

NATIONALISM, ANTICOLONIALISM, NEUTRALISM

1 March 1960

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INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

Washington, D. C.

Dr. Hans Kohn, Professor of History, City College of New York, was born in Prague, Czechoslovakia, in 1891. He received the degree of Doctor of Law at the German University there, and an honorary degree of Doctor of Humane Letters from Colby College, Maine, in 1958. He came to the United States from Palestine in 1931. He was professor of history at Smith College from 1934 to 1949, when he accepted his present position. He was on several occasions visiting lecturer in international relations at Harvard and other universities. He was a member of the Institute of Advanced Study in Princeton in 1948 and 1955 and a Guggenheim Fellow in 1940. He is an associate of the Foreign Policy Research Institute at the University of Pennsylvania and editorial advisor of the Encyclopaedia Britannica. The latest of his many books are "American Nationalism," published in 1957 by Macmillan, and "The Mind of Germany" which Charles Scribner's Sons will publish in April. This is his first lecture at the Industrial College.

NATIONALISM, ANTICOLONIALISM, NEUTRALISM

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CAPTAIN POWELL: Gentlemen: The subject of this morning's lecture is "Nationalism, Anticolonialism, Neutralism." These terms represent concepts which are very essential to our understanding of contemporary international politics. They represent forces which underline the struggle between nations and blocs of nations in the world today.

Certainly, an understanding of these forces will enable us better to identify the problems facing the United States in the conduct of its foreign policy.

We are indeed fortunate today in having with us the eminent lecturer, historian and professor, Dr. Hans Kohn. A glance at his biography will reveal that he is exceptionally well qualified to deal with the subject this morning in great breadth and depth.

Dr. Kohn, it is a pleasure to welcome you to the Industrial College of the Armed Forces and to present you to the students and faculty here today.

DR. KOHN: Gentlemen: In addressing and speaking to you about nationalism, I wish first to state that as a historian I regard our age as the age of pannationalism. That means that it is the first age in history when peoples all over the earth, from Japan to the jungles of Africa, from Ireland to Indonesia, and from Cuba to Argentina, are obeying one and the same fundamental impulse, that of nationalism.

This nationalism, or this age of nationalism, is everywhere a very recent phenomenon. It started in Europe and in North America only around the 18th century. If you think back in history to the Middle Ages, or even to the 17th century, it was at that time not nationalism but religion which claimed the supreme loyalty of man. If you think back to the 17th century, you will remember that in what we call the Thirty Years' War between Protestants and Catholics; in Germany, German Protestants had much more in common with Protestants outside Germany, and Catholics in Germany with Catholics outside Germany. Germans fought against Germans. And when you think back to as recently as 1685, to the revocation of the Edict of Nantes by Louis XIV in France

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and the expulsion of the Huguenots, the Protestants, from France, you can understand that at that time French Catholics hated and feared French Protestants, and vice versa, much more than any of them hated or disliked Germans or Englishmen for that purpose.

So nationalism is a very young phenomenon, even in Europe. In Europe it originated, as I told you, at the end of the 18th century. We may regard the American Revolution and the birth of the French Revolution in many ways as the beginning of the age of nationalism. From Western Europe it spread in 1848 to Central Europe, and then to Eastern Europe, and only in this century, the twentieth, it penetrated to Asia, and only in our own days, quite recently, to Africa. So much so that today, for the first time in history, all people everywhere are subject to the emotional impact of nationalism, all striving for their own nation-state, all promoting and favoring their own national civilization or culture.

Let me give you a few more examples. I just came back from a trip to the Middle East, and I was again visiting Egypt. Let's say that 80 years ago when somebody went to Egypt and asked a peasant, an Egyptian peasant: "What are you? How do you define yourself?" He would have answered either "I am a peasant," or "I am a Mohammedan." It would have been unthinkable that he would have said, "I am an Egyptian." The concept did not exist. He was a peasant or a Mohammedan. Today there is no doubt that he will answer proudly, "I am an Egyptian."

Nationalism has taken within a short span of time the place of religion as a dominant factor. I was born in Prague, now the capital of Czechoslovakia. I was born there when it was a part of the Austrian Empire. Now, today the Czech peasants who, even in 1800, hardly knew to be Czechs, and who in 1848 were deeply loyal to the Austrian Hapsburg Dynasty--it was not nationalism but loyalty to the Prince and the Dynasty which determined them and loyalty--and to the church are part of this phenomenon of "nationalism above all" that we find all over the world.

