UNITED STATES POLICIES AND PLANNING FOR MANPOWER READINESS FOR WAR

12 November 1959

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Washington, D. C.

Mr. Edward L. Keenan, Deputy Assistant Director for Manpower, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, was born in Somerville, New Jersey on 21 January 1911. Since graduation from Temple University in 1933, Mr. Keenan has spent his entire career with the Government in the labor field. He was State Manpower Director of Ohio during World War II and came to Washington in 1945 as Deputy Director of the War Manpower Commission. Subsequently he was Deputy Director of the U.S. Employment Service and later Deputy Director of the Bureau of Employment Security in the U.S. Department of Labor. In 1951, Mr. Keenan was named Director of Field Operations for the Defense Manpower Administration and Co-Chairman of the Central Coordinating Committee, Regional Defense Mobilization Committees. He has served with a number of U.S. delegations to international conferences on manpower. In 1952, he was the official U.S. delegate to the Latin-American Technical Manpower Conference at Lima, Peru. He was also an adviser on labor and manpower at the Brazil-United States Technical Commission meeting at Rio de Janeiro in 1948, and at the Maritime Conference of the International Labor Organization at Geneva in 1958. This is his second lecture at the Industrial College.

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COLONEL KLEIN: Gentlemen: Sometimes I think we are inclined to overlook the fact that almost everything done in this world, be it significant or important, is done by people for people on behalf of people. People form the indispensable ingredient that must be ground into any policymaking or planning that we do at any government level; that is, if we expect these policies or plans to be practical and successful in their implementation.

So it is pretty important that we take a look at some of the measures our Government is taking to improve our national manpower capability to meet any national emergency that may arise.

To guide us through some of these and to take a look at some of these measures this morning, we have Mr. Edward L. Keenan, the Deputy Assistant Director for Manpower, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization. You will have noted from his biographical sketch that he has had pretty wide experience in this field of manpower [control], and undoubtedly what he has to say this morning will be a product of some of the learning that he has acquired in the field of hard knocks in predicting or planning what people are likely to do, which is anything but an exact science.

Mr. Keenan, it is certainly a pleasure to welcome you back to the College and to introduce you to this year's class. Mr. Keenan.

MR. KEENAN: General Houseman, Colonel Klein, Gentlemen of the Industrial College: It is a great pleasure to be invited back. I understand that the Director of OCDM has talked to the College this year and that Bill Lawrence from the Production and Materials Group has also spoken.

My job is manpower and I would like to attempt to relate that part of the resources job to the overall resources program of OCDM. I am sure that Governor Hoegh explained the National Plan for Civil and Defense Mobilization and the annexes that we are putting out to implement that plan. Annex No. 30, to be known as the National Manpower Plan,

is at the Government Printing Office. I believe you gentlemen have seen a draft copy of that, and therefore I am not going to go into detail, as I presume you have looked at it, and we can talk about it some during the question period.

I would like to divide this topic of manpower for my discussion this morning into six parts. Roughly the job that we are doing in OCDM in manpower divides up that way. First, our job is to develop--and we have developed now--a national manpower plan for all contingencies, and then to see that there is an emergency manpower organization in place, capable and ready to administer such a plan. That is our No. 1 job. Second, we must have an adequate knowledge of present and foreseeable manpower supply and requirements. In other words, we have to know the manpower picture, the way it is today, and the way we figure it is going to be a few years from now. Third, we must develop policies or programs to eliminate present or foreseeable manpower shortages. Fourth, we must have an understanding of the relationship of manpower in the United States and in the rest of the world, with particular emphasis on assisting in manpower matters in friendly, underdeveloped, and uncommitted countries. This phase of the program is of particular importance during a continuing period of international tension such as we have been living with the last few years. Fifth, we must have manpower for emergency administration in the Government, primarily the civilian national defense executive reserve. Sixth, we must have a plan for mobilizing manpower and utilizing manpower if and when there should be a total emergency such as a nuclear attack on the United States. That last phase is the civil defense manpower part of the job.

Within these six categories there are many other things we have to keep our eye on. But by and large, as we attempt to do a planning and a programing job for manpower mobilization, it divides up these six ways.

