup; the question of strategic overseas bases, such as site, location, and buildup of the base. In practically every operation there is a critical logistic element which limits the action of the commander. You have instances of logistic factors permitting the maintenance or affecting the maintenance in a political situation without resort to war. You have the question of strategy of blockade. You have the problem of overall national economic resources. And you have the problem of a critical logistic target when you are thinking in terms of the enemy. Those are the general types of strategic logistic relationships that I suggest.

Well, what are the examples?

#### SLIDE 17

Start with the glorious first of June in 1794--a very controversial battle. Admiral Villaret was told that if that grain convoy from the West Indies did not get in he would have his head chopped off. The

British won a glorious victory, but the grain got in, and the very hungry people of Paris, who were getting very discontented with the French Revolution, were fed with that grain from the West Indies, and the French Revolution survived.

Of course our U. S. submarine campaign against Japan had a very specific result and illustrated the strategy of blockade of a critical logistic target.

In China the Nationalist forces in Mukden surrendered without a fight when the U. S. logistic force which had been promised them did not arrive, and you had a tremendous loss of political position without war, due primarily to lack of sound logistic procedures in Washington.

Of course the airlift in the Berlin blockade is a striking example of these things. We were able to maintain a political position without war. There were certain critical logistic elements in the airlift of food and fuel.

There were many others.

#### SLIDE 18

There was the Cairo Conference in 1943. The major work in that was the evaluation of the logistic factors, and the strategic decisions were modified. For example, the Normandy Landing was delayed one month to allow time for buildup. The Southern France Operation was delayed two months because of a critical logistic element--availability of landing craft. The Aegean Expedition proposed was cancelled because

of the critical logistic element of landing craft and oil. The Moulmein landing of Mountbatten was cancelled because of the critical logistic element of landing craft and steel.

These are quite clear, well authenticated, historical examples.

#### SLIDE 19

Every amphibious operation in the Pacific involved the overseas base site selection and logistic buildup along the line of strategic advance. The Normandy Invasion was a wonderful example of the integration of strategic, logistic, and tactical planning, of composition, balance, and deployment of combat and logistic forces.

The full effects of the Suez crisis we don't know, but it was a lack of integrated strategic-logistic planning. There was a critical logistic and economic element of oil and transportation. There was a lack of rapid force buildup, and a critical lack of sea and air troop and cargo lift--a wonderful example of the relationship between strategy and logistics.

Now, today we find ourselves in the Department of Defense finding great emphasis placed on the concept of weapon systems. Just how do these fit into our concepts of command, our concepts of strategy, our concepts of logistics? The Department of Defense and the three services have recently stated their concepts of weapon systems. Briefly, DOD has said that weapon systems comprise facilities, and equipment, in combination or otherwise, which form an instrument of combat to be

used by one or more of the military departments. They define the term, total management, as including planning, budgeting, research, design, development, acquisition, storage, distribution, maintenance, logistic support, and training. They define the scope as being both within military departments and with contractors. They define the time as when and they use the weapon system concept when existing organizational structures are not adequate to meet the time requirements of the problem. And what? A weapon system is a method to produce and place into operational use advanced instruments of combat without regard to existing organization and functions of the department.

I believe it is too early to tell how these weapon system concepts will work under the strain of actual crisis and combat, but I think there are certain pertinent questions that should be answered. Will these weapon system concepts facilitate flexible employment of a variety of weapons and weapon systems under a single tactical or operational commander? For example, an amphibious operation uses a great variety of weapons and weapon systems. Will weapon system management dissolve when the weapon system is delivered to operating forces, or will it continue to function and create a separate logistic system? Will these concepts tie up undue amounts of resources under separate and perhaps inadequately coordinated special managers? In other words, will there be a fragmentation of the logistic system?

This kind of problem requires a very careful identification of

common-use items. There is another question: Will logistic rigidity be introduced, and to what degree will this logistic rigidity induce tactical rigidity?

