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ARMED FORCES

THE UNITED KINGDOM

Mr. Denis A. Greenhill, C.M.G., O.B.E.

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Reviewed by: Colonel P. B. Klein, USAF

Date: 14 April 1960

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WASHINGTON, D. C.

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9 March 1960

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COLONEL HAWKINS: Gentlemen: Today we continue our study of the individual countries in our course on Contemporary International Politics. We treat with a group of countries ~~of~~ the United Kingdom.

We are very privileged to have a person who has been very active with the British government in making and retaining the position of Great Britain ~~in~~ and the United Kingdom in its place in international politics.

It is a pleasure for me to present to the class the Head of Chancery of Her Majesty's Embassy, Mr. Denis A. Greenhill.

MR. GREENHILL: General Mundy, Gentlemen: I am glad to have had the opportunity of coming and talking to you here in an effort to answer the question which is posed in the curriculum. The curriculum says that this should be a discussion of the basic trends in British domestic and foreign affairs since World War II; an examination of the impact of major domestic issues and of Commonwealth ties on British foreign policy; an assessment of the role played by Great Britain in the achievement of Free World aims in comtemporary international politics.

This is quite a tall order, but I hope that in my talk and in the subsequent questions we can cover most of the ground. I hope you will forgive me if I concentrate more on foreign affairs than on domestic affairs, as foreign affairs are more my business and more, I think, your business.

Let me say that if you want to be powerfully misled about the United Kingdom, you can't do better than stick to what is called the essential reading--Hedley Bull's "Commonwealth," and the article, "Class and Conflict in British Foreign Policy," by the man with the almost unbelievable name, Peregrine Worsthorne.

If I may be allowed to recommend alternative reading, I would like to draw your attention to Drew Middleton's book, published in 1957, called "These Are the British." It is not a non-critical book but it is a book by an experienced and sensible newspaper man, rather than a tortured intellectual.

Well, to get down to business--World War II was, of course, a turning point in British history. It was a shattering blow to the whole system of the country, political, social, and economic. In six short years, we shot away our accumulated wealth, liquidated our very large overseas investments, and imposed an almost intolerable strain on our human and material resources.

All of this was accepted without serious complaint and with a considerable unity of purpose, but a great effort brought a great reaction, and the mood of the country undoubtedly underwent a fundamental change.

What, then, was the frame of mind of the average thinking person when peace at last came? I think it was something like this: The first thing was, there was a general determination that if sacrifices ever had to be repeated at some future date, there would have to be an extremely good

reason. Second, the more egalitarian pattern which the war had forced upon our society was recognized to be a desirable thing and worth retaining. War, with all its rationing and equality of service and so on had been a great leveler, painful in many cases, but generally felt to be a step in the right direction. The third thing was, I think it was felt that the underprivileged should be protected from the poverties and hardships of the prewar period, and a break with the less attractive features of the past was felt to be essential. Lastly, I think that everyone felt that we had paid a heavy price for victory and that this entitled us to a suitable place in world affairs and a substantial say in how the peace was to be run. At the same time, I think it was recognized that things would never be the same again and that Britain's role could never be as dominant as it had been in the past.

These trends have persisted since the war. On the domestic front, the desire for a sharp break with the past led to the election of a socialist government in 1945 and what appeared to be a surprising rejection of Sir Winston Churchill and the wartime leaders. The socialist government effected, or rather confirmed and made permanent, the quiet revolution in English life which the war had set in train. It launched the welfare state, the conception of which it is well to remember was bipartisan, and at first in an atmosphere of some bitterness set a new pattern for English life.

In foreign affairs, we accepted, I think, with comparatively good grace, the adjustments which our new and relatively weaker position forced upon us, a notable example being the settlement with India. We were, I submit,

a little ahead of the international field in identifying the dangers which the Soviet Union and its system presented to the Free World. At the same time we were, of course, greatly handicapped by the continuing economic overstrain which, but for the help from this country, would undoubtedly have been fatal. Nevertheless, I suggest, future historians will point to five British initiatives in the immediately postwar decade which had, and will continue to have, a beneficial effect on the future of the Free World.

The first, to which I have already referred, was the identification of the Communist peril, which was due, as much as anything, to Winston Churchill and to the Fulton speech, and so on. The second was the granting of independence to India and the acceptance of a nation country and a nation republic into what had hitherto been a white commonwealth. I think this was in the eyes of the world the effective end of British colonialism. The third initiative, I think, was the response by Mr. Bevan to General Marshall's Harvard speech, which led to the European Recovery Program and to the Marshall Plan. I think the British response to that and the organization of the Europeans in response to it would not have taken place without our initiative and were of immensely far-reaching consequences. The fourth initiative, in a different field, was the Indo-China settlement after the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu. Looking back on it now, one can recognize that that was an extremely dangerous situation which had developed then, and I think the initiative for the settlement, unsatisfactory as it was in many ways, was our Foreign Secretary's initiative and of great

benefit to the Western World. The last initiative which I'll mention was the formation of the Western European Union, which permitted German rearmament, under controls, within a framework acceptable to her former enemies.

