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AN ADDRESS

General Randolph McC. Pate, USMC

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Reviewed by: Colonel Tom W. Sills, USA

Date: 23 December 1959

INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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28 October 1959

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Reporter: Grace R. O'Tode

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GENERAL MUNDY: General Harrold, Gentlemen of the National War College and of the Industrial College: Our talk this morning is the second of the series that will bring us the Chiefs of the four military services as well as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

To discuss the role of the Marine Corps, we are again fortunate to have its Commandant, General Randolph McCall Pate. General Pate, who is the twenty-first Commandant of the Corps, needs no introduction to this audience, of course, but, since he is terminating his second tour as Commandant in the near future, I feel that we should take recognition of his long and distinguished career of service to his country at this time. I would also like to express the appreciation of the two Colleges for his full and wholehearted support of these two institutions during his four years as Commandant.

General Pate, it is with pleasure that I present you to the combined Colleges. Gentlemen, General Pate.

GENERAL PATE: Thank you very much, General Mundy.  
General Harrold and Friends: Trouble--the diet of our Armed Forces today is trouble; tension here, unrest there, nibbling, erosive efforts by our enemies everywhere. That is the atmosphere in which I am

obliged to frame my remarks this morning.

To set the stage for the next 40 minutes, let us take up a practical example of trouble as it might confront us on our own doorsteps at any time. Let us say that on December 1, 1959, it becomes unquestionably evident to the United States that a foreign power whose interests are wholly inimicable to our own has finally managed to establish firmly its influence on Island X in the Caribbean and has begun to exercise substantial control over the military and political activities on that island. Large stocks of arms have gradually been introduced into the island, and its puppet regime constitutes a growing threat to the United States influence in the hemisphere.

Continuing further, let us say that, perceiving this, the United States, among other precautionary actions, directs a naval task force to proceed quietly to the vicinity of Island X and to stand by there in the event of need. Then, ten days later, as the crisis intensifies, and on orders from Washington, the naval task force lands its embarked Marines on Island X. The landing force destroys the anti-United States forces, captures the extensive munitions stocks, seizes the seat of government, and makes way for the reestablishment of an administration favorable to our interests.

This, gentlemen, is a reasonable picture of a limited war action that could happen at any time. To some, this form of combat is a new

look in warfare, a problem whose solution demands the creation of totally new mechanisms. But this is really not true. The incident I have described is not new or hypothetical at all. It is real. It has already happened. It occurred on the Island of New Providence in the Bahamas in the year 1776, when our fleet landed its Marines in our country's first limited war action. The situation and the solution were just as I described them, and my purpose in recounting it to you here was simply to emphasize that the limited war problems with which we are plagued today are really nothing new, as well as to give you a historical example of the continuing role of the United States Marine Corps in the security of our country over the years, upon which subject it is my pleasure to address you this morning.

Mine is the same sort of talk that you have had or will have from all of the other service Chiefs, its purpose being to present you an authoritative picture of one element of our national military structure. I am sure that you have found none of the other service Chiefs guilty of understating the contribution which his service may make. I can assure you I shall not understate my case either. You may be sure that I will present the Marine Corps to you in a favorable light, not only because I am a Marine but, more fundamentally, I believe that the United States has a greater need today for what the Marines have to offer than ever before.

What I propose to do, then, is to tell you what the Marine Corps actually is today, how it fits into the geometry of today's military organization, what it is doing, and, finally and most important, what it is prepared to do.

First, a few words on what the 1959 Marine Corps is. The Corps numbers about 175,000 officers and men, of which almost 100,000 are in the fleet Marine force. This force, comprising three Marine divisions and three Marine aircraft wings, is our major contribution to the security of the United States. It has been designed specifically to meet our primary task, which, of course, is the prosecution of wars across the seas.

In the post-World War II era, the Marine divisions and wings have evolved steadily in terms of organization and equipment toward a condition where they can employ effectively the dramatic advances in technology which have been our heritage in the past few years. The 1959 Marine division looks like this. (Chart) It is a light, highly flexible formation, designed with a keen eye upon its predominantly naval environment, upon a unique problem associated with moving rapidly across the seas and fighting from mobile floating bases. Its assault elements embody great shock power, and <sup>are</sup> ~~are~~ helicopter transportable, which I will emphasize later, is the real key to our effectiveness today.

The 1959 Marine aircraft wing is designed specifically to complement

the Marine division. It is a balanced, supporting air component whose purpose is to provide the ship-to-shore mobility, the air fire support, and the air protection demanded by a landing force in the modern day. The wing includes attack planes for close air support, the effective air-ground technique that ~~is to~~<sup>has</sup> become the hallmark of Marine combat everywhere, helicopters in growing numbers to convey our assault forces ashore, fighters to assist in providing close protection for our troops, and control elements to tie it all together.

Its components are all comfortably at home in ships of the fleet and are capable of displacing quickly to minimal expeditionary air facilities which we assemble ourselves in the combat area ashore.