The psychology of the weapon system is interesting. I ask the question: Will the weapon system managers have a greater loyalty to their weapon systems than to the tactical commander and to the fleet commander? There is some evidence that this takes place now.

The fact that each of the three services is taking its individual weapon-systems approach indicates that these hazards are recognized, and I think it is very wise of the Department of Defense to let each of the three services take its own approach. But, no matter how these matters develop, we should never forget that the military problem is primarily a question of command--house command and weapon system.

#### SLIDE 20

We said that logistics creates and supports combat forces; command employs combat forces; economic considerations limit the creation of combat forces; logistics considerations limit the employment of combat forces; strategy governs the comprehensive employment; tactics governs the immediate employment. That is a simplified diagrammatic relationship between weapon systems and strategy, logistics, economics, and command.

#### SLIDE 21

Now, command views the weapon systems, as I said before, and it sees there are certain advantages. The development of procurement is

expedited; the cost is presumably expedited; the quality is presumably improved; and it may facilitate employment--may facilitate employment.

What are the disadvantages?

#### SLIDE 22

The concept encourages specialization, while the need for flexibility demands versatility in people and in forces. The system brings speedy economical creation, but it may handicap logistic economy and effectiveness by fragmentation. The weapon system concept may further complicate already complex organizations. The question arises--this is a hazard--we don't know: To what degree will management of weapon systems attempt to exercise command over the employment of the weapon systems, or that particular weapon system? I don't know, and I don't think anybody else knows. The existence of the system may bring about a demand for its use even though its use is strategically inappropriate--a psychological factor. And it may develop its own loyalty which in turn may override the larger loyalty to strategic concepts and to strategic objectives.

I think, today, in examining the thoughts that are expressed by our top people--military, political, civilian, and scholars--there is pretty general agreement that we must be prepared for three major possibilities in this area of conflict. I mention them, not in any order of priority, but rather to indicate the great variety of action that is involved. I suggest that a wise policy consists of being able to take sure, effective

action in all three areas. First, we must have the capability for making massive retaliatory thermonuclear strikes, delivered as rapidly as possible on pre-selected targets in accordance with a previously prepared plan. This action will be ordered only as a desperate measure to prevent or limit the destruction of the United States. This action implies the simultaneous use of all available striking power. Secondly, there is a possibility that we will want to make selective thermonuclear strikes which may be delivered on appropriate targets selected at that time, and timed in accordance with a developing situation. This concept is based on the supposition that nuclear power, striking from invulnerable sources, can be used in a selected, in a delayed, and in a limited manner. Some persons consider this to be a greater deterrent than the threat of the more automatic massive retaliatory action. Third, we must retain the ability to conduct limited action with appropriate combinations of conventional, atomic, and thermonuclear weapons in distant areas of the earth. I say appropriate combinations; that means that we may under certain circumstances wish to use only conventional forces.

Now, this last has three major implications, the conduct of limited action. The limited action, we must remember, may be rapidly and suddenly elevated to unlimited action. The limited action, if it is to be effective, must be swift. If it is limited, it must be effective and swift, both. Otherwise it will not be limited, or it will be unlikely to

be limited. We must be able to conduct more than one limited action at a time, and, in spite of the desirability of the swift, decisive action which we hope to be able to take, we must be able to sustain one or more limited actions for long periods. Particularly, we must be able to remain poised for decisive action in certain areas for long periods. This, of course, is illustrated by the Suez, the Quemoy, and the Lebanon crises.

In the light of the uncertainty as to the use of atomic weapons in future conflict situations, it seems obvious that we must not neglect to provide strong conventional forces. This series of necessities vastly complicates the logistic problem. Not all of these implications can be discussed in one talk, but one thing seems clear. We should seek to create sustained combat effectiveness in forces which have in themselves a built-in capability for thermonuclear action, for limited action, and for cold-war pressure under the same command, using the same units and the same basic organization. The numbered task-force system which draws units appropriate to the task in hand from larger forces composed of mobile, flexible, versatile combat units with an assured, sustained logistic support seems to provide the capability for this type of flexible, powerful action.