That's a bit of the past. As for the present, the picture has changed. On the domestic front, the economic recovery is virtually complete; full employment is a reality; and the welfare state, with full bipartisan support, is again of concern. Our financial reserves are not as large as they ideally should be, but the outlook is a good deal more stable than it was. I think the last general election in October showed that the average British voter is satisfied with the redistribution of wealth and opportunity which has taken place and that, by and large, he is satisfied with the international position which the country has achieved and the foreign policy which the government is following.

In considering how to explain our current foreign policy to you, I was reminded of a conversation which took place at the end of the 19th century between a foreign visitor to England and Lord Salisbury, who was then Foreign Secretary. The foreign visitor said to Lord Salisbury, "I have talked to you and to other distinguished Englishmen, but I'm damned if I can understand the policy of your government." To which Lord Salisbury replied, "You ought to know that we've not got a policy, but work from hand to mouth."

I suppose that's true to a certain extent, and must be so in any parliamentary

democracy. Long-term planning on the Hitler model or the Russian model is simply not practical politics in a democracy with its inevitable elections. But, how far in fact has any country a freedom of choice in its basic foreign policy? I'm always astonished in reading in the press and in newspaper columns how frequently it is assumed that governments have a wide range of choice in the policies that they adopt. In fact, is it not true that the range of choice open to any government, of whatever party, is always limited, and fairly strictly limited? This limitation is imposed by certain constant, or nearly constant, facts. These facts include the geographical position of the country, its natural resources in human and material terms, the pattern of its trade, and the traditions of its people.

Let us examine some of these facts, as far as the United Kingdom is concerned, and see how they determine its foreign policy. First of all, the United Kingdom is an island, and a very small island. It has few natural resources--"a bit of coal and ourselves," the Prime Minister once said. I suppose, if you were being generous, you could add a certain amount of agriculture and fishing. We live by importing raw materials, processing them, and selling them abroad, and the diversification of both our imports and our exports is extraordinarily wide. We import from almost everywhere and export to every country in the world.

More than half the world's trade is conducted in the English pound sterling. By ingenuity and mercantile skills, and possibly even by brains,

an economy has been built up which is supporting over 50 million people at a standard of living which is second only to this country. These 50 million people are crowded into an area very little larger than the States of Alabama and Louisiana. And these 50 million people are brought up in a tradition of freedom and social justice which may have been equaled but has certainly not been surpassed.

Lastly, by a largely accidental process over the last 200 years, the United Kingdom has built up an extensive empire which has evolved and is now evolving with increasing rapidity into a commonwealth of independent nations.

That is the picture, then—a densely populated island of negligible natural resources, living in freedom at a high standard, by means of worldwide trade, a focus also of an extensive multi-racial group of nations of equal status, namely, the Commonwealth.

Given these facts, what must be the objectives of British foreign policy? First and foremost, peace, with the preservation of our own freedom. No nation in the world has a greater vested interest in maintaining peace than we have. War kills trade, and by trade we live; and war kills freedom, and freedom is the tradition of the country. Our slogan, "Export or Die," is not just a meaningless catch phrase but is in fact the hard truth. True freedom cannot flourish in war conditions. Fredom of movement is at an end, and the needs of national security impose abhorrent restrictions upon every facet of national life.

Peace is for us doubly necessary in the nuclear age. Once upon a time, before the invention of the aircraft, we enjoyed a certain immunity. Sheltering behind a powerful fleet, we could say to anybody, "Come and get us." Spain, France, and Germany were all defeated over the centuries fundamentally because we were an island. But World War II was the last time we enjoyed this immunity. And nowadays the situation is entirely different.

Although we have our own nuclear striking force, we have no protection against nuclear missiles. The crowded United Kingdom is about as good a nuclear target as anyone could wish for. We have heard a lot recently in Washington about the effect of 300 Soviet missiles on the United States. Six, or maybe nine, are good enough for us.

So the first priority must be so to conduct our foreign policy that war does not break out. This does not, I assure you, mean peace at any price. The heart of the country is, I believe, just as sound as it was in 1940, and "Better dead than Red" is still the natural view of the majority of Englishmen. I was asked the other day what evidence I could produce to convince anyone that England was just the same as it used to be, and I was quite at a loss how to do so, until I saw a review in an English sporting magazine of the new paper-back edition of "Lady Chatterley's Lover." This is what the review said:

"This fictional account of the day-to-day life of an English gamekeeper is still of considerable interest to outdoor-minded readers,

"as it contains many passages on pheasant raising, the apprehending of poachers, ways to control vermin, and other duties of the professional gamekeeper. Unfortunately, one is obliged to wade through many pages of extraneous material in order to discover and savor these sidelights on the management of a shooting estate. This book cannot take the place of Miller's 'Practical Gamekeeping.'"

