THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

2 March 1960

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SPEAKER--Colonel Willis M. Smyser, USAF, Member of the Faculty, ICAF 1

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THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

2 March 1960

COLONEL SMYSER: General Mundy, General Houseman, Gentlemen: The question is frequently asked, What is our foreign policy? and sometimes it is charged that we have none. Prominent and influential people have sometimes made this charge, for example, Walter Lippmann.

Dean Acheson confides in the first page of his recent book, "Power and Diplomacy," that the most exasperating question put to a responsible State Department official is one of the most common: What is the foreign policy of the United States?

In a lighter vein, some scholars say that the United States Secret Service might devote its spare time quite profitably to searching for the United States foreign policy. And the British are reported to believe that they should no longer send diplomatic representatives to our country; that instead they should send their best men from Scotland Yard to find the American foreign policy.

Well, in spite of these remarks, there has been and there is a United States foreign policy, and, as the title of this lecture indicates, it has undergone considerable evolution. I speak of foreign policy in the collective sense, because it is made up of many policies, of course.

This morning I propose to examine with you some of the factors which produce these policies and then survey the principal policies, of our country.

One of my professors at the Graduate School of Georgetown University many years ago used to say that the study of foreign policy and international relations has great interest to so many people, that just that word "international" has a tremendous appeal to many, and it holds an almost strange fascination especially to women--women of both sexes, he used to add.

Now, since it is not just because of a casual interest in this subject that we are having this lecture this morning, I think I should tell you the purpose and the nature of the talk--what it is and what it is not.

Taking these in reverse order, the talk is not a comprehensive or a thorough treatment, nor is it a critical analysis or commentary on current United States policy. That will come later, in the lecture on Friday. What is it, then? It is an examination of the factors in our American national life which have produced and do produce our foreign policy, and then a survey of the principal policies from the beginning of our national existence to the present. In brief, it is intended to provide you with a perspective for critical analysis of current policy in contemporary international politics.

Since this talk will be followed by a lecture on current policy by a top authority in the field, Senator Fulbright, I suggest that you reserve your questions for him.

With these few introductory remarks, let us proceed with the first part of the talk, the "Factors Influencing United States Foreign Policy." I have prepared a chart (chart 1, page 3) which shows the factors in the order that I will mention them. These are: "geographical factors," such as the location of the United States, space for expansion, resources in abundance, and weak neighbors. The "historical factors" include the many European wars, sharp rivalries, and the European troubles which so often were to operate to our great advantage. Then, the "factors of our national character" include the idea of mission, our moralism and religion, partisan politics, prejudice, and our great charity and sympathy.

The geographical factors are quite well known, so I don't think they need much elaboration. The United States is physically separated from Europe and from Asia. The two oceans are sometimes called America's greatest liquid assets. Especially in the past, this geographical separation has provided a considerable measure of security and it has given the United States a considerable degree of license in foreign relations.

Added to the physical separation, the United States had the advantage of space for expansion, and there were resources in abundance. While other nations, particularly the European nations, clashed with their neighbors when they tried to acquire more space or needed resources, our forefathers were able to move into thinly populated areas, rich with resources. When the Europeans went to other continents, this was called imperialism, but when we expanded it was Manifest Destiny.

Not during the colonial period so much, but during most of our national existence, we have had weak neighbors from whom we had no fear of any major attack. This, too, provided a considerable degree of license in foreign relations, seldom enjoyed by many other nations.

CHART 1

FACTORS INFLUENCING UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICIES

GEOGRAPHICAL

LOCATION SPACE RESOURCES WEAK NEIGHBORS

HISTORICAL

EUROPEAN WARS, RIVALRIES, AND TROUBLES

NATIONAL CHARACTER

IDEA OF MISSION MORALISM PREJUDICE

PARTISAN POLITICS CHARITY & SYMPATHY

When we turn to the historical factors, we see how well these compliment the geographical factors. Our security, resulting from physical separation, was greatly increased by the European wars and rivalries. So often we overlook the tremendous advantage the United States gained at critical moments as a result of these European wars and rivalries.

Before independence, the American Colonies became involved in European wars, especially those of major proportions. The Colonists were in the War of the League of Augsburg, the War of the Spanish Succession, the War of the Austrian Succession, and the Seven Years War. In the Colonies these wars were of little real interest, and they were given local names, like King William's War, Queen Anne's War, King George's War, and the French and Indian War. As could be expected, the Colonists were not at all happy about being dragged into these European wars in which they had so little interest, and this situation helped to develop a feeling of contempt for Europe and its intrigues.

