CIVIL DEFENSE--FEDERAL READINESS AND PROGRAMS

2 March 1960

MR. PULVER: General Houseman, Admiral Patrick, Ladies, and Gentlemen: I understand that in the Pentagon a particularly complex and difficult problem is known as a can of worms. Chart 1, page 2, at first glance might look like a writhing can of worms but, using rope, this is my version of how civil defense and defense mobilization might appear to most of you at this point of your course here in the College.

My purpose here is to remind you, and myself, that we have already explored several major aspects of this problem. Also I have tried to symbolize, with knots, the Federal-State-local military relationships which are under consideration in these four lectures on civil defense. I think this shows the relationship better than an organization diagram, as here you can easily visualize that some of the knots may be tied more tightly than others. Also in our study of the problem, our series of four lectures on civil defense will attempt to tie up some loose ends, as shown on chart 2, page 3.

In my talk, which is the first of the series, I hope to elaborate somewhat on what Governor Hoegh told you last October, not just about the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (OCDM) but also about the readiness of the whole Federal Government to perform in a civil-defense emergency. We will discuss organization, facilities, systems, and the concept of emergency operations, at both national and regional levels.

And then I feel you would want to know more about a few key nationwide programs now being given top priority by the Federal Government in order to assist the State and local governments in getting prepared to meet their responsibilities.

Finally, I want to explore with you a few new thoughts about civil defense in conjunction with cold war and limited war.

Before we look into the matter of Federal organization, there are a few points about Federal emergency plans that we should clearly understand. These have to do with the relationship of the National Plan for Civil Defense and Defense Mobilization to Federal Emergency Plans C and D-minus and the differences between Plans C and D-minus.

CHART 1

PLANS
ORGANIZATION
STAFFING
FUNDING


ORGANIZATION
FACILITIES
SYSTEMS
CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

2


PLANS
ORGANIZATION
FACILITIES
SYSTEMS
PROBLEMS


POLICY
PLANS
RESOURCES
CAPABILITY

CHART 2

THE KNOTTY PROBLEMS
OF CIVIL DEFENSE & DEFENSE MOBILIZATION



You will recall that the National Plan is a statement of responsibilities, general policies, and guidelines for all levels of government, industry, the public, and for the individual citizen. It covers the whole spectrum of possible emergencies, as well as preattack preparedness measures and postattack operations.

Federal Emergency Plans C and D-minus are Federal operations plans in support of the National Plan. They prescribe and describe what Federal action is to be taken, by whom, and at what time under certain emergency circumstances as set forth in each of them.

What is the difference between Plan C and Plan D-minus?

Well, Federal Emergency Plan C assumes an emergency situation in which the continental United States has not been attacked, whereas Federal Emergency Plan D-minus assumes a nuclear attack on the United States.

In the Plan C situation,emergency wartime agencies would be established; this would require enabling legislation. In that case, under the assumed circumstances, there would be time for enactment of that legislation, whereas in the Plan D-minus situation most of the actions are to be executed on signal, and are based on existing contingency legislation and emergency war powers of the President.

Both Plans C and D-minus are classified "secret," but we have copies in our classified library.

I offered this in explanation of the Advisory Bulletin which was recently distributed to you, and which sets forth guidelines for the activation of emergency agencies. If a general war should be preceded by a limited war, it is probable that upon the advent of the general war emergency agencies would be functioning, having been previously established during the limited war period. In this event we would be somewhat better prepared organizationally to handle a general war situation. But today I want to talk about Federal organization in the event we should have a sudden general war emergency in which there would not be time to establish emergency agencies.

You will recall the simple organization chart on page 6 of the National Plan. In chart 3, page 5, I have elaborated somewhat on its Federal Government aspects.

CHART 3



FEDERAL ORGANIZATION FOR CIVIL DEFENSE & DEFENSE MOBILIZATION

Under conditions of nuclear attack, the principal functional areas which would require nationwide emergency management by the Federal Government are indicated in the nine large blocks in the center of the diagram.

While emergency agencies probably would be established for these nine functions sometime during the postattack period, initial responsibility is assigned to certain existing Departments, agencies, and the OCDM offices. Primary responsibility for six areas on chart 3 is assigned to the Departments and agencies as indicated--Agriculture for food; Labor for manpower; Commerce for production; Health, Education, and Welfare for health and welfare; Interior for energy and minerals; and Housing and Home Finance Agency for housing.

For the three areas on the left-hand side of chart 3--stabilization, transportation, and telecommunications--the OCDM Deputy Assistant Directors (DAD's) would take over their management during the initial postattack period.

Now, the agencies and offices we have written into our nine blocks so far might be compared to the single manager concept in use by the Armed Forces, although the comparison is not entirely valid. In each functional area there are other Federal departments and agencies which have responsibilities. So by way of illustration let's consider three or four of these functional areas and see what other agencies are involved. First, let's take manpower, which you have already studied.