That's the best evidence I can produce. But, joking aside, our situation is such that we can't take many risks. We've got to look at every international situation with the utmost care to insure that, if there is a risk of war, that risk is worth taking. And no British statesman can expect to be able to lead the country into a nuclear or, indeed, any other war unless and until he has satisfied public opinion that there is no honorable alternative.

This, I think, explains why Mr. Macmillan felt it necessary last February to take the initiative when it looked as if Khrushchev was issuing an ultimatum to the Western powers over Berlin. But obviously, we cannot expect to keep the peace on our own; nor indeed can anyone else. The potential peace-breakers are too powerful and too numerous. We share your appreciation of Soviet intentions and your detestation of Communist methods. To meet the threat, the countries of the Free World need allies; they need to band together for mutual defense; to pool their resources; to coordinate their strategies in order to keep the peace.

In the United Kingdom we naturally seek and find our closest allies

in our kith and kin in the Commonwealth, in the United States of America, and in our European neighbors. We are the only country which has simultaneous membership of NATO, SEATO, and CENTO, and these alliances are the keystones of our foreign policy. We attach the utmost importance to the closest links with you, and many of you who have worked in the diplomatic, defense, and intelligence fields know just how close these links are. We like to think that the Anglo-American alliance is not just an alliance dictated by the necessities of the hard world, but is the natural outcome of ideals shared in common.

At the same time it is our policy to draw nearer to Europe. For the first time since the Middle Ages, public opinion in the United Kingdom is ready to regard our country as a part of Europe and to seek a logical closer economic and political association. But, because of our Commonwealth links, we may not be able to go as far as some would wish, but we shall certainly go farther than we are at present.

English opinion in relation to Europe is undergoing a quiet revolution, the significance of which will, I feel, be profound. As I said, until recently the average Englishman drew a sharp distinction between himself and his European neighbors. In the Middle Ages, for example, and even in later times, the English had a sense of oneness with Europe, but in the 18th and 19th centuries England and Europe drew apart and wasted much of their energy in mutual antagonism. For us, the enemy was always on the Continent of Europe--Spain, France, Germany.

But the final catastrophe of World War II has brought a new and more sensible outlook. It brought first realization in Western Continental Europe that some drawing closer together was essential for survival. And the common experience of defeat and occupation produced the idea of the unity of Western Europe, described recently as the one great creative political idea which has emerged since the Second World War.

We in the United Kingdom were slow to appreciate and understand this, preoccupied as we were with our own efforts of postwar recovery. But now, I think for the first time, we appreciate the possibilities, and the Secretary of State was recently able to say in Strasburg, "We regard outselves as a part of Europe for reasons of sentiment, history, and geography."

I don't mean by all this that the United States of Europe, including the United Kingdom, is just around the corner. Indeed it is not. But I do believe that in the next 10 years there will be a political and economic harmonization in Europe, including the United Kingdom. It won't be easy. There are practical difficulties which affect the pockets of all concerned.

All right; the United Kingdom is in favor of alliances. What can it contribute to these alliances? First, the industrial and scientific resources of the country--not inconsiderable by any standard. While I won't claim, Russian style, that we invented everything, I think, if you cast your mind over the major inventions and advances in the defense field over the last 25 years, you must agree that our contribution was not insignificant.

The second contribution that we can make to these alliances is real estate for military bases. The United Kingdom, itself, is an essential base for your own Strategic Air Force, and it is no secret, I think, that amongst the first moves in any retaliatory action against the Soviet Union would be launched from bases in the United Kingdom. There are other installations in the United Kingdom, which I need not specify, which are essential links in the defense chain of North America and the Free World.

In addition to the United Kingdom itself, we can offer a worldwide pattern of bases spanning the greater part of the globe--Gibraltar, Malta, Libya, Cyprus, Aden, East Africa, Persian Gulf, Gann, Singapore, Borneo, and certain Pacific islands. These bases can be of the utmost value in global war, and perhaps of even more value in limited war.

To take one specific example: Any action undertaken by SEATO against a southward thrust by the Chinese Communists would depend heavily on our Singapore base.

The third contribution that we can make to these alliances is our own armed forces. These are undergoing extensive reorganization and modernization in the light of new weapon developments. They consist, first, of a small deterrent force of nuclear-armed V bombers. This, of course, does not compare in size with your own deterrent force but is sufficiently formidable independently to inflict very severe damage on any potential aggressor. Could Russia, for example, leaving the United States unharmed, afford to take action against the United Kingdom in isolation and be considerably

weakened by our retaliation?