Historians say that, when the United States fought for independence, the French Alliance was the really decisive factor, but it is an historical fact that also lined up against Great Britain were Spain, the Netherlands, and the seven members of the Armed Neutrality (Russia, Denmark, Norway-Sweden, the Holy Roman Empire, Prussia, Portugal, and the two Sicilies) which amounted to most of the world against the British when we fought for independence.

When Madison seized part of Florida from Spain and when Andrew Jackson conquered the rest, Spain was fighting for survival, and in 1812 the British were near exhaustion because of the Napoleonic Wars, and so on throughout our history. I could cite some more examples, but I don't think it is necessary to labor the point.

Now let us turn to the factors of national character. One of the strong and persistent factors in our American national character is the idea of mission. This has been described and discussed by scholars in many different ways. A composite definition might be that the American idea, or ideal, of mission includes a manifest destiny--a mandate to educate, to liberate, and to improve the less fortunate rest of the world; to spread democracy and to set an example of freedom and equality; and to be loved and respected.

The concept that the United States is ordained to carry out this mission is partly explained by the geographical factors and the historical factors. But, in addition, while political philosophy was brought over

from Europe, conditions here created increasing differences from the Old World. The deep-rooted aristocracy of Europe became only a thin aristrocratic veneer over here. Physical ability and talent commanded respect. Careers were open to people on the basis of capability, and class distinction was less pronounced. This sense of difference grew into dissatisfaction and scorn for the Old World and into the ideal that we are ordained, because of our virtue, to advance our type of civilization. This theme runs throughout our history.

American moralism and religion are closely associated with the idea of mission. Respect for law, honor, decency, and dignity can be included as part of the American national character. President McKinley, in a message to Congress relative to the acquisition of territory, said that, "forcible annexation, by our code of morality, would be criminal aggression." American moralism was emphasized by President Truman in his famour 1945 Navy Day speech, when he said that the United States foreign policy is based firmly on righteousness and that we shall not compromise with evil.

The Mayflower Compact, the Charter of Maryland, and the Charter of the New England Confederation are a few of the many declarations which dedicate this Nation to the "Glory of God" and to the "Advancement of the Christian Faith." The same theme runs throughout our history, down to President Eisenhower's address at my Alma Mater, Gettysburg College, last year, when he said that our aims must be "to promote the cause of an America living under God."

Now, there are many who are critical of this moralism and religion. They claim that it produces self-justification and self-righteousness. Mayer and Forester in their book, "The United States and the Twentieth Century," say:

"Most states, without apology or embarrassment, frankly pursue a large number of policies aimed at their own advancement. The United States, in contrast, has been exceptional in her capacity for self-deception regarding her motives. She justifies her conduct by appealing to ideals."

In thinking about this characteristic I am reminded of several historical examples of its manifestation. I'll cite only two, two rather extreme examples. Theodore Roosevelt is the first. He described the Spanish-American War, which historians say was plain American

aggression, as "the most righteous foreign war undertaken by any nation," and, when he took Panama, the schedule of events included:

Chart 2, page 7.--The USS Nashville arrived in Panama 2 November 1903; the Panama patriots, who were bribed Colombian soldiers, revolted on 3 November; Panama proclaimed independence from Colombia on 4 November; the United States recognized Panama on 6 November; and the agreement was signed to build the Panama Canal on 18 November.

When Roosevelt was questioned about this, he said, "The United States Government had a mandate from civilization to take this action." This is usually called the Rape of Panama by historians, but Dr. Clem and I were talking about it, and we thought a better title is Puppetry in Panama, because here we employed this technique of the puppet government very successfully, and we had already done it several times before. And you know this is a technique that is now used quite successfully by the Communists.

The second example is President McKinley, who was confronted with the question of what to do about the Philippines. He announced that he got down on his knees and prayed for divine guidance night after night, and that God gave him the answer late one night to make them a United States possession in order to civilize and Christianize them.

I think it is accurate to say that the theme of mission and moralism pervades the writings and pronouncements of great Americans throughout our history. Perhaps this moralism is sometimes scoffed at and perhaps there is some hypocricy in it; but the record is clear on one thing: With our moralism we have never embarked on world conquest, as so many other nations have.