As you learned, and referring to the alphabet soup here, the Civil Service Commission, the Selective Service System, the National Science Foundation, the Public Health Service, and the Maritime Administration of the Department of Commerce are all assigned responsibility for some aspect of the manpower problem. These assignments in some instances are a regular part of their statutory responsibility, or covered by an Executive order, and/or covered by the Manpower Annex of the National Plan.

Another area which you recently studied is economic stabilization. Here are some of the agencies and one Department involved in that: the Council of Economic Advisers, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Home Loan Bank Board, the Treasury Department, and the Federal Reserve Board. There are others, but I ran out of space--chart 3.

Some of the agencies involved in transportation and in telecommunications are: ICC, FAA, Commerce BPR Maritime, and FCC. There is a more nearly complete picture in the organization complex charts; but, I think this gives you a general idea of the principle involved.

With reference to the overall organization, let us for a moment consider the problems involved in the claimancy for, and the allotment of, resources for military, foreign, and domestic uses. To the extent possible, each of the functional area administrators would allocate resources to these claimants. The great bulk of these problems would be covered by the relative urgencies and specified priorities; and I might add that these are continually being refined--it's no simple job. Therefore, the problems which would have to be referred to the Director of the OCDM for decision would be limited to important exceptions not covered by relative urgency and priorities policy and doctrine. In the case of such problems requiring referral to the Director of the OCDM, these area managers will have staffed out the problem; and the likely consequences of various courses of action will have been provided the Director to assist him in his decision.

This Federal organization is not just something which would be set up in event of attack or on the declaration of a civil-defense emergency. It works in many ways on a day-to-day basis. Although there are some day-to-day actions being executed in implementation of the Defense Production Act, most of the activity now going on involves the development of plans and capability in the eventuality that it might have to operate on a full-time emergency basis.

In chart 3 you will note that the OCDM, DOD, AEC, and State are on the same level and report directly to the President. This relates to the primary operational functions of these Departments and agencies. It must be pointed out, however, that should there be a conflict in claimancy for resources, the Director of the OCDM has the power of adjudication.

Shifting our attention now to the regional level of organization of the Federal Government, you will note the switching arrangement I have indicated at the bottom of the chart. This is to show that when centralized national control is possible, the OCDM regional offices coordinate, rather than direct, the other Federal agency activities in the field. Under these circumstances the field offices of other

Federal agencies are directed by their own national headquarters. However, in a cutoff situation, that is, if centralized national level control could not be exercised, then the OCDM regional directors would direct other Federal agency field offices within their own OCDM regions.

And over at the lower left-hand side you will note that at the regional level the Zone of Interior Army Commanders coordinate military operations and planning with the OCDM regional directors. I think perhaps that Secretary Jackson will discuss this a little bit more when he comes here on 25 March.

Now, back to the national level. You may wonder what relationship the OCDM offices have to the various functional areas shown in the nine large blocks on chart 3. Let's enlarge that block within the Executive Office of the President, labeled "OCDM" and discuss it for a while.

The OCDM is responsible for policy formulation and coordination, chart 4, page 10, whereas the regular agencies shown in the nine large blocks, chart 3, are responsible for operations and execution of policy.

In discussing the organization of the national headquarters, which includes offices in Washington, Battle Creek, and the Classified Location, I will not attempt to describe and detail the functions and responsibilities of each of these blocks. The titles of the blocks, for the most part, are descriptive of the functions involved. However, I would like to carry Frank Carney's explanation one step further to show you some facets of the organizational concepts which reflect the integration of the former ODM and FCDA, and explain the scheme of titles for officials of the agency.

There are, of course, the statutory positions for director, deputy director, and three assistant directors. These five are Presidential appointment positions, subject to Senate confirmation, and as such they are comparable to the positions of secretary, under secretary, and assistant secretary in Federal Cabinet-level Departments.

The three assistant directorates are considered the line functions of the agency. Plans and Operations consists of functions the bulk of which were those of the former FCDA. There are a few exceptions there, though. One is that the Federal Plans Office of the former

ODM was combined with the State and Local Plans Office of the FCDA; and the Federal portion of the Continuity of Government Program, formerly the responsibility of the ODM, was combined with the State and local aspects of that same program.

Training, Education, and Public Affairs is a line function because of the importance and magnitude of the task assigned. It is staffed primarily by former FCDA people, simply because the FCDA did, and the ODM did not, have a sizable staff for this purpose.