What are the sources of flexibility?

#### SLIDE 23

In the first place, the source of flexibility lies in the perception

and character of the commander. It lies in sound strategic and practical concepts, in the availability of a variety of weapons appropriate to the nature and degree of control that you may want to exercise. It lies in the versatility of forces and the versatility of personnel, in the mobility of forces, in the flexible organization with a numbered task force and a functional command. And it requires a logistic support which is responsive to both strategic and tactical command. The essentials of that logistic support lie in reserves under the control of the commander and a transportation system under the control of the commander. That does not mean that all transportation all over the world should be under the control of one commander, but no commander has flexibility unless he can control some of his own transportation. And it implies a common military doctrine with a maximum decentralization of operations.

No single factor can dominate; no factor of this group can be neglected, without reducing flexibility.

I have discussed conflict, command, strategy and tactics, economics, logistics, and logistics planning, and I have discussed weapon systems. I have mentioned the sources of flexibility. Let me draw these concepts together in a related form.

#### SLIDE 24

This chart has been given you, and it is complex, but I don't know that any other attempt has ever been made to analyze and discuss the sources of military flexibility. So I beg your indulgence for providing

such a chart in a lecture.

I think the understanding of these concepts and the carrying out of these concepts, in summation, will give us the flexibility that the present world situation demands. There is an understanding of the fact that we are dealing with an entire spectrum of pressure, violence, and destruction. A variety of pressures and situations demands a variety of tools and flexibility in their use.

Command creates, supports, and employs combat forces. Command blends strategic, logistical, and tactical considerations. Command transforms war potential to combat power by its use of the logistic process. The perception and character of command are the foundation sources of flexibility.

The concept of strategy is the comprehensive direction of power to establish control, to attain objectives. We are talking of control, not destruction. Strategic needs determine the weapons that are going to be used.

The concept of logistics is the creation and the sustained support of combat forces, the concept that, while economic factors limit the creation of combat forces, logistic factors limit their employment. Logistics is the physical base of flexibility, for it provides mobility. And for logistics to contribute to flexibility it must be responsive to command.

The concept of tactics is the immediate application of power; in

other words, the specific employment of forces and weapons to attain control of objectives established by strategy.

Weapons and weapon systems--the compatibility of weapon systems will facilitate their employment and simplify their logistic support. Flexibility demands a variety of weapon systems appropriate to the nature and degree of control strategy requires. And the weapon system must always be subject to the needs of strategy.

In conclusion, I feel that, regardless of how economics, politics, and technology develop in the next 50 years, an understanding of these concepts and their relationship is essential to the security of the Nation.

MR. HENKEL: Admiral Eccles is ready for your questions.

QUESTION: In Kissinger's book--I have forgotten the name of it-- he advocates a strategic division on a functional basis between the strategic and the tactical forces in order to limit war. He feels that the tactical forces should be pretty clearly divided off from the strategic ones. Also, he feels that, in order not to dissipate our tactical forces in the process of handling a limited war, this should be done, and also, in order not to have it grow into an all-out conflict this division should be made. I gather from your talk, Admiral, that you disagree with this concept of flexibility as being most important. I'd like you to comment on this.

ADMIRAL ECCLES: I think the Kissinger concept may be attractive to those who do not understand the sources of flexibility. It gives you a rigid system. I believe that it is absolutely impossible to predict what will happen once shooting starts between two major forces, major nations. That lack of predictability, coupled with the enormous power of destruction of weapons now available, is the thing that makes it essential that flexibility with a variety of weapons be available to a man who has got a combat situation to deal with. I think the separation that he suggests would be very bad, and I doubt that it would induce any true economy or contribute to the support of effective defense of the country. It does not have the elements of flexibility that I think are essential.

QUESTION: Admiral, you stated that there is some evidence that weapon-systems managers have more loyalty to the systems than possibly to the commanders who employ the systems. Could you give us an example or two of that, please?

