



SUMMARY OF NATIONAL SECURITY
OBJECTIVES AND REQUIREMENTS

Colonel John C. Lackas, USA

NOTICE

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Reviewed by: Colonel Thomas C. Keach, USAF

Date: 1 December 1959

INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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3 November 1959

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Reporter: Ralph W. Bennett

Reviewed by Colonel Thomas C. Keach, USAF, 1 December 1959.

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COLONEL LACKAS: General, Faculty, Students, Friends: This is in the nature of a swan song, as you probably know; and because of what I have to say and the way in which I say it, it may be something of a "grande jete" as in Tschaikovsky's ballet "The Black Swan." I'll say for you people who don't know these ballet terms because you haven't been concerned with ballet that a grande jete is where a dancer makes a great big ^{jump} off into the wings.

In the preparation of this talk I thought of Friedrich Nietzsche's aphorism: "Whoever is fundamentally a teacher takes things, including himself, seriously only as they affect his students." And with this in mind, the things that I propose to say today I hope may have some effect on you as students.

I noticed this morning that a remark I had made in my opening talk, in which I had referred to Mr. Humphrey's comment on foreign affairs, was observed by at least one student, who quoted him this morning and quoted the article.

When I introduced this unit, I used an old German proverb, as you recall, in my opening remark. It was concerned with the proposition that one must will what one can do. I'll start this time with that old Army saying, "He who wills the task must will the means." This saying might well be the slogan of this unit, because what we are concerned with

in this unit is our limited resources, limited ideas, limited availability of everything for overwhelming tasks.

Here is what the unit was concerned with: (Chart 1)

REQUIREMENTS UNIT COURSE

A. The formulation of national policies and objectives.

B. The planning, programing, and budgeting processes to support such policies and objectives.

In the development of this talk I shall follow, more or less, the subject-matter of the unit as it was presented to you. Thus, I will begin with a consideration of certain aspects of organization. And, as you recall, that was one of the first talks that Dr. Hunter gave--Organization for National Security.

In my opening remarks I said that the mere existence of an organization structure does not assure the proper or appropriate performance of a function. I pointed out that the organization is merely a means toward an end and does not constitute the end in itself. And, as I just said, I quoted Senator Humphrey, who said: "No amount of structural manipulation can make up for a lack of leadership that is politically wise and morally responsible."

Nevertheless, organization has a great measure of significance. It is significant because it helps to channel individual effort toward specific goals. Mooney and Reilley, authors who have written quite extensively in the field of organizational management, some years ago wrote a book called "Principles of Organization." That book is in the

nature of a classic on the subject, and they set forth certain principles of organization. I'll mention three of them.

First, the coordinative principle, which has to do with the orderly arrangement for unit of action. Then the scalar or hierarchial principle, which has to do with the problem of leadership, delegation, and functional definition. And, finally, the functional principle itself, which provides for the differentiation of kinds of duty.

For the attainment of national security we look to (Chart 2) organizational effectiveness through the best use of men, money, and material.

It should be noted that organization charts usually appear as follows: (Chart 3 without overlay) However, after they have been designed like this, this is how they operate: (overlay).

This viewgraph suggests that the informal relationships within an organization may be as important as, if not more important than, the formal structure itself.

The organization with which we are concerned has to do, as I said in my opening remarks, with the decision-making process. At that time I showed you a chart which is somewhat similar to this one. (Chart 4) It points out that there are six levels of decision-making in a problem that we are considering--the determination of policy objectives, planning, programing, and then budget formulation, execution, and review.

In that opening talk I pointed out that the three segments concerned with the budget process were provided to you intentionally because they

are the points at which the decision really becomes evident.

In the consideration of the formulation of national policy at the highest level you had a talk, as was mentioned this morning, by Mr. Gordon Cray; and that was supplemented by a class seminar on the mechanics of policy formulation. (Chart 5)

The formulation of national objectives comes about in this manner: The National Security Council considers the various aspects of our national life--the Constitution, political power, economic power, military power, cultural power--as well as our national interests, principles, existing policies and commitments, and concludes what is our national interests, from which may be derived our national objectives.