In Resources and Production you will recognize, reading across and down, Deputy Assistant Directorates for Food and Water, Economic Stabilization, Telecommunications, Production and Materials, Manpower, Transportation, and Fuel and Energy. These functions were the principal functions of the old ODM. Some of these--Food and Water, Manpower, and Transportation particularly--absorbed personnel from the old FCDA Civilian Resources and Requirements Office and the FCDA Transportation Office.

The other blocks across the top--General Counsel, and Directors of Special Liaison, Security and Inspection, Administration, Program and Policy, Health Service, and Research--may be considered staff functions. Most of them existed in some form in both the ODM and the FCDA; so the integration allowed for some reduction of staff in these areas.

The directors of the staff functions and the deputy assistant directors are generally GS 16's, 17's, and 18's; and they might be roughly considered equivalent to flag-rank officers in the Deputy Chief of Staff and the Assistant Chief of Staff billets in the Pentagon.

To the right and left of the Director's box, chart 4, you see the Civil Defense Advisory Council and the Civil and Defense Mobilization Board (CDMB). The Advisory Council is a statutory body, chaired by the Director, and is composed of 12 additional members, who are appointed by the President. Three each represent the State and the local levels of government, and the other six are citizens of the United States, of broad and varied experience in matters affecting the public interest. The Advisory Council is responsible for advising and consulting with the Director with respect to general or basic policy matters relating to civil defense.

CHART 4

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

OFFICE OF CIVIL AND DEFENSE MOBILIZATION



APPROVED
LEO A. HOEG[illegible]RECTOR
AUGUST 1959

OCDM BC 2668

The CDMB, which was established by Executive Order 10773, despite its unpretentious box on this diagram, is a most important part of the organization. This body, which is also chaired by the Director, is composed of secretaries, commissioners, chairmen, and administrators, or their alternates, of some 20 departments and agencies of the Federal Government. It serves both preattack planning and implementing efforts, and postattack would recommend courses of action to the Director. In its day-to-day capacity, it is the principal means for coordinating and facilitating the development of policy and preparations of the major agencies of the Federal Government in civil defense and defense mobilization.

Here is a typical OCDM regional office organization, chart 5, page 12, in which you see an abbreviated version of the national office structure. Note the same three line functions across the bottom. The staff functions are fewer and different in some cases. In the regions of natural disaster operations and inspections, followthrough on matching fund and grant programs and training, and public information keep the staff traveling about within the region almost half of their working time.

Now that we have covered organization, though rather briefly, let's look into the Federal Government facilities. I will first cover the regular OCDM headquarters, and then we will look into the status of emergency locations or protected facilities for the Federal Government as a whole.

The OCDM National Headquarters is in Washington, D.C., where most of the top executives have offices in the Executive Office Building at 17th and Pennsylvania Avenue. Numberwise, however, the majority of the Washington staff works in the Winder Building, across 17th Street from the Executive Office Building.

About two-thirds of the National Office personnel work in Battle Creek, Michigan, at the Federal Center. This is called Operational Headquarters, and also houses the Civil and Defense Mobilization Staff College. It is also the headquarters for the OCDM Region 4.

Other OCDM regional offices are located from 20 to 50 miles outside target areas and are of conventional construction, providing little if any protection from fallout.

CHART 5

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

OFFICE OF CIVIL AND DEFENSE MOBILIZATION

REGIONAL ORGANIZATION



Last year the Cabinet approved in principle the building of eight protected regional headquarters; and the Congress actually appropriated funds to build the first of these on a prototype basis in Denton, Texas, for Region 5.

On the National Headquarters protected sites, I am happy I can report considerable progress. And this part of my talk must be classified "secret."

(Note: The classified part of this lecture was transcribed separately and is on file in the Classified Reference Unit of the ICAF Library.)

The balance of my talk is unclassified.

So far we have discussed organization and facilities. The next topic is systems. These include fallout forecasting and monitoring, warning, communications, and damage assessment. The first of these two are systems within the overall Radiological Defense Program; we will cover that later on.

On the warning system I feel that General Kuter filled you in on the essentials quite well. Also you may recall the maps of the National Warning System and the National Communications System, which we had in the College electronics exhibit here the first week in February. If you have questions on these which you feel are worthy of general class attention, we can take them up after the break.

I would like to make one point, though, about the National Communications System (NACOM). It is the Federal system, operated by the OCDM, which links the States, through the OCDM regions, to the Federal Government. It also links up with the Interagency Communications System (ICS) at the Classified Location. The ICS, which at the Classified Location is operated by the Signal Corps for the OCDM, connects together the Federal Agency National Level Emergency sites. Because it provides Presidential communications, specific details are highly classified on a very restricted "need to know" basis.

Both the NACOM and the ICS rely primarily on commercial facilities; but these, as you learned from Mr. Duncan of A.T.&T., are specially engineered to assure a high measure of reliability under attack conditions; and this reliability will improve as their program is carried forward.

