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PLANNING AND PROGRAMING IN A MILITARY DEPARTMENT

Major General B. J. Webster, USAF

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Reviewed by: Captain W. P. Schoeni, USN

Date: 26 October 1959.

INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

1959-1960

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GENERAL HOUSEMAN: We have been studying objectives and policy as they pertain to the national security objectives at the very top levels of government. We have discussed policy at the national level. We have gone into planning by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

It is appropriate this morning to go into another aspect of our planning and programing by the military services. Early this morning we all got infused with shots and reconditioned with clear minds. So now we are going to start in again by having Major General B. J. Webster talk to us. He is in charge of planning and programing for the Air Force and is the appropriate individual to bring to us this facet of understanding of the problem.

General Webster.

GENERAL WEBSTER: Thank you, General Houseman. Good morning, gentlemen. I am pleased to be with you and I will try to help in this part of your study. I was here last year, as some of the faculty know, and I thoroughly enjoyed myself, particularly the question period afterwards, when there were some really fine and difficult questions fired at me. So I am glad to be back and I am glad to try to discuss Planning and Programing in a Military Department.

I will start by saying that planning and programing sounds like a relatively simple subject, but, as many of you who have been in the business in your own services know, there are so many inputs, so

many internal and external influences, that there is really no simple, straightforward solution to military planning and programing. As a result, the actual process is not very easy to describe and, as a result also, we sometimes feel--those of us who are in the business—that we are on a treadmill. We work hard but we never seem to get quite to that point of developing war plans which in fact reflect what we would do in case of war, nor do we ever get to the point of actually being able to put out a peacetime program that accurately reflects the course that we will take if we continue the cold war.

None the less, it is perfectly apparent that we must plan and program. We must do it as well as we can. We must try to lay out in detail the road that we expect to take, so that everyone will be working toward the same end, so that our computation of dollars, manpower, and materiel will be such that, when we reach some future point in time, everything will come out even and we will be able to do the job.

It is also, I think, obvious that we must have a procedure or a system which tries to insure that we lay out these plans and programs as well and as realistically as possible.

So this morning I will first discuss the Air Force system in general terms. Then I will mention some of the Air Force's planning and programing documents which will result from the system. I will discuss our so-called programing cycle, and, finally, I will discuss some of the problem areas, these influences which I mentioned earlier, which

tend to complicate the job.

Before starting on our system for planning and programing, however, I might point out that there is one well known but primary concept which guides us in our planning and programing in these days. That is that we must maintain in being a force capable of responding quickly and powerfully to national emergencies, whether they be limited or general war. This concept is contrasted to the older ones where we had a relatively small peacetime force with subsequent mobilization buildup, which makes obviously a great deal of difference in our planning and programing. It means that there must be a close relationship between our war plans and our peacetime programs, since the force with which we will fight is substantially the force that we will have on D-Day.

As such, then, our peacetime programs provide the starting position for war plans, and at the same time the task which the Air Force must perform in war in a later time period provides the goals toward which the peacetime program is directed.

How does the Air Force decide what forces it needs at various times to do the job? At the same time, how do we determine what forces we can get during this period? In other words, how do we determine what our forces should be and what we can actually attain? The problem is a big one and it is by no means peculiar to the Air Force. All three military departments consider that it is almost essential

that they have more and better forces than those which have been approved and funded. These two words, "approved" and "funded," are, of course, key words. The authorities who control the purse strings, the Congress and the executive department, have not yet given the military departments all the funds that they think are necessary. I am sure they never will, in peacetime. Things being what they are in a democracy, where there are so many projects, sponsors are honestly convinced that their particular project or idea is of the highest priority, and all are fighting to get their share of the tax dollar. So the condition of being sure of what everyone would like for defense is always with us. This being so, we must face up to it.

The Air Force tries to do this by developing each year and revising, and maybe doing it several times each year, two basic force structures, an objective force structure and an attainable force structure. A force structure is, as the name implies, an expression of forces or units, usually, in our case, in terms of wings and squadrons, time phased from where we are today through 10 years into the future. It shows the equippage of these forces. For example, we would show the Strategic Air Command. We would show first the so-called combat forces--so many wings of B-52's, B-58's, and B-47's; and so many missile units--time phased by end-year positions out for 10 years. We do the same thing in supporting forces--flying and nonflying units. This is what our force structure will look like.