The mechanical means for accomplishing this process are provided by the following organizational process: (Chart 6) This is how the NSC works, and I think it's evident to you. We haven't had this kind of a charter, but it's been talked about. The proposed agenda items come from departments and agencies through the Planning Board to the National Security Council; and after the President has made the decision, the implementation of the policy by departments and agencies is coordinated, as Colonel Mendez said this morning, by the Operations Coordinating Board.

Now, that is the formalized way in which national policy is formulated. However, in the Sunday Magazine Section of the New York Times for September 28, 1958, Peter Lisagor, a correspondent for the Chicago Daily News, said a number of things. This is the article (holding up

newspaper). "How our Foreign Policy is Made." Here is what he said:

"A great many people with a passion for tidiness and order often sound as though they thought it possible to make the nation's foreign policy according to some precise formula or recipe, like baking a cake. They are annoyed and frustrated by the unending crises and the air of improvisation that seem to hang over Washington's reaction to them. They would like to feel that everything that happens in the world is not only predictable but manageable. Given adequate staff work, vision and brains, the State Department and White House should have in their filing cabinets folders marked 'Revolution in Iraq--Causes and Consequences,' 'Summit Conference--Paths and Pitfalls,' and the like, diagramming every eventuality and supplying the President and his top advisers with clear alternative courses of action in each case. Unhappily for the tidy-minded, events seldom occur exactly as expected in this revolutionary world. And crises, far from being manageable, often produce a chaos of conflicting interests and pressures, within both the Administration and the free coalition of states led by the United States."

The author points out that "Until World War II, the State Department had been the historic font of most ideas and change in the field of foreign policy. With the onset of the cold war and the nation's growing involvement in a shrunken world, the problems of national security became too many and varied for the diplomat alone. They covered a wide range of government activity--military, economic, fiscal, psychological, internal security.

"It became clear," the author continues, "that the President required better machinery than his Cabinet alone if he were to discharge his constitutional responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs adequately and effectively. As a result, Congress passed the National Security Act of 1947, creating the National Security Council as an arm of the Presidency. The Council was designated to coordinate the work of all interested agencies and to make policy recommendations affecting America's position in the world."

That complete satisfaction with the machinery provided by the National Security Act of 1947 does not exist is evidenced by the unanimously adopted Senate Resolution 115, which authorized the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery of the Senate Government Operations Committee to study the effectiveness of existing Government organizations and procedures for formulating and executing national security policy in the contest with world communism. And, incidentally, that is the paper that Colonel Leonard brought to your attention this morning. We have one copy in our library: and I snatched it in order to give this talk. Here it is (exhibiting paper). It's called "Background Memorandum on Study of National Policy Machinery. The Committee on Government Operations." And the members of that committee are Senators Jackson, who is chairman; Senator Humphrey, and Senator Mundt.

This Senate Memorandum goes on to say: "The twelve years which have passed since the National Security Act of 1947 have seen world communism obliterate the traditional distinction between peace

and war. World communism now challenges us all the time. The competition goes across the board--cultural, and diplomatic.

"It is now commonly accepted that the cold war may persist for 25 or 50 years into the future. The fundamental issue before the Subcommittee is this: How can we best organize for the long pull to generate the sustained national effort which will be needed to win in the cold war? How can our free society so organize its human and material resources as to outthink, outplan, and outperform totalitarianism? How can our Government best organize to formulate, and to translate into effective policies and programs, a coherent national strategy which has as its goal helping build a world community of peace, justice and order?"

It goes on to say: "This study is not concerned with questions of substantive policy as such. It will not pass judgment, that is, on particular policy decisions made in the cold war. Rather, it is concerned with whether existing governmental machinery gives us the greatest possible likelihood of devising and successfully carrying out integrated and effective national security programs."