The second element is the United Kingom land forces. These are split into a contribution of 55,000 men to NATO, based on the Continent of Europe, in Germany, and a mobile strategic reserve retained in the United Kingdom. Modest forces are also kept overseas in Cyprus, Aden, East Africa, and the Far East, and the bases there are, as far as possible, prestocked to receive elements of the strategic reserve when flown in in times of emergency.

Third there is the Royal Navy, with carriers with nuclear capability, amphibious forces designed for limited-war situations, and a strong anti-submarine force.

And, lastly, we still have the largest merchant marine in the world. Thus, I think we may claim that, in pursuit of our objective of keeping the peace, we are active and powerful contributors to the essential pattern of Free World alliances. But, having prepared outselves by the organization of our own forces and by our participation in a widespread system of alliances, we in the United Kingdom feel it necessary to go one step further than that.

The Soviet Union is not a static society, any more than we are. Soviet society is constantly evolving and there may be, may be, some chance that it is evolving in a direction which may make possible an understanding between East and West. It is because we believe this that we have for some time past favored a Summit meeting, and not just one summit but a

series of summits. This is not from weakness or from lack of determination. It is just a logical and reasonable precaution. The risks of continued East-West tension are so high for us all, and for the United Kingdom in particular, that we do not believe it is sufficient to leave avenues of negotiation unexplored.

If peace with justice is the first objective, that in itself is not enough. We need as our second objective in the United Kingdom favorable trading conditions, access to raw materials on reasonable terms, freedom for our ships to come and go, security for our overseas investments, and access to markets for our manufactured goods. We want to see an overall expansion of world trade. The bigger the cake, the larger, we hope, will be the volume of our share. We want to see the underdeveloped countries more fully developed. Equally, we want to see the advanced countries advance still further, and we, ourselves, are investing annually overseas $1.2 billion to this end. We want to see the purchasing power of, say, the Indian peasant increased just as much as we want to see more money in your pockets, because we believe that amongst the purchases of both the Indian and the American will be the product of our own factories.

But this outlook also means that we must oppose any "ism" which seeks to exclude us, by unreasonable means, from a fair share of available commerce , and any "ism" which seems to exact an unreasonable charge for raw materials essential to our industry, and any "ism" which threatens our ability to move our purchases and our products freely across the sea

and air lanes of the world. I think you can see that these "isms" may range from American protectionism right across the spectrum to Russian communism.

I hope that in that very brief review, which I hope we can expand in the question period, I have shown you that the United Kingdom is not, as is sometimes portrayed, a threadbare, down-at-heel state, deploring its departed glories. I hope you see it as it is, a modern country with a powerful industrial base, ready to accept international obligations in the interests of world peace and ready to contribute, with the special risks that that entails, its considerable resources to the defense of freedom.

COLONEL HAWKINS: Gentlemen, Mr. Greenhill is ready for your questions.

QUESTION: Sir, you spoke of the care and caution which Great Britain was taking in dealing with war situations. I wonder if you would consider the action in the Suez crisis in 1957 as in keeping with that policy of great care and caution.

MR. GREENHILL: No. Don't report that, though. ?

QUESTION: Mr. Greenhill, is there a conflict between your trade arrangements with the Commonwealth nations and your engagement in the Outer Seven? If so, how will this be resolved?

MR. GREENHILL: There is a conflict. I don't think you can sort of point to any sort of short-cut. I think the reconciliation of the Outer Seven and the Six and the Commonwealth will take a long time and will go by

pretty easy stages. We are, I think, in a jam really about how to identify what we don't quite know, where our interest ultimately will lie. There is quite a sort of debate going on as to what is the right thing to do. I think one of the clues, one of the missing pieces, or one of the answers that everyone would like to have, which we would like to have in England, is: What is the Six? How is the Six going to evolve? Is it going to lead to a really unified Six in Europe? Are the political advances going to run parallel with the economic ones? Are we going to get a formidible--and it would be a very formidable--political and economic grouping of the Six in Europe?

Our anxiety, if that happens, if it develops like that, into a really effective economic and political group, acting with a singleness of purpose, is not to be on the outside of that, as you can imagine. On the other hand, it may not develop that way, and we've got to judge whether to sort of go in now or to hold off, which we find very difficult. The Commonwealth interest bulks very much in our minds.