We consider these force structures as one of the very early and one of the most basic steps in the planning and programing process. There is a difference between them. The objective force structure is really a requirements expression, modified to some extent to be within reason. We, of course, have many arguments as to just what "within reason" might be. The essential point, I believe, is that the objective force, although not arbitrarily limited by dollars or other resources, except in the near-time period, where we can't change things, cannot merely be a grab bag full of everybody's pet ideas. It must be balanced, it must be within the state of the art, and it must be fairly close to reality or it will have relatively little value. The attainable force structure derives from the objective force structure, but it considers as best it can what resource limitations will be imposed upon us as we look out into the future. It cuts back from the objective force structure, but, looking at the objective force structure enables us to see where we can best take certain calculated risks and still feel that we can do the job and live up to the Air Force responsibility.

CHART 1

My first chart shows in general terms the steps we take in arriving at these force structures which form the basis of later work in developing the detailed plans and programs. I must make it clear that we can't really start fresh at any one point in time and take all of these steps always in sequence. Certainly the first step, examination of the threat,

we do, and revise continually, and also the determination of tasks. These really are starting points. But, between steps 3 and 4, for example, it is perfectly obvious that you can't do one without the other. It's a kind of chicken-and-the-egg proposition. You select weapon systems, but you have to know what force structure you are selecting them for. Similarly, for example, if your force structure showed a reduction in reconnaissance units, you probably would not want to develop a weapon that was particularly high in cost to fulfill this mission. So these are the general steps, but we do go back and forth in the actual step-by-step process.

The next question is: All right, just how does the Air Force go about following these steps?

CHART 2

My next chart shows the agencies responsible for these and other important across-the-staff jobs within the Air Force. These are the four boards that are set up in Air Force Headquarters. You will notice that they report to the Air Force Council, which is made up of the Deputy Chiefs of Staff of the Air Force. They are advisory boards. We keep them relatively small in terms of members. They are advisory, as the Air Council is, with the Chief of Staff, of course, being the decision maker.

The Force Estimates Board, the box on the upper left, does most of the jobs that I indicated in my previous chart. It is responsible for

determination of the threat, and in doing this, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, is the Chairman of the Board. Of course we take into account the national intelligence estimates, the JCS guidance, and the various kinds of guidance which we receive, but we do come out with a paper that is the threat as we see it, and it is passed up to the Council and to the Chief for approval.

The next step, the determination of the tasks, is also a function of this board, and again we come out with a paper which indicates the general tasks that we must perform.

Finally, this board is also responsible for these two force structures which I mentioned. Here we have considerable difficulty, particularly when we are considering the attainable force, the force that is limited by dollars and manpower. The tasks are stated in general terms, but, to develop the force structure, we must, of course, get specific in terms of the units. And the big questions come up: How much risk can we take in the various mission and support areas? How much force is our minimum in SAC, as opposed to air defense, as opposed to the tactical side, or as opposed to MATS, the airlift? I am sure that some Army and Navy members in the class could give us good advice on this subject and help us greatly in determining just how much we should put in what area. In any event, it is a difficult job. However, we must come out with our recommendation, this board must, as to what we think the attainable and objective force structures should be.

I turn now to the Weapons Board, as is indicated by the name. This group determines, within dollar limitations, what weapons and how many of them we should buy, looking, of course, at the desired force structure. Again I point out that this is a back-and-forth proposition. We must look at such things as cost effectiveness and war-gaming results. We must consider them. We have, of course, considerable difficulty in this job. We must look at the future and at the present. We must try to decide whether we should buy the B-52's, which are here today, the B-58's, which arejust coming out, or put more money onto the B-70, for example, or whether we should do a combination of them. We must try to make the determination between ballistic missiles and manned aircraft. These are difficult judgments, but, in any event, this is the board which starts the work on the determination of what is going to be in our procurement programs each year.

