


ADVANCE COPY



THE NATION-STATE IN THE WORLD TODAY

Dr. Charles O. Lerche, Jr.

NOTICE

This lecture has not been edited by the speaker. It has been reproduced directly from the reporter's notes for the students and faculty for reference and study purposes.

No direct quotations are to be made either in written reports or in oral presentations based on this unedited copy.

INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

1959-1960

THE NATION-STATE IN THE WORLD TODAY

26 February 1960

COLONEL SMITH: In opening the Unit on Contemporary International Politics this morning, Colonel Black did a good job of introducing this first lecture on the subject of The Nation-State in the World Today.

I think it is necessary, therefore, only to remind you that this is the basic unit by which men share their aspirations and at the same time through which they conduct international relations.

Our speaker has made a study of this subject, specifically at the Naval War College, and has spoken on it there. He is Professor of International Relations at the School of International Service at American University.

I am pleased to welcome for his first lecture at the Industrial College Dr. Charles O. Lerche, Jr.

DR. LERCHE: General Houseman, Colonel Smith, Gentlemen: It is a great pleasure for me to be here for my first visit. I have heard of this institution on a number of occasions, always very favorably, and today it is with a great sense of a personal thrill that I come here and see you. I am very sensitive to the privilege which is mine in giving this lecture so close to the beginning of your series on international relations.

The subject of the Nation-State is, I think, an extremely appropriate place to begin a consideration of international relations, because it is the state as an organization that is the agency through which international relations

operate. We always start our discussions of international law with the flat statement that the state is the international person and that, therefore, we have to operate on the intellectual plane, and that international relations, although operated, as I will try to suggest in a few minutes, by human beings, the contacts themselves are made by discreet human persons. Nevertheless, the personalities which are involved in the international society are the states, and we must, while paying due recognition to this fact, guard ourselves against the danger of using this notion to excess. The state is a personality but the state is not a person.

The newspapers are full of the fact that the United States does so and so and Russia replies. This is a good and useful way to communicate, but we must always remain alert to the fact that it is not the United States which does something but some determinate human being who speaks in the name of the state, called for convenience the United States, and that the Russian answer is given by some determinate Russian.

It is this fascinating interplay between human beings and this corporate entity, the state, and the outcomes which this agreement upon a corporate fictional personality, the state, has produced in international relations which I would like to discuss with you today.

The state, as a factor in international relations, is basic, and yet the state, in an objective physical state, does not exist. But people exist, geography exists, and the instruments of national power all exist. But one would be hard put if he were obliged to answer the question: Where is the

United States? What is the United States? He is forced to rely, as almost everybody is, upon a definition which does not ~~summarize~~ tell what the state is but describes its characteristics. We usually define the state as-- the standard definition is--a politically organized body of people occupying a definite territory, living under a government which incorporates sovereignty. This is fine. If you find something somewhere which consists of these four things you have found a state. There are a number of these in the world.

The exact definition of an exact number of states in the world today is not clear, mainly because there are so many new political entities which are on their way to statehood, and the exact legal definition of when a state becomes a state has never been settled. So, therefore, the best we can say is that there are about 90 states of some sort, 90 full-fledged participants in international affairs, and together they make up the international community. It is a fairly small community, with 90 members. If each one of you in this room represented one state, some of you would have to leave, because there aren't enough to go around. This is the kind of community within which international relations go on.

Since international relations result from what happens when states come into contact with each other in any one of an almost unlimited variety of ways, most of the studies of international relations, quite properly, begin with a consideration of those events which preceded such an international contact, in other words, the process of decision and action which leads a state, a government, up to the making of a decision to act. Secondly, they

concentrate upon the phenomena of the contact themselves--this is the area of diplomacy and interstate negotiation--and then on the consequences of such a contact, which usually involves the analysis of the patterns, conflict, adjustment, and harmony, as some of our more system-minded people say upon patterns of state action, reaction, and interaction--which is a lovely phrase, and I would use it more often myself if I was really sure what it meant.

When we talk about the state in international relations, we have to start with one pretty basic assumption, which is that the state, in international relations, acts purposefully; it acts for a reason. International relations do not just happen. States don't wander around in the world bumping into each other by sheer accident and then hurriedly recoup from the upsets of such contact. At least generally speaking states don't, and I hope that the United States does not.

As an analytical assumption, we have to assume that they do act purposefully. They act so as to achieve certain purposes, to achieve certain goals, which most of the time we call objectives. An objective in international relations is most usually defined in some way as a state of affairs which the state wishes to bring about. States, having decided upon objectives, decide upon a course of action to achieve these objectives, and this is called, at least by the academic students, a policy--a course of action to achieve an objective.

If a state is going to act, it must use in support of its decision those

aspects of itself which make it possible to achieve the objective. This is normally what we mean when we talk about power or capability-- the sum total of the resources which a state has available to be committed to the achievement of an objective.

All of this is pretty elementary stuff, and yet it must be kept in mind, because the state behavior in international relations is dynamic. It is not something which can be coldly described in a series of categories by saying that if you know these things about states in general you know everything you need to know about international relations, or, if you know these things about a particular state you know all you need to know about that state. One can study the Soviet Union and learn everything there is to be learned about the personalities of the Soviet leadership, about the way the Soviet decisional structure is made up, and about the resources which are available in terms not only of intercontinental missiles but of political energy, morale, and national character. One can make an almost interminable list of so-called objective data and, when he is through, he doesn't know an awful lot more about why the Soviet does what it does. To appreciate this he must grasp something of the dynamic which gives life and power and strength to these abstract or concrete but essentially sterile statistical data.