Now, the paper contains a number of questions and I thought I'd bring these questions to your attention, because these are the questions that you ask.

1. What can be done to improve State-Defense coordination.
2. What should be the role of the office of Secretary of State in relation to the President?
3. How can the National Security Council best function?

4. What should be the role of the President's staff in national security policy making?
5. Can we improve the system for the allocation of resources devoted to national security?
6. Can better mechanism be devised for increasing our ability to satisfy our national security requirements?
7. How can we more closely integrate scientific research and development with our foreign policy objectives?
8. How can the "committee system" be made to work more effectively?
9. How can we develop better policy makers?
10. What can be done about the high turnover of top policy makers at the Senate confirmation level? That means that ^{among} these people who are appointed by the President and require confirmation by the Senate there's a considerable turn-over, as you know; and recently in the Department of Defense this has been almost epidemic.
11. How can the scientist best play his vital part in the policy process?
12. Can better procedure be devised for assuring timely consideration of important facts, ideas, and policy alternatives at appropriate Government levels?
13. What contribution can "think groups" make to our problem? Think groups are people who are concerned with foreign policy primarily in academic life--people like yourselves.

14. Can better machinery or procedures be developed for helping promote wider public understanding of national security problems?

These are the questions that they propose to answer; and I would like to urge you to follow the workings of this committee. It's been my observation that the various committees of the Congress, in making investigations of this kind, bring into Washington the best minds on the particular problems.

As a specific illustration of that, about a year and a half ago there was a committee on the effect of disarmament on our national economy. The people who appeared before that committee sound like a speakers' list for the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. There were such men as Gerhart Colm; and the economist from Harvard, Seymour Harris, and the like--these people who spoke to you. And the report of what they said, the papers they submitted, provide an extraordinarily good insight into the nature of our economy, and how our economy is operating. I can't honestly say that there is a better kind of a summation and a greater unanimity of opinion about economic matters than appear in that little report by this Senate committee concerned with the effects of disarmament upon our economy.

I would like to make one other point in regard to this question of machinery and the means by which policy for us can be better made and better implemented. That is to bring to your attention again a remark made by one of your speakers; and I think of this specifically because of a conversation I had during the break with one of your fellow students.

That is that our policy is somewhat in the nature of a defensive policy in the realm of ideas, because, as someone said, what we are concerned with is the maintenance of the status quo. We are concerned with keeping what we have. The other side is the revolutionary side. They of necessity must have the aggressive action, because they are attacking this status quo. And so our function becomes one of providing something to countreact that kind of aggressive step-taking to destroy the status quo. So in general the likelihood is that this will be the nature of our history, for the time being at least.

Now, returning to these questions which are raised by this subcommittee of the Senate, I point out again that they are not questions which merely relate to organizational matters. They are questions concerned with the whole gamut of problems involved in national security. They attest to the interrelationship of all problems relating to national security. No matter what aspect of national security we may consider, we cannot consider it in isolation. Let us look at a definition of military planning for today.

(Chart 7) "Military planning is an art which cannot live, today, without facing political, economic, social, and psychological realities, as well as purely military problems. These realities, however, do not develop or act in isolation, but are so intertwined as to make it almost impossible to separate one from the other."

The primary planning agency insofar as national security is concerned is the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Here is a diagram indicating its

structure. (Chart 8) You have had something similar, but I bring it again to your attention.

Notice that the command line created by the Reorganization Act goes from the ~~Department of Defense~~ President through the Secretary of Defense through the JCS to the unified and specified commands.

This type of structure implies that the primary responsibility for operational planning rests with the JCS and their subordinate commands. It follows, therefore, as was brought out in one of your oral presentations, that the primary responsibility of the military departments is that of logistical support and administrative control.