The third board, the Budget Advisory Board, is third in my discussion, but often it is really first in making some of the essential recommendations. This is the board that looks across the board, prior to budget-estimating time, and, looking out into the future, tries to determine how much effort, how many dollars, should be set aside for each one of our so-called appropriation areas. If we know how many military personnel we are going to have, the costing of the dollars for military personnel appropriation is relatively simple. But, when we get to operation and maintenance, O and M accounts, and when we get

to R&D, military construction, and reserve forces, it is, of course, quite difficult to decide how much of our resources should go in these areas. In any event, this determination is made, and the procurement dollars which are not necessary for the day-to-day operation of the Air Force are then decided upon by the Weapons Board.

The job of the final board here, the Military Construction Board, I guess is relatively obvious. It passes on military construction programs to best support the force which we project. The problem with the Military Construction Board, of course, is that we have intense interest in this program on the part of many people, and that we have long lead times involved. The fact that we might not have a program which is too good shows up here, and it has shown up recently, as I am sure some of you know. We have a hospital in Europe which we are probably not going to open. We have a high-energy fuel plant that has hit the headlines, and, most recently, the R. I. Bong Airfield out in Wisconsin which was planned but now has been stopped.

Before leaving this chart, which you have had in front of you for quite a period of time, I should point out that there is interlocking membership, as you may have already noticed, although they are in different orders there. There are four lucky people who are able to sit on all four boards--the Director of Operations in the Air Staff, the Director of Operational Requirements, the Director of Budget, and, finally, the Director of Programs, myself. This means that we

can spend a great deal of our time in the building, sitting at board meetings, and we can stay after or get in early to do the rest of the work.

Well, I have tried to give you in the past few minutes a description of how we initiate our planning and programing in the Air Force. As a next step--assuming approval of an attainable force structure, we produce peacetime programs showing in detail where the Air Force expects to go in the next five years. We also produce our war plans, the Wartime Capabilities Plan and the USAF Midrange Wartime Requirements Plan, having as their base point the peacetime programs for the particular D-Day with which they are concerned.

First, briefly to these war plans: The Wartime Capabilities Plan, which we call the WPC, is published once yearly and covers two D-Days in the near future. It has two primary purposes--to furnish, first, the basis for the commander's war plans, should war occur during the period specified between the D-dates, and, second, the basis for the distribution of war readiness materiel to support the effort. Because of the need for sufficient time to effect this distribution, the WPC is published in advance of the plan you have heard about from the Joint Chiefs, I am sure, the JSCAP, for the same D-date, but is revised as necessary when that plan is published.

The other war plan, the War Requirements Plan, WPR, covers two D-dates approximately 3 and 4 years in the future. This war plan

should support the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan. Both plans talk about limited war, of course. The principal use of the WPR is for determination of the buy programs for wartime requirements--sets of unit equipment, gas tanks, and so on.

Let us now examine the programing process. In the Air Force we publish a series of documents once each year, beginning the process in December as the President's Budget is firmed up, and we keep these programs up to date on a quarterly basis during the year.

CHART 3

This chart shows the principal program documents, consisting of program guidance, aircraft and missiles, the flying-hour program, bases, units, priorities, the PD, manpower, and so on. The P stands for program, as you can tell. The G is for guidance, and so on. The dash-one merely indicates that this is the first in the series, and the 61 indicates the fiscal year for which budget estimates will be prepared.

I don't believe it is necessary to discuss in detail the content of these documents. However, the PG is the kick-off document, and it is the only one which is produced by my office. In addition to force structure and equippage, it contains basic assumptions, guidance on such things as priorities, other key information, such as total personnel strength, crew-to-aircraft ratios, and so on.

The other documents go into complete detail and they must all, of

course, be interrelated and consistent with one another. The purpose of these programs is to provide the major commands and the air staff with general guidance for the future, specific guidance for the operating year, and guidance for the submission of budgets for the following year.

CHART 4

My next chart outlines our so-called five-year programing cycle. You will note that this particular chart has been oriented to funds for fiscal year 1961. These are the funds contained in the budget estimates which we just recently submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. They are referred to as the budget execution or operating year for this chart.

You will notice on the top left that we started last year, in 1958, calendar 1958, on the preparation of the 1961 budget, although we were, of course, right in the middle of discussing the fiscal year 1960 budget. Similarly, we are now beginning to look at the 1962 position, even though we are deep in discussion of the 1961 budget.