So that the state acts purposefully. I think an appropriate first major inquiry at this point is: What are the purposes for which states act? Well, here we have to first make an initial caveat to the effect that no two states

act for the same purposes. As I will try to suggest in a moment, the factors which translate general concerns into purposes for action are unique to each state. Even states which are situated very analogously nevertheless have essential differences in their situations. One of the easiest ways to demonstrate this is to compare the United States and Canada, which are two countries which in terms of social structure, in terms of democratic government, in terms of basic geographic location, and in terms of ideologies are very much alike, and yet their external situations in which they must act are very different, primarily because we have a relatively small and weak neighbor to the north and they have a large and very powerful neighbor to the south, which automatically conditions the way they look at it.

So it is impossible to do more than generalize broadly about the purposes of states because of the fact that the translation of these purposes into concrete undertakings depends upon the situation each finds itself in, and no two have the same situation. At this level of broad generalization, though, even after making this warning, it is possible to make certain general observations about the purposes for which states act. Considering them as we do this morning as unitary personalities and looking at the way states do act and have acted for many years, we can say that basically every state has the same three fundamental purposes in mind in international relations. It, the state, seeks first to guarantee its self-preservation. I will say a little bit about this in a moment. But, operationally, we assume, in making

international analyses, that every state wishes to continue in existence. In the second place, all states are interested in achieving the practical maximum of security, and there are a couple words in here that I will come back to and refer to. Thirdly, all states are interested in the practical maximum of achieving what, for want of a better term, we can call well-being, which is largely an economic concept, but not entirely.

Now, security, self-preservation, and well-being are the common purposes of states. For almost all states, speaking in international political terms, these three purposes are listed--I listed them in an order of descending priority. That is that in practice a state will unhesitatingly sacrifice one of the three lower on the scale in order to achieve those higher above it. A state, in other words--and people accept this almost without thinking--will ordinarily give up almost all or, if pushed to the wall, will give up all of its well-being in order to protect itself against what seems to be an overpowering security threat. Push it a little further, and you will reach the point of saying that states will sacrifice their security in order to guarantee their self-preservation. This is the iron law of state priorities, that the thrills, the good life, are of the lowest order of priority, and that usually the struggle which goes on within a state in the field of foreign policy is the debate over how much of this matter of well-being must be sacrificed in order to achieve the maximum desirable level of security.

This is what the quarrel is in the United States today. It is a quarrel

which is not unique to us. How much of the good life do you sacrifice in order to achieve security? In the case of a number of small and weak states who are unable by their own efforts to guarantee their security in realistic terms, the choice is not at this level at all, but instead is: How much of our security do we have to give up--that is, to what extent do we have to place ourselves at the mercy of other states--in order simply to guarantee our continued existence? This is the kind of choice which must be made among these choices.

Self-preservation, to start at the top, raises one, to me, very interesting question: What is the self which must be preserved? When one studies the state one discovers that in international relations, particularly, there is a curious division between the state as an entity and the state as an agglomeration of people, and it is hard to know just where to take a hold of this. Western man is so complete^{ly} habituated to this that it usually doesn't occur to him to raise the question. It doesn't seem at all silly for a Frenchman in 1945, surrounded by almost utter ruin, his country not only physically and economically devastated but his political morale largely disintegrated as well, to say that France won the war. France won the war, and yet every single Frenchman suffered. This doesn't seem strange. We are habituated to this, because somehow we are able to make this shift between ourselves as individuals and ourselves as units of the state. And the welfare of the state, of this abstraction, is assumed to be something distinct from and, occasionally, superior to the welfare of all the individuals.

So self-preservation in this context means the preservation of this abstract entity, the state, and has no really necessary connection with the preservation of any or all of the citizens. This is the classic way it has been discussed, and this is the way, certainly, all of Westernized political man has operated.

On this matter of security, of course, this is a subject with which you gentlemen are professionally concerned, far more than I. I can only say this at this point, which might possibly be worth saying. That is, that security is, as states operate, a relative concept. The achievement of total, absolute security is, in the way the world is divided, a physical impossibility for any state which does not amass under its absolute control the overwhelming preponderance of all the power of the world. This is a remote possibility today. So states operate on the assumption that the achievement of security in any absolute terms is an impossibility. They therefore wrestle with the problem, as I defined it a moment ago, of achieving the practical maximum which has to be spelled out in terms of their ongoing concerns. They are forced into a rather desperate calculus of deciding which of all of the theoretically possible security threats are in fact the most likely and of devising responses to those in the order of their severity, and then, recognizing that this always leaves a ragged edge of insecurity, prove that they have successfully prepared themselves to turn back any onslaught against them. This is simply impossible to achieve. It is not the sort of thing which can be demonstrated with slide

rules and univacs, and so you, the statesman, you, the responsible officer, are always racked by the thought that somewhere in the line you have made a mistake. You have either misinterpreted your potential enemy's capability or his intentions, or both--and I have no idea of exhuming that corpse this morning. Or you may have overestimated your own capabilities, or another haunting thought is that you may have underestimated your own and you could do more if you had been more accurate. This problem of security and the problem of getting the dividing line between security and well-being are problems which drive statesmen into early graves.

On the matter of well-being, I think it is only necessary here to point to one illustration of the dilemma inherent in the state, and that is the question of whose well-being it is you are talking about. Once again, not so much for the United States, but for many of the smaller and newer countries in the world, there is a real conflict between the well-being of the collectivity and the well-being of the individual, and one can be served only at the expense of the other. This adds a further dimension of conflict which again can be worked out only in terms of the individual statesman's grasp of the situation and his own personal convictions.

The classic case here, of course, is the condition of the Soviet Union after all of these years under Communist rule. If one accepts the notion of the economic strength of the collectivity, the Soviet Union has made fabulous strides. But they have been able to make the advancement in the collective well-being, the collective economic capacity, only at the expense

of major sacrifices in the potential well-being of the individuals taken as a group. So they have been forced to make this choice. This was a choice which was possible in their terms, in their situation. It is not of necessity a model which everybody, or indeed anybody, ought to follow, because these kinds of decisions, as I have stressed, are made by individual states in terms of their unique situation.