To back up these divisions and wings, and to round out their tactical and logistical capability, are a limited number of force troops which, as you see here, are the sort of forces which contribute staying power and shock effect, both atomic and conventional. Here, in my mind, is one of the strong points of our organization.

By drawing on this reservoir of selective armament, we can quickly design an air-ground force to meet the requirements of any sort of overseas crisis, be it a shore force, an all-out war, or something in between. To put it another way, <sup>in</sup> maintaining this flexibility, we have avoided the common pitfall of preparing to fight only one single kind of battle, a battle which, in the perversity of things, may never occur.

However, they are organized, and whatever kind of battle they have to fight, these units, divisions, wings, and force elements have been

designed to work together as a homogeneous air-ground seaborne team, exploiting the tremendous mobility of the assault helicopter. This assault helicopter technique, which the Marines developed back in 1946, has now acquired a worldwide renown. Without it we simply could not face up to the amphibious combat in the nuclear age. With it we have the flexibility, the freedom of choice, and the initiative that are essential if we are to keep the defender continually and fatally off balance and thus win the amphibious battle.

In one dramatic stroke the assault helicopter technique has eliminated the hazardous six-knot boat run to the beach by the leading ~~troop~~<sup>wave</sup> ~~of~~ the troops. In contrast, our attacking forces are now able to move directly from the ship-borne bases far at sea to the objectives ashore at 100 miles an hour and to do so without any concern as to hydrographic conditions, obstacles, or enemy beach defenses. The enemy no longer can afford to focus his attention only to seaward. Now he must look in every direction, to his front, to his flank, and to his rear. In other words, the great flexibility already inherent in amphibious warfare, where the attacker can choose both the time and the place for his landing, is enhanced many fold.

This helicopter assault capability, moreover, is not just a theory, a vision, or a sea story with which I entertain visiting Congressmen. It is a reality today and it is growing more-so daily. Were we required

to do so, we could land the assault elements of two regimental combat teams by helicopter right now, and the capability, of course, will continue to grow. This is not to say, however, that we shall be freed of our dependence on over-the-beach operations for the introduction of follow-up forces or heavy equipment. To the contrary, the helicopter is our assault conveyance only. We see it as an evolutionary advance in amphibious techniques, a vastly improved device for transferring the power of landing force from the sea to the land, and nothing more.

That, then, is how the fleet Marine force is designed today--three divisions and three wings, which have moved steadily forward with the technology of the atomic era. As I have been discussing these units, I am sure that many of you have reflected that they make up a sizable force, and not a cheap one, either. I estimate that they absorb something around 2 percent of our national military budget, but, in my opinion, they are worth the price. Were they not, they would never have come into being in the first place, and they certainly would not have endured. Actually, this unique amphibious arm was created, it was nourished, and it has flourished only because it meets a peculiar need of the United States. This need arises because we are an island power whose enemies have always lain across the seas. It has been a traditional and a basic obligation for our fleets to keep the sea lanes open. This has meant, of course, naval campaigns both large and small. Moreover, it has

often been necessary in those campaigns for our naval commanders to extend their influence ashore on the far end of the sea lane, and this in turn has meant, of course, amphibious operations.

As you well know, such situations have occurred with almost mechanical frequency since the beginning of our history. That is the cardinal reason for the continued existence of the Marine Corps sea-borne combat forces which I have just described. But it is not the only reason. The purely maritime requirement for these combat units is almost indistinguishable from another of almost equal importance. As a dynamic nation, with expanding worldwide interests, the United States has encountered over the years a continuing need for a small, professional military force, one capable of swift, and often unformalized, movement overseas to any and every place where trouble might signify a prompt need for the protection of our national interests, protection in either terms of war or of actions short of war.

These occasions have been both frequent and pressing; from the Tripolitan Wars right up through the Lebanon crisis the pattern has always been about the same. A specific need arises, a need peculiar to our Nation's international position at the moment. A naval force, including its Marine landing component, is at hand and ready to go. It moves swiftly to the scene of the trouble, meets the crisis, withdraws, and once again a basic requirement for such a force is validated.

This is a limited war, and, as I pointed out in the beginning, it is

plainly nothing new. I make this brief reference to the past only to reassure those who need reassurance that it is not propaganda or sky-blue pants which has kept the Marines in business for some two centuries. Rather it is a cold-turkey naval requirement that has existed in one form or another since the Liberty Bell first rang.

Even so, there have been times when the inroads of a vigorous defense economy effort have drained the Marines' strength a little too much. In those cases the United States at large has taken prompt action to correct the deficiency. Witness Korea. Literally, it took everything the Marines had to put one division and one aircraft wing in Korea in 1950. The Marines were all on the front lines. There were very few left, if any, for other contingencies. This the United States didn't like, and it was not long before specific steps were taken to insure that three Marine divisions and three Marine aircraft wings, of which I have just spoken, would henceforward be on hand all the time to meet those crises which have recurred with such regularity.