I have labeled the 1958 portion of the chart as Objectives. What I mean is that we were starting to look ahead then in detail to the 1963 position. This is the difference between a program period of 4 or 5 years and the force structure projections of 10 years. We cost all force structures, but the costs are on a factor basis as we go further out, and this is the period where we program in detail and cost out in detail.

Early this year, as is indicated, we published our 61-1 series of documents, and these have been updated quarterly, so that we are now in the process of publishing the 61-4 series of documents. During the spring and summer, as you see on the chart, we and the commands were busy in the preparation of this 1961 budget, based on the program document which had been published. This year, as I have indicated already, I guess, was a bad year in the program business, and we had to make some fairly large last-minute changes. I'll touch on this point a little later on.

We have been through our own review and the review of the Office of the Secretary, and right now our budget is being examined by OSD and BOB. By the end of the year we will know where we stand with respect to the President's Budget, and the first half of fiscal year 1960, as is shown, will find us on the Hill defending this budget to Congress.

Finally, we will have the funds, and our 1962 series of documents will provide guidance for the operating or budget year, fiscal year 1961.

The final two years, called here on the chart lead-time period, merely indicate that the dollars obligated in the budget year will not result in all cases in hardware or facilities until 1 or 2 years later. This is our 5-year program cycle.

I should point out that, in the determination of proper action in many cases we must look even further ahead. This is why we have the attainable force. For example, it would be foolish to spend large sums

of money to construct bases or facilities not compatible with the anticipated composition of the force structure in a later period. The B-47 force we have today is a case in point. If we should see a significant reduction in the B-47 force in 1964 or 1965, it would certainly be foolish to put too much money into facilities or into long lead-time items for this force.

The publication of the USAF program documents, starting in January each year, then, indicates a chain of actions to the commands designed to secure and obligate money for the following year. The commands submit a budget for the year approximately 18 months away, and a financial plan covering their operations for the fiscal year beginning in July.

With respect to materiel requirements, the Air Materiel Command, which is responsible for the bulk of the Air Force's buying of materiel items, must also submit a materiel procurement program.

Well, again, I have been a long time on this chart. I have only one final comment on it. You will notice that the calendar year 1959 looks like a long one, compared to the others on the chart. I am sure the chart maker felt as I did that it has been a long and difficult year, and he is as hopeful as I am that succeeding years will be a little bit easier.

Now I would like to turn to my final topic, which I mentioned earlier, the so-called problem areas. I have already tried to indicate that the

planning and programing process in the Air Force is not exactly a cut and dried affair. It does not always go exactly as we would like to have it go. There are, as I said, so many things that can and do affect it that we always seem to be reacting and adjusting to problems. These problems are somewhat hard to categorize because one problem tends to affect another and be somewhat closely related to it.

The first problem, however, that I would mention is our inability in this day and age to see very clearly into the future. New things come along which are "musts," which the crystal ball has not revealed very clearly. We are then forced, if this is a "must," to adjust other parts of the program to accommodate it. Or, conversely, some new weapon system that we had counted on may slip and may not be available at the forecasted time. And again we must adjust the program.

As I indicated earlier, in the past year we have had to make fairly large adjustments in the program. This was due to our inability to look clearly ahead to see where we were going. To be particular, what has happened to us in the Air Force in the last year has been emphasis on ballistic missiles, further dispersal of ballistic missiles, an increase in the program, and an increase in space effort. In addition to that, we have had some significant price increases, and, finally, we were a little too optimistic as to what the fiscal limitations might be for the 1961 budget. As a result, our program got considerably out of balance, and these are the reasons for some of the headlines you have seen and

the fact that the 61-4 program is considerably different in many respects from the 61-1 which we started with.

A second problem I call pressures. I am sure you are all well aware of pressures. There are many. There are political, economic, and technological ones, which I indicated in the other problem. There are others. There are interservice problems. They are continually having their effect on our ability to plan and program well. They are internal and external, and they run quite a wide gamut, from the tremendous pressures, for example, two years ago, after Luniks, where it was to get ahead and money was not very tight for a little while, to the internal pressures that we have, where a major commander, for example, doesn't think we are doing right by him and he tries to change us. Finally there are maybe more minor but frequent pressures against, for example, closing a base, or even reducing the base population in any particular congressional district.

I don't believe I need to say any more about them. We merely have to do our best to anticipate and to either overcome or adjust to these pressures which are continually upon us.