I would like, however, to take this last notion I used, of whose well-being, and broaden it a little bit. You remember I said that states act purposefully. I think it is at this time a good question to raise as to just whose purposes these are which a state follows. There are four possible answers, it seems to me. One is the simple and obvious answer given by Machiavelli and parroted by writers ever since, which is that the state has its own purposes, that there are certain purposes built into the nature of the state which it is compelled to pursue. This is not a question of choice; it is as inevitable as is the march of the lemmings to the sea every year. There is, I think, a certain amount of logic to this position that the matter of self-preservation is a function of the state, a purpose of the state, as a state. I don't think it would be hard to argue and perhaps prove that the welfare of the individuals of certain states in the world would be much better if the states themselves disappeared, that the argument for self-preservation is one inherent to the nature of the state and is essentially irrelevant to the human beings that make it up.

To a point I think this position can be successfully maintained, but this,

as I said, ignores the fact that the state does nothing by itself but operates only through its human agents. And, as soon as you feed human nature into the situation, it is not only possible but vitally necessary to descend from the high plateau of philosophical speculation into the somewhat more sordid and crass area of human motivations. So you ask yourself whose purposes in practice does, let us say, the United States Government serve in its foreign policy.

Here there are three answers, I think, and I suspect that, certainly in the case of most democratic states, each of the three answers is partially correct. In the first place, the state serves the interests of the mass, of the bulk of the citizenry. I think this is true, and I would love to be questioned on it afterward if you challenge it. I think this^{is}/true in every state in the world--that the policy makers are caught, they are pilloried, on the rack of mass responses because of the nature of international relations. They dare not separate themselves from their sub-structure of consensus. So, in one sense, if you want to argue the term, every country has a "democratic" foreign policy in the sense that every country takes no moves in foreign affairs which are not within the limits of permissibility in terms of mass responses. They must maintain a close grip on their masses, a close touch with them, and so therefore they are obliged--and leaders have been since the era of the French Revolution--to ground their foreign policy upon mass wants, mass needs, mass prejudices and attitudes, and mass responses to stimuli.

A second set of purposes that most Western governments pursue, however, are those of certain discreet groups in the community. I am not just talking about pressure groups, although, of course, this is significant in those Western democracies which have pressure groups. Quite obviously, large hunks of American foreign policy are carried on in the name of the United States and the American people but are actually carried on on behalf of rather narrow and specialized groups. However, this is not a unique American failing, if indeed it is a failing at all. I sometimes get into pretty heated arguments when I decide that I think that a pretty good defense can be made for pressure groups. But, even in those countries which do not organize interest into pressure the way we do, nevertheless there are certain social groups which are predominant in a society, and I think it is inevitable that the government will serve these purposes whether it means to or not. Obviously, in certain new and unstable governments, the army is probably the most powerful single force, and it would, I think, be fatuous to expect any such government to conduct a foreign policy contrary to the interests of its armed forces. It isn't going to do it.

Likewise, in other kinds of societies the predominant religious group has interest in foreign policy which the government naturally and inevitably serves.

So I think that, when you are analyzing a country's foreign policy, it is an appropriate inquiry to say: What groups in that country are behind

this policy, or what groups in the country are being served by this policy?

If it happens to be a country whose policy you want to change it is appropriate to inquire: What groups in this country are being injured by this policy, and how can the situation be changed so that the injured groups can get into the act, thereby changing policy our way?

A third set of purposes which are served in foreign policy are the purposes of the government officials, themselves. I mean this in two ways. One is, of course, the inevitable effect of bureaucracy and bureaucratic ways of thinking on foreign policies. The bureaucrat is, to me, at least, defined as a man whose major professional concern is with his career rather than with the job he is committed to do. So therefore, foreign policies are executed and conceived by foreign affairs personnel in some countries--what I have to say has no necessary relation to the United States Department of State, not necessarily--men who are primarily concerned with the record they, themselves, are making with their superiors. This is a climate which is not exactly calculated to encourage, strengthen, and stimulate innovation, daring, and brilliant insights. You tend to go by the book.

Not only, of course, is this bureaucracy, but there are also the unique effects on policies and purposes which are those of political officials who are elected and are of the electoral stripe because, in societies where the democratic process operates, such an elected politician approaches international purposes of his government with a keen eye to what the boys back

at the forks or the creeks are thinking. These are government purposes. And I suspect, as I say, that the purpose of the state in international affairs is certainly, with regard to the United States, and I think with regard to most countries, a mixture of all of these. The state itself, the mass, the interest groups, and the government officials themselves all contribute their unique share in proportions determined by, again, the peculiar context of the state to the purposes which are served.

Now, I have been talking about the state. I would like now for a few minutes to finally get, in one sense, to my subject and talk about the Nation-State. I have deliberately left it to this late in the discussion because there is at work in the state, as it participates in international affairs, this peculiar division of motivation. A large part of what goes on in foreign policy arises from the sheer nature of the state as such, the state as a corporate personality. Some of this I have been trying to allude to. Another share of it, however, comes from the fact that virtually all of the states of the world today are nation states, by which I mean they are inhabited by people who are politically self-conscious, who sense themselves as being united in a collectivity called the nation, a collectivity which incorporates not only a bond of membership and identify but lines of exclusion between themselves and the outside world, and also incorporates a different kind of purposes which appertain to the social community of the nation rather than to the political legal entity of the state.