Nationalism is everywhere a recent phenomenon, and that is true, too, about the cult of, and love for the national language and the national civilization. In the Middle Ages in Europe the education was not in the mother tongue of the country but in Latin, and wherever you went--to Bologna or to Paris or to Cologne or to Oxford--Latin and only Latin was the language of education, of culture, and of the educated class.

It was the language of all books written and of all papers read. It was a universal and not a national tongue. The same was true of the Mohammedan peoples. It was not Turkish to which they looked for cultural inspiration or Urdu. It was Arabic for all of them. The one language united them, and there were great Arabic centers of religion and culture like El Azhar in Cairo. People came together from Central Asia, from Chinese Turkestan, and from Indonesia, because they all knew the one universal language.

In the 18th century noble society, or rather the educated society, in Europe spoke French everywhere. Today that has disappeared. Every nation insists on its own language. Universal culture has gone. We don't study Latin any more. Nobody in Turkey is studying Arabic.

In my opinion this is a regrettable fact. Think only that in the United Nations each one has to sit with earphones to understand what is going on. That would have been impossible in any educated group a short while ago. Today each people resurrects and insists on its own language. I would say that it is one of the great things about the United States, that when you became independent you did not insist on creating your own language and did not revive Iroquois or any other Indian tongue to become independent linguistically. I think it is one of the great advantages that we speak one of the practically universal languages like English. In spite of Mr. Mencken, we don't speak American; we speak English. There is less difference within our English and the British English than there is between Oxford English and the Yorkshire dialects in England proper.

Nationalism, I said, is a very recent phenomenon, even in Europe. You may remember what happened after 1918 when, under the slogan of national self-determination, very many new states, national states, arose in Central-Eastern Europe, between the German territory of settlement and the Russian territory of settlement, between the Baltic Sea in the North and the Aegean in the South. How many new nation-states were created there! Nationalism swept over Central-Eastern Europe in 1918, and the map of 1920 bore little resemblance to that of 1848, let's say. And the same thing which happened in Europe after World War I happened after World War II in Asia and in Africa. It is nothing but the same phenomenon moving around the world.

In Asia proper already after World War I we had mighty nationalist movements, and the Asian peoples were quite fortunate in having, after World War I, powerful personalities who fascinated the people,

organized them, inspired them. Think of Gandhi in India, of Sun Yat-sen in China, of Ibn Saud in Arabia, and of men like Kemal Ataturk, Mustafa Kemal Pash then, in Turkey. All of them brought to the masses of the people a desire to become the masters of their own destiny.

We may even date the beginning of this wave of Asian nationalism to 1904 and 1905, to the event when one of the then still unknown Asian states, Japan, one of the small island kingdoms which, until 1868, had been a backward, isolated, mediaeval, oriental country, was able to defeat on land and sea one of the mighty empires of the day, Russia. This example of a nation able by modernization to defeat white imperialism, to stop the advance of white imperialism, seemed to Asia like a signal to follow the way of Japan. As you may remember from your study of history, after 1905 all over Asia, from Turkey to China, nationalist revolutions broke out. The Young Turks in Turkey, and Sun Yat-sen, who founded the Kuomintang in China in 1911-1912, tried to change age-old, lethargic, oriental peoples into modern cohesive nations.

What happened there after World War I has happened after World War II, unexpectedly, in Africa. Gentlemen, the awakening, as we called it, of Asia, came as no surprise to the observer of the Asian scene. The awakening of Africa and its rapidity are something which took by surprise, I believe, even the most experienced observer of the scene in Africa.

I turn to the situation after World War II and to the problems put up for us in the world by this new nationalism, with its accompanying factor of neutralism and anticolonialism. The change in Asia is today complete. It started, and there again, as I think, throughout modern history, the British took the lead in what might be called spreading modern liberty. They took it in 1947 when, in an unprecedented step, they granted the independence of India, and this immense subcontinent, in many ways the symbol of European or Western domination of the globe, the most important single colony in the whole world, became independent; and by 1957 there was no major colony left in what might be called free Asia.

I do not speak at this moment of the Soviet Empire, which follows entirely different laws than the empires of the free world. It has to follow different laws, because it is based on entirely different principles of understanding and interpretation of history and of man's relation to liberty.