Now, the first part of the job--a manpower plan and an organization that can operate it. Our manpower plan is Annex No. 30. When I spoke to the College last year, I said this plan would be published in approximately 60 days. Instead of 60 days, it has been about 12 months. It may not be the best of annexes, but I would wager it is the most cleared of all the annexes that we have developed. It has been up and down and in and around this Government for [the last] many, many months, and,

unlike some of the other annexes, because of its subject matter, manpower, it has also had complete clearance with the national management and labor organizations in this country--which is one of the reasons why it has been such a time-consuming process.

We have a National Labor-Management Committee, composed of some 14 members and 14 alternates. Members are recommended, on the management side by the National Association of Manufacturers and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and on the labor side by the AFL-CIO. Parenthetically, both management and labor share one thing in common in their policy viewpoint; they have historically been against compulsion or conscription of manpower.

This Annex No. 30, the national manpower plan, has been thoroughly considered by management and labor in three or four very detailed sessions with the Committee, and, although the product, as it has come out, does not bear their stamp of approval, at least we can say they have been fully consulted. Labor and management do not choose to say that they endorse this plan, because, if you read the plan carefully, it is provided that, if the national security is threatened, personal services may be "required." That is the word that is used. We used it advisedly, but management and labor know exactly what it means.

Our theory is that we will develop the manpower program with the complete cooperation of management and labor. The programs that are designed to allocate manpower, such as the imposition of ceilings upon employers, the restriction of job opportunities to critical occupations in the most essential activities, and the directing of individuals to priority jobs first, will be done, if at all possible, on a voluntary basis. The plans are not only worked out in cooperation with management and labor but they will be administered with the support and cooperation of management and labor on a voluntary basis as long as the job can be done on a voluntary basis.

We would presume that, in a limited war, the manpower situation might be a lot different in one part of the country than it is in another part of the country. We could well have labor surpluses in many sections of the country and extreme labor shortages in other sections of the country.

Therefore, we have come to the conclusion that the manpower plan must be a flexible one. Voluntary controls, if we can use that expression, might have to be imposed in some areas, whereas in others there would be no need for them. More extreme measures will be needed in some parts of the country than in others.

We presume that, as controls are necessary, they will be put into effect on an area, or, if necessary, on a regional basis. We provide in our general plan that, if individuals are asked or are required to have their employment opportunities limited, and if the local manpower authority refers a worker to an individual job in an individual plant because that is a critical job and the plant is a very essential plant, and if the individual chooses to refuse it and says it isn't suitable for him, the individual will have the right of appeal. The appeal procedure, as set up, will be through a local labor-management committee.

If an existing world situation deteriorated from limited war to general war, or if we should have an all-out attack upon this country without limited war preceding it, we would have the machinery in readiness so that labor-management committees could be established on a moment's notice. We already have eight regional labor-management committees in existence, and they would handle the appeal process until local committees were established.

If, in a nuclear attack situation, individuals were referred to specific jobs and didn't take them, and if there were no good reasons not to take them, something more would have to be done. We are working on the assumption, in that kind of situation, that most people would want to help, and most people would do the right thing. Most people, we believe, would cooperate and go where they were needed most. Even in World War II, when there were two or three efforts to secure national service or something of that description which the Congress did not see fit to pass, there were so-called voluntary controls (some people call it voluntary compulsion) in effect in many of the tighter labor areas in the United States. Individuals were denied the right to seek their own jobs. Individuals were told where to work. Individuals were denied employment if they did not take the priority referral given them by the local office of the Public Employment Service. In some instances, individuals were kept out of employment. It didn't go any further than that. They just were unable to get a job.

It is not difficult to plan, through Executive orders or proposed legislation, that if a number of individuals are in a needed category and refuse critical employment in essential activities, for something else to be done with them. However, we are working on the theory that most people if properly motivated would cooperate for, if we had to use compulsion to put most people where they had to go, we think any manpower system would break down. By and large, most people are going to have to be willing to do it, because you can't have a police force to administer this program. We are going to need manpower in too many places. In the event of nuclear attack, we anticipate great manpower shortages, in part because the remaining labor supply would not be in physical shape to do a day's work.

In all probability, at least under many types of conditions, manpower could be the limiting factor in either retaliation or getting back into production. At the same time that shortages could exist in some areas, it is entirely conceivable that in other parts of the United States we would have manpower that wasn't fully occupied. One of the post-attack jobs would be to move that "surplus" or under-utilized manpower to points of need as soon as possible, granting delays because of fallout, et cetera.