Well, in nationalism we have discovered in the 150 years that we have

been coping with it as a phenomenon that there are really two kinds, at least two kinds, two broad categories. In the beginning, when modern nationalism was born, we discovered that nationalism was, in early 19th century Europe, fundamentally individualist in its orientation, in that the individual joined with other individuals in the nation, and the identity of the individual was kept alive. This was also linked with political democracy. Political independence, private right, and political democracy were the trio of the nationalist movements of the early 19th century. This was born, as you know, in Western Europe, born in the French Revolution. As nationalism spread throughout the 19th century, it tended to keep this identification with individualism and private rights and political democracy. It was largely missed in the United States among students and statesmen alike that even in the 19th century an ominous rift in this trio of nationalism, individualism, and democracy appeared when the German Empire was created only on the crest of a deliberate abandonment of individualism and democracy, and there was instead the identification of nationalism, with blood and iron, and with the symbolism of national power.

Nevertheless, we went right up to the Paris Peace Conference--the Western man in general--of 1919 in the expectation that nationalism meant inevitably individualism and democracy, that a nation state was by definition a free state and a democratic state, and, if you listened to Mr. Woodrow Wilson, also a "peace-loving" state.

Well, this was the only form of nationalism which received intellectual

house room, generally speaking, in the Western world until the inter-war period, when we discovered that the second type, called by Professor Carleton Hayes integrating nationalism--I myself use a much more loaded term, of totalitarian nationalism--appeared as an obvious and unmistakable phenomenon. I said that in the old kind of nationalism you were an individual job, with other individuals in a group, but each of you kept your individuality. The emphasis was on the inter-individual bond. In this new kind of nationalism, as it got preached, when you, the individual join the nation you cease to be an individual. You merge into something much bigger, something much more inherently worthy, which is called the nation. Your individual interests and wants and needs are separate from those of the nation and intrinsically inferior. This means that you are a citizen first and always, and you are a private person only in such spare time as your citizenship duties permit you. Every sphere of activity in this kind of nationalism acquires a nationalist and political overtone, and all areas of human endeavor, from literary creation to biological creation to athletic enterprise, become invested with a peculiar nationalist political significance.

Some of you gentlemen may be, as I am, following the course of the Winter Olympics. I am still waiting for the first dispatch in a newspaper on the Winter Olympics which does not include in the first paragraph the fact that Russia is winning the games. Maybe you have seen one--I'd be delighted to hear about it. This is a nationalist enterprise, and it is an

aspect of what I am talking about, that almost every kind of action acquires a political dimension, and this political dimension becomes predominant.

Now, in the history of nationalism we seem to see some kind of cycle, that by and large most societies, as they move from non-nationalism to nationalism, do it in terms of the symbols and values of the first kind, of liberating nationalism. The nationalist revolutions of our age are going on in terms of the symbols of individualism, democracy, and nationalism as an inseparable trio. But, either almost immediately after fulfilling its initial nationalist gains or after a longer time, whenever the inevitable frustrating reaction sets in, then the outcome of this frustration is frequently--or there is a tendency, a trend, for the reaction of such frustration to be--a movement from individual and liberating nationalism into this totalitarian kind.

I hope I have not sounded invidious in trying to prefer one to the other. I haven't meant to. I am trying to be descriptive. So, when we talk about nationalism in the world, we have to be careful about what kind we are talking about, because it has different consequences. The liberating nationalism has in international relations primarily the effect of trying to move the country away from other countries. It is a philosophy essentially of international individualism, if you will let me, in that by and large liberating nationalists are primarily concerned with achieving independence from outside pressures and that therefore their approach is a centrifugal one. On the other hand, integrating nationalism tends to incorporate among

many of its believers what Professor Hans Morganthau calls nationalistic universalism. That is, every nationalist credo has, as one of its basic assumptions, the innate superiority of the national group in some way. We are not only different from all other people; we are different because in at least this particular way we are better. Either we are more moral or more civilized or we have more fun. For any particular value that you want to build in, nationalism argues that the nation gets together because it gets these like-minded people who are united in this one way.

Liberating nationalism wants to remove the believers from pollution by contact with inferior people, and so you get separated. But integrating nationalism argues that it is not alone enough for us to be convinced that we are innately superior; we must universalize our values, which is a high-flown way of saying we've got to make everybody else agree that we are superior. Not only does this universalize in terms of scope but it frequently tends to universalize functionally. Originally nationalism picked out certain values as being the unique goods and as being the basis on which the nation was formed. But the tendency in a nationalist universalist ethos is to broaden the charge so that you not only are anxious to prove to the world that the Swiss are the world's greatest chocolate makers but instead that the Swiss are the world's greatest people. This is where it gets tough.

Of course the Soviets are a classic example. Modern Soviet nationalism started out with the basic unifying principle being an ideological superiority

with regard to certain economic principles. But now they are not satisfied. Now they insist on universalizing it in everything. They've invented everything. They are the best at anything. And if they are not the best at anything then it is not worth playing. They have gotten this into the Soviet people and they are responding. We should recognize this aspect of it because we have played this game ourselves to a certain extent. We have automatically assumed that in everything that was important we were the best by right, and we got sort of angry when not everybody agreed with us. Now that they are not only disagreeing with us but some of us are proving that we are not the best in everything, we are having some difficulty proving that those things which we are not the best at are not very important anyhow. I still have the Winter Olympics on my mind.

So nationalism works two ways. We have in the world today, in much of the non-Western world, what I call liberating nationalism. We have in all of the world's large, powerful states, by which I include right now four, and possibly more--I include in the giants of the world the United States, the Soviet Union, Communist China, and India--in each of them, principles of nationalistic universalism. Each is seeking to universalize those peculiar values for which it stands and, by extension, a whole flock of values. These values are not all the same. Therefore they don't always, obviously, conflict. But, nevertheless, each of these states, and some other states who don't have quite as good a chance of selling their bill of goods, are trying

to universalize their values. On the other hand, in the non-Western world, you have various forms of this liberating nationalism, riding the crest of national independence movements. By and large, it is a withdrawing type. Some of the states, such as Indonesia, are in a period of transition from where they originally started out as almost xenophobic, withdrawing states. They have switched now and are trying in their own way to universalize their own values. But, by and large, most of the new states, particularly the smaller ones, are still liberating, as far as international relations are concerned, though several of them have had their domestic frustrations and have shifted their emphasis from the joyful communication of man with man, which is the platform of liberating nationalism, to the notion that the nation needs your services and you are hereby volunteered to give your services.