The free world Asian empires had gone by 1957, and in 1957 there happened again, under British leadership, the transformation of Africa, because in 1957, astonishingly, the Gold Coast, a British colony of some standing, became an independent nation, called Ghana. And you remember that then, for the first time in history, an American Vice President, Mr. Nixon, went out in March 1957 to Ghana and to Africa to greet this new transformation of Africa. Gentlemen, I am entirely certain that 10 years later, in 1967, there will be no European colony left anywhere in Africa, though the one most burning problem of the Union of South Africa will probably not be solved. South Africa is unfortunately for human liberty and dignity not a British colony but has been since 1910 an independent nation.

In view of this rapid transformation, we may draw four conclusions. One, a great age of history has come to an end, and this great age of history was the age of European leadership of the globe which lasted from the time of the Renaissance until World War I. Europe was the center of the universe, not only politically, but culturally and economically, and everywhere its influence was spreading over all the continents. Now this age of European domination, leadership, influence, or whatever you call it, has come to an end in our own time. Like all historical phenomena, it was subject to the law of change. It is passing away today like so many great things in history, but let me say that it was a great age in many ways.

European imperialism, or, if you like, Western imperialism, was naturally, like anything and everything human, full of injustice, of cruelty, of exploitation. There is no doubt about that. But it was not due, as our Asian or African friends often think, to a special perversion of the Europeans, or of the white men, with a black heart under white skin. It was not due to any special perversion. Imperialism is an age-old phenomenon to be found throughout all periods of history, and throughout history, Asian peoples have subjected, exploited, massacred other Asian peoples, and Africans have extinguished, destroyed, subjected, and enslaved also other African tribes. Imperialism is not, as some of our colored friends think, a special vice of the white race. It is a universal phenomenon throughout history. But only Western imperialism, in addition to being like everything in history, vitiated by human shortcomings, has had an immense, dynamic function of arousing lethargic people out of their lethargy, of rejuvenating ancient civilizations, of giving them a new feeling of life.

If you ask yourself what made European imperialism possible, the answer is that it was not any evil intentions on the part of Europe but the momentary immense moral, intellectual superiority of Western men, a superiority which is recent in history. It began with the Renaissance and the Reformation. It was not there at the time of the Crusades in the 12th and the 13th centuries. The Mohammedans were then superior in civilization, in culture, and in learning to the Europeans. All that changed after the Renaissance and the Reformation. It was this temporary superiority of the Europeans in administration and in organization, in, I would say, civic morality, which made European imperialism possible and inevitable. Today, thanks--and I underline the word "thanks"--to European imperialism, the gap of superiority is vanishing, and the Asian and African peoples are learning, catching up, and that is the reason why European imperialism is coming to an end.

Now, these former colonial nations feel, naturally, a certain sentiment of resentment, thinking back to the age of imperialism, not clearly realizing in an objective way the reasons why European imperialism came and why it is ending today. They feel, naturally and understandingly, a kind of resentment against the former masters. Gentlemen, we have to understand that and to see that certainly it is natural and could not be otherwise.

You have to think of the United States. Gentlemen, I came here in 1931. That was the time, as you know, when the Japanese began to invade China, and very soon Hitler came to power in Europe, in Germany, and fascism began to be on the march. When I spoke to American audiences then about our absolute need to stand with Great Britain in an unbreakable union, in order to stop the march of fascism and the advent of World War II, the American audiences on the whole showed a strange resentment of Britain. The anti-British attitude in America then was something entirely surprising to me. It was not a rational attitude but an emotional attitude. People remembered George III, whom they regarded, wrongly by the way, as a horrible tyrant, and they began to fight the War of Independence again and again. In Chicago where the greatest newspaper of the world is being published, the "Chicago Daily Tribune," then indulged in rather, I would say, infantile anti-British rantings, and a gentleman named, I think, Thompson, ran for mayor on the platform of driving the British out of North America, and out of the United States.

Gentlemen, even in World War II, and even in the neighborhood of the President himself, people were more afraid of British imperialism

than of Russian communism--in World War II. When you think that we were in no way exploited by the British--the 13 Colonies were the freest men on earth--in the 18th century, yet how long the anti-Colonial, anti-British complex remained in our emotions, deep down somewhere, nurtured by schoolbooks telling an entirely one-sided story of the American Revolution--if you remember that, you will understand that in India, or in Indonesia, or in Ghana, in Africa, there is today an anti-Colonial resentment, the justification of which in places like Algeria cannot be denied.