Now let us turn to the characteristic of prejudice. Our prejudices are many, but the one which influences our foreign policy is hatred of foreigners, or, to use a fancy term, Xenophobia. The Chinese are heathen and inscrutable; the Japanese are treacherous; the arrogant Germans go berserk and run amuck; the Italians are cunning and Machiavellian; the French are immoral; and the Dutch are stubborn. They are Wops, Spigs, Frogs, Gooks, Polocks, and Bohunks, who eat raw fish, snails, octupi, and grasshoppers. This alone is enough to condemn them.

CHART 2

PUPPETRY IN PANAMA



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One of our great early American liberals, Thomas Jefferson, wrote in a letter from Europe that "all the ruling kings are fools, hogs, and insane. This is a natural consequence of being kept idle, fed on a rich diet, permitted to gratify all sexual appetite freely, and discouraged from thinking."

The writings and pronouncements of many prominent Americans are voluminous relative to racial prejudices against thick lips, high cheek bones, slant eyes, sugar-loaf heads, moon faces, lantern jaws, and goose-bill noses.

What has this to do with foreign policy? Well, it shows up in many ways: in immigration policy, and in attitude toward international organizations. For example, in 1924, when for domestic reasons we terminated the Gentlemen's Agreement of 1908 and refused to permit a few Japanese to come in on a quota basis, as other foreign nationals do, we offended a sensitive people. Millions of Japanese vowed never to forget this act of racial discrimination.

During the debate on the World Court in 1925-26, Senator Reed of Missouri appealed to prejudice by asking how the American people would like to have decisions on American justice handed down by Dionisio Anzilotti or by Antonio Sanchez de Bustamente, and he read several pages of such names from the League of Nations. The inference is clear.

Of course, statistics show that prejudice, intolerance, jingoism, and bigotry thrive on ignorance. They are found especially among those with only a grade school education or less. But sometimes you find these attitudes among apparently intelligent people.

Now, I think it is only fair to remember that there is another side to this. And while prejudice against foreigners, Xenophobia, disturbs foreign relations, I think it should be remembered that love for foreigners and for everything foreign is also just as disturbing. Sympathetic understnading and appreciation for whatever merits appreciation are essential, to be sure; but, when an American gets to the point where he says, "I just love Spain," or any other country, I think he has lost his usefulness as a representative of our country.

Now let's turn to the characteristic of charity and sympathy. My first memory of Sunday School, when I was so small that my mother had to take me, was contributing to the collection that they were taking up for the starving Armenians. I had no idea who a starving Armenian was, but when they flashed a picture of a horribly emaciated Armenian on

the screen we all wanted to give as much as we could to the collection. This was only one church in one small town among thousands of such churches and thousands of small towns. In 1919 Congress voted $100 million for needy Europeans. We provided famine relief for Russia in 1921 to 1923, and we provided aid to Japan after the 1932 earthquake. Bundles for Britain and the billions for postwar aid are quite well known. I think it is sufficient to say that American charity and sympathy are unprecedented and unequaled.

Partisan politics have entered into our foreign policy to a very considerable extent in the past, and to a lesser degree today. Throughout the latter part of the 19th century, both parties precipitated many serious crises with Great Britain in an attempt to capture the Irish vote to win important New York. The party which displayed the most hostility for England got the Irish vote. I am sure that you know of many more examples, some quite recent, such as the incident of the visit of the King of Saudi Arabia to New York and the very poor reception he got there from Mayor Wagner, because the Mayor was interested in the Jewish vote.

Bipartisanship in foreign affairs has not entirely corrected this problem but it has done much to improve the situation.

The important thing is the impact of these factors on foreign policy, what they result in.

The geographical factors and the historical factors together have resulted in a concern primarily with domestic affairs, until recently. But, more dangerously, they have resulted in a myth of invulnerability and invincibility, and this in turn has resulted in unpreparedness for wars. The idea of mission and moralism results in, well, consternation when we are not understood, when our virtue is not appreciated, and it results in a tendency toward identification of self-interest with virtue and righteousness. When any issue is made a moral issue, and when we immediately associate our side of the issue with righteousness, then negotiation and compromise become very difficult, because we have to compromise with our own righteousness. President Wilson got into such a position in 1913 when he was having some trouble with the Huerta government in Mexico, and, in a speech in Mobile, Alabama, he condemned that government, and he said, "Morality must be our guide and we will never condone evil and iniquity."