Then we have a third phenomenon about nationalism, something which a generation ago would have simply been declared to be impossible. There are in a number of states, most of them, I might add, in Western Europe, overpowering evidences that nationalism as we have known it and have become familiar with it is on the decline. That is, the appeal of the national symbols now are no longer as automatic. The state, the nation, is no longer the automatic unquestioned receptacle into which the individual pours all his loyalty. It is too much to say that Western European nationalism is being replaced by loyalty to something larger, called Europe. But ^{it} is, I ₁ think, unquestionable that there is a sizable minority of rather influential

Europeans who do feel themselves committed to something called Europe and who are perfectly aware that this has meant, at the very least, a dilution of their national identification. In some cases it has been an actual replacement. It is also unquestionable that the overall militancy of national identification throughout all of Western Europe has been drastically cut down, and cut down by a combination of sad experience in the past, and the overpowering necessity of some kind of supernational action in the present.

So we have to add to this cycle the possibility of a third phase, where it starts out liberating, switches into integrating, and at some point possibly enters the phase of decline. Perhaps, after all, nationalism is, sort of, like measles, a self-limiting condition, and the more it builds up the more the counter tendencies are built up to it and it neutralizes itself. We simply don't know right now.

Now, in my last few minutes, I would like to throw out here a fairly rapid listing of what seem to me to be some of the other important trends, in the state form as it exists in the world today. Some of these points are fairly obvious and just need to be mentioned; some of them will need a little bit of discussion.

In the first place, we are in an era when the number of states is increasing at a fantastic rate. Just before World War II we used to say there were somewhere in the neighborhood of 60 states in the world. Today there are 90. This is a 50-percent increase in a generation. The community is a lot bigger. By and large, too, most of these states are small and/or weak.

Most of them are also non-Western--which changes things a good deal.

A second rather significant trend is the fact that the old, classical kind of nation-state has come to the point where it verges upon obsolescence. That is, in almost any term you care to use, any criterion you care to apply, the classic nation-state is almost obsolete. Let us take France--50 million people and so many hundreds of thousands of square miles. This size and type of state is almost obsolete in the sense that it can no longer, by its own efforts, accomplish that share of the purposes of the French nation which it used to be able to do. On the one hand it is caught by the fact that the effective unit of political organization today is so fantastically much bigger. France is surrounded by giants, and, whereas it used to be the giant, it is now a member of the smaller middle class. On the other hand, the kinds of demands which people are placing on their governments today in international relations are not the kinds of demands which the old-style nation-state could solve, and they may be, as I'll suggest in a moment, the kinds of problems which even the new style, the giant, cannot solve on any satisfactory basis.

So there is at the same time that the number of states is increasing the counter tendency, the growing awareness that there are a number of things which we want government to do which the place where government resides, the national-state, is no longer equipped to do.

What are some of these problems which are taxing the capacity of the state form? Probably the most obvious one is the impact of nuclear

technology. Again I don't think I need to belabor this point with you gentlemen, since you are all more conversant with it than I. There are two aspects of nuclear technology. One is in terms of the new industrial revolution which people are talking about, which will be a tremendously equalizing thing once nations are able to liberate themselves from the nexus of the coal-iron technology. This will be a fantastic reordering of industrial priorities. And then, of course, there is nuclear technology in terms of weapons, where it is perfectly obvious, wherever else one may stand on the constant strategic debate on strategy, that the classic rules of warfare have had to be stretched, as well as reinterpreted, in order to fit nuclear technology to the old classic rules. There are those who find themselves seriously bemused by the problem and almost willing to despair that it can ever be done. I don't know whether I agree with these people or not, since I am almost the only college professor who is not an expert on military strategy.

A second kind of problem which the old-type nation-state can't really solve has to do with transportation and communication. We have a nuclear revolution. We also have a communications revolution, not only in terms of the number of people capable of being simultaneously reached by a message--in the good old Madison Avenue terms--but also in terms of instantaneous communication over tremendous spans. The old notion that one nation could insulate itself from other nations and protect the minds of its people from being polluted is made a mockery by modern electronic

communications. You can go on jamming just so long. You can't have your people in a vacuum any more, whether they want to be or not. They are in a world which transportation and communications have made so small, paradoxically, that only the biggest nation-states can cope with it.

Another problem which is obviously beyond unilateral solution is this whole complex of issues centering around the basic problems of human biology. More people are being born and we are keeping them alive longer. These people have to eat. I am not a Neo-Malthusian. I am not a human ecologist. I don't believe that the human race should limit its numbers so as to make room for the mountain lions and the earth worms and the lichens and liverworts and the other forms of natural life which many ecologists feel have just as much right to live as human beings do. I don't buy that sort of stuff. I do feel, in other words, that the problem of reconciling simple matters of food supply and the mouths into which to put that food is a soluble problem. I have wrestled with this one. I cannot see how it can be soluble in any comprehensible terms by the states of the world as they are presently constituted. This is a problem in which the unit of calculation must be the human species, not nations and not states.

Well, just let me wind up here quickly. I have already spoken over my deadline. These are some of the biggest of the problems which are besetting the old state forms. And we are seeing this as still another trend in the development of the state--we are seeing conscious experiments with all sorts of new organizational forms. We are seeing, of course, in Europe

where the problem is the easiest, I suspect, the development of some organizational patterns which transcend the old state form centering around the European community but with unique ramifications. This is a deliberate new organizational form which, if you wanted to use the ugly word, could be called a superstate or a series of specialized superstates which are, quite obviously, coalescing.