Thus, our national manpower plan presumes a national clearance system. It presumes that the same type of clearance forms would be used throughout the United States, and that, in an emergency, manpower would be requested from one area to the other, with the lowest authority, the local government, having the first say, the State government having the second say, the regional authority the third say, and the national authority the final say as to where manpower actually would go.

That same theory would be true with respect to materials, transportation, and other resources.

Speaking about the order of business in the clearance system, leads me to another important manpower activity. While we were walking into the room this morning, General Houseman mentioned that, in the allocation of resources, a lot has to be done to set up the machinery so that the allocation process will work correctly. There will be many claimants for manpower and many claimants for materials, many claimants for fuel and energy, and many claimants for transportation. Where do they go first? Who gets them first? In the Manpower Annex we set

up some general guidelines for regional, State, and local authorities in the event of a general war. Listed first are the immediate combat operations of the U.S. Armed Forces; second, the maintenance or reestablishment of government authority and control; third, the provision of essential survival items and services; and, fourth, some specifics, such as provision for radiological detection, eradication of bacteriological and chemical warfare agents and instruments, and so forth, that would come in the next listing.

This listing of priority activities in itself can be nothing more than a general guideline. We are presuming the establishment of resource committees in the field, whose job it would be to assist the Civil Defense Director in making relative urgency determinations and in establishing priorities. At the regional level, the Regional Civil and Defense Mobilization Board serves as the Resource Committee. It is chaired by the regional director of OCDM and composed of representatives of the major claimant agencies. Incidentally, the Department of Defense has just sent out instructions to the services with respect to naming an overall Department of Defense representative on each of these eight regional boards.

There is no machinery in existence below the regional level at the present time. For this reason, we are providing for the establishment of resource committees which would be in existence or placed on a standby basis at State or area level as necessary. We differentiate because, in a large State, with many metropolitan areas, you would need a half-dozen of these committees. You would need them in each metropolitan area. In a small State, one committee for the entire State may suffice.

These committees would be composed of representatives of the primary claimant agencies, including the military and the different branches of the military, and it would be their job to determine urgencies within whatever standards were issued nationally. From the urgencies that were established by these committees, with whatever national guidance that could be given to them, manpower priorities and other types of priorities would flow.

For example, if it was determined in a certain area that fixing up the waterworks in order to keep the sewage from leaking into it should be done first, the urgency given to the manpower official would be that manpower should be diverted to that activity first. The same priority would go out for materials, for transportation, and for other resources.

This is an oversimplification of a crucial problem in the allocation for any resource, but in general shows the way we are thinking.

Manpower, of course, has to be handled a little bit differently than some of the other resources so far as allocation is concerned. Once the method and the mechanics for allocating other resources are set up, it is reasonably certain that the job can be done. But in manpower, you can't be sure unless there is a willingness on the part of the individual to do the job when he gets there. You can refer 100 men and you can get them to the spot, but unless they put in a day's work there is no real accomplishment.

I think that is basically why we have approached this manpower mobilization job by working cooperatively with groups that are interested, and have considered our programs on a voluntary basis with the idea that they will be administered voluntarily as long as results are secured. The Government does believe, however, that we must reserve the right to require personnel services if the national security is threatened.

With respect to this point number one, the national manpower plan and the organization necessary to make it effective, the primary delegation of responsibility for the mobilization of civilian manpower has been given to the United States Department of Labor and the Employment Security System which is administered, insofar as the Federal Government is concerned, by the Department of Labor.

The Employment Security System is composed of the State agencies which administer the employment service and unemployment compensation programs in the United States. There are some 50,000 to 55,000 State employees in these organizations, with some 35,000 of these employees being employed today in approximately 1,900 local employment offices around the country. That group would have the basic civilian manpower job.

As the annex indicates, and as has been spelled out subsequently to the drafting of this annex by some correspondence with Selective Serivce and the Department of Labor, the Selective Service System has a backup role in civilian manpower. The primary role of Selective Service is the selection and allocation of manpower for the military, but their secondary role is to assist in the mobilization of civilian manpower. Depending on the type of situation, they might be called upon, in cooperation with the Labor Department and the employment offices throughout the

country, to find individuals, either by name or by skill, through the local board machinery.

There are today 3,900 local boards throughout the United States, and the wartime emergency plans of the Selective Service System, granted there was a little time, would permit the expansion of these boards to 8,000 very quickly. Those boards exist in certain rural areas where there are not fully functioning employment offices.