The Damage Assessment System has its heart in the National Damage Assessment Center, which is located underground at the OCDM Classified Location. Physically, it includes automatic data-processing equipment specifically adapted to assess what resources survive a nuclear attack.

Inputs include, on the one hand, data on a variety of resources essential to national survival; and, on the other hand, nuclear attack information such as location of ground zeros, yields and heights of burst, weather data, and other weapon effects.

Resources data have been compiled and are kept current on tape by the working staff assigned by Federal agencies having cognizance of the various resource categories. These data are made up on the basis of the 24,000 standard locations, which range in size from census tracts to parts of, or whole, counties.

Nuclear strike information would be received postattack by all surviving means of communication on a priority basis. As you can visualize, this would be a difficult confirmation and verification problem.

The outputs would give us a rough estimate, by categories, of what resources remain. Of course, the computer printouts are voluminous in all categories, and have to be interpreted and summarized. This again is done by the Federal agency and the OCDM staff personnel assigned responsibility for the various resource categories. It is a difficult and time-consuming job. An example of the end product of such an analysis is in the Classified Reference Unit of the ICAF Library and is called the "D-plus 14 Situation Summary for Operation Alert 1958."

Early in the final problem we hope to have a special briefing for the general war committees by the Director of the Damage Assessment Center and his Department of Defense (DOD) counterpart. This briefing, which I heard last January, explains the RISK I program, which is a joint endeavor of the OCDM and the DOD, and provides damage probability factors based on official estimates of future enemy capability.

Now that we have a basic knowledge of Federal organization, facilities, and systems, let's look briefly into the concept of Federal nonmilitary defense emergency operations.

Damage assessment studies of massive attack patterns indicate that the postattack environment would, for sometime, consist of "islands of survival" in a sea of radioactive hazard. Hope for national survival and recovery would not be found in or near targeted cities. Rather, our remaining and useful resources would be in the undamaged and uncontaminated areas. These generally would be rural areas, small towns, and perhaps some cities not targeted, or targeted but missed by the enemy.

Radioactivity would decay with time, so that most facilities and resources not physically destroyed would eventually become useful. As they would, then we could do some rescue work and some salvaging of resources. However, resumption of normal habitation in locations where weapons hit will be a matter of years, not months or days.

The many problems of bare existence in such an "island of survival" are vividly covered in Pat Frank's novel "Alas Babylon," which I highly recommend for your reading. It will be on Playhouse 90 from 8 to 9:30 P.M. on 3 April; I personally am looking forward to this as perhaps the greatest breakthrough in educating the public about these problems.

You will find in your mailboxes after the lecture a short excerpt, along these same lines, from the "Saturday Review." This is the story told by three people a year after they survived an imaginary nuclear attack on St. Louis.

I mention these because an understanding of the probable postattack environment is essential to realistic planning and preparedness--by everyone.

Responsibilities for Survival After Attack

Individuals:	State and Local Governments:	Federal Government:
Plan to sustain themselves for at least--two weeks	Plan to sustain their population for at least--four weeks	Plans to help State and local governments as soon as possible, but not later than--the fifth week

This insight into the postattack environment is the basis for the policy assumptions in the National Plan:

a. Individuals and families will be prepared to exist on personal stocks in homes or shelters for two weeks following attack.

b. Cities, counties, and States will be prepared to support their inhabitants with resources immediately available to them for a period of four weeks following attack.

c. Federal stockpiles and resources will be planned for allocation to States not later than the fifth week.

This time phasing of responsibility has to be somewhat arbitrary. Maybe the States could help in one week, or in one week and two days; but, based on analysis of general radiation decay and other even less accurately predictable considerations, these time-phasing factors appear to be reasonable as specific planning objectives.

What this really says is that city, county, State, and Federal assistance will be given as soon as possible; but don't count on it until the times indicated, and make your State, local, and private plans accordingly.

This does not mean, however, that the Federal organization will be idle during the first four weeks. The first problem of survival--self-preservation--applies to the Federal Government as well as to individuals; and the first effort would be to hold a Federal muster, so to speak, to determine what survived in the way of Federal agency resources, capability, facilities, and systems.

As soon as warning is received, the Federal Damage Reporting and Damage Assessment System would go into operation. Within a few days to a week after the attack, with a combination of fragmentary reports and electronically computed data, we would have a rough idea as to where and what resources survived; also when they would be accessible and whether transportation could be available to move them to other areas where they might be needed.

Recognizing the necessity that State and local governments would have to shift for themselves in the immediate postattack period is the strongest justification for the current policy of joint Federal-State-local partnership in responsibility.

This does not contradict the obvious fact that national resources applied to the survival, recovery, and rehabilitation effort must be subject to centralized national control. National direction is planned for as soon as possible in the postattack period. But in the interim, local and State operations would have to proceed on the basis of preattack planning based on Federal guidance.