The plans provided by the JCS provide the basis for the formulation of subordinate plans and programs by the military departments. Programs are a managerial device to provide an orderly process for the implementation of plans. The functions of a military program system are as follows: (Chart 9)

1st. To formulate and record the major objectives of the service over the period of the program.

2nd. To furnish adequate and timely guidance to the staff and major subordinate commands and agencies which will enable them to prepare annual programs and execution schedules.

3rd. To establish a sound basis for the formulation, justification, and execution of the budget in support of the approved programs, and

4th. To permit continuing evaluation of performance measured against the utilization of available resources.

Each of the military departments, as you know, has instructions relating to program preparation. For the Department of the Army it is FM 101-51.

The control programs for the Army are as follows (Chart 10) and you might compare this with that which was given to you by General Webster for the Air Force. These control programs characterize the Army, just as the control programs for the Air Force characterize the Air Force and its functions.

There is, first, the TROOP, which has to do with the strength and force structure. And this is under the supervision of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, obviously. MATERIEL, which has to do with supplies and equipment, is ^{obviously} under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics. The INSTALLATIONS PROGRAM, which has to do with real property generally, is under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics also. The RESERVE COMPONENTS PROGRAM, which has to do with forces, materiel, and installations for the Air Force, is under the direction of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Components. And, finally, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, which has to do obviously with research, development, and testing, is under the Chief of Research and Development.

The responsibilities for a control program include these:

1. Development and annual revision of time-phased quantitative and qualitative objectives for the control program in consonance with approved Army plans and guidance.

2. Review of performance in relation to the objectives of the

control program.

3. Periodic reporting on the status and projection of accomplishment of the control program objectives.

4. Appropriate action to insure accomplishment of control program objectives.

As was previously indicated, the programs are designed to provide a sound basis for the formulation, justification, and execution of the budget. The first step in the budget process is the formulation of the budget. (Chart 11) This is what it includes. It has been mentioned to you, but I thought it worth while to repeat it this morning.

First of all, the BOB issues instructions for the preparation and submission of annual budget estimates, generally late in the spring.

Then, planning assumptions and guidelines are provided by the Secretary of Defense. This is usually in general language.

3. The military departments provide program guidance in their budget calls.

4. Estimates are prepared and reviewed at each level during the summer months.

5. Hearings and reviews by the budget advisory committees are then held.

6. There is review by the OSD and BOB, and at this point I would like to point out, since none of you questioned this, that we wanted this. This is expediency. Before we had this, there was a separate review by OSD. Then they went over to BOB. It was a tremendously time-consuming

process. And when you get down to brass tacks, we all have the same objectives. It's by the grace of God, perhaps, that I'm in the military and somebody else is in the Bureau of the Budget. But, at any rate, these people are concerned about this problem of national security as well as you or I. And there is no injury done to anyone by having this review done together. But, on the other hand, considerable time is saved.

7. Then there is a submission of the entire Defense budget to BOB, and further review by BOB. This is the thing that ~~this article~~ ~~mentions~~ Mr. Archambault mentioned. This is where Mr. Stans, the Director, looks at the thing from the overall standpoint.

8. Then there is the approval by the President and the transmission to the Congress.

9. Finally, there is the review by both houses of the Congress. And I might say that the Senate review is rather perfunctory. They may deal with some matters that have political implications. The real review is made by the House Appropriations Committee.

Somebody mentioned the other day in their OP that there are, I believe, 17 members. Actually, when you get down to brass tacks, there are only about four or five members that listen to any particular military budget. There's a sub-sub-committee of the Military Appropriations Subcommittee--one for the Army, one for the Navy, one for the Air Force. And there are people on these sub-subcommittees that get pretty conversant with this specific military department, and perform

an extraordinarily good job in reviewing it, and most expeditiously. And, generally speaking, they are most cooperative and helpful.

Finally, there is enactment.

Following the enactment of the budget, which is in essence providing new obligational authority to the Executive Department, the budget execution phase begins. (Chart 12) This has to do with^{1.}the formulation of a funding program by the military departments and requests for apportionment.