On the other hand, if there is time--it is all developing in the right direction, I think, to this extent—it will work out. The Commonwealth countries, particularly the white Commonwealth countries, like Australia and Canada, are trading more with Europe than they used to, and they are becoming more European than they used to be in content. I may take Australia as an example. Once upon a time emigration to Australia was entirely, virtually entirely, British. Now there is a large German and Dutch element in it. The same goes for Canada. So that I think, if you cast your minds

on decades ahead you can see a pattern that will ultimately work out, where there will be a greater solidarity between the Commonwealth and Europe and there will be a sort of Europeanization of the Commonwealth and, I think, Europeanization of the United Kingdom.

QUESTION: Sir, would you express your views on the British or your views on how to settle this German question?

MR. GREENHILL: I wish I knew. When you say "this German question" do you mean the reunification of Germany?

STUDENT: Yes.

MR. GREENHILL: I think there is no quick answer for that. Only time can do it. It is rather a broad question. I don't think the reunification of Germany will come soon. It can possibly come within the next 10 years, but it is not an immediate thing or the sort of thing that can be settled at the Summit. I think we've just got to play this thing along. I think the Berlin question is an extremely difficult one to get the right answer to, because I think fundamentally we--when I say "we" I mean the West—are in an extrenely weak position over Berlin. I think that most of the cards are in the other people's hands. I think that, if the Russians really felt determined to make trouble, we would find it very difficult to meet it. That's why we think that possibly, if we discuss with the Russians Berlin in context with a lot of other things, we may get an overall bargain which will be acceptable to everybody.

It is certainly a most difficult problem and one in which I would like

to think we had more assets than we do.

QUESTION: Sir, we have heard several speakers recently say that relations between India and England are at an almost all-time high, that it is a matter of good relations. Would you give us your views on that, please, sir?

MR. GREENHILL: I think they are at an all-time high to the extent that I think British trade and investments in India and, I think, even the number of Englishmen in India are higher than they have ever been before. I don't think there is anything sort of surprising about that. The settlement that we made with India after the war was really the only settlement that could possibly have been made. I mean, I don't think we had any choice in the matter. I think, if I may say so, we realized that in good time and made the best of what was an inevitable development. And on the whole our relations with India have been very satisfactory.

We attach tremendous importance to India and to Indian membership in the Commonwealth, and I think we've got a very high opinion of Indian influence amongst the uncommitted nations. I think basically the Indian influence is very much to the good, certainly under the present leadership and under the present threat from China. I think the Indians will increasingly move toward our way of thinking by the menace of China. I think they are very well aware of that and always have been. I remember an Indian saying to me some years ago, "You will have to put up with an awful lot from us during the next few years; but you can take it from me that our heart is in

the right place but we simply have got to get ourselves in a position to be able to resist what most inevitably will be a threat ultimately from China." He said, "You must really put up with us. We shall go through these motions of neutrality and be very awkward from time to time. Our object is really to get our house in order to meet what we know will be an inevitable threat from China."

I think we work pretty well with the Indians, and, certainly, with the present Indian leadership. The great question is: What will happen after Nehru? I think there is a good deal of worry about whether in fact India can keep together as a nation. That is a longer and more difficult question, but I think in certain circumstances you could have India break up.

QUESTION: Sir, in view of what you said about the limitations any nation has on its foreign policy, do you think there is any hope that the Western side, in going to the Summit meeting, can agree on an agenda of the policy line on where they will give and where they will take?

MR. GREENHILL: Whether the West will be able to agree on a position?

STUDENT: Yes.

MR. GREENHILL: It is quite difficult to say. I have been myself concerned about it in the last few weeks. In fact, I think it is one of the most difficult evolutions that our Western countries have got to make, that is, to work as allies and to accept the full consequences of these alliances. The full consequences of these alliances are that you can't have your own

way all the time, in the discussions, for example, that we have had on the positions over disarmament and the positions over Berlin and Germany. You can see each member of the alliance, not unnaturally, trying to get all it wants, and it is a healthier job to get an agreed position in these circumstances. I think one of the most important developments that we can hope for in the West is a genuine acceptance by everybody of the obligations which the alliances put upon them. It is very difficult to get this. Take a country like France, which has an extremely nationalistic frame of mind. A nationalistic frame of mind mixes very ill with membership in an alliance, because, if you are in a nationalistic frame of mind, you don't give way, or you try hard not to give way, on certain points, and you become a very awkward bedfellow in an alliance.

I mean, anybody who has seen the North Atlantic Council working will see this. You see that some people are better allies than others, in that they are prepared, for the sake of the alliance, to make a sacrifice which is at their national expense; but other people are less accustomed to doing that. And it is a frightfully difficult job to get an agreed position. It is a tremendous advantage which the Russians have. You can see that in the last few weeks the whole Russian effort is designed to prevent an allied position being satisfactorily arrived at.