It is just this sort of self-righteousness in foreign policy that Lester Pearson warns against in his recent book, "Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age."

Prejudice results in irrational actions, just as do partisan politics, and our great charity and sympathy result in generous aid and in support of anticolonialism and self-determination, and a general sympathy for the underdog.

These, then, are the factors which influence policy. Let's turn now to the foreign policies themselves.

I have prepared a chart (Chart 3, page 11) which shows the policies which I will mention. The five major policies are:

Isolationism, with its components of nonintervention and nonentanglement.

The Monroe Doctrine, with its supplement, the Roosevelt Corollary.

Freedom of the Seas, along with Freedom of Trade and the Open Door.

Pan-Americanism.

Cooperation and Aid.

The secondary policies I have listed, and on which I will just merely touch, are:

Expansion and Imperialism.

Pacific Settlement of Disputes.

Commercial and Tariff Reciprocity.

Dollar Diplomacy.

Disarmament.

Nonrecognition of Aggression.

One of the most consistent and best known foreign policies of the United States during the greater part of our national existence has been isolationism. Actually, the two components, nonentanglement and nonintervention, are the policies.

CHART 3

UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICIES

ISOLATIONISM: Nonintervention, Nonentanglement

THE MONROE DOCTRINE, The Roosevelt Corollary

FREEDOM OF THE SEAS, Freedom of Trade, The Open Door

PAN-AMERICANISM

COOPERATION AND AID

- - - - - - - - -

Expansion and Imperialism

Pacific Settlement of Disputes

Commercial and Tariff Reciprocity

Dollar Diplomacy

Disarmament

Nonrecognition of Aggression

Chart 4, page 13.--I have given this policy a popular label. It is: "We'll Keep Out." Well-known enunciations of the policy include:

"It is the true interest of America to steer clear of European contentions," which Thomas Paine pointed out before we became a nation.

Samuel Adams declared: "We shall never intermeddle with the quarrels of other nations."

The two best known and most quoted pronouncements are from Washington's Farewell Address and from Jefferson's Inaugural Address:

"It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world . . . taking care always to keep ourselves . . . on a respectable defensive posture, we may safely trust to temporary alliances . . . ." In many quotations the second part of that is omitted. You have probably noticed it many times.

And, finally: ". . . peace, commerce and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none . . . ."

At this time the United States consisted of the original 13 States, surrounded by the territories of the great European powers.

Unquestionably this policy made sense. It was entirely logical in our early years, since we were struggling for survival and we were simply too weak to risk an active role in international affairs. About the end of the 17th century--1689, to be exact--England had begun a series of wars with France, Spain, and others, which lasted, with few interruptions, until 1815. That's over 100 years. As I pointed out earlier, we became involved, even though we had little interest.

But, how successful has the policy been since we became a nation? Actually, we became involved in all of the world wars which took place during our existence. We got into the Napoleonic Wars, at the end, on the side of France, when we declared war on England, in 1812. We were in both World Wars of the 20th century.

From the Battle of Waterloo until the sinking of the Lusitania, there were no world wars of even remote interest or threat to us, so we managed to stay out of them. Most of the wars that did take place during that period were usually localized affairs, between just two nations, with no interest at all to us, and usually they were so short that they were over before our newspaper correspondents were able to get there. Perhaps that's why we managed to stay out.

CHART 4

ISOLATIONISM *Non-Entanglement, Non-Intervention*

"We'll Keep Out"



"It is the true interest of America to steer clear of European contentions."
Thomas Paine

"We shall never intermeddle with the quarrels of other nations."
Samuel Adams

"It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world . . . Taking care always to keep ourselves . . . on a respectable defensive posture . . . we may safely trust to temporary alliances . . ." *George Washington*

". . . peace, commerce and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none. . ." *Thomas Jefferson*

You might say that we were most successful in staying out of major European wars when there were none.

It is interesting to note how consistently we pursued this policy. The answer is that we pursued it meticulously when and where our interests were not involved. I'll expand on this when we come to Freedom of the Seas.

Another interesting aspect of this policy is our neutrality and our affinity for neutrality legislation. The first was Washington's Proclamation of Neutrality in 1793 and 1794. They all ring a familiar note, right down through history: Before the War of 1812, before World War I, and the famous neutrality legislation and proclamations of 1935, 1936, 1937, and 1939. This indicates our desire to stay out of war, and you might note that neutrality proclamations and legislation have preceded our entry into almost every war.