2. BOE hearings on requests and issuance of advices of apportionment.

3. A review of apportionments by OSD and certification of funds.

4. Then allocations to operating agencies.

5. The operating agencies in turn make allotments to field installations.

This, then, is the execution process. It is followed by the budget review. (Chart 13)

The budget review is--

1. Review of expenditures from the point of view of legality and propriety.

2. Review of actual performance for the purpose of obtaining a link between the past and the future and the determination of policy objectives and the formulation of future budgets.

3. And a review of performance for the purpose of administrative management.

This is the process. It may appear overly administrative to you. It may appear that there is greater control than the situation justifies. However, we must remember that we are living in a money economy and that money for us provides the common denominator.

The Financial Management Program, about which Mr. Roderick spoke to you, merely provides the accounting devices, such as integrated accounting, stock funds, industrial funds, and the like, to facilitate this process. Granted that these devices may appear complex, yet, as Mr. Roderick implied in his speech, what private corporation could operate today a modern business without the use of these devices? And remember that the Department of Defense is the world's largest business.

Now, there are a few things about defense expenditures that I would like to point out to you and which you generally don't hear.

The Operations Research Office of the Johns Hopkins University, operating under a contract with the Department of the Army, in a staff paper entitled "Defense Spending and the U. S. Economy," made the following findings: Here it is (exhibiting paper). Here's the thing. There's a copy in the library, I'm very sure. It came out in June, 1958. It's headed "Strategic Division, Staff Paper ORO SP 57." Here are the findings:

"1. Research and development projects carried on with military funds in order to strengthen the national security usually serve to benefit the civilian economy as well.

"2. Most military occupations today have their civilian counterparts,

with the result that the civilian economy benefits directly from the transfer of skilled personnel who have received training in the armed services.

"3. Defense spending has important indirect, as well as direct, impacts upon virtually every production sector of the economy.

"4. The best existing tool for measuring the indirect effects of defense spending on the economy is inter-industry analysis, which employs input-output coefficients based on Census of Manufacturers data; these coefficients, however, are badly in need of revision."

I don't know whether the other groups or economists got this point, but for my group I pointed out that these inter-industry input-output analyses were originally financed by the Air Force; and I believe they had provided for a continuance of it in their 1947 request for funds, but it was denied them. Unfortunately, therefore, the tool was left dormant; and, as I indicated to my group, inter-industry studies, input-output analyses, provide the best kind of an insight that one can get as to how our economy operates and the interrelationship of the various segments of our economy. This study shows that what I have been saying is relatively correct, and that what is needed is a revision of these data, which were accumulated prior to 1947.

"5. Whether the net effects of military final demand on the economy are favorable, unfavorable, or approximately neutral will depend upon the levels of employment, output, and prices prevailing at the time."

In their concluding remark the authors of this ORC staff paper say:

"The chief goal of this study has been to indicate the great degree to which military expenditures pervade our economy and our lives. In some ways these expenditures exert undesirable influences--while in other ways they benefit the country above and beyond the military protection they provide."

In this regard I would like to say that there are a variety of theories of progress--what brings about, what initiates, what carries on, progress in our society. One of them is that war/ military operations are the most significant factors in progress. And I think, if you examine the proposition just offhand, you are led to see that considerable of what we have today is the result of the research, development, the exploration, the actions taken by the military, both during war and during peace; and that these things are carried over into our civilian life.

There's no doubt in my mind, for example, that the present use of aircraft as a means of transportation, the magnitude of this at the present time, would not be so except for the fact that airplanes were so used during a war. And you can go through a whole array of things that have had an impact upon our life--an impact, I would say generally, of a material nature.

And I feel, personally, that material progress is not the ultimate; that there are more significant things in human society and human life than material progress, not the least of which is moral and spiritual progress. And I say this because I am quite moved by such an exhibi-

tion as we have in today's press, where a man with an extraordinarily fine background, with great capabilities, prostituted himself for a material gain. This is a sad comment on our society, where we would sacrifice a real thing for something that you can't take with you.