QUESTION: Sir, I believe there is one subject on which our two governments are not exactly in agreement, and that is the question of recognition

of Red China. I have a feeling that there are a lot of people in our country who believe that Britain sort of traded an ideal for economic considerations in this. I am not saying that this is my view, but I would rather believe, for instance, that you are more practical than you are idealistic. I wonder, sir, if you have realized the returns from this step that you anticipated when you took it.

MR. GREENHILL: It is an extremely interesting question. The way it happened is quite an interesting historical point, that is, about the recognition of Red China. There was a tremendous debate in the British government and in the Foreign Office and other government departments, about whether recognition should take place or not. It was largely the personal influence of Mr. Bevan that brought it out. Why he was in favor of it was because it was always one of the tenets of the British Socialist Party that, if people had been more reasonable with the Soviet Union, with the Bolsheviks and the Russians, when they were founded, and if Russia had been recognized, and if people had not sort of ostracized the Russians and kept them at arms length, they would have developed in a more reasonable way. Bevan said, "I am not going to have that accusation leveled against me as far as China is concerned. We are not going to have people turn around and say, 'If you had been agreeable to the Chinese they would have developed in a different way. The fact that you were bloody to them has resulted in their being bloodier.'" His personal influence came down very heavily in favor of recognition for that curious historical reason.

The second thing is, our philosophy about recognition of a country is different from yours. We don't regard recognition as in any way a mark of approval. We don't think recognition is something that you give or withhold according to the merits of the people that you are dealing with. In our view it is a recognition of a fact. I mean, is the government in charge of the country? Is it likely to remain in charge of the country? If it is, then, even though you may dislike its complexion in every shape or form, it is rational to recognize it. It is there and you've got to do business with it. It's like some next-door neighbor who may move in. You may hate his guts, but there he is and you've got to live with it. That's our philosophy about recognition.

On the question of whether it has done us any good, or whether we have got any material benefits out of it, the answer is, I don't think we have. We have been pushed around. The wretched people who live in Peking have a hell of a time, and so on. We get a good deal of indignity. But we are in touch with them, and we are familiar with certain developments that are going on there, and we are on the spot, and we think that there is some virtue in that. To put it another way--what do you get by not recognizing them? China is a sort of favorite hobby of mine. I think China is far more dangerous, ultimately, to us all here than is the Soviet Union. I think non-recognition is inclined to produce the frame of mind where you sweep the thing under the rug. I mean you take the attitude, "Let's pretend it is not there." You get this sort of rejection of the whole

concept that Red China exists. I think you run a tremendous risk of, so to speak, forgetting. Or, to put it another way, you run a tremendous risk of creating a colossal gap between the two countries and colossal ignorance of what is going on in the two countries, which I think is a very dangerous state of affairs.

So I don't think we have lost anything by recognizing China. We have gained contact, and contact is valuable from an intelligence point of view, and it is valuable from the point of a general knowledge of what is going on, and it is a point of contact which might, for example, might develop into something good. The classical example always used is Tito. Once upon a time he was completely in the dog house. It was a dreadful Communist country and they were horrible people and we'd have nothing to do with them. But then, these things change. The fact that we both had representatives in Yugoslavia at the time of Tito's sort of defection was of immense value. I think the thing could possibly happen as far as China is concerned.

As to our motives, you said that the commercial element entered into it. That certainly entered into it, but we have done not much business with them. We may do more. We can't afford, as an exporting country, to ignore a market of what might be 700 million people. There was a lobby at home of British merchants who had long traded in China. Their thesis was that a Chinaman is a Chinaman all the time, and that a Communist Chinaman is just like any other Chinaman. They said, "Everything will be all right after we recognize them. You'll find we will be doing business

with them just as we have always done." But that certainly hasn't happened.

QUESTION: Sir, I wonder if you will discuss the situation down in Kenya, especially with regard to the white settlers there, their position, and their future.

MR. GREENHILL: Yes. It is a matter of considerable concern to us. West Africa, as far as we are concerned, is solved, really, and there is no problem of white settlers, and our relationships with the previous colonial countries are satisfactory. In East Africa, as you said, with the white settlers in Kenya, it's a frightfully difficult problem. This is what the constitutional conference has been about in London recently: We hope to create there a multi-racial state which will inevitably be under African control, but in which the white interests will be recognized and safeguarded, and in which the white people will participate. Whether this is a practical proposition remains to be seen. But we are trying to make it so. If one had had time, and if Kenya was sort of an isolated case, and the whole of Africa was not in ferment, I think it would be possible. But I must confess that I don't, myself, think that the chances of producing a multi-racial state in Kenya are any too good. I don't think they are impossible. I think a lot would depend on the emergence of sufficiently fairminded African leaders. It is very difficult for them to go at a slower pace than the extremists demand. It is a very difficult and a very worrying problem. Our attitude toward it is that we've simply got to make the attempt to produce a multi-racial state with proper protection for the whites. We

are going to make that attempt. It remains to be seen whether it will be successful. It might be and it might not. If it isn't then I think the outlook for the white settlers is extremely bad.