In addition to the creation of super federations, we are also seeing in much of the non-Western world the rather rampant movement of these newly independent entities into a consideration, at any rate, of some kind of federation, as a means of building the unit of organization up to a large enough size so that it could do the jobs which are necessary.

We are seeing extensive kinds of long-lasting international cooperation patterns in the whole United Nations system, for example, specialized agencies which are obviously attempts to solve problems which the states cannot solve by themselves.

I am saying here, and with this I will close, that the state in the world today is obviously in a period of change. Some people find this shocking. I, myself, don't, because history teaches me that the state form had nothing inevitable or cosmic about it, that it happened to be the basis of organization which, at a particular point in history, served to meet the needs which men were demanding of their duly constituted authorities. What I am suggesting possibly is that, in the middle of the 20th century, the pressure of needs and problems is now becoming possibly too great for the state, in its traditional

form, to solve. And men, as they did before the state, are once again doing, it seems to me, the natural thing. If the organization we have isn't working, let's see if we can't modify the organization so it works and in this way preserve the values which the state system has while freeing ourselves from the worst of its disabilities.

Thank you.

COLONEL SMITH: We are ready for question, gentlemen.

QUESTION: What will be the effect on the United Nations organization and our participation in it of this tremendous increase in membership?

DR. LERCHE: That's a very very good question. Part of the answer is already available. In the first place it has made the General Assembly far more than ever before--and it already was quite a ways--the center of the organization. The General Assembly now runs the show. The Security Council is almost non-existent. It doesn't meet as often as it used to. Membership on the Council for a non-permanent member is just a plum. It doesn't mean anything. How long has it been since the Security Council has done anything? The General Assembly is it. The second thing, quite obviously, that this increase in membership will mean is a change in focus of the concerns of the organization. The ex-colonial countries are now in the majority in the United Nations, which means two things: One, that issues of colonialism and their related issues of an emphasis on social and economic programs are vastly stepped up in priority, and issues stemming from the East-West struggle are badly downgraded. The cold

facts of the matter are that most of the new members, most of the non-Western members, couldn't care less. They are bored with the cold war. Therefore, this shows in the U. N. They are not really interested. I think that, had it not been for the fortuitous fact that the Chinese Communists acted like a bunch of idiots in dealing with India, this is the year, this past session, that we would have gotten creamed on the matter of Chinese membership. The Chinese saved us by acting like a bunch of dopes.

But they are much less impressed with this exchange of insults and recriminations by the Soviet and the United States. They look upon this as a digression from the important business, which is to hurry along the revolution of rising expectations by means of U. N. action.

I think those are the two biggest results.

QUESTION: You said that the state is in a period of evolution now. I was wondering if you could look into the future and see what you can see with regard to the evolution of the South American states in relation to the United States.

DR. LERCHE: Well, we are in private here. Every once in a while--not always--I take advantage of the fact that I am irresponsible, so I can speculate. I think that the era where the notion that the United States has a Gemini in the Western Hemisphere is coming to a close. The intellectual underpinnings of the meaning of Gemini are rapidly, I think, becoming obsolete. So the Latin Americans are not going to be a group of American-type satellites any longer. We don't call them that, but that's what the rest

of the world has called them. It was said in the United Nations: Why should the United States get mad that the Soviet has three votes in the United Nations? We have 21. This was a hard one to answer. This is not true any more, incidentally. So that increasingly the United States is going to have to cope with these people on a different kind of basis-- which is why the President is down there right now.

Implicit in your question I detected a wish for me to raise the question of Latin American federation. This will come--not federation, no--not necessarily federation. The creation of a somewhat more cohesive Latin American personality in the world will come. How long it will take I am just simply unable to guess. The recent experience in developing new organizational forms has led me to the conclusion that there is no inevitable historical sequence. What there is instead is the gradual accumulation of pressures. But then, when the pressure builds high enough, the change is made with startling suddenness. At what point the pressures in Latin America will build up to devise some new kinds of forms, I don't know. It's a magnificent notion that President Kubitchek has in Brazil of 50 years' progress in 5. He's doing pretty well. It's true that Brazil has 50 million people and half the population of South America. But Brazil cannot go as far as she wants to alone. These are the cold facts of the matter as it applies to us, too. We can't go where we want to go by ourselves. We've got to drag everybody else along with us. In Latin American terms, this is what Brazil is up against. And there may be the creation of

a Latin American thing, a Latin American entity in the world affairs under Brazilian leadership. It may come in two years and it may take 100. It will come.

QUESTION: I have essentially the same question with relation to Africa. The countries there now are old colonies, but sooner or later they should coalesce.

DR. LERCHE: Yes, because of the kinds of problems and the expectations. Let me be professorial and generalize a minute. Every government, no matter how stable it is, must in its day-by-day existence face the fact that revolution is possible. This is as much of a problem in Washington as it is in Moscow or as it is in Ascuncion, because, after all, the state coerces people, and the revolution comes when people won't be coerced by this particular group of leaders.

Students of revolution pretty well agree that revolution does not come at the bottom of the cycle of development. Revolution does not come when things are at their worst. It comes when you hit bottom and are slowly coming back. Every one of the great revolutions of our time, and actually just about every one of the minor revolutions of our time, have come when things have past their worst and are starting back. Why at this point? It has to do with the matter of expectations. The old proverb is, Blessed is he who expects nothing for he is never disappointed, and bears on this point. As long as the people expect nothing they won't revolt. But once things start to get better, then they expect something, and then revolution

is dangerous.

This preface is by way of answering your question. The African nationalist movements have succeeded in making changes because they have aroused the expectations of their people for not just political independence but for what they call in these non-Western revolutions rising expectations. These people expect things. The brutal facts of the matter are that there isn't one of the new states in Africa that comes anywhere near meeting the expectations of its people on its own terms.