ADMIRAL ECCLES: When I say weapon-systems managers I am talking not so much about a specific weapon-system manager as I am about the attitude that has been encountered in certain instances whereby officers of the Navy have been more concerned with the protection of the interests of their type commander than of the fleet commander. The reason I make that remark is that several years ago two different officers who had served on fleet staffs came to me and stated that in the Suez crisis the fleet commander had difficulty in getting the required

coordination because of the concern of certain of the staff officers with the welfare of the type commanders with whom they had been associated. I have seen other instances where type commanders and their staffs have been shortsighted and have failed to grasp the overall problem. So I believe that it is a quality of mankind that makes it easy for a man to give loyalty to the job that he has in hand, and that may detract from his loyalty to something with which he is not in day-to-day contact. The evidence that I got came to me from officers who had been through that experience who came to me saying, "I am disturbed about this. What can we do in the Navy to get our loyalties directed toward the problem of the fleet rather than the problem of the type commander?"

I don't know whether that occurs in the Air Force or in the Army, but, since we are all of human sources, and since that is an example of understandable human behavior, it would not astonish me if certain instances of that sort should be brought out.

QUESTION: Admiral, at what level within the Government is it necessary, in your opinion, to make a decision with respect to weapon systems that will be procured and sent to the operating forces?

ADMIRAL ECCLES: Frankly, I haven't the slightest idea. I would make a wild guess that the only person who can and should decide that is the Secretary of Defense. I would certainly expect that he would have the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on such a thing.

QUESTION: Sir, I have read Congressional Committee Reports which are critical of the military man in his procurement activities. Some have recommended that the entire matter of procurement be turned over to a civilian specialist. My question is this: Do you feel that a military man can be properly trained in the logistics if this element of procurement is removed from his field?

ADMIRAL ECCLES: No.

QUESTION: Admiral, in the beginning of your lecture I believe you said that the United States has abandoned the concept of massive retaliation. Would you care to elaborate on that?

ADMIRAL ECCLES: The United States has abandoned the concept of sole reliance on massive retaliation as expressed by Mr. Finletter in the October 1954 issue of The Atlantic Monthly. Some of the most remarkable nonsense has been spouted by men in high authority in the last 10 years. I am very happy that the content of nonsense has been very greatly reduced in the last few years. Mr. Finletter's article in The Atlantic Monthly at that time specifically stated that no funds should be allocated to any force other than the Air Force until the Air Force got everything it wanted--probably the highest bit of sheer nonsense that ever was put into print. I am somewhat less than attentive when Mr. Finletter talks.

QUESTION: Sir, I understand you have just returned from a NATO Strategy Conference. I wonder if you will give us some of your impressions

of the interrelationship between logistics and strategy over there.

ADMIRAL ECCLES: I will be delighted. I am a member of the recently formed Institute for Strategic Studies which was formed in England by a grant from the Ford Foundation about a year ago. They held their first conference in Oxford last weekend, the 2d to the 5th of October. It was attended, among others, by General Boeuf, the G-4 of SHAPE. Sir John Slessor was Chairman of the Conference. Mr. George Kennan gave the opening remarks and some of the closing remarks, and the discussion was The Interdependence in NATO. Among the topics discussed were, the development of a NATO controlled intermediate-range ballistic missile as a deterrent; the problem of infrastructure; the balance between conventional and atomic nuclear weapons; the question of reorganization of NATO to extend its authority elsewhere; and the question: Should NATO have its own mobile task force for use even outside of NATO?

The conference was attended by about 100 people. There were two essential things, or there were several things of great importance that came out of it. No formal conclusions were attempted, because obviously no group, no matter how good, could come up with answers to problems of that sort in any meeting. It was remarkable that there were certain things that seemed to be fairly generally agreed upon. One was that NATO should not be extended, that, rather than create new organizations

in NATO, it is better to improve the organizations and consultations that are now available. Others were that the exchange of information has improved but needs to be further improved; that NATO should not be extended outside of its present area but that it should have the exchange of information with groups outside the area. Still others:

The great need in NATO is for the development of greater conventional forces . Nothing could be worse than to permit nations independently to develop thermonuclear capabilities, because no nation could develop one that would be large enough to be significant, and the attempt to develop a nuclear capability would only detract from the ability to support conventional forces which are needed much more. A small nuclear capability is no protection but is merely a provocation.