I would say our Asian-African fellow nations set, on the whole, an encouraging example of a very mild kind of anti-Colonialism. Think for instance of the Irish and how anti-British they remain, so much so that in World War II the German Legation in Dublin not only functioned but after Hitler's death the President of the Irish Republic went to express to the German Minister his regret of Hitler's death. When I think how long the anti-British, anti-Colonial complex lasted in the American Irish, I wonder how little of it there is in Asia and Africa today. I think that we Americans must understand and appreciate it.

Naturally, the Africans think, and I think, too, that Algeria should be independent. The time when French settlers could do anything that they liked has gone forever. But that is not anti-Colonialism but a justified attitude strictly for elementary justice, and it is an attitude which the Arabs and Africans learned, from where? They learned from us, from the American Revolution, from 1775 and 1776, and from 1789 from the French Revolution, from the proclamation of the right to liberty, equality, and fraternity for everybody, everywhere. What we see today in Asia and Africa is to a large degree a fulfillment of the Western message which the West brought there. Gentlemen, we make an immense mistake if we ascribe these movements to Communist influence. We give much too much credit to the Communists. We enhance them, their merits and their prestige. If our fellow citizens of African descent in the South demand equality, or if the Africans or Asians demand liberty and equality, it is not Communist influence; it is our influence, the influence of our Western democratic, modern ideas of the equality of all men, which is not a Communist invention but our invention. As long as we allow the Communists to get away with this by our own stupidity and mischief, by ascribing to them the message to peoples who felt rightly that they have been in the past accorded only a second-class position in the world and now demand equality, then we play into the Communists' hands.

It is our demand that people everywhere be treated as people in their own right of human dignity. It is our message, not the Communist message. Nobody, gentlemen, undermines the future, the dignity of Western culture so much as those people who ascribe the natural demands, aroused by us, of peoples who have not full equality for equality to Communist influence instead of saying that these demands are our product. We stand for the equality of man, and it is in our Declaration of Independence that all men are created equal, and it is not to be found in Karl Marx, or Lenin, or Khrushchev.

In thinking about neutrality, I again have a different opinion from some of our fellow citizens. Gentlemen, only if I have an opinion different from those of others is it worthwhile to listen to me, because, if I tell you what you expect to hear, what you like to hear, then it is time lost. I know it is very difficult to listen to lectures. It is a great effort. It is only worthwhile if the lecturer tells you something which not many others tell you.

You see I believe it is natural that Nasser in Egypt or Nehru in India act the way they do. Let me say immediately that I have a high respect for both of them. They are doing a splendid job within human limitations to which all men are subject, in their countries. I fully understand their neutralism. Again I wish to recall to you that until quite recently the American people were neutralists. I spoke already about what I found here when I came to this country in the 1930's, when I was told, "We cannot stand with Britain or France against fascism. We are neutral; we have a neutrality legislation. We don't wish to interfere in this fight between British imperialism and other imperialisms." We did not go out of our way to align ourselves with Britain and France in the struggle against totalitarian dictatorships. Why should Egypt or India, Ghana or Indonesia do it today, if we, so much older and wiser, did not do it 25 years ago? These are young countries. They have an immense task to perform at home. Gentlemen, if you have not been to Egypt or India or Indonesia, you don't know the immense poverty, illiteracy, and backwardness in these countries. It is unimaginable. It is an immense task to grapple with these problems and to concentrate on them.

To a certain extent they follow our own example, when we, in a new country, tried to build up that country and not to mingle in world affairs or European affairs of that time. So I would say, "Mind that these people are not Communist, they are not Communist sympathizers. They

are nationalists." They think of Egypt or of India or of Ghana, and at present they wish to stay out of what they regard a great power struggle, and I think they are right. Moreover, not only are they right because they follow our own example; they are right because I think it is good if there are some neutral countries left in the world. I, during World War I and World War II, was quite happy that Switzerland remained a neutral country, and I think it is good that, in a world of tension, of immense tension, there are some countries who, in a certain way, as Woodrow Wilson understood it, too, can look without too much passionate involvement on the struggle going on.