This really underlies what I was saying about Latin America. The expectations of these people, as they are rising--and they are--cannot be met by the old organisational forms. Political leaders are assiduous cultivators and manipulators of nationalist symbols, and they are usually the last in a country to be willing to give up the nationalist business. This is known rather vulgarly as wrapping yourself in the American flag. But, even more than the symbolism of nationalism, these guys want to keep their jobs, and, in a revolutionary society, they are interested in preserving whole skins.

These Africans have moved very quickly, you see. Coming from the great emotional burst of assuming independence and national status and a national flag, and all that jazz, suddenly they move almost immediately to the problem of talking about federation and of submerging this national identity which is so precious and so new. Why? Because they realize that their governments can't cut the mustard as presently made up. You've got

to have a bigger base. You've got to have a bigger tax base, if nothing else.

So I suspect that this notion which I said is that the number of states is greatly increasing is a temporary and transitory phenomenon, and a generation from now the number of political units in the world may well be only half of what we have now.

That's a wild one for you.

QUESTION: Certain students of the international political scene conclude that the international power struggle today is less a struggle between democratic capitalism and communism and more a struggle between Russian and United States nationalism. Would you address yourself to that?

DR. LERCHE: Well, after what I have said, there is no point being modest any more. I am afraid that, generally speaking--though I don't like pigeonholes--I would put myself in that category you just mentioned, in the sense that I am pretty much a non-ideological person. To me, as I look at international relations, ideology is used in fact more as a tool of national foreign policy than it is as a blueprint for action. I am not challenging the fact that there is an ideological total, ideological opposition between the East and the West. This is obvious to anyone who can read, or even listen. But, what I am questioning, and have been questioning, for some time, is what the fact of ideological opposition means. Were this an ideological struggle pure and simple, two things would be true. One,

it would mean that the leaders of both sides would be fanatics, not sane men. They would, by most normal standards of mental hygiene, be declared to be unsound emotionally. Two, it would mean that this would be a struggle for extinction, because, if men are motivated entirely by ideological considerations, they will stop at nothing until they have seen the victory of their ideological predispositions brought about in the world.

Now, as I read--and I am just one poor college professor--it, it is perfectly obvious to me that American foreign policy does not proceed from any set of ideological suppositions for the achievement of an ideological end. This I think most of you would agree with. You might be quite so willing to accept without further argument my further characterization of the Soviet Union as being the same way. They very possibly did start out that way. I am willing to grant the fact that Lenin, 30 days before he seized power, considered himself ^a 100-percent ideologist motivated only by the eternal truth which he discovered. But the moment he seized power the purity of his ideological motivation began to be diluted by the sordid realities of the necessities of holding and administering power. The further this has continued, the longer the Soviet regime is concerned with it and it has gone on, the greater the tendency has become.

Please don't read me as meaning that the Soviets ignore ideology. They are quick to use it as justification for what they do. They have no objection to having people believing their propaganda. Our only real concern is whether the guys who issue the propaganda believe it. I think the

record indicates that they don't. I have had this out with a number of honest-to-gosh Soviet specialists--which I am not. At least some of them argue that it is impossible for a person to conceive of a step in Soviet policy--you can't imagine the Soviet doing anything--for which ideological justification could not be found in impeccable and unimpeachable sources. It is that kind of an ideology.

So, therefore, if you ask me: "Are we fighting Marxian socialism or Khrushchevism in ideological terms?" I would have to say, "No, we are not fighting it because I don't conceive that that is our enemy." I am perfectly convinced that, if the Russian leaders decided on the basis of their own and Russian interest that a permanent end to the cold war were necessary and desirable, they would be able to prove this by ideology and point to their people that we were right all along. If they feel their people they figure they are that much ahead.

But, as for this being their motivation in international relations, I think it strains credulity too much to accept.

QUESTION: You mentioned Canada as being a nation-state, along with the United States. Do you make any distinction between Canada in that position and Canada as a part of the British Empire?

DR. LERCHE: Only this distinction, sir: In constitutional law, Canada is a completely self-governing country which happens, as a result of its own decision, to have the same person wearing the crown of Canada as

wears the crown of Great Britain. The Canadian Parliament elected Elizabeth as their Queen when she ascended to the throne of Great Britain. So, in legal terms, Canada is a national entity. However, the British can teach us a great many things. One of the things that I think we are just beginning to learn from the British is the fact that there is no great intrinsic value in having an iron-clad treaty agreement with an ally, since the most powerful and closely knit and unified alliance in the world, the British Commonwealth, is tied together by nothing more than the personality of Elizabeth II. The British have learned how to break the iron bonds that tied them with an ex-colony while at the same time tying them down very strongly by bonds, almost invisible bonds, of silk.

So you can talk about such a thing as the Commonwealth, and, with the possible exception of the Union of South Africa, the Commonwealth is in international relations, for the purposes on which they are agreed, a single international entity. On other purposes on which they are not agreed, they act as completely free agents.

You see, India is a member of the Commonwealth, a key member of the Commonwealth, the largest member of the Commonwealth. But also India is a member of another grouping, the Afro-Asian Bloc, and the Indians find no difficulty in maintaining these two memberships, because India is able to so divide its attention that it never gets drawn into the position where its obligations conflict.

Canada is a close participant in its own right in defense planning with

the United States, and Canada is also a member of the Commonwealth. The Canadians are able to maintain this balance without causing conflict. This is a matter of management from London, and beautiful, skillful management it is.

QUESTION: Doctor, you just brought up the subject of India. You said in your speech that it is one of the four great nations of the world to be. Would you relate this now in terms of the Afro-Asian Bloc and the SEATO organization, the Rice Bowl, and so forth, as to why you expect this?