QUESTION: I would like to go back to your subject of the Summit conference, if I may. You stated that one of the objectives of the Summit conference, insofar as the British government is concerned, is that we must talk and we must give and take. Are we going through the same situation, in view of the Communist doctrine that "we will always give a little bit as long as we can take more than we are giving?" Are we going back to another Munich?

MR. GREENHILL: I don't think so. There is fortunately always the example of Munich before the people. I don't know. I don't think we are under any illusions about the risks or the possibilities, and I don't think we shall certainly go into any Munich. I do think that the Soviets are evolving. There is no doubt that they are evolving. Fundamentally now I think they are much less doctrinaire than they were. I think there are far better chances now of compromise than there were with Stalin. I mean, Khrushchev is an opportunist. He is a man of strong emotions. He is not, I think, completely conditioned by Communist theories and what not. He is, I think, much more the sort of man that one can deal with than any other Russian statesman who has yet appeared. He is emotional and he is a politician. I don't put beyond the possibilities equal concessions on both sides. I think we've got to take it slow. I shall be surprised if the first

Summit meeting yields much more than little sort of marginal settlements and an expression of good intentions, and the setting of a tone for following meetings. I mean, he is a realist and not a doctrinaire person, Khrushchev. I think you can do business with a realist where you can't do business with a man who is a complete doctrinaire.

QUESTION: Mr. Greenhill, there are some people who feel that in America's foreign policy there are timid characteristics of not being firm, that we tend to concede, give in, and defer in order not to have people dislike us. In contrast, Britain, in exercising her policy, when it comes the proper time, shows firmness and discipline of a high order. For instance, in Cyprus Sir John Harding took a hard line, and with the Mau Maus in Kenya you did. Should America perhaps be a little more firm in its dealings with our neighbor to the South, who is cavorting at the moment?

MR. GREENHILL: I think we are all in in the next few years for a difficult period, in the United States, and in particular in the United Nations. For example, if you look at all the list of new members coming into the United Nations, you will see a very curious bunch of people, people whose votes we wonder whether we can in any way rely on. I think that, even if what you said was true about the United States being worried about world opinion as exhibited in the United Nations, in the future you will have to worry a good deal less, because I think we are going to get in the years to come in the United Nations governments which will vote

down the United States and the United Kingdom by quite a big margin on things which we feel are absolutely right and proper and just. I think we shall all have to develop sort of international rhinoceros hides as far as that sort of thing is concerned. We'll say, "All right. You voted us down, but we are going on as before."

I'll tell you, for example, the sort of occasion which might happen. For example, I think that, if the United States resumed nuclear tests for entirely good reasons, I should think there would be a tremendous vote in the United Nations against the United States, condemning the United States for the resumption of nuclear tests. Well, I think in that case you would just have to say, "All right, we note what you say, but we consider that our interests and the interests of the Free World entitle us to do as we have done."

I think, as far as the gentleman to the South is concerned, that you might find the same sort of situation arising, in that you would feel compelled to do something in regard to him which would be condemned in the United Nations. But I think you will have to face the facts, and that you will just have to ignore that.

It's quite an interesting situation. It is quite a new situation. I think it is a situation that wants thinking about. It's an entirely new situation. Hitherto the sentiment of the United Nations has been basically in favor of the Free World. It can easily pass to a mixture of neutrality and hostility which would put us both at a considerable disadvantage. I think we shall

have to be strong enough in just doing more.

Does that really answer your question?

STUDENT: It gives me an idea. Thank you, sir.

QUESTION: Returning to your answer about the Inner Six and the Common Market, you indicated that you thought that economic and political development might not go hand in hand. Could you expand on the possibilities of a strong economic growth occurring with essentially political division?

MR. GREENHILL: Well, I'll have to do it without being indiscreet. If you look at the political situation in the Six at the present moment, I think it is a very unnatural situation. You've got the acceptance by Germany of French leadership and French domination. Is that a situation which is going to persist? Can you imagine when certain figures have gone from the scene that that is going to continue? At the moment you've got a sort of, I think, false political harmony there, which might develop in an entirely different way. On the other hand, you are developing very very close economic links between the members of the Six, and that may be sufficient to compel a political development toward unity. As I say, the situation at present is slightly unnatural. Will you have the same French cooperation with the Six if the leadership of it passes to the Germans? That's really what it amounts to. I don't know whether you will. I hope you will, because I think that the development of unity in Europe is an absolutely essential thing. Or should I say, the development of harmony

in Europe is an absolutely essential thing for the survival of the Free World?