Let me conclude with one remark. I am rather optimistic about the future of the world and the future of peace, and I am optimistic too about the future of the United Nations. The United Nations is so much superior, in my opinion, to the League of Nations, because the League of Nations was a European organization to maintain the status quo. The United Nations is a universal organization conscious of the immense changes going on in the world today. The League of Nations met, as you know, of course, in Geneva, which is a quiet, backward town. The United Nations meets in New York, the most dynamic city in the world today. The League of Nations was a somnolent organization, like the city of Geneva is. The United Nations is full of dynamism. Fifteen years after the foundation of the League of Nations--it was founded in 1920, as you know--in 1935, the League of Nations was in full dissolution. The United Nations was founded in San Francisco in 1945. Fifteen years later, in 1960, it is alive. Everybody tried to leave the League of Nations; everybody stays in the United Nations.

Naturally, the United Nations cannot establish peace on earth. Nobody can do that. For the next X years--I don't know how long--I would say certainly in your lifetime--I don't say my lifetime, which has a short way to go--there will be no peace on earth. There will be tension, unrest, the need for preparedness, intelligence, and foresightedness--not a comfortable time. Nobody can establish peace in a world as it is today. But the United Nations is a meeting ground where, for the first time in history, the peoples of all civilizations, all creeds, all ideologies, meet and discuss.

Gentlemen, we of the parliamentary tradition should understand the value of talking, of discussing. And mind, as various peoples come to New York and discuss under the rules which we have of Western parliamentarianism, they accept the Western form of discussion, of procedure,

in this situation, which I regard as a hopeful sign, because it is important to talk together. In that situation the world is changing, too.

In 1945 there were only two power centers left in the world, we and the Soviet Union. It was, as we called it then and probably do even today, a bipolar world of two centers alone. Some of us thought that might continue for a long time. Gentlemen, that is passing today. The world is becoming no longer bipolar with two centers, but with many centers, it is becoming a multicentric world--not a duocentric world.

Europe has recovered astonishingly, and there is in London and in Bonn an independent power center. Other centers are growing up, and, gentlemen, believe me, in 20 years' time New Delhi, Tokyo, Cairo, and Brasilia, to name only a few, will be independent centers of world influence to a growing degree. The same is happening in the Communist world. In 1945 it seemed, to use a famous term, monolithic, hewn out of one bloc and one man, one man alone, Stalin, in the Kremlin, seemed to dispose of the whole Communist world at one pressing of the button. That is no longer true today, gentlemen. There are independent centers of Communist power--Yugoslavia, to a certain extent even Poland, and certainly China. Don't think for one moment that Khrushchev can push any button today and the Communist world obeys. It does not.

Communism, which seemed to us so monocentric with one center only, in Moscow in 1945, has today several centers. Who knows whether in 30 or 40 years' time--I don't know--the center in Peking might be more powerful than that in Moscow? Things in history move and change always, and the intelligent statesman tries to foresee and to understand the changing trends of history.

In the free world too, it is no longer Washington alone which decides. There are new centers coming up. I regard this multicentric world, this world of several centers, as a safer place to live in than one with only two centers and with the immense tension between these two poles. I would say that the United Nations on the one hand and this transformation of the world power picture into a multicentric and pluralistic world on the other hand, again, in my opinion, is one of the reasons why I look forward to the future not with any pessimism of despair but with a cautious and reasoned optimism.

If we remain faithful to our own principles of liberty and equality, I have no doubt that, whether we have sputniks or they have sputniks,

we shall preserve and deepen the realm of liberty. Moral factors are the deciding thing in history. The Germans lost the two World Wars, not because they were backward technologically. The Germans were, in 1914 and 1939, superior technologically to us and to Russia by far--no comparison. There were no people in the world in 1914 and 1939 who in scholarship and in technology equaled the Germans. They lost the wars not because they had not enough technology but because any true moral purpose above purely national power interests was not there.

What we have to safeguard in this changed world of nationalism, anticolonialism, and neutralism is certainly our moral principles and strength.

Thank you.

CAPTAIN POWER: Dr. Kohn is ready for your questions.

QUESTION: Sir, do you see a trend toward breaking away from this nationalism in certain areas, especially in Europe, like in the Common Market, and the need which is there for countries to amalgamate with other countries in order to achieve their national objectives and the requirement that they give up some of their nationalism? Do you see this developing?

DR. KOHN: There is a trend like that. There is no doubt about that. This again came surprisingly strong in Europe after 1945, much more than anybody expected. But again we must be very careful. There has been a resurgence of a very pernicious nationalism in France lately. The present President of France stands for extreme nationalism, France first, in a way similar to that symbolized in the last step taken by the German government which upset me very much. I have been back to Germany every year since 1949, and on the whole I am a very great defender of the present Germany. I must say the first thing that upset me deeply was an attempt by the Adenauer-Strauss government to establish German bases in Franco Spain. It aroused unhappy memories in my mind and in other minds, too, about what Germany did before.