So, as coordination of the public employment service system, with its 1,900 local offices and its 35,000 local office employees, and the approximately 4,000 local boards of the Selective Service System, with their unpaid but very patriotic voluntary board members and their paid clerks, would be the nucleus organizations forming the emergency manpower machinery for implementing this national manpower plan.

We have scheduled a series of eight regional conferences around the country, beginning in December of this year. There will be one held in December and the remaining seven will be held during the first four months of 1960. Each of these conferences in the eight OCDM regions will be for the purpose of introducing this national manpower plan and to set up the necessary administrative machinery to get it operationally effective at State level.

These conferences are being called by OCDM and we will direct the meetings. Present at the conferences will be the regional officials of OCDM, the Labor and Commerce Departments, Selective Service System, and HEW. HEW has an important role in this because the U. S. Public Health Service is responsible for health manpower. The Department of Defense, who would be the greatest claimant in time of emergency, will also be represented.

Included also as major participants are the State directors of civil defense, the State directors of Selective Service, the State directors of Employment Security, and the State public health directors.

We hope to accomplish three things at these meetings: First, to get a common understanding of this national manpower plan; second to get agreement that all State civil defense survival plans, which were developed before the merger of ODM and FCDA, will be amended so that they will be completely consistent with the national manpower plan and also so that they will include an organization chart of the emergency manpower setup at the State level; and, third, to get agreement on the part of State officials that, as soon as the State survival plan is amended,

the States, with the cooperation and assistance of our regional offices, will initiate a series of meetings at the area level throughout the country to see that the manpower plan is understood and implemented [agreed upon], at the local level.

None of these plans, none of these annexes, is operationally ready unless there is understanding at the local level. Having a national manpower plan in itself is only a beginning step. Even having an organization chart at the State level in itself accomplishes very little. Manpower can be referred at only one place, at the local community level. That's where manpower is; it is the only place you can get it; and it is the only place you can find it to take it somewhere else.

So, we are driving for the implementation of this national manpower plan at the local level. It means, down the road a piece a few months from now, we will be sitting down with appropriate State officials and chief executives of local government, including civil defense, Selective Service, and the Employment Security people at the local level, to assure that this manpower plan is put into effect [with an organization chart and everything else it takes] in every community of any substantial size throughout the United States.

The U.S. Department of Labor has taken on a job of issuing to the field, a "Defense Readiness Handbook." Preliminary copies have already been distributed, but they are going to bring it up to date and expand it. This "Defense Readiness Handbook" can be likened to a kit of tools. It will contain a draft employment stabilization plan, a draft employment ceiling program, and a priority referral system. It will have the "gimmicks," if you wish to call them that, for administering a manpower program under all emergency circumstances. Revised copies will be in the hands of all appropriate local officials this fiscal year.

One of the jobs that has to be thought through, and perhaps fought through, in making this manpower plan--and this has to be done in other resources areas, too--is to see that we get the right kind of working relationships between Federal, State, and local authorities. There may be some jurisdictional questions. They have to be faced up to; they have to be worked out. We are very hopeful that, as far as Annex No. 30 is concerned, these regional meetings will get everybody concerned together for the first time, and that we will achieve agreement on some of the basic jurisdictional questions.

This is the first part of our job. Obviously, for this year, it is the biggest part--having a manpower plan and getting it operationally ready.

The second part is an adequate knowledge of present and foreseeable manpower supply and requirements. We can't do our job unless we look ahead. The U. S. Department of Labor, in cooperation with the National Science Foundation, the U. S. Office of Education, and other appropriate agencies of Government, furnishes a wealth of information on the present labor supply situation, forecasts on population growth, and forecasts on the labor market 10 and 20 years from now. With that information, we are able to do certain planning. We can keep track of where we are, looking ahead three or four years, on the possible distribution of manpower between the civilian economy and the military in the event of an emergency. One of our jobs in OCDM is to advise the President, who has to make the final overall decision on the allocation of manpower between the military and the civilian economy. We keep our fingers on that situation.

I am sure you know from your studies and from other discussions which have taken place at the College this year that the population explosion that is going on around the world, and particularly in this country, will result in the age distribution of our population 10 years from now, and even more so 20 years from now, being a great deal different than it is today. We are going to be faced with shortages beyond any reasonable doubt. The best estimates that have been made would indicate that by 1965, for example, we will need 40 percent more engineers in this country than we had employed in 1957. With the great technological advancements that are going on in this missile or space age, we are going to need thousands of individuals in the so-called high-talent manpower classifications, thousands more than we have today.