In this connection the Federal Government is attempting to provide guidelines and assistance, and is attempting to develop capability in the State and local governments now. The purpose is to provide for uniformity in State- and local-level actions which should be taken as soon as possible during the emergency. This uniformity is to provide for maximum compatibility between local, State, and Federal activities and thereby minimize changes needed as each superior echelon becomes able to exercise control.

Unfortunately at this time, progress of this effort, as evaluated in Operation Alert 1959, is, to say the least, not very encouraging. As you learned in the Economic Stabilization Unit, there is at this time practically no organization or capability and few plans at State and local level to carry out economic controls. Further, Federal planning and guidance is in many areas still in the development stage.

Although the preparations of the Federal Government which I have so far described have considerable meaning and effectiveness, for complete readiness the States, cities, industry, and the people must also be prepared. The Federal Government has many programs in operation to encourage and assist in this respect. We have time to cover only a few of these programs, and then only briefly.

There are three programs now being given equal top priority by the OCDM. These are the Continuity of Government, the Radiological Defense, and the Shelter Programs. Since Colonel Duncan will cover the Continuity of Government Program in his oral presentation of 25 March, I will not discuss it today.

First let's look into the Radiological Defense Program.

As you know, thermonuclear war would bring a unique hazard of monumental proportion--widespread and intense nuclear radiation. I don't intend to review with you the nature of these hazards, which were covered exceptionally well and in detail by the Sandia briefing team here last fall. I do, however, feel you would want to know what has been done and what is planned to meet this aspect of the threat.

Radiological Defense (RADEF)

Subjective subprograms:	Supporting subprograms:
Forecasting	Operational Procedures
Instrumentation	Training
Monitoring	Public Information
Fallout Shelter	Research
Decontamination	

The RADEF consists of subprograms of Forecasting, Instrumentation, Monitoring, Fallout Shelter, and Decontamination. These in turn require Operations Procedures, Training, Public Information, and Research--supporting subprograms.

Fallout shelter, although it may be considered an important part of a total RADEF program, is of sufficient importance and complexity to be treated as a major program in its own right, and it is. So we will cover it after the discussion of some selected RADEF subprograms.

Because of time limitations, and because I can show you more tangible progress in these than in some others, I have selected four subprograms, as follows: Forecasting, Instrumentation, Monitoring, and Training.

Fallout forecasts are prepared and distributed by the U.S. Weather Bureau under an OCDM delegation of responsibility, chart 6, page 19. This program since its start in 1955 has expanded to where it includes the special high-altitude wind observations made at 80 radar wind observatories as shown on chart 6. These forecasts do not predict the dose rate or intensity of radiation. However, they are a useful tool for emergency planning before and immediately after attack.

Forecasts, combined with alerts from the attack warning system, constitute fallout warning. The value of such warning, which may range from one-half hour to several hours, is obvious. Although it should not be a controlling factor in a decision to evacuate an area, it will give residents of threatened areas time to take action to improve their chances for survival, chart 7, page 20. These actions include improvisation and final preparation of fallout shelters and the positioning of supplies in the home refuge. Also, monitoring personnel can be positioned and given special directives for their postattack operations.

CHART 7

Instrumentation. --At the grassroots of the RADEF problem is instrumentation. Without instruments we wouldn't know when to take shelter or when it was safe to come out of shelter. Our primary instruments for operational use are shown here, chart 8, page 22. I won't discuss them further; you had a chance to handle them during the electronic exhibit last February.

We have always had the problem of maintaining balance in the program, because of a shortage of instruments. However, Public Law 85-606, enacted last year, makes us optimistic, for it permits a stepped-up procurement program over a 5-year period.

This chart shows the status of instrument distribution as of September 1959, chart 9, page 23. These figures do not include instruments obtained by the States through direct purchase or under the matching funds program. Neither do they include the instruments held by the Armed Forces. Planned RADEF instrument procurement costs for all training and operational programs through fiscal year 1967 will be about $75 million.

Monitoring. --A network of approximately 150,000 fixed monitoring stations is being established across the country. They will utilize the facilities of Federal, State, county, and local governments and their existing personnel. Approximately 3,000 of these stations will be at Federal locations, manned by Federal employees. Chart 10, page 24, shows the location of some of the 1,480 stations which are now in operation. The total network is scheduled for completion by the latter part of calendar year 1963.

Training. --Both instrumentation and training requirements are related to the monitoring net needs. How are we doing in this training program? Without going into details of where the schools are, the content of the courses, and that sort of thing, here are some concrete figures so you can compare our present status with future goals, chart 11, page 25. These are cumulative totals. So you see, we are making some progress in radiological defense, although we wish we could go a lot faster.