This policy of isolationism persisted long beyond the time that it made any sense, when isolationism was merely an illusion of insulation from the rest of the world. The words of Washington and Jefferson have been used entirely out of their true context, and for partisan political reasons, such as during the debate on the League of Nations. The story of its persistence is well known, and it is within our own lifetime that we have witnessed the shift away from it.

Chart 5, page 15.--Our next major policy is the Monroe Doctrine, and it is a logical complement of the first.

An appropriate popular label for this policy is: "You Keep Out."

In 1823 the United States had now grown in stature. We had acquired Louisiana and had seized the Floridas. At this time President Monroe said:

"The American continents . . . are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers . . . In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part nor does it comport with our policy to do . . . We owe it, therefore, to candor . . . to declare that we shall consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety . . . . Our policy in regard to Europe . . . remains the same . . . not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers."

THE MONROE DOCTRINE "You Keep Out"

"The American continents . . . are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers . . . In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part nor does it comport with our policy so to do . . . We owe it, therefore, to candor . . . to declare that we shall consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety . . . Our policy in regard to Europe . . . remains the same . . . not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers." *James Monroe, 1823*

This was a truly remarkable policy. It was regarded with contempt in Europe and with indifference in Latin America. It is even more remarkable when we consider that the United States Capitol at Washington was burned by the British only nine years earlier.

Actually, the policy was suggested by the British in a note from their Foreign Secretary, George Canning, who proposed a joint British-United States declaration to prevent European intervention in the Americas.

Incidentally, a situation in far-off Greece entered into the problem. The Greeks had revolted against the Turks, and they were fighting for survival. Remember those factors I cited. They were the underdogs, and pro-Greek sympathy was so great as to include sermons, orations, solicitation of aid funds, newspaper articles, and even resolutions in Congress. But in this instance Monroe reiterated American determination to stay out of the Greek problem and to stay out of Europe, and he made the unilateral warning for Europe to stay out of the Americas.

Much of the success of the policy must be attributed to the British fleet, especially in the early years, even though some of the times when we invoked the Monroe Doctrine we were against the British. Probably the fullest explanation of the Monroe Doctrine was contained in the note by Secretary Olney in 1895 to the British in connection with the British-Venezuela boundary dispute in which United States tempers had become quite heated. The incident is interesting because the clamor for war was amazing. Senator Chandler of New Hampshire called for "war with England with or without cause." President Cleveland delivered a warlike message to Congress. And Theodore Roosevelt said: "I rather hope the fight will come soon." The Irish National Alliance promptly pledged 100,000 volunteers. At this time the United States had no coastal defenses and only 3 battleships, while the British had 50 battleships. But England did not want a war. We did, however. The war spirit was strong; and we finally declared war on Spain.

As late as 1945, the principle of the Monroe Doctrine was reiterated by President Truman in his famous foreign policy speech on Navy Day.

Chart 6, page 17.--An interesting supplement to the Monroe Doctrine was the Roosevelt Corollary of 1904.

An appropriate popular label for the Roosevelt Corollary is, "You Better Behave." When European nations found it necessary to intervene in Central and South America because of various grievances, Theodore Roosevelt said:

CHART 6

THE ROOSEVELT COROLLARY "You Better Behave"

"Chronic wrongdoing . . . may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power."

Theodore Roosevelt, 1904

"Chronic wrongdoing . . . may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power."

I don't have to point out that this policy met with extreme unpopularity in Europe and in Latin America, and especially in the Caribbean and Central American areas where we did intervene with military forces many times and over a period of several years. You see, here our national security area was directly involved.

This policy, the Roosevelt Corollary, was practically repudiated in 1928 by the Clark Memorandum and, with the growth of Pan-Americanism and with the multilateralization of the Monroe Doctrine, it has been gracefully buried.

Chart 7, page 19.--The next major policy to be considered is Freedom of the Seas, along with Freedom of Trade and the Open Door.

The popular label I have given this policy is "Keep Off Our Ships."

Declarations of the policy have been made throughout our history, and instances involving the principle are numerous, from the outrage committed by the British frigate Leopard against the Chesapeake in 1807 down through history to the sinking of the Lusitania.

The grievances against King George III of England, enumerated in the Declaration of Independence, include: "For cutting off our Trade with all parts of the world," and, "He has plundered our seas."