What I have been saying throughout this talk has had, as I know, philosophical overtones, and intentionally so, for I am in accord with Bishop Berkeley, who was a distinguished English philosopher, when he said: "Whatever the world thinks, he who hath not much meditated upon God, the human mind, and the summum bonum, may possibly make a thriving earthworm, but will most indubitably make a sorry patriot, and a sorry statesman."

Thank you.

COL. KEACH: As you know, this is the last period of Unit 2. This will be your final opportunity to ask questions concerning Unit 2 that may still be perplexing you in your minds. So Colonel Lackas will now take your questions.

QUESTION: You mentioned this moral business and as an example Van Doren. Would you give your views as to how we can go about ~~increasing~~ elevating the moral plane? I notice that in our foreign policy we talk about "Be a good Christian" and all this business and western democracy and so on and so forth, whereas a lot of the people that have to be convinced don't know what we're talking about, because we're dealing with Moslems and Hindus and various other kinds of religions and with fighting communism. Can you give us your views as

to how we can go about increasing the moral ~~tone~~ plane against communism and against the materialistic business that you are trying to pursue?

CCL. LACKAS: I'd like to say that the basic tenets of Cristianity are also in most every other religion. I don't know how many of you heard U Nu Sunday on this Person to Person, I guess it was, and Ben Gurion in Israel, and Ignu down in Hong Kong, and there was this exchange. And Ben Gurion and Nu were speaking about Euddism. Ben Gurion is a tremendous scholar and was as familiar with Buddhism as Nu was. And he pointed out to Nu--or vice versa, I don't recall--how the basic notions of Euddhism are also those contained in the Old Testament and which we carried over into the New Testament. And I feel that this is true of every kind of ethical structure. Nu pointed out, by the way, that in Buddhism there's no God. But the basic concepts of what is right and good behavior are the same in Buddhism as they are in Judaism and Cristianity and in ~~Mohammedanism~~ Mohammedanism ~~too, I think~~ too. The same kind of things.

Some years ago I wrote a little paper on comparative law. There are certain principles in our law. Our law comes from the English common law, which is one of the things that I also explained to my section on economics--what the common law is. The English common law came out of the customs and the traditions of the people of England. These legal concepts are the same as ^{those} ~~those~~ which the Roman people who were not part of the Roman hierarchy had. These principles of law are quite comparable to the law which we find in very ancient texts on law--

formalized things. The informal relationship is much more important-- his participation.

And also the direct member, the Secretary of Defense, for example, has the benefit of close contact with the other people. So he gets an ~~insight~~ ^{inside}. This really is part of the formal mechanism, and I'm certain that it was meant this way. I don't think it would make too much difference.

QUESTION: I'm a little disappointed that you didn't leave us any gems this morning from your long law background, such as how to deposit money in both your savings and checking accounts at the same time. So I have two questions. One, if you want to leave us any money-making gems, we would certainly appreciate it. But, more seriously, in regard to the National Security Council and our statements of policy, Colonel Mendez this morning pointed out that very few people ever get an opportunity to see a statement of policy. I wonder sometimes if we wouldn't be better off if our policy were better known ~~as to who~~ ^{to those that} it is being applied to, as well as to the bulk of the people. Would you care to address yourself to this secrecy as opposed to an open policy?

COL. LACKAS: This is a value judgment actually, and it's made by people on the top level, but between the President, who feels that it's important to limit the knowledge of a specific policy to those who require it in their work. And I suspect the reason for this is that the situation is so fluid that to announce a specific policy with regard to a specific thing is relatively meaningless.

Now, this is an important policy determination. This places the United States Supreme Court above the acts of the State legislatures.

Then there are decisions, many of them, such as were begun in *Marlbury vs. Madison*, where the Supreme Court said that it had a right to declare an act of the Congress unconstitutional--a Federal agency.