My next problem I would call indecision, or lack of decision. I am not being critical, because I well know how difficult it is to make many of these decisions. But it is none the less a fact that the lack of a firm and lasting decision greatly impedes our ability to chart the course we think we should follow. This inability in turn often means

either that we start in the wrong direction or that we do not start at all. In the former case it is quite obvious that we will waste resources if the decision is reversed, and in the latter case our implementation of part of the total program may well be undesirably delayed.

The fourth problem I have labeled confusion. Here again I don't mean to be critical, but, with the size of the problem, with the many agencies and people who are involved in some way or another with the Air Force plans and programs, it is often very difficult to know precisely just where authorities and responsibilities begin and end in any particular area. It is hard to know just who is doing what to whom and how often. The saying, of course, is that, if you are not confused, you simply don't understand the situation. This may exaggerate the problem to some degree, but it is certainly true that it is anything but easy to cope with the problem of confusion. I don't mean that it is all external or all organizational. We do it to ourselves sometimes. But it is a problem.

The final problem that I have listed as being one of the major ones I have listed as size. Here I am thinking primarily of the tremendous job of spending some $18 billion each year as well as it should be spent. Even with a stable program the job would be difficult, but, with the many changes that the other problems force upon us, the magnitude of the task of seeing to it that everyone gets the word and everyone reacts as promptly as possible is enormous. This, I guess, is particularly

true in the area of logistic support, where our Air Materiel Command must compute and recompute requirements for thousands of line items to support the force in the activity which we project.

Well, gentlemen, this has been a look at the Air Force system of planning and programing, some of its documents, and some of the problems which, it seems to me, we face in trying to do the job well. If I have made it seem like a difficult task, I think I have done so properly. I should point out, however, that I believe we have a good system, that many of the program elements do stay stable, and that we are often able to make things come out even so that we get on with the job of conversion or whatever it is properly and at the right time and place.

Further, although the problems are large and complex, we have made some strides in attempting to minimize them. In other words, the picture is not all dark, and I continue to have the fond hope that we will cope with the problems better as time goes on.

Thank you very much for your attention. I will be glad, after the break, with the help of my cohorts down here in front, to try to answer any questions that you may have.

COLONEL KEACH: I would like at this time to introduce your panelists for this afternoon, before General Webster takes your questions. The Group No. 1 panelist is Colonel Berry. Group No. 2 panelist is Colonel Cardenas. Group No. 3 panelist is Colonel McCutcheon.

Group No. 4 panelist is Colonel Hohs. Group No. 5 panelist is Colonel Boylan. Group No. 6 panelist is Colonel Dade. Group No. 7 panelist is Colonel Rawlins. Group No. 8 panelist is Colonel Williams. Thank you, gentlemen.

GENERAL WEBSTER: I might point out before I start that I have four programers and four planners. I am the Director of Programs, but I have four planners backing me up here.

QUESTION: General Webster, it has been alleged from this platform any number of times in the last 60 days that the Air Force is programing itself right out of the capability of fighting a limited, conventional war. Would you care to comment on that?

GENERAL WEBSTER: Yes, I'll be glad to. It is a good question. There is no question, I think, that, when we look at overall priorities for the job in the Air Force, we look at the strategic deterrent as No. 1 priority. This has meant that, with increased costs and increased complexities of weapons, with the missiles coming in and competing with aircraft, with tremendous increases in O&M costs and in military personnel costs, as we have had to face the problem each year as we go down the road, we have taken significant cuts in the tactical Air Force. I am speaking now without regard to the airlift side of it. I am speaking of just the tactical fighting force. We know that we have done this and that we have cut them severely. If you look at the figures, this is the place where we have taken the greatest cuts.

However, I don't think that we yet planned them out of business. It is very interesting that you bring it up at this time. I sat in our Weapons Board all day yesterday. Yesterday afternoon we listened to General Everest, who is the Commander of our Tactical Air Command at this point of time. Of course he made a play for increased modernization of the tactical force. I can point out, however, that we are to some degree modernizing the tactical force. We have the F-105, which is being bought. It is coming in, and it is a supersonic fighter for this tactical role. There is a good chance, I think, that we will continue to modernize it and keep it in the force.