It is significant to note that, in taking steps to insure the availability of these forces, the United States raised no question as to cost. This, I believe, reaffirms the well known fact that you cannot fool the American people for long. They pretty much know what they need, they are prepared to pay for it, and, as a result, they usually get exactly what they want. This is exemplified by the growing recognition throughout our

country today that our defense cannot be trifled with, that, whatever the cost, we must bear it, because there simply is no choice between living a full and a happy life on the one hand and being chained to a wheelbarrow in a Siberian uranium mine on the other. Fortunately, the United States is coming more every day to heed its most distinguished economists who assure us that, despite fears to the contrary, we do have the resources, we do have the Treasury, we do have the means to be strong and free, if we only will be.

But, enough of background as to what the Marine Corps is and how it got that way. Now allow me to draw the Marine fighting forces into some relationship with the rest of the Nation's armed might. The Defense Reorganization Act of a year and one-half ago has had as one of its purposes the strengthening of our military unification structure. This made little change in the Marines' operational relationship, because we are already more unified than anybody else. With our own completely homogeneous air-ground force and our close and effective family relationship with the Navy, we have exemplified real unification in action for years. Today, as in the past, the Marine Corps is a purveyor of fighting forces to the unified commands. We organize, train, and equip our units. We develop and perfect their specialized techniques. And we turn them over to the combatant commanders in fighting condition. It is important to note, however, that we do so in a somewhat

different way than do the other services. Initially, the bulk of our Marine fighting forces are first assigned to the principal fleets of the Navy. There they serve to complement the other capabilities of the fleets in meeting the strategic requirements of a basically maritime nation.

Here is a picture of the way the operating forces of the Marine Corps are distributed among the fleets today. (Chart) These fleets in turn are assigned directly to the several unified commanders, who thus possess a ready amphibious arm which they may deploy in any locality where swift overseas action may suggest the need or even the hint of a need.

Here is how the unified commanders have disposed of their Marine landing forces and the associated fleet amphibious forces. (Chart) You will discern that the distribution provides for an amphibious capability in each of the great ocean areas, paralleling generally the distribution of the fleet itself, and paralleling specifically the distribution of the fleet's amphibious forces with which the Marine units are so firmly joined.

It is in these amphibious ships that we live much of the time. It is in them that we find our global mobility as well as our logistic support.

This worldwide distribution will suggest to you, I think, the great reliance that the unified commanders place in this versatile and wholly

unique maritime arm. Indeed, it would be hard to recall a crisis or a period of tension anywhere in the world in recent years that has not caused some unified commander to quietly and swiftly move his amphibious forces in the direction of the trouble.

Those of you who will go from here to serve in one of those unified command headquarters will find that, because of their distinctive character, these specialized amphibious forces tend to maintain their own identity as a ready, uncommitted, strategic weapon. Furthermore, you will find that the usefulness of amphibious operations in general, and the capabilities of the Marine Corps forces in particular, will not be allowed to go unheralded. Your Marine staff associates will take care of that. They will appraise the problems laid before them from the viewpoint of the unique and specialized professional skill which they have acquired over the years, and they will present their views in this vein. This, I believe, is one of our most useful contributions to the operations of any joint headquarters. It helps to assure the heavily burdened commander that the capabilities of one of his most powerful weapons do not go unanswered and unnoticed.

Up to this point my comments have been largely addressed to organization matters. Now I think it is time to face a little reality. What, exactly, is the Marine Corps doing today? It is doing the same thing as the other armed services--fighting communism in any and every

way that it can. The Marines are in the front ranks of our cold war forces. They are in action, doing something about it, and doing it now. There are Marines, the better part of a division and an aircraft wing, standing by in the Far East, prepared to land wherever trouble brews in East Asia. The Marines who were in Lebanon are now poised in the Mediterranean, ready to move to the next area of crisis. And wherever they are they are prepared to make their influence felt in either 30 or caliber/megaton terms.

This just happens to be the pattern of the moment, but in fact it is the same old design that we have seen repeated again and again during the past several years. You recall Suez, for instance. While Marines in the Mediterranean evacuated our nationals from Alexandria, other Marines sped to the Eastern Mediterranean, prepared to land and to fight, if necessary. At the same time, Marines from the third Marine division in Japan were embarked and sailed for the Persian Gulf in a matter of hours after the order was received. Later, when the temperature rose in Indonesia and another big piece of Southeast Asia stood in danger of falling into Communist hands, the response was just the same. Marines from the third division and first aircraft wing embarked in the aircraft carrier Princeton on a training exercise in the Philippines, were moved to the scene ready to make an all-out landing attack. For five days they lay off Sumatra, and then returned to the Philippines, where

they maintained a four-hour alert status for two continuous months.

These recurrent cold-war crises reflect a down-to-earth need which has resulted in the worldwide deployment of Marines. As I showed you a moment ago, this is actually our organization for battle in the conflict which is going on right now. Those Marine elements which are not deployed in the forward area, nose to nose with the enemy, are busy doing just one thing--training, training with their brothers in the fleet with a degree of seriousness and urgency that reflects the obligation of being fully prepared at any time.