CHART 8



CHART 9

RADEF INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION
(AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 1959)

	TOTALS	SURVEY METERS	DOSIMETERS AND CHARGERS
FEDERAL AGENCIES	66,397	16,108	50,289
STATES AND COMMUNITIES	90,335	48,690	41,645
HIGH SCHOOLS	63,477*	28,212	35,265
	220,209		

*NINE INSTRUMENTS IN EACH HIGH SCHOOL TRAINING KIT

0-1205

CHART 10


MONTANA
NORTH DAKOTA
MINNESOTA
IDAHO
WYOMING
SOUTH DAKOTA
WISCONSIN
CALIFORNIA
NEVADA
UTAH
IOWA
COLORADO
ILLINOIS
INDIANA
OHIO
PENNSYLVANIA
MISSOURI
KANSAS
KENTUCKY
VIRGINIA
ARIZONA
NEW MEXICO
TENNESSEE
N. CAROLINA
TEXAS
ALABAMA
GEORGIA
S. CAROLINA
MISSISSIPPI
LOUISIANA
MAINE
VT
NEW YORK

CHART 11

RADIOLOGICAL DEFENSE TRAINING
PRESENT STATUS AND FUTURE GOALS

SEPTEMBER 30, 1959		1968
156,684	MONITORS	750,000
10,000	RADEF OFFICERS	20,000
7,000	ASSISTANT RADEF OFFICERS	20,000
2,000	MONITOR INSTRUCTORS	10,000

0-1206

811

Let's take a quick look now at the implementation of the National Policy on shelter's:

National Policy on Shelters

"The Administration's National Civil Defense Policy, which now includes planning for the movement of people from target areas if time permits, will now also include the use of shelters to provide protection from radioactive fallout."

Implementation:

Public information and education.
Criteria for and survey of existing structures.
Accelerate research.
Construct prototypes and text habitability.
Provide Federal leadership and example.

By direction of the President, the National Policy on Shelters was announced in May 1958, by the Director of the OCDM. The policy advocates the use of shelters to provide protection from radioactive fallout. There are no plans for a massive federally financed shelter construction program.

To implement this policy the following Federal actions have been taken in carrying out the five points of implementation listed here:

a. A wide variety of fallout shelter designs have been publicized, ranging from well-equipped underground shelters with a protection factor of 1,000 or more, with some inherent blast protection, to simple do-it-yourself basement shelters having a protection factor ranging from 100 to 200.

b. At the same time sample surveys of shelter areas in existing facilities have been undertaken in four communities. Survey techniques have been developed and published, and all communities are now being urged to carry out such surveys.

c. Shelter research efforts thus far have produced designs for dual-use shelters in schools, such as utilizing cafeteria areas; and are producing designs for multistory underground garages, hospitals, and commercial buildings in both new and existing structures.

d. As of yesterday, 27 prototype shelters had been built or were under construction; and contract agreements were in process for an additional 108 in various other cities.

e. All Federal civil buildings scheduled for future construction will contain shelters as appropriate. During the question period somebody might want to know what this "when appropriate" business is.

Despite these modest gains during the past 20 months, it is becoming clearer that what some people thought was a simple, do-it-yourself program is really fraught with complex problems.

In the middle of January 1960, the OCDM Program Advisory Committee was asked to make recommendations to Governor Hoegh on some unresolved policies with respect to the shelter program. These, in general, involved the matter of recommended shelter standards versus shelter costs as related to the salability of the program. The criteria on fallout shelter policy and problems under reconsideration involve factors of "attenuation," "length of stay," "habitability standards," and "geographic variables" around different parts of the country. Although there isn't time to discuss these further here, I do have material on these in my office which should be of special interest to those of you who are delving into the subject of shelters.

I see my time is running out now. In closing I would like to leave a few thoughts with you concerning civil defense as related to cold war and limited war.

Until rather recently most people have thought of civil-defense preparedness as something we need only if we get into a nuclear war. It has been only since the promulgation of the National Plan that civil-defense preparedness has been considered a vital part of the deterrent and the total defense. These nonmilitary, or civil, aspects of defense take on greater significance as both sides approach the time when each will have enough offensive power to devastate the other. When this level of capability is reached, relative civil-defense preparedness of one side against the other may well be a decisive factor. Military capability must be appropriately matched with homefront preparedness if our policy of massive retaliation is to remain credible.

And then, too, in the cold war and during a limited war, as long as the specter of general war hangs over us, civil-defense preparedness will make a substantial difference in our negotiating strength at the international conference table.

Finally, here is a little gem for those of you who will be on the limited war committees in the Final Unit: Do you know that when the Korean War started, our Congress seriously considered a $3-billion appropriation for civil defense; and that the State of California at about the same time actually appropriated over $100 million for its State civil-defense program?