In James Madison's War Message of 1812, he said: "British cruisers have been in the continued practice of violating the American Flag on the great highway of nations."

Woodrow Wilson's conditions for peace included, "Freedom of the sea is the sine qua non of peace, equality, and cooperation." Freedom of the Seas was the second of his famous 14 points.

And, as late as 1945, in his statement of United States basic policies, President Truman said, "We believe that all nations should have the freedom of the seas."

CHART 7

FREEDOM OF THE SEAS *Freedom of Trade, The Open Door*

"Keep Off Our Ships"





"For cutting off our trade with all parts of the world . . . He has plundered our seas."

Declaration of Independence, 1776

"British cruisers have been in the continued practice of violating the American Flag on the great highway of nations." *James Madison, 1812*

"Freedom of the sea is the sine qua non of peace, equality, and cooperation."

Woodrow Wilson, 1918

"We believe that all nations should have the freedom of the seas."

Harry Truman, 1945

Here is a policy that was concerned with our national interest and we intervened when the situation required it. In fact, we have been very sensitive about it. We have fought declared wars for this policy and we have fought several undeclared wars. We fought the Barbary Pirates. We fought an undeclared naval war with France after the French had seized many of our naval vessels. During 1798 and 1799 the tiny United States Navy captured more than 80 armed French ships. In fact, from about 1798 to 1812, both France and England had been seizing our ships. The French seized some 500 and the British over 900. There was considerable dispute concerning whom we should fight.

The War of 1812 was primarily over freedom of the seas, and the principle was involved in our entry into World War I.

The open door policy is generally associated with the Far East, notably China, although it applies generally to backward countries. It means that, in trade, American citizens are to have the right to compete with other foreigners on an equal basis.

Vigorous adherence to the policy of freedom of the seas certainly was logical when the United States was weak and when foreign trade was very important. It also has an idealistic and moralistic appeal. But, at present, we control the seas, and we are in a position to exercise that control. Perhaps this policy is no longer advantageous to us. In any event, think about it.

Chart 8, page 21.--Pan-Americanism and the Good Neighbor represent the maturing of our policy in regard to the Western Hemisphere.

An appropriate popular label is, "Let's Get Together--in the Western Hemisphere, of course."

In 1928 Charles Evans Hughes said: "Pan-America rests upon four pillars. The first is independence . . . the second is stability . . . the third is mutual good will . . . and the fourth is cooperation."

We are all familiar with Franklin D. Roosevelt's famous words in 1933: "I would dedicate this nation to the policy of the good neighbor."

And in 1936 he added: "Non-American states seeking to commit acts of aggression against us will find a hemisphere wholly prepared to consult together for our mutual safety and our mutual good."

CHART 8

PAN AMERICANISM *The Good Neighbor*

"Let's Get Together" *(in the Western Hemisphere)*



"Pan America rests upon four pillars.
The first is independence . . .
The second is stability . . .
The third is mutual good will . . .
The fourth is cooperation."

Charles Evans Hughes, 1928

"I would dedicate this Nation to the policy of the good neighbor."

Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1933

"Non-American states seeking to commit acts of aggression against us will find a Hemisphere wholly prepared to consult together for our mutual safety and our mutual good." *Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1936*

Pan-Americanism was a little slow to take root because of the past domineering attitude of the Colossus of the North. I was talking to Mr. Sandifer about this, and he said he remembers when Mr. Hughes made the statement that I quoted, at the Inter-American Conference in Havana in 1928, and Mr. Hughes went there in a bettleship. This was an act that evoked very little enthusiasm from the Latins. Nevertheless, his address was a really memorable one.

It was shortly after this event that the Clark memorandum repudiated the Theodore Roosevelt Corollary, and Pan-Americanism developed with really unexpected success through the 1930's and the 1940's, and in particular during World War II and the Korean Conflict.

The culmination of the policy was the conclusion of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, or the Rio Treaty, in 1947.

At the moment, there is still much to be desired in our relationship with Latin America, and, as you know, President Eisenhower is working on that right now.

Chart 9, page 23.--The last major policy to be considered is Cooperation and Aid--Worldwide.

Manifestations of this policy include: Joining the United Nations, the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall plan, and the development of NATO. An appropriate popular label is simply, "Let's Get Together." This is a long, long way from the earlier "We'll Keep Out" and "You Keep Out."

An epochal pronouncement in solemn tones was made by President Truman to the Congress in 1947: "It must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."