In the past 12 months these forces, Navy and Marine together, have executed some 42 realistic war-style exercises, each one in every sense a rehearsal for combat. But the thing that is most significant with respect to all of these dispositions is this: There is no variation whatever in the readiness of our forces, wherever they may be. Those on the West Coast are in the same state of preparedness as are those in Okinawa. Those on the East Coast are in an identical condition with those in the Mediterranean. From one end to the other, these fleet Marine forces are a homogeneous whole, ready to go now.

With the picture of what the Marine Corps is, where its forces are, and what they are doing now, I believe you are finally prepared to take a hard look at what they must be ready to do in the face of impending world events.

In facing this problem, I realize that I, like all of the other service

Chiefs, must be careful not to conjure up situations which are tailor-made 100 percent to fit the capabilities of my own forces, diseases for which we only have a cure. This is an undesirable thing, but it is one which I fear we see all too much of. For my part, I would like to avoid this unrealistic approach and to offer my observations regarding the future in terms of a single, simple premise which I think we can all accept.

Today the United States and the Soviet Union both possess formidable nuclear arsenals with which they may gravely damage one another if they choose. This is my simple premise. I am sure you will accept it in essence. Whether these great arsenals are used wholly, partly, soon, later, or never, we are faced with an uneasy interim period wherein our enemies will seek to confront us with as many costly incidents as they possibly can. The Communists know that they can do us great hurt through the disruptive effects of many expensive little wars, and they will not miss a chance to do it. It is against the background of this war, the battle for men's hearts and minds through cold and tepid means, that I will give you my idea of the Marines' contribution to the future. I will not relate my thoughts to existing ~~AV~~ plans, but I still consider my reflections to be completely realistic.

First, let us consider the globe as a whole. The great bulk of the sites of potential trouble are washed by one of the great oceans. Marine

units, as elements of our fleet, are prepared to go anywhere that trouble may demand. They are at sea right now, somewhere, as a matter of fact, and, if tension grows anywhere on the world's shores, they can move on their seaborne bases quietly in the direction of the fight. It will not be necessary to wait for formal commitments. The move will be unobserved and unheralded. It will not have to be preceded by negotiations for transit or overflight authority, and will not endanger any sensitive diplomatic negotiation which may accompany the crisis. Furthermore, these forces will not have to land solely because they move in the direction of the trouble. They can stay at sea, within striking distance, for days or weeks, as they did in Lebanon. If they do land, they need put ashore only such power as is required by the specific situation, and, when that need is fulfilled, they can return to their floating bases and disappear into the same ocean vastness from which they came.

This is the real operational flexibility and operational economy to be found in the mobile, seaborne force, and I am sure it will pay dividends in the <sup>many</sup> naval campaigns, both big and small, during this era of nuclear-induced tension.

So much for the generalities of our contribution. Now let us be a little more specific. Let's take a look at Asia for a moment. There the Marines will contribute in the future, as they are contributing today,

by keeping the enemy on the defense. In Asia he is land bound, with little freedom of action. We, on the other hand, have complete freedom both as to where and as to when we attack. The Pacific, the South China Sea, and the Indian Ocean are our bases, and they are absolutely free for us to use, because nobody has a flag on any one of them. This is why our sea-supported, amphibious capability is a constant and oppressive threat to the Communists everywhere in Asia. I estimate that on the East Coast alone, of China, there are at least a dozen divisions tied down in beach-defense tasks. They are immobilized, simply because there are about 20,000 Marines and their associated amphibious lift somewhere in that area, and the enemy is never sure that this force will be in the same place for two nights in a row.

This is a form of deterrent, too. It is not the same as H-bombs, but it is a deterrent, all the same. It is a concrete and continuing contribution that we are making now and will continue to make in the future, solely by virtue of our capability, as a part of the fleet, to descend at any time on the Asiatic Coast from our elusive seaborne base. Then, to be even more specific, a Communist coup could occur in Cambodia, Indonesia, Thailand, or South Vietnam at any time, calling for quick action on our part to stifle the enemy effort before it becomes a full-blown success. We have the forces out there right now, with the mobility, the skill, and the readiness to take on the job. These forces, moreover, coming as they do from the sea, and transported largely by

helicopter, will not require the development of costly land lines of communication for supply in these underdeveloped areas.

And, how about Korea? Who will guarantee that President Rhee will not precipitate a crisis which will reopen the battle on that peninsula? We can go back there on short notice at any time, and we won't have to butt our heads against truce line defenses, either. How about our own hemisphere? What is to happen in the West Indies? Is it possible that we may be faced with a flourishing hammer and sickle on our doorstep? We pray, not. But, if we are, there had better be a hard-headed American force ready to plough its way ashore and reestablish tranquility before the brush fire gets out of control. There are Marines ready to do it now.

Then let's move over to the Middle East tinder box. If there is a cold-war requirement in Lebanon, a warm-war requirement in the Persian Gulf, or a hot-war requirement in North Africa, we have forces trained and ready to make a major contribution to getting the job done.