If this could happen when the Soviets had only a small number of nominal bombs and limited delivery capability, What do you suppose might happen if we should have a Korea today? If the people demanded a multibillion-dollar massive public shelter program, What would this do to concurrent efforts to improve sealift and airlift, and to modernize conventional weapons?

In our last unit of study here at the College, we heard that economic controls in a limited war would be needed primarily to offset the psychological pressures. If I recall correctly, the consensus was that our economy is just too prosperous to be seriously affected by limited war requirements. But then a multibillion-dollar shelter program was not a part of those requirements. A fast horseback estimate makes me feel that we might just have a little trouble rounding up the steel and the concrete, not mentioning the strain on the construction industry.

I don't have any answers to these questions, but I think they are real good questions which we must soon face up to; and I'll finish on that note.

Thank you.

COLONEL SILLS: Mr. Pulver is ready for your questions.

QUESTION: I didn't notice Hawaii or Alaska on any of your charts. Will you tell us a little about what has happened there?

MR. PULVER: Originally, before I had to cut about 20 minutes out of my talk, I had Hawaii and Alaska on the regional organization diagram showing the geographical setup. Alaska is part of our OCDM Region 8 and Hawaii is part of Region 7. They are included in the plans, too.

QUESTION: What actual shelter construction has the Federal Government undertaken in any of its city buildings?

MR. PULVER: In Government buildings I don't know of any actual construction that has been completed. We requested funds from the Congress for 1959; they were denied. I think that in just one building they are planning on shelter construction. Funds are again being requested this year.

There is quite a problem here in the criteria of things. You find out that when you get too many people in an area, the question arises do we have to have ventilation, perhaps air conditioning. Then the cost per head rises pretty high, which indicates that maybe we shouldn't be figuring on their staying there two weeks. Maybe it would be best to plan on keeping them there for three days, at the end of which time they could come out and go where the radiation is not as intense. This is the sort of thing I mentioned in my talk about the criteria-habitability problem.

QUESTION: Sir, your national headquarters is partially manned all the time, or at least that is what I have understood. By what level of people and from where? Do you get any of the high-level people out of the departments or is it only from the lower levels? I am talking now about a continuing basis.

MR. PULVER: In our own agency we have been requiring our DAD's to spend a week's locational duty down there. In addition the director of the facility is, I think, about sixth or seventh on this succession list to the Director.

Other Federal agencies also maintain a watch down there, a nucleus of people. It's part of the learning process. They are down there studying what they would do if they had to go there. So preparation is improving all the time.

QUESTION: I read recently about some conscientious citizen who ran into a great deal of difficulty with the building code when he tried to put in a shelter. What is being done to square this away and get some uniformity throughout the country with regard to these local codes?

MR. PULVER: That's true. I think that this person you mentioned finally got his problems solved without too much difficulty.

Very recently we published a report on the White House Conference on Fallout. It gives several actions being taken by Federal Housing and others to remedy the building code situation. I think it'll all work out very quickly, within six months or so.

QUESTION: I think that before 1958 the concept of civil defense was that the States and cities and local communities should go it alone more or less. This wasn't too successful; and in the present Reorganization Plan of 1958, we decided that the Federal Government would give assistance. Part of this assistance, I think, was supposed to be financial assistance. Have there been any occasions yet where the Federal Government has furnished financial assistance to States, cities, or counties?

MR. PULVER: In the first place the President recommended in the reorganization plan, and Congress approved, this policy of joint responsibility.

As to what actual financial assistance has been given, we have been giving financial assistance in the grants and in the matching funds across the board over some 15 programs--communications, warning, and what-have-you.

The particular thing you are referring to, I believe, is extending these matching funds to personnel and administrative costs of States and cities. Is that right?

QUESTION: Yes.

MR. PULVER: This was turned down by the last Congress. We are still trying to get funds for it. In other words Congress approved it in principle, but didn't make any money available.

I think in certain areas this is particularly important. For example, in the Economic Stabilization Unit last month, we had that. You recall that in the States and cities there are no regular departments to handle rationing and that sort of thing. Here is an area where these matching funds for personnel costs would be particularly useful in establishing, let's say, a nucleus of maybe one person. We're not asking for anything extraordinary there.

QUESTION: Can you give us some indication of what the Russians are doing in the field of civil defense?

MR. PULVER: Well, the Russians have required all their citizens--it's a requirement, and of course they can do it there, we can't--to take a 20-hour training course in civil defense. They have given them some definite time to complete it. I believe it's three years or something like that.

There is a congressional report on this. The Library of Congress made a study of it. We have copies of it in our library. You can go into more detail there if you want to.

They say they have shelters, although the report says that a lot of them are old World War II shelters; some of them are now full of dirt and collect refuse--this sort of thing. It indicates that perhaps their shelters are not in very good shape; that they are old World War II type shelters. As to the extent of protection from fallout, I don't know.