It is in this general area that we are trying to develop some policies and programs under the third phase of our program, which I labeled in my initial comments, "programs to eliminate present or foreseeable manpower shortages." This is not an easy area to work in because it is an area that is covered in varying degrees by existing agencies of Government and by private organizations. One of the problems is identifying talented youth early enough to keep them in school and assure that they go on to college to realize their full potential, and become physicists, or astronauts, or whatever it is they are capable of becoming. Another objective is to see that science and mathematics,

as taught in our secondary schools and colleges, are good enough to equip students to go on to postgraduate work and to make a real contribution, the kind of creative contribution that is needed, in this space age. The kind of programs we need, really, are programs that are going to help develop the kind of manpower where we will have shortages 5, 10, 15, and 20 years from now. There is just no question at all in our minds, even though there might be a little recession or two along the way, that the die is cast. Twenty years from now we are going to have a different kind of labor market than we have today. We are going to have a different kind of labor requirement than we have today. We will have many more requirements for "brainpower" for high-talent manpower, and many fewer requirements for common labor, for farm labor, and for unskilled labor.

Even today in the unemployment situation--and the figures were in yesterday's and this morning's papers--with 3 million several hundred thousand unemployed, you will find very few high-talent manpower classifications among the unemployed. Look at the ads in the papers today--the need for high-skilled labor, scientists, engineers, engineering aides, and technicians. There are still shortages there. Unemployment today is largely among people without any real training for the kinds of occupations that are on the increase in industry today. It is in common labor, unskilled labor, and, to some extent, in semiskilled labor, with the exception of unemployment in certain of the so-called areas of labor surplus where there are local situations in which whole industries have closed down.

In this program of trying to improve our manpower situation, we have two programs at the present time, and are cooperating with a number of agencies and a number of private organizations in the dissemination of information to get the story across. We have a manpower utilization program, in which we cooperate with the schools of engineering and industries throughout the United States in a series of utilization conferences, bringing together employers and university people and exchanging information on how to better utilize scientists and engineers now employed in industry and how to replace some of them with two-year technicians so that the technicians can do some of the jobs that are today being done by fully trained engineers and scientists. This program is a modest one, but it is under way. It is designed to try to get better utilization of the people now employed.

The second program is one of trying to do something about improving the manpower situation in the future, and this has to do with the

things I mentioned before--disseminating information on the kind of manpower we are going to need, working with agencies of Government and private organizations with respect to improving the science and math curriculum in our schools, and helping to get information out so that local communities can do something through local action to improve their own situations.

A good, but limited, beginning has been made around the country. The State of Oklahoma has done a tremendous job, and the State of Arizona has done a very fine job, entirely through local business, labor, and educators getting together and finding out the kind of skills they are going to need 5 or 10 years from now. A lot of it is fostered by the desire for industrial development in some of these States and it is having a definite effect upon developing more highly technical manpower, which is what we are after.

A fourth phase of our job has to do with the world manpower situation. I think it is rather obvious that it is in our own interest to improve the manpower potential in friendly countries. In an all-out situation we would be dependent upon our allies for assistance, and they would in turn be dependent upon us. The OEEC has a division now on scientific and engineering manpower. NATO has a Manpower Committee. The Ford Foundation, in expanding its program throughout the world, is placing heavy emphasis on manpower development in the underdeveloped countries. It has missions in Nigeria, Ghana, India, Egypt, and parts of Latin America. In fact, my predecessor is the regional director for the Ford Foundation for the Mid-East, with offices in Cairo.

We are working with all these groups, as well as with private groups in this country--the Scientific Manpower Commission, the National Research Council, and many others--because, in our view, these underdeveloped countries and some of the uncommitted countries are going to be requiring more and more assistance from us, technical assistance, as they rush forward industrially, in the training of manpower. We are being called upon today to furnish many technicians and we are finding it increasingly difficult to furnish qualified people. Underdeveloped countries need more and more help and training in some of the very areas where we, ourselves, are becoming increasingly short.

I might add in this connection that, if a limited or a total war situation did come about, it is clear that the immediate increased needs of the military itself would be in these very same classifications where there are shortages in the U.S. economy today.