I could continue to paint other equally probable scenes in which our ready amphibious arm may figure prominently, but I think my view is best expressed by recalling to you that history is worth nothing if it cannot serve as a reasonable weathervane. These hypothetical instances which I have cited are only a modern mirror of our past experience. Korea, Indonesia, Suez, Guatemala, Venezuela, Quemoy, and others, all found

our sea-based forces moving quietly in the direction of the trouble or potential trouble. This is how it has been in the past, and it is how it will be in the future. These actual and potential contributions of which I have spoken at some length reflect my ideas of what the Marines are doing and may do as a member of the total Armed Forces team.

But there is one further contribution which is quite as real and quite as important. It is the contribution we make to the other services directly. By giving full-time attention to the amphibious art, we keep it alive, dynamic, and flourishing. We pass on to each of our sister services the fruits of our reflections on doctrines, tactics, techniques, and equipment, so that they may use all or any part of them where appropriate to their own endeavors. In other words, there is a policeman on the amphibious beat 24 hours every day. This fact has been of practical usefulness to all of the other services many times in the past. I am sure it will continue to be in the future.

I have spoken now for something over a half-hour on what my Corps can do and where it fits into the big picture. As I warned you in advance, my treatment has been confined largely to the Marines. Because I have not spoken at length of the other services should not suggest that I believe the Marines are capable of doing more than their share of the Armed Forces' job. I can assure you I do not believe that at all.

But here, gentlemen, is what I do believe. I believe that the need which the Marines are filling today, which they are prepared to fill

tomorrow, is a real and an important one, based on hard fact and not on fuzzy conjecture. I believe that to fulfill this need properly demands continuous and diligent attention to one single aspect of making war today—the overseas amphibious assault, be it large or be it small. We are putting everything available to us into perfecting our skill and our readiness to do this job. We make it our business all day every day.

Finally, I believe that the undivided attention to our specialized endeavor which has conferred such great rewards on our country when the chips were down in the past will do so again. Whenever the show-down comes, I believe that our three divisions and three wings will prove to be blue chips, no matter where or how the game is played.

Thank you, very much.

**COLONEL BUCKNER:** General Pate is ready for questions.

**QUESTION:** Sir, Many of the political situations, or limited war situations, into which one might have to enter in Southeast Asia, particularly, have as a major element jungle guerrilla warfare. Could you speak briefly on the Marine capability for dealing with this kind of problem?

**GENERAL PATE:** We think we are particularly qualified in that. We have done a lot of it in the past in the jungles in Haiti, Santo Domingo, and Nicaragua, and other countries. We do train in jungle warfare always, and we think we are particularly qualified in that field.

QUESTION: Sir, could you tell us something about the kind of the research development effort the Corps is making in the search for new materiel, and, secondly, what the aspirations of the Corps are in space?

GENERAL PATE: First, as to our R&D effort, our R&D effort is a modest one. Our funds for R&D are included in those of the Navy Department. At the moment I think for 1961 they are some \$12.5 million, which is a very small amount of money for research and development. On the other hand, a considerable amount of research and development is done for us by both the Navy, the Army, and the Air Force. We participate with them, we have liaison with them, and, when, say, the Army develops something that would be useful to us with minor modification, the Army has been very generous about sharing ideas like that. We also frequently contribute funds to the research and development of the other services for things that would be useful to us. That, very briefly, is our research and development program.

We have at Quantico a Small Equipment Board and a Research and Development Board there, which devote their time purely and solely to items of development that are for the Marine Corps use only. Nobody else would have any requirement for them. That is our R&D effort.

As to space, who knows? I don't think the Marine Corps is really interested in space, except to have the first man up. A man who is with

the five astronauts, Lt. Colonel Glenn, I hope will be the first man in space. Other than that we have no particular interest in space.

QUESTION: General, could you give us your assessment of the capability of enemy submarines to interfere with the Marines?

GENERAL PATE: We believe that they, of course, can interfere. It is a matter of whether they will interfere. We think in limited war that they would be very careful about interfering, because this might lead to general war, which I am convinced they don't want, any more than we do. I think in the matter of limited war there is very little chance that they will interfere. That was the case in Korea. They could have interfered there with the submarines, but they didn't.

QUESTION: General, one impression that has stood out in discussions we have had here at the War College up to this point, I believe, is that we need increased limited war capability in the United States. I gained the impression from your speech, sir, that the Marines are pretty well prepared to take care of anything that might happen now. Would you care to evaluate from your viewpoint whether we do or do not have, in general terms--not the Marines only--sufficient limited war capability now to take care of any situation?

GENERAL PATE: I believe in general we do at the moment have sufficient capability. Of course, like General Lemnitzer, who doesn't have enough men, we don't have enough men, in our opinion. Now, the Administration, looking at it from the broadest point of view, has

apparently determined that we have enough, with the world climate as it is. Should there be a change in the world climate, I would think that it would be necessary to increase the size particularly of the Army and the Marine Corps, and maybe the Navy. I believe the Air Force has a sufficient deterrent in its several sections of its organization. At least General White has said that it does, and I, of course, concur with him. But, in general, I think, for the moment, we are probably as well off as we need to be right now.