I think that in our kind of a structure we more or less have to have some kind of body that makes these kinds of determinations. And it must make determinations not in the light of any constituent concept of the law, but in the light of the whole environment in which we live. I'm relatively certain that the United States Supreme Court, for example, in the school segregation cases, had in mind the worldwide implications of this failure to provide equal opportunity to all our people, the worldwide awareness of it as a detriment to our position as a world leader, and expressed a desire for a policy which would reduce that kind of a detrimental viewpoint about us.

Yes. I think the courts are extremely significant in the formulation of certain policies which have world-wide implications.

QUESTION: One speaker said that there are 800 million people in the world that get enough to eat and that there are two billion people that do not get enough to eat. Now, it seems to me that if you provide everybody in the world with equal opportunity, and that means to have equal amounts ~~enough~~ to eat, to live, instead of having 2 billion starving people, we would have 2 billion, 800 million starving people. How do you justify that with the policy you just stated?

COL. LACKAS: There was an article in this morning's paper about this problem, the almost massive problem of the availability of subsistence for growing populations. You know, he made the determination that populations increase geometrically, while food increases arithmetically, and you come to a point where everybody begins to starve. This is a problem that man should direct his attention to--the solution of this problem. I'm certain that people are starving who have no equal opportunity, obviously. But this is the kind of thing I am talking about that we ought to be concerned with.

QUESTION: Let's get back to the judicial side of the question. I'd like to have your comments on the statements made by some 37, I think, out of the 48 Chief Justices of the States to the American Bar Association and the Attorney General that the Supreme Court of the United States is not exercising judicial restraint and is even now legislating rather than passing upon the constitutionality of the various laws that are passed.

COL. LACKAS: I'd like to say that it's interesting to observe that many of those persons to whom you have reference back in, I think it was '37 or '39, when Mr. Roosevelt proposed a packing of the court--you see, the court has nine members--certain of those members then existing were inhibiting certain legislation proposed by Mr. Roosevelt--a number of these people that you have reference to at that time said that the court should be left alone. They should be free of any kind of action. They should have the opportunity to contemplate and to lay down general

of far-reaching significance
principles/ ~~far-reaching, significant~~ and right. They took this kind
of stand twenty years ago. Today they are talking the other way.

My own feeling about this--and there is a considerable number of
people who understand that legal operation--is that the Supreme Court
is an agency in our Government structure which of necessity must
seek to provide some kind of criticism, some kind of censorship, over
our actions; and that these men should be men of good will and good
conscience, and make their determinations in that regard.

There are any number of quotations by any number of legalists--
Marshall, Holmes, Vandyke, and a number of the present jurists--who
point that it's the Constitution that they are interpreting; and that in
their interpretation of the Constitution they must not only take into
account strict concepts of the law; but that they must transcend these
kinds of things and look at the law as a device for proper human behavior
in this day and age and in this time; that the Constitution has this kind
of flexibility and provides them with the opportunity for making this
kind of determination.

You see, what your question raises is, Who should make the
judgment? The Legislative? The Executive? Or the Judicial?
I hold for the Judicial, and I hold for the Judicial because generally
speaking the people who have been the members of the United States
Supreme Court have been generally real leaders, intellectually and
morally; and I'll vote with them.

QUESTION: Sir, you indicated that Ben Curion knew as much about

N Nu
Buddhism as I knew. I take no comfort from this. I think I have a question, however, about your easy writing off of the objection to this joint review of the OSD and BOB of our budget. I would merely like to offer to you the point that many times we don't, even though we--speaking of the Department of Defense in general--we don't always want what's best for us, we do make mistakes, and I'd like to cite an example.

About a year ago, with reference to the Military Assistance Program, someone was making the remark, practically dancing a dance of glee, that "Well, this year we did fine. BOB didn't change a thing that we sent over in our proposed budget." Well, actually, the remark in return was, "Well, why should they? You sent them over what they said to send over."