I don't know how far this abandonment of nationalism is dictated by egotistic nationalism itself, which hopes for an agglomeration of nations dominated by one's own nationalism, like France, which tends to regard itself as the spokesman of the Six of Europe and is to preserve its nationalist leadership. It is very difficult to say at present whether there is a real diminution of nationalism.

CAPTAIN POWELL: Dr. Kohn, you were talking to General Mundy before you came in on a question. Would you like to take that up now?

DR. KOHN: The question between us was the case of China. The case of China is a very special case. The question is: Does it have a decisive influence in other neighboring countries? I am of the opinion that it does not. I shall give you an example. In 1954, when North Vietnam became Communist at the Conference of Geneva and became Communist by French imperialist--shall I say?--stupidity, South Vietnam was created, and everybody believed that South Vietnam would go Communist within a few years, months, days. President Eisenhower, when he held his press conferences, spoke of it like when we are playing dominoes and one piece goes on top of the other. South Vietnam is still not Communist, six years after Geneva, and it is at present stronger and more viable than it was six years ago. And mind you, South Vietnam is not really a nation or a country; it is a kind of primitive chaos, and yet it has not gone Communist.

In China the situation was different. You should not forget one thing. In April 1925, before the great Chinese leader, Sun Yat-sen died--he died of cancer of the liver, and being a medical man by training, knew he was dying--he wrote a famous letter, known to every Chinese intellectual by heart, in which he, in 1925, demanded that the Chinese people should stay together with the great Lenin's revolution, as a faithful ally in the struggle for emancipation of all countries from imperialism and capitalism, and this testament of the great leader deeply impressed the Chinese youth, and Chiang Kai-shek, who had never been abroad, spent two years in Moscow at the Military Academy, and got his training then in Moscow, not in America or in Japan. When he came back he then became commander of the Military Academy at Canton, and led the Chinese armies into the unification of China in 1927 with the help of the Communists and through Communist advisers, both military and civilian, in 1927. He then turned, for a reason we don't know, against the Communists, threw them out, and established his own regime, the Chiang Kai-shek regime. But the Communists did not disappear. They were organized. They moved to Western China. There followed a great trek to Northwestern China. There was a Communist government and army in China from 1928 on until 1949. It was a country with two Chinese governments and two Chinese armies, which decided the future of China.

No condition like this exists anywhere in the world. The Chinese case is a unique case. One word more: Why did Sun Yat-sen turn so

decisively to Moscow and against us? Again you may remember that it was the conference in Washington that in 1922 turned down his insistence that the extraterritorial rights of the Europeans, the Americans, and the Japanese in China be abolished. We turned it down then. The only ones who abolished them then were the Russians.

Certainly nothing wounded Sun Yat-sen more than the refusal on the part of the West to abandon in 1922 the extraterritorial rights which we enjoyed in China, which China regarded, rightly or wrongly, as a humiliation.

So we cannot take the case of China as an example anywhere else. Even Iran, a nation which is not yet a consolidated nation, except by politeness is not Communist. You may remember the articles by the Alsop brothers in the "Herald Tribune" and the "Washington Post" which six or seven years ago were alarmist, which said that Persia had been taken over by the Communists. It has not been taken over by the Communists yet. There may come a revolution--and it probably will come like in Iraq and for the same reasons, but don't forget, even Iraq is not Communist yet. It seems that communism there is losing ground, not gaining. I don't see any free nation, without having a great Communist leader like Sun Yat-sen was in China, going Communist. I just don't see it.

I think we are suffering there from an unsubstantiated fear. If we follow our own principles, as we did not do in China in 1922, I don't think there is any danger of communism taking over.

QUESTION: Doctor, you mentioned that the situation in Soviet Asia was different than it was in the rest of free Asia. I wonder if you feel that there is any trend toward nationalism in that part of Asia, and if the Russians are likely to have trouble in the future with nationalist groups in Soviet Asia.