QUESTION: Sir, following up that question, could you give us your definition of limited war?

GENERAL PATE: The definition of a limited war has been before the Joint Chiefs of Staff for about 18 months. It still is not resolved. There are many definitions that could be used. One would be, any war that isn't a general war would be called a limited war. A limited war might be limited geographically; it might be limited in objective; or a combination of the two. I think that would be as good a definition of limited war as I would like to use. Sometimes they are called brush fires. That's no definition. I think a limited war would be one that is limited geographically, and, of course, by objective.

QUESTION: Sir, in your prepared statement you pointed out that the Marines have under one service an air arm, a naval arm, to an extent, and a ground force. Would you give us your comments on expanding this to a single-service concept?

GENERAL PATE: I don't think we need a single service. I would oppose that 100 percent. I think, if you expand it to one single service, if you are trying to get away from trouble or disagreement, you won't do it. The problems will be there just the same whether you have one service, three services, or four services. It doesn't make any difference. You are going to still have the problems. And those problems are so vast and so complex that no one man is ever going to resolve them, in my opinion. I think that in our integrated forces, in our own ground and air forces, plus the naval forces, we have disagreements. We frequently fight like hell in the family. So I don't think that making it all one service or all one unit would be the answer at all.

QUESTION: Sir, we have heard about the landing at Lebanon. When the Army went in there, there was a lot of publicity in the New York Times that they were going in with atomic weapons, but they never did land them. The policy was that you would keep the Honest Johns aboard ship and not stir up a hornet's nest of public opinion. Is this business of being nuclearized in our armed services a serious problem? When we are called upon to move in and there is a sudden change and we have to go to conventional weapons and not use atomic weapons, does that pose a tremendous operational and training problem?

GENERAL PATE: Well, yes, it does pose a problem, but not too serious a problem. We had the Honest Johns right with us in the ship. So did the Army when they came in. We had the warheads right there,

too. It was only a matter of transferring the warheads ashore as we needed them. The Honest Johns were kept in the ship because it was determined by the Administration for political reasons, largely, that they wouldn't put them ashore. They didn't need them, as it turned out. There could be a problem, but I don't think it would be too serious, as long as they are present in the ship, and they will be.

QUESTION: General, could you give us your definition of what is enough in the way of manpower? You have three divisions. Do you want six, ten, four, or five? How do you measure from your mature judgment of all these years, what would be enough of Marines, or for the operations in general? A general idea of mass manpower.

GENERAL PATE: Well, I would rather speak for the Marine Corps. The law requires the Marine Corps to have three divisions and three wings, with the necessary supporting elements. At the time this was being discussed in Congress, Congress said and agreed that to do this properly would require 245,000 Marines. Now, I don't quite agree with that now. We have examined our organization, we have reduced it in size, some. I don't think the current strength of 175,000 is sufficient, but I testified and I say now again that about 200,000 Marines would permit us, in a minimum fashion, to do our job and comply with the law. We cannot comply with it technically with 175,000.

QUESTION: Sir, my question goes to adequacy of our force. In your position on the Joint Chiefs, and in your experience, have there

been any instances since the Korean War in which the lack of flexibility or the inadequacy of our military force in being has affected desirable foreign policy, and, as the second phase of my question, are there any foreseeable policy positions for the United States in which the lack of flexibility or adequacy of this force is unduly affecting our foreign policy?

GENERAL PATE: That's a right big question. I honestly don't know of any case. I have been in this job almost four years. Within those four years there has certainly been nothing of that kind. We have had all the flexibility that we needed. What the influence has been on the political side of it, I don't know. Maybe some of the State Department people could answer it. It certainly has never come to my attention that we didn't have what we needed at the moment.

QUESTION: Sir, in your prepared remarks you covered very well the capabilities of the Marine Corps. What are your major problems?

GENERAL PATE: Men; we need more men, as I was just saying. We cannot do our job properly with 175,000 Marines. We need 25,000 more. That, my friend, is our main problem.

QUESTION: Sir, you gave a very good discussion of the manner in which you can cope with limited war situations that develop along the coast lines. Have the Marines done any developmental work on being able to get further inland--we'll say as a possible example--at Pakistan, or something of that sort?

GENERAL PATE: Well, we can go anywhere that we are needed, I think. While we are not airborne troops, we are air transportable. If they need Marines in Afghanistan and we can get there only by air transport, we can go. Of course the helicopter is not limited to the beach area. It can fly in at least 100 miles. So we can go anywhere they can take us--maybe by ship, maybe by plane. We can go wherever they need us.

QUESTION: General, has the substitution of jet aircraft for propeller aircraft since Korea adversely affected your close air capability?

GENERAL PATE: We don't think so. We think it has improved it.