Does that answer the question?

STUDENT: Not quite, sir. I find it rather inconceivable that the integration of the economies would not force the politics to stay more or less in harmony. You apparently believe they can diverge.

MR. GREENHILL: Well, I don't think you can answer that sort of definitively, really. I think, if the present sort of political arrangements continue for sufficiently long to permit a tremendous economic integration, then I think you are right. On the other hand I don't think necessarily that the present political arrangements will last as long as that, seeing that they are dependent very largely upon two individuals who are, neither of them, boys, really.

QUESTION: Referring to your comments about the trend toward Europeanization of the white parts of the Commonwealth, such as Australia, I wonder if this trend won't make it more difficult to continue to command the loyalty or the support of the non-white members of the Commonwealth.

MR. GREENHILL: I don't think so. Although we sort of try to avoid saying it publicly, it is so, and we are scrupulously careful in not showing it publicly. The result is a much closer relationship between the white members of the Commonwealth than the Asian ones. The Commonwealth is a practical arrangement. As far as the white elements are concerned, it is practical plus stntimental. As far as the colored people are concerned,

it is practical and useful and they find it of value and we find it of value. I think there is very little sentiment in it. I don't think they will be in any way disturbed by the fact that Australia becomes less essentially British than it has been. I think they will continue to work in the Commonwealth arrangement as long as it suits them.

QUESTION: Sir, would you discuss and possibly compare the racial conflict in the United Kingdom itself, specifically London, and in our own United States?

MR. GREENHILL: Well, I think it is very different. As you know, the racial conflict at home is a postwar development which has arisen from the shortage of labor at home. We've got virtually no sort of able-bodied unemployment to speak of, and we have taken in from the Commonwealth, notably from the West Indies, these West Indian workers. I forget what the total number is, but I think it is six figures. They have tended to concentrate in certain industries and in certain areas, and there have been the usual sort of painful adjustments on the fringes of the sort of black and white areas. But, if I may say so, I don't think the problem is nearly so deep as it is in this country. I may be wrong. The Nottinghill riots, which received such an enormous amount of publicity, were, I hope, a passing phase. Incidentally, I think that, if there were troubles in Kenya, if there were color conflicts in Kenya and that became a sort of red-hot topic, you might see some breakups.

I think you can always work up a color riot with almost any nationality

under the sun. But I think our problem is much more manageable than yours.

QUESTION: Sir, with your stated reliance on foreign trade and our present concern with an imbalance of trade, does there appear to be any opportunity for critical commercial conflict between us?

MR. GREENHILL: Yes, I think there does. An export drive by the United States is obviously going to be in competition with our exports. We hope to meet it in two ways: (a) By remaining competitive and (b) to expand the volume of world trade. I mean, the whole of our economic policy at the moment is directed toward expansion of the volume of trade and the freeing of restrictions and limitations as much as we can. There is bound to be a conflict. I think if you talk to British electrical manufacturers you might find them speaking in rather rougher terms than I am speaking. We've always had competition and we simply have got to live with it. We have no choice. As I say, we would have to meet it, (a) by being competitive and (b) by expanding the volume of trade.

A thing that always gets under our skin, of course--and of course we are not blameless ourselves--is sort of protectionism. Our great fear is that you will try to correct your imbalance of trade by a revival of protectionism rather than by an expansion of your exports. If we had to choose between the two, we would much much rather have the expansion of your exports than we would the putting up of barriers against our goods.

QUESTION: This is a related question. I wonder if you view the Soviet Union's emerging foreign trade as a strong competitor any time in

the near future, and their probably using this as a political weapon and deliberately underselling both you and us.

MR. GREENHILL: Yes, that is true, and I think they have already done so. They are already in competition with us in all sorts of fields, like motor cars, electrical machinery, farm machinery, and stuff like that. But I think you can exaggerate the extent to which they will undersell. I think they will undersell one to get into a market on the sort of old--well, it is not the old Japanese, it's the old anybody's technique--technique. They will accept a loss for a bit in order to get a foot in the door. But if you look at all the Soviet sort of aid projects and things, they are quite hard headed. They are against the free gift and in favor of the loan, and all these loans have to be repaid, and so on. I think they will be in competition with us in a genuine way, increasingly so. I would say that the fear of their using unorthodox methods and things remains, but is probably not as great as you suggest. I don't think they could forever keep up the selling of goods overseas at great losses and what not. I think they would accept the loss here and there for a political advantage but they wouldn't in the long run be able to maintain the sort of entirely false trading position.

COLONEL HAWKINS: Mr. Greenhill, sir, after such a fine, f rank, and open discussion, it is very difficult to portray in words our appreciation, but we certainly do thank you, sir, for being with us today.