DR. LERCHE: Why I expect it--to answer this part first--is a combination of certain objective data, with some value judgments of my own about the shape of world affairs in the future. Objectively, you have here this enormous cluster of population, with a very significant resource endowment and a tremendous amount of political energy, a very vigorous nationalism. All of these, plus the strategic position which India occupies in world affairs today, to me argue very strongly that India's power position relative and absolute in the future is obviously destined to grow. It will grow even more than we expect now if, as I suspect, there is going to be this evolutionary change in the nature of international relations in which the kinds of things with which India is identified in the world's mind will become increasingly the crucial kinds of decisions in international politics.

I hate to say this in a government installation, but to me the biggest single thing in world affairs today is not the cold war any more. It is the

revolution of the non-Western world. This is much bigger than the cold war in terms of its meaning for the next 100 years of history, provided only that East and West don't erase themselves and all mankind from the planet. If we can estimate our chances for survival as being better than even, then I would say that my great grandchild, looking back over this century, would argue that the really significant phenomenon of world history in the century beginning in 1960 was the fact that the non-Western world, if you will let me say this very dangerous thing, was allowed to join the human race, and that this was interrupted from time to time by petty sporadic outbursts of outworn nationalist frenzy in the form of the cold war. This is what a historian of 2060 might well write.

This is why I say that, whether this vision of mine is simply induced by the strength of a cup of coffee I had before I came in here or not, I do think that those things with which India is identified are increasing in significance, and those things which the cold war participants are identified with in the world's eyes are decreasing in specific gravity and intrinsic worth. This is why I think India will continue to move front and center. Part of India's success was that it got itself attacked by China. This helped India a great deal. This was exactly in the image. You see, India is trying to project Gandhi's satyagraha into world politics--you overcome evil by just letting it wear itself out. India has got an astonishing amount of mileage out of this already, and it has been in business only 13 years.

India merits long and committed study by Americans, because increasingly

it is growing and we have such awful misconceptions about it. We have the idea that India and Indians are anti-American. Many of you undoubtedly know different from your personal experience. The Indians whom I have talked to, who are not government people and who have no particular axe to grind--most of them are scholars--say that, contrary to what we read in our press, which is that India is more pro-British today than it ever was, and Americans are left on the outside whistling. Indian intellectual and cultural life has been already enormously infiltrated by American things, and the Indians look at American things and like them, and the American impact on Indian culture is already great, in spite of the frequent bumbling we have had at the political level. The Eisenhower trip to India was not just window dressing. This was a pretty basic thing, and it will, I suspect, bulk very large in the next phase of international relations.

QUESTION: Doctor, in describing the state you cited very neatly the three common purposes of any state and the order of priority in which they would give them up if cornered. Is there a quarrel about that in reverse in relation to this integrated nationalism, with specific reference to the USSR?

DR. LERCHE: I am going to cheat a little bit. Would you clarify for me exactly the reverse in which way?

STUDENT: It begins with economic well-being. For example, if there is a gap or deficiency in economic well-being, or a weakness in it, you want to make up for it and you use that as a motivation for transcending

your particular boundaries and imposing on somebody else.

DR. LERCHE: What you are suggesting maybe is that these are also, if you like, scales of psychic distance between the individual and the state, in that he is most intimately connected on the issue of well-being, somewhat less connected on the matter of security, and feels originally, to begin with, the least identification with this matter of self-preservation.

Sure. How did the Soviets actually sell themselves to the Russian people? From the beginning they promised them individual pie in the sky. This served the Soviet leaders a very neat purpose, because this gave them a built-in excuse for not achieving the pie in the sky. They gave the line: "Sure, we want you to have automobiles, toothbrushes, and shoes, but we can't give them to you because our security is in danger. The capitalists are out to destroy us." This worked very nicely. That is, it was the carrot and the stick. They used the promise of all this lovely peace by and by as the carrot to drive the Russian people on. However, and this is true as a pretty basic lesson in political leadership, this appeal, of course, has begun to run thin. And now, apparently, enough of the Russian people are asking the question: "When are these shoes going to be forthcoming?" At least a more realistic attention to the problem of making them available is now being given in the Kremlin.

If I understand your question really correctly, it is: Is it possible that they could use this pretext of pursuing well-being as a cover-up for new political adventures? I doubt this, mainly because of the mass

psychology which is involved. Our people are constantly being urged from Washington that we must sacrifice. Mr. Goering preached to his people conquest and guns instead of butter--only after the problem of guns has been completely solved can we get the butter. This is what the Russians have been saying.

Now if you tell them that the butter is just around the corner, it is coming, and it is coming not by political military means but because we are better than the Americans at mass production and because we don't have this soulless capitalism, using this as a springboard for political and military tensions would be, I think, dangerous. Somewhere in Proverbs in the Bible there is something to the effect that "Hope often deferred maketh the heart sick." It seems to me that the closer that hope is to realization before it gets deferred the sicker the heart gets. I cannot conceive of the Russian leaders taking the big risk now at this point where they've got their people pretty well sold on the idea that the chickens are coming home to roost in the pot, and saying, "Well, I'm sorry, Ivan, but those dirty Americans did it again." Ivan at this point would say, "No, thanks. I've had too much already." This is a danger. Remember this problem. He's got to play his people like an organist plays his instrument. He's pushing the soft-touch pedal now. He just can't switch immediately to the war trumpet. It's too risky politically.

That's exactly the problem we have in this country. Washington allows itself to get swayed by a mass scale of jitters about the prospect of

mass complacency in the country. It isn't so much complacency that worried them as the problem of getting back out of complacency into the requisite degree of anxiety and frenzy. So the simplest thing is to just keep them tensed up.

COLONEL SMITH: Dr. Lerche, this has been an exciting morning.

Thank you very much.

DR. LERCHE: Thank you, sir.