QUESTION: Sir, may I develop that last question a moment? You had several questions put to you about the flexibility of the Marine force--being able to go into situations where you might find it difficult to take atomic weapons, and so on, and whether you fight both non-nuclear and nuclear limited war. I was thinking back to the Far East where, just a short while ago, you had aircraft of the AD type, which carried a big load of non-nucs, and so on. More and more you are substituting your newer aircraft which are built specifically, or pretty much so, for nuclear weapons. As you have gone more and more toward pretty much substituting in all your squadrons equipment from which you get a really high nuclear capability and a much lower conventional or non-nuclear

capability, at the same time you have also taken on some, I might almost call, strategic targets for your Marine forces, which you didn't have a couple years ago, when they were held off to normal targeting. I was just wondering whether you are not also getting to a bind where you are pointed more and more toward nuclear war and away from conventional war.

**GENERAL PATE:** We have some officers who would agree with you. I am not entirely sure that I disagree. We are examining this very very carefully. One of our problems is this--and I am not complaining. We have to use practically all the time the planes developed for the Navy. This is proper, because we have a dual mission. We not only support these divisions but we have a second mission, which is for our aviators to be able to go aboard aircraft carriers and serve actually for the Navy. So that in that context we have the two missions.

I am inclined to agree that maybe we are moving a little bit away, but it is a matter of what the Navy can buy in the way of planes. We are discussing this constantly with them and we think we are making some headway. I don't have a plane to name, but we think that we will improve our situation in the future.

**QUESTION:** Along that line, the Navy has had to reduce plane procurement for the next fiscal year, and it appears that this money toward plane procurement will get tighter. Do you anticipate that this will have an effect on the strength of your Marine air wings by virtue of the Navy

also procuring the Marine aircraft?

GENERAL PATE: It definitely has already had an effect. We expect to get even more of an effect from it. We are definitely in a bind, the Navy and the Marine Corps, on the purchase of planes. Actually, this current fiscal year, the Navy is buying about the number of planes that we will lose operationally, and for the 1961 budget it looks now like we might not even get enough to stay level. It is bound to affect us, just as it does the Navy.

STUDENT: Sir, we don't have enough money to really maintain our strength in this situation.

GENERAL PATE: We definitely do not.

QUESTION: Sir, the application of force by the United States against any Latin American nation would have certainly deleterious political effects. On the other hand, in Cuba, where you have almost bought ruin, the Marines have the problem of defending the naval base at Guantanamo. Can you tell us what measures have been taken on that situation?

GENERAL PATE: Well, those measures were taken a long time ago. We have on constant alert in the second division and <sup>in</sup> the second aircraft wing a batallion that can be flown down in a matter of hours. Of course we frequently have a BLT and sometimes an RLT MAA G group training in the <sup>2425</sup> Via ~~As~~ area. In fact there is one there now. That is only a matter of hours away from Guantanamo. So CINCLANT is

prepared to take whatever action is necessary. The number of Marines at Guantanamo don't amount to too much. I think they are on the order of about 200, but they could be reinforced very very rapidly.

QUESTION: General, I got the impression that you have roughly half your force, 100,000 men, scattered east and west, with one division and wing in the Atlantic and two divisions and wings in the Pacific. You also pointed out in pictures that they are ready to go at any time. Suppose the Russians, for good reasons, decided to start limited wars or brush fires in three areas at once--two in the Pacific and one in the Atlantic. You would presumably want your Marines to go there. Do you have enough, organic, naval amphibious, and possibly what you could get from the Army and the Air Force, left to get your units to those three areas and support them for a period of, say, 30 to 60 days, until the Army could come in, bearing in mind that if this situation came to pass the Navy, Army, and Air Force would be occupied with their own problems?

GENERAL PATE: You are asking me if there is enough amphibious lift to do this?

STUDENT: Amphibious and air wing --to get them in and support them from both sides of the United States at the same time.

GENERAL PATE: There is not, no. The amphibious lift available today is a minimum 1-1/2 division-wing team, which, obviously, is just

half enough. In the case of the airlift, the Air Force has said they have enough. I know that they know their business, so I assume that they do have enough.

QUESTION: Sir, in the development of the amphibious or landing technique, as I understand it, the Marines are moving more and more to the airborne landing technique. Is the movement in the direction of doing this at night? Does this capability exist? Are we working on that? Also, what if it happens to be foggy at this time? Are we flexible enough to move them right in still?

GENERAL PATE: Oh, yes, we have not given up hopes entirely, and never will. As for the movement by night, we are constantly practicing that. As a matter of fact, in Korea, we evacuated our wounded at night, in the limited helicopters we had then. These recent helicopters are better instrumented, as you know, I am sure. As to fog, you know more about that than I do. I don't want any part of flying in fog.

QUESTION: Will you comment, please, on the vulnerability of your long helicopter lines?