The thing that bothers me is that maybe this isn't so important; if the Russians take the initiative, and let's say they decide to strike the first blow as far as nuclear attack is concerned, they can simultaneously evacuate their cities. So by the time that our retaliation gets there, they don't have a terrific problem like we have.

QUESTION: Isn't it true that the OCDM has absolutely no authority to force any State or anybody else to do anything; that you have to do this through persuasion, through urging, through advising them to do it; and that your Federal budget for civil defense amounts to about 31 cents per capita per year, as compared to about $250 per capita per year for military defense?

MR. PULVER: I think that's about right.

QUESTION: I just wanted to bring that out. And as far as these matching funds are concerned, the present budget of the OCDM contains $10 million. That sounds like a lot of money, but that divides out to about six cents per capita. That's how much the Federal Government is financing State and local shelter programs and other kinds of programs.

MR. PULVER: Well, if we could get the modest funds which we are requesting, we could accomplish a great deal more.

QUESTION: There seems to be a little dilemma here. You are requesting more money and you are talking about shelter programs and so forth. I don't see how it's possible for the Congress to allocate to you or to the military any more money when the President comes out and says that we haven't anything to worry about. Unless the President gets up and at least mentions in passing that there is a

remote possibility of something occurring, I don't see any more money coming your way; so this seems like a little academic exercise. If I'm wrong, I'd like to hear about it.

MR. PULVER: I was quite surprised by what came out of the White House Conference on Fallout Shelters. For example, the State Department has completely reversed its previous outlook on civil defense. Its representatives used to say: "Well, we don't want to be building a bunch of shelters in this country, because it'll scare our allies, or the Russians might think we're really going to attack." There has been a change of heart. Now they consider a good civil-defense program to be an addition to the deterrent and support at the negotiating table at international summit conferences and what-have-you.

QUESTION: Is that their policy line?

MR. PULVER: This has changed just very recently. The AEC Commissioner McCone and several other top officials of the executive branch have statements in this conference report which indicate that apparently all the major Federal Government agencies are getting behind this concept of people building their own shelters. I get the impression that pretty soon there may be some things which will give some incentive here to do so.

QUESTION: Such as?

MR. PULVER: The various housing authorities are modifying their previous regulations. For example, you couldn't apply an FHA loan to the building of a shelter and this sort of thing. This is being changed. Some of them have been changed already--within the last week.

QUESTION: In view of what was just said--that the President isn't backing this up--Is the OCDM going on with its plans? I noticed recently that a honeymoon couple spent two weeks in a shelter in Miami. Is that part of the OCDM publicizing?

MR. PULVER: I think if you were in the position that the OCDM is with respect to funds, you'd grasp at any little straw and take advantage of every opportunity to get the vital message across to the American people.

QUESTION: We have heard during the year about the probability that the medical profession may not be able to spread itself thinly

enough to look after some of the types of casualties. Someone said that it might even block off or exclude from its consideration for a certain period the heavily damaged areas. First, I question this as a probability. Second, is there any such thing as an antiradiation suit or cover that might be obtained if one decided to try to rescue these people? If so, where can one buy it?

MR. PULVER: I guess you could make an antiradiation suit. It would, of course, probably have to be made out of lead, and I don't think you would be able to get around in it very well.

Insofar as the medical problem is concerned, as you know, most of our medical personnel, hospitals, and so on are located in the target areas. Even of those that we do have, we can expect to lose a great number. What is left is going to have to be used on a very cold-blooded basis as to just what is best to get the country back on its feet.

I've heard these doctors talk about this, and from what they say, there never were enough medical supplies or medical personnel. The American Medical Association (AMA) is getting in on the act now; I believe we have an agreement with the AMA. Its people are making studies of these things, trying to get the medical profession behind this, to see what can be done; but, it is a terrific problem.

QUESTION: The best way to avoid the effects of one of these bombs seems to be--just not be there. What is the OCDM doing with respect to a positive program, on a permanent basis, for dispersal of population?

MR. PULVER: We have been working with the Department of Commerce, the Office of Area Development, I believe. Both the former FCDA and the ODM were active in this. The BDSA and our Industry Office try to promote industry survival planning. While a few firms--one example, A.T.&T.--are far ahead of the others, there has been no mad rush to do this. Those that have participated usually have good economic reasons for it. It is a real tough problem, but I personally feel it is beginning to get up some steam. Our own ICAF National Security Seminars are reviving quite a bit of interest in it, and there has been a recent increase in correspondence from industry asking for the OCDM advice and guidance.

COLONEL SILLS: Chuck, thank you very much for a very fine talk.

(8 July 1960--4,600)S/feb:en:mr