While we have reduced total numbers, I think we have improved capability, and I don't see it going too much lower. If the squeeze gets on too tight, I can't tell you, but, as we look at the program today, and as we look down the road, we are still going to have a tactical Air Force--not as large as we would like, but, I think, an effective one. We are going to have tactical forces in the theaters, minimum. We are going to have a quick-strike force in the ZI ready to go.

On the airlift side of it, this again is a tough one. There are pressures in all directions on this one. We have maintained it. We get criticized on one side because of the size of it, and we get criticized on the other side because it is too small. We can't really win this one. We are trying to modernize here, but, again, it is a question of priorities, and it does, as compared to the strategic mission, take a lower

priority.

I hope I have been responsive.

QUESTION: Sir, the other day we had somebody from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and he said that they have not agreed on the definition of limited war. Can you give me what you feel in the Air Force is a definition of limited war?

GENERAL WEBSTER: I am very thankful that in my job I don't get very much into the semantics play that often seems to go on in the Joints Chiefs of Staff. I cannot give you my definition of it. I don't know whether any one of the planners here is ready to give the Air Force suggested definition of limited war or not. Colonel Williams?

COLONEL WILLIAMS: I just happen to have a couple of quotes. This one is from General White's ~~talk~~ remarks before the joint hearings on missile and space activities on the 29th of January this year.

"I consider a limited war anything which does not involve the Soviet Union. It can be stated also that it is a war with limited objectives."

General Wyland summed it up, I think, pretty well, when he said:

"In a limited war, when we use the term 'limited' it is usually with limited political objectives, it is limited in geographical area, it is limited in target areas to be considered, as we found in Korea, and it can be limited in the types of weapons we are permitted to use."

This is quite a hassle going on right now on terms and definitions in the JSCAP as to just what the definitions of limited, general, and

cold war are. It should be settled in the near future.

QUESTION: General, for the past few years the Congress has delayed granting the appropriation for our use until about the end of August or September. How do you overcome the inherent hazard of not taking action to start a program during the first 3 to 6 months of a fiscal year? That seems to be the critical period for programing in any service.

GENERAL WEBSTER: Well, in some cases it is pretty difficult and in others it isn't. I am not sure of the technical details on the budget side, of just how we do go ahead. Very often this will mean a delay of that amount of time. Sometimes, however, I am sure we are able, based on what we think will be approved, to request apportionment of enough dollars to keep it going for a period of time, if we are faced, for example, with sudden stoppages. I think we do have procedures whereby, if we have to keep going in a particular area, we can get a release of funds from OSD and BOB in order to do this.

As I say, I am not an expert on it. It has not come to my attention, however, as being a very serious problem in our programing business. We'd like to get it a lot quicker, and we'd like to get it for a longer period of time as well, as we all know, because this stop-go is difficult.

COLONEL McCUTCHEON: Sir, on all programs that have to contain back to the first of July, after the 30th of June we are given what is called an interim obligation authority. It usually runs for about 30 days, and,

on any program that might stop because the contract has run out, we have no difficulty in asking them for the funds. It is an interim procedure and they will extend it if the budget has not been finally approved.

GENERAL HOUSEMAN: Whom do you mean by "they?"

COLONEL McCUTCHEON: Congress authorizes BOB. That is my understanding.

GENERAL HOUSEMAN: BOB will give you that money.

QUESTION: I would like to explore an earlier question a little further if I could. Regarding the Tactical Air Command you mentioned the 105. I understand the procurement on this is about three wings. Do we have another weapon system phasing into TAC in the near future other than this? What is the research and development program? How much of the Air Force dollar goes into this for Tactical Air?

GENERAL WEBSTER: First of all, on the 105 we are going toward a five-wing program, not a three-wing program. Second, with respect to research and development, the funds committed to the tactical area are very very small. There's no question about that. I have forgotten the dollar figure, but it is about 2 or 3 percent of our research and development, or of that part of the research and development program that is committed toward systems. It is very small.

With respect to following on modernization, this is one we have gone back and forth on. We carried it in the objective force for some time. This was the old FXV stall. The problem here has been quite

simply that we don't see a useful and cheap enough FXV stall ahead of us very soon. We have work going in several areas for the short take-off and landing, but it has been pushed back and pushed back. We haven't funded it very much because we just haven't seen very clearly that we could get it in a simple enough form. For example, the Bell effort, I think, was an 8-engine job. You have a heck of a time figuring an 8-engine job as being simple and easy to operate in the field.