I would expect that the work that we do in international manpower will step up in these next two or three years. We have been reviewing recently a comparison of the technical assistance programs of the United States and the technical assistance programs of the Soviet Union in terms of the number of nonmilitary technicians working in underdeveloped countries. The comparison gives cause for concern. We may have to do more.

The last two programs which I mentioned, points five and six, I will cover extremely briefly. We are concerned in the manpower area of OCDM with the development and the policies concerning the National Defense Executive Reserve. The National Defense Executive Reserve is a standby organization for the civilian Government. It would operate in some ways the way the Ready Reserve would operate in the military. There are at the present time approximately 2,000 individuals in the civilian reserve. They have agreements with some 16 civilian agencies of the Government. They are individuals who have signed agreements and whose employers have signed agreements that, in the event of an emergency, they would become Government executives. They are the group who would come in to help staff and manage the wartime civilian agencies.

They are management and top-level individuals. As far as Washington is concerned, everyone in the executive reserve is figured to slot against a job GS-15, at least, and, in the field, GS-14. You will recall that in World War II it took over a year to staff the Office of Production Management, the predecessor of the War Production Board, and well over a year to get the War Manpower Commission under way. The same was true in other emergency organization setups in World War II.

We would have no such time again. The National Defense Executive Reserve is the organization that would be called upon overnight, to come in and help man the wartime organization of the Government. We are concerned with that because all of our programs and all of the planning will require administrative people, and we've got to have them. The executive reserve is an important part of the job.

On the last task that I mentioned, the task force plan for cadres of people for civil defense, I don't want to go into too much detail. We are trying out the program concept through studies that are going on around the country now, to try to see if we can't get cadres of people

lined up during this planning period who could be slotted for civil defense functions in the event of an emergency.

We are not doing this contra the volunteer approach in the event of an emergency, but it seems to us that there are whole cadres of people who could have postattack assignments agreed upon now, more or less in their same lines of work. We are trying to get them identified with certain emergency activities. The transition would be easy. We know in general what occupational shortages would exist if we were bombed. Obviously the medical and health occupations are some, perhaps the most important. There are others. To line up cadres of people now is our program--people who could step right in, such as demolition crews. Some arrangements have been made through certain unions and others through the Association of General Contractors. The AGC has a plan which involves both manpower and machinery, the big machinery that would be necessary for rubble-clearing. They are getting the men lined up, tied up with the machines, so that groups of 50 or 100 would work as a cadre and would know preattack what their exact job would be postattack.

These are the six general areas where OCDM is planning and programing in the manpower field. I would like to stop at this point and spend the rest of the time responding to your questions.

Thank you very much.

COLONEL KLEIN: Gentlemen, Mr. Keenan is ready for your questions.

QUESTION: Mr. Keenan, who in labor and management reviewed the national manpower plan?

MR. KEENAN: I don't have the names of the committee with me. The seven management members and their alternates have a secretary, Terry Rice, who is the defense coordinator for the United States Chamber of Commerce. One of the men in the management group is Russell McCarthy, secretary of the Rochester, New York, Chamber of Commerce. Another is the individual who is the chairman of the Chamber of Commerce's Industrial Relations Committee. There is a gentleman here in town who was formerly president of the Chicago and Southern Air Lines. They are rather substantial individuals. The labor people include Stanley Ruttenburg, the Director of Research of the AFL-CIO;

Al Lyons of the Railroad Brotherhood; Al Hayes, the president of the Machinists' Union. The secretary of the labor members is Pete: Henle of the AFL-CIO. We have a former committee, and we have had three full meetings on the plan. I am sorry I don't remember the names of all the men.

QUESTION: You indicated that mobilization would be done on a voluntary basis if possible. In the reading assignment it is not clear, however, if you have to fall back on compulsion, where you go for your legal authority. Could you expand on that a little bit?

MR. KEENAN: In time of limited war we would need legislation. In limited war, we presume the Congress would be in session. We have in the draft of the National Resources Act a manpower section. This is already written and could be introduced into the Congress. In time of general war, with an attack on this country, the wartime powers of the President, in our opinion and in the opinion of our legal staff, would give the President sufficient authority to issue Executive orders that would give us all the authority we wanted. The draft National Resources Act, as it is written involves a series of sanctions to put the requirement in. An Executive order of the President in the time of all-out war could involve sanctions. It could involve referral of the individuals who did not take assignments to the Selective Service Board for reassignment. There are other things.