This policy has been continued to the present time, with President Eisenhower's words at Gettysburg College last year, when he said:

"We need to understand our country's purpose and role in strengthening the world's free nations . . . . Mutual security and American security are synonymous . . . . Whenever freedom is destroyed anywhere we are ourselves by that much weakened . . . . The question whether we can afford to help other nations . . . has only one answer: we can and we must . . . . "

CHART 9

COOPERATION AND AID

To Europe and to All Countries Resisting Aggression

United Nations, The Truman Doctrine, The Marshall Plan, NATO

"Let's Get Together"



"It must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." *Harry S. Truman*

"We need to understand our country's purpose in strengthening the world's free nations. . .Mutual security and American security are synonymous . . . The question whether we can afford to help other nations . . . has only one answer: we can and we must." *Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1959*

It is quite a coincidence how far-off Greece enters into some of our major foreign policy announcements. You recall that in the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, the United States declared its intention to stay out of the Greek situation. But it was a situation in Greece which brought on the Truman Doctrine. In 1947, with Greece threatened by the Communists, the Truman Doctrine declared the United States intention to intervene.

The Marshall plan followed, and you know that this was a bold policy which dwarfed the original magnitude of the Truman Doctrine.

As I mentioned before, the Rio Pact was concluded in 1947, and the Senate approved 72 to 1. Some truly momentous events followed. Senator Vandenberg, who had been a leading figure in the conclusion of the Rio Treaty and in bipartisanship in foreign policy, led the Senate in the passage of the Vandenberg Resolution, by a 64 to 4 vote, calling for the United States to support regional treaties. Then the precedent-shattering North Atlantic Pact, creating the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, passed the Senate by 82 to 13, in July 1949.

From the words of Washington and Jefferson to those of Truman and Vandenberg, the evolution was complete. Personally, I think the real evolution was primarily the recognition of the changing area of our national interest and security throughout our history. The area was originally quite small; later it included the Western Hemisphere; and now the area of interest and security where intervention is necessary includes the world.

Now we'll take just a few minutes to mention the secondary policies. Actually, I have labeled these as secondary policies, but at times they have been primary policies. But over the long run I think you can call them secondary policies.

Expansion took place in the early 1800's, while imperialism was a phenomenon of the late 1800's, becoming almost a national aberration in the 1890's. At that time we just had to fight somebody, and, as I mentioned before, we almost fought England but we finally declared war on Spain, even though Spain had given in on almost every issue. And in this war we acquired some overseas territories.

Pacific settlement of disputes has always been quite consistent with a few exceptions--one of which I have just cited. The United States was active in promoting the World Court, the League of Nations, and the

United Nations. We have negotiated well over 100 treaties of arbitration and conciliation, of which over 75 have been ratified.

Commercial and tariff reciprocity has been a policy from time to time, and under Secretary Hull it was pursued quite vigorously.

Parenthetically, as a matter of interest, when the renewal of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act was being debated, a poll indicated that only 1 in 10 American voters had the remotest idea of what it was about. Significantly, the informed 1 in 10 did favor the act. This is just one example of the apathy and indifference of so many of our people, the sort of thing we must be concerned about, and the sort of thing you can expect when so many of our people prefer to spend all of their spare time taking a mental narcotic from their television sets, usually in the form of a homicidal. This might be called our impoverished intellectual life in the midst of prosperity.

Dollar diplomacy was employed to keep European interests out of Latin America and the Far East by encouraging American investment there. It was used mostly during the administration of President Taft, who described the policy as substituting dollars for bullets.

Disarmament is an idealistic policy and one that the United States has supported with real sincerity, in fact, to such an extent that we have on several occasions disarmed unilaterally. You know that it is very much in the headlines today. In fact, this month in Geneva a new disarmament conference begins.

Nonrecognition of aggression is also a rather idealistic policy which we have pursued fairly consistently. There are many who believe that it is somewhat futile, but it is still one of our policies today.

There, then, are the principal foreign policies of the United States. They are significant today even though some of them have been buried, like the Roosevelt Corollary, because the ghost comes back and haunts us. I am sure you already knew most of what I have been talking about here this morning, but I do hope that it helps to put your thinking in focus and in order on this subject. Above all, I hope that it will help you toward a more understanding and thorough consideration of current United States policies in contemporary international politics.

Thank you.

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CIVIL DEFENSE--FEDERAL READINESS AND PROGRAMS

2 March 1960

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