I think this is a problem. Many times we get this: They tell you so much of what they're going to be receptive to that you don't quite follow through with what you really think you should send.

The other point is that I don't question the motives of anybody in any responsible position as to the ultimate solution, but I do find that among some comptroller people, and among some budget people, they are a little more ready to put something aside in the absence of detailed information, rather than insisting that you go and get the detailed information before the decision is made, because there is always the question of saving time. I think this is a rather sensitive thing.

CCL. LACKAS: O.K. This is a relative judgment. Before they

had this kind of arrangement you had to go through this rigamarole before the DOD people, and then you went through it again before BOB. people in the

Many of the services actually wanted it, and I don't know that they object to it very strongly today, because, as I say--and I can't say much more--being there together, you have an opportunity of avoiding this kind of secondary review business.

O.K. Maybe you prejudice yourself on certain things, and admittedly so. But it's a time saver. It saves the efforts of a lot of people, from a most bothersome kind of procedure.

Would you go back to the old?

STUDENT: Well, I guess the problem goes as to how far BOB should be into the details of the military budget, in the actual details. I think perhaps the attitude of the services in saying, "Let's combine DOD and BOB in the same pot" because they view DOD and BOB in the same category--

COL. LACKAS: Right.

STUDENT: When in effect why, then, do you not, when the Department of Air Force is preparing its budget, save more time and call OSD in and call BOB in too?

COL. LACKAS: O.K. Of course I wouldn't go along on this kind of proposition, because, first of all, these are the people who are concerned with the specific budget and they should prepare it before they present it to either one, obviously. Well, you pays your money and takes your choice.

QUESTION: I don't rise to defend myself, but a good friend of mine has suggested--and I haven't heard him rise to make the point-- that we are a fine military organization, organized thoroughly to solve the Battle of the Budget. And maybe this is about all we're organized to solve. You might think about that for a minute and sometimes it will frighten you if you have labored with it for the last fifteen years. Secondly, another old friend of mine said that there are two kind of Naval officers--those that can fight the battles of peace and those who can fight the battles of war. You can comment on that if you want to.

COL. LACKAS: I must say I'm not one that's won any one, but I'd like to address myself to this proposition.

The reason we have a budget is because we have the kind of economy we have. I can't even conceive of the Soviet Union not having budgetary problems. As a matter of fact, I know that they do have. As a matter of fact, they have a tremendously more difficult budgetary problem that we do. And the reason for that is that their budget is concerned with nearly the entire scope of the economy, while we are concerned with a segment, the Government segment of the economy, / ^{though} we realize, as I indicated from these quotations from ORO, that what we do in the military moneywise has a tremendous implication upon our economy.

No matter what anyone might say, you cannot live in isolation. I think I attempted to bring this out in my talk--that all problems are intertwined; that they are all interrelated. It's only for our convenience

that we differentiate, let us say, between policy making, planning, programming, and budgeting. These are all one. They are all part of one package.

We as human beings do this kind of thing in every area. For example, in biology we have a whole array of species. We make differentiation in species, where actually in nature this differentiation does not exist. Rather, it's a kind of smooth thing going up. We pick up points and say, "This is different from that."

You might even say that in geology we make differentiations in the structure of earth materials. In nature these differentiations in fact do not exist. There's just a smooth kind of figure.

In every aspect of life we make these differentiations for our convenience, because our mind is not capable of comprehending the oneness and the unity of things. This is expediency.

And so you might say that budget making is different than planning a war, that planning a war is different than fighting a war, and this is different from that. But in essence they are all interrelated. They all have a bearing upon the problem that we are concerned with.

It would seem to me that it would be utterly ridiculous to have a military structure of such magnitude that it would absorb the entire resources of our nation, so that rather than having the economy and the governmental structure that we have now, we have something else. What then would we be fighting for?

So in anything that we do we have to think of the thing in its totality