This was the subject of General Everest's address to us in the Weapons Board yesterday afternoon, and he is going to General White a week from today with the same presentation. I think there is a good chance of getting some additional modernization of the F-100's, out a few years. We have been carrying F-100's in the force structure, away out in the future. I think there is a good chance that we will buy something which is a little cheaper than the 105, but we will commit most of the tactical jobs.

In the missile area, Mace, as you may know, has been up in the air. We do have two Mace units on the way to Europe, Mace A. Mace B, as you may know, was knocked out of our program by the Congress this year. The language of the bill permits us to go ahead with it if the Secretary of Defense makes the determination that it is essential. We are right in the middle of discussing this one with the Secretary of Defense. We do have in our 1960 program dollars to go ahead in our revised program with Mace B, and I think there is a chance that we will

go ahead with this tactical missile. There is nothing to follow on the tactical bomber that we foresee.

QUESTION: Sir, can you tell us something of the story behind the cancellation of the F-108?

GENERAL WEBSTER: Yes, I think I can. This gets back to the problem I mentioned, or tried to mention, in my talk about what has happened to us in this past year. Our crystal ball was just pretty clouded a year ago. We didn't foresee the increase in some of the high-cost areas. I mentioned the ballistic missiles. We had a 9 Titan Atlas and an 11 Titan squadron program. We were given additional funds by Congress to speed this up. We now show this as being 13 and 14. This is in our submission down stairs.

Lots of things along this line happened. The point I want to make is that the things that happened in increases were in the fast-spending area. Missiles spend rapidly. The dollars on missiles go. We have had tremendous increases, as I mentioned, in operation and maintenance costs. These things spend rapidly. Personnel costs have gone up very rapidly. An airman first-class used to have about 1.2 dependents. We suddenly find that he is up over 2 dependents now. So our military personnel costs are going up. All the fast-spending costs have gone up more than we anticipated.

This means that we have had to take major surgery of cut-back in other areas when we have had an expenditure limitation imposed upon us.

On the 108, we saw, I think, in the Air Force some months ago that we would have to cut back in some major weapon systems. The decision has been extremely hard to come by, because we feel that the 108 is a desirable and necessary system, but something had to go. There were many ways of doing it. The boards worked and made presentation after presentation as to how to get the program back in balance, and finally it was the decision on the part of the Chief of Staff and the Secretary that this is the one that has the lowest priority. This is because of the question as to what the real manned-bomber threat is. Nobody liked it, but this is the one that was finally chosen as the system that had to go.

I don't know that I can say much more about it.

QUESTION: You touched on my question, but I'll ask it anyway. In your list of items that you go through, you put the assessment of the threat as No. 1. You said that was always in that position. My question is: In the long-term, 5-to-10-year period, what is your value that you put on the assessment of the threat? Is it good? Do we know what they are going to do 5 or 10 years from now? Or is it adequate for these purposes?

GENERAL WEBSTER: I think the straight answer to your question would have to be, no, it is not adequate. We wish it were better. We get into, as you know, tremendous arguments as to how good it is. Although the whole Intelligence Community works on the national

intelligence estimates, we get into terrific arguments as to how good it is. This is not only you and me. It is everywhere. What is the real threat? I am afraid we don't know as well as we would like to know. I can say, well, you have to start with this. Just as the whole problem of planning and programing is full of imponderables, this is certainly one, too.

I would say again that the direct answer to your question is no, we do not know what they will do.

QUESTION: Will you please comment on the value and the future of the Air Reserve and the Air National Guard?

GENERAL WEBSTER: There is a general with a couple more stars than I have who stood on the platform not too long ago and made some comments. This is not an easy one, as everybody knows. Our policy, I think, is very clear, that we want to make the best use we can of them. We want them, however, to be ready for the D-Day mission. It is a potential that we want to use. We are doing some very difficult soul-searching right now to try to see if the program that we now have is the best one for the reserve forces. As you may know, the air reserve unit is primarily in the troop carriers. They have 15 wings, 45 squadrons of C-119's. Well, one of them is a C-123. We have the national guard in the tactical area and they use equipment which falls out from the regular force. Also some are in the air defense area and some in the TAC organization.