Then, very interestingly—and this I think is most significant to all there of us—~~is~~ the fact that as far as I could tell there was complete unanimity on the thought that the economy of the European nations has improved so much in the last few years that they should assume a greater share of the financial support of our NATO effort and that the United States financial support should be reduced in proportion. That was completely agreed upon. Europe is extremely prosperous.

There was another thing that came out. This was brought out by General Boeuf on the problem of standardization. Five or six years ago the NATO forces were fairly well standardized in their equipment, because most of it came from the United States and Great Britain. But,

with the improvement in industrial capabilities in Europe, the NATO forces are now getting more and more equipment produced by the local economies, without standardization; so that the standardization situation has deteriorated in recent years, in spite of the efforts to improve it. There was some discussion on this point in my committee, and it was brought out by Sir John Eldridge, who was formerly the senior military man in the Ministry of Supply, and by General Boeuf, that, rather than attempt too much standardization, we should concentrate on standardizing essentials. The identification of essentials they gave was: Petroleum, ammunition, and the electrical characteristics of military equipment. They said that the attempt to standardize too much might be strongly resisted by the nations concerned.

That is a brief run-down of the general thought of the meeting. It was most interesting. I felt very privileged to be able to attend. I got back Saturday.

QUESTION: Sir, you mentioned in your pros and cons on weapon systems some advantages and some disadvantages. On the disadvantage side, I believe the words were that it might handicap the logistic economy by fragmentation. Would you amplify a little bit on that, please?

ADMIRAL ECCLES: If every weapon has its entire design, production, and logistic support concentrated in its own chain of command and management, you will have a task force commander, such as an amphibious force commander, who may control the employment of the various weapons

but will have no one single force of logistic coordination in the support of those weapons, because every weapon-system manager has his own chain of command, and, instead of having one logistics coordinator to assist him in his work, he will have to be dealing with 10, 12, or 13 principalities, all jealous of their prerogatives. That's the way human beings behave.

I don't say that will happen. I say that that is a hazard. That is a thing which may happen and must be guarded against. Therefore, we should be cautious as to what weapons and what logistics support are placed under weapon-systems single management.

Is that clear?

STUDENT: Yes, sir.

QUESTION: Sir, in the NATO agreement there is a statement, made at the insistence of this country, I believe, which says that logistics is a national responsibility, that each nation will supply its own forces. And yet we have a command structure which gives, for example, the Central Army Group a commander commanding French, German, and American forces, and LANDCENT which commands those and other nations. It appears to me that these NATO commanders have absolutely no control over the logistics support necessary to the exercise of their commands. Do we have really a farce here, or do we have anything that is effective at all?

ADMIRAL ECCLES: When I was working with CINCSouth some years

ago, it was recognized by General Levy in SHAPE, who was the Chief in SHAPE, that, from the standpoint of combat effectiveness, the principle that logistics is a national responsibility is untenable, that you cannot operate effective combat forces in Europe under that principle. It was a situation which had to be suffered because it was politically unlikely that that principle could be changed.

Last week in Oxford we discussed the problem in the same terms in which it was discussed in Paris, Naples, and other places in 1951 and 1952. The conclusion is just the same, that you cannot operate effective combat forces in Europe so long as logistics remains a national responsibility not under the control of the NATO commander. We are faced with that problem, and that is one of the reasons why many people believe that NATO is a more effective political force than military force.

One of the things agreed upon at the conference was the fact that NATO commanders, NATO authorities, should be given more authority over their military requirements, and there was general feeling that they should be given more control over their logistics support, because the present system cannot be expected to stand up under combat.

MR. HENKEL: Admiral, as usual you have given us an excellent presentation on a very difficult subject. In behalf of the Commandant, thank you very much.

ADMIRAL ECCLES: Thank you.