GENERAL PATE: Yes, sir. That is always of interest to people. How vulnerable are these helicopters? Well, naturally, they are vulnerable, but, we are never going to go anywhere in amphibious operation without air control at the moment. We didn't do it in World War II. You couldn't do it then, and you can't do it now. There will be long

preparation, with aircraft carriers. The Air Force is mixed up in this, too. They will assist us in getting our air control at the moment. Now, these helicopters, as you know, can fly close to the ground and do some contour flying, and they are very difficult to see. They are also not so easy to shoot down as you might suspect. I remember in Korea we had many helicopters come back with a lot of bullet holes in them. We lost some, but not nearly so many as you would expect. So, while they are vulnerable, we don't think they are as vulnerable as people believe they are, particularly if they are handled correctly.

QUESTION: I would like to go back to the airlift problem, general. Did you have any airlift problems during the Lebanon crisis? And how were they solved?

GENERAL PATE: We had a slight airlift problem. When the first battalions went in, we were not too sure what the situation would be. People could have been shot and killed; actually they weren't; but we never knew. So we got together a small battalion from Camp Lejeune-- it wasn't a full battalion--these were actually replacements--and we flew them over in our own R4Q's and R5D's. This was a matter of about 400 people, I think. That was our only use or problem in airlift.

QUESTION: Sir, you covered limited war very nicely. On the other hand, many people feel that, if we have an all-out nuclear exchange, we won't be able to mount a large-size war and get Army troops fast in a nuclear affair. With your Marine force scattered throughout the

world today, if we have an all-out nuclear exchange, what do you envisage the role of the Marine Corps to be?

GENERAL PATE: I would think it would be the same as it is now, to go where needed. If everybody is wiped out, there is nothing else we can do. These Marine forces are still active and available. They will go anywhere they can be taken. I think they could be used usefully. That's my opinion.

QUESTION: Sir, my question concerns the Reorganization Act of 1958. Do you believe that your Marines, as part of a unified command, can expect the timely and dynamic decisions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff that they could expect from a single military individual to that unified command?

GENERAL PATE: I certainly do. As to this business of the Joint Chiefs of Staff disagreeing, of course they disagree, but, every time there is a situation that demands a decision in a hurry, they get it. There have been many since the Reorganization Act. As a matter of fact, these people can be called up on the telephone and make decisions like that (snapping his fingers). The Chairman goes right along up and says, "I have talked to them all and this is it," and there you go. I don't see any delay at all. The delays come from policy, not decisions, or immediate actions. We still want to hassle about the policy of this and the policy of that. But those are not the decisions. If the unified commander needs a decision, he gets it.

QUESTION: General, you spoke of manpower as being perhaps your greatest problem. Have you gained any manpower as a result of single manager support, or can you foresee any Marine manpower gain as a result of increased logistics implications?

GENERAL PATE: As a matter of fact, we have lost on that deal. No, we have not gained any. We have actually lost, and it has cost us money. We don't save any money or men, no.

QUESTION: In the Lebanon situation, Chamoun feared that he was going to lose control of his government, so he asked the United States to send forces over to help him out. With reference to your example in the Caribbean, if the head of the Island X government feared that he was going to lose control and asked the Russians to come over and they did the same thing that we did in Lebanon, would you speculate on the position of the United States?

GENERAL PATE: I don't think I even need to speculate. I think some people would have a hell of a fight on their hands, and I hope the Marines would be in it.

QUESTION: Sir, would you care to comment, assuming a good inspection system, on the possible effects of disarmament?

GENERAL PATE: Well, of course, my feet are not in concrete, but they are damn near being in it. I just don't believe that the Russians, with their minds such as they are, with their tradition, their secretiveness, their distaste for anything capitalist, will ever permit us to get in there

and inspect. Under those conditions we would be foolhardy, I think, to even consider reducing our forces to any extent.

QUESTION: Sir, could you give us an idea of what information you have on efforts which the Russians may be making to have forces similar to our Marines, with amphibious capabilities, and so forth, and what developments they are making?

GENERAL PATE: We have very little information on it, like in so many other areas. But they do have some Army units that are training with their Navy. They don't have a typical Marine Corps. They transfer these fellows, as I understand it, from the Army to the Navy, and they work for the Navy. They do have some amphibious vessels of small types. They don't have anything big. I saw some figures last week. They have on the order of some 200 to 300 small vessels capable of small amphibious operations--island to island hopping.

QUESTION: With respect to missions, is there an overlap or a conflict between the fleet Marine force and the relatively new Army STRAC?

GENERAL PATE: I don't know of any, no. Our mission is written out in law, to help the Navy in naval campaigns, as you know. There is one final proviso, that we do any other things the President may direct. That might consist in guarding the mail. It has on two occasions. It

could be anything else. I see no overlap of missions. Of course we need STRAC. I see no duplication of missions.

COLONEL BUCKNER: General Pate, on behalf of the Commandants and the staffs and faculties of both Colleges, I want to thank you for again coming over and giving us an up-to-date picture of Marine capabilities.

GENERAL PATE: My pleasure. Thank you very much.