A board has been appointed, which meets next Monday, and it is going to look into this long-range problem. Right now, however, for the program period, if I showed a national guard and an air reserve program it would look very much as it is today. This special board is going to look at this next month. I am not sure what they will come up with. There is talk about putting these forces into more or less recovery and civil defense types of areas.

It is a very difficult one. I am charged with briefing next Tuesday the Reserve and Guard Policy Committee which meets in the Headquarters next week on the status of plans and programs for the reserve, and I think I am going to have a difficult time.

QUESTION: Sir, General Taylor and at least one Congressman have proposed a new system of programing, as I understand it, for specific jobs. If I understand that correctly, it would relieve your service of this responsibility for deciding how much would go to the deterrent force, how much to the airlift, and how much to TAC. How do you view this proposal?

GENERAL WEBSTER: This is a so-called criterion of sufficiency, as I understand it. I haven't got into it in detail. Under the present setup, as I see it, this is such a basic issue that I do not see how the Joint Chiefs could agree on any such determination. It is very basic, just like dollars and how much is enough. It is just so basic that I don't

think we could possibly see eye to eye. It means in effect that the Joint Chiefs can't decide it, and I don't see how they can. They can't agree to the apportionment of dollars now. If they can't, then I don't see but that it has to be done at the Secretary of Defense level and up the line. If this is so, I think we are getting the same effect right now. In other words, we have to justify what we think is proper for SAC to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and his decision is made.

Now, if we could get to some system, single service or call it what you will, where we could attack these very basic differences and get resolutions, maybe this would be a good way to go about it.

QUESTION: General Webster, I was connected for quite a while with a program that both Air Force and Navy had, where we spent rather large sums of money in industry, building up facilities, what we used to call the industrial base, such as tooling up aircraft companies for new types of production. One of your magnificent examples is the heavy press program which I suspect you are still having trouble keeping occupied. Could you give us a feel for where we are going in this area, naturally from your service? I know that we have cut back a little. I wonder if your Air Force program for this year and the last year, and maybe for the next couple of years, is going to tool, or do much of this.

GENERAL WEBSTER: I don't think so, but I am not familiar with the details of this part of the program. I'll ask Colonel McCutcheon.

COLONEL McCUTCHEON: We have likewise cut back terrifically on it. I don't know the dollar amount. Any tooling up for prior manufacture any subcontractor wants to do has to be approved by the Air Force to make sure that facilities are not already in existence in somebody else's plant that we could subcontract for. We have gotten rid of thousands of machine tools that we had in storage. So that part of it is definitely on the way down.

STUDENT: Are you putting millions, hundred millions, or billions into it, for example?

COLONEL McCUTCHEON: I wouldn't say hundreds of millions. We might be putting millions into it but it would be more for building up missile manufacturing capability, of the dust-free, air-conditioned type that we have to have. It is nothing at all compared to the magnitude that it was.

QUESTION: General, in view of the limited funds for development and procurement for the tactical air force, what is the Air Force view toward participation in the NATO light-weight strike-fighter program?

GENERAL WEBSTER: I am not sure what our latest position is on that program. I know in normal terms. You are talking about just the light-weight strike-fighters for NATO itself. Can one of the planners tell me what our latest position is? I don't know. But let me say this: We have continued to, or OSD has continued to, put funds against the

N-156, which is Northrup's light-weight fighter, for development of it. As far as I know there is nothing yet in any program which would provide it. As to the European efforts, I don't know. Generally, though, our position, I think, is that we want to supply our allies with good aircraft, but we don't want to compromise too much on the ability to do the job.

We have gone into this N-156 in the Weapons Board quite a bit. It has been suggested, because it will eventually be considerably cheaper, as a vehicle for our own forces. We consistently turn it down because we don't think it will quite do the job for our own forces.

I am afraid I can't answer you as specifically as I should be able to as to how we do stand with respect to this or the European version of the light-weight fighter for NATO.

COLONEL KEACH: General Webster, we are very grateful to you for this very fine presentation on the Air Force planning and programing, as well as for your frank answers to our questions. I think the boys are eager to get to the ball game now, so we will let you off. Thank you very much.

GENERAL WEBSTER: Thank you.