QUESTION: In the first point that you talked about you mentioned the allocation of manpower to meet certain priority tasks. How will you classify skills for these priority tasks so that you will allocate the proper manpower?

MR. KEENAN: By registration through the offices of the Public Employment Service. Of the 35,000 employees in this nationwide system--thousands of them are trained interviewers. They would do the classification work through interviews.

QUESTION: Sir, there is some evidence that many graduates of the engineering schools, by virtue of the fact that the potential employers view their scholastic records and consider them not good enough to work for them, are going into other occupations. Is anything being done about having that pool of potential engineers so that we can get more value out of our engineering colleges?

MR. KEENAN: It's a tough one. We've done a lot of talking about it. Some of the boys go into things other than engineering, for example, sales engineering, because of salary inducements, also. The indications last year were that a pretty high percentage of them did go into engineering. In these utilization conferences we are having, we are talking about this subject. As far as I know there is not much else being done.

QUESTION: You mentioned limited war and general war. Of course there is quite a Tower of Babel at work on this subject at present. Do you have a clear concept, at least from your viewpoint in the OCDM, as to what will be considered general war? Would this be a declared war, or what?

MR. KEENAN: It is defined in the national plan this way: Limited war involves our Armed Forces being committed to war on foreign soil, with no attack on the United States and no imminent attack upon the United States. General war we define as either nuclear attack upon the continental United States or a nuclear attack being expected momentarily.

QUESTION: In your discussion of world manpower you mentioned a comparison between the United States and the U.S.S.R. technical assistance programs. Your conclusion was that more must be done by the United States. Would you mind amplifying your findings?

MR. KEENAN: Some of the information CIA would have to give out, I guess. The size of the Soviet technical missions in some of the uncommitted countries is a great deal larger than ours. That's one point.

Our own participation in some of the international organizations is another point. This is not directly in comparison with the Soviet participation. We participate in the U.N. and UNESCO, for example. We put into UNESCO perhaps 30 percent of the funds, but today the number of Americans employed in UNESCO is perhaps 10 percent of the staff. It was more than that a few years ago. The salaries aren't so attractive any more. Industrial salaries and Government salaries have gone up. There seem to be fewer Americans employed in international organizations than there were a few years ago.

We are getting more and more requests from some of the uncommitted countries for technical assistance. The requests come two ways. They want people to come here. India wants to send hundreds of people a year to be trained in our Iron and Steel Institute, and so on. On the other hand they are asking for more people to come to be of assistance to them, to come for a year or so and help them either as visiting professors in a college or top technicians to guide them in some science project or in engineering.

I talked to people at the National Academy of Science and they are finding it more and more difficult to qualify scientists to go. We have in ICA and in other international organizations lots of unfilled vacancies for technicians, and it is getting harder and harder to find people to go, particularly to the countries where living conditions are bad--Africa, for example. It is very hard to find a person with the required skill who will take a two-year assignment there. Yet, the countries are asking for more and more people. I have seen articles in the press that the Soviets are training more engineers than they need and are training them specifically to go to these underdeveloped countries. I have no idea whether that is true or not. But it is that sort of thing that has us concerned.

QUESTION: Mr. Keenan, in World War II it seems like we hit an X in our now standing job in planning on mobilizing our resources. However, we didn't have the problem of battle damage. In the case of general war, it appears that the priorities would be shifting, the labor force would be a shifting problem, and we would have the problem of great casualties. Is your plan based on any study of the way the British and the Germans handled this problem in World War II?

MR. KEENAN: We have studied the British and to some extent the German experience. Some of the tools that were used in World War II, some of the tools used in the United States, were quite similar to those used in England--I mean taking people away from less-essential industry, and that sort of thing. As far as the casualty problem goes, in Operation Alerts that are held each year, different assumptions are used, and through these different assumptions we have obtained different measurements of where we would be manpowerwise. I don't know that we have thought it completely through. A heavy bomb drop was assumed in the last two years in Operation Alerts. The situation would be chaotic for weeks and months. We'd have a terrible time shifting manpower around because we wouldn't have any communication and we wouldn't have any transportation.

I don't know whether I have answered your question.

STUDENT: I might clarify it further. It seems to me that the first couple of weeks, and maybe even two months, priority would be just devoted to survival alone. We would have to forget priorities that we thought of in terms of World War II, that is, the priority associated with, say, turning out a part for an airplane, or something like that. We would have to think in terms of survival only and of a man acting in terms of people and their welfare. This, I guess, is basically my question.