DR. KOHN: There is a trend of nationalism in the Soviet Empire, certainly a very strong one, not only in Asia but even in the Soviet European Empire. There are many Ukrainians in the Western Soviet Empire, or Uzbeks in Central Asia, Kazakhs, and others who are in no way happy--I would not say to be Communist, I don't know--but to be under Moscow's control. They regard control by Communist Moscow as an alien control. There is Tito. Tito is as good a Communist as Khrushchev. He is not a Democrat, nor a liberal, or a Fascist. He

is a Communist, an outright Communist, but he does not wish to be controlled by Moscow. He is a nationalist. The same may happen or is happening in China today. There is a tension between Moscow and Peking, undoubtedly. I do not say it will lead to a break. Don't misunderstand me. I don't come from the school which says that we shall fight with Russia together against China. But there is tension. There is no doubt about it. Mao does not follow Khrushchev's words. You know, when Khrushchev was here last fall, he flew from here directly to Peking. Though I do not know what happened in Peking, I can assure you that he had a much more difficult time in China than he had in America. He had a much more difficult time with Mao than he had with Eisenhower.

QUESTION: Doctor, a current topic course is divided Germany. In view of the fact that 15 years have passed, that they have different ideologies, and that one is an industrial country, do you think that this surge of nationalism could reunite Germany? Would you address yourself to that problem?

DR. KOHN: There is no doubt a nationalistic demand for the reunification of Germany. If you want my personal opinion, I believe that there will be no reunification of Germany in any foreseeable future. We shall not allow Western Germany to go Communist or pro-Soviet, nor do the Western Germans wish to do it, nor will the Soviets allow Eastern Germany to go democratic. I believe that for any foreseeable future the division of Germany will stand, as the division of Korea will stand for any foreseeable future, or as the division of Viet Nam will stand for any foreseeable future.

QUESTION: You sort of dissipated my question with that last answer, Doctor. What role do you foresee in Europe and in the world for Germany in the future? Her power seems to be growing, and England's power and France's power are diminished by the loss of colonies and raw materials.

DR. KOHN: I would say, if I may say so, that the economic position of Germany is, as you know, immensely strong, but Britain is very prosperous today. I think it is a mistake to ascribe Britain's position today to the loss of her colonies. Britain is today more prosperous than she was after 1920. In fact, in no time of her history was Britain as prosperous as she is today. Don't forget, Germany has lost not only all her colonies, too, but she has lost half of her national

territory, and yet Germany is immensely prosperous. This growth of economic strength and strength generally is one of the best proofs that it is not, like DeGaulle thinks, empire or territory which makes for the strength of a nation. You are entirely right. Germany is growing in importance, much more than France is, without empire, and without half of her national territory, which has been lost outright or indirectly to Communist influence as the result of the war.

What Germany's future will be, I don't know. As I told you already, I was one of the very few people who were rather--if I may say in a very abbreviated way, and please don't misunderstand me--pro-German last year. I always regarded the present situation in Germany as the most promising one imaginable, and even today I am of this opinion, and when I think back to 1935, gentlemen, nobody in 1935 could have predicted that Germany would be like the Germany of today, nobody. And yet I must say, as I have said already, this last attempt of Adenauer and Strauss to establish military bases and training grounds for forbidden weapons of all territories, Franco Spain, the only surviving direct ally and friend of Hitler, is one of the most disturbing facts, and I must say that the most hopeful fact is that Britain reacted so strongly against it. It was also very disturbing that our State Department did not react strongly enough against it.

I would say I am now rather doubtful. I was one of the strongest defenders of helping Germany to get back to full power. I must say what Germany did now, what the German government did, and our only half-hearted reaction to it, makes me doubt whether Germany may not again make trouble. I would have denied it two months ago. Today I am not so sure that Germany has not again become a great troublemaker in Europe. Part of that is because of the reaction of our State Department, treating it as a slight disturbance. If Germany ever becomes a troublemaker again, I would say the fault lies not so much with the Germans but with the immensely lenient attitude which the Pentagon and the State Department takes of this unheard-of thing, the action of the Germans in trying to build up military forces in Franco's Spain. There seems, favored by the Pentagon, a close alliance in the making of Germany, not with a real democracy, not with Scandinavia, not with Britain, not with the Low Countries, but, of all countries, with the only remaining fascist country, Spain.

This is one, I think, of the most disturbing things that has happened in this year 1960 so far. I would say that I could not answer your question today as confidently as I would say I could two months ago.

CAPTAIN POWELL: Dr. Kohn, we are all very sorry our time is up. On behalf of the Commandant, the students, and the faculty, thank you for a tremendous contribution to our course of studies. Thank you, sir.

(8 July 1960--4, 600)O/en:msr