MR. KEENAN: We would put survival and the continuity of government together, the continuity of government because you've got to have some law and order. In that kind of a situation the military would do everything to assist civilian government. The more the civilian government can do to hold the thing together the better the military can do its own business. There is only one thing that we put above that, right after a bomb drop, and that is whatever is needed for immediate retaliatory efforts. In other words, you can have a situation where, even though survival looked like it should be number one, you might have to move some aviation gasoline or you might have to do something like that.

QUESTION: I'd like to ask a question about the National Defense Executive Reserve. I believe you mentioned that there were some 2,000 now signed up in that program in 16 agencies. My question is: How many of those 2,000 are signed up for a war manpower operation, and what type of individual do you recruit for that war manpower executive reserve?

MR. KEENAN: The Labor Department has a relatively small number. I have been told that this year they didn't have any financing for travel or for the security investigations involved. They may have somewhere in the neighborhood of a dozen people. I presume most of them would be used in manpower administration. They've got two or three people who had experience in the War Manpower Commission in World War II. They have two or three industrial-relations types and a couple of very good economists in executive reserve.

In our shop, in the general manpower field, we have about 15 executive reservists, three top labor people, three or four management people who had experience in the Department of Defense or who had something to do with manpower, two of them in the Department of Defense in World War II, and a couple of economists. In the field most

of the executive reservists in manpower--there are only a few of them--are usually people who had some experience either in World War II or at the time of Korea.

QUESTION: Sir, it seems to me that, if we ever have a big, thermonuclear war, and the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy--the military forces--are almost the only ones that have the organization to take care of getting the country back on its feet transportationwise and communicationwise, and so forth, some thought might be given to a declaration of martial law in a case like that, for the entire country, or for certain sections. Has any thought been given to that?

MR. KEENAN: Yes a lot of it. There is an annex to the national plan, Annex No. 7, which is published and is available. It is called "The Role of the Military." The first draft of it was written by the Department of Defense, and it has been agreed upon by the Department of Defense and OCDM. This document sets forth the general thesis that the Army, Navy, and Air Force do not wish to take over the civilian government; they wish to support it. They will help where necessary but they are going to have such a tremendous job to do that they just aren't going to be able to do everything.

We have assumed that in some of the worst hit areas, if civil government does not exist, or if civil government breaks down, everybody would look to the help of the military. But the general plan is to try to make civil government conscious of the fact now that they've got to do the job with whatever assistance the military can spare to help them. It isn't right, with the terrific task that the military will have, to expect the military to do everything. They say they will support civilian government to the limit of their facilities.

There will be just so much to be done that we are working on the theory that, as long as civilian government can operate, it should, and that the military will help it.

I suggest that you might look at Annex 7. I think you would find it quite interesting.

QUESTION: To come back to this matter of executive reserves, during World War II and Korea, you may recall that some of the so-called dollar-a-year men who came from industry were later criticized for making decisions in favor of the industries from which they were

furloughed. Do these events cause you any difficulty in lining up these same or similar people in industry who have had experience in these two wars down here?

MR. KEENAN: Yes, it has come up. We have a waiver of the conflict-of-interests statute so far as the executive reserve is concerned. Some agencies have made provisions, as we have in OCDM, so that, if an emergency came and these fellows became Government employees, they would be subject to two parts of the conflict-of-interests statute but not the other parts. They would be subject to those parts where they couldn't negotiate contracts with their own firms and the fact that they couldn't be sued for two years.

The Department of the Interior has been particularly concerned with this because of the nature of its wartime role and the fact that it has to rely so closely in some of the fuel and energy areas upon industry. Rather than having too many people in the executive reserve, for example, in the general electric power area, the Department of Interior has chosen to pick several key people as WOC consultants, without official compensation. Those individuals have signed the conflict-of-interest agreement.

That's a tough way of doing it. It is remarkable that they have been able to get as many as they have, because a lot of businessmen don't want to sign. It gets into the question of selling stock and all that business. Nevertheless they have found some people who are in a position to sign as of today.

In Interior, I think they are avoiding that problem in their planning fairly well.

COLONEL KLEIN: Mr. Keenan, I want to thank you for coming down here to be with us this morning, and to discuss these manpower problems and policies and plans for the future. Thank you very much.

MR. KEENAN: Thank you.

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